ML20211L083
| ML20211L083 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1986 |
| From: | George Thomas PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | Noonan V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-01.097, RTR-REGGD-1.097 SBN-1143, NUDOCS 8607010221 | |
| Download: ML20211L083 (6) | |
Text
.s George S. Thomas Vice Pre:Jdent-Nuclect Production Pub 5c Service of New Hampshire N:w Hampshire Yankee Division June 26, 1986 SBN-1143 T.F.
B7.1.2 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention:
Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director PWR Project Directorate No. 5
References:
(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-44 3 and 50-444 Subj ect:
NRC Requests for Additional Information; ICSB
Dear Sir:
The enclosed is provided in response to discussions with the Staf f regarding the Radiation Dat a Manage.aent System, the Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves, Station Service Water, inadequate core cooling instru-mentation, and the open items from the EICSB site audit. We trust that the enclosed is acceptable and request that this be reflected in the next supplement to Seabrook's SER, where applicable.
Very truly yours, 7
George S. Thoma s Enclosure cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List l
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8607010221 860626
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j PDR ADOCK 0500 3
A P.O. Box 300 + Seabrook,NHO3874. Telephone (603)474-9521
sDisna Curran, Esquira Pater J. Mathawa, Mayor Hnrmon & Weios City Hall 2001 S. Street, N.W.
Nswburyport, MA 01950 Suite 430 Washington, D.C.
20009 Judith H. Mizner Silvergate, Gertner, Baker, Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.
Fine, Good & Mizner Office of the Executive Legal Director 88 Broad Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Boston, MA 02110 Tenth Floor Washington, DC 20555 Calvin A. Canney City Manager Robert A. Backus, Esquire City Hall 116 Lowell Street 126 Daniel Street P.O. Box 516 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Manchester, NH 03105 Stephen E. Merrill, Esquire Philip Ahrens, Esquire Attorney General Assistant Attorney General George Dana Bisbee, Esquire Department of The Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Statehouse Station #6 Office of the Attorney General Augusta, ME 04333 25 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301-6397 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Chairman, Board of Selectmen Mr. J. P. Nadeau RFD 1 - Box 1154 Selectmen's Office Kennsington, NH 03827 10 Central Road Rye, NH 03870 Carol S. Sneider, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. Angie Machiros Department of the Attorney General Chairman of the Board of Selectmen One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Town of Newbury Boston, MA 02108 Newbury, MA 01950 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Mr. William S. Lord U.S. Senate Board of Selectmen Washington, DC 20510 Town Hall - Friend Street (ATTN: Tom Burack)
Amesbury, MA 01913 Richard A. Hampe, Esq.
Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Hampe and McNicholas 1 Pillsbury Street 35 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301 Concord, NH 03301 (ATTN: Herb Boynton)
Thomas F. Powers, III H. Joseph Flynn, Esquire Town Manager Office of General Counsel Town of Exeter Federal Emergency Management Agency 10 Front Street 500 C Street, SW Exeter, NH 03833 Washington, DC 20472 Brentwood Board of Selectmen Paul McEachern, Esquire RFD Dalton Road Matthew T. Brock, Esquire Brentwood, NH 03833 Shaines & McEachern 25 Maplewood Avenue i
Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
P.O. Box 360 Holmes & Ells Portsmouth, NH 03801 47 Winnacunnet Road Hampton, NH 03842 Robert Carrigg Town Office Mr. Ed Thomas Atlantic Avenue FEMA Region I North Hampton, NH 03862 442 John W. McCormack PO & Courthouse Boston, MA 02109
ENCLOSURE TO SBN-ll43 RADIATION DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (RDMS):
a.
Since the Seabrook Station RDMS design is based on previous project-specific system designs the Applicant should ensure that G.
A. Technologies continues to access the adequacy of the process used to determine the impact of deficiencies or modifi-cations associated with previous project-specific RDMS designs from which the Seabrook design evolved.
Response
We will assure that G. A. Technologies continues to access the adequacy of the process used to determine the impact of deficiencies or modifications associated with previous project-specific RDMS designs from which the Seabrook design evolved.
b.
The applicant should assure that appropriate steps are taken by G. A. Technologies to make sure that use of the firmware configuration document will result in use of the correct version / revision of a PROM.
Response
Upon entry into the sof tware library, the project - specific Pro-grammable Read Only Memory (PROM) is traceable through version /
revision identification.
Following entry into the library the PROM version / revision for each Seabrook RDMS monitor is provided in a document entitled Firmware Configuration.
System acceptance test procedures require the utilization of the Firmware Configuration d ocume nt.
It is necessary that the correct version / revision of a PROM be used when performing an acceptance test procedure, and there-fore, we have ensured that the appropriate steps are taken by G. A.-
Technologies to make sure that the use of the Firmware Configuration document will result -in use of the correct version / revision of a PROM.
ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP VALVES ( ASDV):
Periodic testing and surveillance shall be included as part of the Technical Specifications to check the operability of the ASDVs and associated manual controls including the safety-related gas supply system.
Response
The Seabrook Technical Specifications include a check of operability of-the ASDVs and associated manual controls including the safety-related gas supply system.
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ENCLOSURE TO SBN-1143 (Continued)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97:
The Applicant should show that the quench tank temperature indication will remain functional and on-scale, including the maximum expected saturation temperature, during any accident that lifts the pressurizer relief valves or provide a range that will envelop these conditions.
Response
We will show that the quench tank temperature indication will remain functional and on-scale, including the maximum expected saturation temperature, during any accident that lifts the pressurizer relief valves, or provide a range that will envelop these conditions.
If an extended range is necessary it will be installed before startup af ter the first refueling outage.
STATION SERVICE WATER:
Procedures for cooling tower operation during normal power operation shall contain restrictions on the operation of the diesel generators when the Technical Specification tower basin temperature could be exceeded.
Response
Procedures for cooling tower operation during normal operation include restrictions on operation of the diesel generators when the Technical Specification basin temperature could be exceeded.
INADEQUATE CORE COOLING INSTRUMENTATION (ICC):
As a result of discussions with the Staf f regarding the ICC we are providing the following additional clarification / confirmation.
a.
We wish to clarify the schedule requirements previously submitted with PSNH Letter (SBN-952), dated February 24, 1986 where we incorrectly stated that the ICC Instrumentation will be f ully operational prior to fuel load. The ICC Instrumentation cannot be " fully operational" until the reactor head is on and the incore thermocouples are inserted.
The implementation schedule for ICC Instrumentation will be in accordance with the limiting conditions for operation of accident monitoring instrumentation in Technical Specification 3.3.3.6.
The system will be operable prior to entering Mode 3, Hot Standby.
The ICC Instrumentation will be fully operational with appropriate emergency operating procedures in place prior to entering Mode 3 and will be fully calibrated prior to exceeding 5 percent power operation, (prior to entering Mode 1). -
ENCLOSURE TO SBN-1143 I
(Continued) j b.
The ICC equipment is environmentally qualified in accordance with R.G. 1.89.
The quality assurance of the ICC Category 1 instrumentation
+
l is in accordance with the QA Program described in Chapter 17 of the Seabrook FSAR.
EICSB TRIP REPORT
SUMMARY
During the EICSB site audit in May,1986, various concerns with electrical separation were discussed with the NRC reviewer.
The following is our response to these concerns including a brief statement of the NRC concern.
1.
During audit of the Main Control Room Control Board consoles l
(MCB), the reviewer observed various areas where cables appeared to have insuf ficient electrical separation.
These areas were as j
follows :
a)
Train A associated and-Train B associated cables at the bottom of the computer Intelligent Remote Termination Unit (IRTU) CP-125.
b)
MCB Section B - Train A and B cables (F26-FK2, F26-GK8, F26-GK9, and F26-il36).
c)
MCB Section C - wiring near control switches CS-2400 and CS-2419.
d)
MCB Section E - wiring for control switches FW-CS-4214A&B, j
FW-CS-4224A&B, FW-CS-4234A&B, and FW-CS-4244A&B.
e)
MCB Section F - wiring for control switches MS-CS-3001-1, MS-CS-3002-1, MS-CS-3003-1, and MS-CS-3004-1.
f)
MCB Section H - wiring for indicating light ED-ZL-9922 and selector switch EDE-SS-9785.
These separation concerns have been resolved by retraining of wire /
cables to achieve 1" separation or by the addition of barriers. This 1" or barrier separation criteria is based on an analysis and test program which was submitted to the NRC for review by PSNH Letter (SBN-979), dated March 31,1986.
It is our understanding that the acceptability of this.
criteria will be documented in the upcoming supplement to Seabrook's SER.
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ENCLOSURE TO SBN-1143 (Continued) 2.
During inspection of the solid state protection system, the NRC reviewer noted that there appeared to be insuf ficient electrical separation between the protection channel cables providing input i
to the Train A and Train B input cabinets. The applicant re-sponded by stating that separation barriers had been installed in i
these cabinets to achieve adequate separation but that work re-quests SC-0653 and SC-0662 had been issued to temporarily remove these separation barriers for the purpose of installing fire barrier material.. These separation barriers will be reinstalled prior to fuel load to provide adequate separation between the cables.
3.
During inspection of the Train B logic cabinet (1-MM-CP-0013) of the solid state protection system, the NRC reviewer noted that there appeared to be insufficient electrical separation between the Train A and Train B cables entering the bottom of the cabinet.
The applicant committed to providing adequate separation by rerouting cables and installing barriers. ECA #
03804153 has been issued to perform the necessary work which will be completed prior to fuel load.
J 4.
During walk through of the remote shutdown procedures, the NRC reviewer noted that indicator RC-TI-9411 had an incorrect name pla te.
This nameplate has been corrected to read Cold Leg Temperature.
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