ML20211P850
| ML20211P850 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109268 |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1999 |
| From: | External (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138D213 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9909140121 | |
| Download: ML20211P850 (127) | |
Text
SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR THE TRANSTOR PART 71 SHIPPING CASK SYSTEM Revision C i
PREPARED BY:
BNFL FUEL SOLUTIONS Scorrs VALLEY, CALIFORNIA SEPTEMBER 1999
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SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 G ENERAL INFORMATION............................................................................ 1 - 1
1.1 INTRODUCTION
.......................................................................................... 1 -2 1.2 PACKAG E D ESCRIPTION...-.................................................................... 1 -9 1.2.1 Packagin g.......................................................................................... 1 -9 1.2.2 Operational Features.................................................
...... 1-18 1.2.3 Package Design Information.........................
......... 1-18 1.2.4 Contents o f Packaging.................................................................... 1 - 19 1.3 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION...................................................... 1 -25 1.3.1 Re ferences.................................................................................... 1 -2 5 1.3.2 Operational Schematics....................................................... 1 -2 5 1.3.3 Safety Classi fication............................................................ 1 -25 1.3.4 Drawi ngs...................................................................................... 1 -2 8 2.0 STRUCTURAL EVALUATION................................................................................ 2-1 2.1 STRUCTURAL DES IGN.............................................................................. 2-1 2.1.1 Di sc ussion.................................................................................... 2-1 2.1.2 Design Criteria.......................................................................... 2-5 2.2 WEIGHTS AND CENTERS OF GRAVITY.......................................... 2-16 2.3 MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF MATERIALS..................................... 2-16 2.3.1 TranStor Shipping Cask and Basket Materials............................ 2-19 2.3.2 Impact Limiter Materials............................................................ 2-19 2.3.3 Radiation E ffects............................................................................. 2-40 2.4 GENERAL STANDARDS FOR ALL PACKAGES............................... 2-40 2.4.1 Minimum Package Size................................................................. 2-40 2.4.2 Tamperproo f Feature...................................................................... 2-40 2.4.3 Posi tive C losure.................................................................................. 2-40 2.4.4 Chemical and Galvanic Reaction...................................................... 2-41 2.5 LIFTING AND TIEDOWN STANDARDS FOR ALL PACKAGES.......... 2-42 2.5.1 Li fting Devices.................................................................................... 2-4 2 2.5.2 Tiedown Devices................................................................................ 2-44 2.6 NORMAL CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT.......................................... 2-48 2.6.1 Heat..........................................................................................2-48 2.6.2 Cold...............................................................................................2-49 2.6.3 Reduced Extemal Pressure............................................................. 2-49 2.6.4 Increased Extemal Pressure............................................................ 2-50 2.6.5 Vibration............................................................................................. 2 -5 0 2.6.6 Water Spray........................................................................................ 2-5 0 2.6.7 Free Drop........................................................................................ 2-51 2.6.8 Comer Drop............................................................................ 2-5 3 2.6.9 Compression.............................................................................. 2-5 3 2.6.10 Penetration..........
4............
.........................................................2-53 2.6.11 Lead Gamma Shield Pour........................................................ 2-5 3
SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 -
September 1999 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2.7 HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITION......................................... 2-54 2.7.1 Free Drop................................................................................... 2-5 4 2.7.2 Puncture............................................................................................2-58 2.7.3 Thermal...........................................................................................2-62 2.7.4 Immersion - Fissile M aterial........................................................ 2-63 2.7.5 All Packages............................................................................. 2-63 2.7.6 S ummary o f Damage.................................................................... 2-63 2.8 S PECIAL FORM......................................................................................... 2 -64 2.9 FUELRODS.............................................................................................2-64 2.10 TRANS' LOR CASK COMPONENT ANALYSES................................ 2-65 2.10.1 Cask Body Analysis........................................................................... 2-65 2.10.2 Inner Shell Buckling Analysis......................................................... 2-118 2.10.3 Impact Limiter Analysis............................................................. 2-12 8 2.10.4 PWR BASKET ANALYSIS......................................................... 2-13 5a 2.10.5 BWR Basket Analysis...................................................................... 2-13 7 2.10.6 References........................................................................................ 2-15 6 3.0 TH ERMAL EVALUATION.......................................................................... 3-1 3.1 DIS C US S ION................................................................................................ 3-1 3.2
SUMMARY
OF THERMAL PROPERTIES OF MATERIALS................... 3-2 3.2.1 Effective Thermal Conductivity for Neutron Shield........................ 3-2 3.2.2 Effective Thermal Conductivity for the Borated Aluminum Plate...... 3-2 3.2.3 Efrective Thermal Conductivity for the Fuel Region........................ 3-13 3.2.4 Surface Heat Transfer Ccefficients............................................... 3-13 3.2.5 Emissi vi ty......................................................................................... 3 - 14 3.2.6 Cask Surface Heat Transfer............................................................... 3-15 3.2.7 Cask Internal Heat Transfer................................................................ 3-16 3.3 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF COMPONENTS.............................. 3-17
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3.3.1 Temperature Specifications for Metallic O-rings............................... 3-17 3.3.2 Temperature Specifications for Lead Gamma Shield....................... 3-17 3.3.3 Temperature Specifications for Neutron Shield.............................. 3-18 3.3.4 Temperature Specification for Cask Structural Components............ 3-18 3.3.5 Temperature Specification for Basket Sleeve Assembly................ 3-18 3.3.6 Temperature Specification for Borated Aluminum Poison Sheet... 3-19 3.3.7 Temperature Specification for Basket Shell...................................... 3-19 3.3.8 Temperature Specification for Fuel.................................................... 3-19 3.4 THERMAL EVALUATION FOR NORMAL CONDITIONS OF TRAN S PORT................................................................................................. 3 - 19 3.4.1 Thennal Models........................................................................... 3-19 3.4.2 Maximum Temperatures................................................................. 3-3 3 3.4.3 Minimum Temperatures.................................................................. 3-43 3.4.4 Maximum Intemal Pressures......................................................... 3-43 i
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SAR-TranStar* Shipping Cask Revision C n
Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.4.5 Maximum Thermal Stresses.............................................................. 3-43 3.4.6 Evaluation ofTranStor Shipping Cask Perfonnance for Normal Conditions of Transport...................................................... 3-43 3.5 HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT THERMAL EVALUATION..................... 3-43 3.5.1 Thermal Model.................................................................................. 3 -44 i
3.5.2 Package Conditions and Environment........................................ 3-45 3.5.3 Package Temperatures.................................................................. 3-45 3.5.4 Maximum Intemal Pressures........................................................ 3-45 3.5.5 Maximum Thennal Stresses............................................................. 3-51 3.5.6 Evaluation ofTranStor Shipping Cask Performance for Hypothetical Accident Thennal Conditions....................................... 3-51 3.6 REFE RENC ES.......................................................................................... 3 -5 1 4.0 CONTAINM ENT........................................................................................................ 4-1 4.1 CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY..................................................................... 4-1 4.1.1 Containment Vessel........................................................................... 4-1.
4.1.2 Containment Penetrations..................................................................... 4-1 4.1.3 Seals and Welds.................................................................................. 4-2 4.1.4 Closure................................................................................................4-3 4.2 REQUIREMENTS FOR NORMAL CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT....... 4-3 4.2.1 Containment of Radioactive Material.................................................. 4-3 4.2.2 Pressurization of Containment Vessel................................................ 4-4 4.2.3 Containment Criterion......................................................................... 4-4 4.3 REQUIREMENTS FOR HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITICNS OF TRANSPORT................................................................ 4-4 4.3.1 Containment of Radioactive Material.................................................. 4-4 4.3.2 Pressurization of Containment Vessel............................................... 4-4 4.3.3 Containment Criterion.......................................................................... 4-4 4.4 REFERENC ES.................................................................................................. 4-4 5.0 S H IELDING EVALUATION...................................................................................... 5 - 1 5.1 DISCUSSION AND RESULTS....................................................................... 5 4 5.2 SOURCE SPECIFICATION.................................................................... 5-1 1 5.2.1 G amma Source................................................................................. 5 - 1 2 5.2.2 Neutron Source................................................................................. 5 - 19 5.3 MODEL S PECIFICATION............................................................................ 5-21 5.3.1 Description of the Radial and Axial Shielding Configuration........... 5-22 5.3.2 Shield Regional Densities................................................................... 5-30 5.4 SHIELDING EVALUATION....................................................................... 5-3 5 5.4.1 MCNP Computer Code..................................................................... 5-3 5 5.4.2 Primary (2-D) Shielding Analyses..................................................... 5-37 5.4.3 Supplementary Shielding Analyses................................................... 5-43 111
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE OF CONTENTS 5.5
' ADDITIONAL INFORMATION............................................................... 5-51 5.5.1 Dose Rate Calculations for Altemate Burnup Level Cases............... 5-51 5.5.2 Stainless Steel Clad Fuel................................................................ 5-72 5.5.3 M ix ed-Ox i de Fuel............................................................................. 5 -75
.5.5.4 Re ferenc es................................................................................ 5 -7 5
6.0 CRITICALITY EVALUATION
.................................................................. 6-1 6.1 DISCUS SlON AND RESULTS.................................................................... 6-1 6.1.1 Criticality Design Features of the TranStor PWR Basket.............. 6-1 i
6.1.2 Criticality Design Features of the TranStor BWR Basket.............. 6-4 6.2
- PACKAG E FUEL LOADING..................................................................... 6-4
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6.3 MODEL S PECIFICATION.......................................................................... 6-26
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6.3.1 Description of Calculational Model.................................................. 6-26 6.3.2 Package Regional Densities.............................................................. 6-29 6.4 CRITICALITY CALCULATION............................................................... 6-29 6.4.1 PWR Criticality Calculational Method....................................... 6-32 6.4.2 BWR Criticality Calculational Method........................................... 6-37 6.4.3 Criticality Results............................................................................ 6-4 2 6.5 CRITICAL BENCHMARK EXPERIMENTS......................................... 6-45 6.5.1 Benchmark Experiments................................................................ 6-45 6.5.2 Benchmark Calculations............................................................ 6-46 6.5.3 - Results of Benchmark Calculations................................................ 6-48 6.6' REFERENC ES........................................................................................... 6-5 1 7.0 OPERATING PROCEDURES................................................................................... 7-1 7.1 METHODS OF LOADING A TRANSTOR BASKETINTO A TRANSTOR S HIPPING CASK................................................................... 7-1 7.2 PROCEDURES FOR RECEIPT AND LOADING OF THE TRANSTOR S H IPPING CASK................................................................... 7-3 7.2.1 Receipt Inspection and Unloading of the TranStor Shipping Cask from the Transport Vehicle........................................................ 7-3 7.2.2 Preparation of the TranStor Shipping Cask for Wet Loading......... 7-4 7.2.3 Wet Loading of Fuel in the Basket While Within the TranStor Shipping Cask.................................................................. 7-7 7.2.4 Preparation of the TranStor Shipping Cask for Dry Loading..... 7-11 7.2.5 Dry Loading of the TranStor Basket into the Shipping Cask in the Spent Fuel Building.................................................................. 7-12
-7.2.6 Dry Ioading of the Basket in the TranStor Shipping Cask at the IS FSI Iocation.............................................................................. 7-13 i
7.2.7 Preparation for Transport.................................................................. 7-13 l
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SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE OF CONTENTS 7.3 PROCEDURES FOR UNLOADING THE TRANSTORm SHIPPING CASK
....................................................................................................7-15 7.3.1 Receiving Inspection..................................................................... 7-15 7.3.2 Preparation for Unloading the TranStor Shipping Cask for Retum of the Basket to a Concrete Cask.................................. 7-16 7.3.3 Unloading the TranStor Shipping Cask for Retum of the Basket to a Concrete Cask............................................ 7-17 7.3.4 Preparation for Unloading the TranStor Shipping Cask for Return of the Basket and Fuel to the Pool................................ 7-17 7.3.5 Unloading the TranStor Shipping Cask for Retum of the Basket and Fuel to the Pool................................................... 7-18 7.1 PREPARATION OF EMPTY TRANSTORm SHIPPING CASK FOR TRAN S PO RT................................................................................. 7-2 0 8.0 ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM............................... 8-1 8.1 POST FABRICATION ACCEPTANCE TESTS................................. 8-1 8.1.1 Visual Inspection................................................................... 8-1 8.1.2 Post Fabrication Structural, Pressure and Leak Tests............... 8-1 8.1.3 Leak Test s........................................................................ 8-3 8.1.4 Component Tests........................................................... 8-6 8.1.5 Tests for Shield Integrity................................................. 8-7 8.1.6 Thermal Acceptance Test................................................ 8-9 8.1.7 Neutron Absorber Verification Test........................................... 8-12 8.2 MAINTENANCE PROGRAM........................................................... 8-12 8.2.1 Structural and Pressure Tests.................................................. 8-12 8.2.2 Periodic Maintenance Leak Tests............................................... 8-14 8.2.3 Subsystem Maintenance Tests............................................................ 8-14 8.2.4 Tests of Valves, Rupture Discs, and Gaskets on Containment Vessel..........................................................................................8-14 1
8.2.5 S hielding Tests............................................................................ 8-14 j
8.2.6 Thermal Tests.......................................................................... 8-15 8.2.7 Miscellaneous Tests.............................................................. 8-15 8.3 LEAD INSTALLATION PROCEDURE............................................. 8-15 8.4 REFERENC ES.............................................................................. 8 - 1 8 APPENDIX 1
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PROPRIETARY DRAWINGS................................................................. A-i y
r SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE OF FIGURES Figure 1.1-1 Schematic of the TranStor" Shipping Cask................................................. 1-3 Figure 1.1-2 Illustration of the TranStor Shipping System..................................... 1 -4 Figure 1.2-1 Schematic of the TranStorm P WR Basket.............................................. 1 - 13 Figure 1.2-2 Schemat2 of the TranStor B WR Basket................................
......... 1 - 14 Figure 1.3-1 Flow Chart of TranStor" Shipping Cask Operations..........................1-27 Figure 2.3-1 Thermal Expansion Coefficients for Neutron Shielding..
2-38 Figure 2.3 2 Typical Stress-Strain Diagram for Aluminum Honeycomb....................2-39 Figure 2.5-1 Tiedown Device Load Evaluation Free Body Diagram....................... 2-46 Figure 2.7-1 Lead Slump from HAC Side Drop....................................................
.2-59 Figure 2.7-2 30-f1 Side Drop - Cask Midpoint Free Body Diagram.............................. 2-61 Figure 2.10.1-1 Lead Shielding Dynamic Stress-Strain Properties at 100*F,250 F, and400'F.............................................................................................2-75 Figure 2.10.1-2 Two-Dimensional Finite Element Model of the TranStor* Cask Body........................................................................................................2-76 Figure 2.10.1-3 Two-Dimensional Finite Element Model, Top Region......................... 2-77 Figure 2.10.1-4 Two-Dimensional Finite Element Model, Bottom Region.................... 2-77 Figure 2.10.1-5 Three-Dimensional Finite Element Model of the TranStor* Cask Body.......................................................................................2-79 Figure 2.10.1-6 Side Drop Cask Interface Pressure Distributions......................... 2-82 Figure 2.10.1-7 Side Drop Pressure Boundary Conditions...................................... 2-83 Figure 2.10.1-8 Cask Body Stress Evaluation Section Locations...................................... 2-87 Figure 2.10.1-9 Temperature Contours, Hot Thermal Load Condition, PWR Fuel.......... 2-89 Figure 2.10.1-10 HAC Side Drop Plus Pressure Stress Intensity Contours........................ 2-95 Figure 2.10.1-11 Lead Slump Prediction for Bottom-End Drop Load Condition.............. 2-97 Figure 2.10.1-12 Bottom-End Drop Lead Pressure Veuur. G Level................................... 2-99 Figure 2.10.3-1 Free Body Diagram - Cask and Impact Limiter, Comer Drop............. 2-134 Figure 2.10.5-1 2-D ANSYS Finite Element Model of Besket Shell............................... 2-139 Figure 2.10.5-2 ANSYS Global Loads Finite Element Model........................................ 2-140 Figure 2.10.5-3 ANSYS Finite Element Model, Insert Tubular Assembly....................... 2-141 Figure 2.10.5-4 ANSYS Finite Element Model, Spacer Insert Type 1 Assembly............. 2-142 Figure 2.10.5-5 ANSYS Finite Element Model, Spacer Insert Type 2 Assembly............. 2-143 Figure 3.4-1 Cask Axisymmetric Thennal Model........................................................... 3-21 Figure 3.4-2 Heat Transfer Mechanism Application location...................................... 3-22 Figure 3.4-3 PWR Fuel Assembly Axial Heat Source Distribution.....................
.. 3-25 Figure 3.4-4 BWR Fuel Assembly Axial Heat Source Distribution.................................. 3-26 Figure 3.4-5 PWR Fuel Basket 2-D Thermal Model..................................................... 3-27 Figure 3.4-6 PWR Fuel Basket 2-D Thermal Model (Inset)............................................ 3-28 Figure 3.4-7 BWR Fuel Basket 2-D Thermal Model.................................................... 3 -3 0 l
Figure 3.4-8 BWR Fuel Basket 2-D Thermal Model (Inset)......................................... 3-31 Figure 3.4-9 Neutron Shield Thennal Model...
.....................................3-32 Figure 3.4-10 PWR Fuel Basket Temperature Distribution (100 F Ambient Temperature / Solar)................................................................................... 3-41 vi I
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TABLE OF FIGURES Figure 3.4-11 BWR Fuel Basket Temperature Distribution (100 F Ambient Temperatuie)..................................................................................................... 3 -4 2 Figure 3.5-1, Hypothetical Accident Condition History ofMaximum Cask Surface Temperature.................................................................................................... 3 -4 7 l
Figure 3.5-2 Hypothetical Accident Condition History of Maximum Cask Inboard Component Temperatures.............................................................................. 3 -4 8 Figure 3.5-3 Hypothetical Accident Condition History of Maximum 0-Ring and Bolt Regi on Temperatures........................................................................................ 3 -49 Figure 3.5-4 Hypothetical Accident Condition History of Maximum O-Ring and Bolt Region Temperatures [ Snap-Shot of First Three Hours)................................. 3-50 Figure 4.1-1 TranStor Shipping Cask Main Assembly...................................................... 4-5 l Figure 5.0-1 Required Cooling Time vs. Burnup Level for PWR and BWR Spent Fuel Assemblies (Zirealoy Cladding)............................................................... 5-2 Figure 5.0-2 Minimum Initial Enrichment vs. Burnup Level for PWR and BWR Spent Fuel Assemblies...................................................................................... 5-3 Figure 5.1-1 Calculated Dose Rate Imcations for Normal Conditions of Transport............. 5-6 l
Figure 5.1-2 Calculated Dose Rate Locations for Hypothetical Accident Conditions.......... 5-7 Figure 5.2-1 PWR Fuel Assembly Axial Burnup Profile..................................................... 5-15 Figure 5.2-2 BWR Fuel Assembly Axial Bumup Profile.................................................... 5-16 Figure 5.3-1 A Normal Condition Shielding Model Geometry (Cask Top End)................... 5-23 Figure 5.3-1B Normal Condition Shielding Model Geometry (Cask Bottom End).............. 5-24 i
l Figure 5.3-2A Accident Condition Shielding Model Geometry (Cask Top End)................. 5-28 Figure 5.3-2B Accident Condition Shielding Model Geometry (Cask Bottom End)............ 5-29 l
Figure 5.4-1 Infinite Slab Shielding Model of TranStor Shipping Cask Top End.......... 5-45 Figure 6.2-1 W 14x14 Assembly Class Lattice Layout.c...................................................... 6-11 Figure 6.2-2 W 14x14 SS Assembly Class Lattice Layout.................................................. 6-12 Figure 6.2-3 W 15x15, W 15x15 ANF, and W 15x15 SS Assembly Class Lattice Layouts.........................................................................................................6-13 Figure 6.2-4 W 17x17, W 17x17 OFA, W 17x17 ANF, and B&W Mark l
BW Assembly Class Lattice layouts............................................................... 6-14 Figure 6.2-5 W 17x18 Assembly Class Lattice Layout........................................................ 6-15 Figure 6.2-6 B&W 15xl 5 Assembly Class Lattice Layout.................................................. 6-16 Figure 6.2-7 CE 14x14 and CE 14x14 St. Lucie Assembly Class Lattice Layouts............ 6-17 l
Figure 6.2-8 CE 15xl 5 A Assembly Class Lattice Layout.................................................. 6-18 l
Figure 6.2-9 CE 15xl 5 B Assembly Class Lattice Layout................................................... 6-19 Figure 6.2-10 CE 15x15 C Assembly Class Lattice Layout................................................. 6-20 Figure 6.2-11 CE 16x16 Assembly Class Lattice Layout...................................................~ 6 21 Figure 6.2-12 CE 15x16 Assembly Class Lattice layout.................................................... 6-22 Figure 6.2-13 BWR 9x9A Assembly Class Lattice Layout................................................... 6-23 Figure 6.2-14 BWR 9x9C and 9x9D Assembly Class Lattice Layouts................................. 6-24 Figure 6.2-15 BWR 10x10A Assembly Class Lattice Layout............................................... 6-25 Figure 6.3-1 PWR Basket Inside TranStor Shipping Cask............................................... 6-27 Figure 6.3-2 BWR Basket Inside TranStor Shipping Cask............................................... 6-28 vii l
I SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE OF FIGURES l
Figure 7.2-1 Unloading of the Transtor Shipping Cask from the Transport l
Vehicle..............................................................................................................7-5 Figure 8.1-1 Cask Thermal Acceptance Test Configuration............................................... 8-11 l
Figure 8.3-1 Thermocouple locations for Lead Installation............................................ 8-17 l
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SAR -TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE OFTABLES l
Table 1.1-1 Regulatory Requirements Cross-Reference Table............................................ 1-5 l
Table 1.1-2 Regulatory Requirement Cross-Reference Table............................................... 1-6 Table 1.2-1 TranStor Shipping Cask Weights (PWR Basket Configuration)............... 1-10 Table 1.2-2 TranStor" Shipping Cask Weights (BWR Basket Configuration)................ 1-11 Table 1.2-3 Contents Decay Heat Limits............................................................................ 1 -22 l l
Table 2.0-1 Materials Table for Major Cask Components.................................................... 2-3 Table 2.0-2 Applied Acceleration Factors with DLFs Compared to Analyzed Acceleration Factors............................................................................................. 2 -6 Table 2.1-1 bad Combinations Nonnal and Hypothetical Accident Conditions................ 2-8 l
Table 2.1-2 Allowable Stress Limits Containment Structures............................................. 2-9 Table 2.1-3 Allowable Stress Limits Non-Containment Structures.................................. 2-10 Table 2.21 TranStor System Components Used for Shipping Weights and Centers o f Gravity - BWR................................................................................ 2-17 Table 2.2-2 TranStor System Components Used for Shipping Weights and Centers of Gravity - PWR................................................................................. 2-18 Table 2.3-1 Mechanical Properties of S A-240, Type 304 and S A-479, Type 304 Austenitic Stainless Steels.................................................................................. 2-20 Table 2.3-2 Mechanical Pmperties of SA-240, Type 304L Austenitic Stainless Steel....... 2-21 Table 2.3-3 Mechanical Npenies of SA-336, Type 304 Austenitic Stainless Steel.......... 2-22 Table 2.3-4 Mechanical Properties of SA-240, Type XM-19 and S A-249, Type
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TPXM-19 Austenitic Stainless Steels.............................................................. 2-23 Table 2.3-5 Mechanical Properties of SA-705, and SA-693 Type 630, HI150, 17-4 ph Precipitation-Hardened Manensitic Stainless Steels......................... 2-24 Table 2.3-6 Mechanical Properties of SA-36 Ferritic Carbon Steel.................................... 2-25 Table 2.3-7 Mechanical Npenies of SA-516 Grade 70 Ferritic Carbon Steel.................. 2-26 i
Table 2.3-8 Mechanical Propedies of A-500, Grade C Ferritic Carbon Steel..................... 2-27 Table 2.3-9 Mechanical Pmperties of SB-637, Grade N07718 Nickel Alloy Steel Bolting M aterial.................................................................................................. 2-2 8 Table 2.3-10 Mechanical Pmperties of SA-540, Grade B24, Class 1, Alloy Steel Bolting Material.................................................................................................. 2-29 Table 2.3 11 Mechanical Pmpetties of SA-588, Grade A or B Ferritic bw-Alloy Steel..................................................................................................................2-30 Table 2.3-12 Mechanical bperties of SA-570, Grade 45 Ferritic Carbon Steel................. 2-31 l
Table 2.3-13 Mechanical Properties of A-514, Grade B Ferritic bw-Alloy Steel.............. 2-32 Table 2.3-14 Mechanical Properties of Boral SB-209 Grade 1100 O (Annealed)
Aluminum with Aluminum / Boron Carbide Composite Core........................... 2-33 Table 2.3-15 Mechanical Properties of Lead (Static Conditions).......................................... 2-34 Table 2.3-16 Mechanical Nperties of Neutron Shield Material.......................................... 2-35 Table 2.3-17 Design Parameters of Coatings......................................................................... 2-36 Table 2.10.1-1 Summary of TranStor* Cask Body Critical Stress Results..................... 2-66 j
Table 2.10.1-2 Design Basis Thennal bad Case Evaluation Matrix..........
........ 2-68 Table 2.10.1-3 HAC Drop bad Cases............................................................................... 2-71 Table 2.10.1-4 Relative Severity of Drop Orientation Results......................................... 2-72 l
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SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE OF TABLES Table 2.10.1-5 HAC Ioad Combinations......................................................................... 2-74 Table 2.10.1-6 Cask Body Stress Evaluation Section locations....................................... 2-84 Table 2.10.1-7 XM-19 Cask Material ASME Code Allowable Stress Intensities, 400*F.............................................................................................................2-85 Table 2.10.1-8 Primary Membrane and Bending Stress Intensities, Intemal Pressure....... 2-90 Table 2.10.1-9 Comparison of Thermal Stress Results, BWR Fuel............................ 2-91 Table 2.10.1-10 Comparison of Thermal Stress Results, PWR Fuel.................................. 2-92 Table 2.10.1-11 Primary Membrane and Bending Stress Intensities, NCT Side Drop Plus Intemal Pressure :................................................................................ 2-100 Table 2.10.1-12 Primary Membrane and Bending Stress Intensities, NCT Side Drop
+ Pressure + Thermal................................................................................. 2-105 Table 2.10.1-13 Primary Membrane and Bending Stress Intensities, Immersion.............. 2-110 Table 2.10.1-14 Primary Membrane and Bending Stress Intensities, Top End Drop........ 2-111 Table 2.10.1-15 Primary Membrane and Bending Stress Intensities, Bottom End Drop lead................................................................................................... 2-1 1 2 Table 2.10.1-16 Primary Membrane and Bending Stress Intensities, HAC Side Drop
+ Pressure...................................................................................................2-113 Table 2.10.2-1 Geometry Parameters for the TranStor Cask Inner Shell and Transition Sections................................................................................... 2-122 Table 2.10.2-2 _ Theoretical Elastic Buckling Stress Values (KSI) (SA-240, Type j
1 XM-19 and SA-249, Type TPXM-19 Stainless Steel)............................... 2-123 Table 2.10.2-3 Capacity Reduction Factors for the Transtor Cask Inner Shell and Transition Sections............................................................................... 2-124 Table 2.10.2-4 Fabrication Tolerances for the TranStor" Cask Inner Shell.................... 2-125 Table 2.10.2-5 Upper Bound Buckling Stresses............................................................... 2-126 Table 2.10.2-6 Buckling Evaluation Margin of Safety Results TranStor Inner Shell............................................................................................................2-127 Table 2.10.2-7 The least Margin of Safety ofInteraction Checks.................................... 2-127 Table 2.10.3-1 Summary ofImpact Limiter Decclerations fer the TranStor Shipping Cask.............................................................................................. 2-1 31 Table 2.10.3 2 Summary of DLF and Static Decelerations for the TranStor S hippin g Ca sk.............................................................................................. 2-13 1 Table 2.10.3-3 Summary of DLF and Static Decelerations for the TranStor" BWR Basket.........................................................................................................2-132 Table 2.10.5.1 Summary of Maximum Stress Intensities Nonnal Condition of Transport Intemal Pressure (8.1 psi)............................................................ 2-148 Table 2.10.5-2 Summary ofMaximum Stress Intensities Hypothetical Accident Condition Intemal Pressure (43.1 psi)........................................................ 2-148 Table 2.10.5.3 Summary of Maximum Stress Intensitics Differential Thermal i
Expansi on Loads....................................................................................... 2 - 149 Table 2.10.5-4 Summary of Maximum Stress Intensities 30 Foot End Drop (120 G's Deceleration)............................................................... 2-149 Table 2.10.5-5 Summary of Maximum Stress Intensities 30 Foot Side Drop.................. 2-150 l
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SAR -TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE OF TABLES Table 2.10.5-6_ Summary of Maximum Stress Intensities 1 Foot Side Drop (20 G's Deceleration).............................................................................................. 2-1 Table 2.10.5-7 ' Load Combination Stress Intensities Normal Condition ofTransport Imading Combination............................................................................ 2-15 2 Table 2.10.5-8 Load Combination Stress Intensities Hypothetical Accident Side Drop Lo ad ing........................................................................................... 2-1 5 3 Table 2.10.5-9 Load Combination Stress Intensities Hypothetical Accident End Drop loading.............................................................................................. 2-1 5 4 Table 2.10.5-10 load Combination Stress Intensities Hypothetical Accident
)
Pressure loading........................................................................................... 2 - 15 5 Table 3.1-1 Thermal Analysis Bounding Conditions - Nonnal Conditions of Transport............................................................................................................3-3 Table 3.2-1 Thermal Pmperties of Stainless Steel................................................................ 3-4 Table 3.2-2 Thermal Properties of C-MN Ferritic Steel........................................................ 3-5 Table 3.2-3 Thermal Properties of C-MN-SI Ferritic Steel.................................................... 3-6 Table 3.2-4 Thermal Properties of Helium............................................................................ 3-7 Table 3.2-5 Thermal Properties of Poison Material............................................................... 3-8 Table 3.2-6 Thermal Properties of Solid Neutron Shield Material....................................... 3-9 Table 3.2-7 Thermal Properties o f Lead.......................................................................... 3-10 Table 3.2-8 Thermal Properties of Dry Air......................................................................... 3-i 1 Table 3.2-9 Thermal Conductivities of Fuel Assemblies................................................... 3-12 Table 3.4-1 Maximum Component Temperatures - Normal Conditions of Transport, Maximum Decay Heat, Maximum Ambient Conditions (100*F Ambient Temperatum, PWR Fuel,24 KW Decay Heat Load, Solar Insolance)............. 3-34 Table 3.4-2 Maximum Component Temperatures - Normal Conditions of Transport, Maximum Decay Heat, Minimum Ambient Conditions (-20*F Ambient Temperature, PWR Fuel,24 KW Decay Heat Imad, No Solar Insolance)..........................................,.................................................................. 3 -3 5 Table 3.4-3 Maximum Component Temperatures - Normal Conditions of Transport, j
Maximum Decay Heat, Minimum Ambient Conditions (-40*F Ambient Temperature, PWR Fuel,24 KW Decay Heat Load, No Solar j
Insolance)......................................................................................................
Table 3.4-4 Maximum Component Temperatures - Normal Conditions of Transport, Maximum Decay Heat, Maximum Ambient Conditions (100'F Ambient Temperature, BWR Fuel,24 KW Decay Heat Load, Solar Insolance)............ 3-37 Table 3.4-5 Maximum Component Temperatures - Normal Conditions of Transport, Maximum Decay Heat, Minimum Ambient Conditions (-20'F Ambient Temperatum, BWR Fuel,24 KW Decay Heat lead, No Solar Insolanc e).............................................................................................
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SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE OFTABLES Table 3.4-6 Maximum Component Temperatures - Normal Conditions of Transport, Maximum Decay Heat, Minimum ambient Conditions (-40'F Ambient Temperature, BWR Fuel,24 KW Decay Heat Load, No Solar Insolance)....................................................................................................... 3 -3 9 Table 3.4-7 TranStor Shipping Cask Thermal Performance Summary for Normal Conditions o f Transport................................................................................. 3-40 Table 3.5-1 Maximum Component Temperatures Hypothetical Accident Conditions
- Fire Conditions: 30 Minutes,1475'F Fire,24 KW Decay Heat.................. 3-46 Table 5.1-1 TranStor Shipping Cask External Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Normal Conditions of Transport 45 GWD - 10 Year Cooled PWR Fuel....................... 5-8 Table 5.1-2 TranStor Shipping Cask Extemal Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Normal Conditions ofTransport 40 GWD - 10 Year Cooled BWR Fuel...................... 5-9 Table 5.1-3 TranStor" Shipping Cask Extemal Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Hypothetical Accident Conditions 45 GWD - 10 Year Cooled PWR Fuel.................................................................................................................5-10 Table 5.1-4 TranStor" Shipping Cask Extemal Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Hypothetical Accident Conditions 40 GWD - 10 Year Cooled BWR Fuel....................................................................................................................5-10 Table 5.2-1 PWR and BWR Fuel Region Gamma Source Strengths and Energy Spectra...............................................................................................................5-13 Table 5.2-2 PWR and BWR Assembly Non-Fuel Region Gamma Source Strengths........ 5-18 Table 5.2-3 PWR and BWR Fuel Neutron Source Strengths (Neutrons /Sec-Cask)........... 5-20 Table 5.3-1 TranStor Shipping Cask Shielding Model Material Descriptions................ 5-31 Table 5.3-2 PWR Fuel Basket Interior Homogenized Material Descriptions..................... 5-32 Table 5.3-3 BWR Fuel Basket Interior Homogenized Material Descriptions..................... 5-33 Table 5.4-1 Relative Bumup level and Source Strengths for PWR Assembly Axial S ub-Sections..................................................................................................... 5-41 Table 5.4-2 Relative Bumup level and Source Strengths for BWR Assembly Axial Sub-Sections....................................................................................................... 5-41 Table 5.4-3 Neutron Flux-to-Dose Conversion Factors 2
- (mrem /hr s neutron /cm -sec)......................................................................... 5-42 2
Table 5.4-4 Gamma Flux-to-Dose Conversion Factors (mrem /hr m y/cm -sec)............... 5-44 Table 5.5-1 PWR Fuel Gamma Source Strengths and Energy Spectra for Alternate Bumup Levels (y/sec-cask).............................................................................. 5-53 Table 5.5-2 BWR Fuel Gamma Source Strengths and Energy Spectra for Altemate l
Bumup Levels (y/sec-cask).............................................................................. 5-54 Table 5.5-3 PWR Fuel Neutron Source Strengths for Altemate Bumup levels (neutmns/sec-cask)........................................................................................... 5 -5 5 Table 5.5-4 BWR Fuel Neutron Source Strengths for Altemate Bumup levels (neutrons /sec-cask).......................................................................................... 5-5 5 Table 5.5-5 PWR Assembly Non-Fuel Region CO-60 Activation Levels for Altemate Fuel Bumup levels (curies / assembly)............................................. 5-56 xii
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE OF TABLES Table 5.5-6 BWR Assembly Non-Fuel Region CO-60 Activation levels for Altemate Fuel Burnup Levels (curies / assembly)............................................ 5-56 Table 5.5-7 Dose Rate Multiplication Factors for Altemate PWR Bumup Levels and Cooling Times........................................................................................... 5-5 8 Table 5.5-8 Dose Rate Multiplication Factors for Alternate BWR Bumup Levels and Cooling Ti mes............................................................
.......... 5-5 8 Table 5.5-9 TranStor Shipipng Cask Extemal Dose Rates (mrcm/hr) for Normal Conditions of Transpon 30 GWD - 5 Year Cooled PWR Fuel................. 5 -5 9 Table 5.5-10 TranStor Shipping Cask External Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Nomial Conditions of Transpon 35 GWD - 6 Year Cooled PWR Fuel......... 5-60 Table 5.5-11 TranStor Shipping Cask Extemal Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Normal Conditions ofTransport 40,000 MWD - 8 Year Cooled PWR. Fuel.......... 5-61 Table 5.5-12 Transtorm Shipping Cask Extemal Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Normal Conditions of Transport 50,000 MWD - 12 Year Cooled PWR Fuel....................................................................................................................5-62 Table 5.5-13 Transtor Shipipng Cask External Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Nomia! Conditions of Transpon 60,000 MWD - 20 Year Cooled PWR Fuel..............................................................................................................5-63 Table 5.5-14 TranStor Shipping Cask Extemal Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Normal Conditions of Transport 30,000 MWD - 5 Year Cooled BWR Fuel.......................................................................................................
.5-64 Table 5.5-15 TranStor Shipping Cask Extemal Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Normal Conditions of Transport 35,000 MWD - 6 Year Cooled BWR Fuel....................................................................................................................5-65 Table 5.5-16 TranStor Shipping Cask Extemal Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Normal Conditions ofTransport 45,000 MWD - 12 Year Cooled BWR Fuel.............. 5-66 Table 5.5-17 TranStor Shipping Cask External Dose Rates'(mrem /hr) for Normal Conditions ofTrensport 50,000 MWD - 14 Year Cooled BWR Fuel.............. 5-67 Table 5.5-18 TranStor Shipping Cwk Extema! Dose Rates (mmm/hr) for Hypothetical Accident Conditions 30,000 MWD - 5 Year Cooled PWRFuel.........................................................................................................5-67 Table 5.5-19 TranStor Shipping Cask Extemal Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Hypothetical Accident Conditions 35,000 MWD - 6 Year Cooled PWR Fuel...............................................................................................................5-68 Table 5.5-20 TranStor Shipping Cask External Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Hypothetical Accident Conditions 40,000 MWD - 8 Year Cooled PWR Fuel..................................................................................................................5-68 Table 5.5-21 TranStor Shipping Cask Extemal Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Hypothetical Accident Conditions 50,000 MWD - 12 Year Cooled PWRFuel...............................................................................
..... 5-69 Table 5.5-22 Transtor Shipping Cask Extemal Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Hypothetical Accident Conditions 60,000 MWD - 20 Year Cooled PWRFuel......................................................................................................5-69 xiii
s SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE OF TABLES Table 5.5-23 TranStor Shipping Cask External Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Hypothetical Accident Conditions 30,000 MWD - 5 Year Cooled BWRFuel.......................................................................
..................... 5 -7 0 Table 5.5-24 TranStor Shipping Cask External Dose Rates (mrem /hr) fc.
Hypothetical Accident Conditions 35,000 MWD - 6 Year Cooled BWRFuel.........................................................................................................5-70 Table 5.5-25 TranStor Shipping Cask External Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Hypothetical Accident Conditions 45,000 MWD - 12 Year Cooled BWRFuel...........................................................................................................5-71 Table 5.5-26 Transtor Shipping Cask External Dose Rates (mrem /hr) for Hypothetical Accident Conditions 50,000 MWD - 14 Year Cooled BWRFuel..........................................................................................................5-71 Table 5.5-27 Gamma Source Strength Comparison for Stainicss Steel vs. Zircaloy C lad P WR Fuel............................................................................................... 5-74 Table 5.5-28 Gamma Source Strength Comparison for Stainless Steel vs. Zircaloy Cl ad B WR Fuel..............................................................................................
Table 6.1-1 24-Assembly P WR Basket.............................................................................. 6-2 Table 6.1 20-Assembly PWR Basket.............................................................................. 6-3 Table 6.1-3 61 -Assembly BWR Basket.................................................................................. 6-5 Table 6.1-4 60-Assembly BWR B asket............................................................................... 6-6 Table 6.2-1 Characteristics ofTranStor PWR Design Basis Fuel Assemblics.................. 6-7 Table 6.2-2 Characteristics ofTranStor BWR Design Basis Fuel Assemblies................. 6-9 Table 6.3-1 Materi al Densi ties............................................................................................. 6-3 0 Table 6.3-2 KENO-VA Material Densities (atoms /bam-cm).............................................. 6-31 Table 6.5-1 Key Physical Parameters of the UO2 Critical Experiments............................. 6-47 Table 6.5-2 UO2 Fuel Benchmark Analysis Results for the Scale-4.1 CSAS25 Code i
Sequence.............................................................................................................6-49 Table 7.0- 1 Fastener Torque Values........................................................................................ 7-2 Table 8.2-1 TranStorm Shipping Cask Maintenance Program Schedule.......................... 8-13 xiv
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SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 In general, the TranStor PWR basket has a capacity of 24 fuel assemblies and the BWR basket has a capacity of 61 BWR fuel assemblies. Damaged fuel assemblies are canistered, and a limited number may be shipped with intact assemblies but in specific basket locations in the PWR case. The PWR basket can accommodate up to four damaged assemblies while the BWR basket can accommodate up to 8 damaged assemblies. The details of the contents of the fuel basket types are presented in Section 1.2.4.
Definition of major terminology used throughout this SAR is provided below. Since this SAR addresses only the off-site shipping of the irradiated fuel, the term "TranStor" cask" or
" cask" is used to refer to the Tranftor Shipping Cask. The term "TranStor Basket" or
" basket" is used to refer to both the TranStorm PWR and BWR baskets where the discussion is common to both baskets. Whcre the discussion is unique to the PWR or the BWR configurations, the basket is identified separately as the "TranStor PWR Basket" or the "TranStor" BWR Basket." The discussion of features unique to each configuration is handled in subsections, as appropriate, within each chapter. The TranStor* Shipping Cask is assigned Category I based on a maximum package activity in excess of the values defining the lower limit for Category I (see Chapter 5.0). The Transport Index is zero (0) based on Chapter 6.0 analyses.
The Design Criteria for the TranStor* Shipping Cask, including that for fabrication and i
welding, is contained in Chapter 2.0, Subsection 2.1.2.
Mechanical properties and specifications of package materials are contained in Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.
Definition of Maior Terminolony TranStor Basket: The basket is the stainless steel welded container in which intact fuel assemblies, damaged fuel, or fuel debris is stored and shipped. It consists of an assembly of
- sleeves inserted in a shell closed by a welded shield lid and a welded structural lid.
Damaned Fuel: Damaged fuel are fuel assemblies that can be handled by normal means with known or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks. Damaged fuelis stored in damaged fuel cans.
TranStor Damaced (a.k.a. Failed) Fuel Can: Damaged fuel cans are specially designed containers for damaged fuel and are placed in a basket. These cans are closed but not sealed.
Fuel particulate and other loose items are retained by screens in the can bottom and lid.
l Fuel Debris: - Fuel debris is fuel with known or suspected defects, such as severed rods, or loose fuel pellets and fuel pellet fragments. Fuel debris includes fuel assembly metal fragments such as portions of fuel rods and grid assemblies. Fuel assemblies that cannot be handled by normal means due to fuel cladding damage are considered to be fuel debris. Fuel debris is stored in fuel debris cans.
j 1-7
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TranStorm Fuel Debris Can: Fuel debris cans are specially designed enclosures for fuel debris, and are stored in a basket.
TranStorm Shinni.nc Cask: The cask designed to transport baskets. The cask consists of the l cask body and a closure lid. The cask body consists of an inner cavity containing a basket, inner and outer shells, lead gamma shield between inner and outer shells, neutron shielding material outside the outer shell and on the cask bottom, and a carbon steel jacket around the side neutron shielding material with a stainless steel shielding cover on the bottom. The cask is provided with four lifting trunnions and two removable rotating trunnions for lifting and handling purposes, respectively.
TranStor System: A multi-purpose system designed for the safe off-site transportation and on-site storage of irradiated nuclear fuel. The system consists of a TranStor
- Basket, TranStorm Shipping Cask with impact limiters, an on-site storage cask, and an on-site transfer cask. The basket and the shipping cask with impact limiters, cradle, tiedowns, and personnel barrier are the components used for the off-site shipping of the irradiated fuel.
Containment Boundary: The containment boundary consists of the packaging that contains the radioactive contents being shipped and is defined in SAR Section 4.
Intact Fuel Assembly: Intact fuel assemblics are fuel assemblies that can be handled by normal means: (1) without known or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks; or (2) with missing fuel rod (s) that is replaced by dummy rod (s) minimally displacing an amount of water displaced by the original rod (s). Intact fuel assemblies are stored in a basket.
Impact Limiters:
Components designed to protect the Transtorm Shipping Cask by substantially reducing the impact forces that occur in a drop event during transport. The impact limiters are designed to fit over each end of the cask and consist of aluminum honeycomb components encased in a stainless steel shell.
l Packane: The TranStor Shipping Cask packaging (cask, basket, impact limiters, and personnel barrier) together with its radioactive contents as presented for shipping. The personnel barrier is physically attached to the cask but does not represent the cask surface for dose rate limit purposes.
Pavload: The contents of the Transtor Shipping Cask, i.e., the loaded TranStor Basket.
l Partial Fuel Assembly: Partial fuel assemblies are fuel assemblies that can be handled by normal means: (1) without known or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks; or (2) with missing fuel rod (s) that is not replaced by dummy rod (s). Partial fuel assemblies are stored in a basket.
Rotation Trunnions: Two removable trunnions located on the bottom forging near the bottom of the cask positioned 180 degrees apart. The rotation trunnions provide the l
l-8 1
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 capability to rotate the TranStor Shipping Cask from the vertical position to the horizontal position, and vice versa.
Liftine Trunnions: Four solid steel cylinders welded to the top forging and outer shell of the cask at 90-degree intervals. The four trunnions extend radially outward from the cask, and are designed to provide redundant lifting capability for the cask.
Independent Spent Fuel Storace Installation OSFSI): The ISFSIis the complex designed and constructed for the interim storage ofintact fuel assemblies, partial fuel assemblies, damaged fuel, or fuel debris as defined by 10CFR72.3.
TranStor Storane Cask: The storage cask is the ventilated structure in which a basket is stored. The storage cask consists of a steel inner liner and a reinforced concrete shell.
TranStorm Transfer Cask: The transfer cask is designed to contain the basket during and i
after loading. The transfer cask is used to transfer the basket containing between the spent
. fuel pool and the storage cask, and the storage cask and the shipping cask.
1.2 PACKAGE DESCRIPTION This section provides a description of the TranStorm Shipping Cask packaging and its components. An illustration of the package (including basket and impact limiters, tiedowns, credle, and personnel barrier) is shown in Figure 1.1-2. The detailed information on the dimensions and materials are provided on the drawings in Section 1.3.4.
1.2.1 PACKAGING 1.2.1.1 GROSS WEIGHT The TranStor Shipping Cask is designed to be either dry or wet loaded. The maximum gross weight of the loaded shipping cask and its lifting yoke coming out of the pool after wet loading is under 125 tons (250,000 lbs) as shown in Tables 1.2-1 and 1.2-2. For plants with cask handling cranes under 125 ton, the 100 ton TranStor Transfer Cask can be used to move the loaded basket from the pool to the shipping cask (dry loading).
The maximum gross transport weight of the TranStor Shipping Cask loaded with PWR fuel is calculated to be approximately 275,000 pounds. The maximum gross transport weight of the cask loaded with BWR fuel is approximately 280,000 pounds. Details of these shipping weights are shown in Tables 1.2-1 and 1.2-2.
Section 2.2 (Chapter 2.0) provides a more detailed tabulation of the Transtor Shipping Cask components and their weights.
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SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 1.2.1.2 MAJOR PACKAGE COMPONENTS 1.2.1.2.1 TranStor Baskets The Transtor design includes two types of fuel baskets. One basket is designed to accommodate PWR fuel, including damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris. The second basket is designed to accommodate BWR fuel, including damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris.
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SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask -
Revision C Docket No.- 71-9268 September 1999 TranStor" Shinoinn Cask Structural Materials Fracture Touchness Regulatory Guide 7.11, " Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment Vessels with a Maximum Wall Thickness of 4 inches (0.1 m)."
Regulatory Guide 7.12, " Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment Vessels with a Wall Thickness
. Greater than 4 inches (0.lm) but not exceeding 12 inches (0.3m)."
TranStor Shinoinn Cask Lininn Trunnions NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants."
e ANSI N14.6, "Special Lining Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds or More" TranStor Fuel Basket Structural Design ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division I, Subsections NC and NG.
Regulatory Guide 7.8, " Load Combinations for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks for Radioactive Material.
NUREG/CR-6322, " Buckling Analysis of Spent Fuel Baskets".
TranStorm Fuel Basket Structural Materials Fracture Toughness Regulatory Guide 7.11, " Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment Vessels with a Maximum Wall Thickness of4 inches (0.1 m)".
1.2.4 CONTENTS OF PACKAGING The TranStor Shipping Cask can accommodate the LWR fuel types listed in Tables 6.2-1 and 6.2-2. Tables 6.2-1 and 6.2-2 give the physical dimensions for each assembly type. The assembly arrays of each assembly type are illustrated in Figures 6.2-1 through 6.2-15. Tables 6.2-1 and 6.2-2 list the maximum assembly uranium loading values treated in the criticality analyses. However, the assemblies are limited to an upper bound uranium loading of 0.469 MTU/ assembly for PWR fuel and 0.197 MTU/ assembly for BWR fuel, due to shielding considerations. For all of the PWR and BWR assembly types listed in Tables 6.2-1 and 6.2-2, the actual assemblies do meet the maximum uranium loading limit. The lengths of the
- baskets vary to accommodate the various fuel assembly lengths. Analyses are conservatively 3
based on bounding weights and axial dimensions.
1-19
SAR -TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 The basket for PWR fuel assemblies has 24 cells to accommodate one of the following:
a) 24 intact assemblies, b) 20 intact assemblies and 4 special cans ofdamaged fuel or fuel debris, c) any intermediate combination (e.g.,22 intact fuel assemblies and 2 special cans).
The basket design allows for storage of fuel with or without control components, burnable l poison assemblies, and thimble plugs.'
The basket for BWR fuel has 61 cells to accommodate one of the following:
a) 61 intact assemblies with or without channels, b) 49 intact assemblies and 12 partial assemblies, c) 57 intact assemblies and 4 special cans of damaged fuel or fuel debris, d) any intennediate combination (e.g.,49 intact assemblies, 8 partial assemblies, and 4 special cans, or 56 intact fuel assemblies,4 partial assemblies, and I special can).
The PWR and BWR baskets also are designed for the storage and transport of higher enriched fuel by reducing the allowed number of fuel assemblies.
These configurations can accommodate only 20 PWR assemblies and 60 BWR assemblies. The details and limitations are presented in Chapter 6.0. The higher enriched 20 PWR assembly configuration has the l four center sleeves of the 24 assembly basket left vacant. The higher enriched 60 BWR assembly configuration has the central sleeve of the 61 assembly basket left vacant.
In addition to the above, the following conditions must always be satisfied for all packages:
The maximum transport weight of any one TranStor Shipping Cask does not exceed the values shown in Tables 1.2-1 and 1.2-2 for PWR and BWR packages.
The total decay heat of the shipping cask contents does not exceed Table 1.2-5 limits.
Radiation levels and leakage are within limits established in 10 CFR 71.47, and 10 CFR 71.51 respectively.
Surface contamination levels are within limits established in 10 CFR 71.87(i).
The fuel assembly bumup levels and cooling times meet the criteria specified in Chapter 5.0, Figure 5.0-1. The minimum cooling time is a function of fuel bumup.
1-20
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 The assembly initial enrichment is equal to or greater than those presented in e
Chapter 5.0, Figure 5.0-2.
The minimum allowable enrichment varies with bumup.
The assembly initial enrichment does not exceed those presented in Chapter 6.0, e
Tables 6.1-1 through 6.1-4. The maximum allowable enrichment varies with assembly type, All damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris are placed in special cans shown in e
the TranStor System drawings. Assemblies and debris shall not be placed in the same can (but may be placed in the same basket).
For the fuel debris, the fissile material quantity does not exceed 10 kg and total plutonium inventory does not exceed 20 Ci per basket.
The plutonium inventory of the fuel debris must be documented consistent with the user's quality assurance program, including preparation, verification and approval by qualified individuals.
1.3 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1.
3.1 REFERENCES
1.1 SNC-96-72SAR, Rev. B," Safety Analysis Report for the TranStor* Storage Cask System," Sierra Nuclear Corporation,1997.
1.3.2 OPERATIONAL SCHEMATICS Figure 1.3-1 provides a flow chart of the various activities that are associated with the operation of the TranStorm Shipping Cask. Detailed procedures are contained in Chapter 7.0 of this SAR.
1.3.3 S_AFETY CLASSIFICATION TranStor Shipping Cask package structures, systems, and components that are important to safety are defined as:
To maintain the conditions required to safely transport spent fuel; To prevent damage to the spent fuel basket during transportation; and To pmvide a reasonable assurance that spent fuel can be transported without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
1-21
~ SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 The equigment/ components that have been identified as important to safety for the TranStor Shipping Cask package are:
TranStor* Shipping Cask Assembly, including the Impact Limiters TranStor* PWR Basket (intemals only) e TranStor* BWR Basket (intemals only)
The equip 4nent/ components that have been identified as not important to safety for the TranStor Shipping Cask package are:
Lifting yoke Shipping cradle /tiedown system e
Transporter
- Personnel barrier 1
l-22
- SAR-TranStor Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE 1.2-3 CONTENTS DECAY HEAT LIMITS FuelType Zircaloy Clad Stainless Steel Clad PWR 24.0 kW 22.0 kW BWR 24.0 kW 23.0 kW p
1-23
SAR - TranSt:r" Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 1
i 1-24
SAR - TranStor" Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK j
l-25
SAR - TranSt:r" Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 i
THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK l
1 l
l l
l 1-26
14 l REDACTED l
- 15. PE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA l
i PER SAR CHAPTER 8.
% TORQUE TO500120 FT-LB.
-}.
SPECIF!ED.
~
%HROME PLATE 0.0002/0.0005 PER 00-C-320.
I
- 19. LIAD AND NEUTRON SHIELDING INTEGRITY SHALL BE DETERblNED BY A GAMMA SCAN AND NElfrRON SCAN, RESPECTNELY, AFTER COOL e
DOWN TO AMBIENT TEMPERATURE. ACCEPTANCE CRITERlA PER SAR I
CHAPTER 8.
e
- 20. CASK CONTAINMENT TO BE HYDR 0 STATICALLY TESTED TO A MINIMUM OF J
90.0 PSIG PER ASME SECTION lil, ARTICLE NB-6000.
21.
j l
I
- 22. LOAD TEST TRUNNIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAR CHAPTER 8.
l
% PORT DIMENSONS SHOWN ARE REFERENCE DIMENSONS.
ACTUAL l
DIMENSIONS AND TOLERANCES TO CONFORM TO SAE Ji92611-3 (150 11926). USE SAE STRAIGHT THREAD BOSS COUNTER BORING TOOL q
e l
JI926 SIZE 3.
% TORQUE TO 190 IN-LB MINIMUM.
- 2.,
I j
'n f
- 4. ;
e DD I
\\
1 SHEAR KEY ASSEMBLY WITH PLUG l
B:
- 7. :
a ROTATION TRUNN!ONS 9.
l g
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/xperturc C,rd k
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504 OW M OR NOWDCLMUNE WUumL ptu 04 M OR NOWDCLMUE WATERAL ND.
E0'D LD. NO.
OR DESGum0N SPJQEAp0N _
NO.
E0'D LD. NO.
OR DESQuFn0N 5_PEWQ 29 2
BEARING BLOCK
[' A!;TW A 240 ' N 1
1 OUTER SHELL (ASTW A 240 PL 3.0 STK
\\ TYPE XW-19 SS )
PL 2.65 THK
{ TYPE XW-19 SS j
30 3
SOCKET SET SCREW 3fA)fftS3TEQ '
2 1
NNER SHELL
{ ASWE SA-240
/ YPE XW-19 SS
(
7/8-9 UNC-2A,1.5 LC PL 1.5 STK T
31 6
SOCKET SET SCREW STNNLESS STEEL 3
1 TOP FORGING i ASWE SA-336 5
1-8 UNC-2A,1.0 LG
( TYPE XW-19 SS 32 1
OUICK CONNECT VALVE SWACELOK 4
1 CLOSURE UD f ASWE SA-240 6.00 THK
{ TYPE XW-19 SS
/
33 12 SOCKET HD. CAP SCREW ASTW A 193 5
1 OUTER BOTTOW FORGING ['ASWESA-336 f 6-32 UNC-2A,.19 LC CRAr
, TYPE XW-19 SS k 34 1
ELASTIC WGAL SEAL HEUC0 FLEX 6
4 UFTING TRUNNION
) ASTW A 705 6
\\ TYPE 630, H115017-4 PWs 35 1
ELASTIC WETAL SEAL HEUC0 FLEX 7
2 A 705 ROTATION TRUNNON
( TYPE 630 H115017-4 Ph 36 16 SEAL RDAINER CUP HEUC0 FLEX 8
1 A 240 SHEAR KEY PLUG
\\ TYPE _304,SS _ y 37 1
WGAUC 0-RING HEUC0 FLEX 9
1 PUsilEEDM ~
PURE LEAD ASTW B29 38 1
ELASTIC WGAL SEAL HEUC0 FLEX 10 1
LOWER TRANSITION SHELL (ISfWA240' 'N PL 2.0 STK TYPE XW-19 SS /
39 1
ELASTIC WGAL SEAL HEUCO FLEX 11 2
QUIClf CONNECT VUE 7gOK 40 1
SE4. PLUG PARKER 12 60 SOCKET HEAD BOLT 58-637 CRADE 2-8 UN-2A. 8.5 LC N07718 41 60 HEUCOIL INSERT EWHART INDUSTRIAL 13 A/R W SHM 1
2-8 THREAD mm_
~
_m 43 3
PLATE
( ASTW A 240
)
14 3
/ TW A 24'O ' N PORT COVER 2.0 STK
( TYPE XW-19 SS 5 (TYPE XW-19 SS J 43 8
1/2" RUPTURE DtSC BRASS 15 36 FN PLATE
.25 STOCK gy (REUEVE AT 3015 PSIG) n x x
16 18 SOCKET HD. SCREW ASME SA-540 CR B24 5/16-18 UNC-2A,1.5 LG.
TYPE 1 NICKEL PLATED llES; E "5EK ASTuh WELD TO BE WULTIPLE PASSES. PT OR WT ALL PASSES. [ACH PASS 16 12 HEX. HD. BOLT ASME A-19 NO GREATER THAN 1/8",
1/4-20 UNC-2A,.50 LG.
GRADE RADERAPH All CIRTH AND LONGITUDINAL WELDS IN ITEMS 2, 3.10
$AC 20 36 NElfTRON SHIELD SHELL ALL EXTERNAL WELDS TO BE CROUND SWOOTH AND ALL INTERNAL WELDS PLATE.25 STOCK ASTM A 36 TO DE GROUND FLUSH. CARE MUST BE TAKEN NOT TO REDUCE BASE 21 1
UPPER TRANSITION SHELL[
45lC6A WETAL THICKNESS.
PL 1.5 STK TYPE XW ALL THREADED SURFACES TO BE FULLY COATED WITH POOL COMPATIBLE 22 1
/
LUBRICANT SUCH AS NEVER SEEZE OR EOUlVALENT.
PLATE 9.25 THK sIXPMM. U9LS, /
23 16 SOCKET f1AT HD. BOLT 50-637
-CONNECTON OF SWACEl.DK VALVE SHALL BE PER WANUFACTURERS 1.25-8 UN-2A 4.75 LC.
GRADE N07718 NSTRUCTIONS. All CONNECT)ONS TO BE VACUUW AND HEUUW LEAK 24 2
STMNLESS STEEL TESTED PER FABRICATION SPECIFICATION.
NAMEPLATE 3g.g
-PERFORM HYDROSTATIC TEST OF CONTMNMENT BOUNDARY PROR TO 25 1
UPPER KUIRON SHELD END DRILUNC DRAIN.
PLATE.25 STOCK PERFORW VI 0F WELDS SPECiflED PER ASME SECTION V ARTICLE 9.
26 1
BOTTOW SHO.D RING MGTO A*479" D ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA TO BE PER ASWE, SECTION lit, ARTICLE NF-5300.
2.0x2.0 STOCK BAR
( TYPE 304 SS
)
PERFORW PT OF WELDS SPECIFIED PER ASME SECTION V, ARTICLE 6.
27 1
BOTTOW SHIELD COVER (
ASTW A 240
)
ACCEPTANCE CRfTERR TO DE PER ASME SECTION lli ARTICLE NB-5300.
.25 STOCK
? TYPE 304 SS
(
PERFORM RT OF WELDS SPECiflED PER ASME SECTION V, ARTICLE 2.
26 A/R BISCO HT-870 OR /
l g
ACCEPTANCE CRITERA PER SECTION lit, ARTICLE NS-5300.
BF-1000,
/
4 WELDS ON C (TNNWENT BOUNDARY WA ERIALS SHAll B IN ACC DANCE f
l/
l
~{
WITH ASME SECTION lit. NB-4400. ALL OTHER STRUCTURAL WELDS v
b i
TO CI IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASWE SECTION lit, NF-4400. CERTiflCATE i
i HOLDERS AND AUTHORtZED NUCLEAR NSPECTORS, AS REERENCED ON cson m I NB/NC/NR/NG-4000, ARE NOT USED.
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%'&#L". J;lfllE """. *"s swa TOROUE TO WINIWUW OF 2500150 FT-LB.
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sa ne me, u se am wm wss==
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TronStor" SHIPPING CASK MAIN ASSEMBLY
- ER710022 FNONE Sht-71-002 Or 6
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10 CA (.135) STK I
2 i
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~
ASSEMBLY 3
12 BOLT IV0E BASE PLATE 1 1/4 STK i
4 A/R MCLE 2 X 2 X 1/8 5
12 BOLT TUDE b
i 82 X.095 WALL l
f 6
12 UPPER DOLT TUDE I-
- 6 X.120 WALL I
7 A/R CUSSET 3/4 STK l REDACTED ]
8 A/R CUSSET 1* STK I
9 A/R PLATE 3/4 STK
)
10 1
LOWIR RING f~
3/4 STK 11 1
CENTER VERTICAL PLATE 1/2 STK 12 1
CEN*ER RING 1/? STK 13 8
ATTACHMENT. PLATE 1/4 STK ~
l 14 8
LOCK NUT 1
1/2-13 UNc q
ROIES.:
?
ALL STRUCTURAL WELDS SHALL DE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME SECTION lit, NF-4400.
I 2.
HALL BE VISUALLY EXAMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME SECTION lit, NF-5360.
3 r1 ELD WELDS SHALL DE PERrORMED AT IMPACT UMITER ASSEMBLY.
4.
UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED, FILLET WELDS SHALL HAVE EQUAL LEGS WITH SIZE COUAL TO THICKNESS Or THINNER MEMBER.
O NONPROPRIETARY
- PEhaUME-m.
CARD
(
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(dso Available on 1
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f101 OfY MM OR NOMDeCLATURE WM NOTES.
1 1
SWR S ELL 1 eERroRM n Or ROOT tmR. ONE-He Or mE mEo e' 75 STx JOINT THICKNESS, AND FINAL SURFACE.
I 1
SHQD UD g
3 HOLI FOR (TEM 4 IN BASKET STRUCTURAL UD TO BE AUGNED WITH HOLES FOR SWAGELOK OUICK CONNECT IN ffEW 2.
3 1
SmVCTURR UD pSCREWS (ITEM 8) TO REPLACE HolST RINGS IN STRUCTURAL UD 4
2 PORT C(NER PLATE (ITEM 3). HolST RINGS ARE AMERICAN DRILL BUSHING PART 173202 OR COUIVARNT. NO SHIM WASHERS MAY BE USED UNDER 7'
.25 STOCK 6
i BACKING RING 4
ffEMS 4 MAY HAVE DiFTERENT THICKNESSES AS LONG AS THEIR
.50 STOCK SQUARE BAR S
INOMDUAL THICKNESSES ARE WORE THAN.5 AND COMBINED TKCKNESS IS >2.5 AND <2.7.
7 A/R CELL ASSEMDLY I4 pTHE FOLLOWING MATERIAL DESIGNATORS ARE USED ON ALL BWR E
8 SOCKET SET SCREWS STAINLESS BASKD ITEMS IDENTIFIED.
I 1/2-6 UNC-2A 2 5 LG STEEL MS - SH[LL AND ATTACHMENTS MATERlAL
.-A/R CELL ASSEMBLY ll I'
304: ASME SA-240. OR SA-479 TYPE 304 304L: ASME SA-240. OR SA-479 TYPE 304L 7
IC 4
SPACER 1 C
[ REDACTED l CONRGURAil0N g1 l REDACTED ]
11 4
SPACER 2 PALL FIELD CLOSURE ELDING TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME u
SECTION RI ARTICLE NC-4400.
12 A/R CELL ASSEMBLY g3 plENGTH WILL VARY DASED ON LENGTH OF FUEL MAXIMUM BASKET I
LENGTH IS 192.25. MAXIMUM CELL LINGTH IS 172.05.
13 A/R CELL ASSEMBLY (2 kPERIUMM Fi/Mi w SPECIFCWELD]S PtR ASME SECTION V
~
(DcTH touALs sAsgy_W7Y LI35 t.5 +/- 0 5) 14,
4 SPACER 1 ARTICLE 6/7. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA TO BE PER ASME SECTION lli CONOGURATION (2 EDAGED y ARTICLE NC-5300-15 4
BORATED ALUMINUM SEE DWG TS8-012 C-SHAPE ITEM 2
%ttSHEETS 2 (ALTERNATNE A) AND 3 (ALTERNATNE B) SHOW 16 46 BORATED ALUMINUM ANGLE SEE DwG TSB-012 ALTERNATE METHOOS Of ASSEMBLY DEPENDING ON POISON I
MATERIALS USED FOR FABRICATE 0N. SELECTED ALTERNATIVE IS SPECIFIED FOR EACH PROJECT.
17 8
SHIM 3/16 STOCK
- 11. DEPENDING ON SLEEVE STACK-UP. SOME OF ITEMS 10.11 AND 14 18 2
EMSKET UFilNG LUG S
S MAY DE TRIMMED TO MNNTAIN CAP OF.25 ACROSS STACKS OF 9 1.0 STOCK AND 7 SLEEWS AND.18 ACROSS STACK OF 3 SLEEVES.
19 4
SHIELD UD SUPPORT S
%ERFORM HEUUM LEAK TEST (LT) OF WELD, ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA TO DE NO LEAKAGE RATE GREATER THAN 1X10E-4 SCC /SEC AT 20 1
PIPE STAINLESS STEEL e10 SCH 160 13 01.5 PSIC PRESSURE. PERFORM PT OF WELD AFTER HEUUM LIAK TEST.
21 1
OUICK CONNECT STAINLESS STEEL SWAGELOCK j
I
- 1. GEMINI BALL VALVE STMNLISS STEEL INSPECTED. PERFORM VT OF ALL WELDS SPEClflED PER ASME SECTION V, ARTICLE 9.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA TO BE PER ASME DMSION 1. SECTION lit, NG-5361. IN ADDfTION. NO IMPERFECTIONS 23 1
1* NPT CLOSE NIPPLE STMNLISS STEEL CHARACTERIZED AS A CRACK OR LACK Of FUSION ARE PERM!SSIBLE.
2s 1
AlifN HEAD PLUG SINNLESS STEEL NECTIONS TO BE He LEAK TESTED AT 14.7 PSIG MINIMUM 1-11 1/2 NPT 13-6 PRESSURE. ANY ITEM WTH A LIAK RATE GREATER THAN 1.OC-4 25 A/R TE A 500 GR.
OR i
STD CC/S OR NDICATIONS Of INDICATIONS OF PERABILITY SHALL BE REPAIRED OR PIPUCED AND RE-TESTED.
26 A/R CORNER PLATE CS WIN TILID 20KSI p AN OPDON, ITEM 21 MAY BE REPLACED WITH A BALL VALVE 11 CAGE AND CONNECTlf*C NIPPLE (ITEMS 22 AND 23). NSTAL1ED HDGHT 27 A/R DORATED ALUMINUM SHEET p
Or EML1 VALVE AND NIPPLE MUST BE LESS THAN 3.75" ABOVE
.085 1.006 BOTTOM OF 3.82* DEEP HOLE IN ITEM 2.
28 A/R HOLDING STRIP CS WIN YlELD 20KSI 19 GAGE hi ALL EXTERIOR AND INTERIOR SURFACES EXCEPT ITEM 27.
COATING iS TO BE PER SNC-213.03.27, APPUCATION AND 29 A/R HOLDING SHEET CS WIN YlELD 20KSI 19 GAGE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA PER MANUrACTURER'S RECOMMENDATION.
o g ol L
N Uptc3 CDEM M N ED DNENSCHS g*qrs NON-PROPRIETARY a a %'"""' A AON W
, as xx *m
- r
.xem ex *.ms ruct SOtutlOns
_ ew no en m se tax
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hWem TIEWi TronStor* SYSTEM BWR BASKET ASSEMBLY 571004A l~NONE
- ~ IR-71-004 for a f S
)
NOTES CONTINUED:
EM BI>00 DONG ON DE SPECTED CEE KTUURM. USE ONE Of DE FOLL CQ1 ALTDUMTM3 FOR POGON 9m ATTACHE TO 00 VOLE ELL USE NONPROPRIETARY STis",%T '.,a" "SaEr I' """" 5^"' ""
ALTEDAM C: Sa SET 7.
ALTERNAM D-SEE STET 8.p 2
8
%DNG ON THE SPEC #ID CEL1 ALTERNAM. USE Ott Of THE FOLL CD1 ALTERNAMS FOR P0GON 9ET ATTACHWENT TO NNER COL USE SAME ALTERNAM FOR ALL CQ1$ WITMN SAME BASKET.
y A[
AfAfffffffffAI.
A fgngy f h sh :
f nitmam 5 Sa 9m a Lj i
i y
13 All WELDS NOT EOLARED TO BC PT OR WT SHALL BE VtSLW1Y HSPECTED.
O
...l PERf0RW VT Of ALL WELDS PER ASWE SECTION V ARTOI 9.
ACCEPTANCE S
-i---
CRffERIA TO DE PER ASME DMSION 1. SECTX)N til. NG-5361. N ADDm0N.
U l3 3 NO IMPERFECTION CHARACTERIZED AS A CRACK OR LACK Of FUSION 6 U
j g
PERW!SSIBLE.
j
- SHEET 2
%NECTIONS TO BE He LIAK TESTED AT 14.7 PS3G WIN 1WUW P ANY
+
}
ITEW WTTH A LIAK RATE CREATER THAN 1E-4 STD CC/S OR NDICATIONS Of l
NOPOWMU1Y SHAL1 DE REPAIRED OR REPLACED AND RE-TESTED.
- 15. ITEMS 10.19. 20, 21 & 22 TO BE HSTAU.ID WTTH NE0LUDE 100 THREAD SEAUNT. ALL OTHER THREADED SURFACES TO BE FULLY CO COWPATIBLE LUDRICANT SUCH AS TRPRO N-5000 OR EOUNALINT.
.q
% AN OPin0N, ITEW 20, OUICK CONNECT WAY BE REPLACED Wf7H A BALL s '\\
+
VALVE AND CONFECTING HIPPLI (ITEW 21 AND 22). NSTAl1[D HDGHT Of g
BALL VALVE AND NIPPLI WUST BE LESS THAN 3.75* ABOVE BOTTOW Of 3.82*
DEEP HOLI N ITEM 2.
s l
l
-2 TYP
- 17. ITEW 9 uAY BE USED W THE TOP FOUR POWS TO ACCOWOOATE THE g
VARATION N STACK-UP EIGHT.
+
l REDACTED l g
% CQ1 CONflGURAtl0N l2 6 W:fH TTEWS 27 D TO THE h
OPPOSTTE SIDE.
%W 31 REQUIRED FOR ONE CORNER ASSEMBLY PER BASKET. %
IS D h'
% FELD CLOSURE WELDING 10 BE IN ACCORDANCE WTTH ASWE SECTION N1, v
m ARTICLE NC-4400.
l 14 TYP l
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l 10 x
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=.= --
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i.25
'68 0 TOP VIEW
[g gfY PWtf OR N0tOICLATURE MAfDuel frDi QTY PWtf oft 800MDCLATUIE WATURAL A
sE0'0 LO. 680.
cet DOCarn0N SPEQRCADON 88 0.
REQ'D t.D. 880.
Oft O(304Pn0N
$PECECAHON 1
1 PWR SHRL 28 A/R PolSON S ET p
%WS 7
PL.75 STK
.118 1.006 2
1 SHIELD UD 29 A/R SORATED ALUWINUW g
pgS 30 A/R OCK 3
4 ASSEMBLY p
31 A/R PLATE CJRKfN STE'[L --
4 2
PORT COVER PLATE pg5 11 GAGE (.1198) 5 8
SHlW pg5 g
25 STOCK
1 BACKWG RING g5 SPE0 FED IN SPECOCATION SNC-213.03.27. COATINGS TO BE APPUED AND SOUARE BAR.50 STOCK M:CEPTANCE CRITERIA PER WANUfACTURER'S RECOWWENDATIONS.
7 4
CROSS LOCKING PLATE pWS 2.50x1.75m.75 STOCK
- PC PT ROOT LA1TR, ONE-HALT Of THE WELDED JOINT THICKNESS, 8
1 STRUCTURAL UD ASSEMBLY pWS
- SCREM (ITEM 10) TO REPLACE HOIST RINGS N STRUCTURAL UD (fiEW 8). HOIST 9 %
MAIN CROSS f
___l AbbbM0b LR W
RINGS ARE AWDtlCAN DRILL BUSHNG PART ( 23202 OR EQUMLENT NO SHlW WASKRS WAY BE USED UNDER TT H0tST RlHG FLANGE.
10 8
SOCKET SET SCREWS STNNESS
'p 1 1/2-6 UNC-2A, 2.5 LG STEEL
'fTEWS 4 WAY HAVE Dir1TRENT THICKNESSES AS LONG AS THOR INDMDUAL THICKNESSES U
4 NtE WORE THAN.5 AND COWBINED THICKNESS IS >2.5 AND <2.7.
$N p
Tet FOLLOWNG WATERIAL DESIGNATORS ARE USED ON ALL PWR BASKET DRAWINGS:
12 12 RETMNER WS - SHQ1 AND ATTACHWENT WATERMLS
.25 STOCK ASTW A-516 CR. 70 304: ASWE SA-240 OR SA-479, TYPE 304
,3 4
DOUBLE CELL' ASSEMBLY CONnG.(2 304L-ASWE SA-240 OR SA-479, TYPE 304L gNGru Wilt v4Ry BASED ON ENGTH Of FUEL mmW BASKf7 trNG1Fl5 _
t4 4
CORNER CELL ASSEMBLY p
199 9L EArtWulLCftt ENGTilfS iMfMCQHENGTh EQUALS BA5KEf~CAWTr
@ 13(i6.5).'HR Pdt. cEELItNGQ IQuALS 161.0 AND BASKET LENGTH EQUALS 181.1 16 STOCK OUANiTTY WILL VARY DEPENDING ON FUEL lfNGTH.
8 mm E EW M pm PERf0RW He LEAK TEST (LT) Of WELD. ACCEPTANCE CRITERM TD BE NO LEAKACE RATE GREATER THAN 1X10E-4 SCC /SEC AT 13.0 +1.0
.50 PSIG PRESSURE.
17 2
UFTING LUG pWS RRFORW FT/MT Of WELDS SPECarlCD PER ASWE SECTION V, ARTICLI 6/7.
'E 4
SHIELD UD SUPPORT pWS r.;CEPTANCE CRITERIA TO BE PER ASME SECTION NI, //TIClf NC-5300.
.50 STOCK OEPENDING ON VHE SPE0f1ED CELL ALTERNATIVE, USE ONE Of THE FOLLOWING CELL 1 SCH 160 ATERtMTNES FOR POISON SHET ATTACHWENT TO CORNER CELL USE SAWE ALTERPMTNE FOR All CELLS WITHIN SAWE BASKET.
20 1
OUICK CONNECT STAINLESS STEEL ALTERNATNE B AND C: SE SHEETS 7,9.
SWAGELOCK ALTERNATNE D: SEE SHET 8-21 1
1* GEWINI BALL VALVE STAINLESS STEEL APEFf'URE 22 1
1* NPT CLOSE NIPPLE STAINLISS STEEL p
CARD 23 1
ALLEN HEAD PLUG
$TAINLISS STEEL 1-11 1/2 NPT M
Also Available on 24 A/R STRUCTURAL TUBE f
f TS 5x2x.iB8 STOCK 3 Aperture Card 25 A/R STRUCTURAL TUBE i
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SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cesk Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 2.1.2.4 Fabrication The TranStor Shipping Cask confinement boundary is fabricated in accordance with Article NB-4000 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III (Reference 2.2).
The TranStor Fuel Basket is fabricated in accordance with NC-4000, for the confinement boundary and welds thereto, and NG-4000 for the internal fuel support structures and welds thereto. Other welding on structural materials for the shipping cask and fuel basket is in accordance with NF-4000. Because the cask and the basket are not N-stamped, Certificate Holders and Authorized Nuclear Inspectors, as referenced in NB/NC/NF/NG-4000, are not used.
1 2 a
SAR - TranSt:r Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268-September 1999 2.3.1 -TRANSTOR SHIPPING CASK AND BASKET MATERIALS Primary structural components of the TranStor Shipping Cask are made of stainless steel and components of the TranStor basket are designed to be fabricated of stainless steel (shell) and carbon steel (intemals). The specific materials used for the system components, including fasteners, are shown in the Chapter 1.0 drawings. The structural evaluations use the l bounding properties and allowable stresses.
Mechanical properties of materials are presented in Tables 2.3-1 through 2.3-14.
Certain materials (such as poison plates, neutron shield, and lead) are incorporated in the system only to provide radiation shielding and criticality control; therefore, their strength is neglected for structural qualification of the NCT and HAC load cases. Other non-structural material properties, such as thermal expansion coefficients and weight, are considered in the structural analyses of the cask. The properties of shielding materials are pres'ented in Tables 2.3-15 and 2.3-16. The properties of the basket coating materials are listed in Table 2.3-17.
2.3.2 IMPACT LIMITER MATERIALS The impact limiters used on the TranStor Shipping Cask are manufactured from aluminum honeycomb encased in steel shells. The impact limiters are attached to the top and bottom end of the cask with threaded steel rods. Details of the impact limiters are depicted in the Chapter 10 drawings. The impact limiters are constmeted in 30" pie-shaped sections manufactured from bi-directional aluminum honeycomb (crosscore). These pie-shaped sections have strength directions which are oriented radially and along the axis of the cask. In the radial direction each pie-shaped section consists and inner and outer sector with each made up of blocks bonded on axial planes. There is no bonding between honeycomb blocks or other components within the impact limiter housing. At the end of each impact limiter consists of annular material in 30' sections which are also not bonded to the other core.
The impact limiters dissipate the energy associated with a cask drop through compression and crushing of the honeycomb. The energy absorbed is equal to the area under the force-deflection curve for the impact limiter material (no energy dissipation credit is taken for impact limiter material that is not cmshed). Strength properties for the material are derived from the manufacturer's data and will be verified during the limiter qualification testing. A typical stress-strain diagram for aluminum honeycomb is presented in Figure 2.3-2. As shown in the figure, the stress-strain curve is essentially flat at the specified cmsh strength value except for the initial peak. This peak is attributed to the beginning of the aluminum cell buckling. It does not need to be considered for the side or oblique drops since the contact area l
associated with the peak deflection is small and does not result in excessive load on the cask.
)
At the ends of the impact limiters the material surrounding the annular core is pre-cmshed to avoid the peak. Also in the case of oblique and side drops stress normal to the plane of cmshing depends on the angle of crush. The manufacturer's data and material tests indicate l
crosscore honeycomb is 30% stronger midway between the two strong directions.
2-19
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 A Y l
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SAR - TranStor Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 2.
10.6 REFERENCES
2.1 Not used.
2.2 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, The American Society of Mechanical Engineers,1992 with all addenda up to and including Summer f
1994.
1 2.3 Not used.
2.4 ANSI N14.6,"American National Standard for Radioactive Materials - Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4,500 kg) or More," American National Standards Institute,1993.
2.5 ARMCO Product Data Bulletin No: S-22, "ARMCO 17-4PH Precipitation-Hardening Stainless Steel," ARMCO, Inc.
2.6 Zimmer, A. et al., " Development of Circumferential Honeycomb Impact Limiters for Defense High Level Waste Shipping Cask," Waste Management, Tuscon, AZ,1988.
2.7 Biggs, J., " Introduction to Structural Dynamics," New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964.
2.8 Tietz, T.E., " Determination of the Mechanical Properties of High Purity Lead and a 0.05% Copper-Lead Alloy," Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park,
' CA, WADC Technical Report 57-695, ASTIA Document No. 151165, April 1958.
2.9 Gallagher, C.,."NL Industries Intemal Test Report on Tensile Properties of Chemical Lead at Elevated Temperatures," Central Research Laboratory, Highstown, NJ, Febmary 1976.
2.10 Roark, R.J., Formulas for Stress and Strain,5th Edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, Inc,1975.
2.11 Not used.
l 2.12 Evans, J.H., " Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks, Volume 8, Experimental Study of the Stress-Strain Properties of Lead Under Specified Impact Conditions," ORNLfrM-1312, Vol. 8, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak
]
Ridge, TN, August 1970.
1 2.13 Shigley, J.E., Mechanical Engineering Design, Third Edition, McGraw-Hill J
Book Company,1977.
2-156
-)
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE 3.2-1 THERMAL PROPERTIES OF STAINLESS STEEL Property (units)/
Value @
Temperature
-58 F 400'F 900'F 3
Conductivity (Btu /hr-in-F) 0.656 0.867 1.058 Density (lb/in')
0.282 0.282 0.282 l
2 Specific Heat ' (Btu /lbm-F) 0.111 0.129 0.138 l
I 3
Emissivity 0.48 0.48 0.48 l
Emissivity (Ext. Coating) 3 0.90 0.90 0.90 l
Emissivity (Int. Coating)3 0.77 0.77 0.77 l
' Reference 3.18 Reference 3.19
- From coating qualification report l
3-4
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE 3.2-2 TIIERMAL PROPERTIES OF C-MN FERRITIC STEEL Property (units)/
Value @
Temperature
-10*F 200'F 400"F 650"F 900 F 3
Conductivity (Btu /hr-in-F) 2.26 2.30 2.23 2.04 1.84 Density (lb/in')
0.284 0.284 0.284 0.284 0.284 l
2 Specific Heat 3 (Btu /lbm-F) 0.094 0.116 0.127 0.139 0.155 Emissivity 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 l
3 Emissivity (basket coating) 3 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 l
Emissivity (cask coating)3 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 l
' Reference 3.18 2 Reference 3.19 8 From coating qualification report l
3-5
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE 3.2-3 THERMAL PROPERTIES OF C-MN-SI FERRITIC STEEL Property (units)/
Value @
Temperature
-10*F 100'F 300'F 400'F 900'F Conductivity ' (Btu /hr-in 'F) 1.89 1.99 2.03 2.02 1.74 Density (lb/in )
0.284 0.284 0.284 0.284 0.284 l
2 3
Specific Heat 3 (Btu /lbm-F) 0.095 0.11 0.123 0.128 0.156 Emissivity 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 l
3 Emissivity (coated) 3 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 l
' Reference 3.18 2 Reference 3.19 8 From coating qualification report 1
3-6
SAR - TranStor Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE 3.2-4 THERMAL PROPERTIES OF HELIUM Property (units)/
Value @
Temperature
-27'F 32*F 513'F 1017"F 1
1 Conductivity ' (Btu /hr-in *F) 0.0063 0.0069 0.0112 0.0151 Specific Heat ' (Btu /lbm-F) 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 l
2 3
4 4
4 4
Density (lbm/in )
5.96 10 5.96 10 5.96 10 5.96 10 l
' Reference 3.20 3-7
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE 3.2-5 THERMAL PROPERTIES OF POISON MATERIAL Property (units)/
Value @
Temperature 100'F 500 F 752*F 1112*F i
Conductivity for Aluminum Cladding 10.61 10.72 10.45 9.95 (Btu /hr-in-F) 2 Conductivity for the Core Matrix 3.119 2.971 2.815 2.562 (Btu /hr-in 'F) 3 Density for Aluminum Cladding 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.098 l
3 (Ib/in )
Density for the Core Matrix 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090 l
3 3
(Ib/in )
Emissivity (treated) d 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 l
' Reference 3.22 2 Calculated based on References 3.11,3.21, and 3.22
' Reference 3.11
- Fromcoating qualification report 3-8
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE 3.2-7 THERMAL PROPERTIES OF LEAD' Property (units)/
Value @
Temperature 81 F 261*F 621*F Conductivity ' (Btu /hr-in-F) 1.69 1.63 1.50 2
3 Density (lbm/in )
0.410 0.410 0.410 l
Specific Heat 2 (Btu /lbm *F) 0.031 0.032 0.034 3
Emissivity 0.60 0.60 0.60 l
' Reference 3.24 2 Reference 3.25 8 Reference 3.26
l 1
3-10
SAR - TranStor Shipping Cask.
Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 3.3.3 TEMPERATURE SPECIFICATIONS FOR NEUTRON SHIELD The safe operating temperature range of the solid neutron shield material is determined to be
-40'F to +338'F based on manufacturer's data. This is based on tests of shield material under conservative conditions. Thermal analyses of the casks under NCT are presented in Section 3.4. The results of these analyses show that the maximum temperature of the radial neutron shield is 335'F and remains below the safe operating temperature of 338*F. For the HAC fire transient, the radial neutron shield is conservatively assumed to remain intact throughout the fire and be removed at the end of the fire. This assumption is conservative because it results in larger quantities of energy being transferred into the cask during the fire and lesser quantities being rejected from the cask after the 30 minute fire.
3.3.4 TEMPERATURE SPECIFICATION FOR CASK STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Reference 3.32) permits a maximum operating temperature of 800 F for stainless steel when used for structural purposes. This ASME limit is applied to the cask components under all conditions, except for a 30-minute fire accident at 1475'F, as specified in 10 CFR 71.73(c)(4).
10 CFR 71.73(c) specifies that a fire be postulated after the sequential application of other hypothetical accidents in the evaluation of the TranStor system. Therefore, the only components that need to perfonn a structural function after the fire are those that comprise the cask pressure containment boundary. The maximum intemal pressure stress during the worst conditions (including the HAC fire)is 1.89 ksi. ASME Code Case N-47 provides the i
design allowable stress limits for stainless steels at elevated temperatures for limited periods.
For the period of 10 hrs at 1500 F, Sm is 5.3 ksi. Therefore, a short-term excursion to 1500 F is acceptable.
Carbon steel is used in the neutron shield cooling fins an:1 skin. Although the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code permits a maximum operating temperature of only 700 F, this material performs no structural function during or after the HAC fire. Since the melting temperature of this material is above 2500*F, the material would stay in place throughout this event.
-3.3.5 TEMPERATURE SPECIFICATION FOR BASKET SLEEVE ASSEMBLY
. For the A-516 Gr. 70 and A-500 Gr. C, a maximum operating temperature of 750 F is taken due to minimal structural property degradation at this temperature. The melting point for carbon'and stainless steels is above 2500 F per Reference 3.18. However, the coating temperature limit for this component is 850 F. Thus, a peak excursion temperature limit of 850'F is established (coating qualification report).
3-18
SAR-TranStsr* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 3.3.6 TEMPERATURE SPECIFICATION FOR BORATED ALUMINUM POISON SHEET The borated aluminum poison sheets have a manufacturers maximum short term dry temperature limit of 1000 F and a maximum long-term dry temperature limit of 850 F (Reference 3.11).
3.3.7 TEMPERATURE SPECIFICATION FOR BASKET SHELL The basket shell is designed as a structural component and is governed by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Reference 3.32). However, the temperature limit on the basket shell is established by the external surface coating. This coating has a long-term exposure temperature limit of 475 F (coating qualification report) and a peak excursion temperature limit of 530 F for a maximum duration of 4 % hours.
3.3.8 TEMPERATURE SPECIFICATION FOR FUEL Tne TranStor" Shipping Cask is designed to limit fuel clad temperatures to below levels J
where the clad degradation may lead to fuel failure. The value of 570 C is demonstrated to provide adequate margin against clad degradation for transport durations. This value is documented in published data for zircaloy-clad fuel (References 3.1 and 3.2) and has been used in previous licensing actions.
The allowable temperatures for stainless steel clad fuel are documented in EPRI report TR-106440, Evaluation Of Expected Lwr Stainless Steel Clad Fuel Behavior In Long-Term Dry j
' Storage (Reference 3.16). The report recommends a long-term temperature limit of 430 *C.
3.4 THERMAL EVALUATION FOR NORMAL CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT This section provides thermal evaluation of the TranStor Shipping Cask package under NCT as specified in 10 CFR 71.71. The results demonstrate that the package maintains its design basis temperatures under these conditions; i.e., all temperature limits discussed in Section 3.3 are met. The results of the thermal evaluation also demonstrate that the cask components important-to-safety are maintained within their safe operating temperature ranges.
3.4.1 THERMAL MODELS Thermal analysis of the TranStor Shipping Cask is performed using the ANSYS computer program. The finite element models used in the analysis of the cask under NCT is described in this section. The bounding conditions are shown in Table 3.1-1. The thermal analysis considers a decay heat of 24 kW and the following environmental conditions:
1.
Ambient temperature = 100 F, full solar insolance 2.
Ambient temperature = -20 F, no solar insolance 3.
Ambient temperature = -40 F, no solar insolance j
3-19
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 3.4.1.1 ANALYTICAL MODELS 3.4.1.1.1 Cask Axisymmetric Model The ANSYS axisymmetric model used to analyze the cask under NCT is shown in Figures 3.4-1 and 3.4-2. The element types used to constmet the subject model are PLANE 55 (2-D
)
thermal solid element used for all " structural" entities and conduction driven helium gaps)
J and the SURF 19 (surface effect element). Depending on geometry and location, the SURF 19 element is used to represent convection, conduction and radiation interaction in the model.
AUX 12 coupled with the MATRIX 50 super elements were used to model radiation interaction between the top fuel surface and adjacent coated basket surfaces and the cells within the spacer itself. These are used because the assumption of unity for the view factor is inappropriate in these regions.
The model includes the following components:
1.
Shipping cask:
neutron shield and its shell inner and outer steel shells lead shield shell top and bottom forgings closure lid 2.
Basket shell, lid and bottom plate 3.
Basket sleeve assemblies and fuel (modeled as a homogeneous region)
At the cask exterior surface, heat is transferred by means of convection and radiation to the air surrounding the cask. In the model, the convection coefficient is comprised of the free convection film coeflicient and radiation (see Section 3.2.6). No heat transfer mechanism is modeled through the top or the bottom of the cask to or from ambient because of the insulating effect of the impact limiters.
The radiative heating of the sun (insolation) on the cask surface is included in the thermal boundary conditions. The insolation required by 10 CFR 71 is to be applied over a 12-hour period evaluated in the steady state (applied over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />). The following calculation 4
provides the heat flux due to insolation on a curved surface.
l 3-20
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 4.0 CONTAINMENT The containment boundary for the package is described in Section 4.1. The package is shown to meet the containment requirements of 10 CFR 71.51 (Reference 4.1) for Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and 10 CFR 71.53 for Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.
4.1 CONTAINMENT' BOUNDARY The TranStor Shipping Cask's containment boundary consists of the following components:
1.
Inner shell 2.
Bottom forging 3.
Closure lid and bolts 4.
Top forging -
5.
Closure lid inner 0-ring 6.
Drain port cover plate, bolts, and inner O-ring 7.
Vent port cover plate, bolts, and inner O-ring The test port cover plate is outside the containment boundary formed by the closure lid and inner 0-ring. The containment boundary of the shipping cask main assembly is shown in Figure 4.1-1.
4.1.1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL The containment vessel consists of a 1.5 inch thick inner shell, a 7.4 inch thick top forging, a 9.25 inch thick bottom forging with a drain port, and a 6 inch thick closure lid with a vent port.
The containment vessel components are fabricated from austenitic steel satisfying the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III specifications (Reference 4.2). The containment boundary is illustrated in the General Arrangement drawings in Section 1.3.
4.1.2 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS The TranStor" Shipping Cask primary containment boundary has three penetrations for loading, venting, draining, backfilling and leak testing.
1.
Closurelid 2.
Drain port 3.
Vent post 41
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SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 1
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Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999
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t FIGURE 5.3-1B NORh1AL CONDITION SIIIELDING h10 DEL GEOh1ETRY (CASK BOTTOh! END) 5-24
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 Section 2.7.1.3). Maximum size voids are conservatively assumed to exist at the bottom and top of the lead shield simultaneously, even though a void would only exist in one of the two locations during the HAC.
As discussed in Section 5.4.3.4, the gamma dose rates presented for HAC in Tables 5.1-3 and 5.1-4 have also been adjusted to account for the possible effects of horizontal lead slumping in the gamma shield (which may occur after a cask side drop). Therefore, the HAC shielding
)
analysis results are conservatively based upon worst case gaps appearing at the top, bottom, and sides of the lead gamma shield simultaneously. Therefore, the results bound the effects of l
any possible type of slumping in the lead shield.
L Other than the three differences discussed above (i.e., the absence of the neutron shield stmetures, the absence of the impact limiters, and the presence of gamma shield gaps to model lead slump), the HAC shielding model geometry is identical to that of the NCT shielding model.
l As discussed in Section 5.1, dose rates are calculated on the package surface, on the personnel l barrier surface, two meters from the side of the rail car (package surface), and two meters l
from the ends of the bottom and top impact limiters. The personnel barrier forms a cylindrical surface that extends between the top and bottom impact limiters, with a radius equal to that of the impact limiters. The attenuation of the personnel barrier material was conseivatively not modeled in either the NCT or HAC shielding analyses. The location of the personnel barrier outer surface was only used to define the detector locations in the NCT analyses.
The 10 mrem /hr dose rate limit applies on the vertical planes which are two meters from the rail car sides and rail car ends. In the radially symmetric shielding models, the two meter side dose rates are calculated on the surface of a cylinder which has a 148.74 inch radius and is centered around the cask system centerline. The 148.74 inch radius is based upon an assumed rail car width of 140 inches (the width of the actual package). Because the exact rail car length dimensions are variable, the cask end dose rates are conservatively calculated on vertica' planes placed two meters away from the bottom and top ends of the package.
The HAC dose rates are calculated for a cylindrical surface one meter from the cask body side l
surface (with no neutron shield structure) and for vertical plane surfaces one meter from the l-cask body ends (with no impact limiters). At these locations, the 1000 mrem /hr dose rate j,
limit applies.
I For both NCT and HAC, the gamma dose rates on the cask top end are not directly calculated by the primary shielding analyses, but are calculated as discussed in Section 5.4.3.1.
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5-27
r SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 10P FifTlHG Illl1111ll i
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SAR - TranStor Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999
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l-SAR - TranStor Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 l-September 1999 CARBON STEEL s
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5-45
SAR-TranStor" Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999
6.0 CRITICALITY EVALUATION
nis chapter presents the criticality evaluation of the TranStor Shipping Cask package. The
. results demonstrate that an infinite number of packages with optimum intemal and external moderation remain subcritical. This corresponds to a transpon index of zero, and, therefore, meets the most stringent 10 CFR 71 criticality requirements for packages containing fissile material.
6.1 DISCUSSION AND RESULTS The TranStor" Basket design incorporates different basket configurations to accommodate PWR and BWR fuel. Design characteristics of these baskets with regard to criticality are discussed in the following sections. The criticality analyses and results arediscussed in Section l 6.4.
The criticality analysis of the TranStor Shipping Cask was performed using the KENO-Va Monte Carlo criticality code module (Reference 6.3) of the CSAS25 criticality code sequence of the SCALE code package (Reference 6.2). The values of La for Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) were determined using the 27 gmup neutron library (27GROUPNDF4). The assumptions employed in the model are discussed in Section 6.3. The final analysis results include an adjusted kn.w; value, which consists of the calculated ken,,a value plus the 2 o of the calculation. This adjusted kon.w; value is compared with the Upper Subcritical Limit (USL), calculated in accordance with NUREG/CR-6361 (Reference 6.14). The USL includes a 0.05 administrative margin.
6.1.1 CRITICALITY DESIGN FEATURES OF THE TRANSTOR PWR BASKET Criticality control in the TranStor PWR basket is achieved using flux trap components consisting of separated poison plates. Flux traps thermalize fast neutrons and poison plates remove the thermal neutrons from the system. His methodology allows the TranStor PWR system to maintain a k,nbelow 0.95 for all NCT and HAC.
Two loading schemes are available to maximize the transportable fuel enrichment in the TranStor Shipping Cask. The first is the fully loaded 24-assembly basket. The second loading scheme is a partially loaded 20-assembly basket where the four center sleeves are left vacant. The absence of the four center assemblies creates a negative reactivity effect that enables the cask to accommodate higher enriched fuels. The calculated results indicate that l removal of fuel assemblies fmm the four basket center locations has a significant efTect on i
reactivity. The assembly-specific limits for the 24-and 20-assembly baskets are provided in i
Tables 6.1-1 and 6.1-2. He 20-assembly basket is identical to the 24-assembly basket, except for a smallerload capacity.
6-1 i
SAR-Transtor" Shipping Cask Revision C
{
Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE 6.1-1 24-ASSEMBLY PWR BASKET l
Assembly Class
- Maximum Enrichment W 14x14 4.90 W 14x14 SS 5.00 W 15x15 4.40 W 15x15 SS 5.00 W 15x15 AhT 4.30 W 17x17 4.40 W 17x17 OFA 4.30 W 17x17 AhT 4.29 W 17x18 5.00 B&W 15x15 4.40 B&W 17x17 4.39 CE 14x14 4.80 CE 14x14 St. Lucie 5.00 CE 15x15 A 4.80 CE 15x15 B 4.80 CE 15x15 C 4.60 CE 16x16 4.90 CE 15xl6 5.00
- The assembly class descriptions are presented in Table 6.2 1.
i 6-2 i
SAR-TranStor" Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE 6.1-2 20-ASSEMBLY PWR BASKET l
Assembly Class
- Maximum Enrichment W 14x14 5.00 W 15x15 4.60 W 15x15 ANF 4.60 W 17x17 4.70 W 17x17 OFA 4.60 W 17xt7 ANF 4.58
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4.70 CE 14x14 5.00 CE 15x15 A 5.00 CE 15x15 B 5.00 CE 15x15 C 4.80 CE 16x16 5.00
- The assembly class descriptions are presented in Table 6.2-1.
i 6-3
1 SAR -TranStor" Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 I
TABLE 6.1-3 61-ASSEMBLY BWR BASKET Assembly Class
- Maxinum Enrichnwnt 6x6A 5.00 6x6B 5.00 6x6C 5.00 6x6D 5.00 7x7A 3.70 7x7B 3.60 7x7C 3.50 7x7D 3.60 7x7E 5.00 8x8A 3.60 8x8B 3.70 8x8C 3.70 8x8D 3.90 9x9A 3.60 9x9B 3.60 9x9C 3.70 9x9D 3.70 10x10A 3.40 10x10B 3.50 l
- ne assembly class descriptions are presented in Table 6.2 2.
6-5 j
SAR -TranStor" Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE 6.1-4 60-ASSEMBLY BWR BASKET Assembly Class
- Maximum Enrichnwnt 7x7A 4.00 7x7B 3.90 7x7C 3.80 7x7D 4.00 8x8A 3.90 8x8B 4.00 8x8C 4.00 8x8D 4.20 9x9A 3.90 l
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- The assembly class descriptions are presented in Table 6.2-2.
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SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 e e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e ec e e Oc e O c e D e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e e Oc e e e D e e e e e e Oc e e e e e e e O e e e e e e e e s e e e e e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e Oc e e e e e e e O e e s e e e Oc e s e Oc e s e s e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e Oc e Oc e Oc e Oc e s e e e e e e e e e e e e s s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e
Fuel Rod h
GuideTube Water Hole or Instrument Tube Figure 6.2-1 W 14x14 Assembly Class Lattice Layout Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause ken to decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod or integral bumable poison md will cause kca to decrease.
6-11
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e Oc e Oc e Oc e D e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e e Oc e e e Oc e s e e e Oc e e e e e e e O e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e s s e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e 0 0 e e e 0 0 e e 0 0 e e e e e Oc e *
- Oc e s e s e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e 0 0 e 0 0 0 0 e e 0 0 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e s e
Fuel Rod h
GuideTube Figure 6.2-2 W 14x14 SS Assembly Class Lattice Layout Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause ken to decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod or integral bumable poison rod will cause ken to decrease.
l 6-12 l
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e Oc e O c e e O c e Oc e
- e. 0 0 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 0 e 0 0 e e s e e O c e e e e Oc e s e e e Oc e e e e e e e e D e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e Oc e s e e e Oc e o e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e Oc e e e e e e e e Oc e s e e e Oc e e e e Oc e s e e s e e e e e Oc e e e e c e e e Oc e Oc e e Oc e D e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e
Fuel Rod h
GuideTube Water Hole or Instrument Tube l
Figure 6.2-3 W 15x15, W 15x15 ANF, and W 15x15 SS Assembly Class Lattice Layouts Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause ken to decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod or integral burnable poison rod will cause ken to decrease.
6-13
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e s e e e Oc e O c e O c e e c e s e e O c e e e e e e e e D e e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e O c e Oc e Oc e O c e Oc e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e Oc e D e e e e Oc e O e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 0 e e 0 e e 0 0 e 0 e e 0 e e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e j
e e 00 e 0 o e e 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 e
. 0 0 0 e e 0 e e 0 0 e 0 0 0 0 0 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e
Fuel Rod h
GuideTube Water Hole or Instrument Tube Figure 6.2-4 W 17x17, W 17x17 OFA, W 17x17 ANF, and B&W 17x17 Assembly Class Lattice Layouts
- Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause k.m to decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod orintep amable poison rod will cause kar to decrease.
6-14
SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9e 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 i
O Fuel Rod Water Hole or Instrument Tube Figure 6.2-5 W 17x18 Assembly Class Lattice Layout Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause ken to decrease. Also, replacing any fu-l rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod or integral bumable poison rod will cause kca to decrease.
6-15
SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 1
e e e e e e e e. e e e e e e e e e 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 e 0 e 0 e 0 0 o e e e e 0 0 0 0 0 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 1
e e Oc e D e c e Os e Oc e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e e e e e s e e e e e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e Oc e Oc e e Os e Oc e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e s e Oc e e e e e e Oc e o s e e e e O c e e Oc e s e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e
Fuel Rod i
h GuideTube Water Hole or Instmment Tube Figure 6.2-6 B&W 15x15 Assembly Class Lattice Layout Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause ken to decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod or integral bumable poison rod will cause ken to decrease.
6-16
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 O O 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 19 9 9 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O R O O O O O O R O O O O V O O O O O O U O O 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 O
Fuel Rod Guide Tube Figure 6.2-7 CE 14x14 and CE 14x14 St. Lucie Assembly Class Lattice Layouts Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause kerr to decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod or integral bumable poison rod will cause kert to decrease.
6-17
SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 O O O O 9 9 9 9 9 O O O O 9 0 0 0 0 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O O O O O O 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
Fuel Rod Water Hole or Instrument Tube Figure 6.2-8 CE 15x15 A Assembly Class Lattice Layout Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause ha to decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod or integral bumable poison rod will cause ha to decrease.
i 6-18
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C l
Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 O
9 9 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 O
9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 O
O O O O 9 0 0 0 0 O O O O O
Fuel Rod Water Hole or Instrument Tube Figure 6.2-9 CE 15x15 B Assembly Class Lattice Layout Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause kerr to decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod or integral burnable poison rod will cause kert o decrease.
t 6-19
- 1 SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 O O O O 9 0 0 0 0 O O O O 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O O 9 9 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 0 O O 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 9 9 9 9 9
{
e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e O O O O 9 0 0 0 0 O O O O O
Fuel Rod Water Hole or Instrument Tube Figure 6.2-10 CE 15x15 C Assembly Class Lattice Layout Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause kerr to decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod or integral bumable poison rod will cause kerr to decrease.
6-20
SAR - Trt,Stor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No 71-9268 September 1999 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 9 9 0 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O O 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O O O O O 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O O 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
Fuel Rod Guide Tube Figure 6.2-11 CE 16x16 Assembly Class Lattice Layout Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause ken to decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod or integral bumable poison rod will cause ken to decrease.
l 6-21
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 O O O O O O O O O O O O O 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 e 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 O O O O 9 0 0 0 0 O O O O O
Fuel Rod Water Hole or Instrument Tube Figure 6.2-12 CE 15x16 Assembly Class Lattice Layout Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause kerr to decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod or integral burnable poison rod will cause kert o decrease.
t 6-22
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 j
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9
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O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 O
Partial Length Fuel Rod O
Fuel Rod j
Water Hole or Instru nent Tube Figure 6.2-13 BWR 9x9A Assembly Class Lattice Layout Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause ken to decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod or integral burnable poison rod will cause ken to decrease.
6-23 w
1 SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 SeptemberJ.999 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 O
Fuel Rod Water Hole or Instrument Tube Figure 6.2-14 BWR 9x9 and 9x9D Assembly Class Lattice Layouts Note: Displacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) with a non-fuel material will cause k n to decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an assembly with a non-fuel rod or integra' I.."mble poison rod will cause ken to decrease.
6-24
SAR -TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e )( e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3( 0 0 0 0 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e
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-e Fuel Rod Water Hole or Instrument Tube Figure 6.2-15 BWR 10x10A Assembly Class Lattice Layout Note: Dis lacing any moderator within an assembly (i.e., within a water hole or guide tube) p with a non-fuel material will cause kert o decrease. Also, replacing any fuel rod within an t
assembly with a non-fuel rod or integral bumable poison rod will cause kerr to decrease.
6-25
SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 6.3 MODEL SPECIFICATION 6.
3.1 DESCRIPTION
OF CALCULATIONAL MODEL The KENO-Va model used in the criticality analysis is a three-dimensional representation of the basket inside the TranStor* Shipping Cask. Two models are constructed, one for the TranStor" PWR Basket (Figure 6.3-1), and the other for the TranStor" BWR Basket (Figure 6.3-2). Fuel
- pin arrays are explicitly modeled in the fuel assembly locations within the intact fuel. The damaged fuel locations are modeled with the assumption that they contain fuel pins with the most reactive pitch permissible in the canister opening. Section 6.4 describes the analysis performed in determining the most reactive fuel matrix. The three dimensional KENO-Va model includes the basket sleeves, poison plates and major structural elements in the basket. Top and bottom end-fittings are not modeled (i.e., they are replaced by water).
The cylindrical TranStor" Shipping Cask model is surmunded by a cuboid of water, void, or water at some partial density. A fully reflective boundary condition is imposed on this outer cuboid surrounding the cask to simulate an infinite array of casks in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 71. The size and the water density of the exterior cuboid is varied to study the effects of cask spacing and extemal' moderation (between casks) on cask array reactivity. Criticality analyses are also performed using void boundary conditions and infinite l water reflector boundary conditions.. These analyses model single casks surrounded by water and void and are performed to estimate the magnitude of neutronic interaction between casks and the effect of that interaction on the keft value.
The TranStor" Shipping Cask is modeled for both NCT and HAC. The model for the HAC is the same as the model for NCT except for the removal of the neutron shielding material. The neutron shield loss HAC is based on the fire during which temperatures can exceed the neutron shielding design temperatures.
The model employs all of the following conservative assumptions:
Zero bumup credit.
e
- Zero boron credit in the spent fuel pool.
The assembly fuel loading is basd on filling the dishes and chamfers of the i
pellets in the stack with as-fabricated fuel.
'Ihe fuel assemblies are loaded in their most reactive configuration.
Worst case flux trap dimensions (PWR basket).
Worst case poison sheet dimensions.
]
e 6-26 i
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SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999
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SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 I
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t FIGURE 6.3-2 BWR BASKET INSIDE TRANSTOR SIIIPPING CASK 6-28
SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 All component dimensional tolerances are included to maximize reactivity.
The fuel assembly pellet-to-clad gap is filled with water.
Optimal exterior and interior moderation.
75% of actual boron density in poison sheets.
The most reactive failed fuel matrix.
6.3.2 PACKAGE REGIONAL DENSITIES The material densities and atom number densities for constituent nuclides of all matenals used in the calculational models are shown in Tables 6.3-1 and 6.3-2.
6.4 CRITICALITY CALCULATION This section discusses the criticality analysis performed for the TranStor Shipping Cask. The analysis demonstrates that the TranStor Shipping Cask would maintain a kerr alue below v
0.95 under NCT and HAC for all packages containing fissile material.
The TranStor package has a criticality transport index of zero, and would remain subcritical when surrounded by an infinite array of casks in fresh, unborated water at optimum intemal and external moderation. Accordingly, the model assumes that both the PWR and the BWR baskets are in fresh, unborated water with reflective boundary conditions simulating an infinite array of undamaged casks. Using this configuration, the optimum internal and external moderation is determined and applied.
In the above configuration, the TranStor Shipping Cask is also modeled without the neutron shield to verify that the cask meets the requirements of 10 CFR 71.59 under hypothetical accident conditions. The calculations to determine the values for the optimum intemal and extemal moderation are discussed in Section 6.4.3.
The TranStor Shipping Cask criticality analysis is performed using the CSAS25 criticality sequence of the SCALE code package.
The calculations are performed using the 27GROUPNDF4 cross-section library. The CSAS25 sequence corsists of the SCALE Material Information Processor (Reference 6.2), the BONAMI-S and NiTAWL II cross-section pre-processing code moduic: (Refemaces 6.7 and 6.8), and the KENO-Va Monte Carlo criticality code module (Reference 6.3).
6-29 4
SAR -TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE 6.3-1 MATERIAL DENSITIES Material Densitv(c/cc) 3 UO2 10.5216 g/cm (96% theoretical) for PWR 3
10.4120 g/cm (95% theoretical) for BWR Zircaloy 6.44 HO 0.9982 2
Steel 7.92 Lead 11.35 Aluminum 2.70 Poison (core) 2.67 Neutron shielding 1.63 6-30
1 SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE 6.3-2 KENO-VA MATERIAL DENSITIES (atoms / barn-cm)
Element Fuel
hi matrix 11 6.675E-2 5.318E-2
'B 7.384E-3 1.981E-4 "B
2.998E-2 8.044E-4 C
1.245E-2 2.158E-2 N
1.333E-2 0
4.690E-2 3.338E-2 2.372E-2 At 6.024E-2 3.299E-2 7.365E-3 i
Pb 3.299E-2 Cr 1.743E-2 Mn 1.736E-3 Fe j
5.936E-2 6.535E-3 Ni 7.721E-3 72 4.252E-2 zu U 2.248E-2 2n U 9.733E-4
- Presented values represent 4.1% enriched fuel. Values used in analyses will vary with fuel enrichment.
6-31
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 The Material Information Processor processes the SCALE input file, which contains both material and geometry descriptions, to prepare the data for the cross section processing codes, BONAMI-S and NITAWiell, and the criticality evaluation code KENO-Va. BONAMI-S and NITAWI II produce resonance and self shielding conected cross section libraries. KENO-Va calculates the model's kerusing Monte Carlo techniques. Validation of CSAS25 and the bias associated with the use of the CSAS25 code sequence for criticality evaluation are discussed in Section 6.5.
6.4.1 PWR CRITICALITY CALCUL,ATIONAL METHOD 6.4.
1.1 DESCRIPTION
OF PWR LOADING OPTIONS Two PWR MSB loading options were evaluated in the analyses; the 24 assembly option and the 20 assembly option. The 24 assembly loading option was evaluated for criticality based on the following loading configuration:
the most reactive design basis canistered fuel arrangements modeled inside the 4 comer fuel e
l design basis intact fuel assemblies modeled inside the other 20 fuel sleeves j
The 20 assembly loading option was evaluated for criticality based on the following loading configuration:
the most reactive design basis canistered fuel arrangements modeled inside the 4 comer fuel sleeves.
design basis intact fuel assemblics modeled inside the other 20 fuel sleeves, except for the 4 centennost fuel sleeves which are left vacant The fuel assemblies were modeled as explicit arrays of fuel rods. All assumptions regarding fuel modeling as described in Section 6.3.1 were simultaneously applied. The canistered fuel rod and intact fuel rod models were the same in a given criticality calculation. The most reactive array configuration (array size and rod pitch) for the canistered fuel was modeled in the four comer fuel sleeves.
6.4.1.2 FUEL CAN LOADING OPTIMIZATION The four s!ceves located in the comers of the PWR basket are 0.5 inches larger than the rest of the fuel sleeves to accommodate individual cans containing partial or damaged fuel assemblies. l These sleeves may also be filled with a can containing fuel debris (i.e., pellets, pellet fragments, or rod fragments). Fuel debris and a fuel assembly may not be placed in the same can.
Since the fuel debris can does not have a separate containment boundary, the total package contents may not contain more than 20 curies of plutonium as required by 10 CFR 71.63. Also, the total fuel material quantity is limited to 10 kg. This small amount of material is not as l 6-32
~
1 SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 reactive as an intact fuel assembly (with over 400 kg of fuel material) no matter how it is distributed within the fuel debris can.
Damaged or partial ~ fuel assemblies inside a can may be more reactive than intact fuel l assemblies, however. LWR fuel assemblies have an H/U ratio that is less than the optimum value, so that a negative void coefficient is maintained. Therefore, an increase in rod pitch yields an increase in assembly reactivity. Partial assemblies or assemblies with damaged grid spacers may have an effective fuel rod pitch that is higher than that ofintact fuel. Therefore, calculations were performed to determine the optimum fuel rod pitch inside a fuel can.
The optimum fuel rod pitch calculations model a square pitched fuel rod array, the fuel can,' and the fuel sleeve. The model surrounds the fuel sleeve (containing the can) with materials and geometries similar to those that surround the fuel sleeve in the actual system, so that the system boundary conditions are accurate. For each major LWR assembly type (with its corresponding fuel rod dimensions) the rod pitch was varied and the optimum rod pitch was determined.
A fuel can containing this optimum fuel rod array has the most reactive possible contents for a comer fuel sleeve. In the criticality analyses performed for each assembly class, the comer fuel l
)
sleeves are assumed to contain a can containing this optimum fuel rod array. An intact fuel assembly (without a can) may also be loaded into the comer fuel sleeves. An analysis was l performed to verify that a comer sleeve containing an intact fuel assembly is less reactive than a sleeve containing a can with an optimum fuel rod array.
The PWR can analysis demonstrated that cans containing an optimum fuel rod array are more l reactive than those containing intact fuel assembly. However, the slight increase in corner sleeve reactivity has a very small effect on the overall reactivity of the entire PWR basket.
6.4.1.3 DETERMINATION OF MOST REACTIVE TRANSTOR PWR SYSTEM CONFIGURATION i
The most reactive TranStor PWR System configuration was defined prior to determining the maximum allowable enrichment values for each fuel assembly class. The following evaluations were performed to determine the most reactive configuration for use in the maximum allowable enrichment search cases.
The most reactive tolerance for each MSB intemal component was assumed in all of the calculations.
1
.. Ihe models were developed by ignoring all free space that may exist between MSB intemal components aAer accounting for the most reactive tolerances. The tightest packing of fuel sleeves is obtained by ignoring all potential free space between components.
6-33
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 An evaluation was performed to determine the most reactive assembly shifting arrangement e
within the fuel sleeves. The system was modeled as a 3-D infinite array of bare MSBs with maximum intemal moderator density and minimum extemal moderator density.
An evaluation was performed to confimi that modeling canistered fuel arrays in the comer sleeves is more reactive than modeling intact fuel assemblies in the comer sleeves. The system was modeled as a 3-D infinite array of bare MSBs with maximum intemal moderator density and minimum extemal moderator density.
The BORAL poison sheet attachment-pin holes were modeled explicitly. An evaluation was e
performed to determine' the effect of modeling either water, void, or BORAL in the attachment-pin holes. The system was modeled as a 3-D infinite array of bare MSBs with maximum intemal moderator density and minimum extemal moderator density.
An evaluation was performed to determine the most reactive intemal water moderator density. The system was modeled as a 3-D infinite array of bare MSBs with varying intemal moderator density and minimum extemal moderator density.
An evaluation was performed to determine the most reactive cask center-to-center pitch.
The system was modeled as a 3-D infinite array of MSBs inside shipping casks with maximum intemal moderator density and minimum external moderator density. The evaluation was performed with and without the shipping cask's neutron shield present.
An evaluation was performed to determine the most reactive cask extemal water moderator density. The system was modeled as a 3-D infinite array of MSBs inside shipping casks with maximum intemal moderator density and varying extemal moderator density. The evaluation was performed with and without the shipping cask's neutron shield present.
An evaluation was performed to evaluate the effect of modeling the guide tubes as solid pins while conserving the actual guide tube cross-sectional area. A number of guide tube cross-sectional areas were modeled both as solid pins and as annular tubes. The resulting effects on ken providejustification for the guide tube specification and modeling techniques.
The system was modeled as a 3-D infinite array of MSBs inside shipping casks with maximum intemal moderator density and minimum extemal moderator density. Also, the shipping cask's neutron shield was not modeled.
An evaluation was performed to evaluate the effect of cladding volume on ken. A number of cladding outer diameters were evaluated while the cladding thickness was held constant.
Then, a number of clad thicknesses are evaluated while holding the clad diameter constant.
The resulting effects on k a provide justification for modeling the minimum cladding volumes (i.e, minimum diameters and thicknesses). The system was modeled as a 3-D infinite array of MSBs inside shipping casks with maximum intemal moderator density and minimum external moderator density. Also, the shipping cask's neutron shield was not modeled.
6-34
o SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 An evaluation was performed to verify that the shipping cask configuration was more e
reactive than either the transfer cask or the storage cask. The shipping cask configuration was modeled as a 3-D infinite array of MSBs inside shipping casks with maximum intemal moderator density and minimum extemal moderator density. Also, the shipping cask's neutron shield was not modeled. The transfer cask configuration was modeled as a single MSB inside a transfer cask surrounded by an infinitely thick region of full density water.
The storage cask configuration was modeled as a 3-D infinite array of MSBs inside storage casks with maximum internal moderator density and minimum external moderator density.
Based on the results of the most reactive configuration studies, all of the subsequent criticality calculations were performed using the most reactive configuration that bounds all phases of operation (i.e., loading / unloading, transfer, storage, and shipping).
6.4.1.4 PRELIMINARY MAXIMUM ENRICHMENT DETERMINATION FOR 24 ASSEMBLY LOADING CONFIGURATION A series of calculations were performed for each assembly class to detennine its preliminary maximum allowable enrichment. The most reactive TranStor PWR System configuration was used to calculate the preliminary maximum allowable enrichments. The various enrichments were only specified to 0.1 wt% accuracy in this preliminary round of maximum enrichment searches. The kerr from each criticality calculation was compared to its corresponding USL value (as a function of AFG) to determine if the studied enrichment was acceptable.
The most reactive assembly representations from each assembly class were used in the preliminary maximum enrichment search cases. The most reactive assembly representation was defined by the following criteria:
minimum cladding outer diameter o
minimum cladding thickness e
minimum pellet diameter e
maximum active fuellength e
minimum guide tube cross-sectional area.
a The cladding and guide tube criteria identified above were justified by the most reactive geometry studies described in Section 6.1.1.2. The active fuel length criterion that yields the most reactive assembly configuration is intuitively obvious (i.e., the maximum length).
However, it is not intuitively obvious that the minimum fuel pellet diameter yields the most reactive assembly configuration; especially when considering that the pellet-to-clad gap is filled with full density water. Hence, the preliminary status of the maximum allowable enrichments determined in this study. Section 6.1.1.4 describes a series of pellet diameter studies which either verify the preliminary maximum allowable enrichments as the true values or adjust the 6-35 1
1 SAR-Transtor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 '
September 1999 preliminary maximum allowable enrichments to a values that are also bounding with respect to fuelpellet diameter.
6.4.1.5 PELLET DIAMETER STUDIES A series of calculations were performed for each assembly class to verify that the preliminary maximum allowable enrichments were bounding with respect to fuel pellet diameter. Since PWR assemblies are designed to be slightly undermoderated, it is expected that keg will increase with decreasing pellet diameter; especially when the pellet-to-clad gap is filled with water. Hence, the assembly specifications for each assembly class define a minimum allowable fuel pellet diameter. It is possible, however, that ken may not vary monotonically with pellet i
diameter over the range from the specified minimum pellet diameter to the cladding inner diameter.
I The series of pellet diameter studies for each assembly class are intended to perform the following functions:
verify that the maximum allowable enrichment bounds any non-monotonic behavior of ken e
with changing pellet diameter demonstrate an overall inverse relationship between pellet diameter and ken (i.e., generally, e
when pellet diameter increases ken decreases).
For a given assembly class, if the ken conesponding to any of the evaluated pellet diameters (evaluated at the preliminary maximum allowable enrichment) failed to satisfy the USL, the preliminary maximum allowable enrichment was decreased by 0.01 wt% until all of the evaluated pellet diameters satisfied the USL The enrichment at which all the evaluated pellet diameters satisfied the USL was the maximum allowable enrichment for the assembly class (based on the 24 assembly loading configuration).
6.4.1.6 OUANTIFICATION OF 24 ASSEMBLY LOADING CONFIGURATION SUBCRITICAL MARGINS The subcritical margin was defined in the following manner:
Subcritical Margin = (k,, + 2b)-USL.
The bounding calculadon for each assembly class is based on the maximum allowable enrichment and the most rt active assembly specification criteria. The tuberitical margins for the bounding calculation of each assembly class were calculated for use in detennining the maximum allowable enrichments for the 20 assembly loading configuration as described in Section 6.1.1.6.
6-36
1 i
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 6.4.1.7 MAXIMUM ENRICHMENT DETERMINATION FOR 20 ASSEMBLY LOADING CONFIGURATION Using the 20 assembly loading configuration, a series of calculations were performed for each assembly class to determine its preliminary maximum allowable enrichment. The most reactive TranStor PWR System configuration was used to calculate the preliminary maximum allowable enrichments. The various enrichments were only specified to 0.1 wt% accuracy in this first round of the 20 assembly loading maximum enrichment searches. The key from each criticality calculation was compared to its corresponding USL value (as a function of AFG) to detemiine if the studied enrichment was acceptable. If the studied endchment was acceptable with respect to the USL, its suberitical margin was calculated and compared to the corresponding bounding subcritical margin from the 24 assembly loading configuration as
' desciibed in Section 6.1.1.5.
j If the first round maximum allowable enrichment for the 20 assembly loading yielded a key that satisfied the USL and yielded a subcritical margin at least as large as the corresponding bounding suberitical margin from the 24 assembly loading configuration, the enrichment was acceptable. If either the USL or subcritical margin criteria was not satisfied, the enrichment would be decreased by 0.01 wt% until both criteria were satisfied. The resulting enrichment became the maximum allowable enrichment of the assembly class for the 20 assembly loading configuration.
6.4.1.8 TROJAN-SPECIFIC END-DROP HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITION (HAC)
A shipping cask end-drop HAC with potential criticalitgeffects has been postulated for the Portland General Electric Trojan site-specific TranStor basket design. In this HAC, it is postulated that the PWR basket suffers a top-end impact resulting in displacement of the fuel L
sleeves with respect to the fuel assemblies. Specifically, the fuel sleeves and attached BORAL sheets could potentially slide to the top-end of the basket cavity while the fuel assemblies are J
retained in their previous locations (supported by control component hardware located above each assembly). The resulting arrangement of fuel sleeves, BORAL, and fuel assemblies could potentially result in exposing a length of the assembly active fuel regions to each other, thus, removing the benefit of the flux trap configuration previously present in that length of the active fuel region.
Criticality calculations were performed to demonstrate that the TranStor PWR System at Trojan would remain suberitical under this HAC. The criticality calculations for this HAC evaluation were performed using the Trojan-specific fuel specifications for their most reactive B&W 17x17 and Westinghouse Standard 17x17 fuel assemblies.
6-37 l
1 i
SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 6.4.2 BWR CRITICALITY CALCULATIONAL METHOD 6.4.
2.1 DESCRIPTION
OF BWR LOADING OPTIONS Two BWR MSB loading options were evaluated in the analyses; the 61 assembly option and the 60 assembly option. The 61 assembly loading option was evaluated for criticality based on design basis intact fuel assemblies modeled inside all 61 fuel sleeves. Additional analyses are performed to verify that the following configurations are no more reactive than the design basis (61 intact assembly) configuration:
the most reactive design basis damaged fuel assembly array modeled inside the 4 comer fhel e
sleeves (at the basket edge along the 45 degree axis) the most reactive design basis partial fuel assembly array modeled inside 12 sleeves around e
the periphery of the basket. (There are rows of three fuel sleeves at th6 basket edge on each of the four sides of basket. The two fuel sleeves on the ends of each row (i.e., all but the
{
center sleeve in each row) correspond to eight of these sleeves. The other four sleeves are j
the comer sleeves described above.)
i l
Since it is shown that 12 partial assemblies, or four damaged assemblies, do not cause basket reactivity to increase, a loading configuration containing 4 damaged fuel assemblies and 8 partial fuel assemblies is also covered by the design basis (61 intact assembly) configuration.
The 60 assembly loading option was evaluated for criticality based on the same configuration as the 61 assembly loading option except that the center fuel sleeve is left vacant.
The fuel assemblies were modeled as explicit arrays of fuel rods. All assumptions regarding fuel modeling as described in Section 6.3.1 were simultaneously applied. The most reactive array configuration (array size and rod pitch) for the damaged and partial fuel was modeled in the cormsponding fuel sleeve locations.
6.4.2.2 DETERMINATION OF MOST REACTIVE TRANSTORm BWR SYSTEM CONFIGURATION Before pc'rforming the analyses which determined the maximum allowable enrichments for each assembly class, several analyses were performed to detennine the most reactive basket and cask configuration.
This bounding configuration was then assumed for the maximum enrichment analyses. Sensitivity analyses were performed for the following parameters:
fuel sleeve inner cavity width e
assembly position within the sleeves e
the presence or absence of the Zircaloy BWR fuel channel e
cask arraypitch e
6-38
SAR -TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 moderator densitybetween casks e
the presence or absence of the cask neutron shield (i.e., normal or accident conditions) e basket interior moderator density.
e All of these analyses were performed for a basket containing 61 BWR assemblies of the 8x8A assembly class. For each individual parameter sensitivity study, all other parameters were set to their most reactive values. Then, one by one, the sensitivity studies showed that the baseline assumption for each parameter was the bounding assumption (i.e., that all other allowable values are less reactive). The baseline (i.e., most reactive) assumptions for the cask system parameters were a minimum sleeve inner width, all assemblies pushed (within their sleeves) towards the basket center, the fuel channel present, a cask pitch that was mughly equal to the cask diameter (i.e., a close packed cask array), void between the casks, and no neutron shield j
present (i.e., accident conditions).
I After the most reactive basket and cask geometry was determined. Sensitivity analyses were performed on several assembly parameters. As shown in Table 6.2-2, minimum or maximum allowable values as opposed to specific values are specified for many of the assembly parameters. For each of these parameters it was demonstrated that either the maximum or f
minimum value was the bounding value with respect to criticality.
For many of the parameters, the effect on system reactivity due to variation of the parameter value was obvious. It was assumed that a maximum active fuel length, a minimum assembly bottom nozzle region length, a minimum poison sheet width, a minimum fuel sleeve spacer thickness, and a maximum poison sheet thickness all yield maximum reactivity. These parameters are specified accordingly in Table 6.2-2 as maximum or minimum allowable values.
All the criticality analyses were performed based upon the bounding values for all of these parameters.
For some of the assembly parameters, however, it was not considered obvious which values J
were more reactive. Therefore, sensitivity analyses were performed for these parameters.
These assembly parameters included the following:
fuel rod cladding diameter e
fuel rod cladding thickness e
fuel pellet diameter e
number of assembly array water holes.
e A number of analyses were performed to verify that increasing the cladding thickness or outer diameter causes reactivity to decrease. The results of these analyses justify the specification of minimum allowable values for cladding dimensions.
6-39
- l SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 For some of the assembly classes, the design basis calculations bound a maximum number of water holes. For each of these assembly classes, criticality calculations for assembly arrays with water hole quantities ranging from zero to the maximum specified number were performed to verify that the maximum enrichment determining calculations were performed using the number of water holes that yield maximum reactivity.
It was not obvious which pellet diameter yields maximum reactivity. For each assembly class, criticality analyses were performed for four pellet diameter values.
The analyses were performed for a fully loaded basket (61 assemblies). The most reactive assembly parameters other than pellet diameter were applied in the sensitivity study. All of the pellet sensitivity 1
studies were performed assuming the most reactive basket and cask configuration.
The first pellet diameter studied was the maximum diameter, which was equal to the cladding inner diameter value. The second pellet diameter studied was the nominal pellet diameter value.
Two additional pellet diameter vahies corresponding to 94% and 97% of the nominal pellet diameter value were then studied.
These analyses show which pellet diameter value, for each assembly class, is most reactive. In all cases, the data shows a clear decreasing trend of reactivity with pellet diameter by the time the 94% of nominal value is reached. Therefore, the analyses will verify that the analyses are bounding for all smaller pellet diameter values. In most cases, the analyses show that the maximum pellet diameter (equal to the cladding 1.D.) yields maximum reactivity. Thus, the maximum allowable value specified in Table 2.4 is the bounding value, and is the value assumed in the maximum allowable enrichment analyses.
It was required that all four analyzed diameters be under the USL value, and that the USL value would not be exceeded at any diameter between the values studied. In the cases where maximum reactivity did not occur for the maximum allowable pellet diameter, whichever diameter (of the four studied values) yields maximum reactivity was assumed in the analyses to determine the maximum allowable enrichment.
However, the maximum possible pellet diameter was still listed in Table 6.2-2 as the maximum allowable value. This is valid because the sensitivity analyses demonstrated that the maximum enrichment analyses were bounding for all pellet diameters within the allowable range.
Additional calculations of a TranStor BWR basket inside the TranStor transfer cask, (both standard and thin walled versions) with full water reflection on all sides, were perfomied to verify that the array of transportation casks discussed above is bounding for all phases of Transtor operation. These analyses were performed assuming the most reactive values (as l determined by the sensitivity analyses discussed above) for all assembly, basket, and cask parameters. The criticality margins for these cases were then compared to the margins calculated for the corresponding transportation cask array case.
These analyses serve demonstrate that the transportation cask array configuration bounds all other TranStor BWR l system configurations with respect to criticality.
Based on the results of the most reactive assembly and basket configuration studies, all of the maximum enrichment search criticality calculations were performed using the most reactive 1
6-40
SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 configuration that bounds all phases of operation (i.e., loading / unloading, transfer, storage, and shipping).
6.4.2.3 MAXIMUM ENRICHMENT DETERMINATION FOR THE 61 AND 60 ASSEMBLY LOADING CONFIGURATIONS After all of the most reactive configuration analyses were completed, a final set of criticality analyses were performed to determine the maximum allowable enrichment for each BWR assembly class for the 61 and 60 assembly loading configurations.
The most reactive configuration as detennined in the sensitivity studies was used in all of the maximum enrichment search calculations. The most reactive 60 element basket configuration has the eight assemblies adjacent to the empty central sleeve pushed out (away from the basket center) towards the other assemblies in the basket.
6.4.2.4 PARTIAL AND DAMAGED ASSEMBLY LOADING EVALUATION After the maximum allowable enrichment levels were determined for intact BWR assemblies of each defined assembly class for both the 61 and 60 assembly loading configurations, additional criticality analyses were performed to evaluate partial and damaged BWR assemblies loaded into the basket edge fuel sleeves. Due to the undermoderated nature of BWR fuel assemblies, partial and damaged assembly configurations may be more reactive than intact assembly configurations. The analyses were performed to demonstrate that loading the maximum reactivity partial assembly configurations into as many as 12 basket edge slots has no measurable impact on overall basket reactivity. Analyses were also performed to demonstrate that loading bounding damaged fuel configurations in all four basket comer slots has no measurable effect on basket reactivity.
Simplified criticality models were used to detennine the most reactive partial and damaged assembly configurations. The analyses modeled an infinite array of TranStor BWR basket l fuel sleeves. These arrays were modeled with full water reflection on the top and bottom ends of the fuel rods and sleeves. BORAL poison sheet material, at the same thickness and boron loading as that present in the actual basket was modeled around the outer edges of the steel fuel sleeve. This simplified model was similar to the actual TranStorm BWR basket with respect to l allimportant neutronic phenomena.
For the bounding partial assembly configuration analysis, the fuel rod array was constrained to stay within the design basis fuel rod array envelope. This fuel rod array was centered within the fuel sleeve interior (since an infinite sleeve array model is used). For the damaged fuel assembly configuration analysis, the fuel rod array was assumed to occupy the entire fuel sleeve interior. Thus, the rods were always assumed to be distributed evenly throughout the fuel sleeve interior (i.e., the fuel rod pitch was equal to the sleeve interior width divided by the rod array size).
The most reactive array configurations for both partial and damaged fuel assembhes are j
. bounded by a regular fuel pin array with an optimum pitch value (i.e., an optimum H/U ratio).
- The optimum array was determined by varying the array size present within the assembly i
6-41
envelope dimension (for partials) or the fuel sleeve interior (for damaged). For each analyzed array size, the rod pitch was equal to the envelope width divided by the array size. The array size was varied in half rod increments (i.e.,8 x 8,7.5 x 7.5,7 x 7,6.5 x 6.5,6 x 6, etc...). This was done by modeling half fuel rods (i.e., hemicylinders) along two of the four edges of the envelope region. This analysis was performed over a wide range of rod array sizes. Peak j
reactivity occurs for one of these array sizes, and reactivity decreases if the array size is j
increased or decreased from that optimum value. The pitch of the peak reactivity array size was established as the optimum pitch, and therefore, the optimum partial or damaged assembly configuration.
)
Thus, the only difference between the partial and damaged assembly analyses was the size of the envelope dimension that the optimum rod array must fit within. It was clear that the damaged case would be much more reactive, since larger arrays are significantly more reactive.
Once the optimum array size and corresponding rod pitch were determined for the panial and damaged assembly configurations (using the infinite sleeve array models), criticality analyses were perfomied to verify that loading panial and damaged assemblies around the basket edge had no measurable effect on basket reactivity.
In the first part of this evaluation, the intact assemblies in all 12 of the basket edge locations were replaced with the most reactive partial assembly fuel rod array. As with the intact assemblies, the optimum partial assembly configurations are pushed (within the sleeve interior) as close as possible to the center of the basket. In the second pan of the evaluation, the intact assemblies in the four basket edge corner locations were replaced by the optimum damaged fuel rod array.
These analyses were performed to demonstrate that loading up to 12 panial assemblies or up to 4 damaged assemblies in the specified basket edge locations has no measurable effect on overall basket reactivity. This verifies that the maximum enrichment levels detennined for each assembly class (based upon baskets loaded with intact assemblies) are applicable to partial or damaged assemblies, given the loading restrictions.
l The four basket edge comer locations may also contain fuel debris canisters containing less than 10 kg of fuel (heavy metal) per cask. Given this low fissile mass, the fuel debris canisters are clearly less reactive than intact assemblies. Therefore, no debris can analyses were required, and the enrichment limits determined for intact fuel assemblies are applicable for fuel debris material.
6.4.3 CRITICALITY RESULTS i
6.4.3.1 TRANSTOR PWR CRITICALITY RESULTS The most reactive TranStor PWR system configuration was determined to have the following characteristics:
infinite 3-D array (both radially and axially) of transportation casks containing MSBs e
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SAR -TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 all component dimensional tolerances applied within the MSB to maximize system e
reactivity the transportation cask neutron shield material replaced by void e
the MSB and transportation cask structure above and below the fuel sleeves replaced by e
extemal moderator (i.e., void) extemal moderator represented as void or zero density water e
3 intemal moderator represented as water at normal density (0.9982 g/cm )
e BORAL attachment pin-holes modeled as being filled with intemal moderator e
maximum fuel sleeve inner cavity width e
assemblies modeled as being shifted within their respective fuel sleeves such that five e
clusters of four assemblies were represented in the basket intact fuel assemblies modeled in the central 20 fuel sleeves and more reactive canistered e
fuel arrays modeled in the outer 4 comer fuel sleeves.
The maximum allowable enrichment results presented in Tables 6.2-1 and 6.2-2 for the 24 and 20 assembly loading configurations, respectively, are bounding for all of the assembly parameter ranges presented in Table 6.2-1. The maximum allowable enrichments are a!.m bounding for the loading configurations described in Section 6.4. The maximum allowable enrichments bound all phases of TranStor PWR system operation (i.e., loading / unloading, transfer, storage, and transportation).
Addtionally, CSAS25 calculations were perfonned to evaluate the Tmjan-specific end-drop HAC using the most reactive Trojan fuel types. The results of these calculations showed that a uniform loading of the Westinghouse 17x17 assembly having a maximum enrichment of 3.46 wt% results in the highest ken. A minimum suberitical margin of 3.6% Aken exists for this most reactive Trojan-specific end-drop HAC configuration.
Assuming the most reactive loading of Trojan fuel, the shift in fuel sleeves and BORAL with respect to the active fuel zone of the assemblies does not cause ken to exceed the USL. The results indicate that in the bounding Trojan-specific end-drop HAC there is no threat to criticality safety due to having loaded Trojan fuel into the Transtor" PWR system. Note also that this HAC condition can only exist with the TranStor PWR system at Trojan. The current design precludes movement of the active fuel zone with respect to the BORAL sheets such that fuel can never slide outside of the BORAL zone.
6.4.3.2 TRANSTOR BWR CRITICALITY RESULTS 6-43
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 The most reactive TranStor BWR system configuration was determined to have the following characteristics:
infinite 3-D array (both radially and axially) of transportation casks containing MSBs e
all component dimensional tolerances applied within the MSB to maximize system e
reactivity the transportation cask neutron shield material replaced by void e
minimum cask-to-cask pitch (note that kenwas shown to be insensitive to cask pitch) e minimum moderator density between casks (note that kenwas shown to be insensitive to e
moderator density between casks) maximum moderator density inside MSB e
all assemblies pushed toward center of MSB in the 61 loading configuration e
all assemblies pushed toward center of MSB in the 60 loading configuration except the e
sleeves surrounding the vacant center fuel sleeve; these assemblies are pushed toward the MSB outer shell minimum fuel sleeve inner cavity width e
Zircaloy fuel channel present around all intact assemblies e
most reactive assembly parameters as shown in Table 6.2-2.
e The maximum allowable enrichment results presented in Tables 6.1-3 and 6.1-4 for the 61 and 60 assembly loading configurations, respectively, are bounding for all of the assembly parameter ranges presented in Table 6.2-2. The maximum allowable enrichments are also bounding for the loading configurations described in Section 6.4. The maximum allowable enrichments bound all phases of TranStor BWR system operation (i.e., loading / unloading, transfer, storage, and transportation).
i
)
6-44 J
SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 6.5 CRITICAL BENCHMARK EXPERIMENTS The accuracy of the KENO-Va criticality code (using the CSAS25 code sequence) is verified by comparing ker values calculated by KENO-Va to measured km values for a series of experimental critical configurations. An upper subcritical limit (USL) value is calculated for each criticality calculation as a function of the average energy group of the neutrons causing fission (average fission group or AFG). The USL is a linear function of the code bias and includes the NRC's 0.05 Aker dministrative margin.
a Two sets of benchmark calculations are performed in support of the TranStor* Shipping Cask criticality analysis. The first set of benchmark calculations determine the code bias for fresh UO2 fuel criticality analyses performed using the CSAS25 criticality code sequence of the SCALE code package (featuring the KENO-Va criticality code module) and using the 27GROUPNDF4 cross-section library.
UO fuel criticality analyses have been performed using versions 4.1 and 4.3 of the TranStor 2
SCALE code package. No significant changes were made to the CSAS25 criticality code sequence between the two SCALE code package versions, and calculations show that these two ven; ions of SCALE give the same results (within statistical error of the code). Therefore, the code bias detennined for UO2 fuel criticality calculations using SCALE 4.1 (CSAS25) is applicable for SCALE 4.3 (CSAS25) UO2 uel criticality calculations as well.
f 6.5.1 BENCHMARK EXPERIMENTS A total of 42 critical experiments (References 6.9 through 6.13) are analyzed to establish a code bias for the TranStor" Shipping Cask UO fuel criticality analyses. The overall configuration 2
of all of the experiments is similar to that of the actual system studied in the criticality analyses.
The critical experiments consist of square pitched arrays of fuel rods containing fresh UO2 fuel. l The moderator is pure unpoisoned water for all cases. Most experiments contain several square fuel rod arrays, similar to fuel assemblies, that have some water spacing or a combination of water and poison sheets between them.
Most experiments have a 2nU enrichment level of 4.3%, with r,ome cases having enrichments as high as 5.74%. Thus, for most of the experiments, the enrichment level is similar to that present in the majority of the TranStor" Shipping Cask criticality analyses. The experiments with higher enrichment levels bound the higher enrichment values that are analyzed in the TranStor" Shipping Cask UO2 fuel criticality analyses for the partially loaded basket configurations and for some of the less reactive assembly types.
The set of critical experiments cover a wide range of rod pitches and H/U ratios. The neutron energy spectra present in the experimental systems (the average neutron energy group causing fission) bound the spectra present in the actual TranStor" Shipping Cask configurations that are analyzed. The TranStor cask UO2 fuel analyses produce average fission group values 6-45
l SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 l
ranging fmm 21.3 to 22.5. The critical experiments had average fission group values that range l from 21.3 to 23.4. In addition, the set of critical experiments include a large number of poison materials, poison loadings, and reflector materials, including all of the poison and reflector materials present in the cask. Four of the experiments contain actual flux traps, similar to those pmsent in the PWR basket.
As the discussion above shows, the TranStor" Shipping Casks analyzed have parameters that are very similar to, yet bounded by, the parameters present in the large set of critical experiments used to establish the KENO-Va code bias. The key parameters for each of the UO 2 fuel critical experiments are summarized in Table 6.5-1.
65.2 BENCHMARK CALCULATIONS The critical experiments described in Section 6.5.1 are modeled explicitly, in three dimensions, by the KENO-Va code models. _ The (one sigma) Monte Carlo error' for the benchmark calculations is 0.26% or less for all of the critical experiments. A rough correlation exists between average neutmn energy group and code bias (difference between kerr and unity). l Experiments which have a high fuel rod pitch, and therefore have a higher H/U ratio and a softer spectrum, (i.e. a higher average fission group value) generally yield lower levels of code bias (less than 0.5%).
6-46
SAR -TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 I
TABLE 6.5-1 KEY PHYSICAL PARAMETERS OF THE UO2 CRITICAL, EXPERIMENTS i
Esperiment Enrichment H/U Avg. Fiss.
Flued Assembly I'rlmary pg Number (w/o U-235)
(Vol. Ratio)
Group Poison Separation Renector 1
4 31 0.745" 1.6 21.819 Baronex 2.83 cm 11 4 2
431 0.745" l6 21.812 Bomacx 3.60 cm IIS 3
431 0.745" 1.6 21.842 Ikwonex 4.72 cm 11 4 4
4 31 0 745" 1.6 21.888 Baronex 8.50 cm 11 4 5
4.31 0 745"
'6 21.825 Homnex 2.83 cm 11 4 6
4 31 0.745" 1.6 21.852 Baronex 4.72 cm 11 4 7
4 31 0.745" 1.6 21.854 Bomnex 6.61 cm lie 8
4 31 0.745" 1.6 21.789 Boroacx 2.83 cm 11 4 9
431 0.745" 1.6 21.802 Baronex 4.94 cm 11 4 10 431 0.745" 1.6 21.833 Bomnex 6 61 cm He iI 431 0.745" 1.6 21.775 Baronex 2,83 cm 11 4 12 431 0.745" 1.6 21.835 Baronex 6.61 cm 11 4 13 431 0.745" 1.6 21.829 Baronex 8.50 cm 11 4 14 431 0 745" 1.6 21.799 Boral 2.83 cm He i
15 431 0.745" 1.6 21.787 Boral 3.17 cm 11 4 16 431 0 745" 1.6 21.834 Boral 4.72 cm 11 4 17 431 0.745" 1.6 21.830 Boral 5.24 cm 11 4 18 431 0.745" 1.6 21.853 Boral 8.50 cm 11 4 4
19 4 31 0.745" 1.6 21.859 Cadmium 2.83 cm 11 4 20 4 31 0.745" I.6 21.890 Cadmium 5 30 cm 11 4 21 4 31 0.745" 1.6 21.881 Cadmium 6.43 cm 11 4 22 4.31 0.745" 1.6 21.876 Boral 8 30 cm Steel /114 23 4.31 0.745" 1.6 21.882 Baronex 8 37 cm Etcell114 24 4 31 0.745" 1.6 21.892 Cadmium 8.94 cm Steel /114 25 431 0.745" 1.6 21.896 Bor Steel 9.83 cm Steel /114 26 4.31 0.745" 1.6 21.922 Cu Cad 10.57 cm Steel / II4 27 431 1.0" 3.882 23.182 None 12.89 cm Steel / IIe 28 431 1.0" 3.882 23.219 None 14.25 cm Steel / IIS 29 431 1.0" 3.882 23.263 None 14.12 cm Steel / IIS j
30 431 1.0" 3.882 23.315 None 12.44 cm Steel /lle 31 431 1.0" 3.882 23330 None 9.80 cm Steel /114 32 431 1.0" 3.882 23358 None 8.24 cm Steel /114 33 4.829 1.0" 3.882 23.227 None 20 62 cm Lead /114 34 4.829 1.0" 3.882 23.278 None 20.78 cm trad/ HD 35 4.829 1.0" 3.882 23314 Nonc 19.04 cm trad!HS 36 4 829 1.0" 3.882 23337 None 10.30 cm Lead /I14 37 4306 0.745" 1.6 21.620 Bor Steel 3.73 cm*
IIS 38 4306 0.745" 1.6 21.628 Bor Sicel 3.10 cm*
11 4 39 4306 0.745" 1.6 21.613 Bor steel 2.47 cm*
HS 40 4306 0.745" 1.6 21.623 Bar Steel I.84 cm' 11 4 41 5.74 0.56" I.933 21.917 None N/A IIS 42 5.74 0.52" 1.5015 21327 None N/A i14
- Poison sheets rest against each assembly. The listed separation lies between the sheets forming a flux trap. Voiding material (Al) is used to reduce the effective separation between the poison sheets. This effective separation is listed in the table.
6-47
SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 The set of UO fuel experiments that yields the lowest KENO-Va calculated ken values, and 2
therefore the highest code bias, are the experiments that contain flux traps. Because the fuel assemblies are in contact with the poison plates in these experiments, the energy spectrum for these cases is relatively hani. Their average fission group value is 21.6, which is lower than that present in any cask system analyses. For these four experiments, the KENO-Va analyses use a larger total number of particles to reduce the Monte Carlo error to 0.12% or less.
6.5.3 RESULTS OF BENCHMARK. CALCULATIONS The results of the benchmark calculations are presented for all 42 UO2 fuel critical experiments in Table 6.5-2. For each experiment, the table lists the ken alue calculated by KENO-Va, the l v
(one sigma) Monte Carlo uncertainty level of the calculated ken value, and the calculated code bias (1.0 minus the calculated kenvalue).
The benchmark results analysis was perfonned in accordance with NUREG/CR-6361 (Reference 6.14) and utilized the data fmm the 42 calculation-to-experimental comparisons of Table 6.5-2. Computer code USLTATS, Version 1, (Reference 6.14) was used to calculate the Upper Subcritical Limit (USL) in accordance with Method 1, " Confidence Band with Administrative Margin." Method I was chosen so that the margin of 0.05 was applied to the criticality analysis.
The USL can be determined as a function of several parameters. To determine which parameters would have the most significant bearing on the USL, the correlation between ken and each of the following five parameters was calculated:
Enrichment Rod Pitch Water to Uranium Volume Ratio Average Fission Group (AFG) e Assembly Separation (SEP) e I
6-48
SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 TABLE 6.5-2 002 FUEL BENCHMARK ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR THE SCALE-4.1 CSAS25 CODE SEQUENCE Emperiment Calculated One Sigma Calculated Number Keff Uncertainty Bias 1
0.9921 0.0021 0.0079 2
0.9939 0 0025 0.0061 3
0.9905 0.0023 0.0095 4
0.9966 0.0025 0.0034 5
0.9993 0.0023 0 0007 1
6 0.9924 0.0024 0.0076 7
0.9949 0.0023 0.0051 8
0.9991 0.0025 0.0009 9
0.9935 0.0024 0.0065 10 0.9913 0.0021 0.0087 11 0.9943 0.0023 0.0057 12 0.9971 0.0024 0.0029 13 0.9904 0.0023 0.0096 14 0.9940 0.0024 0.0060 15 0.9937 0.0021 0.0063 16 0.9908 0.0019 0.0092 17 0.9910 0.0023 0 0090 l
18 0.98 %
0.0023 0.0104 19 0.9988 0.0023 0.0012 20 0.9934 0.0023 0.0066 21 0.9934 0.0024 0.0066 I
22 1.0004 0.0026
-0.0004 23 1.0000 0.0023 0.0000 24 0,9924 0.0024 0.0076 25 0.9949 0.0026 0.0051 26 0.9985 0.0024 0.0015 27 1.0035 0.0024 0.0035 28 1.0008 0.0023 4.0008 29 0.9990 0.0020 0.0010 30 0.9994 0.0023 0.0006 31 0.9948 0.0024 0.0052 32 0.9957 0.0023 0.0043 33 1.0019 0.0024
-0.0019 34 1.0053 0.0023
-0.0053 35 1.0026 0.0024
-0.0026 36 0.9965 0.0024 0.0035 37 0.9859 0.0011 0.0141 38 0.9884 0.0011 0.0116 39 0.9846 0.0012 0.0154 40 0.9853 0 0011 0.0147 1
O.9928 0.0013 0.0072 41 42 0.9915 0.0011 0.0085 l
6-49
SAR -TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 Since kerr correlates most strongly with AFG and SEP, these two parameters were used to develop an applicable USL The result is:
USMAFG) = 0.8311 + 4.7812x10xAFG for AFG < 23.226
= 0.9422 for APG >= 23.226 d
USMSEP) = 0.9318 + 6.8435x10 xSEP for SEP < 14.926
= 0.9420 for SEP >= 14.926 Generally, the SEP-based USL value is larger than the AFG-based USL value. Therefore, the calculated kon+2e value for each criticality calcuation was required to be less than the corresponding AFG-based USL value to ensure that the configuration was acceptably subcritical.
l 6-50
e SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999
6.6 REFERENCES
6.1 Viebrock, J. and Malin, Douglas, " Domestic Light Water Reactor Fuel Design Evolution," Volume III, DOE /ET/47912, September 1981.
6.2 Landers, N.F. and Petrie, L.M., "CSAS4: An Enhanced Criticality Safety Analysis Module With An Optimum Pitch Search Option," NUREG/CR-0200, Revision 4, Volume I, Section C4, March 1992.
1 6.3 Petrie, L.M., Landers, N.F., " KENO V.a: An Improved Monte Carlo Criticality Program With Supergrouping," NUREG/CR-0200, Revision 4, Volume 2, Section F11; March 1992.
6.4
" Domestic Light Water Reactor Fuel Design Evolution Volume III," NAC-C-8129.
]
6.5 U.S. DOE, " Characteristics of Spent Fuel, High-Level Waste, And Other Radioactive Wastes Which May Require Long-Term Isolation," Volume 3 of 6, DOE /RW-0184.
6.6
" Functional Requirements and Specifications for a Dry Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI).", Specification No. TD-06, Rev.1, Attachment 11, Section D, Trojan Nuclear Plant, Portland General Electric Co., May 1995.
6.7 Greene, N.M., "BONAMI-S:. Resonance Self-Shielding By The Bondarenko Method," NUREG/CR-0200, Revision 4, Volume 2 Section Fl; August 1981.
6.8 Greene, N.M., Petrie, L.M., and Westfall, R.M. "NITAWL-II: SCALE System Module For Performing Resonance Self-Shielding And Working Library Production," NUREG/CR-0200, Revision 4, Volume 2 Section F2; June 1989.
6.9 Bierman, S. R., and Clayton, E. D., " Criticality Experiments with Suberitical 235U Enriched UO Rods in Water at a Clusters of 2.35 wt % and 4.31 wt %
2 Water-to-Fuel Volume Ratio of 1.6," NUREG/CR-1547 (PNL-3314), Pacific Northwest Laboratory,1981.
6.10 Bierman, S.R., and Clayton, E.D., " Criticality Experiments with Suberitical 235
. Clusters of 2.35 wt % and 4.31 wt %
U Enriched UO2 Rods in Water with Steel Reflecting Walls," NUREG/CR-1784 (PNL-3602), Pacific Northwest Laboratory,1981.
6.11 Bierman, S.R., Durst, B.M., and Clayton, E.D., " Criticality Experiments with 235 Subcritical Clusters of 2.35 wt % and 4.29 wt %
U Enriched UO2 Rods in Water with Uranium or lead Reflecting Walls.", NUREG/CR-1784 (PNL-l 3602), Pacific Northwest Laboratory (1981).
6-51 1
SAR-TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 6.12 Bierman, S.R., " Criticality Experiments with Neutron Flux Traps Containing Voids," PNL-7167, Batelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory,1990.
6.13 Taylor, E.G., "Saxton Plutonium Program Critical Experiments for the Saxton Partial Plutonium Core," WCAP-3385-54, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 1965.
6.14
" Criticality Benchmark Guide for Light-Water Reactor Fuel in Transportation and Storage Packages," NUREG/CR-6361, March 1997.
6-52
SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 3.
Install the cask top closure plate and drab port plate, and tighten the bolts in accordance with the preload requirements of General Arrangement Drawings, Section 1.3.
4.
Utilizing appropriate fittings, attach a leak detector and a source of helium gas, in parallel, to the vent port. Install valves on each of the lines to allow independent isolation of the leak detector and the source of the helium gas to the vent port.
Close the valve to the helium gas source and open the valve to the leak detector.
5.
Evacuate the system through the vent port until the vacuum is adequate to operate the leak detector per the manufacturer instructions.
6.
Provide a helium atmosphere about the exterior of the cask body, taking care to purge all other gases from any pockets or cavities adjacent to the cask body.
7.
Determine the leak rate of the system using the leak detector manufacturer's recommendations. Record 1.he leak rate value.
4 3
8.
If the leak rate of the system is determined to be greater than 1x10 cm /sec, air, release the vacuum, disassemble the system and utilize appropriate methods to locate / isolate the leak path. Repair the leak path and repeat Steps 3 through 7 to verify cask leakage integrity.
9.
Remove the leak detector from the vent port.
8.1.3.2 LEAKAGE RATE TEST OF THE VENT AND DRAIN PORT AND CLOSURE LID SEALS This is a continuation of the previous test in Section 8.1.3.1.
1.
Backfill the evacuated cask cavity to 20 PSIG with 99.9% pure helium.
2.
With an appropriately calibrated MSLD, monitor the annulw men the inner and outer O-rings via the test port on the closure lid and the installed drain port cover plate.
3.
Leakage in excess of 1.0 x 10 cm /sec, air shall render the test unacceptable, at l
4 3
which time appropriate corrective measures shall be taken, after which the test chall be repeated until acceptance has been achieved.
4.
Upon completion of the test bleed the helium pressure to O psig.
5.
Remove the previously installed drain port cover plate and re-install the quick connect fitting in the vent port.
8-4
SAR - TrenStor Shipping Cask.
Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 6.
Remove the quick connect fitting in the drain port.
7.
Assemble the vent port cover plate and torque fasteners to required values.
1 8.
Repeat operations I through 4 except monitor the annulus between the inner-
. and out 0-ring of the installed vent port cover plate.
8.1.3.3 PRESHIPMENT LEAKAGE RATE TEST l
The procedure for leak testing the cask containment boundary prior to shipment is given in this section:
1 1.
Assemble the cask for shipping per the procedure in Section 7.2.3 of Chapter 7.0.
2.
At the conclusion of Step 34 of Section 7.2.3, attach a suitable vacuum pump to the vent port. Reduce the cask cavity pressure to below 1.0 PSIA and isolate the vacuum pump.
3.
Attach a helium source to the vent port and backfill the cask cavity to 20 PSIG with 99.9% pure helium. Isolate the helium source and disconnect from the vent port.
4.
Evacuate the closure plate test port and with a mass spectrometer leak detector (MSLD) monitor the annulus between the inner and outer 0-rings.
4 3
5.
Leakage in excess of 1 x 10 cm /sec, air is not acceptable. Appropriate corrective measures shall be taken and the test repeated until acceptance is achieved.
6.
Reduce the cask cavity pressure to the required shipping pressure and disconnect all leak test equipment from the cask.
7.
Ensure that the vent and drain port areas are clean and free of water.
8.
Install new metallic O-rings on the vent port cover and position the cover close to the port area. Enclose the vent port and fill the cavity with helium at a slightly positive pressure to ensure helium saturation.
9.
Install the vent port cover plate.
Torque the attachment bolts to the requirements listed in the drawings located in Chapter 1.0. Remove the helium source from the vent port area and remove the vent port enclosure.
10.
Remove the plug in the vent port cover plate. Attach a MSLD to the test port, establish a vacuum and perform the leak test.
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SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 The outer metallic O-rings for the cask lid, vent port cover plate, drain port cover plate, and test port cover plate provide a secondary closure for the cask contents, and access to the annulus for testing the inner O-rings which form the primary containment boundary.
The metallic O-ring (s) of any component are replaced prior to re-installation of the component. The containment boundary metallic O-ring seals are tested and maintained in accordance with the maintenance program schedule of Table 8.2-1 and the leak test criteria of Section 8.2.2.
8.1.4.3 TESTS OF MISCELLANEOUS COMPONENTS The TranStor Shipping Cask components include energy absorbing impact limiters designed to protect the cask in the event of a drop accident during transportation. The impact j
limiters, shown in the design drawings, are made of aluminum honeycomb encased in a
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stainless steel shell. The impact limiter material is verified by performing tests on samples from each block of honeycomb for density and strength. Procurement of the impact limiters is under a quality assurance program designed to ensure that the scale model impact limiters on which acceptance testing is performed are representative of the limiters as designed. The joints and seams of the exterior are welded to provide a sealed unit; thus no degradation affecting the impact limiter's intended function would occur due to weather and corrosion.
i Visual and liquid penetrant tests of the welds at the impact limiter stainless steel shell joints are performed to verify weld integrity following final closure welding of the shell.
The acceptance criterion for the strength of each type of honeycomb used in the impact limiters is specified in SAR drawing 71-003, Sheet 1. The acceptance criterion for leakage at l the impact limiter shell is that the leakage must not exceed 1 x 10 2 standard em'/sec.
If any of the above acceptance criteria is not met, the cause of the nonconformance is determined and repaired. The test is then re-performed.
8.1.5 TESTS FOR SHIELD INTEGRITY 8.1.5.1 GAMMA SHIELD TEST A gamma scan test of the steel and lead shielding of the TranStor Shipping Cask body shall be performed prior to completion of fabrication to verify shield integrity. The test shall be performed in accordance with written approved procedures.
The gamma scan test shall be conducted by continuously scanning or probing over 100 percent of all accessible cask surfaces using a 3-inch detector and a cobalt-60 source. The
- source strength shall be of an intensity sufficient to produce a count rate that equals or exceeds three times the background count rate on the extemal surfaces of the cask. Scan path spacing will be a maximum of 2.5 inches and the scanning speed will be 4.5 feet per minute or less. All probing will be on a 2-inch grid pattem (when using a 3-inch detector) and the specified count time will be greater than one minute.
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SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cosk Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 The acceptance criteria for the shield test will be that the shield effectiveness of the cask body and lids shall be equal to or greater than the shield effectiveness of a lead and steel mock-up, where the steel thicknesses are equivalent to the minimum thicknesses specified on the SAR drawings (Chapter 1.0) and the lead thickncss is equivalent to the minimum thickness specified in the license drawings less 3 percent. The shielding mock-up will be produced using the same fabrication techniques as those approved for the cask.
Measured count rates that exceed those established by the test mock-up shall cause the l
component to be considered rejected. The rejected areas / components shall be evaluated to determine the corrective action to be taken. Any repaired areas shall be re-tested prior to acceptance.
i An additional gamma shield effectiveness test shall be performed on each cask following first fuel loading.
See Section 8.1.5.3 for detrils on the neutron and gamma shield effectiveness test procedures and acceptance criteria.
8.1.5.2 NEUTRON SHIELDING TEST The neutron shield of the TranStor is provided by a solid synthetic polymer with a B4C content of 0.050 gm/cm and a hydrogen density of 0.0988 gm/cm'. A 5 inch layer of this 3
material is located in the annulus formed by the outer shell and the neutron shield shell.
The installation of neutron shield material in the fabrication of the cask is a special process and, as such, procedures will be prepared and qualified to ensure that the mix ratios, mixing method, degassing, pouring, and curing of the material is properly performed. The neutron shielding material is installed into the annulus between the outer shell and the neutron shield shell by pouring it with the cask in an inverted vertical position. During fabrication, samples of the actual material being poured into the annulus will be taken at regular intervals and tested te ensure that the material is properly mixed and poured and that it provides the minimum neutron attenuation required by the shielding analysis. Samples that do not meet the acceptance criteria or that have voids or excessive porosity will cause the section (between adjacent fins) from which the sample was taken to be rejected. Corrective action will be taken to ensure proper installation of the neutron shielding material.
4 Following final closure of the neutron shield shell, a neutron scan test shall be performed by continuously scanning or probing over 100 percent of the exterior neutron shield surface using a neutron detector and a neutron source. The source strength shall be of an intensity sufficient to produce a count rate that equals or exceeds three times the background counting time on the external surface of the neutron shield shell. Scan path spacing will be a maximum of 2.5 inches and the scanning speed will be 4.5 feet per minute or less. All probing will be on a 2-inch grid pattern and the counting period will be one minute or greater.
The acceptance criteria for the shield test will be that the shield effectiveness of the extemal neutron shield shall be equal to or greater than the shield effectiveness of a lead / steel / neutron shield material mock-up where the neutron shield material thickness is equivalent to the 8-8
r SAR - TranStor Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 minimum neutron shield thickness shown on the SAR Drawings (Chapter 1.0) less 3 percent.
The shielding mock-up will be produced using the same fabrication techniques as those approved for the cask.
Measured neutron count rates that exceed those established by the test mock-up shall cause the component to be rejected. The rejected areas / components of the cask shall be evaluated to determine conective actions to be taken. Any repaired areas shall be re-tested to the original acceptance criteria prior to final acceptance.
An additional neutron shield effectiveness test shall be perfonned on each cask following first fuel loading. See Section 8.1.5.3 for details on the neutron shield effectiveness test procedures and acceptance criteria.
8.1.5.3 NEUTRON AND GAMMA SHIELD EFFECTIVENESS TESTS Following first fuel loading, a neutron and gamma shield effectiveness test shall be performed for each cask prior to transport. The test shall be performed with the cask loaded with fuel, drained, vacuum dried and backfilled with helium. The purpose of the test is to document the effectiveness of the neutron and gamma shielding materials. The test shall be performed in accordance with detailed approved written test procedures.
l Calibrated neutron and gamma dose rate meters shall be used to measure the neutron and
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gamma dose rate at contact with the outer shell of the neutron shield and 2.3 meters from the surface. Dose measurement points shall be established on the extemal surface of the shell at 30 intervals and at five points along the height of the shield (a total of 60 measuring points).
In addition, neutron and gamma dose rate measurements shall be made of the trunnion areas above the neutron shield, at four points below the neutron shield, and at the edges and center of the cask top (outer lid) and cask bottom surfaces. Dose rates at the top and bottom of the cask shall be measured with the transport impact limiters installed. The dose rates measured at contact and at 2 meters shall be recorded on the test data sheet, along with the total power of the loaded fuel assemblies; date, time and location of test; identification and calibration of instrumentation; and identification of test engineer and operators.
i To allow an evaluation of the cask shielding perfonnance, the burnup and cool time for the actual fuel assemblies loaded into the cask will be used to determine the expected dose rates using methods similar to those employed in Chapter 5.0.
A comparison of the predicted and measured dose rates will be performed to verify that the package provides shielding as described in the SAR. If the values differ significantly (indicating a potential discrepancy in the SAR) or if a measured value exceeds the regulatory limits given in Chapter 5.0, then corrective actions will be taken prior to shipment of the package.
8.1.6 THERMAL ACCEPTANCE TEST An acceptance test is performed on the TranStorm Shipping Cask to verify that the cask's thermal performance is consistent with the results of the thermal analyses provided in Chapter 3.0 of this SAR. Specifically, the cask is subjected to a thermal heat rejection test to 8-9
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SAR-TranStsr* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 demonstrate satisfactory operation of the shells, closure lid, and shielding materials, but without the drain port covered. The test setup, procedure, and acceptance criteria are discussed below.-
8.1.6.1 TEST SETUP The cask orientation for the thermal acceptance test is shown in Figure 8,1-1. As shown in the figure, the cask containing the basket is supported horizontally for the test, with the impact limiter or equivalent insulating material attached to each end of the cask. In lieu of the closure lid, a thermal test lid with connections for thermocouple leads and electric heater power cables is installed on the cask. The O-ring on the thermal test lid is capable of ma'mtaining the containment cavity helium atmosphere. Electric heat sources capable of producing a minimum of 1 kW are installed in each fuel tube. The heat sources are supported within the basket so as to preclude contact with the fuel tube walls. The power supplied to the heat source is recorded throughout the duration of the test.
A minimum of 6 pairs of calibrated thermocouples are provided to measure temperature gradients across the cask. As shown in Figure 8.1-1, the thermocouples are attached on the neutron shield shell and the intemal cavity of the cask. A thermocouple is also provided to measure the ambient temperature of the test area. The measured temperatures are recorded by a strip chart recorder throughout the test. The thermocoi:ples are required to be accurate within i 2 F.
8.1.6.2 TEST PROCEDURE ~
With the casks and thermocouples configared as described in Section 8.1.6.1, the cask cavity is evacuated and backfilled to 1.0 atmosphere absolute pressure (14.7 psia) with helium.
Power is applied to the heaters to simulate the presence of fuel, and is maintained and -
recorded until the cask has reached thermal equilibrium. Thermal equilibrium is considered to be achieved when over two consecutive hours, the change in temperature across the cask
- wall is less than or equal to 2*F. After verification of the equilibrium, final thermocouple temperature measurements and the final power measurements for the electric heaters are recorded.
The thermal test acceptance criteria are given in Section 8.1.6.3. If these criteria are not met, appropriate corrective actions must be completed, and the cask re-tested successfully to the original test requirements and acceptance criteria, prior to acceptance.
8.1.6.3 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA The purpose of the heat dissipation acceptance testing is to ensure that the analytical methods
- used in the cask thermal analysis conservatively predict the maximum temperatures and temperature gradients in the cask. Using data from the thermal test, a specific thermal analysis of the cask will be performed for the actual test conditions, including ambient
. temperature and heat load. This analysis will be performed using the same analytical model that is used to perform the licensing basis thermal analysis of the cask. This analysis will provide the analytically predicted temperatures at thermocouple locations for the actual test conditions.
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i SAR - TranSt:r Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 THERMOCOUPLES l
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i THERMOCOUPLES FIGURE 8.1-1 CASK THERMAL ACCEPTANCE TEST CONFIGURATION I
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SAR - TranStor* Shipping Cask Revision C Docket No. 71-9268 September 1999 8.2.6 THERMAL TESTS The heat removal capability of the TranStor Shipping Cask is verified prior to first use of the package as described in Section 8.1.6. No further thermal tests are required.
8.2.7 MISCELLANEOUS TESTS The cask cavity is visually inspected for evidence of obstruction or damage prict to each basket loading. It shall have no visible damage or obstructions that could affect the loading function. Should evidence of damage be present, the components are repaired as appropriate prior to re-inspection and acceptance. Results of all inspections are documented.
The overall condition of the cask is also visually inspected and documented during each cask use for compliance with license requirements. If non-compliant, the cask must be repaired as necessary and re-inspected prior to acceptance.
The impact limiters are visually inspected prior to each shipment. Any defonnation at any location greater than one inch when compared to the nominal dimensions presented in the SAR drawing, or any cracks, holes, punctures, broken welds, and broken or defective attachment lugs will be repaired. Any affected honeycomb will be filled or replaced with identical material. The stainless steel casing will be straightened or replaced and rescaled.
I After one year of service and at five-year intervals thereafler, the impact limiter welds shall be subjected to visual and liquid penetrant inspection to the same requirements as initial fabrication.
NOTE: The visual inspections described above are to ensure that the system conforms, (to the extent it can be confirmed visually), to the configuration described on the applicable drawings and/or in the associated operating procedures. If these inspections reveal potential adverse conditions, the condition shall be evaluated to the original specification (s) for the component to determine if a nonconforming condition exists. Ifit is determined that a nonconforming condition does exist, it shall be processed and dispositioned in accordance with the vendors approved QA program.
8.3 L.EAD INSTALLATION PROCEDURE Chemical lead in the annulus formed by the inner and outer shells of the Transtor Shipping Cask body serves as the main gamma shielding material. The lead is poured in place in the annulus. The lead pour is followed by a controlled cooldown of the cask. The procedure for the lead installation is described below..This includes requirements for the lead pour, inspection of the cask inner shell dimensions prior to and following the lead pour, and gamma scan or X-ray inspection of the lead shielding.
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ENCLOSURE 8 TRANSTORm PART 71 SIIIPPING CASK SYSTEM REDACTED CALCULATIONS t