ML20212E754
| ML20212E754 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1986 |
| From: | Ellis J Citizens Association for Sound Energy |
| To: | Bloch P, Jordan W, Mccollom K Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#187-2086 OL, NUDOCS 8701050440 | |
| Download: ML20212E754 (43) | |
Text
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214/946-9446 accxttcr (CITIZENS ASSN. FOR SOUND ENERGY)
&c December 30, 1986 Administrative Judge Peter B. Bloch Dr.KennethA.]hStreet c'Collom Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 1107 West Knap U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Stillwater, Oklahoma 74075 Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr. Walter H. Jordan Carib Terrace 3
552 North Ocean Boulevard
(
Pompano Beach, Florida 33062 l
Subject:
In the Matter of Texas Utilities Electric Company, et al.
Application for an Operating License Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, s
(
Units I and 2 Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 - d Potentially Significant Items In accordance with the Board's desire to be kept informed of potentially significant matters which may affect these proceedings, CASE wishes to advise the Board of the following items which we consider to be in that category:
1.
As indicated in Mr. Doyle's affidavit attached to CASE's 12/30/86 Partial Response to Applicants' 12/1/86 Response to Board Concerns (being sent at the same time as this mailing), Mr. Doyle and CASE believe it is important that the Board get copies for its review of the following documents:
" Piping and Pipe Support Requalification Program, Unit 1 Large Bore Piping Final Report," by Stone & Webster, referenced in covenletter of 11/17/86 to Board from Applicants' counsel Mr. Wooldridge.
"Small Bore Piping and Pipe Supports Generic Issues Report,"
by Stone & Webster, referenced in cover letter of 12/19/86 to Board from Applicants' counsel Mr. Wooldridge.
2.
We wish to advise the Board of what CASE considers to be a very significant change to Applicants' FSAR. This change is contained in Amendment 60, November 3, 1986, page 1.4-3, and removes responsibility and control of design and engineering from Gibbs &
Hill (the architect-engineer throughout the life of the plant until now).
1 8701050440 861230 PDR ADOCK 05000445 O
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6 For the Board's convenience, we are attaching hereto a copy of this single page, along with a copy of FSAR page 1.4-3 which has been in effect throughout these proceedings until now.
3.
Mr. Doyle and CASE believe it is important that the Board get copies for its review of the following documents:
"CPSES Design Basis Consolidation Program Plan," December 19, 1986, by Stone & Webster, referenced in cover letter of 12/22/86 to Board from Applicants' counsel Mr. Wooldridge.
" Civil / Structural Generic Issues Report," Revision 0, 11/20/86, by Stone & Webster, referenced in cover letter of 12/22/86 to Board from Applicants' counsel Mr. Wooldridge.
For the Board's convenience, we are attaching some selected pages from this Report.
We are continuing to review the numerous documents we have received recently and will attempt to keep the Board advised of potentially significant items.
Respectfully submitted, CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy) w.W.
rs.) Juanita Ellis President cc: Service List l
l 2
i
i CPSES/FSAR agreement to coordinate the design, quality assurance, and construction supervision of the TUC0 system's nuclear generating units was made between Dwners and TUGC0/TUSI.
Key personnel for staffing of tne TUGC0/TUSI Nuclear Division have been selected primarily from the 46 operating companies of TUEC.
The TUGC0 Nuclear Division has over 200 man years of experience in the design, construction and generation of electric generating stations.
TUGC0/TUSI's involvement in nuclear power began in mid 1971 with the origination of the Nuclear Power Plants Division - Design and Construction Department.
In 1975, the division was renamed the Nuclear Division - Engineering and Construction Department.
1.4.4 ARCHITECT-ENGINEER -
GIBBS & HILL, INC.
Gibbs & Hill, Inc. has been designated as the architect-engineer responsible for the design and engineering of CPSES.
Founded in 1911 and with home offices in New York City, Gibbs & Hill, Inc. is a New Jersey Corporation furnishing engineering and construction services to domestic and overseas clients in the fields of electric power generation, power transmission, canmunications, urban development, transportation, environmental services, and industrial and railroad engineering.
Since 1965 Gibbs & Hill, Inc. has operated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dravo Corporation, a major U. S. constructor of large scale industrial, utility and municipal projects.
Architect-engineering services rendered by Gibbs & Hill, Inc. in the field of thermal-electric power generation include projects having a total aggregate capacity of 35,197 MW, of which 11,684 MWe represent nuclear projects, other than CPSES.
i AMENDMENT 46 1.4-3 FEBRUARY 10, 1984
s CPSES/FSAR agreement to coordinate the design, quality assurance, and construction supervision of the TUC0 system's nuclear generating units was nade between Owners and TUGC0/TUSI.
60 TUGC0/TUSI's involvement in nuclear power began in mid 1971 with the origination of the Nuclear Power Plants Division - Design and 46 Construction Department.
In 1986, the division was renamed Nuclear 60 Engineering and Operations.
1.4.4 ARCHITECT-ENGINEER -
Gibbs & Hill, Inc. was the original as the architect-engineer responsible for the design and engineering of CPSES.
TUGC0 gradually assumed more responsibility for the design and 60 engineering of CPSES. This transition took place over several years and in an orderly and controlled manner. At the present time, TUGC0 is the engineering organization ultimately responsible for the design and engineering of CPSES.
Portions of this design and engineering may be contracted to engineering services contractors working under a TUGC0 approved Quality Assurance program.
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l.4 3 AMENDMENT 60 NOVEMBER 3, 1986
'i TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING CO.
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i CIVIL / STRUCTURAL GENERIC ISSUES REPORT i
STONE & WEBSTER
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11/20/86 TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY (TUGCOf COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION I
UNITS 1 AND 2 STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION'S CIVIL / STRUCTURAL GENERIC ISSUES REPORT
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.li CIVIL / STRUCTURAL l
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GENERIC ISSUES REPORT 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) has been retained by Texas Utilities Generating Company (TUGCO) to develop and implement a Corrective 1
Action Program for the Civil / Structural Generic Issues identified for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) Seismic Category I structures in response to the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) findings and other identified findings and problem areas. The CPRT program is comprised of two separate subprograms, one deals with quality of construction issues and the other with design adequacy issues.
The Quality of Construction Program review has been performed by Evaluation Research Corporation (ERC).
The Design Adequacy Program review has been performed by TERA Corporation 4
j '
TERA findings were documented via Discrepancy Issue Reports (DIRs).
Discrepancy Issue Reports (DIRs), have been identified by TERA Corporation, the third party reviewer and by external sources.
This corrective action plan defines the methodology and procedures for responding to any design 4
issue related to the CPRT program with the objective of demonstrating structural adequacy in accordance with the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and other licensing commitments.
Both technical and programmatic requirements are addressed by the plan.
In forma!ating this plan, SWEC has reviewed the TERA (1; and external source (E) DIRs pertinent to structural design, TRT issues, and issues effecting design raised by the ERC review.
In conducting this review of l'
issues, SWEC -assumed that each issue as written was factual, complete and correct.
No effort was made to ascertain the accuracy of each issue in order to quickly envelope the magnitude of probable corrective action requirements.
Subsequent reviews may determine that the number of issues enveloped may be reduced or increased.
This review of issues has provided an indication of the types of structural design problems which the Civil / Structural Corrective Action Plans (C/S CAPS) must address.
l 2.0 SCOPE l
The corrective action to be implemented by SWEC consists of fif teen indi-vidual corrective action plans for Civil / Structural generic issues identified in Table 1.
These fif teen generic issues address all DIRs (both l
D and E type) reviewed to date.
The review covered D-DIRs D-0001 through l
D-2202 and E-DIRs E-0001 through E-1271. TERA D-DIRs and E-DIRs, TRT Issue i
Specific Action Plans (ISAPs), and ERC concerns will be incorporated into the individual plans where applicable.
f The SWEC corrective action scope includes development of design criteria i
incorporated in the design basis documents (DBDs), review of calculations,
! t upgrading of calculations to licensing basis standards where required, incorporation of ERC issues, providing the necessary information for r
upgrading of drawings and specifications if required, and providing resolution to all DIRs.
SWEC's scope of work will encompass safety related civil / structural design.
6753-1634503-B2 4
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TABLE 1
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APPENDIX GENERIC ISSUES 1
j A.
Reactor Containment Concrete Design (Mat, Shell, Dome, Discontinuities, and Penetrations)
B.
Reactor Containment Concrete Internals C.
Other Seismic Category I Concrete Structures l'
D.
Seismic Category I Structural Steel E.
Pipe Whip Restraints and Jet Impingement Shields F.
Reactor Containment Liner l
G.
Fuel Transfer Tube Support and Other Liners s
H.
Miscellaneous Supports (Equipment)
I
}
I.
Penetration Sleeves and Anchorage J.
Concrete Anchors K.
Computer Code Benchmarking L.'
Testing Programs M.
Heavy Load Drops a
N.
. Generic Technical Concerns O.
Seismic Analysis g
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l 6753-1634503-B2 7
R2vicien: 0 Data: 11/20/86
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APPENDIX A - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN -
REACTOR CONTAINMENT CONCRETE DESIGN
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for the Reactor Containment Concrete Design with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies.
The calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs}
issued by TERA.
SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Reactor Containment Concrete Design generic issue and has formed the corrective
)
action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized j
below.
Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in paren-theses (
).
(A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations Piping reactions not considered in design (SRB-112C)
/
Concrete design not in compliance with code and licensing comunitments (SRB-112C)
Most critical section not considered for determination of required reinforcement (SRB-112C)
Poor or nonexisting documentation; governing load cases not addressed (SRB-112C)
In design of the equipment hatch the dome thickness
{2 ft-6 in. } was used to calculate transverse shear rigidi-ties, the cylinder wall thickness should have been used (4 ft-6 in.} (SRB-112C)
' Critical load case was not addressed (SRB-3C1)
Computer output used for design is unconservative (SRB-3C1)
Computer analysis missing; independent review indicates an error existed in the analysis (SRB-3C1)(SRB-92P thru 103P)
(SRB-3C2)(SRB-87P)(SRB-112C)
Polar crane loads applied at wrong locations (SRB-3C2)
Seismic loads inc~orrectly calculated (SRB-3C1)
Jet loads incorrectly applied (SRB-3C1)
Apparent error in calculating area of reinforcement (SRB-112C) j Incorrect stress allowable used and combined load effects not considered (SRB-IC2) 1 6753A-1634503-B2 A-1
R;visitn: 0 D:te: 11/20/86
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Voided seismic data used as design basis (SRB-1C1)
Inconsistencies in " Quake" seismic analysis program output Combination of three directional seismic effect not consis-tent with licensing commitment, plus not all rcquired combi-nations evaluated correctly (SRB-IC1)
Envelope seismic values are less than individual component j
(SRB-1C2)
Design did not consider governing load equations due to erroneous conclusions (SRB-1C2)
Calculation / computer analysis missing (SRB-1C2) 1 Incorrect design pressure used in calculation (SRB-IC2)
)
Inadequate justification of method used to evaluate thermal loadings (SRB-1C2)
J Discrepancy between review calculation and calculation of record (SRB-3CI)
(B) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings Calculation requires more reinforcement than shown on draw-5 ings (SRB-112C)(SRB-104C)(SRB-122C)(SRB-3Cl) 9 Dimensions in calculation for sleeve anchorage different than that shown on drawing (SRB-108C)
Drawing calls for reinforcement but no calculation exists to support this (SRB-112C)
DCA referenced to revise drawing does not exist in log (SRB-122C)
(C) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / output Apparent lack of documentation (sources of inputs, criteria,
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applicable design codes, assumptions and computer runs are missing plus calculations are not organized)
(SRB-112C)
(SRB-1C1)(SRB-IC2) (SRB-104C)(SRB-3C2)
Reinforcing overstress accepted without adequate justifica-tion (SRB-112C)
Design of reinforcing incomplete (SRB-112C)
Computer analysis not available Original calculation in error but never voided (SRB-112C)
(SRB-160C)
I 6753A-1634503-B2 A-2
R;visica: 0 Date: 11/20/86 Tornado loads were not addressed (SRB-3C1)(SRB-3C2)
Items on structural checklist shown to be complete but are l
not (SRB-3C1)(SRB-3C2)
Basis for reinforcing not justified (SRB-160C) 4 (D) Calculations Not Consistent With Licensing Commitments I
Nethodology used for analysis and design not consistent with licensing commitment (SRB-109C)(SRB-3C1)
Comparison of rock bearing stress given in FSAR not calculat-l ed correctly (SRB-1C1)
Tangential shear stress not addressed as committed to in FSAR
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(SRB-112C)
Design temperature used in calculations not consistent with SER i
Design of tangential shear reinforcement not consistent with licensing commitments (SRB-112C)
Containment liner used as strength element which violates licensing commitments e
Not all load cases in the licensing commitments were ad-dressed (SRB-1C2) i (E) Structural Items Lacking Backup Calculations Radial bars at main steam and feedwater penetrations
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(SRS-112C)
Replacement rebar at penetrations (SRB-112C)- -
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6 Punching shear adequacy at penetrations (SRB-112C) l Sole plate bolts of polar crane (SRB-109)
Transverse shear reinforcing at equipment hatch (SRB-112C) 1.2 There are no E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of the Reactor Containment Concrete Design.
i 2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for the Reactor Containment's Concrete Design contain technical errors and inconsistencies when compared to the drawings and do not consistently meet licensing commitments. Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.
6753A-1634503-B2 A-3
Ravinica: 0 Date: 11/20/86 1l APPENDIX B - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN -
REACTOR CONTAINMENT CONCRETE INTERNALS 1
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for the Reactor Containment Concrete Internals with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies.
The calculational deficiencies identified
- 1 have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports (D-DIRs}
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issued by TERA.
SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Reactor Containment Concrete Internals generic issue and has formed the g
corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as
.)
summerized below.
Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in parentheses (
).
1 (A) Technical Errors in Calculations i
Design of concrete wall did not consider end moments from Steam Generator Restraint Beam Finite Element modeling of mat did not consider a long continuous dropped haunch (SRB-1C1)
The design of the Reactor Vessel Thermal Restraints violates certain AISC and ACI requirements (SRB-115C)
(B) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings Design calculation for sizing reinforcement and design live loads do not agree with drawing (SRB-115C)
(SRB-112C)
(SRB-101C)
(C) Calculations Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments All FSAR load combinations not considered y
Calculation of thermal gradient used in concrete design does not meet FSAR commitment (SRB-1C2)
(D) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output Apparent lack of documentation and traceability of "STARDYNE"
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analysis for basis load cases (SRB-4C2)
Input source for pressure load for wall design missing (SRB-116C) i Apparent lack of references and clarity for design input and assumptions (SRB-115C) 1.2 There are several E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of the Reactor Containment Concrete Internals.
These E-DIRs can be categorized as follows:
i i
6753B-1634503-B2 B-1
RIvision: 0 Date: 11/20/86
)
1 (A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations General concern on lack of accident temperature design for structural members Thermal design of concrete wall in vicinity of upper and
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3ower lateral restraint for concurrent maximum change in temperature would exceed concrete allowable stress limits Material substitutions were made for the upper lateral restraint which were not addressed in the modeling of its interface with the supporting shield wall
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Shield wall needs to be evaluated for lateral movement of restraint beam during LOCA Upper and Lower Lateral Restraint Beans inadequately designed
~.
The use of 450 psi for the tensile strength of concrete may not be conservative (B) Discrepancies'Between Calculations and Drawings Reinforcement required by design may not have been installe/
in the Reactor Cavity Wall up to elevations 812 ft-0 in and 819 ft-0 in.
4 (C) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output No procedure to transmit as-built loads for inclusion into design record calculation Changes to nonsafety related designs might have an impact on safety designs (D) Calculation Not Consistent with Licensing Consitments LOCA should be considered with OBE l
(E) Structural Items Lacking Backup Calculations Bolts anchoring the upper lateral restraint to the shield I
wall were shortened without technical justification (F) Construction Problems Construction debris between Reactor Insulation and Shield Wall
[
Concern regarding hollow places existed in the concrete behind steel liner of Unit 2 Reactor Cavity.
1.3 Issue Specific Action Plans:
(Refer to Appendix N " Generic Technical l
Concerns" for more details) 6753B-1634503-B2 B-2
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1.3.1 ISAP II.a - Reinforcing Steel in the Reactor Cavity A revised drawing, which added rebar to the Reactor Cavity between I
elevation 812 ft and 819 ft, was issued subsequent to the concrete pour for the affected area; hence, the added rebar required by this revised drawing was never installed.
The NRC TRT investigation revealed that there was no documentation which showed an engineering justification for. omitting the additional rebar.
1.3.2 ISAP II.b - Concrete Compressive Strength This ISAP will be addressed in Appendix C (Other Seismic Category I Concrete Structures).
1.3.3 ISAP V.b - Improper Shortening of Anchor Bolts in Steam Generator Upper 1.ateral (SGUL) Supports An investigation of the shortened anchor bolts involved a review of I
calculations to determine bolt forces.
This review resulted in a
~
detailed reanalysis using a finite element model which included both i
upper and lower lateral supports and a large portion of the concrete internal structure.
Thermal / fluid analyses were performed to develop compartment pressurization loads and steam generator loads while the j
structural analyses were performed to evaluate the baseplates and bolts connecting the SGUL beam to the concrete walls, the embedment and the beam itself.
2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for the Reactor Containment Concrete Internals contain technical errc,rs and inconsistencies when com-s pared to the drawings, and do not consistently meet licensing commitment.s.
Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable, n
3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES 3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) develop design basis documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly identified and implemented.
P 3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifi-cations pertaining to the Reactor Containment's Concrete Internals for O
consistency with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated project change documents, i.e.,
Design Change Authori-1 zations, DCAs, and Component Modification Cards, CMCs).
This review j
shall be documented using the following steps:
I 3.2.1 A review procedure will be developed and used to document and l
ensure uniform and complete technical and programmatic reviews.
i a
6753B-1634503-B2 B-3
l-R;visien: 0 E
Data: 11/20/86 APPENDIX C - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN -
OTHER SEISMIC CATEGORY I CONCRETE STRUCTURES I
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for other Seismic Category I Concrete Structures such as the Auxiliary Building, Fuel Building, Safeguard Building, and Pipe Tunnel with the intent of 1
identifying any calculational deficiencies.
The calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports (D-DIRs} issued by TERA.
SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to Other Seismic Category I Concrete Structures generic issues I
and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized below.
Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in parentheses (
).
I A.
Technical Deficiencies In Calculations Error in calculating reef and wall loads (SMI-103C)
Incorrect slab dead load used in STRUDL analysis Incorrect dimensions used for input data resulted in incorrect static analysis for members (SAB-122C1)
Incorrect modeling of beams and columns in STRUDL static analysis (SAB-122C1)
Slab not designed to meet compression requirement All loads and associated load combinations not considered in design (SAB-122C2)
Moment of inertia incorrectly calculated 'in Fuel Building (SFB-103C)
Apparent lack of analysis / discussion provided for additional rebars around large openings in walls and slabs.
No calculations provided for reduced slab thickness.
(SFB-103C)
(SFB-104C) (SFB-105C) 1 Incorrect live loads used for walls, columns, slabs, and
{
beams.
Incorrect reactions transferred to columns and walls (SFB-105C) (SFB-103C)
No calculations available for 4 in pipe whip impact on 2 ft thick wall Walls and equipment loads not included in beam frequency calculations (LIS-511C) t 6753C-1634503-B2 C-1
i l-Rtvisien: 0 1
Date: 11/20/86 Seismic vertical and lateral loads, thermal loads, and torsion not considered in design of slabs, walls, and columns (SFB-103C) (SFB-105C)
Incorrect support condition assumption for Service Water Tunnel (DMI-8C)
Incorrect method applied to determine expected maximum floor displacements (LIS-511C)
Incorrect method applied to determine the change in frequency for rotation (LIS-503C)
B.
Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings Calculation requires more reinforcement than shown' on drawings (SAB-122C1) (Dwg 2323-S-0700 through 0786) l Design input used from drawing which later was voided and no documentation in the calculations provided thet the drawing is voided (SAB-135C) (Dwg 2323-S-0910)
Inconsistencies between two drawings for missile-resistant hatch details (Dwg SI-630, SI-617) (SSB-121C)
Inconsistencies between calculations and drawing for jib crane regarding type of bolts and plate thickness (GIS-104C)
(Dwg 2323-S-1121)
Inconsistencies between calculations and calculation master index regarding category of structure for stop gates of service water intake structure (GIS-104C)
C.
Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output Latest loads for steam generator restraints not incorporated i
into final design calculations Cross-reference missing in the calculations.
No mechanism exists
':o assure that member would be re-evaluatcd for revised loads (SAB-137C)
Lack of documentation of justification available for pipe whip load influence on structural member design Lack of documentation (source of inputs) in calculations for referenced drawing (GIS-104C) (Dwg 2323-S-1120)
References quoted in calculations not retrievable.
Assumptions and criteria not discussed (SFB-103C) (SFB-104C)
(SFB-105C)
Lack of justification or documentation provided for the effect of impact load on wall (DSI-12A) 6753C-1634503-B2 C-2
Rsvisica: 0 Date: 11/20/26 Lack of.
justification or documentation provided to demonstrate that walls and ceilings were analyzed for pipe whip loads D.
Calculation Not Consistent with Licensing Commitment Lap splice not in compliance with ACI code requirements (Sketch FE-8151) (Dwg. 2323-S-0711 and 0745)
Inconsistency between design calculations and FSAR regarding wind velocity (SMI-101C)
Combination of three directional seismic effect consistent with FSAR not used in design of columns and walls for fuel building (SFB-105C)
E.
Inconsistency in Design and As-Built Condition Horizontal shear ties shown on the design drawing but not l-installed in the field (Sketch FE-8181) (Dwg. 2323-51-0608)
(Dwg. 2323-51-0624)
No. 9 vertical rebar shown on the design drawing but not installed in the field (Sketch FE-8226) (Dwg. 2323-S-1107, 1108)
No. 5 ties shown on the design drawing but these ties missing in exposed area in the field (Sketch FE-8225)
(Dwg.
2323-S-703, 751)
No.
11 vertical rebars not installed per design drawing (Sketch FE-8137) (Dwg. 2323-S-703, 751)
No. 10 rebars for Refueling Water Storage Tank as shown on the drawings were not installed.
(Dwgs. 2323-SI-318 and 319)
Inconsistency between design and as-built condition for rebar arrangements (SAB-125C1) (NCR-C-1168)
Inconsistency between drawing and as-built condition for air gap dimensions between buildings.
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Structural Items Lacking Backup Calculations Lack of calculations to show the equation used to predict the conservative results for effect of gap condition on seismic response (LIS-503C)
Lack of design basis calculations for seismic gap width acceptance criteria 6753C-1634503-B2 C-3
Rnvision: 0 Date: 11/20/86
- l l
1.2 There are several E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy'of other Seismic Category I Structures.
These E-DIRs can be categorized as follows:
A.
Technical Errors in Calculations Dynamic amplification factor inadequately applied for seismic design Nonseismic supports such as field run conduit, drywall and lighting supports installed in safety related areas Inaccurate use of strength reduction factor in the design of concrete structures B.
Calculation Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments Welding procedures not meeting AWS D1.1 code requirements Tornado load used for Fuel Building not per FSAR requirement Air gap not maintained between concrete structures per FSAR requirement C.
Structural Items Lacking Backup Calculations Nonauthorized cutting of rebars without techutcal justification 1.3 Issue Specific Action Plans (ISAPs):
(Refer to Appendix N Generic Technical Concerns for more details) 1.3.1 ICAP II.a - Reinforcing Steel in the Reactor Cavity:
This ISAP is addressed in Appendix B: Reactor Containment Concrete Internals 1.3.2 ISAP II.b - Concrete Compressive Strength:
Allegation raised by an individual who claimed that concrete strength tests were falsified between January 1976 and February 1977 for safety-related area; furthermore, a number of other allegations dealing with concrete placement, slump, air content test and deficient aggregate grading were identified.
1.3.3 ISAP II.C - Maintenance of Air Gap Between Concrete Structures:
Air gap between Seismic Category I structures to prevent seismic interaction during an earthquake per FSAR requirements is not maintained.
Field investigations indicated unsatisfactory conditions due to the presence of debris in the air gap such as wood wedges, rock. rodofoam 6753C-1634503-B2 C-4
Rsvisica: 0 Date: 11/20/86 etc.
In addition, it is not apparent that the permanent installation of rodofoam between the Safeguard Building and the Reactor Containment, and below grade for the cther Seismic. Category I structures is consistent with seismic analysis assumption and dynamic models used to analyze th; buildings.
1.3.4 ISAP II.d - Seismic Design of Control Rooc Ceiling Elements:
TRT determined that calculations for Seismic Category II components (e.g.,
lighting fixtures) and for the sloping suspended drywall ceiling did not adequately reflect inter-actions with the nonseismic items, nor were the fundamental frequencies of the supported masses determined to assess the seismic. response.
Additionally, TRT could find no evidence that the possible effects of a failure of nonseismic items had been considered.
2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for other Seismic Category I Concrete Structures contain technical errors and inconsistencies when compared to the drawings and do not consistently meet licensing commitments.
Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.
i 3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE 3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), develop design basis documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly identified and implemented.
3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifi-cations pertaining to the Other Seismic Category I Structures for consistency with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated project change documents, i.e., Design Change Authori-zations, DCAs,- and Component Modification Cards, CMCs).
This review shall be documented using the following steps:
3.2.1 A review procedure will be developed and used to document and ensure uniform and complete technical and programmatic reviews.
3.2.2 A set of prints of current permanent plant drawings and related unincorporated DCAs, CMCs, any other project change documents and cut rebar drawings will be used to ensure complete review of the as-installed condition.
3.2.3 The review for technical adequacy will address calculation
- inputs, assumptions, methodology,
- accuracy, outputs and conclusions.
Input will be reviewed for applicability,
- accuracy, and source.
Methodology will be reviewed for 6753C-1634503-B2 C-5
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.y-APPENDIX D - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURAL STEEL l
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for Seismic I
Category I Structural Steel with the intent of identifying any
)
calculational deficiencies.
The calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs}
}
issued by TERA.
SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Seismic J
Category I Structural Steel generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized below.
Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in
. parentheses (
).
~
(A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations Dynamic load factors incorrectly developed (SAB-135C) (SFB-105C)
(SAB-113C)
Seismic loads !ncorrectly applied (SAB-136C)
Raceway support loads not properly transferred to supporting steel members (SAB-135C)
Incorrect computer modeling of steel members (SAB-135C)
Member design inaccuracies (SSB-105C)
(SAB-113C)
(SAB-136C)
(SAB-137C) (SFB-105C) s Member to member connection design inaccuracies (SMI-103C)
(SAB-136C) (SAB-137C)
(B) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output I
Two different documents with the same I.D.
Number (SAB-135C)
No correlations between model input and actual geometry (SAB-135C)
(SAB-137C) 1 e
A calculation revision not traceable to a source (SAB-135C)
(SAB-137C)
(C) Calculation Not Consistent With Licensing Ccmmitments Design according to the 8th edition of AISC instead of 7th Edition as required by FSAR (SAB-137C)
Specification / Code deviations without sufficient technical justi-L fication FSAR load combinations neglected (SAB-135C) (SAB-122C) (SAB-113C)
'f (SAB-113C) 6753D-1634503-B2 D-1
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i (D) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings By comparison between the drawings revisions and design record calculation, drawing revisions not addressed in the calculations (SAB-137C) 1.2 There are no E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of Seismic Category I Structural Steel.
2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for Seismic Category I Struc-tural Steel contain numerous technical errors, inconsistencies when compared to the drawings, and do not consistently meet licensing commitments. Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these I
calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.
I 3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES 3.1 Usffig:::=Ah6"Tinal Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) develop design basis documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly identified and implemented.
3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifica-tions pretaining to Seismic Category I Structural Steel for consistency with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated project change documents, i.e., Design Change Authorizations, DCAs, and Component Modification Cards, CMSs).
This review shall be documented using the following steps:
3.2.1 A review procedure will be developed and used to document and ensure uniform and complete technical and programmatic j
reviews.
j 3.2.2 A set of prints of current permanent plant drawings and related unincorporated DCAs, CMCs, an any other proj ect change documents will be used to ensure a complete review of the as-installed condition.
l 3.2.3 The review for technical adequacy will address calculation
- inputs, assumptions, methodology, accuracy, outputs, and conclusions.
Input will be reviewed for applicability,
- accuracy, and source.
Methodology will be reviewed for compliance with licensing commitments and to ensure that it is appropriate for the calculation's objectives.
Outputs will be reviewed to confirm that they are reasonable in consideration of the inputs, methodology, and objective of the calculation.
(NOTE:
Any input not deemed final will be marked " Confirmation Required.")
Additionally, changes ' to calculations as a result of ERC findings will be included.
4 6753D-1634503-82 D-2 1
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d APPENDIX E - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - PIPE RUPTURE RESTRAINTS AND JET IMPINGEMENT SHIELDS
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for the pipe j
rupture protection hardware with the intent of identifying any calcu-lational deficiencies.
The calculational deficiencies identified I
have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs}
I issued by TERA.
SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Pipe Rupture Restraints and Jet Impingement Shields generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the
?
issues, as summarized below.
Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in parentheses (
).
r (A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations Incorrect modeling assumptions used in analyzing the baseplate anchor bolts.
(SRB-125C) (126C, 129C) a Not all load combinations addressed.
(SRB-129C) (SSB-128C) 1 Omission of the potential governing pipe break case in the design of the restraint 1
Confinnation/ justification of dynamic load factor is required.
(SRB-125C)
The weld analysis was not included.
(SRB-148C)
No evaluation in calculations to cover time-history of loads and separation of two load cases.
(SRB-125C)
J Incorrect stress allowables were used.
(SRB-157C)
Nonconservative design load (SRB-129C)
Inadequate justification of dynamic amplification factor.
(SAB-134C) 5
)
Inadequate analysis of base plate (SRB-157C)
Inadequate load application (SRB-3C2) i Apparent lack of justification for unconservative modeling 9
assumptions.
(SSB-134C)
Overly conservative design loads.
(SRB-134C)
(B) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings Calculations were not revised when' baseplate details were changed.
(SSB-119C) o 6753E-1634503-B2 E-1
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~
Calculation design sketches show different dimensions than the drawings. (SRB-111C)
I, The drawing shows smaller bolt size than what was designed.
(SRB 125C)
A discrepancy between the design and as-built bumper dimensions exists.
(SRB-130C)
(C) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output Lack of calculations for the steam generator side of restraint.
1 The RCP side is designed for PSAR and preliminary WNES criteria
}
WPT-797.
Calculations do not include coverage of anchor bolt design.
(SRB-111C)
Lack of justification is offered as to whether the items reviewed for the steam generator inlet restraint are the critical components.
(SRB-115C)
Memo with the pipe rupture restraint calculation differs from as-designed and drawings.
(SSB-128C) l Lack of input reference for the loads on restraint.
(SRB-133C)
Pages are missing from the calculation.
(SRB-133C)
Assumptions were not stated and/or justified.
(SRB-133C)
The bolting material is not identified in FSAR. (SRB-133C)
The source and the basis for the design input was not identified.
(SRB-3C2)
Omission of design calculation.
(SRB-148)
(D) Calculation Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments Violation of prequalified weld requirements.
(SRB-119C)
Incorrect allowables used.
(SRB-129C) (SRB-111C)
?
Material selection violates FSAR requirements.
(SAB-134C)
I a
2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for the high energy pipe break and jet impingement damage evaluation contain technical errors and inconsistencies, and do not consistently meet licensing commitments. Design I
inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these I
calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.
i i
i 6753E-1634503-B2 E-2
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.1' APPENDIX F - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - REACTOR CONTAINMENT LINER
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 TERA rev.ewed calculations pertaining to the design for the Reactor Containment Liner with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies.
The calculation deficiencies identified have been J
documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs} issued by TERA.
SWEC bas reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Reactor Containment Liner generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized below.
Calculations associated with the issued are denoted in parentheses (
).
(A)
Technical Deficiencies In Calculations i
Liner design does not comply with ACI 359/CC 3700 (SRB-105C1)
Analysis / design of liner anchorage to base mat was not considered (SRB-105C1) 9
- The P-A (load-deflection) characteristics of the liner stud was not properly modeled for in the analysis (SRB-105C1)
- Liner attachment analysis does not properly address inter-action between the concrete and the attachment to the liner including studs (SRB-113C)
(B)
Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings
- Liner attachment design calculation does not qualify all e
design configurations shown on the drawing (SRB-113C)
(C)
Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output
- Liner attachment design loads are not traceable to their source (SRB-113C)
(D)
Calculation Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments 1
- Not all FSAR load combinations are considered (SRB-113C)
)
(SRB-169C) 1.2 There is one {1} E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of the containment liner plate attachments.
2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for the Reactor Contain-ment Liner contain technical errors, inconsistencies when compared to the drawings and does not consistently meet licensing commitments.
l Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer modeling techniques for these calculations are inadequately documented.
6753F-1634503-B2 F-1
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11/20/86 APPENDIX G - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - FUEL TRANSFER TUBE SUPPORT AND OTHER LINERS 9
s
1.0 BACKGROUND
I J
1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for the Fuel Transfer Tube Support, Refueling Cavity Liner, and Fuel Pool Liner designs with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies.
The calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepency Issue Reports {D-DIRs} issued by TERA.
SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRS related to the Fuel Transfer Tube Support and Other Liners generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized below.
Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in parentheses (
).
(A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations The assessment of liner plate and anchor loads was
' incomplete; only operating thermal loads were considered.
Liner seam offsets and welds were not addressed.
(SRB-105C1)
Differential thermal displacement between the liner components and building structure was not considered.
2 (SFB-105C)
The one-dimensional analysis used disregards the total stud load from the orthogonal direction.
(SRB-105C1)
Potential thermal expansion and connection details for the new fuel elevator support embedment plate were not d
addressed.
(SFB-106C)
Differential thermal displacement between liner
]
components and building structure was not constdered.
(SFB-106C) 1 Variation of stud spacing at periphery of pipe penetration through liner not considered.
(SFB-106C) 9 Analysis of the Fuel Pool lift gate bracket involves j
conceptual and equilibrium errors and incorrect interpretation of hand book data for stud design.
(SFB-106C)
Incomplete and potentially improper assessment of discontinuity stresses and strains.
(SFB-106C)
Anchor bolt design calculations did not consider the combined effect of anchor bolt shear and tension, l
(SFB-106C) 3 9
f 6753G-1634503-B2 G-1
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.J The Spent Fuel Pool calculations do not consider pool water sloshing effects under seismic events.
(SFB-103C)
The Spent Fuel Pool calculations do not perform a complete analysis for the thermal load case.
Axial forces and shear forces are not calculated, and the J
analysis does not address loads due to average temperature increase through the wall thickness.
(SFB-103C)
(B) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output i
Deficiencies in the identification of input data sources.
(SFB-106C)
Details such as bolted connections, and full penetration d
vs fillet welds are inconsistent between drawing and calculation.
(SFB-106C)
-(C) Calculation Not Consistent With Licensing Commitments The stress-strain criteria used in the liner plate design was not identified.
(SRB-105C1) 2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES J
The calculations which form the design basis for the refueling cavity liner, the fuel pool liner and the fuel transfer tube support contain technical
~
errors and inconsistencies, and do not consistently meet licensing commit-D ments.
Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysts for these calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.
3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES a
3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), develop new or review t
and modify as necessary, existing design basis documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly identified and implemented.
l 3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifica-l tions pertaining to the Fuel Transfer Tube Support, Fuel Pool Liner and Refueling Cavity Liner for consistency with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated project change documents, i.e.,
Design Change Authorizations, DCAs, and Component Modification Cards, CMCs).
This review shall be documented using the following steps:
3.2.1 A review procedure will be developed and used to document and ensure uniform and complete technical and programmatic reviews.
i 3.2.2 A set of prints of current permanent plant drawings and related unincorporated DCAs, CMCs, and any other project change documents will be used to ensure complete reviews of the as-installed condition.
6753G-1634503-B2 G-2
- l
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11/20/86 APPENDIX H - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - MISCELLANEOUS SUPPORTS (EQUIPMENT)
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for Miscellaneous Supports (equipments) such as polar crane girder supports, monorail supports, battery racks, pump supports, fuel gate storage brackets etc a
with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies.
The calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs} issued by TERA.
SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Miscellanecus Supports (Equipment) generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our I
understanding of the issues, as summerized below.
Calculations asso-ciated with the issues are denoted in parentheses (
).
j (A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations b
Modeling error and unjustified assumptions for polar crane runway support design.
(SRB-109C)
For elastic design approach, plastic section modulus used in design.
(SRB-109C) f Amplification factors omitted without technical justification 2
for seismic design of equipment supports.
(SSB-112C)
Mathematical error in calculation for frequency of support system (DMI-IC)
Prying action on baseplate and eccentricity of attachment to anchors not considered.
Unit error in calculations.
(SRB-119C)
)
Model used for analysis does not consider frame action in two orthogonal directions.
(SRB-119C) 1 I,
Vertical seismic component and horizontal load of monorail omitted without justification for monorail supports.
(SRB-119C)
Dynamic amplification factor of 1.0 used in the analysis for monorail supports in Reactor Building and Safeguard Building without technical justification.
(SRB-109C)
(SSB-105B)
All loads and local combinations for polar crane were not fully addressed and justified.
Critical load position of crane was not investigated.
(SRB-109C)
Incorrect dimension used for models.
Models for plant elements and bolts do not consider all loads and load directions.
(SRB-109C)
Mathematical error found in plate design; this results in the answers being incorrect.
(SRB-109C)
I 6753H-1634503-B2 H-1
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Overlapping shear cones not considered.
Edge distance criteria for anchor stud not correctly used.
(SFB-106C)
Error made in determining proper units of mass.
(SSB-105C)
Distribution of wheel loads assumption for crane - rails not justified.
(SRL-109C)
Critical load combinations not considered in design for service /
circulating water intake structure stop gate.
(GIS-104C) d Eccentricity effects of lateral loads and frictional effect 1
not considered in monorail supports design.
(GIS-104C)
Potential thermal expansion and connection details not considered for new fuel elevator support embedment plate design.
(SFB-106C)
Operating reactions for attached piping not considered for pump supports.
Pipe break reactions not considered with d
seismic loads.
(SSB-112C)
Incorrect moment calculated for design of floor plate.
(SSB-1342)
Fluid weight of pump not included as dead load for equipment support design.
Weights of equipment differs from the vendor's equipment qualification" report.
(SSB-112C)
(B) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output Source of acceleration assumed for the design not identified.
s
. Source for reactions at support points for rotating crane not
' referenced.
(SRB-3C2) 1 Poor documentation between polar crane vendor loads and design loads used in calculations.
(SRB-109C) l Apparent lack of documentation of source of design input for I
polar crane such as accelerr.tions, load combinations, bracket loads.
Lack of justification for assumption on polar crane wheel geometry and loads.
Preliminary data not confirmed later with vendor input.
(SRB-3C1)
Apparent lack of reference to basic design code.
Lacking explanations of design approach and judgement used in the calculations.
(SRB-109C)
Design calculations marked as not safety related while master g
index identified this calculations as safety related.
(SRB-119C) 6753H-1634503-B2 H-2
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11/20/86 (C) Calculations Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments Vendor interface drawing does not include the effect of 1
payload.
FSAR requires that SSE plus payload be addressed.
(Load Drawing 7523-CL-1)
Frame angles not designed per AISC requirements.
Incorrect use of K value.
Per ACI 349 criteria a capacity reduction factor of two not used for single expansion anchor.
Edge distance violated for bolt hole in baseplate design.
(SRB-119C) d j
Deformation approach and acceptance criteria used for polar j
crane support design not consistent with Section 3.8.1.
Incorrect theory used in calculating. the deformation.
(SRB-109C) 1 Incorrect allowable bending stress used for steel member (GIS-104C)
Three directional effects of seismic loads not considered per FSAR section 3.7B.2.6 requirements for equipment support design.
(SSB-112C)
In elastic analysis, plastic section modulus used for design of baseplate which is not in compliance with FSAR Section 3.8.4.3.3.
For battery racks support design, two directions of seismic input were used which is not in compliance with FSAR.
(SAB-113C) d 1
(D) Structural Items Lacking Backup Calculations J
'No design calculations available for the design of the sole plate bolts of the polar crane runway girder supports.
(SRB-109C)
Analysis for mounting plate, nut, and bolt not included in
, calculations.
(DMI-1C)
Allows ie weld stress and local bending not calculated.
]
Torsional effects omitted in design of monorail supports in i
Reactor Building.
(SRB-109C)
Concrete pullout and shear capacity for anchor bolt not J
calculated.
Shear concrete edge distance not checked for j
anchor bolt capacity.
Prying action and bending in connection, and construction eccentricity not considered in design.
Plate flexibility not considered in design of plate.
I i
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11/20/86 Connection design ignored without technical justification.
Design, section modulus and stresses of weld not calculated.
1 (SAB-113C)
Lack of calculations for pullout capacity of anchors, embedded plates design, weld stresses, slotted holes for thermal and local deflections.
(SRB-109C) a Effect of tolerances in fit-up of critical items not 3j addressed in the calculations.
(SRB-109C)
Lack of rational design calculations to document the design, fabrication, and installation of polar crane.
ho calculations available for allowable weld, stiffeners,
]
lifting lugs, monorail stop angles, and splice plate con-nections.
(GIS-102C) 1.2 There are E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of polar crane runway supports and HVAC supports qualifications.
1.3 Issue Specific Action Plan - ISAP VII.b.4 - Hilti bolt instruction ISAP is addressed in Appendix N " Generic Technical Concerns."
2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for the Miscellaneous Supports (equipment) contain technical errors and inconsistencies when compared to the drawings and do not consistently meet licensing com-mitments.
Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.
30 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES 3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), develop design basis documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly identified and implemented.
3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifi-cations pertaining to the Miscellaneous Supports for consistency with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated project change documents, i.e.,
Design Change Authorization, DCAs, and Component Modification Cards, CMCs).
This review shall be documented using the following steps:
1 i
I i
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11/20/86 APPENDIX I - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - PENETRATION SLEEV'ES AND ANCHORAGE 8
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for the Reactor Containment Penetration Sleeves and Anchorage with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies.
The calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy 7
Issue Reprots {D-DIRs} issued by TERA.
SkT.C has reviewed the D-DIRs J
related to the Penetration Sleeves and Achorage generic issue and has formed the corrective action plac based on our understanding of the I
issues, as summarized below.
Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in parentheses (
).
(A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations Penetration at equipment hatch not evaluated for concrete deformations or mechanical loads (SRB-169C)
Penetration sleeve anchorage design assumes a uniform bearing stress distribution for shear and moment loads, this assump '
tion needs justification (SRB-108C) (SRB-169C)
Design calculation does not adequately address all penetra-tion design considerations (SRB-108C) (SRB-161C)
Element stress gradients were used rather than element strains to design liner anchorage at equipment hatch (SRB-169C)
(B) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings i
Lug material specified in calculation does not agree with material specified in as-fabricated documentation (SRB-108C)
(C) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output Calculation for heat transfer analysis of penetration (s) lacks originator and reviewer signatures, sources of design input, and acceptance criteria Requirements for welding and treatment of stainless steel material not consistent for Types II, III, and IV penetra-tions Specification does not list cyclic loads or any load criteria for penetration design g
No code class shown on vendor drawing i
k 6753I-1634503-B2 I-1
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11/20/86 (D) Calculation Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments Stress limits listed in penetration specification do not agree with FSAR requirements Specified design temperature for penetration design is less than FSAR commitment Impact test temperature specified in penetration specifica-
]
tion does not agree with ASME Code requirement e
Penetration anchorage allowables do not agree with FSAR commitments (SRB-108C)
(E) Structural Items Lacking Backup Calculations No calculation for liner end anchorage weld to equipment j
hatch barrel (SRB-169C) 1.2 There are no E-DIRs specifically related to the design ' adequacy of pencration sleeves and anchorages.
d 2.0 SWEC'b UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for penetration sleeves and anchorage design contain numerous technical errors, inconsistencies when compared to the drawings, and do not consistently meet licensing co'amitments.
Design
- inputs, sources of
- input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.
e 3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES J
3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), develop design basis documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly identified and implemented.
3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifi-cations pertaining to the Reactor Containment's Penetration Sleeves and Anchorage for consistency with the design basis docu.7ents and drawings (including unincorporated project change documents, i.m., Design Change Auth rization, DCAs, and Component Modification Cards, CMCs).
This review shall be documented using the following steps:
n 6753I-1634503-B2 I-2
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11/20/86 APPENDIX J - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - CONCRETE ANCHORS
}
1.0 BACKGROUND
j 1.1 TERA reviewed. calculations pertaining to the design for the Concrete Anchors with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies.
i The calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports.
{D-DIRs } issued by TERA.
SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Concrete Anchors generic issue and
)
j has fornied the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized below.
Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in parentheses (
).
(A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations Nonconservative generic criteria used for anchor. bolt pullout
+
capacity reduction factor for cone overlapping (SRB-123C)
Modeling assumption does not consider normal shear force on embedments to be taken by anchor bolts (SRB-115C)
Effect of prying action and flexibility not considered on anchor bolts (SRB-115C) (SSB-112C) (SRB-157C)
Pullout capacity of anchor bolt not based on concrete cone failure (SSB-112C) 4
~
Mathematical error in calculating tension of anchor bolt loads (SSB-ll2C)
Vertical upward seismic loada not included in determining the-tension on anchor bolts for tank support (SSB-112C) d Apparent lack of technical justification provided for using 1.8 factor of safety for Richmond inserts under SSE condition 1
In modeling assumptions, prying action and eccentricity of axial load for embedment plates were not considered (SAB-113C)
Incorrect governing load considered.
Critical load case not evaluated (SAB-137C)
Incorrect modeling assumption of load distribt. ion for anchor bolts (SRB-111C) 1 j
Vendor's recommended minimum effective embedment depth criteria for Hilti bolts was violated by project procedure Incorrect tension calculated for Hilti bolts (GIS-104C)
?
Lower factor of safety used in design for anchor bolts not
]
justified (SSB-1342).
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(B) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings Calculation specifies ASTM A320 bolts while drawings show ASTM A540 bolts.
Drawings do not agree with calculation for anchor bolt patterns (SRB-123C)
Dimensions used in calculations different than that shown on drawing (SAB-137C) o (C) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output a
Calculation references superseded computer analysis for plates.
No consideration provided for incorporating revised computer analysis into calculation (SAB-137C)
Calculations do not provide a mechanism for transmitting wall plate loads to structural member verification (SAB-137C)
Apparent lack of documentation (vendor source seismic loads, i
applicable
- drawings, material properties, code / criteria source) (SFB-106C)
Apparent lack of documentation of the technical-justification for the qualification process of eighty-four (84) plates (SAB-137C)
Documentation lacking for anchor bolts used on site which are o
different from those specified in specification c-1 No procedure available for embedded plate verificatio,n of dimensions and loads I
(D) Calculations Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments j
Edge distance criteria violated for wall plates design per AISC Table 1.16.5 (SAB-137C)
Effect of limited slab thickness on pullout capacity of group anchorages not considered per code requirements (SAB-137C)
Inclusion of floor finish topping with floor slab thickness for embedment depth of anchor bolt is not in compliance with ACI 318 Code (SAB-137C)
(E) Structural Item Lacking Backup Calculations No calculations available for anchor bolt development in J
concrete (SSB-121C)
Missing calculations for pullout capacity of anchors, concrete shear cone capacity, basis for assumptions, etc (SSB-105C) i e
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.l Bending due to compression on bottom of baseplate which is critical not calculated (SRB-157C)
SSE loads are controlling loads but not addressed in design (SAB-137C)
Pullout capacity of studs against factored loads and SSE loads not considered.
Interaction equation for Nelson stud and Hilti bolts not checked (SRB-111C) 5 1.2 There are several E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of embedment plates and anchor bolts.
The DIRs can be detailed as follows:
I No. guidelines provided for the selection of stiffeners for embedded plates in specification.
No justification provided of factor of safety for anchor bolts of supports.
I Effect of prying action not considered in the Nelson Studs.
Concern regarding manufacturer's published load ratings, for Hilti bolts, based on testing data, Technical problem existed in the design of the embedments of i
the steam generator lateral support.
i Concern regarding the loads on the structure due to concrete anchors and thru-bolts.
1.3 ISAP VII b.4 - Hilti Anchor Bolt Installation (Refer to Appendix - N
" Generic Technical Concerns" for more details)
J The NRC's Technical Review Team (TRT) inspected Hilti anchor bolt installation on pipe supports and electrical raceway supports to the j
requirements.of installation of Hilti drilled-in bolts and found 1
several deficiencies.
Technical deficiencies identified include mininium embedment requirements, lack of documentation for bolt markings, length of the bolts, torque verification on bolts by QC.
2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for the connections and anchorages contain technical errors and inconsistencies when compared to the drawings and do not consistently meet licensing commitments.
Design inputs, sc: trees of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for either inadequately documented or unavailable.
these calculations are i
a 6753J-1634503-B2 J-3
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'J Ravisien: 0 Date:
11/20/86 APPENDIX K - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - COMPUTER CODE BENCHMARKING
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 In reviewing the structural calculations, TERA identified several deficiencies where the computer programs used in the analyses did not i
have appropriate documentation certifying that the programs are quali-fied for the use in the design of Seismic Category I structures. The calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs} issued by TERA.
SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Computer Code Benchmarking generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our under-standing of the issues, as summarized below.
Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in parentheses (
).
1 I
(A) Reactor Building Containment - "KALNINS,"
"SRTHRG,"
"KPOST1,"
"KPOST2," "PKH16."
(B) Reactor Building Containment - " QUAKE."
(C) Cable Spreading Room Wall Plates -
"ANSYS,"
"BIP1,"
"BIP2."
(SAB-137C)
(D) Cable Spreading Room Structural Steel - "NASTRAN."
(SAB-135C)
(E) Cable Spreading Room Baseplates -
"ANSYS,"
"BIP1,"
"BIP2."
(SAB-137C)
(F) Reactor Containment Concrete Internal -
"STRUDL,"
(SRB-137C) 4 1.2 There are no E-DIRs related to Computer Code Benchmarking.
J 2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE i
Programs used for the analysis and design of Seismic Category I structures are required to have as a minimum, the following provisions:
(a) Each computer run must be traceable to a program revision number or version.
(b) Each version cr revision of a
computer program must be l
retrievable.
(c) Each version or revision of a computer program must be benchmarked
}
to demonstrate that the program can solve the problems which it is j
3 stated as being capable of doing.
)
(d) The program must have a user's guide or manual which clearly
{
states the limitations of the program.
(e) The computer program must provide consistent output in all cases.
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.1 APPENDIX L - TESTING PROGRAMS 1
s
1.0 BACKGROUND
TERA cited numerous technical and programmatic discrepancies in the j
testing programs they reviewed.
The discrepancies are:
1.1 Test Report CPPA-26039
" Determination of Torque Requirements for Expansion Anchors" Test report and calculations not checked independently.
Mathematical errors in determination oi' torque requirements.
]
Ultimate pullout strength of the anchors for short embedment not 3
justified.
1.2 " Specification for Containment Structural Acceptance and Leakage Rate 1'
Test," SS-21/2.
Apparent lacking of documentation for review and approval process.
d 1.3 Test Report CPPA-38267
" Shear and Tension Loading of Richmond Inserts" Inadequate method used for calibrating hydraulic cylinders during j
Richmond Insert Tests.
1.4 Test Report CPPA-29063, " Shear Tests on Richmond 1/2 Inch Type EC-6W Inserts" Losses due to friction and seal leakage not considered in load d
calculations.
l Two deviation items - (not calibrating cylinder as instructed and not testing samples to failure) were not documented in report and approved prior to testing.
I All sample data sheets not included in test report.
j 1.5 Test Report CPPA-11269, " Epoxy Grout Testing" 5
Epoxy grout testing does not conform to test specification requirements.
I References, signatures, sample record
- sheets, and sample J
preconditioning information are missing from report.
Specimen dimensions and recording intervals deviation from procedure not reviewed and approved.
Compressive strengths of two grouts for various temperatures reported in test report without identifying statistical error.
1 I
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11/20/86 1.6 Test Report CPPA-21620 "1/2 Inch Diameter Nelson Stud Torque / Tension Correlation Test" Report does not conform to qualify assurance requirements for review and approval of reports.
Test violates normal engineering practice by determining one time
-torque value to preload the studs.
1.7 Test Report CPPA-24736
" Torque / Tension Tests of A490/A325 Bolts" Test report does not adequately document test procedure, objective, equipment and control. procedure.
t Test report does not conform to tert control procedure j
requirements to prepare test plan prior to conducting test.
J Test procedure violates normal engineering practice which requires y
wrenches to be calibrated at least once each working day.
1.8 Concrete compression strength test results were falsified.
ISAP II b addressed this particular issue and no further work is proposed for 1
these E-DIRs.
I 2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE 1j The test reports are the basis for installation and/or acceptance of Expansion Anchors, Richmond Inserts, Nelson Studs, High Strength Bolts, Epoxy Grouting, etc.
All test reports must be reviewed and updated to ensure they reflect confirmed standard test procedure requirements, and are consistent with licensing commitments.
3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE s
Using the items described under Section 2.0, review and modify as l
necessary, the existing test reports. After modifying above documents.
J implement revised requirements into test reports.
If existing tt reports cannot be adequately modified, supplemental test programs shall be developed.
All site testing programs used for Seismic Category I structures will be reviewed for consistency with licensing commitments.
?
I 4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCLHENTS 4.1
" Determination of Torque Requirements for Expansion Anchors" - Teo Report CPPA-26039, 4.2 " Specification for Containment Structured Acceptance and Leakage Rate Test" - SS-21/2.
4.3
" Shear and Tension Loading of Richmond Inserts" - Test Report CPPA
-38267.
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11/20/86 APPENDIX M - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - HEAVY LOAD DROPS l
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 TERA reviewed calculation sets pertaining to the design for Heavy Load Drops in the Reactor Containment, Auxiliary Building, Fuel Building, j
and Service Water Intake Structure with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies.
The calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs}
issued by TERA.
SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to Heavy Load Drops generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized below.
Calculations associated with the is nes are denoted in parentheses (
).
(A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations Not all potential load drops were analyzed Local structural response was not checked 3
i Punching shear was not checked Apparent lack of justification for target load distribution or frequency determination (B) Discrepancies between Calculations and Drawings J
Member concrete thickness used in calculation does not agree with drawing 1.2 There is one E-DIR that specifically addresses NUREG-0612.
TERA resolved this DIR with reference to Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) No. 6.
J Compliance to NUREG-0612 is not considered an issue.
I 2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for evaluation of Heavy Load Drops contain technical errors and at least one inconsistency when compared to the drawings.
Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and any computer analysis for these calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.
3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES 3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), develop design basis documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly identified and implemented.
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.i APPENDIX N - CORRECTIVE ACTION PI.AN - GENERIC TECHNICAL CONCERNS l
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 In response to a directive issued March 12, 1984 by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Executive Director for Operations, the NRC - formed a Technical Review Team (TRT) to address various technical concerns and allegations.
l 6
With the exception of Item (A) below, the following are specific TRT issues which concern the civil / structural aspects; all issues may l
potentially impact the design.
l (A)
ISAP VII.c.
Construction Reinspection / Documentation Review Plan This activity is self-initiated and includes a reinspection /
documentation review of QC accepted safety-related construction work activities performed at CPSES.
An example of the items covered by ISAP VII.c. is " Concrete i
l Placement and Consolidation."
Several independent questions regarding the placement and consolidation of. the concrete mix have been raised..These include:
Concrete quality near a seismic gap Quality of starter grout at a construction joint.
Some loose unconsolidated mortar was identified at a
l construction joint by ERC in their construction reinspection program (ISAP VII.c).
Allegation that 2 or 3 five gallon pails are buried in one of the concrete containment shells.
The presence of voids was detected in the Unit 2 Reactor t
{
Cavity Shield Wall.
These were repaired but the possible presence of voids in the Unit No. I shield wall will be investigated.
i Unconsolidated concrete was discovered at a location on the exterior of the Unit 2 Reactor Containment Shell.
1 I
Allegation of poor concrete quality / consolidation in some core holes.
6 t
i SWEC will have an active role in the resolution of this issue.
(B)
ISAP V.b Improper Shortening of Anchor Bolts in Steam Generator Upper Lateral Supports.
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The TRT was informed that there had been unauthorized cutting of anchor bolts during installation of the Steam Generator Upper Lateral Supports; their investigation revealed that inspection records which verify the engagement length of these bolts in the drilled and tapped holes could not be found.
Related issues which are to be addressed as part of this ISAP are:
Thread engagement for Richmond inserts Thread engagement of other blind hole bolted connections designed by the structural and mechanical disciplines SWEC will have an active role in resolving this issue by coordinating the effort with TUGC0 and Gibbs Tx Hill.
(C)
ISAP II.a. Reinforcing Steel in the Reactor Cavity Reinforcement in the Unit 1 Reactor Cavity Wall between el 812 ft-0 in. and 819 ft-in. was installed and inspected to drawing 2323-SI-0572, Revision 2.
After the concrete was
- placed, Revision 3 was issued indicating additional reinforcing was required.
The TRT found that justification l
for omitting the additional reinforcing had not been 2
documented by Engineering.
(D) ISAP II.b. Concrete Compression Strength Allegation that concrete test reports were falsified during 3
the period January 1976 and February 1977
)
(E) ISAP II.c. Maintenance of Air Gap Between Concrete Structures Field investigations to determine adequacy of air gaps between concrete structures indicated unsatisfactory condi-tions exist due to the presence of aebris such as wood wedges, rocks, clumps of concrete, and rodafoam in the air gaps.
There are two [2} E-DIRs specifically related to maintenance of air gaps between concrete structures.
(F)
ISAP II.d. Seismic Design of Control Room Ceiling Elements TRT determined that calculations for Seismic Category II components (e.g.,
lighting fixtures) and for the sloping suspended drywall ceiling did not adequately reflect interac-tions with the nonseismic items, nor were the fundamental frequencies of the supported masses determined to assess the seismic response.
Additionally, TRT could find no evidence that the possible effects of a failure of nonseismic items had been considered.
There are several E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of seismic design of control room ceiling elements.
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i
,1 (G) ISAP II.e. Rebar in the Fuel Handling Building Allegation that in January 1983 rebar associated with the i
installation of the trolley process aisle rails in the Fuel Handling Building were cut without proper authorization (H). ISAP VI.b. Polar Crane Shimming Allegation that shims for the rail support system of - the Containment's polar crane for Unit I had been altered during installation 2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE' ISSUE TUGC0 must resolve all TRT technical concerns and allegations, presently identified in the CPRT Issue Specific Action Plans summarized in Section 1.0.
Documents which form the basis for closure of the TRT and related 3,
issues must be reviewed and updated as necessary to ensure they reflect d'
confirmed design inputs and assumptions, are technically correct, and are consistent with licensing commitments.
o 3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES The NRC TRT civil / structural issues are being addressed by TUGCO's CPRT Issue Specific Action Plans (ISAPs) II.a II.b, II.c, II.d, II.e, V.b, and VI.b.
The self-initiated reinspection / documentation review is addressed by ISAP VII.c.
For concrete placement and consolidation (Item A of Section 1.0), SWEC will:
l
)
address each question determine the root cause of any concrete construction
]
problems i
determine the necessary corrective actions determine the adequacy of the overall concrete construction program at CPSES In ISAP V.b.
(Item B of Section 1.0), SWEC has already coordinated the effort required to resolve the Steam Generator Upper Lateral Restraint bolts.
SWEC reviewed calculations by both G&H and Westinghouse and identified those required to be revised and strengthened.
- Also, confirmatory calculations required to satisfy SWEC and TERA comments were coordinated by SWEC.
Under ISAP V.b, SWEC will coordinate the effort required to resolve the thread engagement issue for Richmond inserts and other threaded Connections.
4 1
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.I APPENDIX 0 - SEISMIC ANALYSIS
.O BACKGROUND Because Amplified Response Spectra (ARS) are inputs to the pipe stress and support requalification, and conduit and cable tray analyses, responsibility for the review of the ARS was assigned to a special SWEC task force.
This task force independently developed structural models n
and performed technical evaluations for selected seismic Category I structures.
The methods of modeling and evaluations were consistent wtth Stone & Webster's normal practice for nuclear power plant struct-ural seismic analysis.
The conclusion was that the design basis ARS are adequate for use even though there might be some discrepancies in
[
the procedures and calculations used for their development.
In revtewing the original seismic analysis calculations, TERA subse-quently identified several discrepancies in the seismic analysis used for Setsmic Category I structures, to determine accelerations, dis-
~
placements, forces, and moments caused by the OBE and SSE.
The calculational discrepancies identified by TERA have been documented ir.
the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports (D-DIRs).
SWEC has reviewed the L
I4 D-DIRs related to the Seismic Analysis.
~
J.0
- .wtC*S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE z
T*.->
TERA DIRs report that calculations for the seismic analysis of J
setsetc Category I structures, particularly those for the Auxiliary /
Electric Building, contain inconsistencies with the design drawings and FsAR, as well as undocumented sources of ir7ut which have not been
- i vertfied.
Additionally, one of the computer programs used appears to give inconsistent results.
)
3.0 sWIC ACTION PI.AN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES The SWEC action plan outlined below has been established to provide i
further assurance that the design basis ARS are adequate.
The following specific actions will be taken:
3.1 verify the validity of the DIRs.
3.2 Prepare a calculation to demonstrate that the response spectra of the horizontal and vertical time histories, used as input to the seismic analyses, adequately envelope the design ground response spectra in the FSAR for all relevant damping values.
3.3 Prepare a calculation which independently analyzes the Auxiliary /
Electric Building, using Stone & Webster standard methodology and documented computer programs.
The results of this analysis will be used to demonstrate that the design bases are adequate.
3.4 Calculate the mass and fundamental natural frequencies of the other Seismic Category I buildings, and compare them to those in the calculations of record.
3, no e s
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-. _ _ _