ML20211G417

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Forwards Final SALP Rept 50-289/85-97 on 850916-860430, Incorporating Util 860816 Comments.Minor Revs Made to Rept on Fire Brigade Training & Radiological Control Audits. Revised Pages 19,20 & Table 8 Included
ML20211G417
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/24/1986
From: Murley T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Hukill H
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
Shared Package
ML20211G422 List:
References
NUDOCS 8611030500
Download: ML20211G417 (3)


See also: IR 05000289/1985097

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24 OCT 1986

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Docket No. 50-289

GPU Nuclear Corporation

ATTN: Mr. H. D. Hukill

Vice President and Director of TMI-1

P. O. Box 480

Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057

Gentlemen:

Subject:

Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)

Report No. 50-289/85-97

l

This letter refers to the SALP evaluation of Three Mile Island, Unit 1 for the

period of September 16, 1985 through April 30, 1986, initially forwarded to

you by our July 10, 1986 letter (Enclosure 1). This SALP evaluation was dis-

cussed with you and your staff at a meeting held on July 30, 1986 (see Enclo-

sure 2 for attendees). We have reviewed your August 19, 1986 written comments

(Enclosure 3) and herewith transmit the final report (Enclosure 4). Based on

a review of your comments, we made minor revisions to our report on . fire brigade

training (pages 11 and 29) and radiological controls audits (page 12). We have

also issued revised pages 19, 20, and Table 8 to correct editorial errors.

In your response to the SALP findings in the Plant Operations functional area

concerning fire protection training and drills, you indicated that you believe

NRC now agrees that your training and drills are thorough and realistic. A

more appropriate characterization of our position is that upon implementation

of the additional provisions discussed during the August 12, 1986, meeting, we

agree that your program will be more thorough and realistic.

Our overall assessment is that you and your staff have continued to demonstrate

competent management, and generally exercised effective control of activities.

Your cooperation in the SALP program is appreciated.

Sincerely,

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Thomas E. Murley

Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NRC Region I letter - T. E. Murley

to H. D. Hukill, July 10, 1986

2.

SALP Meeting Attendees

3.

GPUN letter, H. D. Hukill to

4.

SALP Report 50-289/85-97

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T. E. Murley, August 19, 1986

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0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

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10/22/86

8611030500 861024

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24 OCT 1986

cc w/ encl:

R. J. Toole, Operations and Maintenance Director, TMI-1

C. W. Smyth, Manager, TMI-1 Licensing

R. J. McGoey, Manager, PWR Licensing

E. L. Blake, Jr. , Esquire

TMI-1 Hearing Service List

Public Document Room (PDR)

Local Public Document Room (LPDR)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident Inspector

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Chairman Zech

Commissioner Roberts

Commissioner Asselstine

Commissioner Bernthal

Commissioner Carr

bcc w/ encl:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

W. D. Travers, Director, TMI-2 Cleanup Project Directorate

J. Goldberg, OELD: HQ

T. Murley

Division Directors, RI

Deputy Division Directors, RI

J. Durr

L. Bettenhausen

R. Bellamy

J. Joyner

K. Abraham (2 copies)

D. Holody

J. Taylor, IE

Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o encl)

DRP Section Chief

John Thoma, PM, NRR

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Operations

50-289

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TMI-1 Hearing Service List

Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairman

Bruce W. Churchill, Esquire

Administrative Judge

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge

Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel

1800 M Street, N.W.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C.

20036

Washington, D.C.

20555

Dr. Oscar H. Paris

Atomic Safety & Licensing Board

Administrative Judge

Panel

Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C.

20555

Washington, D.C.

20555

Frederick J. Shon

Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal

Administrative Judge

Board Panel

Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C.

20555

Washington, D.C.

20555

Joanne Doroshow

Docketing & Service Section

The Christic Institute

Office of the Secretary

1324 North Capitol Street

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C.

2002

Washington, D.C.

20555

Louise Bradford

1011 Green Street

Harrisburg, PA 17102

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Enclosure 1

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UNITED STATES

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10 JUL 1986

Docket No. 50-289

GPU Nuclear Corporation

ATTN:

Mr. H. D. Hukill

Director, TMI-1

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P. O. Box 480

Middletown, PA 17057

Gentlemen:

Subject: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP); Report

No. 50-289/85-97

The NRC Region I SALP Board conducted a review on June 6,1986, and evaluated

the performance of activities associated with the Three Mile Island (Unit 1)

Nuclear Generating Station.

The results of this assessment are documented in

the enclosed SALP report, which covers the period September 16, 1985, to

April 30, 1986.

The Interim SALP which covered the period from September 16,

1985 to January 10, 1956 is also enclosed for completeness. We will contact

you shortly to schedule a meeting to discuss the report.

At the' meeting, you should be prepared to discuss our assessment and any plans

you may have to improve performance further. Any comments you may have regard-

ing our report may be discussed at the meeting. Additionally, you may provide

written comments within twenty days after the meeting.

Following our meeting and receipt of your response, the enclosed report, your

response, and summary of our findings and planned actions will be placed in the

NRC Public Document Room.

Your cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely,

/

Thomas E. Murley

Regional Administrator

Enclosure:

As stated

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GPU Nuclear Corporation

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10 JUL 1986

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cc w/encls:

R. J. Teole, Operations and Maintenance Director, TMI-1

C. W. Smyth, Manager, TMI-I Licensing

R. J. McGoey, Manager, PWR Licensing

E. L. Blake, Jr.

TMI-1 OTSG Hearing Service List

Public Document Rcom (FDR)

local Public Document Roca (LPDR)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident Inspector

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

bec w/ encl:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

DRP Section Chief

SALP Board Members

NRC Resident Inspector, CC

J. Taylor, IF

T. Murley, RI

J. Illan, F.I

PAO, RI

W. Kane, Ri

H. Kister, RI

F. Young, RI

R. Conte, R!

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Enclosure 2

TMI-1 SALP ATTENDEES

GPUN

P. Clark, President

R. F. Wilson, Director, Technical Functions

R. L. Long, Director, Nuclear Assurance

R. Heward, Director, Radiological and Environmental Controls

H. Hukill, Director, TMI-1

R. W. Keaton, Director, Engineering Projects

D. K. Croneberger,' Director, Engineering and Design

R. J. Toole, Operations and Maintenance Director, TMI-1

J. Thorpe, Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs

G. Kuehn, Manager, Radiological Controls, TMI-1

C. Smyth, TMI-1 Licensing Manager

NRC

T. Murley, Regional Administrator

R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

J. Stolz, Director, Project Directorate No. 6, NRR

S. Ebneter, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

W. Kane, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects

W. Johnston,- Deputy Director, DRS

H. Kister, Chief, Projects Branch No.1, Division of Reactor Projects

J. Durr, Chief, Engineering Branch, DRS

R. Blough, Chief, Reactor Projects Section IA, DRP

R. Conte, Senior Resident Inspector (TMI-1)

R. Weller, Section Leader, Projects Directorate No. 6, NRR

J. Thoma, TMI-1 Operating Reactors Project Manager, NRR

L. J. Callan, Chief, Performance Appraisal Section, IE

J. Dyer, IE

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

A. Bhattacharyya, Nuclear Engineer

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inclosure 3

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GPU Nuclear Corporaticn

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Nuclear

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Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057-0191

717 944 7621

TELEX 84-2386

Writer's Direct Dial Number:

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August 19, 1986

52T1-86-2129

Dr. Thomas E. Murley

Region I, Regional Administrator

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

631 Park Avenue

King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)

Operating License No. DPR-50

Docket Nos. 50-289

Response to SALP Report 85-97

Enclosed is GPUN's response to the most recent SALP Report. The response is

formatted to reflect the major areas addressed in the NRC's Report. This

response and our response to the interim SALP (5211-86-2068 dated April 21,

1986) complete our response for this SALP period.

Sincerely,

.

. D.

kill

Vice President & Director, TMI-1

HDH/CWS/spb

Enclosure

cc:

J. Thoma

R. Conte

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GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation

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' Introduction

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As reflected inethe SALP repopt and our discussions on July 30, 1986,

sverall performance at TMI-1 has'been safe and competent and we have

well defined 7.nd solid programs'in place to continue to operate in a

safe and professional manner. 'We believe that the SALP report as

clart/ied in our discussion provides constructive input to our ongoing

effort, and NRC. comments during the July 30 SALP meeting, basically

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agree with our evaluation.

Our goal is to continue to' improve our performance by ensuring that

management's goals and our programs are fully understood and

implemented at all levels within our organization. Major efforts will

be directed towards this end. +These efforts will also be directed

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specifically at instilling in our people, especially middle management

and first line supervisors, the requirement for " attention to detail"

in their activities.

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With startup and initial operati[n successfully behind us, we expect to

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see an increasing level of understanding and experience in our staff.

We believe our personnel.bre improving in the area of attention to

detail and that experience' wi. tis close management attention and guidance

will be major contributors to '6ilt improvement.

As confirmed in the SALP we.have a good procedure system. We agree

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that additional efforts are feeded to upgrade procedures and to be more

consistent and demanding of our, people in the area of procedural

compliance. The actions discu6srd in our response to the Interim SALP

(attached) continue. We will also re-einphasize to our supervisors that

they are responsible for; procedure implementation on a continuing basis

and must, therefore, proparly review procedures and closely oversee

implementation practicer.

Continued efforts are underway to improve preventive maintenance as one

factor in reducing unplanned reactor trips and challenges to safety

systems., .<In addition, we are actively engaged with the B&W Owners

Group in reviewing and developing programs to reduce trips and

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challenges to safety systems.

' We agree that improvement in impleme$ ting our programs in the area of

modification and maintenar.co support'if needed. Our answer to the PAT

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Safety System FunctionabInspection ouscribed many of our initiatives

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in this area which are underway and receiving direct management

overview and assessment.

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The SALP report makes1 the observation that/gsome activities are

. performed in a hurried manner to" meet schedules and that this sometimes

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results in problems.

In our judgement, the' pace of activities has, for

the most part, been appropriate: Our evaluation of the unplanned

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exposures and radiological releases as discussed in our letter dated

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July 15,1986 (5211-86-2122) indicate that they resulted not from the

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high pace of activities, but rather from a mistake in judgement and

lack of experience in opening the Reactor Coolant System shortly af ter

the plant had been shut down. We do understand that meeting schedules

can cause problems if not properly managed and planned. We will

continue to monitor this factor to ensure our middle managers

understand and comply with the appropriate pace of activities and don't

attempt to meet schedules by failing to comply with procedures.

There are some comments in the sat.P report which are characterized as

involving improper management attitude. We have reviewed these and as

discussed in our meeting do not believe there are such attitudes. We

believe that the observed situations result from lack of understanding

between us, differences in judgement on priority or lack of attention

to detail.

We very strongly endorse the Chairman's and the Executive Director's

initiative to establish performance objectives. This program if

properly developed would help provide clear and measurable standards to

supplement the subjective evaluations inherent in the current SALP

process. We would be more than willing to participate in the

development of such a program.

II.

Plant Operations

Procedures - addressed in Introduction.

Attention to detail - addressed in Introduction.

Pace of activities - addressed in Introduction.

Major efforts are underway to improve logkeeping and ensure that out of

specification readings are identified and reported to the Shif t

Supervisor / Foreman so that appropriate action can be ,taken, if

warra nted.

Specifically, the following actions have been implemented:

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The Manager of Operations has issued memos reinforcing logkeeping

practices.

2.

QA Monitors have been requested to specifically observe logkeeping

practices.

3.

Those conducting management tours have been requested to observe

logkeeping practices.

During our meeting on August 12, 1986, we described the extent of our

fire protection training and drill program. Based on these discussions

and clarifications, we understand that you now agree that our training

and drills are thorough and realistic and provide meaningful training.

As we discussed, the drill that was the subject of the alleged

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violation in Inspection Report 86-01 was not typical of fire drills at

TMI-1 and no credit was given for that drill.

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III.

Radiological Controls

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A detailed review of the circumstances surrounding the airborne

radioactive buildup in the Reactor Building following shutdown 'and

personnel entry to the building has been conducted. The lessons

learned from this event have been documented and promulgated to

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appropriate personnel. Our evaluation and report of corrective action

for this event is contained in our response to Notice of Violation from

Inspection Report 86-05-(GPUN letter 5211-86-2122 of July 15, 1986).

We agree that in most instances direct irwolvement of upper / middle

level plant management in detailed work should be limited and directed

to training and assuring supervision. This matter has been discussed

in detail with those involved. Senior management is closely' monitoring

the situation and providing individual direction where ~needed.

This section refers to QA audits of the radiation protection program.

As discussed in our meeting, the audits referred to were conducted by

Rad Con nott by,QA. These audits are required by the Radiation

Protection Plan and were initiated by the Rad Con management in order

to improve 'the quality of their activities. Overall audit plans are

now used in order to assure that all program elements are reviewed.

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IV.

Maintenance

We agree that major jobs are well planned, superviced and carried out

but that more routine and minor work is not always perforced in as

complete a manner. This is an indication of operating experience level

and attention to detail.

Increased mariagement and supervisory

attention will be applied in order to improve performance of

maintenance and engineering support thereto for all maintenance

activities, not just major jobs'.

Based on our discussions at the July 30, 1986 SALP meeting, we

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understand that the level of documentation has, in some cases, created

an appearance of insufficient inquiry / evaluation of problems. We agree

that our documentation can be improved to capture more completely the

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basis for our corrective actions and to make this more visible to the

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NRC. We will increase our efforts in this area. We believe, however,

that the depth of our reviews and evaluations have generally been

adequate, notwithstanding our documentation.

In response to a concern previously expressed by the NRC, Plant

Engineering conducted a review of job tickets to identify instances

where minor modifications have been accomplished incorrectly as job

tickets without proper engineering documentation.

Engineering reviews

. and QA monitorings requested by management identified approximately 20

instances where modifications had been accomplished as job tickets.

Nearly all of these have been evaluated to date and either removed,

accepted as is, or upgraded.

Maintenance management has been

instructed to be watchful for instances where this may occur in the

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future so that it can be prevented and/or corrected.

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V.

Suneillance Testing

The issue concerning the use and understanding of the Exception and

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Deficiency forms we believe has been resolved.

Recent changes to

procedures have clarified the forms use. We intend to continue to

monitor this area to verify that this problem has been corrected.

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With respect to the procedures used to test our battery capacity:

(1) GPUN has been both aware of and understands the current industry

standards for battery testing and (2) we did consider adopting the most

current test methods at the time the "A" Battery replacement

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Operability / Maintainability /Constructability Review (OMCR) was

conducted. We are continuing our evaluation of the new standards and

will adopt them if it is determined they are technically superior to

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our gurrent battery operability test methods,

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VI.

Startup Testing

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No comments.

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VII.

Emergency Preparedness

As discussed in our meeting, we believe, the noise and congestion in

the Control Room is largely caused by the artificiality of the drill in

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that drill controllers and obseners are present. Their presence

causes a degree of noise and congestion that would not be present under

non-drill conditions. We will take action to minimize this disturbance

during future drills.

SALP Recommendation

(1) Assess the effectiveness of dose assessment and in-plant health

physics functions in emergencies dealing with longer term

scenarios where the EOF and OSC are fully operational.

Response:

We believe that the dose assessment function during

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emergencies is being conducted logically and effectively.

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Further, based on our discussions on July 30,1986, we

believe it is being conducted in the manner that the NRC

desires as discussed below.

During emergencies, all dose assessment is initially

conducted by the RAC in the control room. This dose

assessment includes both in-plant and off-site dose

assessment / projections. The in-plant dose information is

needed and used by the Emergency Director (ED) during all

phases of an event in order to make operational decisions.

The off-site dose projections are also needed by the ED to

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make protective action recommendations prior to the

Emergency Support Director (ESD) arrival.

Once the ESD

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position is manned, protective action recommendations are

made by the ESD. The ESD uses off-site dose projections

performed by the Environmental Assessment Command Center

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(EACC) which is manned at the alert level.

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drill timing, complete transfer of off-site dose assessment

from the RAC to the EACC may not occur immediately. This

function may be performed by both the RAC and EACC for a

short period of time until the transfer is complete. Our

drills to date have all included a full transfer of

responsibility for off-site dose assessment from the RAC to

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the EACC.

Once this is done, the RAC continues to perform

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in-plant dose assessment for the ED to support plant

operational decisions and provides source term information

in support of the EACC.

Off-site dose assessment is done

by the EACC at the EOF providing direct support for the ESD.

VIII. Security and Safeguards

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In a recent letter to the NRC, GPUN committed to resolving the

perimeter intrusion detection system issue by December,1987.

Although initial corrective actions did not correct the badge control

problem, as indicated by the report, subsequent actions were taken and

have been effective in correcting the security badge control problem.

IX.

Technical Support

We understand this section covers primarily modifications and design

and does not address many aspects of technical support such as

training, emergency procedures, startup testing, plant transient

review, risk analysis, etc. Many of these activities have been

commented on favorably in other sections of the SALP report and some

are not directly addressed in the report.

GPUN has long recognized the need for in-depth technical support to the

operating plants. The Corporation has made a major commitment over the

last five years as demonstrated by the resources applied. This

includes technical involvement in working with, and overseeing the

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results of almost every facet of plant operations.

This SALP technical support assessment is essentially based on the NRC

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Performance Appraisal Team report of modification / design problems in

one of two plant systems reviewed as documented in Inspection

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50-289/86-03. Our detailed response to the Performance Appraisal Team

Inspection Report was contained in our letter of June 27, 1986

(reference letter 5211-86-2099).

Regarding plant modification / design

support, we note that the SALP report recognizes GPUN has an

established program which contains appropriate controls for

modification activities.

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We recognize the need to improve the detailed implementation of the

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modification / design program.

We are putting a significant effort into

staff (including contractors) training, procedural clarification and

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working with first line supervision to ensure improvements in program

implementation. We have also reviewed our QA audit program. Our

review supports the continued shift towards greater emphasis on

identifying technical issues which includes assessment of engineering.

The PAT confirmed that this shif t, which commenced prior to the PAT

review, is appropriate and should be retained and reinforced. A

continuing refinement of this program is ongoing to ensure a balanced

review of technical and programmatic parfornance is achieved. One or

two of these balanced performance appraisal type audits will be

conducted in the next 18 months.

SALP Recommendations

(1) "In light of recurring problems in the environmental qualification

(EQ) area, assess the adequacy of or the need for better

accountability on specific engineering projects, such as EQ."

Response:

The environmental qualification area is one in which very

substantial problems were identified in the spring of 1984,

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in part through NRC inspections and assessment. We have

made sweeping changes in program, pecple, resources,

responsibilities and effort. We have re-reviewed changes

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made and conclude they were appropriate and the

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improvements required both by the NRC and ourselves have

largely been obtained. The issues identified in the

Performance Appraisal Team assessment largely deal with the

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adequacy of in-plant confirmation.

We have reverified all

of the common EQ items in the plant.

Our recent efforts

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have not detected any issues which arise from uncertainty

in accountability.

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(2) " Conduct a critical evaluation of the design review process with

emphasis on the role of peer review adequacy and first line

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supervisory oversight."

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Response:

As outlined in our response to the Performance Appraisal

Team, the design review process and its implementation is

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currently being critically evaluated. This internal

assessment has confirmed the need for improved attention to

details particularly in the area of design verification and

overall documentation. We have started actions to improve

the performance in these areas principally through staff

training, procedural clarification and greater supervisor

involvement. As mentioned earlier, we had begun and are

going to further reinforce our QA audit program to provide

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ourselves more consistent insight into our attention to

detail through in-depth, technical and program assessments.

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X.

Training and Qualification Effectiveness

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Training on procedures in the modification control area is discussed

above under Technical Support.

Procedure adherence has been and will continue to be emphasized by

management. Further, as indicated in our response to the Interim SALP,

a Corporate Task Force has been formed at the request of the Office of

the President to review all divisions' implementation of policies and

attitudes for procedural compliance. The report of the Task Force is

in final preparation.

Its recommendations and findings will be

evaluated and appropriate actions taken to strengthen procedural

compliance.

XI.

Assurance of Quality

SALP Recommendations

(1) Establish and enforce a policy that can be understood by mid-level

managers and workers to ensure procedural adherence and resolve

the perception that schedules are of a higher prioHty.

(2) Reassess the process used for assuring individual procedures are

technically adequate and complete.

In particular, assess the

relative roles of peer review and management oversight in

procedure reviews and changes.

Response:

We agree that more attention is needed by management and

supervision in ensuring that procedures are adequate and

maintained up-to-date.

Increased management awareness and attention to Quality

Assurance Department (QAD) effectiveness reviews will be

given especially in the area as noted in our reply to the

Interim SALP.

Increased QAD monitoring of procedural

adequacy and compliance was conducted at the specific

request of the Director, TMI-1.

The results were reported

to him, as well as to other cognizant managers and

supervisors. This increased monitoring and surveillance

uncovered several minor procedural issues that had

heretofore gone undetected.

Also, as discussed in our reply to the Interim SALP, a

Corporate Task Force has been established to review

procedure compliance and change programs and their

implementation in all divisions. This Task Force has

completed their review and is preparing the final report

for senior management. We believe this detailed report

will clearly demonstrate the strengths, weaknesses and,

just as important, variations in procedural policy between

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divisions in the Company.

It is management's intent to

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incorporate the strong points highlighted in the report;

while also developing actions to improve ~ weak areas in all

divisions.

It is also our intent to establish a standard,

practical company-wide policy for procedural adherence that

can be understood by all employees and can be enforced

consistently by managers and supervisors.

With regard to the " pace of activities," see Section I

" Introduction" above.

(3) Assess the need for better indoctrination and/or training for

individuals associated with engineering design work and design

change control.

Response:

Our response to the PAT inspection (5211-86-2099, June 27,

1986) described procedure enhancements related to

engineering and design work. These enhancements are

designed to correct the weaknesses identified in the PAT

inspection which are at the root of the SALP assessment.

These enhancements combined with appropriate

training / indoctrination on them as well as other training

described in our PAT response are responsive to this SALP

finding.

XII.

Licensing

GPUN is pleased that the NRC has recognized the improvements made in

Licensing. . This has been an area of concerted effort and will continue

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to receive much attention.

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GPU Nuclear Corporation

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Post Office Box 480

Route 441 South

Middletown Pennsylvania 17057-0?9

717 944 7621

TELEX 84 2386

Writer's Direct Dial Number:

April 21, 19P6

52)1-86-2068

Or. Thomas E. Murley

Region I, Regional Administrator

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

631 Park Avenue

King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI-1)

Operating License No. DPR-50

Docket No. 50-289

GPUN Response to the TMI-1 Restart SALP Report

This letter provides GPUN's comments on the March 17, 1986 SALP Report as

clarified by our meeting with you on March 31, 1986. We are pleased that the

report and your comments during the reeting conclude that the TMI-1 restart

was safe and well controlled.

Our responses to previous inspection reports (IR 85-22, 25, 27 and 30) address

the root causes of specific items identified in the SALP Report.

Those

responses are not repeated here.

There were however three general issues

identified in the report.

These issues relate to Use and Quality of

Procedures,

Use of Oversight Group Findings,

and Technical

Support.

A

discussion of these items is attached which includes appropriate actions taken

or planned to improve our performance.

We believe the SALP process is an overall useful process in that it provides

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additional diverse insight into the quality of our activities.

Sincerely,

~

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H. D. Hukill

Director, TMI-1

HDH/CWS/spb

Attachment

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GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation

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  • !.

Use and Quality of Procedures

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TMI-l uses over 2500 procedures, most of which were revised and uograded

during the 6-1/2 year shutdown.

Specifically, we believe our AT00,

procedures were a major improveme nt.

GPUN did anticipate that some

minor procedure problems would surface during the restart as more and

more of the procedures were used under normal operational conditions.

Indeed some problems were noted both by the HRC and by GPUM.

The

problems identified were generally minor and caused no safety problems.

While we have made major improvernents in our procedures, we believe

additional improvement can be achieved. To this end, and as a result of

the procedural problems identified, r,Pillt has completed or will complete

the following items:

1.

the TMI-l Director has discussed procedural compliance and the need

to

identify

required

changes

with

all

Plant Operations

and

Maintenance personnel,

2.

procedure compliance and

identifying needed changes have been

discussed at the TMI-l fianagers tieeting,

3.

procedural guidance has been issued to clarify which circumstances

require written procedures,

4.

various nemos have been issued to document the above items,

5.

at the request of the THI-l Di rector, OA specifically monitored

procedural compliance and reported its results, (This monitoring is

conti nui ng. )

6.

a large number of PCRs have been processed to correct problems

identified during the startup that had not been turned in during the

startup (these had been saved up by ~ individuals we believe to avoid

disrupting the restart program with minor items),

7.

the discussions for items 1 and 2 above have included work habits

such as housekeeping and usi ng sensitive equipment in lieu of

ladders or scaffolding,

8.

the t1anagers conducting off-shif t tours and the OA shif t monitors

have been requested to emphasize procedural compliance and work

habits,

9.

finally, a Corporate Task Force has been established to review the

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safety related procedures and their implementation in all divisions.

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II.

Use of Oversight Group Findings

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The SALP Report at page 12 identifies three items.

Each item is

discussed below:

A.

Disposition of NSCC Recommendations

The SALP Report indicated that " Board dispositions for some NSCC

recommendations were not clear".

The following is provided to

clarify handling of NSCC recommendations.

NSCC is composed of three

outside members of the GPUN Board of Directors.

NSCC members as

such

attend

the

monthly

Board meetings

and report on

their

activities.

In accordance with its charter, the NSCC provides to

the

Board

a

semi-annual

report.

This

report

includes

any

.

recommendations.

The

report's

recommendations

are

formally

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responded to by the Prasident GPUN.

The NSCC evaluates those

i

responses and in subsequent reports provides the results of these

assessments.

At the direction of the GPUN Board these NSCC reports

are provided formally to the NRC.

B.

Management

Response

to

QA

Assessments

Regarding

Procedure

Implementation Problems

i

As discussed at the SALP Meeting, QA assessment reports indicated

minor procedural implementation problems.

We consider our procedure

system to be sound and effective if properly inacted.

Management

did respond to QA assessments and emphasized procedural compliance

and the need to ensure procedures are up-to-date;

however, it is

apparent that stronger and more forceful actions were needed to

prevent

recurrence

of

these

problems.

Significant management

attention has been focused in this area as indicated in Iten I.

above.

C.

IOSRG Recommendations

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This item arises from a memorandum written by an IOSRG staff member

to his Manager on September

5,

1984.

It was occasioned by a

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corporate-wide assessment of verification procedures performed by

NSAD/IOSRG at the request of the Office of the President.

The memo

represented the personal opinion of this IOSRG staff merrber.

After

some consultation and reflection the 10SRG Manager rejected the

recommendations contained in the memorandum.

The recommendation was

not distributed by the IOSRG for further action and it remained a

piece of internal IOSRG correspondence.

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III. Technical Support

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The Restart effort placed a heavy burden on the Plant Engineering

staff.

This, with the need to explain engineering technical decisions

to various company and NRC oversight groups, stretched this technical

support to its limits.

Decisions had to be made concerning the priority

of each issue and the depth of documentation appropriate to be developed

in the near term. We believe that the on-site engineering and technical

support is a

uate, however

we consider that greater use of the

available off-s te technical , support is also necessary.

GPUN will

re-emphasize the need to more fully utilize Technical , Functions off-site

resources.

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