ML20212E945
| ML20212E945 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/23/1999 |
| From: | Burrows F NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Travers W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212E942 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9909270198 | |
| Download: ML20212E945 (2) | |
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- y f " * % ,t UNITED STATES
. Q.Iv g n 8 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
%./j E WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 0001 f}
T&: Qpoepria g g g :t March 23, 1999
. DEDE DEDR MEMORANDUM TO: William D. Travers DEDM Executive Director for Operations ,
A0 GrR980 @
FROM: Frederick H. Burrows, Electrical Enginee Electrical Engineering Branch
, , , p Division of Engineenng Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
CLOSURE OF DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION (DPO) ON SETPOINTS AND ALLOWABLE VALUES in your February 16,1999, memorandum you provided the final NRC decision on the subject DPO. With this memo I now provide you with my final thoughts as an NRC employee (I may file a petition for rulemaking as a private citizen) pertaining to that DPO.
A DPO (or Differing Professional View (DPV)) is, by nature, a criticism Cmed at the staff.
Those who have submitted a DPV/DPO know that the staff reaction will be to " circle the wagons" and defend the staff position no matter what. My conclusions pertaining to tha staff's actions associated with the setpoint/ allowable value DPO are no different.
Over the years I have worked at NRC, I have been requested to review and comment on technical specifications, a regulatory guide, and an industry standard involving setpoints and allowablo values. Even though on most occasions my comments have been signed by my branch chief / division director, there has never been any formal / informal adjudication.
My official comments have been mostly ignored.
Starting with a March 6,1996, memo and ending with my DPO on August 5,1998, I provided my personal views pertaining to setpoints and allowable values. My written views were detailed and were by-in-large supported by quotes from NRC/AEC documents and regulations. The staff's responses (except for the DPV Panel Report) were generally not detailed and did not focus on the specific words in the regulations. As an example, in my DPO ! stated that I would focus on the pertinent AEC references and that the judgement on the DPO issues should be based on an understanding of those references and the figure I included. Although those AEC references led to the development and inclusion of limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in 10 CFR 50.36, the DPO panel did not discuss those references with me and did not refer to them in their report.
CONTACT: Frederick Burrows, EELB/DE 415-2901 99092701909yOg oao s roR eon
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. Willi m D. Tr:v:rs 2-in the July 24,1998, DPV disposition memo, Samuel J. Collins concluded that the regulations are not clear in this area and that OGC had advised that it may be possible to justify the use of other values such as the allowable value to satisfy the definition of an LSSS. OGC qain reiterated this advise to the DPO pLnelin a December 17,1998, memo. Although the DPO panel stated the they believe the staff's use of the allowable value to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36 is technically adequate, they i recommended that the staff more clearly document its basis for the current approach, 1
in your February 16,1999, DPO final decision memo, you state that an open and (
thorough debatts on how we perform our regulatory programs is essential to keeping these !
programs effective and efficient. There has never been an open and thorough debate on setpoint verses allowable value as an LSSS. How could the staff participate in an open, thorough debate when they believe the pertinent regulations are unclear and the basis for their previous action has never been clearly documented or justified.
Section 182(a) of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1952 requires technical specifications which the Commission deems necessary to enable it to find that... adequate protection will f
be provided to the health and safety of the public.10 CFR 50.36 specifies what items )
are to be included in technical specifications. Specifically,10 CFR 50.36 requires LSSS's that are settings chosen such that automatic protective action will correct the abnormal situation before a safety limit is exceeded be included in technical specifications. Trip j setpoints satisfy this because they are chosen to account for all known instrumentation "
errors. Further the Bases of all the latest Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS) state that trip setpoints provide adequate protection (although somewhat
- i unclearly). The allowable value is not a setting and does not account for all known instrument errors and it can never become the LSSS 'and provide adequate protection unless the staff redefines the requirements.
Per the staff, plants are safe because licensees have procedures in lieu of technical l specifications for control of trip setpoints. In other words, adequate protection is provided !
by the plant-specific procedures and not the technical specifications as required by Section 182 of the AEA. It is therefore my opinion that the staff is currently not complying with nor implementing the requirements of Section 182(a) of the AEA and 10 CFR 50.36 because trip setpoints have not been included in the ISTS and plant-specific technical specifications based upon the ISTS.
Personally, I am embarrassed to be associated with NRC. All during the DPO panel meetings, a panel member said that it would be pristine if things were done my way but licensees can not afford that. Repeatedly I have said that the staff's use of the allowable value to satisfy 10 CFR 50.36 is neither technically concise nor technically correct. It appears that the staff does not care if their products are technically in error. There appears to be no middle ground; we can't afford perfection so we will settle for lack of conciseness. Congress is right; we might as well be downsized if we add no value to the process.
cc: Samuel Collins David Woodend Lawrence Chandler