ML20212J116

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Responds to NRC Re Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-400/86-87.Corrective Actions:Instrument & Control Technician Counseled Re Procedure Compliance & Attention to Detail
ML20212J116
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/19/1987
From: Watson R
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
References
CON-NRC-526 HO-870340(O), NUDOCS 8701280089
Download: ML20212J116 (3)


Text

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f' CP&L Carolina Power & Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 i JAli 101937 L File Number: SHF/10-13510E Letter Number: HO-870340 (0) NRC-526 Document Control Desk ~

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen

In reference to your letter of December 23, 1986, referring to RII: 50-400/86-87-01, the attached is Carolina Power & Light Company's reply to the violation identified in Enclosure 1.

It is considered that the corrective actions taken/ planned are

satisfactory for resolution of the item.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

s Very truly yours, s l @

R. A.' Watson Vice President

Harris Nuclear Project RAW /slun Attachn.ent cc
Meests. B. C. Buckley (NRC)

C. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)

, Dr. J. Nelson Crace (NRC)

~

8701280089 870119 PDR 0 ADOCK 05000400 PDR _

! g60 f MEM/HO-8703400/ PACE 1/0S1

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Attachment to CP&L Letter of Response to NRC Report RII:

50-400/86-87-01 Reported Violation:

10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, as implemented by the licensee's accepted Quality Assurance (QA) Program (FSAR 17.2.5) requires that maintenance activities on safety-related equipment be conducted in accordance with written procedural requirements. Maintenance testing of the Solid State Protection System logic for the Safety Injection System is performed in accordance with Maintenance Surveillance Test Procedure, MST-I-0320 which requires verification that the "B" Train Safety Injection signals are blocked prior to returning the system to its normal alignment.

Contrary to the above, on November 2, 1986 a maintenance technician while performing MST-I-0320 failed to verify that the "B" Train Safety Injection signals were blocked prior to returning

'the system to its normal alignment. Failure to verify that the "B" Train Safety Injection signals were blocked resulted in an inadvertent initiation of safety injection.

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I).

Denial or Admission and Reason for the Violation:

s s The violation is correct as stated. At 1009 on November 2, 1986, while an Instrumentation and Control technician was troubleshooting a problem on steamline isolation in the "B" Train Solid State Protection System (SSPS), a safety injection actuation signal was initiated. The signal was generated due to personnel error in failing to follow the procedure for SSPS restoration.

This incident happened while the plant was in a pre-fuel load condition.

Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved:

No water was discharged into the reactor vessel due to the Safety Injection signal because the "B" Train Residual Heat Removal Pump and the Safety Injection Pump were under clearance at the time.

The "A" Train components did not start since the inadvertent SI was cnly within the "B" Train SSPS cabinet. The cause of the signal was determined and equipment was restored to the previous configuration.

MEM/H0-8703400/ PACE 2/051

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Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Noncompliance:

To prevent recurrence of this event, the Instrument and Control technician was counseled concerning procedure compliance and attention to detail. Other I&C personnel have been instructed on the importance of and requirement for procedure compliance and attention to detail. In addition, direct communications between the control room and the test personnel will be required for activities which involve the Solid Sta*.e Plant Protection System logic. The communication will requir4 a positive response for procedure steps.

The governing procedure for the conduct of surveillance tests (MMM-007) will be revised to reflect this requirement.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved:

It is projected that procedure MMM-007 will be revised as stated above by January 31, 1987.

s s l

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MEM/HO-8703400/ PACE 3/OSI t