ML20212F107

Amends 207 & 86 to Licenses DPR-66 & NPF-73,respectively, Revising SRs in TSs 4.1.2.3.1,4.1.2.4.1,4.5.2.b & 4.6.2.1.b & Associated Bases

ML20212F107
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	10/28/1997
From:	Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Duquesne Light Co, Ohio Edison Co, Pennsylvania Power Co
Shared Package
ML20212F112	List: ML20212F107 ML20212F115
References
DPR-66-A-207, NPF-73-A-086 NUDOCS 9711040186
Download: ML20212F107 (28)

Text

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t UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4'

- WASHINGTON, D.C. mmi 44.....

DUOVESNE LIGHT COMPANY OHIO EDISON COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY I

DOCKET NO. 50-334 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 207 License No. DPR-66 l.

The Nuclear Regulatory Connission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Duquesne Light Company, et al. (the licensee) dated October 4,1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as a:nended (the Act),

and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, i

the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment'will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and 5

E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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4 9711040186 971028 PDR ADOCK 05000334 P

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Accordingly, the-license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment,

-and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 207, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'[

J T. Sto z, irector PoectDirectoratefA2

'ision of Reacter Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: October 28, 1997

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 207 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66 DOCKET NO. 50-334 Replace the following pages of Appendix A Technical Specifications, with the enclosed pages as indicate.

The revised pages are identified by amendment r, umber and contain verticai lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert XI XI 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-12 3/4 1-12 3/4 5-4 3/4 5-4 3/4 6-11 3/4 6-11 B 1/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-la B 3/4 6-10 B 3/4 6-10 B 3/4 6-11 B 3/4 6-11 B 3/4 6-12

DPR-66 INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY.

B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS.

B 3/4 4-5 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY.

B 3/4 4-11 3/4.4.11 RELIEF VALVES.

B 3/4 4-11 3/4.4.12 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS B 3/4 4-11

't 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 AND 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM B 3/4 5-2 3/4.5.5 SEAL INJECTION FLOW.

B 3/4 5-3 4

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.1.1 Containment Integrity.

B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.1.2 Containment Leakage.

B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.1.3 Containment Air. Locks.

B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.1.4 AND 3/4.6.1.5 Internal Pressure and Air Temperature.

B 3/4 6-9 3/4.6.1.6

-Containment Structural Integrity B 3/4 6-9 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 AND 3/4.6.2.2 Containment Quench and Recirculation Spray Systems.

B 3/4-6-10 3/4.6.2.3 Chemical Addition System B 3/4 6-11 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES B 3/4 6-12 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL.

B 0/4 6-12 s

i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 XI Amendment No.207

DPR-66 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump (l) in the boron injection flow path required by Spctification 3.1.2.1 or low head safety injection pump (with an open reactor coolant system vent of greater than or equa) to 2.07 square inches) shall be OPERABLE and capable of

-being powered from an OPERABLE bus.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

ACTICN:

With none - of the aoove pumps

OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until one charging pump or low head safety injection pump is restored to i

OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 4.5.2.b.1.

l 4.1.2.3.2 When the low head safety injection pump is used in lieu of a charging pump, the low head safety injection pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

Verification of an OPERABLE RWST pursuant to 4.1.2.7, l

a.

b.- - Verification of an OPERABLE low head safety injection pump l

pursuant to Specification 4.5.2.b.2, c.

Verification of an OPERABLE low head safety injection flow l

path from the RWST to tho Reactor Coolant System once per shift, and d.

Verification that the vent is open in accordance with 4.4.9.3.3.

(1) With two charging pumps OPERABLE, follow Specification 3.4.9.3.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 Amendment No. 207

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- 4, DPR-66

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. REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMPS --:OPERATINGI 1

LIMITING CONDITIONL OR OPERATION' F

3.1.2.4-At least-.two charging pumps shall~be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: : MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 N.

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With=only one-charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE _ status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> - or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to. a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 14

- - Ak/k - at 200*F within the next-6 hours; restore at -least two -- charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the _ next 7 - days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

-SURVEILLANCE. REQUIREMENTS 4.~1'.2.4.1 Each charging' pump.

shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to specification 4.5.2.b.1.

4.1.2.4.2.. All - charging pumps, except the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperabie : at-least --. once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> whenever the -temperature of : one or more of the inservice-RCS cold legs > is-s' the ' enable temperature set forth in Specification - 3.4.9.3

by_ verifying.that the-control switches are placed in the PULL-TO-LOCK position and tagged.-

_(1) ' A. maximum of one : centrifugal charging pump shall be OPERABLE l

whenever'the temperature'of one or more of the non-isolated RCS cold legs is 5 the enable temperature set forth in Specifi'ation

'3.4.9.3.

BEAVER VALLEY;-_ UNIT 1 3/4 1-12 Amendment No. 207

a, DPR-66 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYETEMS 4

j SURVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem sh'all'be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that-the following a.

j valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operator control circuits disconnected by removal of the plug in the lock..out circuit from each circuit:

f Valve Nimher Valve Function Valve Position MOV SI 890 A LHSI to hot leg CLOSED j.

MOV SI 890 B LHSI to hot leg CLOSED l

MOV SI 890 C LHSI to cold leg OPEN

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MOV SI 869 A Ch Pap to hot lag CLOSED i

MOV SI 869 B Ch Pap to hot leg CLOSED b.

By verifying, at tha frequency specified in the Inservice j

Testing-Program, the following:

1 1.

The centrifugal charging pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required' developed head as specified in the Inservice 1

l Testing Program and the ECCS Flow Analysis.

l 2.

The low head safety injection pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than-or equal to the required developed head as specified in the Inservice Testing Program and the ECCS Flow Analysis.

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 5-4 Amendment No. 207 i

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DPR-66 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3 / 4 '. 6. 2 DEPRESSURIZiCION AND COOLING SYSTEM 9 CONTAINMENT OUENCH SPRAY SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two separate and independent containment quench spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2,

3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one containment quench spray subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-4.6.2.1 Each containment quench spray subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE; a.

At least once per 31 days by:

1.

Verifying that each-valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position; and 2.

Verifying the temperature of the borated water in the-refueling water storage tank is within the limits of Specification 3.1.2.8.b.3.

b.

By verifying, at the frequency specified in the Inservice Testing Program, that each quench spray pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to.the required developed head as specified in the Inservice Testing Program and the Containment Integrity Safety Analysis.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-11 Amendment No. 207

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-DPR -3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS fECCS)

= BASES 3/4.5.1 ACCUNULATORS The OPERABILITY of each of the RCS accumulators ensures-that a sufficient volume of borated-water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators.

This initial surga of-water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The-limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure-ensure that - the assumptions used - for accumulator injsetion in-the accident analysis are met.

The limit of one hour for operation with ar. inoperable accumulator minimizes the time exposure cf the-plant to a LOCA - event occurring concurrent with fallure of an - additional accumulator _

which -may rssult in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

The RCS ' accumulatorF are isolated when RCS pressure is reduced to 1003 i 100 psig to prevent borated water from being injected into tha

.RCS during normal plant cooldown and depressurization-conditions and also to prevent inadvertent overpressurization of the RCS at reduced RCS temperature.

With the accumulator pressure reduced to less than the reactor vessel low temperature overpressure protection setpoint, the accumulator pressure-cannot challenge the cold overpressure protection system or exceed the 10 CFR-50 Appendix G-limits.

Therefore, the accumulator -discharge isolation valves may _ be opened to perform the accumulator discharge check valve testing specified in the IST program.

13/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 -ECCS-SUBSYSTEMS.

The-OPERABILITY of two separate and _ independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will. be available in the event of LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in-conjunction with the-accumulators is capable of supplying I

sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding _ temperatures f.

- within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from

.the double-ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition,.

each ECCS subrystem provides-'long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery

]

period.

The Surveillance _ Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the accident analyses are met and that subsystem-OPERABILITY is u.aintained.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 207

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-DPR-66:

. EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS-

1 BASES o

3/ 4 '. 5. 2 AMD 3 / 4. 5. 3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

Periodic surveillance testing of ECCS pumps to -detect gross l

degradation caused by impeller structural damage or other hydraulic component _ problems is required by Section XI of the ASME Code.

This typeLof testing may be accomplished by measuring the pump developed head at only - one point on the pump characteristic curve.

This verifies-. both-that the measured performance is within an acceptable tolerance of the original. pump baseline-performance and that. the 1

performance at the test flow is greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the ECCS Flow - Analysis.

The term " required-developed: head"' refers to the pump performance at a given flow point that is assumed in - the ECCS Flow - Analysis.

This is possible since i

the_ analysis assumes the pump delivers.different flows at different times-during accident-mitigation.

These multiple points-are l

-represented by a curve.

The values at various flow points are

' defined by the Minimum Operating Point (MOP) curve in the-Inservice:

b Testing _ (IST) Program.

The "erification that the pump's developed head at the flow test point greater than.or equal to the required developed head is performed bs using the MOP curve.

Surveillance requirements are specified the-IST Program, which encompassesSection XI of the ASME Code.

Section XI of the ASME Code provides the activities.and frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements.

The limitation for a maximum of one charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be! inoperable s the enable temperature set

.forth in Specification 3.4.9.3 provides assurance that -a mass l

= addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a-p single PORV.-

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i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT-1 B 3/4 5-la Amendment No. 207 l

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DER-66:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i

-BASES 3/4.6.2' DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3 '/ 4. 6. 2.1 and-3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT OUENCH AND RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY-of the containne~nt _ spray systems ensures __that containment depressurization and-subsequent return.to subatmospheric

. pressure-will occur in-'the event of a LOCA.'

The pressure reduction and resultant termination of containment. leakage are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The1 recirculation spray system consists of four 50-- percent capacity

-subsystems each composed _of a spray pump, associated heat exchanger and flow-path.

Two of the recirculation spray pumps and motors are located outside containment (RS-P-2A and RS-P-2B) and two pumps and motors - are located inside containment (RS-P_-1A and RS-P-1B). _ The flowf path from each pump is piped ~ to -an -individual 180' recirculation spray: header' inside containment.

Train "A"

electrical power and-river water is _ supplied to the subsystems containing recirculation apray pumps RS-P-1A and RS-P-2A.

Train "B"

electrical power and-river water is_ supplied to the subsystems containing recirculation E

spray-pumps RS-P-1B and RS-P-2B.

Verifying that each quench spray system pump's developed head-at the flow. test - poit.t is greater than or equal to the required developed head --ensures that' quench spray system pump performance has not degraded during the cycle.

The term:" required developed head" refers to - the value. that - is assumed in the-Containment Integrity Safety Analysis for -the quench spray pumpes developed-head - at a specific flow point..

This value, for the required developed head at a flow

point is' defined--as the Minimum Operating Point- (MOP) in the 7_

LInservice.-Testing. (IST) Program.

The verification that the pump's

' developed head at the flow test point is greater _than or equal-to the required developed head is performed by using a MOP curve.

The MOP curve - is - contained in the IST. Program and was developed using the required developed head ' at a specific flow - point as a reference point..

From the - reference point, a wurve was drawn which is a constant percentage-below the current pump performance curve.

Based on_the MOP curve, a verification is performed to -ensure that the-pump's: developed head at the flow test point is greater thax or equal

.to-the f required' developed head.

Flow and differential head are normal E test parameters of centrifugal pump performance required ~ by Section - XI.. of. the ASME Code.

Jince the quench spray system pumps cannot be tested with flow through the spray headers, they are tested on bypass ~ = f 3 ow.

This test confirms one. point on the pump design curve:and is indicative of overall performance.

Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures.by indicating abnormal performance.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-10 Amendment No.207

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- DPR-66 --

l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2.1 and 3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT OUENCH AND RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEMS (Continued) i i

.Ver fy ng that each recirculation spray system-pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed hraad encures that recirculation spray system pump performance has not degraded during the cycle.

The term " required t-developed head" refers to-the value that is assumed in the

- Containment Integrity Safety Analysis for the recirculation - spray pump's developed head at a specific flow point.

This value for the t

required developed head at a flow point is defined as the MOP in the IST-Program.

The verification that the pump's developed head at the-flow test point is greater than or equal to the required-developed head'is performed by using a-MOP. curve.

The MOP curve is contained in the IST Program and was developed - using the required developed head at a specific flow point as a reference point.-

From the reference point, a curve was drawn which is a constant percentage below-the current pump performance curve.

Based on the MOP curve, a-verification is performed to ensure that the pump's developed head at the-flow test point is greater than or equal to the required-developed head.

Flow and differential head are normal test parameters of centrifugal pump performance required by Section XI of the'ASME Code.

Since.the recirculation spray system pumps cannot be

- tested with flow through the spray. headers, they are tested on bypass flow.

This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance.

Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance,-

and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance.

-3/4.6.2.3 CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the chemical addition system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA.

The limits on NaOH minimum volume and concentration, ensure that 1)-

the iodine removal efficiency-of.the spray water is-maintained because of the increase in pH value, and 2) corrosion effects on components within containment are minimized.

These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-11 Amendment No.207

DPR-66 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

-BASES 3/4.6.3-CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment.

Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis for a LOCA.

The opening of-locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations:

(1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL l

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the l

detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions.

Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the -expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions,

2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and 3) corrosion of metals within containment.

These hydrogen control systems are consistent with tr.e recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7,

" Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA."

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-12 Amendment No. 207 l

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,9 UNITED STATES j-j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t

WASHINGTON, D.C. at 44001 "v...../

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY OHIO EDISON COMPANY THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY THE TOLE 00 EDIS0N COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-412 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 86 License No. NPF-73 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Duquesne Light Company, et al. (the licensee) dated October 4,1996, complies with the standards and rege'rements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),

and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of'this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

, 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-73 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 86, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. DLCO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical 3pecifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULA1/t'tY C0WilSSION J r

. Stolz, Directo W ect Directorate DTvision of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications-Date of Issuance: October 28, 1997 s

ATTACRMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 66 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-73 DOCKET NO. 50-412 Replace the following pages of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the enclosed pages as. indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert XI XI 3/4 1-10 3/4 1-10 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 5-4 3/4 5-4 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-5 3/4 6-10 3/4 6-10 3/4 6-11 3/4 6-11 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-la B 3/4 6-10 B 3/4 6-10 B 3/4 6-11 B 3/4 6-11 B 3/4 6-12 1

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o NPF-73 INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.6_

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE.

B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY.

B 3/4 4-5

-3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY.

B 3/4 4-5 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS.

B 3/4-4-6 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY.

B 3/4~4-15 3/4.4.11 REACTOR _ COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES.

B 3/4 4-16 3/4.4.12 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEAD VENTS.

B 3/4 4-16 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) i 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS.

-B_3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 AND 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS '.

B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.4 SEAL INJECTION FLOW.

B 3/4 5-2 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT.

B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS.

B 3/4-6-10 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.

B 3/4 6-12 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL.

D 3/4 6-12 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

-3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE.

B 3/4 7-1 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION B 3/4 7-3 3/4.7.3 PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM.

B 3/4 7-3 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 XI Amendment No. 86 u

NPF-73 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP-SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION W

3.1.2.3 At - least - one - charging pump in the boron injection flow -

= path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 or low head safety - injection pump (with _an open Reactor Coolant. System vent. of greater' than or equal-to 3,14 square inches) shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an' OPERABLE emergency bus, t

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 4, 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With' none of the 'above pumps -OPERABLE, suspend = all operations involving ; CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until one l

_ charging -- pump or low head safety _ injection pump is restored - to OPERABLE status, t

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstr.sted OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 4.5.2.b.1.

l' 4.1.2.3.2 When-the low head safety injection _ pump is used in lieu of _ a charging pump, the low head safety injection pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a, Verification of an OPERABLE - RWST pursuant 1 to - 4.1. 2. 7 and 4.1.2.8, b._

Verification of an OPERABLE low head safety injection pump pursuant to Specification-4.5.2.b.2, Verification of an OPERABLE low head safety injection flow c.

path from the RWST to the Reactor Coolant System once per shift, and d.

Verification that the vent is open in accordance with-4.4.9.3.3.

(1)

With two charging pumps OPERABLE, follow-Specification 3.4.9.3.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 1-10 Amendment No. 86 1

I NPF-73 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i

CHARGING PUMPS-OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR UPERATION l

3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2 and 3 N..

l ACTIOht With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1 percent Ak charging pump /k at 200'F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at least two s to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days,.' be.in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQU%REMENTS 4.1.2.4.1 Each charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to specification 4.5 2.b.1.

(1)

The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into itODE : for the centrifugal charging pump declared inoperable pursuant to Specification 3.4.9.3 provided that the centrifugal charging pump is rastored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs exceeding 3 7 5'F, whichever comes first.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 1-11 Amendment No. 86

a NPF-73

'EMERGEHCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued; Valva Numher Valve Function Valve Positig) a.

2 SIS-MOV 8889 LHSI to hot legs closed b.

2 SIS-MOV 869A HHSI to hot leg Closed c.

2 SIS-MOV 8698 HHSI to hot leg Closed d.

2 SIS-MOV 841 HHSI to cold leg Open e.

2CHS-MOV 8132A HHSI pump disch x-conn open f.

2CHS-MOV 8132B HHSI puap disch x-conn open g.

2CHS-MOV 8133A HHSI purp disch x-conn open h.

2CHS-MOV 8133B HHSI pump disch x-conn open a.2. By verifying that 2CHS*MOV373, HHSI pump minimum flow valve, is open by:

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, verifying flow through the 1.

minimum flow path using control room indication ( ) and that the motor operator is de-energized by the absence of valve position indicator lights.

2.

At least once per 31 days, energizing the line starter and checki~ng valve indicator lights indicate open, then de-onergizing.

b.

By verifying, at the frequency specified in the Inservice Testing Program, the following:

1.

The centrifugal charging pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to ths required developed head as specified in the Inservice Testing _ program and the ECCS Flow Analysis.

2.

The low head safety injection pump's aeveloped head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head as specified in the Inservice Testing program and the ECCS Flow Analysis, c.

At least once per 31 days by:

1.

Verifying that each-valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the-flow path that is not

locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

(3)

If control' room indication is not available, local verification of stem position or flow using tcaporary instruments may be performed.

BEAVER VALLEY

. UNIT 2 3/4 5-4 Amendment No. 86

8 m

NPF-73 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) i 2.

Verifying that each ECCS subsystem is aligned to receive electrical power from separate OPERABLE emergency buses.

d..

By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which. could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions.

This visual inspection shall be performed:

.1.

For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2.

of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

e.

At least once per 18 months by:

1.

A-visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suctiora inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks,

screens, etc.)

show no evidence of

' structural distress or corrosion.

f.-

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1.

Cycling-each power operated (excluding automatic) valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation, through at least one comp 1wie cycle of. full travel.

2.

Verifying that-each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection signal.-

3.

Verifying that the centrifugal charging pump and low head safety injection pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection signal.

f@

g.

The' containment recirculation spray subsystem shall

'co

• [, '

demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable portions of Specification-4.5.2.2.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 Amendment No.86 u

• n d.- c.

NFP-73

.O cGMTAllatE3fT SYSTEMS 4

V 214. sla neseensterntioM Aun MLima system cogTAllDEENT QUEncM RPRAY BYsTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION-4 h

3.6.3.1 Two separate aM -independent containment quench spray subsystems shall-be OPERABLE.

1 APPLIC&BILITY: _ NODES:1, 2, 3, and 4.

MELMS With.one containment quench spray subsystem inoperable, restore the H

. inoperable _ subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at l-

least NOT STANDBY.within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within

the:f011owing-30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1 t

4.6.2.1,'Each

' containment quench spray subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE s

a.

-At;least-once par 31 days by:

1..

Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or

' automatic) in the flow path that is not

locked, sealed, or. otherwise secured in position, is in its Loorrect: position.

g

'J. ~

_ Verifying the temperature _of the borated water in the m

+

refueling water storage tank is within the limits of (Specification 3.1'.2.8.b.3.

,b.-

- By. verifying, = at the frequency _ specified in the Inservice

. Testing Program, that each quench spray pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the n.

_ required developed head' as specified in the Inservice 7

Testing-Program and the Containment Integrity Safety Anelysis.

c;'

At least once per 18 months ~during shutdown, by:

l'. _

' Cycling each power c,perated

valve; in. the. flow path that is(excluding automatic) not testable during

. plant' operation, through at -least one complete cycle

'of full travel.

BEAVER VALLEY ~- UNIT 2 3/4 6-10 Amendment No. 86 q

4 s

NFF-73 CONTAllOtENT SYSTEMS 1

SURVEILLhMCE REQUIRENENTS (Continued) 2.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a test s.ignal.

3.

Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically nn a test signal.

d.

At. _least once per 5 years by. performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each epray nossle is unobstructed.

I.fa v

1

)

BEAVER VALLEY --UNIT 2

' 3/4.6-11 Amendment No. 86

-~

.-.w-.m.~.

y-.w

+-. -.--

,.,.~,,-,.--~~-e w

-ev.,-m-..r

.--r.--

---,--.:--.~.--#-ws-rmwr

s 4.

.NFF 3/4.s numonzucy twee conLYNa sYsTrus faces)

BASEE 3/4.s.1 uctnnnTnna The ' OPERABILITY of each of the RCS accumulators ensures that a-sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure-falls below the pressure of the accumulators.

This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism i

during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The ' limits on _ accumulator. volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the. assumptions used : for accumulator injection in the

-accident analysis are met.

L-The limit of one : hour for operation with an inoperable accumulator minimizas' the time-exposure of the plant to a LoCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result

.in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

The-RCS accumulators are isolated when RCS pressure is reduced to 1000 1 100 psig to prevent borated water from being injected into the RCS--during normal plant-cooldown and depressurization conditions and also to prevent inadvertent overpressurtsation of the RCS at reduced RCS temperature.- With the accumulator pressure reduced to less than the reactor vessel low temperature overpressure protection setpoint, the accumulator pressure cannot challenge the cold overpressure protection system-or exceed the 10- CFR 50 Appendix G limits.

Therefore, the ' accumulator discharge isolation valves may be opened to perform the accunulator discharge check valve-testing-specified in the IST program.

3/4.s.2 and 3/4.s.3 recs sunsysTrus

, The - OPERABILITY of two sopr. rate and independent ECC.3 subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a IOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Pdther subsystem operating in conjunction

. ith the accumulators is capable of supplying w

suffic^ent core cooling to limit-the peak. cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the~largost RCS cold leg pipe. downward.

In o

addition,, each ECCS. subsystem provides long term core cooling

capability --in ' the. recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.1 The' surveillance requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a-minimum, the assumptions used in the accfdont analyses -are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.-

LBEAVER VALLEY'

-UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 86

..---z..

s ^0 NPF-73 quEmaEucY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ansrs 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBBYSTEMS (Continued)

Periodic surveillance testing of ECCS pumps to detect gross

- degradation caused by impeller -structural damage or other hydraulic component problems is required by Section.XI of the ASME Code.

This

-type of testing may be accomplished by measuring the pump developed head at only one point on the pump _ characteristic curve.

This verifies both that the measured performance is within an acceptable

-tolerance of the original-pump baseline performance and that the perJormance at - the test-flow is greater then or equal to the performance assumed in the ECCS. Flow Analysis.

The term " required developed-head" refers to the pump-performance at a given flow point that is assumed in the ECCS Flow Analysis. _ This is possible since the analysis assumes-the pump _ delivers different flows at different times during-accident. mitigation..

These multiple points are l represented by a curve.

The-values at various flow points are detined-by the Minimum operating'-Point (MOP) curve in the Inservice Testing (IST) - Program..

The verification that the pump's developed head at the flow' test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ~is performed by using the MOP curve.

Surveillance requirements are specified - in the IST Program, which encompasses section XI of tho' ASME = Coden Section XI of the ASME Code provides the activities and-frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements.

The limitation for aLaaximum;of one charging pump to be OPERABLE and the surveillance requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required-OPERABLE pump to be inoperable-below 3 50'F provides

assurance that a mass addition pressure-transient'can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

k 1

BEAVER'V % LEY UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-la Amendment No.86 l

1

[...

g

_0 %

-MyP-73 cQMTunnmMT sYSTEh5 y,

e mAsPs 3/4 a.2 DEDamnatraTEAT10N AND" COOLING BYSTEMB 3/4.a.2.1 and 3/4.6.2.2-CONTAINMENT OUENCH AND RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEMS m

The OPERABILITYc of the: containment spray systems ensures that containment depressurization and subsequent return to subatmospheric pressure will occur in the event of a LOCA.

The pressure reduction and resultant termination of containment leakage are consistent with

.the assumptions used in the' accident analyses.

1 n

The ' recirculation spray system = consists of four 50 percent capacity l

l subsystems each composed of a : spray pump, associated heat _ exchanger and flow path.

All recirculation spray pumps-and motors are located outside-containment and supply flow: to two 360'- recirculation spray y

P ringEheaders ' located in contannment.

Ome spray ring is supplied by the "A" train subsystem containing recirculatio.n spray pump 2RSS-P21A

and the = "B"-

train subsystem.-containing recirculation spray pump 2RSS-P21D_.with-the.other spray ring being supplied by the "A" train

subsystem containing-recirculation spray pump. 2RSS-P21C and the "B" train 1 subsystem containing recirculation spray pump 2RSS-P21B.

When p

the _. water in-the refueling water storage tank has. reached a

predetermined extreme low

level, the C -and D

subsystema are

automatically switched to' the cold leg recirculation mode of

-emergency core cooling system operatitsn.

. Verifying'that'each quench spray system pump's developed head at the flowf test point is greater. than or-equal ~ to the _ required developed

' head-ensures-that ' quench spray system pump -performance has not

-degraded during tho' cycle.- The term " required developed head" refers Lto. the value that is:: assumed -in the containment Integrity safety

Analysis for the ; quench spray pump's. developed head at a specific flow: point.

This :value for the required developed head at a flow

point-ist. defined; as.the Minimum Operating Point (MOP) in the

' Inservice Testing ' (IST) Program.

-The verification that the pump's developed; head at the: flow test point is greater than or equal to the required: developed-headLis performed by using a MOP curve.

The MOP

'm

' curve 'is contained inithe;IST= Program and-was developed using the required ' developed - head.at a specific flow point as a reference

pohnt; From the o reference point, a curyw was drawn which is a constant. percentage below'thezcurrent pump performance curve.

Based s

on 1 he t MOP c curve, a _ verification is performed to ensure that the t

(pu:ap's; developed head' at the flow test' point is greater than or equal sto +the ' required L ; developed head.

Flow and diffarential head are

. normal test parameters ;of ; centrifugal pump. performance required by

'Section XI "of the ASME - Code.

Since the' quench spray system pumps icannot be, tested with flow through the spray headers, they are tested BEAVER VALLEY

. UNIT 2 B'3/4 6-10 Amendment No.86

( #

NPF-73 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2.1 and 3/4 6.2.2 CONTAINMENT OUENCH AND RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEMS fContinued) on bypaws flow.

This test confirms - one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance.

Such inservice tests confirm component, OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance.

Verifying that each recirculation spray system pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that

-recirculation spray system purp performance has not degraded during the cycle.

The term " required developed head" refers to the value that is assumed in the

Containment Integrity Safety Analysis for the recirculation spray pump's' developed head at a specific flow point.

This value for the required developed head at a flow point is defined as the MOP in the IST Program.

The verification that the pump's developed head at the

[

flow' test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head is performed by using a-MOP curve.

The MOP curve is contained in the IST Program and was developed using the required developed head at a specific flow point as a reference point.

From the reference point, a curve was drawn which is a constant percentage l

below the current pump performance curve.

Based on the MOP curve, a verification is performed to ensure that the pump's developed head at t

f the flow test ' point is greater than or equal to the required developed head.

Flou and differential head are normal test paramaters of centrifugal pump performance required by Section XI of the-ASME Code.

Since the recirculation spray system pumps cannot be tested with flow through the spray headers, they are tested on bypass flow.

This test' confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance.

Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by. indicating abnormal performance.

3/4.6.2.3 CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the c.1emical addition system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a

-LOCA.

The limits on NaOH minimum volume and concentration, ensure that-1) the iodine removal' efficiency of the spray water is maintained because of the increase in pH value, and 2) corrosion effects on components within containment are minimized.

These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in'the accident analyses.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-11 Amendment No.86 C

( #

o NPF-73 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment

= atmosphere or pressurization of the containment.

Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in tha analyses for both a LOCA and major secondary system breaks.

The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations:

(1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls,

,(2) instructing this op7rator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent t

the release of radioactivity outside the containmetat.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions.

Either. recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions,

2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and 3) corrosion of metals within containment.

These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7,

" Control of

-Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA."

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-12 Amendment No.86 l

U

.