ML20211E710
| ML20211E710 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1997 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211E708 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9709300213 | |
| Download: ML20211E710 (3) | |
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1 UNITED STATES y
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHlh0 TON, D.C. BeteHeH SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.102 TO FACIllTY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY.
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY
)l0PE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated July 3,1997, the Fublic Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G, the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would revise TS Table 3.6.3-1, " Primary Containment Isolation Valves."
The changes to the TS table would add four inboard isolation valves (relief valves) to four penetrations Itsted in that table. The revisions to TS Table 3.6.3-1 would support )lant modifications being made to address concerns raised in NRC Generic.etter (GL) 96-06, " Assurance of Equipment Operability r.nd Containment Integrity During Design Basis Conditions." These modifications are currently planned to be completed during the upcoming refueling outage (RF07).
2.0 BACKGROUND
GL 96-06 was issued on September 30, 1996. Among the safety-significant issues identified was that thermally induced overpressurization of isolated water-filled piping sections in containment could jeopardize the ability of accident mitigating systems to perform their safety functions and could also lead to a breach of containment integrity via bypass leakage.
By letter dated January 27, 1997, PSE&G made the 120-day response to GL 96-06 for the HCGS.
In this report, PSE&G identified five containment penetrations that were susceptible to overpressurization associated with thermal expension of the fluid in the piping.
PSE&G also stated that the overpressurization concern would be addressed by making a design modification to the affected penetrations. The modification would install pressure relief devices on penetrations P10 P25, P26, P29, and P30, with installation to be completed by the end of the next refueling outage (RF07).
The July 3,1997, licensee submittal proposed changes to TS Table 3.6.3-1 that add four inboard isolation valves (relief valves) to containment penetrations P25, P26, P29, and P30. Approval of the proposed TS changes would enable the design modifications, as stated in PSE&G's January 27, 1997, letter, to be installed.
9709300213 970915 DR ADOCK 0500 4
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To address GL 96-06 overpressurization concerns, containment penetration P10 would have a relief valve added during the same modification, but because, in this case, the added relief valve is not considered a containment isolation valve, there is no TS change associated with the addition of that valve. The P10 penetration, inside containment isolation valve was reclassified to no
. longer be a containment isolation valve in Amendment 93 to the HCGS License, issued February 22, 1996. Because there is no inboard primary containment isolation valve for P10, the added relief valve is not considered a primary containment isolation valve either.
3.0 LVALUATION The licensee states that the proposed spring loaded, water Cincompressible fluid) relief valves would be designed to PSE&G Piping SpecLfication P-500 and i
ASME Codes applicable to the existing penetrations and isolation valves, and would also be required to meet-the same surveillance requirements already specified for other relief valves that are containment isolation valves. The valves would be designated as safety-related and Seismic Category I components, except for the discharge piping, which would be non-safety related, seismically analyzed and designed to the requirements of ANSI B31.1.
The staff finds this acceptable.
The licensee states that the design c/ the proposed relief valves would maintain containment integrity in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident inside containment. The licensee also states that proposed relief valve setpoints would be selected to ensure that the ASME Boiler and Pressure vessel,Section III, pressure ratings will not be exceeded for the existing piping and isolation valves in the affected penetrations, and that the valve bodies and internals for the proposed relief valves would be qualified for the maximum pressure and temperature ratings specified in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
The staff has determined that the proposed relief valves are designed to the applicable codes and maintain containment integrity. The staff has also determined that the proposed relief valves do not affect the ability of the affected penetrations to withstand a single failure.
The staff has concluded that the installation of the proposed relief valves to address overpressurization concerns raised in GL 96-06 would not keep the systems, structures and com)onents from performing their safety functions, and that the modification and tie TS changes associated with the modification are acceptable.
- 4.0 1 TATE CONSULTATION In accordance with the Commission's regulations,--the New Jersey State Official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
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5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Cc nission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 43375). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 CQMCLUSION The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discusred above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the hoalth and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the pi'oposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
M. Hart Date:
September 15, 1997
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