ML20211E318
| ML20211E318 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/13/1987 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8702240285 | |
| Download: ML20211E318 (197) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Briefing by GPUNC on Status of TMI-2 Cleanup (Public Meeting)
Location: Washington, D.
C.
l Date:
Friday, February 13, 1987 Pages:
1 - 75 Ann Riley & Associates b
Court Reporters 1625 i Street, N.W., Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
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STATEMENT OF GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION AND GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION ON TMI-2 CLEANUP BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FEBRUARY 13, 1987 i
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, W. G. Kuhns I am William G. Kuhns, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of General Public Utilities (GPU).
With me today are John F. O' Leary, whom the GPU Board of Directors intends to elect as my replacement when I retire in May. Mr. 0' Leary's experience and abilities tre known to many of you.
He has served on the GPU Board of Directors for eight years, and will continue to serve as Chairman of the Board of the GPU Nuclear Corporation, which is responsible for operation of our nuclear plants.
A resume of his experience is provided as Attachment A Also here today are Philip R. Clark, President and Chief Executive Officer of the GPU Nuclear Corporation, Edwin E. Kintner, Executive Vice President of GPU Nuclear, and Frank R. Standerfer, Vice President and Director of the TMI-2 Program for GPU Nuclear.
Also with us are Herman M. Dieckamp, President of General Public Utilities and a Director of GPU Nuclear, and Dr. Robert Marston,whotookoverasChairmanoftheTMI-2SafetyhdvisoryBoardlastMay when Dr. James Fletcher left to return to NASA.
We appreciate your accepting our request to discuss TMI-2 with you again.
We believe the Cleanup of TMI-2 has great significance to the NRC and the nuclear industry as well as for our company.
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, On the last two occasions of our meeting with you to discuss TMI-2, I
conunitted the GPU System's full support for completing the TMI-2 Cleanup and for the safe operation of TMI-1, and I reaffirm those commitments today.
The Cleanup is proceeding without financial constraints.
We are providing the resources in personnel, training and management support necessary to assure the continued safety of TMI-1.
TMI-l operated in 1986 until shutdown for scheduled refueling and modification in October at an overall forced outage rate of four percent. We believe the soundness of TMI-l operations is recognized by the NRC staff reports, including the latest SALP.
TMI-2 continues to provide important new information.
In particular, the core examination program this year provided much additional data about the accident and its consequences through the Department of Energy's research program.
We now have, at last, reasonably accurate information on the condition of the damaged reactor core, but a great deal remains to be learned from the research and development efforts of the TMI-2 Program.
The major portion of the presentations today will address the insights gained, the progress made and the problems encountered since we met with you in January last year.
However, let me first bring you up to date on the status of funding for the Cleanup Program.
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, Last year I advised you that, in accordance with the overall TMI-2 funding plan, the various contributors -- the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the customers of the GPU System, the Edison Electric Institute, the Department of Energy and the Japanese nuclear industry -- were all current in their payments with the qualified exception of the Department of Energy.
That continues to be true for all the contributors.
Our latest understanding is that 00E funding will not be further reduced.
We continue to believe that it is important to assure that the insights and data available as the result of the TMI-2 accident are fully developed and disseminated, and we will continue discussions with DOE as to how to assure the effort to do that can be increased.
As we enter the last two years of the program and better understand the uncertainties still ahead, both in the work itself and in the process of arriving at an agreed set of criteria for the program's end point, it seems prudent to provide for some contingencies in the work and spending plans.
We were able to take the first step in that direction in 1986 when we spent $
versus the $124M planned when we talked to you last year. These contingencies will allow us to assure first priority to the controlling fuel removal task.
We expect the Cleanup to be completed including resolution of uncertainties and difficulties -- for the previously identified funding.
An updated version of the Cleanup Funding Plan showing the sources and application of funds is provided as Attachment B.
Now, let me turn the presentation over to Mr. Clark.
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i i P. R. Clark i
I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the TMI-2 Cleanup Program e
with you again.
i The Cleanup continues under an integrated organization of GPU Nuclear and; Bechtel.
The Director of TMI-2, Frank Standerfer, is a Vice President and Division Director in GPU Nuclear; the Deputy Director, Tem Demmitt, is a Senior Principal Engineer with Bechtel National, Inc.
GPU Nuclear and Bechtel engineers and managers fill the various positions without consideration of
...m their parent organization. This organizational arrangement has been in effect 4
for four years and is increasingly integrated in its operation.
In addition to GPU Nuclear and Bechtel, Catalytic Construction Corporation provides a significant part of the labor force for the Cleanup. We have today 530 GPU personnel, 175 Bechtel personnel, 260 Catalytic personnel and 60 other persons for a total force working on the TMI-2 project of approximately 1030.
In anticipation of the completion of the project, we have laid out a plan for GPU Nuclear personnel which will assure to the maximum practical degree that we retain the critical personnel support needed for an effective conclusion of the work, while at the same time taking into consideration the needs of our employees for assurances regarding their futures.
4 In the conduct of our work, we continue to have the benefits of advice from the TMI-2 Safety Advisory Board (SAB) made up of ten outstanding scientists in the various fields important to assuring the continued safe conduct of TMI-2 Cleanup. You will hear later a report from Dr. Marston, the Chairman of the SAB.
Dr. Marston comes to this position with very strong credentials, including five years as the head of the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, and ten years as President of the University of Florida.
We believe he is unusually well qualified to chair the SAB.
Dr. Marston's biography is provided in Attachment C.
We intend to continue to receive the counsel of the SAB until Cleanup is completed.
We continue to work to ensure that information developed in the TMI-2 activities are made widely available. The 00E, EEI, and EPRI also participate in assuring the dissemination of useful information from TMI-2.
One of the most important actions on which we were embarked when we talked to you last was the preparation of a plan for safe, stable storage of TMI-2 facility following removal of the fuel and completion of the Cleanup Program.
5 As we described to you last year, this condition is based on the following principles:
Fuel has been removed and shipped off-site such that criticality is o
precluded.
o The potential for a significant release of radioactivity has been eliminated.
o Water has been removed from the plant; the potential for its reintroduction has been minimized.
Radioactive wastes have been packaged and shipped off-site, or safely o
stored pending shipment.
Radiation has been reduced to levels which will allow: (1) continued o
plant monitoring, (2) performance of required maintenance, and (3) plant inspections.
o Containment isolation is maintained in accordance with NRC-approved Technical Specifications.
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. In short, a safe, monitored plant condition has been established.
We have named this condition Post Defueling Monitored Storage (PDMS).
Mr. Standerfer will discuss the PDMS plan in greater detail.
Before submitting it to you, it was reviewed by the SAB and the GPU Nuclear Board.
The NRC onsite Cleanup Project Directorate and the NRC Advisory Panel For The Decontamination of Three Mile Island have been kept advised of our plans.
We believe this plan is a responsible answer to an unprecedented question.
We will continue to work closely with your staff as the proposed plan obtains the thorough and ecompt review it deserves.
I would like to emphasize that POMS is not deconsnissioning, real or implied.
It is independent of any decision on disposition of the plant.
P We have been concentrating our planning entirely on the Cleanup Program.
During our discussion last year, you asked what we were doing to keep the citizens in the TMI area informed about the Cleanup. Our efforts in this regard are extensive.
They include briefings of public of ficials and the
- media, newspaper and television advertising, specific news
- releases, presentations to the NRC Advisory Panel, town meetings and public tours.
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Both our proposal for disposition of the processed water and our plans for PDMS were addressed in briefings of public officials and the media and by newspaper advertisements.
In addition, in July we distributed to state and local officials, medical professionals, and the media a summary report
" Radiation and Health Effects: A Report on the TMI-2 Accident and Related Health Studies."
We believe that report is a significant contribution to public understanding.
It is being widely used.
We have provided, in response to requests, over 13,000 copies to such organizations as universities, medical centers, other utilities, EPRI and government officials.
A summary report of these activities is provided as Attachment D.
Now, Edwin E. Kintner, Executive Vice President of GPU Nuclear, who has the primary responsibility within the GPU Nuclear Office of the President for TMI-2 matters, will discuss some of the recent difficulties and successes in the Cleanup.
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, E. E. Kintner For the first three months of 1986, we made good progress in fuel removal.
More than 1/6 of the core was loaded into shipping canisters.
- However, in January we were surprised by a rapid growth of biological organisms which covered many of the structural components in the reactor vessel.
After several months of investigation, we arrived at a process to control the biological growth, but when we resumed continued mining of debris in the damaged reactor, the water in the vessel became more and more turbid.
We had designed and built a special water purification system, the Defueling Water Cleanup System (DWCS).
It included ion exchange beds to reduce the radioactivity in the reactor vessel water and thus the radiation levels in which the defueling crews must work.
The ion exchange beds are in series with 1/2 micron filters to remove particulate material stirred up by the mining operations.
This system worked in that the outlet water was clear, but the 1/2 micror, scintered metal filters clogged in a matter of a few hours.
Since they contain some fuel material, cost abrut $70,000 each and require special storage space in Idaho, continued utilization of this process was impractical.
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. The problem could not be solved in a straightforward way.
We tried simple sand bed and diatomaceous earth filters.
The effluent of these filters was about as transparent as black coffee.
We tried Millipore fabric filters, diatomaceous earth precpats of existing filters, and coagulants.
Eventually, we established a Water arity Group (WCG) of outstanding persons in the field of water purification advise us on how to proceed.
The make up of this group is shown on Attacht it E.
The Water Clarity Grc 3 had no magic solution.
The Group's first reaction was that if we had set out deliberately to create a water purification problem, we could not have done better.
Its second reaction was to suggest a number of avenues for additional research, including far greater emphasis on the use of coagulants.
The work categories recommended by the WCG are shown on Attachment F.
After considerable investigation, including assistance from radiaticn chemists at Oak Ridge and in Idaho, we found that the filters were clogging with tiny (of ten less than 0.2 micron) metallic particles -- silver, indium, cadmium, zirconium and oxides of iron and aluminum.
Some of these particles may have been formed by the vaporization of core material at the height of the accident, creating aerosols of extremely small size which have been resident in the debris bed since the accident.
. Recently, af ter testing some 40 coagulants and " filter aid" materials, we found a combination of coagulant and diatomaceous earth which, used together in the proper proportions, serves to extend the life before clogging of one of our existing filters from previous levels of a few thousand gallons throughput to nearly one million gallons. The coagulant agglomerates the~ small particles into larger ones which do not enter the pores in the filter, and the diatomaceous earth prevents the larger particles from forming an impervious coating on the surface of the filter element.
We began using this process this January.
It is performing well.
We now have a reasonable process to obtain visibility in the reactor vessel and that will greatly improve our ability to remove the fuel.
However, as a backup, we are also developing sonar equipment which could 2
be used in the extreme case that visibility should be lost in the future and could not be recovered.
There is one additional major problem ahead which is being investigated along two parallel tracks.
That is the problem of cutting through the lower support structure in the reactor vessel to remove some 20 tons of fuel in the lower head of the reactor vessel. Attachment G
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. One of the most successful and useful steps in the defueling program since we last talked to you was the " core boring" effort. This program provided samples for hot cell examination from ten different locations.
The equipment, designed and developed by EG&G for DOE, removed 2-1/2 inch vertical cores, very much li.ke oil well cores, through the reactor down to within 8 inches of the bottom head of the reactor vessel head.
From these cores, EG&G projected cross sections of the damaged reactor as shown in Attachment H.
We now know there was a large fused mass,in the center of the reactor vessel, whereas last year estimates were that there was a void in the center of the debris mass.
The removed cores indicate that the lower portions of the fuel assemblies, ranging from about i foot to about 5 feet in length which remained covered with water during the accident, are relatively undamaged.
We believe that when we have mined down to those stub assemblies, we will be able to remove them essentially intact.
The first loaded fuel canisters were shipped to Idaho by DOE in July for examination and storage.
To this time, 7 casks containing 49 canisters have been shipped out of about 280 canisters we expect to be required in total.
. Thus, the entire defueling system, including the water purification and core boring equipment and shipment casks, has now been exercised and is working as intended.
All the work at TMI-2 is being done with particular attention to radiation control requirements and worker doses.
Attachment I shows worker exposure to date.
Although total personnel exposures in 1986 were the highest during the Cleanup project due to the fact that we expended 250% as many manhours in containment as in
- 1985, the total integrated personnel exposure was significantly below our projection of 1500-2000 man-rem.
This further confirms our expectation that total doses will fall below the NRC's Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) lower level estimate of 13,000 man-rem.
One area of concern discussed with you last year was the prevention of criticality in the damaged reactor fuel during removal operations.
You had requested the ACRS to review this matter.
Subsequent to our meeting they reported "that appropriate studies have been performed and that procedures being followed will provide the necessary protection against criticality during defueling."
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..In a project as developmental as TMI-2, it is difficult to predict exactly when any given event can be completed.
However, we have overcome the problem of visibility, have much greater knowledge and experience with defueling equipment and operations, know much more of what lies ahead, and continue to make progress in the controlling work of removing the damaged fuel.
Therefore, we continue to work towards shipment of the last fuel before the scheduled completion of the Cleanup Program in September 1988.
We are doing everything practicable to increase our confidence that schedule will be net.
To that end, a third shipment cask, in addition to the two provided by the DOE, is being leased.
One of the best production managers in GPU Nuclear has been assigned to TMI-2 as Defueling Director.
The Director TMI-2 has been advised that additional resources needed to complete defueling at the earliest practicable date are available to him.
TMI-2 operations are carried out under the close overview of the NRC site and Region I staff, and we believe we have been doing the work to the general satisfaction of your people.
For example, the latest TMI-2 Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP), issued in July 1986 for the period ending in February, gave TMI-2 ratings of five l's, and two 2's.
We are pleased to have earned that good report card.
Now, Frank Standerfer, Director of the TMI-2 Cleanup Project, will provide further details on defueling, decontamination, and our plans for Post Defueling Monitored Storage.
. F. R. Standerfer We described the defueling system and equipment in our last briefing of the Commission.
Briefly, there is a rotating shielded platform over the open reactor vessel.
Defueling crews work through slots in this platform with long handled tools through 25 to 30 feet of water to load fuel debris into stainless steel canisters.
The canisters are 14 inches in diameter and 12 feet long. Each canister contains up to 1,500 pounds of fuel debris.
When full, we transfer the canisters through the containment vessel to the fuel storage pool using shielded transfer casks, and the original fuel transfer tube:;.
The canisters are then dewatered, weighed, and transferred to a DOE fuel shipping cask for shipment to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL).
Attachment J is a summary of the defueling activities over the thirteen months since we met with you.
From mid-January to mid-April we loaded loose fuel debris from the center core region above the so-called hard layer with good success.
This material was removed using a tool called the spade-bucket and was done despite decreasing visibility due to the problem with microbiological material in the water.
. From mid-April to the latter part of May we treated the reactor coolant with hydrogen peroxide and scrubbed down surfaces in the reactor vessel to kill and remove microbiological material that first appeared in January.
With clearer water, we performed the first good video survey of the core since beginning to remove fuel.
We then moved loose subassembly fittings and cleared debris from the planned locations for the next step, that of obtaining core samples.
June and July were spent installing the DOE core drill machine and taking the ten core samples which are being examined by EG&G at INEL.
These core samples finally gave us a clear understanding of what existed under the hard layer and in the lower part of the reactor vessel.
The only major area in the reactor vessel not examined is the 8 inches immediately above the bottom head of the reactor vessel.
In late July and early August, we drilled several extra holes in the hard layer as an aid to the next defueling step.
It was slow drilling because we had to avoid each of the 52 locations where instrument' thimbles are connected to the lower reactor vessel head.
The core drill was removed in August.
We found we could not penetrate or break up the hard fused mass.
We decided to reinstall the core drill and rubblize the hard material.
But first we had to remove the end fittings from the debris bed.
That was done in September and early October.
At the end of October and early November, the core drill was used again to drill up the hard layer in the center 8 feet of the core - the limit of diametric travel of the drill machine.
By this time, we had an approved safety analysis that did not place a limit on where we could drill because of the in-core instruments.
During Thanksgiving week, we found the drilled up area did not load as easily as we had expected. Also, we found several large rocks on the debris bed which we believe fell in from the outer diameter of i
the core which the drill could not reach.
By mid-December, we finally had several mining openings started and have since loaded more than 20,000 pounds of the resolidified, rubblized core material.
Attachment K shows the rate at which we have loaded the fuel debris.
Also shown is the shipment of the fuel to INEL which started in July.
A total of 48,000 lbs. of fuel has been shipped.
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At the bottom of Attachment J, we show the hours per day the defueling platform has been occupied in defueling activity.
We have demonstrated the capability to defuel up to 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> per day on a sustained basis.
During the remainder of each day, maintenance crews perform support activities to sustain the next day of defueling. Defueling operations are being conducted on a 7 day, 3 shift per day basis.
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. In addition to defueling, several major accomplishments were achieved in 1986 in decontamination activities.
The Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building (AFHB) was made accessible o
to personnel in street clothes for the first time since the 1979 accident.
o Over 60% of the AFHB cubicles were decontaminated to baseline radiological endpoints.
Non-RCS system flushing was initiated.
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Gross flushing of the RB basement walls with the " Rover" robot demonstrated the effectiveness of high pressure water removal of loose surface material.
o Ultra high-pressure water scarification of the R8 basement walls demonstrated that activity in the concrete was effectively removed to a depth of 1/4 inch.
The " Workhorse" robot was operationally tested in a non-contaminated o
area and was used to train robotic operators.
..I would now like to show a short TV tape which summarizes our work during 1986.
In response to a commitment made at our last briefing, we submitted to the NRC in July our recommendation to evaporate the processed water - the so called TMI-2 accident water.
We briefed the NRC TMI-2 Advisory Panel and the public on cui recommendation at the Panel's meeting in August.
The NRC draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on this water disposal was issued for public comment in December 1986.
The EIS was discussed with the public.at the NRC Advisory Panel meeting January 21.
The Panel concluded it needed more time to consider the matter and has scheduled further discussions at its nex meeting on February 26.
It stated its intent to request a 45-day extension in the period allowed for coment on the EIS.
The EIS concludes that none of the methods considered for disposal of the water poses significant risk to the public or our workers.
In fact, the processed water is already in compliance with existing NRC regulations for such disposal from other reactor plants.
We hope to obtain NRC approval of our water disposal recommendation this spring as originally scheduled and are now receiving proposals from prospective vendors of this evaporation service.
. Let me now provide additional details on the PDMS plan outlined by Mr. Clark wnich was transmitted to your site office on December 3.
The criteria presented in the plan will assure we will meet or exceed normal NRC licensing standaros for an operating plant.
Post-Defueling Monitored Storage will provide several layers of assured protection of public health and safety:
First: Inherent Stability -- The plant will be in a condition which is stable and not open to transients or accidents.
o About 99.7 percent of the fuel will have been removed.
A nuclear chain reaction will not be possible with the small quantity and configuration of the fuel remaining.
Contamination will have been removed to the extent that there is no o
reasonable possibility of hazardous release of radioactivity.
Remaining contamination will be contained in place.
Water in plant systems and equipment will heve been removed.
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Few combustibles will remain, therefore, there will be low fire potential.
o Systems will be depressurized.
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. Second: Effective Containment -- The remaining radioactivity will be isolated from the environment by protective structures:
o Closed piping systems.
o Sealed cubicles, Locked Reactor Containment Building.
o Secure Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building.
o Third: Positive Control will be maintained by:
Conducting radiological and environmental monitoring.
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Maintaining plant protection systems, such as fire protection.
o Maintaining plant security.
The TMI-2 plant will remain enclosed within the TMI site protected area during PDMS.
TMI-2 facilities will be locked with access controlled by the site security force.
The Reactor Building normally will be locked, and containment will be maintained functional as a contamination barrier in accordance with the PDMS Technical Specifications. At least one of two edundant trains of the Reactor Building ventilation system will be designated as operable for use, as needed.
. The Auxiliary Building will be locked but accessible for regular inspection and surveillance.
The Fuel Handling Building ventilation system will be maintained operable and will be operated as required.
The fuel pool and SDS pool will have been drained of water.
While some systems, such as fire protection and ventilation systems, will be required and maintained operable, most TMI-2 plant systems will be deactivated.
Of the deactivated systems, a select few will be mothballed for future use (e.g., the polar crane and the special water treatment systems used during the Cleanup, including the Submerged Demineralizer Systems.)
All other deactivated systems will be placed in a safe, stable shutdown condition.
Our measurements of fuel in the primary systems outside the reactor vessel continue to indicate very small fuel quantities outside the reactor vessel -
well below the level which would cause future criticality concerns.
l Nevertheless, we are continuing our efforts to remove the fuel outside the reactor vessel.
Our best estimates of fuel in ex-vessel locations are shown in Attachment L.
The small amount of fuel left in the systems during PDMS (25 to 150 kg) will be considerably less than 400 kg - the established limit for security and safeguards concerns for this type of fissionable material.
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. The expected general radiation levels in plant facilities during PDMS are shown in Attachment M.
With the exception of the Reactor Building basement, the plant spaces will be at radiation levels which will allow ready access for the monitoring and maintenance activities required.
The plant under PDMS will continue to be licensed under 10 CFR Part 50, for Possession Only.
We will propose a new set of Technical Specifications.
We will comply with radiation protection regulations 10 CFR Part 20. The off-site dose will be a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I limits.
In addition to protecting the health and safety of the public, this approach to TMI-2 after the Cleanup Program is consistent with ALARA principles.
It will reduce overall worker exposures.
During monitored storage, radiation levels in the plant will be reduced further by natural decay of radioactive materials.
Monitored storage also allows time for continued development of decontamination technology so that the most effective, efficient and proven techniques may be used in the future.
This approach to minimizing worker exposures is consistent with our practice of keeping occupational exposures low.
Overall exposures during the Cleanup Program have been comparable to or less than those at operating nuclear power plants.
It is a record we are proud of.
, The goal of the Cleanup Program - a safe, stable, and secure TMI will be met under PDMS.
Post-Defueling Monitored Storage will assure protection of the health and safety of the public and workers and of the environment.
The plant will be secured, monitored and maintained.
Effluents from the plant will be filtered and monitored and will be well below NRC allowable limits.
After long study of the problem, we believe PDMS to be a logical, responsible condition for TMI-2 after Cleanup.
Now, let me turn the presentation back to Phil Clark.
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. P. R. Clark At this time I wish to introduce Dr. Robert Marston, Chairman of the TMI-2 Safety Advisory Board, whose biography is shown on Attachment C.
Dr. Marston plans to provide comments on behalf of the SAB and will be glad to respond to your questions.
The Charter of the SAB and a list of its members are provided in Attachments N and 0 respectively.
Dr. Marston's statement will be provided separately at this time.
P.R. Clark To complete our presentation on TMI-2 and what we see ahead, I would like to comment on our relationship with the NRC on TMI-2.
There are two areas deserving mention.
The first is that, although constantly faced with unique technical questions, the NRC site staff has responded well to our requests for approval of the day-to-day project work.
We have not been held up significantly by the special TMI-2 requirements to obtain NRC technical understanding and detailed agreement.
We appreciate that sense of responsibility on the part of the NRC, especially Dr. Travers and his staff.
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While the staff has concentrated on the more immediate questions, approval of less urgent items have been taking longer than we would like.
In June and July 1985, we made a number of proposals for simplification of Technical 1
Specifications relating to atmospheric control systems and emergency diesel generators.
These proposed changes would allow us to better utilize our personnel and apply their efforts where they are most effective under the special conditions of TMI-2.
It would be very helpful if we could get approval of these long standing requests.
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- Finally, with less than two years remaining before its scheduled completion, it is important to completing the TMI-2 Cleanup in a reasonable time and in an orderly way to reach an understanding with you on our proposals for water disposal and the plans for PDMS.
1 As Mr. Standerfer has said, we submitted the PDMS plan in December.
We i
will be providing an Environmental Analysis shortly.
We intend to forward the i
licensing documentation in the form of new Technical Specifications in a i
series of submittals starting next month and completing before the end of 1987.
This will provide approximately one year for NRC to consider the issues attendant to the licensing of PDMS on a schedule consistent with our plan to i
enter the PDMS phase in the fourth quarter of 1988.
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. There are no precedents for the planned Post Defueling Monitored Storage, as there are none for the work we are doing to cleanup TMI-2.
We believe we have proposed a logical and responsible plan for PDMS.
It is similar to one of the end points analyzed in the NRC's PEIS.
Obviously, in order to effectively manage a
project of such magnitude and developmental uncertainties, it is important to have an understanding on the remaining work in sufficient time to plan and manage the work and ensure appropriate staffing.
We solicit your prompt attention to our plans.
We will work clotely with your staff to reach an early understanding and responsible conclusion to establishing PDMS conditions.
Meanwhile, we are proceeding with the work and with preparations to implement our plans for water disposal and PDMS.
In summary, we continue to learn and progress in cleaning up the TMI-2 accident.
Despite unexpected difficulties in the fuel removal portion of this unprecedented project, we still plan to complete the Cleanup Program in September 1988.
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4 STATEMENT OF GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION AND GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATI0h ON TMI-l BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FEBRUARY 13, 1987 t
P. R. Clark i
I now have a brief report for you about TMI-1.
A year ago when we met with you, TMI-1 had successfully completed its j
carefully planned start up and power ascension program and started full power i
operation.
We have had a very successful operating cycle.
The forced outage rate for 1986 was 4%.
For the last six months of the cycle, after the planned eddy current outage, the forced outage rate was only 0.4% and the capacity factor was 99.8%
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At the same time the number of unplanned scrams per 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> critical l
for the cycle -- including the startup and test program was 0.6 -- just below 4
the industry median for all operating plants the last two years.
There were l
no scrams the last five months.
. Another important indicator is total radiation exposure to workers.
For 1986, including the five week eddy current outage and two months of refueling and modification outage, the total exposure at TMI-l was 245 person rem --
well below industry average.
Finally my last example is that the number of continuously activated alarms / annunciators has been kept at a low level averaging only about eight for all of 1986 and five or fewer for the last four months.
Ouring the past year, as you know, there was what we believe to be an unprecedented level of NRC inspection and oversight of TMI-1.
That included two Performance Assessment Teams (PAT) inspections and three SALP reports, plus four assigned site residents.
While we are pleased with the performance during the cycle, we recognize that there is still a need for improvements.
The results of our own reviews are largely confirmed by reports of your teams which also identified some additional items.
We are continuing our efforts to achieve excellence in all areas. One general area being given major attention is that of procedures and procedure compliance.
i
The results of the latest SALP, while summarizing identified areas for improvement, rate TMI-l as Category 1 in six areas and Category 2 in four Overall, we are pleased with the ratings.
areas.
Finally, 1 outlined a few minutes ago our efforts to keep the public and officials fully apprised of Cleanup activities.
Similar efforts are continuing as well with regard to TMI-1.
4 l
i
BIOGRAPHICAL
SUMMARY
John F. O' Leary Born:
Reno, Nevada -June 23, 1926 Education:
George Washington University - 1950 A.B. - Economics Business:
Present
- Energy Consultant Sept. 1979 - present
- Chairman of Board of Directors of GPU Nuclear Corportion Feb. 1984 - present Past
- Deputy Secretary of U.S.
Oct. 1977 - Sept. 1979 Dept. of Energy
- Administrator, Federal Jan. 1977 - Oct.'1977 Energy Administration
- Administrator of New Mexico Nov. 1975 - Jan. 1977 Energy Resources Board
- Technical Director of Energy 1974 - 1975 Resources and Environment Div. of MITRE Corp.
- Director of Licensing - Atomic 1972 - 1974 Energy Commission
- Energy consultant (petroleum, 1970 - 1972 natural gas, coal industries)
- Director of Bureau of Mines 1968 - 1970
- Chief of Bureau of Natural Gas 1967 - 1968 of Federal Power Commission
- Deputy Assistant, Secretary for 1962 - 1967 Mineral Resources, Dept. of Interior
- Economist - Office of Assistant 1952 - 1962 Secretary of the Interior For Natural Resources Business Oriented Affiliations:
l Cosmos Club of Washington, D.C.
I l
Attachment A l
~
PROJECTED TMI-2 SPENDING AND SOURCES OF FUNDS (5 Millions)
ACTUAL PROJECTED Pre '87 1987 1988 Post-1988 TOTAL Spending M
$136(1)
$ 98 (l)
$ - (2) g Sources of Funds GPU Customers
$165
$ 48
$ 30
$ 6
$249 GPU 69 5
5 25 (3) 104 Subtotal TTJ4 TTJ T35 TT T353 States
$ 26
$ 7
$ 7
$ 2
$ 42 Insurance
$306
$306 6
USD0E
$ 66
$ 9
$ 4
$ 79 (4)
Industry: EEI
$ 46
$ 32
$ 26
$ 49
$153 Japan 9
3 3
3 18 Subtotal TTI U
T 27 W
TT7T co Total E
M
$ 75 Q
g Currulative Company I
Advances
$ 44
$ 76
$ 99
$ 14
$ 14 l
2 Notes:
(1)
Spending budgeted for 1987 and 1988 are $110 and $65, respectively, allowing a contingency of $59 which may be used in those two years or later depending on fuel removal progress and final cleanup end point definition and approval.
f (2)
After cleanup completion, annual O&M costs for post-defueling monitored l
storage ("PDMS") of about $5 will be required.
i (3) i B&W lawsuit settlement rebates of $7 and amortization of permanent TMI-2 facilities of $18 will be collected after completion of cleanup.
(4) DOE had committed to $83 total funding.. DOE's current planning only supports
$79, but GPU is attempting to improve the funding from DOE to the original $83 expected.
Actual work accomplished by DOE through 1986 was $69, but $3 will not be received by GPU until 1987.
2/4/87 Attachment B
BIOGRAPHICAL
SUMMARY
ROBERT Q. MARSTON Born:
Toano, Virginia - 1923 Education:
B.S - Virginia Military Institute M.D. - Medical College of Virginia B.Sc - Oxford University Rhodes Scholar and Markle Scholar Awarded six honorary degrees from universities & colleges.
Business:
Present
- Chairman TMI-2 Safety Advisory Board
- President Emeritus University of Florida
- Professor at Univ. Fla College of Medicine
- Director of Johnson & Johnson
- Director of The Wackenhut Corporation
- Director of Cordis Corporation
- Director of First National Bank of Alachua, Florida
- Advisor to Sloan, Macy and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
- Advisor to National Academy of Sciences.
Past
- 1974-1984 President of University of Florida
- 1968-1973 Director National Institutes of Health
- 1966-1968 Associate Director of National Institutes of Health
- Fredrick Wachtmeister Chair in Physical Sciences & Engineering at Virginia Military Institute
- Vice Chancellor & Dean of Medicine at Univ. of Mississippi
- Scholar in Residence University of Virginia, Charlottesville
- Distinguished Fellow at the National Academy of Sciences, D.C.
- Chairman of the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges
- Chairman of Planning Committee and Chair"of International Symposium at National Academy of Sciences on the Medical Implications of Nuclear Warfare.
Attachment C 4
l l
TMI 2 INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE PUBLIC IN 1986 Three media briefings were held on TMI-2 subjects:
July 1 - GPU Nuclear's and DOE's plans for rail shipments of core o
debris from TMI-2 to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
In addition to the media briefing, information packages were provided to 20 state officials and 10 local officials.
July 30 - GPU Nuclear's proposal for evaporating the approximately 2 o
million gallons of processed water.
Information packages were provided to 20 state officials and 34 Incal officials and included 11 in-person briefings by the TMI-2 Director.
December 3 - GPU Nuclear's plans for the completion of the TMI-2 o
Cleanup program, known as the Post Defueling Monitored Storage.
Information packages were provided to 20 state officials and 34 local officials.
Seven "TMI Update" ads were run in 10 weekly shopping papers w'ith a combineQcirculationofabout 276,000.
Twenty-two news releases were issued on TMI-2 subjects.
In July >1986, the GPUNC report " Radiation and Health Effects: A Report on tha TMI-2 Accident and Related Health Studies,"
was mailed to approximately 250 TMI area local elected officials; and was also provided to approximately'20 state public officials and half dozen area community leaders.
The report cited findings of major independent studies that concluded that there have been no acute health effects and that it is unlikely there will be any long-term health effects.
In connection with this, company representatives met with editorial boards of six TMI area newspapers and television stations.
Reports covering the status and outlook of operations and the Cleanup at TMI Units I and 2 were provided, either verbally or in written form, to the governing bodies of the counties and municipalities within the TMI area on a monthly basis. As of the end of 1986, such reports were being provided to a total of 32 units of government encompassing five counties, two cities, 11 boroughs and 14 townships.
During 1986, 27,634 persons from the general public visited the Visitors
)
Center.
In addition, 34 special groups comprised of 863 additional persons met there for special briefings and meetings.
i l
3 T
c
WATER CLARITY GROUP 1.
Hamilton, William H.
Chairman /TMI-2 TAAG (Former General Manager Bettis Plant) 2.
Boothe, Jerry E.
Senior Investigator Calgon Corporation 3.
Campbell, David Chemical Technology Divison Oak Ridge National Laboratory 4.
Collins, Emory Manager Radiochemical Proc. Plant Chemical Technology nivison Dak Ridge National Laboratory 5.
Greenaway, William R.
Marketing & Technical Director NUS Operating Services Corporation 6.
Holmes, Raymond E.
Bechtel National 7.
Mahoney, James R.
Manager, Environmental Services Advanced Technology Division Bechtel National, Inc.
8.
Natijevic,Egon Professor & Chairman Department of Chemistry Clarkson University 9.
Mayer, E.
Consultant on Filtering Engineering Department E.I. DuPont, Wilmington
- 10. Salem, Eli Vice-President Technical Department Graver Water
- 11. Shaw, Robert A.
Senior Program Manager Nuclear Engineering & Operations Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
- 12. Stevens, W. R. III Section Director, Defense Waste and Naval Fuels E. I DuPont, Savannah River Laboratory
- 13. Vance Jene N.
ConsultingEngineer Vance & Associates Attachment E
AVEMJES OF M Ptmim IN WATER CLARITY PROGRAM
- 1. CHARACTERIZATION
- 2. FILTER RECLAMATION
- 3. DEEP BED FILTERS
% COAGilANTS
- 5. ALTERNATE FILTER DESIGNS
- 6. VISIBILITY EM%NCEENT A) TELEVISION B) SONAR ATTACHMENT F
Core Damage Profile 61t -
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Attachment G
Core Cross Section Column G 14 0 - i i
iii,,,,iiii
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13 0 2
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- 12 0 l-o E 110
-i i-i c
.9100 g
7, 90
-i Upper Debris Bed ci G-12 G-8
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$ 60 fTi l l l l l l l l _Li l l i p
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sporer Known configuration grid o 40 2nd Proj,ected configurat,on i
g
_ space, E
Ceram.ic Inferred configurat.
o 30 =~ 9'id ion
.y o 20 -.,:
,< Discolored rods Agglomerale
- poc,,
10 = grid Lorge metal segmgolians 2 r,ioupen pi fuci,ods, s,iong;ng ruqi ao,d A 3erpi>i;7s 9
0 Metal veins 1514131211109 8 76 54 3 2 1 Fuel Rod Assembly Numbers P313 ST-197-200 Attachment H
TMI-2 CLEAMP WRKER EXPOSLRE APPROXIMATE PERSON-REM 1979 - 198Ll 2000 1985 700 1986
_j;!Q()_
1979 - 1986 TOTAL 3600 1987 (PROJECTED) 1000 - 1600 OVERALL CLEAMP PROJECT TOTAL WILL FALL WITHIN OR BELOW VALUES OF 13.000 TO %,000 PERSON-REM.
ATTACHMENT ~I e
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T MI-2 DEFUELING
~
/
400 90-
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790 g 7ej
?
O
,70 O
J I
Sei POUNOS OP DEBRIS LOADED x
-30 d soi I
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na 3
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.-30
,.F 20-POUNOS OF DEBRIS S8 UPPED
'2O r
F 80 -
L
' 80 JAN PES DIARCH APR4L EAY JUDIE JULY AUGUST SEPT l OCT { 8eOW l OEC JAN peg m.
AS OP 4-FES-37 I
OOtSAPNemesRC Attachraent X
]
EX-VESSEL LOCATIONS CONTAINING FUEL
" CURRENT' ESTIMATED QUANTITYOF UO2 KG REACTOR BUILDING REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 15 -125 REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS PRESSURIZER STEAM GENERATORS REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS OUTSIDE RCS 5 -15 UPPER PLENUM ASSEMBLY REACTOR BUILDING BASEMENT CORE FLOODTANKS MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION DEMINS LETDOWN LINE AND COOLERS AUXILIARY AND FUEL HANDLING
<5 BUILDINGS (AFHB)
AFHB PIPE SYSTEMS AFHB DRAINS, FLOORS, AND SUMPS 25 -
150*
- BEFORE DEFUELING OF EX-VESSEL LOCATIONS Attachment L
TMI-2 CLEANUP PROGRAM RADIOLOGICAL GOALS GENERALAREA DOSE RATE R/HR REACTOR BUILDING REFUELING CANAL
<0.015 EL. 347' & ABOVE (EXCEPT D-RINGS)
<0.03 EL. 305' TO 347'
<0.07 BASEMENT (EL. 282')
<35 AUXILIARY BUILDING CORRIDORS
<0.0025 OTHER AREAS
<0.05 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING CORRIDORS
<0.0025 OTHER AREAS
<0.05
\\
\\
l OTHER BUILDINGS TURBINE BUILDING
<0.0025 CHEMICAL CLEANING BUILDING
<0.0025 (EXCEPT EPICOR 11 AREA TO BE LEFT OPERABLE)
SERVICE BUILDING CONTAINMENT
<0.0025 TANK AREA Attachtrent M
{
SAFETY ADVISORY BOARD CHARTER INTRODUCTION The unique importance of the TMI-2 Program to GPUNC and to the utility industry in general requires the highest quality technical performance possible.
The program should reflect the best scientific and engineering judgement.
Provision of an independent safety advisory board of highly qualified people to provide a broad appraisal of the TMI-2 Program will further this purpose.
ESTABLISHMENT AND PURPOSE The Safety Advisory Board is established by the President of GPU Nuclear Corporation and serves in an advisory capacity to him.
The primary purpose of the Board is to provide to GPUNC Management a high level appraisal of the technical aspects of the TMI-2 Program as to how it fulfills the responsibility to protect public and worker health and safety.
(A secondary purpose is to support and evaluate communications between GPUNC and interested groups outside of GPUNC in carrying out this program.)
SCOPE The TMI-2 Program encompasses cleanup, waste disposal, and decommis-i sioning or recovery.
The Board will review the technical plans for Program operations and the technical basis for these plans and report to the President of the GPU Nuclear Corporation on the safety and operational adequacy of these plans.
It may also perform other related duties as mutually agreed between the SAB and President of GPUNC.
BOARD SIZE AND COMPOSITION The size of the Board should be the minimum consistent with providing a broad overview capability with the required variety of skills and backgrounds.
BOARD OPERATION 1.
The SAB will meet approximately once every 3 months.
2.
The SAB meetings will be scheduled so as to permit review of planning for major activities before they are implemented.
3.
The proposed agenda for each SAB meeting will be agreed upon between the Chairman and GPUNC prior to each scheduled meeting.
4.
The agenda and relevant written material will be distributed to the SAB members 2 weeks before each scheduled meeting.
Attachment N g--.--,.--,e-
---,..,----,---,-r,.
,...--------w---
-,----,--v.
5.
A nonvoting secretary, supported by appropriate staff, will be made available to the SAB by GPUNC to assist in the destelopment of the agenda, arranging meetings, and the drafting of the re-quired reports.
6.
GPUNC, its contractors, or other interested parties, as agreed, will provide briefings to the SAB on agenda topics.
The SAB shall be provided full access to all relevant information.
7.
A formal report of each meeting will be submitted by the SAB Chairman to the President, GPU Nuclear Corporation, within 1 week following each meeting.
Meetings will be scheduled to provide time for preparation of a draft report before adjournment.
In addition, the SAB summarizes the Board's overall assessment of the adequacy of all aspects of TMI-2 activities as they relate to public and employee health and safety.
8.
The SAB is expected to reach a consensus on all important issues.
If this is not the situation in a particular instance, the Chairman's report should include identification of significant minority views.
9.
The President of GPUNC will respond formally to all recommenda-tions made by the SAB why particular recommen,dations were not adopted. stating what ac 10.
Correspondence between the SAB and any of its members and the President, GPUNC, involving recommendations and conclusions will be made available to interested groups and members of the public.
Approved: /s/
R. C. Arnold President, GPU Nuclear Corporation I
l l,
SAFETY ADVISORY BOARD MEMBERS BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION Dr. Robert Q. Marston, Chairman Dr. Marston is currently the Chairman of the TMI-2 Safety Advisory Board.
He holds an M.D. from the Medical College of Virginia, as well as a B.S.
from Virginia Military Institute and a B.S.c from Oxford University.
Dr.
Marston is President Emeritus of University of Florida and Former Director of the National Institutes of Haalth.
He brings to the SAB broad experience and expertise in the fields of health and scientific research.
(See attachment C for an expanded biography)
Dr. John A. Auxier Dr. Auxier is currently the President of the Applied Science Laboratory Inc., in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
the Georgia Institute of Technology.He has a PhD in Nuclear Engineering fro He was formerly Director of the Division of Health Physics and Safety at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and a past president of the Health Physics Society.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience in nuclear health physics and radiological protection.
Dr. Merril Eisenbud Dr. Eisenbud is currently Professor Emeritus of Environmental Medicine and Director of the Laboratory for Environmental Studies, Institute of Environmental Medicine, New York University Medical Center.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and the National Academy of Sciences Board on Radioactive Waste Management.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience and expertise in the fields of environmental and industrial health and hygiene, with special emphasis on environmental radioactivity and radiological protection.
Dr. Jacob I. Fabrikant Dr.
Fabrikant is currently Professor of Radiology, University of California School of Medicine, San Francisco, and Professor, Biophysics and Medical Physics, University of California, Berkeley.
He has an MD from McGill University and a PhD in Biophysics from the University of London.
He is a Fellow of the American College of Radiology, and is certified in diagnostic, therapeutic, and nuclear radiology. He brings to the SAB expertise on radiological protection and health effects of ionizing radiation exposure.
< SAB continued Dr. Robert S. Friedman Dr. Friedman is currently Program Director for the Center for Science Policy, Institute of Policy Research and Evaluation, and Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University.
He has a PhD from the University of Illinois.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience in the politics of developing public policy in response to scientific and technical issues.
Dr. Bruce T. Lundin Dr. Lundin is currently a private consultant.
He was formerly Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Lewis Research Center.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering.
Dr. Lundin has a degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of California and an honorary Doctorate of Engineering degree.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience in the organization and management of
- large, advanced technology programs.
Professor Howard Raiffa Professor Raiffa is currently the Frank P. Ramsey Professor of Management Economics, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration and the Kennedy School of Government.
Professor Raiffa has a PhD in Mathematics from the University of Michigan.
He brings extensive experience to the SAB in the application of risk analysis techniques and decision-making processes to advanced technology activities.
Professor Norman Rasmussen Professor Rasmussen is currently the McAfee Professor of Enginering at the Massachusetts Institute of technology.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and the National Academy of Sciences.
He was the chairman and principal author of the WASH-1400
- Report, a
major contribution in the area of nuclear power plant safety analysis. He brings to the SAB extensive experience in nuclear engineering, nuclear safety, and technical risk assessment and risk management.
- SAB continued Mr. Lombard Squires Mr. Squires, currently a consultant, was formerly a faculty member in Chemical Engineering at MIT; Technical Director and, later, Manager, of Du Pont's Atomic Energy Division; and Assistant General Manager of Du Pont's Explosive Department.
He was a member of the US AEC's General Advisory Comittee and its Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering.
He brings extensive experience to the SAB in nuclear chemi:try and in tha management of large, advanced technology programs.
Dr. William R. Stratton Dr. Stratton is currently a consultaat to the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. He has a PhD in Physics from the University of Minnesota and was formerly Chairman of the Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards of the Nuclear Regulary Comission.
He brings to the SAB extensive experiene in nuclear reactor design and safety and nuclear fuel technology.
,e.---,-
,w--,-,-
--,-n-e,,- - - - - ~
O THE TMI-2 SAFETY ADVISORY BOARD STATEMENT TO THE NRC COMMISSIONERS BY Dr. Robert Q. Marston February 13, 1987 l
i l
i
In February 1986, Dr. James Fletcher, then Chairman of the THI-2 Sa fety Advisory Board, submitted a statement to you describing the role of the Board and its appraisal of the TMI-2 Cleanup Program.
As you know, Dr.
Fletcher has since resumed his previous role as Administrator of NASA at the request of President Reagan.
I became Chairman of the Safety Advisory Board in June 1986, and I am pleased with this opportunity to address the Commissioners.
I would like to describe the role of the Board and stress that, while members of the Board work in close cooperation with the GPU Nuclear Cleanup Program
- staff, the Board is completely independent in its review function.
Since March 1981, the Board has been reviewing all aspects of the Cleanup as they relate to the health and safety of the public and the workers.
The Charter of the Board and brief biographical sketches of its members are attached to this statement.
The members of the Board are specialists in nuclear sciences, engineering,
- physics, medicine, risk assessment and public perception of risk, and large-scale project management.
The Board holds general meetings four times a year, and also holds periodic working panel meetings to take advantage of each member's expertise.
The panels are currently focussed on reactor vessel fuel core
- removal, radiation source identification, radioactive waste management, radiation hazards, and external affairs.
After each general
- meeting, the Board submits
recommendations to the Executive Vice President of GPU Nuclear, Mr.
Ed Kintner.
Mr.
Kintner then formally responds to our recommendations, explaining what has been done in response to them and why the company feels that alternate action is warranted.
At times, the SAB has presented its observations directly to the Boards of Directors of GPU Nuclear and General Public Utilities, which is the parent company of GPU Nuclear.
Each year, the Board issues a public report of its activities and its assessment of the TMI-2 Cleanup Program.
The Fifth Annual Report of the Safety Advisory Board was issued this past November.
It is important to note that the members of the Safety Advisory Board are unanimous in their opinion that TMI-2 is currently in a stable condition and does not pose any greater risks to public or worker health and safety than those associated with an operating power plant, either nuclear or fossil.
The Board feels strongly that removing the damaged fuel from the TMI-2 plant is the best guarantee of the continued health and safety of the public workers.
- However, the Board wishes to emphasize that the f
expectations of both GPU Nuclear and the public regarding the rate of fuel removal must not be overly optimistic.
The unique and constantly evolving nature of the work requires that care and planning be the first priority.
During its six years of review, the Board has observed a safe and steady progress toward cleaning up the TMI-2 plant.
This progress is the result of a dedicated and increasingly efficient management team that is committed to completing the project.
The Board is pleased to note that' GPU Nuclear was able to advance significantly the date for the start of fuel removal operations and then to safely conduct the operations.
The major preparations included removing the reactor vessel head and
- plenum, designing and installing the extensive defueling equipment and tools, and training the operators.
The Board closely monitored the plans and operations associated with all these activities.
GPU Nuclear is now in the process of removing the fuel core debris and shipping it off site.
Initially, the fuel was loaded into canisters using long-handled tools.
A drilling rig was later used to take samples and then drill apart the resolidified material in the debris bed.
These first-of-a-kind defueling activities have been conducted with care and diligence.
The difficult configuration of the debris bed in the reactor vessel temporarily slowed defueling operations;
- however, there has recently been good progress in removing fuel debris.
In expectation of future progress, the Board has proceeded to examine plans for later operations such as defueling the lower reactor vessel head and core support assembly.
At present, the Board is particularly concerned with the effect on fuel removal progress cuased by the problem of reduced visibility.
This problem is caused by the growth of an extremely varied colony of microorganisms in the reactor coolant water and the inability to filter out very fine inorganic particulates.
The Board is encouraged that an apparent colution to the water clarity problem has been found in the use of hydrogen peroxide, of coagulants and filtration.
Overcoming unexpected problems of such a nature has been a constant challenge in the cleanup Program.
The Board supports GPU Nuclear's plans to purchase sonar imaging systems to ensure some ability to see in case water clarity cannot be consistently maintained and video enhancement equipment to routinely improve visual defueling.
The Board closely monitors occupational exposure
- levels, radiation monitoring practices, area dose
- rates, and dose reduction and decontamination activities.
Based upon its review, the Board believes that GPU Nuclear has maintained an excellent record in limiting worker exposure levels.
The Board is pleased that radiation exposures to workers in 1986 will be approximately two thirds of the previous estimate.
There are several areas which the Board has pressed GPU Nuclear to address.
One is to be sure that dose reduction practices ensure a long-term benefit by removing the sources of radiation rather than just shielding them.
The other is to institute a comprehensive program to control airborne particulates in order to improve air quality.
Such programs are now being planned by GPU Nuclear, and the Board l
I
will press for its implementation.
Members of the Safety Advisory Board have made entries into the reactor building, without respirators, to observe firsthand the working conditions and to demonstrate the safety and advantages gained by the reduced use of respirators.
GPU Nuclear had established a goal of making 25 percent of reactor building entries in 1986 without the use of respirators.
In actuality, 30% of the 1986 entries were made in this manner.
Planning for the period following the completion of the cleanup is underway and the Board has been closely following the development of criteria and plans.
This period is referred to as Post-Defueling Monitored Storage (PDMS) by GPU Nuclear.
A special subcommittee of the Safety Advisory Board chaired by Prof. Rasmussen carefully reviewed the initial planning for this period.
As a result of this review, the Board supports GPU l
Nuclear's fundamental concept of a monitored storage condition, which establishes a reasonable and secure plant configuration at i
the completion of the Cleanup Program.
While this condition is not a decommissioned state, it will ensure that the plant can be maintained in a safe and stable status for an extended period of time.
During this time, a final decision on the disposition of the plant will be made.
The Board has stressed that the final plan i
for PDMS must specifically address issues of health and safety.
l
The Safety Advisory Board is pleased with GPU Nuclear's assurance that the maximum possible amount of decontamination will be performed before storage begins.
The Board is,
- however, concerned about the legacy of radioactivity left in the plant, and will recommend that low radiation fields and sufficient protection for workers exist.
More importantly, the Board will insist that the plant be in such a condition and sealed in such a way that it poses no risk to the public.
I would like to stress that in this and all matters related to public and worker health and safety, the Board's review function will remain independent and that it will continue to raise any concerns and press for timely solutions regarding the TMI-2 Cleanup directly with the executive management of GPU Nuclear.
1
SAFETY ADVISORY BOARD CHARTER INTRODUCTION The unique importance of the TMI-2 Program to GPUNC and to the utility industry in general requires the highest quality technical performance possible.
The program should reflect the best scientific and engineering judgement.
Provision of an independent safety advisory board of highly qualified people to provide a broad appraisal of the TMI-2 Program will further this purpose.
ESTABLISHMENT AND PURPOSE The Safety Advisory Board is established by the President of GPU Nuclear Corporation and serves in an advisory capacity to him.
The primary purpose of the Board is to provide to GPUNC Management a high level appraisal of the technical aspects of the TMI-2 Program as to how it fulfills the responsibility to protect public and worker health and safety.
(A secondary purpose is to support and evaluate communications between GPUNC and interested groups outside of GPUNC in carrying out this program.)
SCOPE The TMI-2 Program encompasses cleanup, waste disposal, and decommis-sioning or recovery.
The Board will review the technical plans for Program operations and the technical basis for these plans and report to the President of the GPU Nuclear Corporation on the safety and operational adequacy of these plans.
It may also perform other related duties as mutually agreed between the SAB and President of GPUNC.
BOARD SIZE AND COMPOSITION i
i The size of the Board should be the minimum consistent with providing a broad overview capability with the required variety of skills and backgrounds.
BOARD OPERATION i
1.
The SAB will meet approximately once every 3 months.
2.
The SAB meetings will be scheduled so as to permit review of planning for major activities before they are implemented.
t 3.
The proposed agenda for each SAB meeting will be agreed upon between the Chairman and GPUNC prior to each scheduled meeting.
4.
The agenda and relevant written material will be distributed to the SAB members 2 weeks before each scheduled meeting.
,_ 1 mw
1 i
5.
A nonvoting secretary, supported by appropriate staff, will be made available to the SAB by GPUNC to assist in the development of the agenda, arranging meetings, and the drafting of the re-quired reports.
6.
GPUNC, its contractors, or other interested parties, as agreed, will provide briefings to the SAB on agenda topics.
The SAB shall be provided full access to all relevant information.
7.
A formal report of each meeting will be submitted by the SAB Chairman to the President, GPU Nuclear Corporation, within 1 week following each meeting.
Meetings will be scheduled to provide time for preparation of a draft report before adjournment.
In addition, the SAB summarizes the Board's overall assessment of the adequacy of all aspects of TMI-2 activities as they relate to public and employee health and safety.
8.
The SAB is expected to reach a consensus on all important issues.
If this is not the situation in a particular instance, the Chairman's report should include identification of significant minority views.
9.
The President of GPUNC will respond formally to all recommenda-tions made by the SAB, stating what action resulted or explaining why particular recommendations were not adopted.
- 10. Correspondence between the SAB and any of its members and the President, GPUNC, involving recommendations and conclusions will be made available to interested groups and members of the public.
Approved:
/s/
R. C. Arnold President, GPU Nuclear Corporation i
l l
i
SAFETY ADVISORY BOARD MEMBERS BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION Dr. James C. Fletcher, SAB Chairman Dr. Fletcher is currently Distinguished Public Professor (Whiteford Professor of Technology and Energy Resources), University of Pitts-burgh, and a director of several companies.
He has a PhD in Physics from the California Institute of Technology. Formerly, he was President of the University of Utah and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering.
He brings to the SAB his extensive experience in directing large and complex advanced technological and organizational projects.
Dr. John A. Auxier Dr. Auxier is currently the President of the Applied Science Laboratory, Inc., in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
He has a PhD in Nuclear Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology.
He was formerly Director of the Division of Health Physics and Safety at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and a past president of the Health Physics Society.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience in nuclear health physics and radiological protection.
Dr. Merril Eisenbud Dr. Eisenbud is currently Professor Emeritus of Environmental Medicine and Director of the Laboratory for Environmental Studies, Institute of Environmental Medicine, New York University Medical Center.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and the National Academy of Sciences Board on Radioactive Waste Management.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience and expertise in the fields of environmental i
i and industrial health and hygiene, with special emphasis on environ-mental radioactivity and radiological protection.
Dr. Jacob I. Fabrikant 1
Dr.
Fabrikant is currently Professor of Radiology, University of California School of Medicine, San Francisco, and Professor, Biophysics and Medical Physics, University of California, Berkeley.
He has an MD from McGill University and a PhD in Biophysic., from the University of i
London.
He is a Fellow of the American College of Radiology, and is certified in diagnostic, therapeutic, and nuclear radiology. He brings to I
the SAB expertise on radiological protection and the health effects of ionizing radiation exposure.
l
Dr. Robert S. Friedman Dr. Friedman is currently Program Director for the Center for Science Policy, Institute of Policy Research and Evaluation, and Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. He has a PhD from the University of Illinois. He brings to the SAB extensive experience in the politics of developing public policy in response to scientific and technical issues.
Dr. Bruce T. Lundin Dr. Lundin is currently a private consultant.
He was formerly Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Lewis Research Center.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering. Dr. Lundin has a degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of California and an honorary Doctorate of Engineering degree.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience in the organization and management of large, advanced technology programs.
Professor Howard Ralffa Professor Raiffa is currently the Frank P. Ramsey Professor of Manage-ment Economics, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration and the Kennedy School of Government.
Professor Raiffa has a PhD in Mathematics from the University of Michigan.
He brings extensive experience to the SAB in the application of risk analysis techniques and decision-making processes to advanced technology activities.
Professor Norman Rasmussen Professor Rasmussen is currently the McAfee Professor of Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and the National Academy of Sciences.
He was the chairman and principal author of the WASH-1400 Report, a major contribution in the area of nuclear power plant safety analysis.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience in nuclear engineering, nuclear safety, and technical risk assessment and risk management.
Mr. Lombard Squires l
Mr. Squires, currently a consultant, was formerly a faculty member in l
Chemical Engineering at MIT; Technical Director and, later, Manager, of l
Du Pont's Atomic Energy Division; and Assistant General Manager of Du Pont's Explosives Department.
He was a member of the US AEC's General Advisory Committee and its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering.
He brings extensive experience to the SAB in nuclear chemistry and in the management of large, advanced technology programs.
l 1
m-
_Q,
A Dr. William R. Stratton Dr. Stratton is currently a consultant to the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.
He has a PhD in Physics from the University of Minnesota and was formerly Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safe-guards of the Nuclear Regulatory Co:nmission.
He brings to the SAB extensive experience in nuclear reactor design and safety and nuclear fuel technology.
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4 5
6 This is an unofficial transcript of a meet ir.g of the 7
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on S
2/13/87 In the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9
'N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and oeservation.
This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain
?
12 inaccuracies.
13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.105, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript.
17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may 21 authorire.
C 22 2S 24 25
3 1
o 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 BRIEFING BY GPUNC ON STATUS OF TMI-2 CLEANUP 5
6 PUBLIC MEETING 7
8 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9
Room 1130 10 1717 "H" Street, N.W.
11 Washington, D.C.
12 13 Friday, February 13, 1987 14
'15 The commission met in open session, pursuant to 16 notice, at 10:00 o' clock a.m.,
LANDO W.
ZECH, Chairman of 17 the Commission, presiding.
18 19 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
20 LANDO W.
ZECH, Chairman of the Commission 21 THOMAS M. ROBERTS, Member of the Commission 22 JAMES K. ASSELSTINE, Member of the Commission i
23 FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL, Member of the Commission 24 KENNETH M. CARR, Member of the Commission 25 l
s 2
1 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
2 S. Chilk 3
W.
Parler 4
H.
Denton 5
W. Travers 6
W.
Kuhns 7
P.
Clark 8
E. Kinter 9
F. Standerfer 10 R. Marston 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 1
21 22 23 24 25
s I
3 1
PROCEEDINGS 2
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Goo'd morning, ladies and gentlemen.
3 This is a briefing today on the status of the Three' Mile 4
Island Unit-2 Cleanup by the General Public Utilities 5
Corporation.
We have scheduled this briefing so that the GPU 6
Nuclear people can bring the Commission up to date on the 7
status and plans for the future activities at TMI-2.
8 I understand that the de-fueling has progressed to 9
the point where about one-sixth of the fuel has been shipped 10 to the Department of Energy facility in Idaho.
The progress 11 at TMI-2 is of continuing interest to the Commissf.on and we 12 look forward to hearing about the status of the work.
13 We are also interested in the plans for the longer 14 term for the care and monitoring of the plant.
Following the 15 presentation today by GPU Nuclear which includes, I understand, 16 a video tape, Dr. William Travers, the Director of the TMI-2 17 Cleanup Project for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, will 18 provide a brief perspective.
19 Do any of my fellow Commissioners have opening 20 remarks?
21 (No response.]
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
If not, Mr. Kuhns, would you like to 23 proceed?
24 MR. KUHNS:
Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very 25 much and good morning.
I am Bill Kuhns, Chairman of the Board
s 4
1 and Chisf Executive Office of GPU.
With me today are Jack 2
O' Leary whom the GPU board intends to elect as my replacement 3
when I retire in May of this year.
4 Mr. O' Leary's experience and abilities are well 5
known to many of you.
He has served on the GPU Board of 6
Directors for eight years and will continue to serve as 7
Chairman of the Board of GPU Nuclear which is responsible as 8
you know for the operation and maintenance of our nuclear 9
plants.
We have attached a resume of his experience as 10 attachment "A."
11 Also here today are Phil Clark, president and chief 12 executive officer of GPU Nuclear; Ed Kinter, executive vice 13 president of GPU Nuclear, Frank Standerfer, vice president and 14 director of the TMI-2 program for GPU Nuclear; also, Herman 15 Decamp, president of GPU and a director of GPU Nuclear and 16 Dr. Robert Marston who took over as chairman of the TMI-2 17 safety advisory board last May when Jim Fletcher left to 18 return to NASA and Tom Demmet of Bechtel.
Tom is deputy 19 director of TMI-2 Cleanup program.
i 20 So we have the first team here, gentlemen, and we 21 are happy to have this opportunity and anxious to respond to 22 any questions you may have.
23 We believe certainly the TMI-2 Cleanup has great 24 significance to the NRC, to the nuclear industry and, of 25 course, to our company.
On the last two occasions of our
s 5
1 meeting with you to discuss TMI-2, I committed the GPU system's 2
full support for completing the TMI-2 cleanup and for the safe 3
operation of TMI-l and I reaffirm those commitments here today.
4 The cleanup is proceeding safely without financial 5
constraints.
We are providing the resources and personnel, 6
training and management support necessary to assure the 7
continued safety of TMI-1.
_TMI-l operated in 1986 until 8
shutdown for scheduled refueling and modification in October 9
at an overall forced outage rate of four percent.
10 We believe the soundness of TMI-l operations is 11 recognized by NRC staff reports including the latest SALP.
We 12 are not satisfied with that SALP.
Six one's and four two's is 13 pretty good but it is not as good as we want to be.
14 TMI-2 continues to provide important new 15 information.
In particular, the core examination program this 16 year provided much additional data about the accident and its 17 consequences to the Department of Energy's research program, 18 We now have at least reasonable accurate information 19 on the condition of the damaged reactor core but a great deal 20 more remains to be learned from the R&D efforts of this 21 program.
22 The major portion of the presentations today will 23 address the insights gained, the progress made and the problems 24 encountered since we met with you last January, a year ago last 25 January.
6 1
However, let me first bring you up to date on the 2
status of funding for the cleanup program.
3 Last year I advised you that in accordance with the 4
overall TMI-2 funding plan, the various contributors including 5
the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the customers of 6
the GPU system, the investor-owned electric utilities through 7
the Edison Electric Institute, the Department of Energy and 8
the Japanese Nuclear Industry were all current in their 9
payments with the qualified exception of the Department of 10 Energy.
11 That continues to be true for all the contributors.
12 Our latest understanding is that DOE funding will not be 13 further reduced.
We continue to believe that it is important 14 to assure that the insights, the data available as a result of 4
15 the TMI-2 accident are fully developed and disseminated and we 16 will continue discussions with DOE as to how to assure the 17 effort to do that can be increased.
18 As we enter the last two years of the program and i
19 better understand the uncertainties still ahead both in the 20 work itself and the process of arriving at an agreed set of 21 criteria for the programs end point, it seems prudent to 22 provide for some contingencies in the work and the spending 23 plans.
24 We were able to take the first step in that direction 25 in 1986 when we spent about $118 million versus the $124 i
7 1
million that was planned when we talked to you a year ago.
2 These contingencies will allow us to assure first priority to 3
the controlling fuel removal task.
4 We expect the cleanup to be completed including 5
resolution of uncertainties and difficulties for the previously 6
identified funding of $965 million.
An updated version of the 7
cleanup funding plan showing the sources and the application of 8
funds is provided as attachment "B."
We would be happy to 9
answer any questions on that, of course.
10 Now I would like to turn the presentation over to 11 Mr. Clark.
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Are we going to hear more 14 about the DOE funding cut?
I would like to hear a little bit 15 more in the way of detail on that.
If someone else is going 16 to address it, that is fine.
17 MR. CLARK:
This might be a good time.
I was going 18 to make one comment on the DOE funding and then maybe we can 19 explore your questions.
20 If you will look at attachment "B," it would show 21 DOE funding shown there at $79 million.
That is the right 22 hand column, two-thirds of the way down the table.
You will 23 find the number of $79.
24 The first thing I wanted to point out is that those 25 are funds that in effect offset cleanup program costs so that
8 1
is DOE funding looked at from that side.
2 The total DOE R&D program on TMI-2, we understand is 3
about $180 million with the remaining funds having been spent 4
or plan to be spent in Idaho, EG&G laboratories examining the 5
core debris.
6 So the total DOE funding is of the order of $180 7
million.
This table shows those funds which in a way offset 8
cleanup costs and have been involved at the Island which had 9
R&D, it was of an R&D nature.
10 I don't know whether, Commissioner, that addresses 11 your question or not.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I am not quite sure what you 13 said but offsetting cleanup costs, what is the four million 14 dollars cutting?
I guess that is the essence of my question.
15 MR. CLARK:
I think a fair way to describe that is 16 that the definition of exactly what work at the Island or in 17 support of cleanup p;.ogram would be funded by DOE, that 18 definition when the agreements were entered into some years 19 ago was at best somewhat vague.
20 We didn't know what the program was.
We didn't know 21 what we would find.
They didn't know what would be R&D.
22 So I don't think we can say that four million 23 dollars went for this, that or the other thing.
It was our 24 understanding that $83 million dollars would be available for 25 research work at the Island.
That would offset costs that we
9 1
would otherwise have had to incur.
2 That is why they show up in this table.
Now as it 3
is played out, DOE has looked to what they think they ought to 4
fund, what they are doing in-Idaho.
They now feel that other 5
things they are doing off site should be counted toward that 6
$83.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I see.
8 MR. CLARK:
I think maybe that is the best way to 9
describe it.
I 10 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
So they are still spending $83 11 million but they are spending a small part of it for perhaps 12 other than that.
13 MR. CLARK:
And is it to our benefit or not so this 14 is not a clean-cut thing.
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
But they are still spending the $83 16 million.
17 MR. CLARK:
They are spending in total $180 million 18 on TMI-2.
A lot of it was examining the core and that was the l
19 first point I wanted to make.
This shows funds which goes 20 towards the cleanup program at the Island and the $965 million 21 dollars.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I think it is fair to say 23 that they are spending less than they intended, probably less 24 on R&D.
l l
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
They are spending it in a
4 10 1
different way.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
It is nice to know that 3
Japan is helping out though, isn't it?
4 MR. KUHNS:
It is.
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Go ahead.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But in terms of your 7
costs, does that leave you four million short?
8 MR. KUHNS:
Yes.
9 MR. CLARK:
It leaves us four million less DOE 10 offset cost than we had in mind when the program was made up 11 than we believed we were going to get.
1%
MR. KUHNS:
Our fourth footnote on that page 13 indicates that we are still trying to go after that.
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
What you are saying, too, I think is 15 that it has been somewhat vague but that DOE is spending the 16 money they committed but part of it is going to expenses that 17 they are incurring perhaps not at the site but where they feel 18 apparently have a relationship to the expenses of the cleanup.
19 In other words, you are not getting it necessarily 20 directly as much as you thought, but DOE is spending what they 21 committed to but not going all to you.
Is that how you see 22 it?
23 MR. CLARK:
That is our understanding.
We obviously 24 don't know exactly what is happening to the money that we 25 don't see and certainly there was no overall commitment of
11 1
$160 or $180 million to us.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Can we proceed, please?
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes.
I mean it is simply 4
not the case that DOE is somehow shifting the money to the 5
national labs.
They are cutting everywhere these days 6
particularly and the fact is, they are spending less money on 7
this than they criginally committed to spend.
8 one can argue' "Well, gee, we are spending more at 9
the national labs than we would otherwise have spent" and 10 nobody can prove or disprove that but they are putting less 11 money into this pot on cleanup than they had committed.
That 12 is the way I see it at least.
13 MR. CLARK:
I think, Commissioner, from a broad 14 standpoint there is concern on our part that there is a great 15 deal to be learned from the TMI-2 accident, that everything 16 that could be learned should be learned and that it will not l
17 be learned under present plans.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That is my view, too.
We 19 have discussed this before at this table.
I think it is 20 simply unacceptable if we do not get all of the research 21 knowledge that we possibly can as a consequence of this 22 accident.
I don't think the American people are going to much 23 care in the end who pays for it, but we should not let valuable 24 fundamental research data on the only severe accident we have 25 ever had go by the way and not be obtained because of nickel
12 1
and dining over research money.
2 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
The footnote says that they 3
are still working at it.
s 4
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I hope so.
5 MR. KUHNS:
We can use all the help that we can get.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
This has come up before and 7
we talked about this for at.least two years now and it seems 8
that it doesn't do much good.
I am sorry.
Go ahead.
9 MR. CLARK:
I would be wrong to suggest we have a 10 great deal of leverage in determining how much federal funding 11 is appropriated and how it is allocated.
We can make our 12 views known.
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Let's proceed.
14 MR. CLARK:
I am pleased to have this opportunity 15 again to talk to you about the TMI-2 Program.
It is continuing 16 under an integrated organization as we told you last year where C
17 GPU and Bechtel people fill the various positions essentially 18 without regard to what company they are with.
We think that 19 arrangement is becoming increasingly effective.
20 In total between GPU Nuclear, Bechtel and Catalytic 21 who provides a significant part of the labor force, we have 22 about 1,030 people working on the cleanup.
l 23 In anticipation of the completion of the project 24 which is not, we believe, less than two years away, we have 25 laid out a plan to attempt to keep on the project the GPU
13 1
Nuclear personnel we are going to need to complete it and at 2
the same time make some provision for the needs of our 3
employees for their future.
4 I will talk a little later about some of the 5
difficulties with that.
6 In the conduct of our work, we continue to have the 7
benefit of advice from the TMI-2 safety advisory board.
You 8
will later a report from Dr. Marston, the chairman of the 9
SAB.
We intend to continue to receive the counsel of the SAB 1
10 until cleanup is completed.
11 We also continue to work to insure that information 12 developed in the TMI-2 Program activities is made widely 13 available.
DOE, EI and EPRI are also involved in assuring the 14 dissemination of useful information from TMI-2.
15 One of the most important actions on which we are 16 embarked when we talked to you last year was the preparation 17 of a plan for safe, stable storage of TMI following the 18 removal of the fuel and completion of the cleanup program.
i 19 As we told you last year, this condition is to be 20 based on the following principles.
Fuel has been removed and 21 shipped offsite such that criticality is precluded.
The 22 potential for a significant release of radioactivity has been 23 eliminated.
24 Water has been removed from the plant and the 25 potential for its reintroduction has been minimized.
(
14 1
Radioactive wastes have been packaged and shipped off site for 2
safely stored pending shipment.
Radiation has been to levels 3
which will allow continued plant monitoring, performance of 4
plant maintenance and plant inspections.
5 Containment isolation is maintained in accordance 6
with NRC approved technical specifications.
In short, we 7
believe a safe, monitored plant condition will have been 8
established.
9 We have named this condition, " post defueling 10 monitored storage."
11 Frank Standerfer will discuss the plan in greater 12 detail.
I would like to note that before submitting it to 13 you, it was reviewed by our safety advisory board and a GPU 14 Nuclear Board of Directors.
15 We have been keeping your NRC cleanup project 16 directorate and the NRC advisory panel for the decontamination 17 of TMI up to date on our plans as they have been developed.
18 We believe this plan is a responsible to an 19 unprecedented question and we will continue to work closely 20 with your staff as the proposed plan obtains the thorough and 21 prompt review it deserves.
l 22 I would like to emphasize that PDMS is not 23 decommissioning, real or implied.
It is independent of any 24 decision on disposition of the plant.
We have been 25 concentrating our efforts and planning entirely at this point
15 1
on the cleanup program.
2 During our discussion last year, you asked me what 3
we were doing to keep the citizens in the TMI area informed 4
about the cleanup.
I think our efforts in this regard are 5
extensive and include briefings of public officials and the 6
media, newspaper and television advertising, specific news 7
releases, presentations to the NRC advisory panel, town 8
meetings and public tours.
9 Both our proposal for disposition of the processed 10 water and our plans for PDMS were specifically addressed in 11 briefings of the public officials and the media and by i
12 newspaper advertisements.
13 In addition, in July we distributed to state and 14 local officials, medical professionals and the media a summary 15 report which we provided to you today, " Radiation and Health 16 Effects."
17 We believe this report is a significant contribution 18 to public understanding.
It is a compilation of all the 19 official studies and understandable language.
In response to 20 requests, we have already provided over 13,000 copies of that 21 report to such organizations as universities, medical centers, i
22 other utilities and EPRI.
t 23 A further summary of our activities to communicate 24 with the public is provided in attachment "D" which provides 25 numbers of visitors and meetings, et cetera.
16 4
1 If there are no questions at this point, I would 2
like to turn the presentation over to Ed Kinter, executive 3
vice present of GPU Nuclear.
Ed has the primarily 4
responsibility within the office of the President for TMI-2 5
matters and has been heavily involved in the cleanup program.
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
Proceed.
7 MR. KINTER:
When we met with you just about a year ago, we were just on the point of commencing full scale 8
9 removal of core debris and for the first three months of 1986, 10 we made good progress in doing that and removed one-sixth of 11 the core and loaded it into shipping canisters and prepared it 12 for shipment to Idaho.
13 However, even in the middle of that we were surprised 14 by the rapid growth of biological organisms in the reactor 15 vessel.
It covered many of the structural components.
They 16 apparently emerged from the background water in the vessel 17 because we had spilled some organic fluids from the hydraulic 18 systems we were using in defueling and had provided them food, 1
19 so suddenly they bloomed.
20 It took us a considerable period of time to find out 21 how to correct that.
When we finally did and got rid of the 22 biological problem and started defueling again, we found that 23 we still couldn't see very well.
24 At some point over the last few months, we couldn't 25 see even one inch in the water in the vessel and that, of
17 1
course, made it very difficult to do much in terms of removing 2
the fuel.
3 It was a defueling water cleanup system which had 4
been designed and built specifically for this purpose.
It had 5
an ion-exchange bed in series with filters.
The ion-exchange 6
beds were to move radioactivity from early cesium so that the 7
defueling crews had less of a field in which to work.
8 The filters were half micron filters and they very 9
rapidly clogged.
These filters had after use some 10 radioactivity and some fuel in them.
They cost $70,000.00 11 each and they had to be stored in special storage in Idaho and 4
12 so this whole process became impractical.
We very quickly ran 13 out of filters in an attempt to keep the water clear.
j 14 The tried the straight forward ways of solving the 15 problem like sand beds and diatomaceous earth filters and the 16 effluent of these filters was about like black coffee.
We 17 tried milli-pour fabric filters and some coagulants and none 18 of this --
19 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Please scoot the microphone a little 20 closer, please.
Thank you.
21 MR. KINTER:
When none of this straight forward 22 approach worked, we established a water clarity group of 23 outside experts to advise us on the problem and the list of 24 those persons is shown on the attachment and just glancing at l
25 it, you will see that it is an impressive group.
3 I
-.._-.,.....--. _.~ -, -, - -
18 1
Ernest Mayor who is number nine is the major
.s 2
consultant on filtration of the DuPont Corporation.
David 3
Campbell is head of the chemical technology division at oak 4
Ridge.
Bill Hamilton who some of you may know is the manager 5
of Bettis Laboratories and previously the head of the advisory 6
group.
7 This group worked on a regular basis to help us 8
solve the problem.
This problem had no magic solution.
The 9
first reaction of the water authority group was that if we had j
10 set out deliberately to create a problem of this nature, we 11 could not have done better.
12 The second reaction was to suggest a number of 13 avenues for additional work including far greater emphasis on 14 the use of coagulants and the spectrum of these activities is 15 shown on Attachment "F."
16 One of the first things we had to do and isn't as i
17 easy as it sounds is to characterize the water in the vessel 18 because it is radioactive, couldn't be handled in a normal way 19 and the kinds of materials in it required special laboratory i
20 equipment which we did not have on the Island.
So that was 21 one of the first things we had to do.
22 You see that there are a number of different steps 23 here all of which we have pursued and are still pursuing 24 including enhancement of the television signals which are used i
25 to provide visibility to the crews and the development of
19 1
Sonar so that if all visibility is lost and can't be regained, 2
we can still see enough to continue with defueling.
3 Those efforts are, in fact, continuing.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Gee, when my son gets algae 5
in his aquarium, he goes out and buys some polyester fabric 6
material and it works.
7 MR. KINTER:
I think this particular incident
(
8 highlighted the difficulties of doing things in TMI-2.
The 9
first and straight forward thing is you put some chlorine in 10 it but you can't put chlorine in a reactor system.
11
-We had thought earlier about putting hydrogen 12 peroxide which was the eventual solution but the argument was 13 that hydrogen peroxide would cause a large amount of the 14 cesium in the rubble bed to be exuded.
We finally did prove 15 that that didn't happen and that is what was the final 16 solution.
17 It is very simple in its context but it took a long l
18
. time to arrive at that.
l 19 MR. STANDERFER:
The final filter problem was not 20 algae.
21 MR. KINTER:
No.
I am going to get to that now.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
The final materials?
23 MR. KINTER:
Yes.
After we got the microbiological 24 problem solved, we still found that the filters were clogging 25 and after considerable characterization, it was learned that
i 20 1
they were clogging with very tiny particles, less than a tenth 2
of a micron, which were silver, indium, cadmium, zirconium, 3
4 The thought is that these were primarily caused by 5
vaporization of the materials during the accident, creation of 6
aerosols and that is why it resulted in such tiny particles.
7 The obvious solution is to make big particles out of 8
small ones by the use of coagulants and after 40 coagulants 9
were tested and filterats materials, we finally found sort of 10 what was a magic solution.
11 One particular coagulant in a particular diatomaceous 12 earth and used together, this has solved the problem.
It is 13 really working beautifully and we have the best water clarity 14 in the vessel now that I think we ever have had and I am going
(
15 to show you some pictures of just how good that visibility is.
i 16 We started using this in January and it is doing 17 well and that has allowed us to make much better plans with 18 regard to the defueling from here on.
19 There is one additional problem in defueling of a 20 significant nature which we are working on in two different 21 avenues and if you will look at Attachment "G," you will see a 22 profile in the bottom of the vessel.
That shows the core 23 support structure which is quite complex and we are going to 24 have to get through that core support structure into the 25 bottom head of the vessel to remove something like 15 to 20
21 1
tons of material which is in the bottom head now.
- p. _.
2 That is going to require cutting through this 3
Inconel stainless steel matrix and getting down there, it is 4
not going to be easy to do but as I say, we have two programs 5
underway to do that.
We are finding ways to do that.
6 In the meantime, we have conducted for the Department 7
of Energy something called core boring.
This was done with 8
equipment developed by EG&G, very much like taking core samples 9
out of logs in oil wells and you see on attachment "G," where 10 four such logs were taken out.
11 One of these, the K-9 one extends into the bottom 12 head and into the material that is shown down there.
When we 13 pulled that log out, the material didn't come with it and we 14 saw that it did, in fact, sort of cave in around the hole that 15' was left and that indicates at least in this particular area 16 that this is like sand and probably easily vacuumable.
17 This information from the ten core bores has been 18 assembled and analyzed by EG&G and on the next attachment, 19 Attachment "H," is one of the cross-sections of the remaining 20 debris as it now shows.
21 The upper debris bed is fundamentally already i
removed and we have this articular structure which extends 22 23 almost across the entire vessel.
This is attachment "H" in 24 which there is a center of a very hard ceramic material and a 25 ring around the outside of what is called agglomerated material
22 1
and the agglomerated material is more in the nature of a
)
2 braised material.
You can actually see individual fuel 3
pellets in it.
~
4 This information obviously is very helpful to us in 5
planning the rest of the defueling operation.
6 You will also see if you go back to the attachment 7
"G,",that there are remaining fuel sub-assembly stubs.
These 8
are essentially undamaged and once you get down below the i
9 point where they received adequate cooling from the water that 10 is s~till in the vessel when the accident sequence was 11 terminated.
12 Up to this time, we have shipped seven full casks of 13 seven canisters each to Idaho out of about the 280 that we 14 think that is going to require.
I 15 So the entire defueling system including water purification, core boring and shipping has been exercised and 16 17 is working as it was intended.
18 All this work at TMI-2 has been done, we believe, 19 with special attention to radiation control requirements and 20 worker doses and attachment "I" shows how that program is 21 going.
We had an estimate in 1986 of up to 1,500 man rem.
We 22 only used 900 even though we did two and a half times as many 23 man hours of work in containment as in 1985.
i 24 So we really believe that we are far enough along to 25 be able to project that we will be below the lower limit of i
+
23 1
the NRc's predictions in PIS when we complete the project.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I am a little confused.
3 Somewhere in here I noticed that you had taken a large number 4
of drilling probes and found that it was very solid material 5
and yet you are saying that when you take these cores, it sort 6
of falls in as sand-like.
7 MR. KINTER:
The material that falls out is the 8
material in the bottom of the aid, the hemispherical head at 9
the bottom of the vessel.
It doesn't show on that sketch.
It 10 shows in the previous one.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I see, it is down in this 12 very bottom region that you get this sandy like material.
13 MR. KINTER:
This material went down here in a 14 molten condition and water was down there at the time and 15 apparently as it re-solidified, it was a grainy sandy kind 4
16 although that is not fully explored yet.
17 In this area, at least, the material did not come 18 out with the core equipment.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Is there any explanation for 20 that if that really came down as molten material that it would i
21 end up as a granular material?
22 MR. KINTER:
Fragmented by thermal shock.
23 MR. STANDERFER:
It is a mixture.
We have seen 4
24 walls of re-solidified material so our best estimate is about 25 half of it is this granular material and the other half are
.,.. _ _ _ _, _ _ _.. _. _. _, _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, _ _ _ _., _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ ~., _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
24 1
rocks.
So it is not uniform.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
When you say granular, are 3
you talking pea gravel or chunky or are we talking fine sand?
4 MR. KINTER:
Both.
5 MR. STANDERFER:
I think paa gravel and sand is the 6
way I would characterize this particular part.
7 MR. CLARK:
There are some larger pieces down there 8
as well.
I think you ought to think of it as a range of sizes 9
but not a mass.
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And the most reasonable 11 explanation for that is thermal shock of the melt?
12 MR. KINTER:
As it fell into the water.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Very interesting.
14 MR. CLARK:
I think that is illustrative of something 15 that we think a lot could be learned of and also with the 20 16 tons of molten material did pour down, what happened to the l
17 reactor vessel head.
I think there are a variety of 18 interesting questions that we think would have value in being 1
19 explored and it is not clear whether they will be.
20 COMMISSIONER BERITTHAL:
Well, I sure agree and, in 21 fact, I would be interested at some point here if we have time j
22 today, in hearing what our staff has to say about that.
That 23 seems somewhat different at least from the melt progression 24 scenarios that I have heard before.
25 MR. STANDERFER:
The water apparently protected the l
. ~.
25 1
structural members.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Exactly.
3 MR. STANDERFER:
Because we have seen some 4
discoloration and very minor damage to structural material.
5 Now we expect sooner or later to find some damage but it is 6
much less than you would have predicted.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That is very interesting.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Excuse me.
Let's ask the staff to 9
comment on that when they come forward if they can, please.
10 Go ahead.
11 MR. KINTER:
One area that were you were concerned 12 about particularly last year was the steps taken to prevent l
13 criticality in the fuel during removal operations.
The ACRS 14 had been requested to review the matter and they reported and 15 I quote that appropriate studies have been performed and that 16 procedures being followed will provide the necessary protection l
17 against criticality during defueling.
18 We have had no indications of any kind that would 19 give us a concern in this regard and we have maintained the 20 boron content high enough to well above the limits.
21 In a project as developmental as TMI-2, it is l
22 difficult to predict exactly when any given event can be 23 completed.
However, we have overcome this basic problem of 24 visibility.
25 We have a far greater knowledge and experience
26 1
with the defueling equipment in the operations.
We know much 2
more what lies ahead and we continue to make progress in the 3
controlling worker removing the fuel and we continue to work 4
toward shipment of the last fuel before the scheduled 5
completion of the program in September 1988.
6 We are doing everything practicable to increase the 7
competence that that schedule will be met.
We have leased the 8
third shipment cask in addition to the two that the DOE has 9
purchased for the shipment of fuel to be sure that the 10 availability of casks will not slow the shipment to Idaho.
j v
11 We have assigned one of our best production managers j
12 to TMI-2 as the defueling director and Frank Standerfor has l
13 been told that additional resources needed to complete 14 defueling at the earliest practical date are available to him.
i 15 The TMI-2 operations are all carried out, of course,
)
16 under the close overview of the NRC site and Region I staff 17 and we believe we have been doing the work to the general 18 satisfaction of your people.
19 The latest systematic assessment of the licensee 20 performance which was issued in July for the period ending in 21 February gave TMI-2 ratings of five one's and two two's and we 22 are pleased to earn that good report card.
23 Now Frank Standerfer will provide further details on 24 the war.'c they are doing and what is ahead.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much, proceed.
\\
l 27 1
MR. STANDERFER:
A year ago we described the 2
defueling system.
Briefly, it is a rotating shielded platform 3
that is mounted on top of the open reactor vessel.
Defueling 4
crews worked through slots in this platform with long-handled 5
tools that are 25 to 30-feet long loading fuel debris into 6
stainless steel canisters.
7 By the time we get to the bottom head, they will be 8
working with 40-foot long tools.
9 The canisters are 14-inches in diameter and 12-feet
~'
10 long.
Each contains approximately 1,500 pounds of fuel 11 debris.
When full, we transfer the canisters through the 12 containment vessel to the fuel storage pool using special 13 shielded transfer casks and the original equipment in the 14 vessel to transfer spent fuel through the containment.
15 The canisters are then de-watered, weighed in the 16 fuel storage pool and transferred to the DOE fuel shipping i
17 cask for shipment to Idaho.
18 Attachment "J" in your package is a summary of the 19 defueling activities that have been accomplished over the last 1
20 13 months since we last met.
Again from mid-January through 21 mid-April, we loaded loose fuel debris from the center region l
22 of the core with a tool called the spade bucket.
23 This is the material that was over the hard layer 24 that Ed mentioned.
This was essentially done blind because 25 of the micro-biological problem at that time.
From mid-April m
\\
l
=
.. _, -,;+~.. -. - -., - - -, - - - - - - - -. -
28 1
to the later part of May, we shut down defueling and treated 2
the reactor coolant with hydrogen peroxide which was the 3
method of killing the micro-biological particles and scrubbed 4
down surfaces to remove that material that had collected on 5
the surfaces.
6 With clearer water, we performed the first good 7
video examination of the core since the beginning of defueling 8
earlier in the year.
We removed loose sub-assembly and 9
fittings and other debris from the locations which were 10 scheduled for core bore sampling.
11 In June and July, we installed the DOE drilling 12 machine, took the ten cores that Ed mentioned.
Those cores 13 are at Idaho.
We have a brief picture of one of them on the 14 video tape which we will show.
15 The core samples f'inally gave us a cle.ar 16 understanding of e at existed under the hard layer and in the S
i 17 lower part of the reactor vessel.
18 The only major area of the reactor vessel not yet 19 examined is the final eight inches on the bottom of the vessel 20 which we chose not to approach with this drilling machine 21 being concerned about damaging of the bottom of the vessel.
22 As we vacuum material from there, we will see the bottom of 4
23 the vessel from the inside.
24 In late July and early August, we drilled several 25 holes in this hard layer with the drilling machine before we l
29 l
1 removed it.
It was slow drilling because at that time our a
2 safety analysis indicated that we needed to avoid the 52 3
locations where instrument thimbles connect with the bottom 4
head.
5 The drill rig was removed in August and what we 6
found out is that we couldn't penetrate this hard layer.
The 7
fuse mass was hard and the few holes that we had drilled just 8
weren't enough to start removing the material.
9 So we decided to re-install the drill and rubbelize 10 that material with some special flat-faced drills but first we 11 had to remove more end fittings that were laying on top of the 12 bed and this was done in September and early October.
13 By the end of October and early November, the core 14 drill was again installed on the vessel.
We drilled up this 15 hard layer, the center eight-foot diameter of the hard layer.
16 That was the limit of diametric travel of the drilling 17 machine.
We couldn't go out to the full ten-foot diameter.
18 That machine now has been modified so that if we 19 want to do that again, we can do it.
20 By this time we had approved safety analysis which 21 did not place any limit on where the drill could drill and we 22 were able to drill 420 holes tangentially in this eight-foot 23 diameter so the entire area was rubbelized.
24 During Thanksgiving week, we found that the drilled 25 up material did not lond as easily as we expected.
Again we
30
'l had poor visibility.
2 After shutting down for Thanksgiving and obtaining 3
good visibility by using some of these canisters that Ed 4
mentioned in the old fashion, we found there were several 5
large rocks in the middle of the vessel and they had fallen in i
6 from this, what we call the doughnut ring.
7 It was that material outside of the eight-foot 8
diameter that was not drilled up.
Some of that sloughed into 9
the hole.
10 Knowing that and using the small spade bucket in 11 mid-December, we finally started a number of holes in the 12 material around the rocks and from mid-December through the 13 earlier part of February, we loaded over 20,000 pounds of 14 material.
15
'The bottom of this figure "K" shows the hours per.
16 day which we manned the defueling platform throughout the 17 13-month period shown.
We have demonstrated an ability to man 18 the platform 14 to 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> per day on a sustained basis.
l 19 During the remainder of the day maintenance crews 20 performed support activities which sustained defueling for the l
21 following day.
So essentially, we are operating 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per 22 day in the building, the black portion here showing the amount 23 of time that the defuelers are actually working and it is being 24 done on a seven day per week, three shifts per day, basis.
25 The next figure in your chart, figure "K," shows the
31 1
rate at which fuel has been loaded over this same period of 2
time.
We have now loaded over 76,000 pounds of material which 3
is 26-percent of the core and almost 50,000 pounds of material 4
have been shipped to Idaho.
5 As you can see, the early spurt last year over 6
56,000 pounds were loaded up through April when we did the 7
micro-biological kill, the number of difficulties through the 8
middle of the year plus the core bora samples and so forth 9
resulted in limited loading and then the loading of the little 10 over 20,000 pounds in the last two months up through today.
11 We are currently down for two weeks doing video 12 examinations on a number of sampling exercises in the vessel 13 and we will commence defueling again in about a week.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
So what is the status of 15 what you call the ceramic hard core area?
Have you succeeded 16 in rubbelizing that?
17 MR. STANDERFER:
If you will look at figure, Ed's 18 figure --
19 MR. KINTER:
"H."
20 MR. STANDERFER:
"H."
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes, that is what I have.
22 MR. STANDERFER:
The diameter of the reactor vessel 23 core is about ten feet.
That is the full diameter here.
The 24 center eight feet have been drilled with a flat-faced drill 25 down to the top of the sub-assembly, so we believe that center
32 1
portion has been selectively rubbelized.
2 Then the two foot diameter or the two foot thick 3
doughnut that was around that, 70-percent of that.had sloughed 4
into the center so we have large rocks laying on the top of 5
there.
So we are removing both with a spade bucket and a new 6
tool called the air lift tool which is a vacuum type tool.
7 We have removed the majority of that loose material 8
but we now have some large rocks on top of that which we have 9
to break up.
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
This is ceramic material 11 because it is what?
Is it uranium oxide primarily?
12 MR. STANDERFER:
Well, it is structural material 13 cladding.
Some of it, for example, looks like little pellet 14 stacks that have been cast in metal.
So obviously that part 15 of the fuel element had molten metal flow around it, melt the 16 cladding and cast the pellets right in there.
17 Also, we have other chunks of resolidified metal 18 stringers in ceramic material as if you had a mixer, kind of r
19 like a reinforced ceramic.
Then we have loose ceramic, also.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I don't understand where the 21 ceramic comes from.
22 MR. STANDERFER:
That is the fuel and zirconium 23 mixture forms a hard ceramic.
The Idaho people showed that in 24 tests.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But ceramics are normally
-_-m.-
33 1
oxides and this is, in fact, an oxide type thing.
2 MR. KINTER:
I think they had established it simply j
3 as uranium zirconium oxides.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I see.
5 MR. STANDERFER:
Obviously, other structural material 6
and control rod materials and so forth, alloyed and provided 7
ductile material.
One of the problems with this is that these 8
drills either work on ductile material or ceramic material but 9
there aren't any drills that work on both kinds of material so 10 depending on which kind of drill you use, you can do one rather 11 than the other one.
12 Stepping away from defueling for a moment, in the 13 decontamination of the plant, several acccmplishments were 14 achieved in 1986.
The lower levels of the aux and fuel 15 handling buildings were made accessible to personnel in street 16 clothes for the first time since 1979.
17 over 60-percent of the aux and fuel handling building 18 cubicles have been decontaminated at the base line radiological 19 end points.
Non-reactor coolant systems piping systems have 20 been, the flushing has been initiated.
Gross flushing of the 21 reactor building basement walls with the rover robot was 22 demonstrated and the effectiveness of the high pressure water l
23 removal of loose surface has begun and will show it on the 24 video tape.
25 Ultra high pressure water scarification of reactor
34 1
building basement walls have been demonstrated.
It has been 2
demonstrated that the surface down to one-quarter inch deep 3
can be selectively removed with this technique removing both 4
concrete and radioactivity.
5 The workhorse robot which is the newest'large robot, 6
strong robot, has been received at the site and operationally 7
tested and we are currently training robotic operators for its 8
use.
9 At this point, I would like to show the brief video 10 tape.
It is about a seven-minute video tape summarizing this 11 work I have been discussing throughout the year and then 12 spliced onto the end of this video tape, it is not narrated 13 but it is a half minute or so of video that was taken this 14 last weekend.
15 You will see how clear the water is and you will see 16 some of the rocks and structures that we are talking about.
17
[Whereupon, at this point in the proceedings, a 18 video presentation was made.]
19 MR. CLARK:
I think when you ask, "What is it 20 like?" the answer is widely variable.
There are just a whole 21 variety of different things missed in there and each one is 22 being addressed with a different tool or method.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
How much impediment to what 24 would just be a fairly, I suppose, brute force method of 25 cutting things apart and tearing them out through the i
35 instrument tube penetrations cause in the bottom?
In other 1
2 words, are they great impediments toward more rapid progress?
3 Is that really the thing that bothers you?
4 MR. STANDERFER:
They haven't been a serious 5
impediment although through last summer we were required by 6
our safety analysis to avoid them but by the time we got to 7
the point where we didn't want to avoid them any more, we had 8
to satisfy ourselves and your office that we could pull on 9
them.
We could break them off in the middle of the core if we 10 wanted to.
11 Now in the bottom head, there is a forest of 52 of 12 these units which when we get down there, will will to 13 determine whether or not we can indiscriminately cut them off 14 or whether we will have to be careful and that has not been 15 settled yet.
16 A couple of other issues, one is the so-called accident' water at the Island, about two million gallons of 17 18 water eventually will be categorized as accident water and 19 we have been not allowed to dispose of that water.
I 20 We provided our recommendations for disposal last 21 July as requested in our meeting last year.
Your staff has 22 prepared an environmental impact statement which was issued in 23 December.
In August we discussed our proposal before the 24 advisory panel chaired by Mayor Morris.
25 In their meeting in January in Lancaster, the NRC
l 36 1
EIS was discussed.
The panel concluded they needed another 2
meeting on this and their meeting on the 26th is again on this 3
subject in Lancaster.
I understand that they also intended to 4
or have requested a 45-day extension on the comment period on 5
that EIS.
6 We believe the NRC EIS supports the package that we 7
submitted and will allow if our recommendation is approved for 8
us to start disposal of water next summer.
We are getting 9
bids today from eight vendors who would propose to supply the 10 evaporation equipment if that is eventually approved.
11 MR. CLARK:
I might note that we got yesterday from 12 DOE approval of our request for a special low level waste 13 allocation of up to 40,000 to 50,000 cubic feet if needed 14 which was an important element of our ability to dispose of 15 the water as proposed.
16 MR. STANDERFER:
The other major issue facing us is 17 the status of the plant at the end of the cleanup.
We provided 18 to the NRC on December 3rd our plan for posted fueling monitor 19 storage.
The criteria in that plan will assure that we will 20 meet or exceed normal NRC licensing standards for operating 21 plants.
22 The plan first includes inherent stability and the 23 plant will have the fuel removed.
Systems will be sealed up 24 and water will be removed from the plant, combustibles removed, 25 fire protection systems will be operational and the system will l
l r
37 1
be de-pressurized.
2 Effective containment will be maintained both 3
through closed piping systems, sealed cubicles, a locked 4
regular reactor containment building and secure auxiliary and 5
fuel handling buildings and positive control will be maintained 6
through monitoring, through maintaining protection systems and 7
through providing plant security.
8 The TMI-2 plant will remain enclosed within the TMI 9
site protected area.
The facility will be locked and 10 controlled by the security force.
The reactor building will 11 be maintained function as a containment barrier in accordance 12 with PDMS technical specifications which we will propose and i
13 one of the two redundant trains of ventilation system will be 14 maintained operable for use as needed through the monitoring 15 storage period.
16 A number of systems will be deactivated.
Other 17 systems such as fire protection system and ventilation systems 18 will be required and will be maintained operational.
Some 19 systems which will be required eventually for future work in 20 the plant like the polar crane and the water treatment systems 21 will be laid up for future use.
22 One issue in this package has to do with how much 23 fuel will be remaining in the plant.
Your attachment "L" 24 shows our current ex-vessel fuel location work showing fairly 25 small quantities of fuel in various parts of the plant outside w,r
38 1
of the reactor vessel.
2 We estimate those systems to contain between 25 and 3
150 kilograms of fuel at the present time.
We have started 4
defueling some of the piping around the pressurizer in 5
January.
The quantity of fuel which may be left in the plant 6
together with that which may be left in the reactor vessel, we 7
expect to be considerably less than 400 kilograms, 99.7-percent l
8 of the fuel will be removed.
9 Four hundred kilograms is a magic number in that 10 that is the number that we have to get below such that we for 11 this type of fuel can be relieved as safeguards concerns.
12 The other issue has to do with the general rad.dstion 13 levels in various portions of the plant.
Our best estimate of 14 those are included in your Attachment M.
As you can see, the 15 outbuildings, the fuel-handling building, the auxiliary 16 building are essentially at levels similar to an operating 17 plant.
18 Within the reactor building itself, the work that 19 we're doing in the fuel-handling canal now is done at a 20 radiation level of about 10 MR per hour.
The work on the 347 21 level is under 30 MR per hour.
The 305 level is about 70 MR 22 per hour.
And while the PDMS does not require the basement 23 levels to be accessible for monitoring, it is not required, we 24 expect to do work in the basement to reduce the general 25 radiation levels below the average of 35 R per hour that
39 1
exists there today.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Is that still -- or I should 3
say, is that now primarily cesium in the walls down there, or 4
what is it?
5 MR. STANDERFER:
Cesium in the walls.
But past the j
6 cesium, there's strontium there which doesn't give a dose 7
thing, but it certainly is a contamination.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But the immediate hazard to 9
the workers is almost all cesium at this point.
10 MR. STANDERFER:
Yes.
And it varies.
There is a 11 concrete block wall which was a fire barrier around one of the 12 stairwells where there are radiation levels around that wall 13 as high as 1000 R per hour.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And this quarter-inch 15 sloughing that you were trying to do with high-pressure water, 16 does that represent --
17 MR. STANDERFER:
Over 95 percent of the material.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Over 95 percent of it.
19 MR. STANDERFER:
On the surface.
Now this concrete 20 block wall is saturated with material.
It's more like a 21 sponge.
It was unpainted wall.
22 But they painted -- the high-pressure concrete was 23 just penetrated an eighth of an inch or so.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Is it possible -- has it 25 been -- have you been able to do an analysis of decay products
e 40 1
to determine whether that was deposited in the wall material 2
primarily as cesium iodide, then, or has anyone tried to do 3
that up to this point?
4 MR. STANDERFER:
The chemical form hasn't been-5 determined, but of course it's combined with the elements of 6
the concrete.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Sure.
8 MR. STANDERFER:
It was solubilized as cesium ion in 9
the water.
So as it goes into the concrete, you find it 10 combined with the constituents of the concrete.
11 So it was not in the compound; it was in the water 12 as an ion.
So its form before it entered the water, you can't 13 determine that.
)
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes, I agree.
It certainly 15 would be of interest, though, to see whether the iodine decay 16 products are present in the wall.
17 MR. STANDERFER:
Yes.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Because that may tell you 19 something about --
20 MR. STANDERFER:
A better place to find that out is 21 in the core debris, which still has considerable cesium in the 22 form that it was at during the accident, incorporated into 23 some of these pellets that haven't been broken up or 24 incorporated to some of the fuel debris that has not I
25 dissolved.
And so the Department of Energy should have the
41 1
best opportunity to answer the question:
What was the chemical 2
form of the fission products after the accident?
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But another very interesting 4
question, it seems.to me, is how it ultimately was transported 5
to the walls, for example, however it came out of the core.
6 It's a question of transport.
7 MR. STANDERFER:
Well, cesium, of course, is like 8
sodium, very soluble in water, and we see it --
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Sure.
10 MR. CLARK:
I think it's fair to say, Commissioner, 11 we haven't been focusing particularly on trying to understand 12 that, the kind of dividing line or areas of interest between 13 us and DOE, that we're focused on what's there and what will 14 it take to clean it up.
Their focus has been on trying to 15 understand the accident, and they have a lot more expertise in 16 those areas than we do.
17 So I don't believe that we've been attempting to do 18 an analyses which would get to the kind of question you 19 suggest.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, I don't want to 21 overestimate or underestimate what you might learn for source i
22 term information, but we sure oughtn't to overlook it, whether 23 we do it or DOE does it or EPRI does it.
Somebody ought to do 24 it, if there's something to be learned there.
25 MR. STANDERFER:
We are having Oak Ridge analyze
4 42 1
samples of the basement cores to see how easily it is to leach 2
the material back out of the concrete.
And this concrete is 3
submerged in water, and if you, you know, change the water, 90 4
percent or more of the cesium can be. leached back.
5 Under the PDMS plan, we will continue to have the 6
reactor licensed under the 10 CFR 50, Part 50 license, 7
possession only.
We propose to comply with other technical 8
specifications for such plants, including the environmental 9
regulations.
10 We believe that the PDMS proposal will provida --
11 protect the health and safety of the public and our workers, 12 and we will be supplying additional information to the 13 Commission this year with regard to that plan.
14 With that, Phil, we'll turn back to you.
16 MR. CLARK:
All right.
I'd like at this time to 16 introduce Dr. Robert Marston, Chairman of the TMI-2 Safety 17 Advisory Board and have him join us here at the table.
18 You have in Attachment C a biography of Dr. Marston, 19 and I think you can see that he brings a great deal of very 20 pertinent background to it.
He was the President of the 21 University of Florida for a number of years, also the Director 22 of the National Institutes of Health, in addition to a variety 23 of other positions.
So we are very pleased to have Dr. Marston 24 as the Chairman of the Safety Advisory Board.
He has a 25 prasentation to make to you.
=
43 1
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you, Dr. Marston.
Proceed.
2 MR. MARSTON:
Mr. Chairman and members of the 3
Commission, I would like to submit, with your permission, for 4
the record the written statement and then to highlight and 5
summarize that statement, if I might.
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Certainly.
7 MR. MARSTON:
While the members of the Board work in 8
close cooperation with the GPU Nuclear Cleanup Program Staff, 9
the Board is completely independent in its review function.
10 Since March 1981, the Board has been reviewing all aspects of 11 the cleanup as they relate to the health and safety of the 12 public and the workers.
13 The charter of the Board and brief biographical 14 sketches of its members are attached to my statement.
15 The members of the Board are specialist in nuclear 16 sciences, engineering, physics, medicine, risk assessment and 17 public perception of risk, and large-scale project management.
18 Each of these individuals, with the exception of me, has served 19 on the Board from its inception.
Thus we have both an 20 exceptionally talented group of experts and individuals who now 21 have a wealth of institutional memories.
The Board's 22 primary role is to monitor worker and public safety currently 1
23 and to review safety aspects of future plans.
And I would like 24 to emphasize the comments I have made in these two regards, 25 first on page 2.
"It's important to note that the members of
44 i
1 the safety Advisory Board are unanimous in their opinion that 2
TMI-2 is currently in a stable condition and does not pose any 3
greater risk to public or workor health and safety than those 4
associated with an operating power plant, either nuclear or 5
fossil."
6 And at the top of page 3:
"During its six years of 7
review, the Board has observad a safe and steady progress 8
toward cleaning up the TMI-2 plant."
9 This safety record has been achieved, however, in 10 the face of unexpected, frustrating problems requiring slow 11 and painful solutions, much of which you've heard about again 12 today.
13 I discuss one such problem, water clarity, which Ed 14 Kinter spent some time on, which by threatening to prolong the 15 entire cleanup process raised potential problems.
Thus we are 16 relieved by the apparent solution to this problem by 17 management.
18 Let me just add as an old microbiologist that 19 hydrogen peroxide doesn't work this well normally.
It is in 20 the association with boron that you are able to get these 21 remarkably effective biocidal effects at levels of 200 parts 22 per million, and it's an interesting discovery or rediscovery 23 in and of itself.
24 TMI will continue to constitute a major research and 25 development project, and the unexpected will occur in the
~ ___
45 1
future as it has in the past.
Looking to the future, the 2
Safety Advisory Board has focused most of its attention 3
recently on what were first called endpoint criteria a few 4
months ago, but today is called the post-defueling monitored 5
storage.
6 A panel of the Safety Advisory Board chaired by l
1 7
Professor Norman Rasmussen of MIT reviewed the evolving 8
proposals last spring, and the Board itself has spent 9
significant time on this particular proposal since July of 10
'86.
11 We conclude, as stated on page 5, which is the next 12 to the last page:
"As a result of this review, the Board 13 supports GPU Nuclear's fundamental concept of a monitored 14 storage condition, which establishes a reasonable and secure 15 plant configuration at the completion of the cleanup program.
16 And while this condition is not a decommissioned state, it 17 will ensure that the plant can be maintained in a safe, stable 18 status for an extended period of time."
19 And furthermore -- and the conclusions are on page 6 20 "The Board is pleased with GPU Nuclear's assurance that the 21 maximum possible amount of decontamination will be performed 22 before storage begins.
The Board is concerned about the 1
23 legacy of radioactivity left in the plant and will recommend 24 that low radiation fields and sufficient protection of workers i
25 exists.
l
46 1
"Most importantly, the Board will satisfy itself 2
that the plant be in such a condition and sealed in such a way 3
that it poses no risk to the public."
4 Let me stress again that in this and all matters 5
related to the public and workers' health and safety, the 6
Board's review function remains independent of management.
7 Finally, the Board is aware that as the tempo of 8
cleanup activities accelerates in the coming months, even 9
greater care must be exercised to ensure continued safety.
10 I thank you very much.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Could I ask just one 13 question?
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Go ahead.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I don't know whether it is 16 in your charter, and I suspect it's not, but has the Board 17 ever considered the question of whether there may be valuable 18 scientific data being lost at one point or another in the is cleanup process?
20 I realize that you're principal charge is to be 21 concerned about the process itself and public health and 22 safety, but I am struck, for example, by the fact that here we l
l 23 are perhaps scaling away the walls in the basement and not 1
24 making any provision for,-- I guess maybe that is being done 25
-- sectional analysis.
And we surely ought to be looking at l
47 1
those things, though, and with the expertise you have on the 2
Board, I would think that you would be ideally situated to do 3
that.
4 MR. MARSTON:
Well, it would be unusual to have a 5
Board of scientists of this type who would not pay that 6
attention.
7 COMMISSIONEL BERNTHAL:
Exactly.
8 MR. MARSTON:
I think the question really is:
What 9
are the limits of our responsibility?
And probably I got 10 close to those limits in a report to the GPU Board last week, 11 because I expressed it this way.
I said, "There is a wish 12 list that the members of the Safety Advisory Board do look 13 at." And high cn that list, there really are two elements --
14 is the hope that continued research will be able to be carried 15 out in the future as new knowledge and new techniques become 16 available, so that we won't lose the very opportunities that l
17 you are talking about.
18 The second one is again looking into the unknown of 19 the future.
It would be nice, not in terms of absolute safety 20 for workers and the public -- it would be nice, as new 21 knowledge becomes available, to be able to chip away at 22 whatever residual contamination may be there and learn from 23 that process.
24 So we do spend time talking about it.
It's easy to 25 confuse those discussions with our bat : responsibility, which
l 48 1
I've tried to state as clearly as possible, that doing that or i
2 not doing that has nothing to do with worker or public safety.
I 3
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, I certainly understand 4
that and agree with it.
I would hope, however, that given the 5
expertise that resides in your group, if your group outside 6
its principal responsibility becomes concerned that valuable l
7 data are being lost or that research will not be performed 8
that ought to be performed for whatever the reasons might be, 9
that you would do us and the public a service of ringing a 10 little alarm bell, so that those of us who have the 11 responsibility can perhaps speak out on that issue.
12 MR. MARSTON:
I thank you on behalf of the Board for 13 saying that, because it fits with what they would like to do.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
You're quite welcome.
15 MR. CLARK:
I do think, though, that it's extremely 16 important that we keep separate the two issues of what's 17 needed for public health and safety and R&D --
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I agree.
I agree.
19 MR. CLARK:
-- and I think it would be very easy to 20 get those fuzzed.
And if the Safety Advisory Board, which is 21 most helpful to us, were to get into comments in that area, 22 that they somehow be separated and directed perhaps to somebody 23 other than us in order to emphasize that distinction.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Thank you very much.
25 MR. CLARK:
To complete our presentation on TMI-2
O 49 1
and look ahead, I'd like to comment on our relationship with 2
the NRC on TMI-2.
There are two areas deserving mention.
3 First is that although constantly faced with unique 4
technical questions, the NRC Staff has responded very well to 5
our requests for approval of the day-to-day project work.
We 6
have not been held up significantly by the special TMI-2 7
requirements to obtain NRC technical understanding and detailed 8
agreement to an extent that does not apply at other plants.
9 We appreciate the sense of responsibility on the 10 part of the NRC, particularly Dr. Travers and his staff, which 11 have made that possible.
12 The Staff has concentrated on the more immediate 13 questions.
Approval of less urgent items has been taking 14 longer than we would like.
15 In June and July of 1985, we made a number of 16 proposals for simplifying the tech specs related to some of 17 the systems we think are no longer needed.
Those changes 18 would allow us to better utilize our personnel and apply their 19 efforts where they are most effective under the special 20 conditions of TMI.
21 I am pleased to note that February lith of this year 22 we saw in the Federal Register formal notice by the NRC Staff 23 of the intent to issue at least one of those two tech spec 24 changes, so I think we have been talking to the Staff, and 25 with their priorities and resources, I'm sure it's been
50 1
difficult, and they apparently have now been able to address 2
at least one of those.
3 Looking forward, with less than two years remaining 4
before its scheduled completion,.it is important to complete 5
the cleanup in a reasonable time and in an orderly way, to 6
reach an understanding with you on our proposals for water 7
disposal and the' plans for PDMS.
We will be submitting 8
technical specification requests to you.
We currently see 9
that starting as early as next month for one of those 10 submittals, and we will be working with the Staff on those 11 tech spec changes.
12 There are no precedents for the plan, the defueling 13 monitored storage.
We think we have proposed a logical and 14 responsible plan for it.
It is similar to one of the endpoints 15 already analyzed by NRC in their PDMS.
16 I think most importantly, in order to manage a 17 project of this magnitude and developmental uncertainties, it 18 is important to have an understanding of the remaining work in 19 sufficient time that we can manage, plan, keep the Staff and 20 apply the Staff in order to do it.
It is for that reason that l
21 we, you know, ask your prompt attention to the proposal, so 22 that we can come into agreement on what remains to be done and 23 do it.
24 We will work closely with your Staff to reach this 25 understanding and conclusion.
Meanwhile, we are proceeding 4
51 with the work and with preparations to implement our plans for 1
2 water disposal and PDMS as we have proposed.
3 In summary, we continue to learn in cleaning up at 4
TMI-2, despite unexpected difficulties in the fuel removal 5
portion, we still plan to complete the cleanup program in 6
September 1988.
7 We recognize defueling was the heart.
We recognize 8
it was the most developmental, and in that sense, we 9
deliberately scheduled it early in our plans, and the original 10 defueling plan had defueling completed well before the end of 11 cleanup.
Despite the slips in defueling, we believe that we 12 still can, and we are planning on scheduling to complete the 13 defueling before the fall of '88 and have the fuel offsite.
14 So while there has been slippage, the schedule has been 15 deliberately biased on the defueling to be as early as we l
16 could and allow for the kinds of things that have occurred so 17 far.
18 That completes the presentation on TMI-2.
Last 19 year, you had asked for a little presentation on TMI-1, and I 20 understood that was appropriate at this time, which I can 21 either go into, or we can address TMI-2 questions as you wish.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Why don't you give us the TMI-1 23 status briefly, if you would.
Thank you.
24 MR. CLARK:
Okay.
A year ago, TMI-l had just 25 completed its carefully planned startup and power ascension
52 1
program and started full-power operation.
We've had a very 2
successful operating cycle.
The forced outage rate for 1966 3
at TMI-1 was 4 percent.
For the last six months of the cycle, 4
after the eddy current outage which had been planned, the 5
forced outage rate was only.4 percent, and the capacity 6
factor was 99.8 percent.
7 At the same time, the number of unplanned automatic 8
scrams per 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> critical for the whole cycle, including 9
the startup and test program, was 0.6.
That's just below the 10 industry average for the years 1985 and
'86.
11 Another indicator is total radiation exposure to 12 workers.
For 1986, which included the five-week eddy current 13 outage and two months of a fueling and modification outage, 14 total exposure at TMI-1 was 245 person-rem, well below the j
15 industry average for plants of that type.
16 Finally, another thing that we keep an eye on is how 17 many activated alarms or annunciators do you have in the 18 control room that are on.
That number has been kept, we 19 think, at a low level, an average of only eight through the 20 cycle, and was down to five or fewer for the last four months.
21 During the past year, as you know, there was what we 22 see as an unprecedented level of NRC inspection and oversight.
23 That included two PAT teams, three SALP reports, and four 24 onsite residents.
While we are pleased with our performance 25 during the cycle, we recognize there is still a need for l
53 1
improvement.
We want to improve.
The results of our own 2
reviews are largely confirmed by reports of your teams, 3
which also identified some additional items.
4 We are continuing our efforts to achieve excellence 5
in all areas.
One general area being given major attention is 6
that or procedures and procedure compliance.
7 The results of the latest SALP report, which covered a
the period through the end of October, was Category 1 in aix 9
areas, Category 2 in four areas.
While we are focusing on 10 addressing the areas that need improvement, we nonetheless are 11 pleased with that rating.
12 Finally, I outlined a few minutes ago our efforts to 13 keep the public and officials apprised of TMI-2 cleanup.
14 Similar efforts are continuing as well with regard to TMI-l 15 and its performance.
16 Thank you for your time, and that's the end of our 17 presentation.
le CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Thank you very much.
19 Questions, fellow Commissioners?
Commissioner 20 Roberts, do you have any questions?
Commissioner Asselstine?
21 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Excuse me.
Just one comment.
22 I think that the SALP is commendable.
You should be very proud 23 of that.
24 MR. CLARK:
I think we are pleased, but there are 25 still things we're working on.
We would like to have all 1s.
54 1
I don't know if anybody has yet done that, but we would like 2
to.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
You certainly have one of the better 4
SALPs, and you should be proud of that.
5 MR. KUHNS:
Yes, we do.
Admiral Rickover convinced 6
me that no matter how good you are, you can be better, and 7
you'd better be.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Yes, and he's right, too.
9 MR. KUHNS:
And with this technology, that's 10 particularly appropriate.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
That's correct.
Commissioner 12 Asselstina?
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Just a couple of questions.
14 Phil, you mentioned over the last few months, you've 15 been making an effort to both discuss with the public and with 16 the TMI-2 Cleanup Advisory Panel your water evaporation 17 proposal.
18 What kind of public reaction have you gotten to 19 that?
20 MR. CLARK:
Let ne comment initially and then ask 21 Frank Standerfer, who is out there in the area.
22 We got, I think, very good acceptance when we went 23 around to see public officials, that it was a responsible 24 proposal.
In particular, Congressman Walker, who had been, 25 you know, very vocal in the leadership, if you will, with
55 s
\\
b regard to water disposal, has told me personally that he's 2
pleased with the proposal and will support it.
3 other people have not been, perhaps, quite as I'
4 positive, but I think it was a good reaction.
5 There has been one area of lobal reaction different 6
than that,'and I would ask Frank Standerfer, who was there, 7
to command.
8 JOR. STANDERFER:
Clearly, the proposal to not put it s
9 in the river is well-received.
The question of evaporated s
--lio matchial then causes some concern.
Thode people,cl guess, 2
i 11 would prefer that tha' material remain on the' island and be 12 stored as water, which we and the NRC, I believe, would prefer r
13 not to be its final disposition.
14 We also beliovi that it should not be solidified and 15 stored on the island, and we,do not want to create an on-island
^
16 permanent war,te disposal site.
And I would hope that the:NRC' 17 analysis that our preposal is satisfactory will ultimately 18 prevail.
19 I believe that the public officials in the area and, 20 "
I hope, the Advisory Panel will come to that conclusion.
21 MR. CLAFK:
We found soyebody who objects to every 22 possible and theoretically imaginable way of disposing of the 23 water.
But by and large, I think there's been a good 24 acceptance on a consensus basis of what we've proposed.
25 INthink that process is envisioned as taking two ummua mi
56 1
years or more once started, so in terms of really getting that 2
issue behind us, I think it is important to reach agreement 3
and get started.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Have you or do you plan to 5
seek the same kind of public comment or public reaction on the 6
post-defueling monitored storage proposal?
l l
7 MR. CLARK:
Yes.
We did first the same thing in 8
terms of briefing the officials and the media and held a press i
conference, I believe, on the PDMS and have taken out ads, you 10 know, everything we can see.
11 In addition, the Advisory Panel, NRC's Advisory i
12 Panel, has addressed that, I guess now in two meetings.
13 MR. KUHNS:
One meeting, the December meeting.
14 MR. CLARK:
Okay.
And is going to return to it.
15 MR. KUHNS:
Yes, after the water issue.
16 MR. CLARK:
So, yes, we do intend to do that.
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
What has been the 18 reaction so far to PDMS?
19 MR. CLARK:
I guess I'd describe it as not as much 20 reaction one way or the other as I expected.
21 COMMTSSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
22 MR. CLARK:
We haven't gotten a lot of "Atta boys,"
23 nor have we gotten, "Oh, my gosh."
I think it's been accepted 24 fairly straightforward 1y with the people we've been talking to 25 as something that perhaps makes sense.
57 1
I don't want to overcharacterize that as acceptance, 2
becausa nobody has had to accept it yet.
But I think it's 3
been a fairly straightforward reaction.
4 MR. KUHNS:
We seem to have had more questions like, 5
"What are you going to do ultimately?
What is the ultimate 6
disposition of the plant?"
7 MR. CLARK:
Yes.
8 MR. KUHNS:
And our position has consistently been 9
that we haven't wanted to confuse the objectives.
We have the 10 responsibility of cleaning up that mess safely, and we're 11 doing that.
And we're not doing that any differently, 12 depending upon what we see as the ultimate disposition of the 13 plant.
14 The PDMS will put it in a safe, stable, secure 15 position for many, many years.
So thE ', facision can be 16 deferred.
That decision will be affected by other than 17 technical considerations -- regulatory, political, economic --
18 and we just have been able to focus solely on the cleanup, 19 which is what we've been doing.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
That sort of brings 21 ne to my next question, which was:
What are the reasons why 22 you would not want to proceed right now with decommissioning?
23 When you finish the cleanup, why would you not want to simply 24 go ahead and decommission Unit 2 at that time?
25 MR. CLARK:
I think that that most simply is
58 1
understood in terms of ALARA and the question of the dose 2
that's involved in doing the work, dose to workers.
We 3
believe that with time both the levels would decay, obviously, 4
and in addition that technology may develop which would enable 5
us to do it with less does to workers, and that ultimately 6
you're looking at, with essentially no risk of that material 7
exposing people offsite, does it make sense to expend worker 8
dose to clean it further when you could do it with less dose 9
later.
I think that's, you know --
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So there is really a 11 substantial savings between now and, say, 35 or 40 years from 12 now.
13 MR. CLARK:
You have at least a factor of two in 14 decay in that time period with the cesium, and in addition, to 15 the extent that there are better ways, better robotics, 16 methods, whatever, and a better understanding of what is an 17 ultimate decommissioned condition, which is not fully resolved 18 yet, as we understand it, we just think all those things argue 1
19 that we ought to get it safe, but not expend a lot of worker 20 dose in order to go farther at this time.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
22 MR. STANDERFER:
Hopefully, the waste can be shipped 23 less than 3000 miles also at that point.
24 MR. CLARK:
That's an additional factor, yes.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Are you able to collect
59 1
funds now for the ultimate decommissioning of the Island from 2
the revenues from Unit 17 3
MR. KUHNS:
We are in a -- well, TMI-l and Oyster 4
Creek, we are collecting today through our ratemaking processes 5
in both states some funding.
Not to the level of the amount 6
recommended in the proposed rulemaking by the Commission of 7
$100 million.
4 8
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Which I suspect may be on i
9 the low side anyway.
10 MR. KUHNS:
Well, I think we're at a level of about 11
$60 million in New Jersey.
That rate may be about 30 to 40 in l
12 Pennsylvania on TMI-1.
13 TMI-2, we have nothing in ratemaking at this point.
14 Of course, that is an issue that ought to be addressed at some 15 point.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay, yes.
Last question.
17 Your experience with the contamination problems in 18 the basement of the reactor building, is one of the lessons 19 that we ought to learn from that that you ought to paint 20 everything in sight, all of the concrete, block walls, 21 everything?
22 MR. CLARK:
Yes.
23 MR. KUHNS:
Amen.
24
[ Laughter.]
25 MR. CLARK:
And I think that was recognized, you
60 1
know, some years ago, that clearly if you can keep liquids or 2
other materials from getting into the walls or the floors or 3
the equipment, clearly that's very helpful.
4 Most of the basement was painted.
But this fire 5
wall and perhaps some other areas were not.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Have you gone back and 7
painted everything at Oyster Creek and Unit 1?
8 MR. CLARK:
I believe so.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
10 MR. KUHNS:
I was down there two weeks ago, and they 11 were painting everything in sight.
12 MR. CLARK:
Again, again.
But we have, I think, 13 learned that lesson and have attempted to go in and paint the 14 areas where there could be spills or releases.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Have you looked at some of 16 those thicker, heavier epoxy paints that some of the Europeans 17 use?
I think Sweden, in particular, uses that.
18 MR. CLARK:
I'm not certain exactly what they use, 19 Commissioner, but I do know this, that.the painting we're i
20 doing in those areas required us to send our people out and 21 get them qualified to apply this special paint and have it l
22 effective.
So it's not just a hardware paint, and it's put on 23 with a process that is intended to give you a good seal.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
Good.
That's all I 25 have.
~
w,- - - -
,-n
61 1
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Bernthal?
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I don't have any further 3
questions.
I would just make one comment, that I hope that 4
we're reaching some sensible resolution of this question of 5
storage of large volumes of radioactive liquid there.
The 6
radioactivity isn't very high, as we all know, but I have to 7
say, it seems to me that the least sensible and least desirable 8
solution to this problem is storing waste materials in liquid 9
form on an island in the middle of the river.
It just seems to 10 me, it's clear that's not the right thing to do.
It sounds 11 like you're on the verge of a solution here that may be 12 acceptable, and I would urge that you move ahead with that as 13 quickly as you can with prudence.
14 MR. CLARK:
We certainly plan to do that.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's all I have to say.
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Mr. Carr?
17
[No response.]
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Well, let me -- we have another 19 presenter.
Let me thank you very much for your presentation 20 and call up Dr. Travers, please, from the Nuclear Regulatory 21 Commission Staff.
22 MR. CLARK:
Thank you very much.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Mr. Denton, are you going to commence 25 this part of this briefing?
l 62 1
MR. DENTON:
Yes, sir.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
3 MR. DENTON:
For almost eight years, Mr. Chairman, 4
we have reviewed and approved from a public health and safety 5
standpoint all the major activities at the Island.
It did 6
present and does continue to present a lot of difficult 7
technical challenges.
8 Mr. Travers has been on the Island for the past two 9
and a half years.
You will remember that this began with our 10 approval of the process to cleanup the water in the auxiliary 11 building.
We went through cleaning up the water in the 12 reactor building.
We eventually authorized the entry into the 13 building.
14 Bill and I were on the containment floor, I guess 15 two years ago, in which we were about to begin the defueling.
16 I think we are getting to the point where this accident is 17 coming to an end.
18 I am very encouraged by the fact that all the fuel 19 is scheduled to be in canisters by the end of this year.
I 20 think that is a very significant milestone with regard to our 21 ability to assure the protection of public health and safety 22 of people in that area.
23 The remaining issues are the disposal of water and 24 the long term storage of the plant and Bill will provide you 25 our current perspectives on those and the current issues.
63 1
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
Proceed.
2 MR. TRAVERS:
Thank you.
I think you, Mr. Chairman, 3
heard a relatively comprehensive report on the status of the 4
cleanup.
I have just a few supplementary comments.
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
6 MR. TRAVERS:
In late 1984, the staff reported to 7
you that with the removal of the reactor vessel head and the 8
funding assurance no longer a significant issue that the most 9
significant progress towards completing the cleanup had 10 begun.
11 On the past year, I am happy to report to you that 12 from our perspective, significant progress in cleaning up the 13 facility is continuing.
More importantly from our view, the 14 cleanup is being conducted with an appropriate emphasis on 15 assuring safety to workers, to the off site public and to the 16 environment.
17 The defueling effort which is clearly the most 18 significant aspect of the cleanup effort itself is ongoing and 19 as you have heard has resulted in removal of about 25-percent
)
20 of the damaged core.
21 Additionally, a great deal has been accomplished in 22 decontaminating, building and equipment surfaces in the 23 reactor and auxiliary buildings.
24 While progress has been made during the past year, 25 the defueling effort has not progressed as quickly as hoped.
,,n---...
,,.n,
64 1
Difficulties in removing the damaged core have necessitated 2
slips in the licensee's schedule for completing this task and 3
in the staff's view, there is a potential for additional 4
delays.
5 Our assessment of past schedule slips have determined 6
that they Were based principally on the unique task at hand 7
rather than the licensee's commitment to get on with the job or 8
their ability to fund it.
9 If additional delays do, however, occur, there is a 10 potential that the overall cleanup schedule could be delayed 11 and that the company's ability to finance the completion of 12 the cleanup would be lessened.
13 This is an issue that the Commission and its 14 independent advisory panel has continued to be interested in 15 and we will plan to keep you advised.
16 I would like to provide a brief update on NRC staff 17 actions relative to two other issues that have been discussed 18 here this morning.
The first issue involves the disposal of 19 approximately two million gallons of water contaminated either 20 directly or indirectly as a result of the March, 1979 accident.
21 As you know and have heard today, the staff has 22 issued a draft environmental impact statement which addresses 23 a number of alternatives for disposing of that water including 24 the licensee's specific proposal that they be allowed to 25 evaporate it.
O 65 1
During the public comment period, the staff has met 2
with intervenor groups as well as with the commission's 3
advisory panel to discuss this issue and following a 4
consideration of all of the public comments that were received 5
on this issue, we plan to publish a final environmental impact 6
statement and then to provide the Commission with a staff 7
recommendation on GPU's specific proposal.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Can you give us some sense of 9
when that is going to happen?
10 MR. TRAVERS:
The Commission as it was pointed out 11 here by Mr. Standerfer has just received a request for an 12 extension of some 45 days.
Currently, the public comment 13 period closes on the 28th of February.
If the public comment 14 period were extended, it would involve something like April 15 15th which would then become the closing date.
16 I plan to have within 30 days following the close of i
17 public comments both a final environmental impact statement l
)
18 and a Commission recommendation or rather a staff 19 recommendation.
i 20 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Within 30 days of the close 21 of the comment period?
22 MR. TRAVERS:
Correct depending on when that occurs.
23 COMMISSIONER ROBERT:
I see.
Thank you.
i 24 MR. TRAVERS:
The second issue that I would like to 25 address relates to the licensee's plan to place the facility 2
66 1
into storage following defueling and the shipment of fuel off 2
the site.
3 The staff does not yet have all the specifics of 4
that plan but we do have enough to begin the preparation of an 5
environmental impact statement to address the issue and we 6
plan to begin that very soon.
7 In addition to an EIS, amendments to the TMI-2 8
license will also be required to facilitate that kind of 9
action.
We plan to keep you informed of significant 10 developments on that issue and in keeping my comments brief, I 11 would like to ask you now if you have any questions that I 12 might respond to.
/
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Thank you very much.
14 Commissioner Roberts.
15 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
No.
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Asselstine.
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Just one quick question.
18 on the post defueling monitored storage and its relationship 19 ultimately to decommissioning, one of the elements in the 20 Commission's proposed decommissioning rule is assurance that 21 the money is going to be there to decommission the plant after 22 it ceases operation.
23 Normally where you have an operating reactor, you 24 have an ongoing source of revenue and in the end the objective 25 of the rule was to insure that money would be collected from
i 9
67 1
that revenue stream and set aside or otherwise identified so 2
that ultimately, it could be used for decommissioning.
3 Is that something that you are going to look at in 4
this case here because you have a little more unique situation 5
where this reactor isn't generating revenue.
6 MR. TRAVERS:
I have admittedly not looked into it.
7 MR. DENTON:
I don't think we have focussed on that 8
part.
We have looked at alternatives from a public health and 9
safety standpoint rather than the financing aspect.
That is 10 an interesting aspect and we will certainly try to consider 11 that in our deliberations.
12 MR. TRAVERS:
I think it is fair to point out, 13 Mr. Commissioner, that we have the Office of State Programs, 14 particularly has been following the funding issue of cleanup.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I suppose it is something 16 that will be triggered when the Commission adopts a final 17 decommissioning rule in any event since then plants have to 18 submit a report in a required period of time.
19 I only have one last question.
Harold, on this 20 painting business, my impression is that a lot of plants still 21 have a lot of bare concrete in the containment areas.
What 22 are we doing to ensure that all of the plants get painted so 23 that if there is another accident, we at least minimize the 24 decontamination going on?
25 MR. DENTON:
I think the value of strippable paint 1
i W.
iei.. m i
i 68 1
was recognized eight years ago and a lot of people have gone 2
to it.
I don't think we have issued any specific requirements 3
to have strippable paint because it was seen to be something 4
that contributed to the difficulty of cleaning up but I would 5
be happy to try to look and see how many plants have.
6 I think many of the newer plants have gone to 7
strippable paints and I have often seen it in use but I don't 8
know the actual statistics.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
My recollection is 10 more on the older plants where I seem to recall seeing a lot i
11 of exposed concrete surfaces.
That is all I have.
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Bernthal.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Have they answered my 14 question that I posed earlier?
I am sorry I had to leave the 15 room for a minute.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
No.
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
No.
Maybe you will have to ask it 18 again.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Let somebody else go ahead.
(
1 20 I will think of it here in a moment.
21 (Laughter.]
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Carr.
23 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Yes.
Do you have any sch'edule l
l 24 for getting through with their request for their tech spec 25 review?
l
O 69 1
MR. TRAVERS:
As a matter of fact, the initial 2
notice of no significant hazards on the request to have the 3
diesel generator requirements taken out of the license has 4
been noticed this week cnd in parallel with that, we have 5
issued an exemption to the GDC requirements that speak to this 6
as well.
7 So within 30 days opportunity for the noticing of 8
that finding and assuming we don't have a request for hearing, 9
the issue will be settled in about 30 days.
10 MR. DENTON:
I have a comment, Commissioner Carr.
11 That is the first time I have ever heard of the issue.
So I 12 don't think it has ever been brought to management's 13 attention.
Secondly, I think we would have proceeded 14 cautiously with regard to lack of emergency power at this 15 station in any event.
16 But I was unaware that they had any difficulty in 17 this area and I think so was Frank Miraglia.
So I am a little 18 surprised that they jumped around all levels of management 19 because it is new to me.
20 COMMISSIONER CARR:
It got management attention 21 today.
22 MR. DENTON:
But I think on the merits, it will l
23 still have to be decided as to whether the Flant is to be kept 24 safe with or without the emergency power available from l
25 diesels.
l
70 1
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
Commissioner Bernthal.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
My staff informs me that I 3
was interested in the possible scenarios that you and our 4
staff might have devised with respect to the progression of 5
the core into the lower region of the vessel and the apparent l
6 shattering of that material, whether that indeed was thermal 7
shock.
Do you have any comments on that?
8 MR. DENTON:
I will let Bill comment.
I will 9
respond that all that work has been done by the Department of 10 Energy consultants.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I see.
12 MR. DENTON:
So in theory, it should be reflected in 13 the advice we are getting back through the research program.
14 MR. TRAVERS:
A lot more information has been 15 developing, of course, and perhaps the most recent information 16 that has been obtained is through this core bore program.
17 The briefing that I believed you received a little 18 bit longer than a year ago was based on some initial evidence, 19 very similar to what you heard today, but it has all come from 20 the Department of Energy's work in this area.
We are all 21 getting the same information from the same source.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I see.
23 MR. TRAVERS:
So it should parallel very closely 24 with what you have heard in the past.
If it doesn't, I would 25 be surprised.
71 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
One other quick question 2
again.
Is there any concern among our own people here in 3
either research or in NRR that we may be losing valuable data, 4
whether it is source term data or whatever it might be for 5
lack of funding or perhaps because of various people being 6
responsible for this and that, things just dropping through 7
the cracks perhaps?
8 MR. DENTON:
We debated early on whether the NRC 9
itself should fund that sort of research and it was decided 10 that DOE would fund all of the experimental research.
I would 11 just think that the almost $200 million dollars they have 12 spent should provide adequate coverage but it has been a 13 program directed by the Department of Energy and they have 14 spent an awful lot of money in this.
15 Bill, maybe you would like to comment on the specific 16 issue.
17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I think what they have spent 18 today is irrelevant.
The question is are we getting now and 19 will be getting as you see it now in the weeks and months l
20 ahead, the kind of funding we need to learn what we should be l
21 learning?
22 MR. TRAVERS:
As I see it, yes.
There is a great 23 deal of information that is slowly coming out, information 24 that parallels the questions you have had about fission 25 product transport, for example.
I think if you ask the
72 1
Department of Energy whether or not with the funding available 2
they think they can glean from the data that which is most 3
important, I think the answer would be yes and that is my view 4
as well.
5 I think there is a lot of information coming and I 6
don't see a real potential for significant loss of information.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
All right.
Well, I would 8
hope that you would monitor that carefully and keep contact as 9
well, for example, with the experts on the GPU advisory 10 panel.
I am well aware that that is not their job on behalf 11 of GPU but there are a number of wise people there and I think 12 we should make sure that we are aware of their thoughts.
That 13 is all I have.
Thank you.
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
Let me just 15 first of all thank the staff for your professional and thorough 16 coverage of this important and unique operation.
I think i
17 Harold, our headquarters staff and the support they have 18 given and especially Dr. Bill Travers' leadership and hard 19 work in this area is certainly showing a responsible NRC 20 action and I am sure that will continue.
21 I would like to say to the GPU people that I am 22 pleased to see the progress you are making and I believe the 23 responsible way you, too, are following this important 24 operation.
There are many important lessons to learn.
25 Of course, we recognize the unique challenges we are
73 i
1 all being faced with, all of us who have responsibilities for 2
the TMI-2 cleanup, scientific as well as engineering challenges 3
are enormous as we know.
We have only touched on them here 4
today.
5 I think Mr. Kinter and Mr. Clark and the many people l
6 working for them should be commended for the responsible and 7
cautious safety oriented way they are going about their 8
business.
9 The delays, I think, are something that we have 10 touched on here, too, that we should be mindful of.
On the 11 other hand, it seems to me that you should complimented for 12 the way that you have watched for the worker exposure and kept 13 radiation exposure in mind during your evolutions, and the use 14 of robots and the very difficult operaticn is certainly i
15 something that I think you have gone about in a responsible 16 manner.
17 There are other things to resolve, the water problem 18 and other plans for your post-defueling monitored storage 19 proposal which the staff continues to review.
So work is not 20 done by a long, long ways but it seems to me that it is being j
21 handled in a responsible manner.
22 I would like although we have talked a bit about the i
23 DOE part in the funding today and our part in research and it 24 seems to me that I would like to ask the Secretary to be l
25 mindful that I think there is general commission interest in J
-.-,..-.e...---,_--,n,--.,_.,___.,,-__.n__._,,.,--,,
e 74 o
1 being informed from DOE perhaps in a meeting, a public meeting, 2
where they could describe the status of funding and the status 3
of research and perhaps allow us an opportunity to indicate our 4
support for not only the funding but also for the opportunity 5
we have here in this very unique situation to learn.
6 I do agree that you can talk about whose 7
responsibility it is and all that, but to me it is the 8
responsibility of our government in my view to learn from this 9
as much as we can, whether it is DOE or NRC or the industry 10 and other nations as we know are involved, too.
So it seems 11 to me that perhaps a DOE briefing would be in order in order 12 for us to make sure we learn as much as we can from this 13 incident.
14 There are many, many research aspects that are 15 fascinating and I agree with Mr. Clark, however, that we 16 really should separate perhaps the issues and maintain public 17 health and safety as one issue and then the research aspects 18 of it and the lessons learned as a second issue but the second 19 issue also is important, I think, to our country.
20 It seems to me that we should do what we can to 21 emphasize this second issue as well as the first.
So if you, 22 Mr. Chilk, will take that on as an initiative the Commission 23 is interested in, I would appreciate it.
24 With that, are there any other comments from my 25 fellow Commissioners?
B C
75 1
(No response.]
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Thank you very much.
3 The meeting is adjourned.
4
[Whereupon, at 11:55 o' clock a.m., the meeting of 5
the Commission was adjourned, to reconvene at the Call of the 6
Chair.]
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
s" l-1 2
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 3
4 This is to certify that th,e attached events of a 5
meeting of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
6 7
TITLE OF MEETING: Briefing by GPUNC on Status of TMI-2 Cleanup (Public Meeting) 8 PLACE OF MEETING:
Washington, D.C.
9 DATE OF MEETING: Friday, February 13, 1987 10 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the file of the Commission taken f
13 stenographically by me, thereafter reduced to typewriting by 14 me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and 15 that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the 16 foregoing events.
17
/
18 Suzann B.
oung 19 20 21 22 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
23 24 25
2/12/87 SCHEDULING NOTES TITLE:
BRIEFING BY GPUNC ON STATUS OF TMI-2 CLEANUP SCHEDULED:
10:00 A.M.,
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1987 (OPEN)
DURATION:
APPROX l-1/2 HRS PARTICIPANTS:
GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION 55 MINS
- WILLIAM G. KUHNS, (5 MINS)
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD AND CHEIF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, GPU
- PHILIP R. CLARK, PRESIDENT (15 MINS)
AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, GPUNC
- EDWARD E. KINTER, (10 MINS)
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, GPUNC
- FRANK R. STANDERFER (15 MINS)
DIRECTOR, TMI-2
- ROBERT Q. MARSTON, CHAIR (5 MINS)
SAFETY ADVISORY BOARD FOR TMI-2
- JOHN F. O' LEARY (5 MINS)
CHAIRMAN, GPUNC NRC 5 MINS
- WILLIAM D. TRAVERS, DIRECTOR TMI-2 CLEANUP PROJECT DIRECTORATE
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RADIATION AND HEALTH EFFECTS A Report on the TMI-2 Accident and Related Health Studies Prepared by:
U. Hans Behling, Ph.D.
hianager, Radiological Health GPU Nuclear Corporation
- d. 7 Mx
-om James E. Hildebrand Certified Health Physicist (CHP)
Radiological Controls Director, Th11-2 GPU Nuclear Corporation Issued by:
GPU Nuclear Corporation hiiddletown, PA 17057
Table of Contents Page
~ Section 1 FO RE WO R D..........................
. iii Section 2 SUhth1ARY.....................
.........iv Section 3 CURRENT KNOWLEDGE OF RADIATION HEALTH EFFECTS....................... 1 Sources of Radiation......................... !
Historical Background..
.....................2 Health Effect Studies....................... 3 Acute Radiation Health Effects................ 5 Delayed Radiation Health Effects............ 9 Cancer Risk Estimates.
........ 15 Section 4 THE Thil-2 ACCIDENT........................ 18 Fundamentals of Reactor Design............ 18 Contributing Events of the Accident............ 19 Radioactivity Released to the Environment.
.... 20 Environmental hionitoring and Radiation Dose Assessment............................24 Assessment by Other Studies of Record......... 29 Section 5 Th11-2 HEALTH STUDIES................... 33 Pennsylvania Department of Health Studies....... 33 Reports of Acute Health Effects................ 36 Reports of Effects on Vegetation and Animals... 39 Cancer Survey Conducted by Local Residents..... 41 Conclusion........
.................43 Section 6 REFERENCES......................... 44 Section 7 GLOSSARY..
....... 47 i
1 Tables and Figures Page Table i Sources and Doses of Radiation................. 1 Table 2 Health Effects from Acute Radiation Exposure..... 47 Table 3 Radiation-Induced Cancer Among Atomic Bomb Survivors through 1978......
................. 13 Table 4 Sensitivity of Various Tissues to Radiation-Induced Cancer....................... 14 Table 5 Estimates of Lifetime Cancer Mortality by Anatomical Site.............................. 15 Table 6 Airbome Radioactivity Released to the Environment during the TMI-2 Accident....................... 21 Table 7 Potential Radiation Health Effects of the TMI.2 Accident to the two Million Population Living Within 50 Miles...................................... 32 Figure 1 Cancer Incidence at Different Ages in the U n it ed S ta tes.................................. 12 ii
FOREWORD Over the past seven years, considerable attention has been given to the I
accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2. Official investigations have been conducted, scientific and medical studies performed, and private surveys launched.
Much interest has been focused, in particular, on the question of whether the accidental release of radioactivity from the plant into the environ-ment has affected the health of the more than two million people who reside within 50 miles of Three Mile Island.
In this report, GPU Nuclear Corporation, the operator of the TMI nuclear power plant, draws together much of what is known to date about the accident and its effects on human health. The report consolidates the results of a number of scientific studies into a single document. It explains how the radioactivity escaped, how it dispersed to the environ-ment, the radiation doses received by people in the community and what health effects are to be expected from the radioactive releases.
We have been involved in the investigation of the accident at TMI-2 and j
have been closely associated with the cleanup as members of the TMI-2 Safety Advisory Board. We believe the report is accurate and reflects the information contained in the scientific studies of the accident.
This report should answer many questions and address concerns that some residents around TMI may have regarding their health and that of their families and friends. It should help them put their minds at ease and permit them to understand better the events of the accident and the real and potential health effects on the communities.
hv j
Jacob I. Fabrikant, M.D., Ph.D.
Professor of Radiology, Biophysics and Medical Physics, University of California, Berkeley and San Francisco Member, TMI-2 Safety Advisory Board John A. Auxier, Ph.D., Certified Health Physicist (CHP)
Director, International Technology Corporation, Radiological Sciences Laboratory Member, TMI-2 Safety Advisory Board i
f 4
Merril Eisenbud, Sc.D., Certified Health Physicist (CHP) 4 Professor Emeritus and former Director, Emironmental Studies Laboratory, New York University Medical i
Center i
Member, TMI-2 Safety Advisory Board t
iii
.. ~... _, - -, - _
SUMMARY
On March 28,1979, the Unit 2 reactor at the Three N1ile Island (TN11)
Nuclear Station was severely damaged by an accident. Radioactivity was discharged to the environment resulting in a small amount of radiation exposure to the public. Continuing concerns by some members of the communities around TMI about the potential radiation-induced health effects prompted GPU Nuclear Corporation to examine the informa-tion gathered from the accident investigation in the context of our cur-rent knowledge of radiation and its effects on human health. Although this report deals with technical matters, the information is presented in np a manner that can be understood by those who do not have scientific Q[W n
backgrounds.
This report is divided into three major sections. The first section pro-
- f vides an overview of the past 80 years of relevant research on the sub-k>1; ject of radiation and its effects on human health. During that time, scien-tists and physicians throughout the world have studied hundreds of thousands of individuals exposed to radiation from medical and occupa-tional sources and from nuclear weapons explosions. Epidemiologic studies of humans, such as the Japanese survivors of the atomic bomb, have established that following exposure to large doses of radiation, cer-tain health effects, including cancer, can be observed.
Radiation-induced health effects from low doses of radiation, such as those associated with the TMI-2 accident, appear infrequently, if at all, and are identical and, therefore, indistinguishable from similar health Radiation induced health effects which occur normally. For example, cancers mduced by radia-
,gg,c,,.from low doses of tion are indistinguishable from those occurring spontaneously or nor-radiation, such as those mElly. It is not possible, therefore, for scientists to determine directly associated with the TMI-2 whether radiation-induced health effects at low doses occur at all; such accident, appear infrequently, observations can only be inferred by statistical methods.
If at all, and are identical and The second section of this report provides a brief de,cription of the TM1-2
... Ind;stinguishable from accident. Most of the radioactivity from the damaged fuel was prevented similar health effects which from escaping from the reactor plant into the environment. Radioac-occur normally, tivity which was released into the environment consisted primarily of the noble gases xenon and krypton. Small amounts of radioactive iodine and trace quantities of several other radioactive elements also escaped into the environment. Radiation doses to humans and the environment were measured by radiation detectors and calculated from environmen-tal samples. Nearly 10,000 samples of air, water, milk, fish, fruits, meat, soil and river sediment were analyzed and demonstrated that radioac-tivity released to the environment was small and will have no detectable impact on human health.
The accident was investigated and all available scientific data have been analyzed by a number of independent committees of experts, including the President's Commission (appointed by President Jimmy Carter), the Governor's Commission (appointed by Governor Dick Thornburgh) and consnittees representing several federal agencies (i.e., Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of IIcalth Education and Welfare, Environmental Protection Agency, and Department of Energy), state governments, foreign countries and industry. There was general agree-ment among all these investigative committees that the radiation doses to the general public were small. Among the important findings, all of which have been published, are:
iv
The highest possible whole-body dose to any one individual was j~
less than 100 millirems (0.1 rem).
The average whole-body dose to individuals within 10 miles of TMI was less than 8 millirems (0.008 rem).
The average whole-body dose to individuals within 50 miles of Th!!
was less than 1.5 millirems (0.0015 rem).
On the basis of these radiation doses, it can be concluded that the potential health effects, if any, would be so small as to be undetectable.
I These radiation doses can be viewed in perspective when it is recognized that, in any given year, each person in the United States receives approximately 100 millirems (0.1 rem) of natural background radiation exposure. hiedical and dental radiation for the average American con-tributes approximately an additional 90 millirems (0.09 rem) per year.
The one-time radiation doses resulting from the radioactivity released during the Th11-2 accident, therefore, represent only a small fraction of the yearly radiation dose that all of us receive throughout our lives from natural background radiation.
The radiation doses to the general public were primarily due to the release of the radioactive but biologically inert noble gases, krypton and xenon.
Other radionuclides, such as iodine, were released in barely detectable quantities. Because the radioactive gases readily dispersed into the atmosphere, exposure of people was transient and confined to individuals in the path of the plume.
The third section of this report reviews health studies which have been con !.icted on Thil-area residents between 1979 and 1985. Within months 1
after the accident, the Pennsylvania Department of Health initiated studies which assessed possible radiation health effects among Thil area residents. Seseral of these studies evaluated potential health effects on pregnant women and their unborn children. Among the most extensive health studies was an analysis of cancer occurrence among all individuals living within 20 miles of Th11. Results of these health studies have been Fcr doses of radiation equal published and are available to the public.
to those resulting from the To date, none of these studies has shown health effects to exist in excess TMI 2 accident, human of the normally expected incidence. This absence of measurable health health effects have never effects is consistent with past scientific observations. For doses of radia.
heen detected in any popula-tion equal to those resulting from the Thil-2 accident, human health i
tion thus far studied.
effects have never been detected in any population thus far studied.
We hope that this report will help to answer any lingering questions and address concerns that our neighbors might have regarding the Th!!-2 l
accident and the potential health effects that might occur. We realize, however, that we cannot possibly address every individual concern, so l
if you have further questions, please feel free to write us at:
Thll Public Affairs Department, P.O. Box 480, hiiddletown, PA 17057.
James E. Hildebrand Radiological Controls Director, Thil-2 i
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CURRENT KNOWLEDGE OF RADIATION HEALTH EFFECTS SOURCES OF RADIATION hiankind has lived with radiation and always will; there is no choice.
Radioactivity has been a part of our planet since its creation. Even some of the atoms that constitute our bodies are radioactive; in fact, more than 7,000 atoms give off radiation in our bodies every second. Within that same second, about 300 cosmic rays from outer space pass through the body. Natural radioactivity in the soil, water, air and building materials also emits radiation. Table I summarizes the common sources of radiation end their average annual doses.
Table 1 Sources and Doses of Radiation,21 s
Natural Man-Made Radiation Dose Radiation Dose Source (millirems / year)
Source (millirems / year)
Cosmic rays 42 Medical / Dental exposure 90 Building materials 35 Weapons fallout 5-8 Internal 28 Releases from nat. gas, Ground 11 phosphate mining, 5
burning of coal, etc.
Consumer products Less than 1 Nuclear power plants Less than 1 APPROXIMATE APPROXIMATE TOTAL 100 TOTAL 100 The average person in the United States receives about 100 millirems (0.1 rem) per year from natural background radiation sources. In some regions of the country, the amount of natural radiation is significantly higher. Residents of Colorado, for example, receive an additional 80 millirems (0.08 rem) per year due to the increase in cosmic and terrestrial radiation levels. In fact, for every 100 feet above sea level, a person will receive an additional 1 millirem (0.001 rem) per year from cosmic radia-tion. In several regions of the world, high concentrations of uranium and radium deposits result in doses of several thousand millirems (several rems) each year to their residents.
Recently, public attention has focused on radon, a natural radioactive gas produced as uranium and radium decay. These elements are widely distributed in trace amounts in the earth's crust. Unusually high con-centrations have been found in certain parts of eastern Pennsylvania and northern New Jersey. Radon levels in some homes in these areas are hun-dreds of times greater than levels found elsewhere in the United States.
The National Council on Radiation Protection and bleasurements (NCRP) estimates that the average individual in the United States receives I
)
4 an annual dose of about 3,000 millirems (3 rems)" from natural radon.
Because radon and its radioactive daughters emit alpha radiation, this dose is limited to the surface cells of the respiratory tract. Drinking water contains trace amounts of uranium and radium. Afilk contains radioac-tive potassium.
In addition to such natural radiation, we are exposed to radiation from a number of man-made sources. The single largest of these sources comes from diagnostic medical x-rays, fluoroscopic examinations and radio-active pharmaceuticals. Some 160 million Americans receive medical or dental x-rays each year. The annual dose to an individual from such ir-radiation averages about 90 millirems (0.09 rem), about the same as that from natural radiation. Nfuch smaller doses come from consumer pro-ducts such as televisions, smoke detectors and fertilizers, nuclear weapons i
fallout and production of nuclear power and its associated fuel cycle.
Radiation such as x-rays, gamma rays and energetic subatomic particles (electrons, protons, neutrons, and alpha particles) can change the struc-ture of molecules in body tissue by adding or removing electrons. The amount and distribution of altered molecules depends on the type of radiation. Unlike penetrating x-rays and gamma rays, charged particles, i
such as alpha particles and electrons, can only penetrate a short distance j
in tissue.
When we breathe or swallow radionuclides, their distribution within the body is not uniform. For example, radioactive iodine selectively con-centrates in the thyroid gisnd, radiocctive cesium is distributed throughout the body water and muscles, and radioactive strontium con-centrates in bone. The total dose to organs by a given radionuclide is also influenced by the quantity and the duration of time that the radionuclide remains in the body, including its physical, biological and chemical characteristics. Depending on their rate of radioactive decay and biological climination from the bcdy, some radionuclides stay in 1
the body for very short times while others remain for years.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND hiedical scientists have been studying ionizing radiation and its effects on human health for more than eight decades. The General Accounting
"... It is fair to say that we Office reported in 1981 that there were more than 80,000 separate scien.
I hav7 more scientific eudence tific studies of the health effects of radiation. The estimated cost of this
- on the hasards of lonliing research is about $2 billion. In fact, the National Academy of Sciences radi tion than most, if not has stated that, "... it is fair to say that we have more scientific evidence s
all, other environmental on the hazards of ionizing radiation than most, if not all, other agents that affect the general environmental agents that affect the general public.""
Public."
The first case of human injury reported due to radiation occurred shortly after Wilhelm Roentgen's discovery of x rays in 1895. The early radiologists often used their hands to focus the primitive fluoroscopic equipment which exposed them to millions of millirems (thousands of i
2 i
~ - - _
rems) of radiation. As early as 1902, the first case of radiation-induced skin cancer was reported. In subsequent years, it was shown that physicians, x-ray technicians and radium handlers had cancer rates which were higher than normal.
The earliest efforts to set radiation standards were made by the Roentgen Society formed in 1916. By 1921, a newly formed British X-ray and Radiation Protection Committee was established to define the maximum tolerance dose. Additional guidelines on radiological protection were pro-vided by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), formed in 1928. Shortly thereafter, in 1929, the Advisory Cem-mittee on X-ray and Radium Protection was founded in the United Stetes; this is now the National Council on Radiation Protection and hieasurements (NCRP). ICRP and NCRP have the longest continuous experience in the review of radiation health effects and recommenda-tions on guidelines for radiological protection and radiation exposure limits.
But their efforts have not been the only ones. In 1955, the United Na-tions created a Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia-tion (UNSCEAR) to make yearly progress reports and to summarize reports received on radiation levels and effects on man and his enviro-ment. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) formed a committee in 1956 to review the biological effects of atomic radiation (BEAR). A series of reports have been issued by this and succeeding NAS commit-tees on the biological effects of ionizing ralliation (BEIR), the most re-cent being 1980 (known as BEIR 111). The NAS continues to review the health effects of ionizing radiation; the work of the fourth committee was begun in 1985.
These committees and commissions of nationally and internationally-recognized scientific experts have been dedicated to the understanding of the health effects of radiation by investigating all sources of relevant knowledge and scientifie data and by providing guidance for radiological protection. Their members are selected from universities, scientific research centers and other national and international research organiza-tions. The reports contain scientific data obtained from physical, biological, and epidemiological studies on radiation health effects, and serve as scientific references for information presented in this report.
IIEALTII EFFECT STUDIES hiuch of our current knowledge of the health effects of radiation comes from extensive laboratory animal experiments. Under laboratory con-ditions many crucial variables can be accurately controlled. These in-clude, for example, the total dose, time interval and quality of radiation and the individual characteristics such as age, sex and health status.
While laboratory animal experiments serve as valuable models for human studies, there are limitations in drawing conclusions from biological effects observed in irradiated animals to potential heahh effects in 3
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humans. Thus, the most relevant studies are the epidemiological surveys that have focused on human populations who received radiation under a variety of conditions of intentional or inadvertent exposure. Most of these epidemiological studies involved popi lation groups ranging from several hundred to more than 100,000 indi/iduals. The most important surveys have involved the following groups:
Survivors of the Atomic Bomb and Nuclear Weapons Tests - The most intensely studied human populations are the.lapanese survivors of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These people were exposed to radiation from the bombs and, subsequently, radioactive fallout. Studies have also been made of natives of the Marshall Islands who were accidentally exposed to fallout from nuclear weapons testing in 1954.
Medical Radiation - Large doses of radiation were given to treat various health problems, such as ankylosing spondylitis, thymus enlargement, ringworm of the scalp, and breast cancer. Children whose mothers were irradiated during pregnancy have also been studied.
Radium Dial Painters - Workers early in this century ingested radium-containing paint from luminous watches, clocks and air-craft instruments through a practice of " tipping" paint brushes with their lips.
Uranium Miners - Early in this century, certain large mines in Europe were worked for pitchblende, a uranium ore. Lung cancer was highly prevalent among the miners as a result of the inhala-tion of large quantities of airborne radioactive dust particles.
Studies have shown that the risk of lung cancer among these miners was at least 50 percent higher than that of the general population.
Radiologists - Pioneer medical scientists and physicians using x.
rays, unaware of the potential hazards, accumulated large radia.
tion doses principally to their hands.
These and other populations, many of whom continue to be studied to add to our current understanding, provide reliable data on health ef-fects resulting from large doses of radiation. Among radiation scientists, there is nearly complete agreement on the health effects and risks follow.
ing such large radiation doses. What remains uncertain and controver.
l sial is the assessment of potential health effects which may result from small doses of radiation.
Central to this controversy is our inabili y to detect an increased incidence t
of cancer or other diseases resulting from exposure to small radiation doses, such as those from natural sources. Ilealth effects from such low doses occur so infrequently, if at all, that they cannot be observed directly or detected statistically above what would be expected to occur spon.
taneously or normally in an otherwise unirradiated population.
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Therefore, while scientists can predict the potential health effects of low-dose radiation with some uncertainties, it is well-recognized that the fre-quency of these effects is too small to measure directly. There is evidence that these very low dose levels may not be harmful.
The risk estimates that are calculated are determined by Since we cannot detect health effects from low-dose radiation, statistical analyses of health nevertheless, for prudent radiation protection guidance we assume that effects observed at high-dose hedth effects occur at a level proportionate to those that occur follow-levels; these effects have not ing high doses of radiation. It is generally agreed among radiation scien-been observed following ex-tists that such estimates tend to overestimate the potential risk of radia-pos,,,,,3,,y go,g,,,g,,
tion. The risk estimates that are calculated are determmed by statistical analyses of health effects observed only at high-dose levels; these effects have not been observed following exposure to very low levels.
ACUTE RADIATION HEALTH EFFECTS Radiation affects the individual cells that are the building blocks cf the tissues and organs of the body. Although all cells can be affected by radiation, some are more sensitive to radiation injury than others in general, the degree of sensitivity depends on the rate of cell division.
Cells of the bone marrow, stomach lining and male reproductive tissues, for example, divide rapidly while brain cells do not. Rapidly dividing cells, in general, are more easily damaged than slower or nondividing ce!!s. Cellular injury may involve a change in the nucleus that prevents the cell from dividing properly or not at all. For certain types of cells, whose primary function is to provide new cells by cell division, an in-ability to divide may result in short-term or acute health effects. These acute or early effects may appear within days or weeks after exposure to radiation. Such short-term health effects may result from external and internal radiation exposure of the whole body or selective tissues.
Acute health effects require radiation doses some thousands of times greater than those received from natural sources. Generally, u dose of at least 100,000 millirems (100 rems) to the whole body within a short time is required to cause even the mildest symptoms. An acute whole-body dose of more than 400,000 millirems (400 rems), in the absence of medical treatment, may be fatalin about half the individuals exposed.
110 wever, even such a large dose given in small a.nounts over a prolonged period of time allows the body's natural mechanisms to replace or repair damaged cells as it would following any injury.
Among the most sensitive cells are bone marrow celli, which produce red and white blood ce!!s. These cells carry oxygen or protect against infections from viruses and bacteria. At radiation doses above 100,000 millirems (100 rems), increasing numbers of bone marrow cells fail to divide, which reduces the number of blood cells. This can lead to anemia, impaired blood clotting, hemorrhage and infection. Collectively, these signs and symptoms are called the bone marrow syndrome (see Table 2).
5
Health Effects fro 1 sone marrow syndrome Chief Determining Bone Marrow Organ Time for Onset 2-3 weeks Dose Range 100,000 500,000 millirems (100 500 rems)
Death incidence 100,000 200,000 millirems None 0 - 70% for doses of 200,000 to 500,000 millirems Time for Death 3 weeks to 2 months to Occur Signs & Symptoms Malaise, nausea, vomiting, fever, shortness of breath, reduction of blood cells Major Underlying Reduction of bone marrow cells and Tissue Effects marrow function, infection, hemorrhage, anemia
- Based on information taken from reference 36.
t 6
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Table 2 icuto Radiation Exposure
- Gastrointestinal Syndrome Skin Effects Small intestine Skin 3-5 days hours - days 500,000 1,000,000 millirems Greater than 300,000 (500 - 1,000 rems) millirems (300 rems) 70% to 100% for doses of None 500,000 to 1,000,000 millirems 3 days to 2 weeks Milaise, loss of appetite, nausea, Skin reddening, vomiting, diarrhea, fever, hair loss, dehydration, circulatory collapse,
- blisters, loss of body salts ulcerations, sloughing Depletion of intestinal cell lining, Cell depletion, mirrow damage, infection ulceration, skin sloughing 7
Radiation doses to the whole body in the range of 100,000 to 200,000 millirems (100 to 200 rems) may result in a limited amount of acute radia-tion illness, but will rarely be fatal. Doses of this magnitude were common i
among the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors as well as some residents of the Marshall Islands. The illness from radiation doses in this range does not present a serious medical problem in that most persons will suffer minor discomfont, some nausea and fatigue, while others may have no symptoms at all. Symptoms of mild nausea and loss of appetite may appear briefly but are transient and fully reversible in most cases.
Whole-body doses in the range of 200,000 to 500,000 millirems (200 to 500 rems) give rise to the bone marrow syndrome within 2-3 weeks follow-ing exposure. Early symptoms may include nausea and vomiting. Addi-tional symptoms may include chills, fever, malaise, headache, fatigue and loss of appetite.
Radiation doses in excess of 500,000 millirems (500 rems) produce gastro-intestinal symptoms. Cells that line the stomach and intestines absorb nutrients from food, water and minerals. In addition, these cells pro-vide a natural barrier against bacteria that normally reside in the intestine.
Nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea may appear within minutes to hours after exposure. These symptoms may subside after a day or two, only to reappear more severely a few days later. At that time, diarrhea, dehydra-tion, ulceration and infection may lead to fluid and chemical imbalance in the body and thus circulatory collapse and death. For whole-body doses greater than 1,000,000 millirems (1,000 rems), death occurs within about 10 days following exposure.
The cells responsible for producing sperm in men and ova in women are among the more radiation sensitive cells of the human body.
Transient infertility has beer. observed at doses of less than 200,000 millirems (200 rems) and permanent sterility at doses in excess of 400,000 millirems (400 rems).
Radiation injury to the skin may cause physical changes which can readily be observed. Doses of 300,000 millirems (300 rems) usually cause red-dening of the skin, which may occur within hours and last for a day or two. This reaction is largely caused by small blood vessels that dilate following the release of histamine-like substances. This form of skin red-dening is similar to the reaction to sunlight or allergens. Larger doses are required to cause skin ulcerations, permanent loss of hair, reduction in skin thickness and changes in skin color which may occur after several weeks. When skin doses are the result of whole-body exposure to penetrating radiation, injury to the skin is accompanied by the other clinical symptoms. If the radiation consists of beta particles or low-energy x-rays which have a very limited ability to penetrate beyond the outer
.,, acute health effects occur layers of the skm, even doses greater than 1,000,000 millirems (1,000 only at estremely high doses, rems) are not considered to be life threatening.
... thomands of times higher than those from the These acute health effects occur only at extremely high doses, that is, TMI.2 accident.
doses thousands of times higher than those from the TMI 2 accident.
Thus, it follows that the radioactivity released during the TMI 2 acci-dent could not have been high enough to cause any of the acute health effects discussed later in this report.
8
DELAYEL) RADIATION IIEALTII EFFECTS Certain health effects may not appear for years or esen decades after exposure to radiation. Such effects result from specific changes that occur in some cells or a single cell. Although these selective cellular changes
... genetic effects... and occur rarely, when they do there is a possibility that the altered cell may cancer can be caused by d;velop into cancer.,1f the altered cell is a reproductive cell, there is a many chemical, ph3 sical and possibility of transmitting genetic defects to the progeny of irradiated biological agents, many of parents. Also, a developing embryo or fetus could possibly suffer injury which exist naturally in the if c pregnant woman is exposed to radiatmn.
environment.
For small doses of radiation, the likelihood that even a single cell will undergo such a selective alteration leading to cancer is extremely low.
Furthermore, genetic effects, disturbances in growth and development of an embryo, and cancer can be caused by many chemical, physical and biological agents, many of which exist naturally in the environment.
Thus, for even large doses of radiation, health effects can only be
- Q observed as small increases above the spontaneous incidence.
A Genetic Effects Genetic changes in the sperm or egg cells can result in ill-hcalth appear-ing in future generations. The fertilized egg contains all of the genetic information necessary to produce the organs and tissues of a new individual. This information is carried in the cell's nucleus in small chromosomes, of which equal numbers are contributed by both parents.
The chromosomes transmit the genetic information from one genera-tion to the next.
The genetic material contained in the cell nucleus can be altered by a 1:rge variety of toxic agents, including heat, chemicals, and both natural and man-made radiation. Genetic mutations occur randomly in all plant, animal and human populations and are considered to be the primary mechanism for evolutionary changes in all species. Geneticists generally agree that most such mutations are harmful. Epidemiological studies have shown that about 1I percent of all people are affected by a genetic disease at some time in their lives.
Laboratory studies of mice exposed to large doses of radiation for many generations have shown genetic effects. Studies of humans, however, h;.ve not yet produced reliable evidence for inheritable effects, such as developmental malformations, still births or neonatal deaths. It is difficult to measure most mutations because they are difficult to observe and are Of the 35,000 children born randomly distributed within a population group. Of the 35,000 children to parents irradiated at born to parents irradiated at Iliroshima and Nagasaki, - the average Iliroshima and Nagasaki...
parental dose being 25,000 to 35,000 millirems (25 to 35 rems) - there there has been no obsers able his been no observable increase in genetic defects. Using all the infor-Increase in genetic defects.
mation available, scientists hase estimated that 100,000 to 200,000 millirems (100 to 200 rems) to each person in a large population would be required'to prod;'ee genetic mutations egaat in number to those occurring naturally in a non irradiated population.
9
Radiation Effects on the Human Fetus Studies on the embryo-fetus exposed in-utero have demonstrated that the human fetus is sensitive to low-dose radiation. Radiation injury to the human fetus may be expressed as congenital defects, mental retar-dation and leukemia. As regards the induction of mental retardation, the fetus is most likely to be affected during the 8th to the 15th week of pregnancy, an initial period when specific cells, including those of the brain, are undergoing crucial development. Althot"th animal experiments have shown developmental health effects with the embryo-fetus for radiation doses as low as 5,000 to 10,000 millirems (5 to 10 rems), it is not possible to demonstrate with certainty that injury to a human fetus can be induced by such low doses. The evidence is bas-ed on the epidemiological studies of children born to women of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who were exposed to radiation in-utcro. The atomic bomb studies have not associated doses below 25,000 millirems (25 rems) with developmental abnormalities of the newborn, such as central nervous system defects, skeletal abnc.rmalities or reduced stature.
Pregnant women have been exposed to medical radiation for diagnostic medical purposes. There is no evidence that associates such low-dose exposure to growth and developmental abnormalities in human fetuses or young children. According to the medical evidence available today, the increased risk from doses less than 10,000 millirems (10 rems) for any individual is very small compared with the normal risk of developmental abnormalities in the newborn.
Childhood cancer studies among the Japanese exposed to radiation in-utero showed no significant excess of mortality from juvenile
!cukemia or other cancers." Other studies predict that the risk of leukemia and other childhood cancers in children increases if the mother is exposed to diagnostic radiation to the abdomen during pregnancy.
These data suggest that the incidence of leukemia among children from birth to 10 years of are in the United States could rise from 3.7 cases to 5.6 cases in 10,000 children if each child were exposed to 1,000 millirems (I rem) of radiation before birth." liowever, these surveys remain controversial. There has been some criticism that the original survey may be flawed by certain selection factors, particularly since many of the radiological procedures were requested by physicians for medical reasons, and the data depended almost exclusively on recall of past events by affected mothers.
The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) recommends that special precautions be taken to limit exposure of pregnant women who may be exposed to radiation as part of their job. The NCRP recommends that the expectant mother should not be exposed to more than 500 millirems (0.5 rem) during the entire gesta-tion period."
10
Radiation and Cancer Next to heart disease, cancer is the leading cause of death in the United St:tes. The American Cancer Society estimates that in 1986, about 930,000 people will be diagnosed as having cancer. In 1985, an estimated
... the prevalence of cancer 462,000 Americans died of cancer. It is estimated that one person m three depends on many risk fac-(: bout 30 percent) will develop cancer some time during their lives, of tors, including race, sex, which slightly more than half will eventually die of the disease."
diet, lifest3 e, health, oc-1 Cancer is considered to be a group of diseases and more than 250 cupation and personal different forms have been identified so far in humans. Taken together, habits.
they affect nearly every human cell type. Studies indicate that the prevalence of cancer depends on many risk factors, including race, sex, diet, lifestyle, health, occupation and personal habits. However, among the most important risk factors is the age of the individual, particularly after the age of 40. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship of age and cancer incidence in the general population. The risk increases significantly at about age 20 and increases approximately 100 fold by age 80.
Contrary to common belief, cancer is not a new disease brought on by industrialization. In fact, researchers believe that the vast majority of cancer-causing agents are of natural origin. Natural cancer-causing agents can be found in most foods which make up the human diet.' A variety of mold, for example, which frequently contaminates food such as corn, grain, nuts, bread, cheese and fruits has been identified as a major cause of liver cancer. Niicrorganisms, such as viruses, are also known to cause
- "C#
... researchers believe that in addition to an abundance of natural cancer causing agents, there are the sast majority of cancer-numerous man-made agents, including radiation, which can produce causing agents are of natural cancer. Tobacco smoking is without a doubt a major and well-understood origin.
risk, causing about 30 percent of all cancer deaths, including lung, larynx, and possibly bladder and breast cancer, as well as 25 percent of the fatal heart attacks in the United States.
The evidence for radiation-induced human cancer comes largely from population studies of three groups of people: (1) persons exposed to atomic bomb radiation;(2) persons exposed to medical radiation; and (3) persons exposed to radiation as part of their occupation. Collective-ly, these groups represent hundreds of thousands of individuals.
Interpreting epidemiological data requires an understanding of the disease process as it affects large populations, together with the statistical techniques used in the interpretation of data. Radiation-induced cancers may not appear for years or decades after exposure.
This time delay between exposure to a cancer-causing agent aud the clinical observation of a cancer is called the latency period. Human leukemias, for example, may not appear for two to five years after ex-posure; solid tumor cancers, such as those of the lung or breast may not be evident for 10 years or more. Long latency periods, therefore, make the investigation of cancer-causing agents difficult. Niany years of observetion are required for reliable conclusions.
11
Figure 1 Cancer incidence at Different Ages in the United States *7 3500 i
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8 3000 8.
k 2500 MALES -
8 g
2000 8
1500 15
.e'
,#', FEMALES-j 1000 E
E 500 J
8 2'
E
. 4' 4
0 3--1 1
_20 30 40 50 60 70 80 85 1
ii e' e"-
I I
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O 10 AGE IN YEARS A second difficulty in the analysis of human data arises from the fact that cancers induced by radiation are indistinguishable from those aris-ing spontaneously or those caused by other carcinogens. Physicians and pathologists cannot determine, based on tissue type, whether certain lung cancers, for example, are caused by radiation or by cigarette smoking.
air pollutants, chemicals or other cancer-causing agents. The ability to detect the common cancers caused by any specific agent is, therefore, limited to statistical analyses. These statistical methods rely on the fact that the incidence of various cancers in a given population can be predicted with reasonable accuracy. For a sufficiently large group of people who have received radiation exposure, an incidence of cac.:ers above the expected level would suggest that radiation was a possible cause for the excess number of cancers, but it would not identify radiation as the cause of a cancer.ar any specific individual.
Epidemiological studies of people who were exposed to relatively high doses of radiation (greater than 50,000 millirems or 50 rems) have shown a causal relationship between radiation and an increased cancer incidence.
Studies of 82,000 Japanese rurvivors of the atomic bomb have psovided valuable information on latency periods, the types of cancers associated with radiation end the doses of radiation required to induce an excess incidence of cancer. Based on reported location at the time of the blast and other factors, dose estimates have been calculated for 97 percent of these survivors.
12
Although radiation doses varied from thousands to hundreds of thousands of millirems (rems to hundreds of rems), the average whole-body dose has been estimated to be between 25,000 and 30,000 millirems (25 to 30 rems). Table 3 summarizes cancer mortality among atomic bomb survivors.
Table 3 Radiation-Induced Cancer Among Atomic Bomb Survivors Throg
'n78u 82,000 Survivors (a group selected in 1950) a 23,500 Total Number Deceased 4,800 Cancer Deaths From All Causes e
250 Cancer Deaths Attributed to Radiation i
Different cells and tissues of the body are affected by radiation in dif-ferent ways. Thus, some cancers are more frequently linked to radia-tion than others. On a relative basis, breast cancer, thyroid cancer and leukemia occur at a higher rate among people exposed to whole body radiation than they do among the general population. A moderately increased incidence occurs for lung, pharynx, pancreas, digestive tract and lymph node cancers.
Other cancers have a low induction rate or correspond to tissues not g
known to be affected by radiation. Although these cancers occur fre-quently in the normal population, to date they have not been observed in excess to their normal incidence among individuals exposed to radia.
tion. This implies that the sensitivity to radiation induction of these c ncers is either extremely low or is absent (see Table 4).
Leukemia was the first type of cancer to appear in excess in the Japanese survivors of the atomic bombs. The first cases began to appear in the late 1940's and peaked about five to nine years after exposure. Initial increases in breast, thyroid, and lung cancers were seen in the mid to I:te 1950's A statistical excess increase for other canceis required even longer periods: stomach (about 15 years), urinary tract (about 20 years) and colon (more than 20 years). Some cancers, such as those of the urinary tract, were not seen at increased rates except in survivors who received radiation doses of more than 100,000 millirems (100 rems).
Some cancers, including chronic lymphocytic leukemia, cancer of the cervix, and flodgkin's disease, have not been observed for even high doses of radiation.
13
Table 4 Sensitivity of Various Tissues to Radiation-Induced Cancer 18 Spontaneous Relative Sensitivity incidence to Radiation induction Site or Type of Cancer of Cancer
- of Cancer Major radiation-induced cancers Female breast Very high High Thyroid Low Very high, especially in females Lung (bronchus)
Very high Moderate Leukemia Moderate Very high Alimentary tract High Moderate to low Minor radiation-induced cancers Pharynx Low Moderate Liver and biliary tract Low Moderate Pancreas Moderate Moderate Lymphomas Moderate Moderate Kidney and bladder Moderate Low Brain and nervous system Low Low Salivary glands Very low Low Bone Very low Low Skin High Low Site or tissues in which magnitude of radiation-induced cancer is uncertain Larynx Moderate Low Nasal sinuses Very low Low Parathyroid Very low Low Ovary Moderate Low Connective tissues Very low Low Sites or tissues in which radiation-induced cancer has not been obsetved l
Prostate Very high Absenti Uterus and cervix Very high Absentt Testis Low Absentt Mesentery and mesothehum Very low Absenti Chronic lymphatic leukemia Low Absentt
' Spontaneous lihideswe orcaster refers to the relatisc ficqueswy of nat ally uuuriing uaers. Thus, camer of the uten us, cersit and prostate occur frequently in a normal population, whereas cancers of bone or connective tissues occur rarely.
t The sensitisity to radiation induction of these caneers is either extremely low or is absent.
14 l
CANCER RISK ESTIMATES Based on the epidemiological studies of large populations exposed to radiation, scientists can estimate how many people are likely to develop specific types of cancers. The probability of getting cancer from any cause is expressed in terms of risk coefficients (the number of cases expected per million people per unit of dose). Table 5 shows the radiation risk values for several types of cancer as estimated by the ICRP, the UNSCEAR and the BEIR 111 Report of the National Academy of Sciences. For example, the ICRP estimates that for one million people, each exposed to 1,000 millirems (I rem) of radiation, there could be 20 radiation-induced leukemia fatalities. Risk values established independently by the three committees are in close agreement. It should be recognized that these estimates, based primarily on a linear response from high doses downward to low doses, are considered to be overestimates of risk to exposure to low-LET radiations, such as x-rays and gamma rays, and that the epidemiological data and analyses do not exclude zero cases as a lower bound.
Table 5 Estimates of Lifetime Cancer Mortality by Anatomical Site Per Million People Exposed to 1,000 Millirems (1 Ficm) Each*
Type of Cancer ICRP UNSCEAR BEIR lli Leukemia 20 15-25 22 Lung 20 25 28 Breast 13 30 11 Bone 5
2-5 0.5 Gl tract 25 19 Thyroid 5
5-15 7
Other 50 25 31 APPROXIMATE TOTAL 110 120 120 To understand what these figures mean, recall that the American Cancer
... about 30 percent of all Society estimates that about 30 percent of all Americans will develop Americans will develop caneer at some time in their lives from all possible causes (e.g., smoking, cancer at some time in their food, alcohol, air pollutants, etc.). Thus, in any normal population of lises from all possible causes 10,000 people, about 3,000 can be expected to develop cancer. If that (e.g. smoking, food, alcohol, same group were to receive 1,000 millirems (I rem) of radiation, three air pollutants, etc.).
more might develop cancer, of which one or two may be fatal.
- Taken from references 60,16 and 39.
15
These three cancers could occur in addition to the 3,000 expected normally for a total of 3,003 cases. This means that a dose of 1,000 millirems (I rem) to each of 10,000 individuals increases the cancer rate by only three one-hundredths of one percent (an increase from 30 per-cent to 30.03 percent). Thus, a lifetime dose of 10,000 millirems (10 rems) may increase the chance of cancer from 30 percent to 30.3 per-cent and a lifetime dose of 100,000 millirems (100 rems) may increase that chance by 3 percent (30 to 33 percent).
Risks from Low Radiation Doses hiost estimates of the number of cancers caused by radiation have relied on epidemiological studies where doses were generally more than 50,000 millirems ($0 rems). In such studies, the long-term effects were observ.
ed as a higher incidence of cancer for a particular group of individuals than one would normally expect. When individual radiation doses are less than 10,000 millirems (10 rems), the dose is too small to detect any statistical excess cancers in the presence of naturally occurring cancers.
Estimates of health effects for low-level radiation are made by assum-j ing that the frequency of risks observed at high doses can be propor-tionately related to corresponding low radiation doses. The estimates also assume that there is no threshold dose below which radiation will cause no cancers. This linear, no-threshold hypothesis assumes that for any 1
dose, no matter how small, there is some correspondingly small risk even if it cannot be measured. hiost scientists believe that the linear no-threshold relationship overestimates the health risk for small doses of low-LET (x-rays and gamma rays) radiation.
The linear, no-threshold hypothesis can be illustrated by the following example. For a group of 10,000 people, we expect about 1,800 to die of cancer from all causes. If each person were exposed to 100,000 millirems (100 rems) of radiation, then we can expect an additional 100 cancer deaths for a total of 1,900. This would be a sufficiently large in.
crease to be readily detectable in an epidemiological study. But it would not be possible to distinguish which 100 of the 1,900 cancer cases were caused by radiation.
Further, consider another group of 10,000 and reduce the exposure to 1,000 millirems (I rem) each. This may result in only one additional fatal cancer, if any, for a total of 1,801. It is apparent that this one possible
... estimating the health risk additional cancer death could have occurred normally or been caused for low doses of radiation by some factor other than radiation. In this case, the additional one death c=not be donc directly, but is too small a number to be statistically significant. Thus, estimating the c n only be estimated...
health risk for low doses of radiation cannot be done directly, but can from cancer data obsened at only be estimated statistically by extrapolating from cancer data observed i high dows,.,
at high doses into the low-dose region w here cancer data are not available.
This uncertainty applies to small doses of other cancer-causing agents as well We know, for example, that cigarettes and ultraviolet radiation cause cancer. Thus, for people who are lifetime smokers or who spend much of their time outdoors in the sun, the excess risks of lung or skin i
16 m. - _ __
cancer are readily measured. A more difficult task would be to deter-mine the risk of these cancers for people who smoke only a few cigarettes or who spend only a limited time in direct sunlight.
An illustration of the uncertainties for low-dose risks may be provided by the following relationship of lung cancer to cigarette smoking.
Scientific studies have established that an additional 100 people will die of cancer out of 10,000 who smoke four cigarettes per day for many ye'rs." Using the linear no-threshold dose-response model commonly cpplied to establish radiation risk, one additional death would be ex-pected if each of these 10,000 only smoked one cigarette per month. This implies that 1,000 millirems (I rem) of radiation has about the same c1ncer risk as smoking one cigarette per month since, as indicated above, one additional cancer death could result from 10,000 people being exposed to 1,000 millirems (I rem) each.
17
THE TMI-2 ACCIDENT FUNDAMENTALS OF REACTOR DESIGN To understand what happened at the Three h!ile Island Unit 2 nuclear power plant on the morning of Afarch 28,1979, it is necessary to know something about the design of the nuclear reactor. Th11-2 is a pressurized water reactor. The reactor has three independent cooling loops. Heat generated by the fission process within the reactor fuel core is transfer-red to circulating water of the primary loop. Water in the primary loop is kept from boiling by keeping it under high pressure (about 2,200 Imunds per square inch).
Heat from the primary loop is transter red to the secondary loop by means of two steam generators. Water in the secondary loop boils to produce steam which expands, turns the turbine, spins the generator, and pro-duces electricity. The steam, after passing through the turbine, is con-densed back to water by a third separate loop which circulates water between the condenser and the cooling towers.
The Thll-2 reactor has Sve independent barriers that confine radioac-tive materials given off by the reactor fuel as it heats the water. Under normal operating conditions, essentially all radioactivity is contained within the first two barriers.
The ceramic uranium fuel pellets provide the first barrier. Alost of the fission products are either trapped or chemically bound in the fuel where they remain. Elowever, a few fission products which are volatile or gaseous at normal operating temperatures may not be contained in the fuel.
The second barrier consists of zirconium alloy tubes that resist corro-sion and high temperatures. The fuel pellets are contained within these tubes. There is a small gap between the fuel and the cladding, in which the noble gases and other volatile radionuclides collect.
The primary coolant water is the third barrier. hiany of the fission pro-ducts, including radioactive iodine, strontium and cesium are soluble and are retained in water in an ionic (electrically charged) form. These materials can be removed in the purification system of the reactor, flowever, krypton and xenon do not readily dissolve in the coolant, par-ticularly at high temperatures. Krypton and xenon collect as a gas above the coolant when the water is depressurized.
The fourth barrier consists of the reactor pressure vessel and the steel piping of the primary coolant system. The reactor pressure vessel is a 36-foot high tank with steel walls about nine inches thick, it encases the reactor. The remainder of the primary coolant system includes the pressuriier, steam generators and associated piping. This system pro-vides containment for radioactivity in the primary coolant.
18
The reactor building (or containment building) provides the fifth barrier.
It has stecilined thick concrete wa!!s that enclose the reactor pressure vessel and the primary coolant system.
During the TMI-2 accident, radioactivity was released to the environ-ment when radioactive liquids w re pumped from the reactor building to the auxiliary building. Even thoegh primary coolant was transported to the auxiliary building, only certain radionuclides escaped into the environment for the following reasons: (1) radioactivity in the primary coolant is readily contained; (2) only radionnclides that leave the primary coolant water as a gas or vapor or are carried in steam can be discharg-ed as airborne effluents; (3) prior to environmental discharge, the air in the reactor and auxiliary bmldings is passed through high efficiency and charcoal filters w hich remove particulates (e.g., cesium, strontium, and alpha-emitting radionuclides) and iodine respectively; and (4) the most likely radionuclides to escape into the environment are krypton and xenon. Ilecause these radioactive gases are chemically inactive, which means that they do not bind to other chemical elements, they are not removed by mechanical or chemical filtration. However, simply
" holding" them for a period of time reduces the amount discharged since many radioactive forms of krypton and xenon exist for only short periods y
of time before they cease to be radioactive.
The radioactive materials released to the environment during the acci-45 dent were those that were released from the damaged fuel and transported in the coolant to the makeup and purification system in the auxiliary building. The noble gases and radioactise iodines, because of their volatile nature and large concentrations, were the primary radionuclides available for release to the environment from the auxiliary building.
CONTRIllUTING EVENTS OFTIIE ACCIDENT At approximately 4:00 a.m. on March 28,1979, a malfunction occurred to components that maintain the flow of coolant water to the steam generators in the secondary loop. This resulted in a loss of ability to remove heat from the primary loop. Thus, most of the heat generated by the reactor remained in the reactor vessel and primary loop. This caus-ed the coolant water temperature and pressure to increase rapidly. This, in turn, caused a relief valve on the pressuriier to open. Steam and water were discharged to the reactor coolant drain tank located in the base-ment and equipped with a pressure-limiting rupture disc.
A key factor in the accident was that the relief valve failed to close when pressure returned to normal. Water continued to be discharged through the open relief sabe into the drain tank. As the water lesel fell, the fuel became exposed resulting in intense heat causing fuel damage.
19
1 So much water and steam were discharged through the relief valve that the storage capacity of the drain tank was quickly exceeded, causing the rupture disc to burst and discharge some 250,000 gallons of radioactive coolant into the reactor building sump and basement. Radioactive coolant water in the reactor building sump was automatically pumped into the auxiliary sump tank in the auxiliary building. Since this tank was already about half full, much of the water spilled into the auxiliary building, which was not designed to contain radioactive material. This liquid did not contain significant amounts of radioactivity, however, because ma-jor fuel damage did not occur until about two hours later.
After fuel damage occurred, radioactive materials were transported through the primary coolant system via the letdown line to the makeup and purification system in the auxiliary building. Because this liquid is a stream of primary coolant directly from the reactor, it contained signifi-cant amounts of radioactivity. As a result of liquid leaks in the makeup and purification system, large amounts of radioactive material were released into the auxiliary building. No longer held under pressure, kryp-ton, xenon and other volatile radionuclides evolved from the water into the auxiliary building atmosphere.
RADIOACTIVITY RELEASED TO THE ENVIRONMENT During the accident, approximately 50 percent of the noble gases and particulate cesium,30 percent of the iodine and small quantities of other fission products were released from the damaged fuelinto the primary coolant water. Before being released into the environment, the small amount of the airborne radioactivity released to the reactor building was filtered and monitored. The high efficiency filtration system in the aux-iliary and fuel handling buildings was designed to remove more than 99 percent of radioactive cesium, strontium and alpha-emitting ra-dionuclides. In addition to mechanical filtration, ventilated air in these buildings was also passed through multiple charcoal filters, which chemically removed 90 to 95 percent of the radioactive iodine. However, neither the mechanical filter nor the charcoal absorbers were designed to prevent the discharge of the chemically inactive krypton and xenon gases which escaped to the environment.
There were a number of pathways by which radioactivity other than no-ble gases was discharged through the TMI-2 stack. These pathways permitted small quantities of radioactive iodine, cesium, strontium, and alpha-emitting radionuclides to be released because some airborne radioactivity bypassed the building ventilation filtration system. Some of the discharged primary coolant water was pumped into a number of holding tanks in the auxiliary building. Noble gases evolved from coolant water contained in the holding tanks. Relief valves on these tanks, which l
were set at relatively low pressures, opened because of pressure produc.
ed by the noble gases. Noble gases and small quantities of several other radionuclides flowed through these relief valves in piping which bypass-i ed the filtration system and discharged directly to the TMI 2 stack.
4 i
20
E' E
R In i
lly analy/ing the radiation monitors and filter media, it has been
[
possible to measure the quantities of radioactisity releaset' to the
(
enuronment (Table 6). These measurements were supported by analyses k
of air, soil and water samples taken f rom sanous points outside the I MI-2 plant.
r l-Table 6 A.% o, H as,aa o t y R.s a n.,
trw Fa, mem "u
+
no nq ne : M:
A.
nn m n
Quantity (Curies)'3 Half-Life i
h Noble Gases h
xenon-133 8.300,000 5.3 days ft xenon-133m 170,000 2 3 days E
xenon-135 1.500,000 91 hours0.00105 days <br />0.0253 hours <br />1.50463e-4 weeks <br />3.46255e-5 months <br /> t
xenon-135m 140.000 15.6 minutes krypton-85 49.000' 10.8 years 4
krypton-88 61.000 2.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> y
E v
k Radioactive lodines N/
k iodine-129 0.000003" millions of years j
iodine-131 less than 30' 8 0 days
[
iodine-133 4
20 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Radioactive Cesiums cesium 134 0 00001 2 0 years t
cesium-136 0 0000003 13 7 days cesium 137 0 00004 30 0 years e
cesium-138 0 00002 32 2 minutes Radioactive Strontiums strontium-89 0.00006 52 7 days strontium-90 0 00006 27 7 years Activation Products tntium 147 12 3 years cobalt-58 0 0004 713 days cobalt-60 0 00009 5 3 years Alpha-emitting Radionuclides gross alpha 0 00008 thousands of years i to-manaes the imore.m Now gone 5
I f
E 21
m L
rr F
)
Monitoring of Airborne Radioactise Pathways b
All stack releases (filtered and unfiltered) are routmely momtored f or radioactnity. In addition, other monitors positioned in the sentilation h
flow path esaluate filter perf ormance and measure airborne radioactisity
{
passmg through filters in the auxiliary, fuel handling and ree or buildmgs.
{
4
[
Radioactnity that leaks f rom the primary to the secondary loop is a
measured at the condenser, where steam is conserted to water agam.
I his is w here noble gases u ould most likely be detected k
I snemely sensitne monitors in the stack are designed to measure the
[
small quantities of radioactne noble gase, iodine and particulates ! easing the stack under normal operating conditions. Radiation doses resulting trom such releases are small and do not present a health nsk to the public.
)
I)uring the accident, radioactnity leasing the stack exceeded the capacity i
of the morutt rs due to noble gases. Howeser. area monitors nearby were toncurrently measunng radiation Comparmg figures f rom the record-E ed data on the two sets of momtors allowed scientists to deuse a ratio
[
to detu anne et tluent releases. I he sahihty of tlus computational method q
tm determining ensironmental releases was subsequentls supported by ensironmental monitormg and sampling.
m-Noble gases
()t the radioactn us released during the ame of the accident, the most abundant radionuclides were those of the noble gases senon and kryp-ton. T he best estimate of the total amount of noble gas distharged to the em nonment n 10 nulhon curies, w hich represented about 0 8 per-gg cent of Ihe total insenton m ihe reactor core. Additionally, about 44JXX) g cunes of knpton-85 were released to the enuronment m June J uly, 4
1980 Iloweser, this release of actnity was approsed by the NRC and
?
Pennsyls ania Gos er nor I)ick I hornburgh tollowing a thorough esalua-
~
non h a task eroup of the National Council on Radiation Protecnon P"
f anJ Nteasurements
[
lodine
\\;though there are 25 ditterent notopes of radioastne todme produced m a nucle.u reactor, af ter a penod of one to two days only the longer-
=
I Ined iodine 111 n of ensnonmental and human health concern. N1ost
~~
a of the other isotopes of iodme pose httle or no threat to humar health or the ensironment because thes either hase a ser> short halt lite or are 4
pr oduced m neghgible quantities For example, iodine-129 remains Iadhnacid e tof seselal ill1thon sears; howeser, it has been <alculated Ihat at t he llInc of the accident, there was onls 4).217 curie of iodine-129 ill
)
the icactor sessel It is estnnated that only about 0.00tNX)1 curie of J
[
iodme 129 was released to the em nonment Enuronmental releases of
{
radioactn e iodine onginated as au borne releases in the auxihary and f uel handhng bmldmps \\lthough thn an n tiltered, small quantities were g
dist hsu ged s ia t he statk I stunates of radioactn e iodme released were t
based on analues ot <har coal <arttidges f rom the building sentilation y
hlter s
- p C
3-i-
=
L r z:
Charcoal filter cartridges were routinely changed and anal >/ed f or radioactiuty by at least two independent laboratones. Of the 129 charcoal cartridges collected during the time of the accident, only one cartndge remains unaccounted f or with seseral bemy mislabeled. Io compensate, estimates of released iodine are gisen as a range of about 15 to 30 cunes f or iodine-131 and about 3 to 4 curies f or iodine-133 Particulates and Tritium ilundreds of radionuchdes are created durmg the process of generating elecincity m a nuclear reactor. Howeser, because of short lif e spans and chemical properties, the oserwhelming majority of radionuclides remains in the coolant water and is not releascd into the en,ironment. For those that do become airborne, the high-ef ficiency air tilters reduce their discharge to the ensironment.
Analyses of airborne samples showed that about 14~ cunes of intium f
were discharged to the ensironment f rom the stack during the actidem Although sizeable quantities of radioactise cesium and strontium existed in the tuel, their physical-chenucal behasior presented their release to j$n the ensironment. I ahoratory analyses of particulate filters indicated releases of only about one ten-thousandth of one cune (0.m01 cune) of stronillim and about sesen one hundred-thousandths of one curie iQ (0.0(KF Curie) of Ceslum.
?[
p Actisation products and many alpha emitting radionuchdes are produced in the reactor. Because the TN11-2 reactor was relatisely new and had only been in operation about three months, only limited quantities of actisation products and alpha-emitang radionuclides existed at the ome of the accident. Their release to the ensironment was restricted by their own physical-chemical properties and by filters. The results of gross alpha analyses indicate that about eight one hundred-thousandths of one curie (0 00008 curie) was discharged ua the TMI-2 stack to the ensironment.
Liquid Pathways, Monitoring and Radioactive Effluents q
Radioactise water released during the accident to the auxiliary, tuel handhng and reactor buildings has been processed and is stored in tanks I
on I hree Mile Island. The only releases of radioactise materials in hquid form were sia the industrial waste treatment and filter systems. These systems normally collect non-radioactis e water f r om s arious sumps The water is tiltered and discharged to the Susquehanna Rner sia a single discharge point, which is continuously momtored f or radioactisity.
Because s arious tanks in the auxiliary building had osettlowed. shghtly radioactise water collected in some sumps was subsequently pumped to these systems. The mdustrial waste treatment sy stem also processed radioactise water f rom the turbine buildmg sump.
D
Small leaks in the steam generators allos.ed radioactise mateiials in the primary coolant to contaminate the TN11-2 secondary system. Small quan-tities of steam leaked f rom the turbine and condensed in the turbine building sump. That water was then pumped to the industrial waste treat-ment system. Studies indicau that no unmomtored water was released and that the monitor at the discharge point neser reached a lesel sufficient to trigger an alarm.
At the time of the accident, Three Niile Island's undamaged Unit One r< actor had just been ref uele.l. Water from that reactor was being treated and discharged, a common procedure during refueling operanons. From Starch 28 through April 30,1979, water discharged to the riser included 11 curies of tritium, 0.3 curie of iodine-131 and a total of 0.05 curie of other radionuclides. The only radionuclide identified in liquid samples that was directly attributed to the accident was iodine-131. The small amount of radioactise material released from TN11-1 at that time did not exceed release limits established by the Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission. Interal ettluent hmits are set at low lesels to ensure the health and ufety of the public.
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND RADIATION DOSE ASSESSMENT T he Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the federal agency that osersees the operation of nuclear power plants. It requires plant operators to deselop a comprehenme surveillance program that monitors all radioactise releases to the ensironment and prosides information on their potential effect on human health and the ensironment. Prior to the TN11-2 accident. GPU had implemented a radiological ensironmental monitor-ing program. Under this program, more than 900 separate samples were analy zed annually from air, milk, fish, fruits, segetation, meat, soil, water and riser sediment. The analyses were used to assess the dispersion of radionuchdes resulting from normal or accidental releases into the en-sironment. In addition, radiation dosimeters (known as thermolumines-cent dosimeters or TI.D's) positioned around TN11 measured radiation doses to humans, ammals and plants.
Prosen computer models are also used to calculate the dispersion of radioactisit) and resultant radiation exposures to the ensironment and human population. Such calculations, which are also used to confirm ensironmental sampling and TLD data, take into account the amount of radioactisity released together with the presailing weather conditions, such as temperature, wmd speed and direction, precipitation and upper atmosphene conditions. This information is obtained by sensors kxated on a tower at the northwest section of TN11. N1eteorological data are
=
generated esery 10 seconds and aseraged oser a 15-minute period before data are sent to a computer. The TN11 meteorological station, which was in operation at the time of the accident, recorded actual data f or the calculated salues of radionuclide dispersion and radiation dose '
N
~~sm-_
Following the TN11-2 accident, environmental monitoring was greatly cxpanded. GPU performed 9,700 analyses of 5,500 environmental samples taken during 1979. In addition, the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Energy (DOE) and the NRC took samples and analyzed them for radionuclides.
Also, researchers and officials from severai universities and health depart-ments of adjacent states helped analyze the data and monitored radia-tion levels. The EPA presented the data from more than 10,000 samples in a comprehensive report to the President's Commission on the Acci-dent at Three Niile Island."
Results of Environmental Sampling Radionuclide analyses and respectis e dose estimates were obtained from railk, vegetation, water and air samples. Dose estimates based on en-vironmental samples were in close agreement with calculated values and those measured by TLD's.
Iodine - Because iodine concentrates in the human thyroid gland, much effort was made to determine its presence in the environment. Both en-e vironmental samples and data collected at the meteorological station at TN11 were used to determine its presence in the environment. It is estimated that between 15 to 30 curies of iodine-131 were released. A maximum thyroid dose of less than 20 millirems (0.02 rem) for any one person has been calculated. The total thyroid collective dose received
!:y all people in the Thll area probably ranged from 1,400 to 2,800 person-rems.
Further,762 people of the Three Niile Island area volunteered for whole body counting, a procedure that identifies and counts specific ra-dionuclides in the body. None had body levels ofiodine-131 above the
.. 762 people of the Three minimum detectable activity of two billionths of a curie." This amount N1ile Island area volunteered of radioactive iodine would produce a dose of less than 12 millirems for whole body counting...
(0.012 rem). This further confirmed that iodine releases were very small None had body levels of and did not result in measurable radiation doses to the general iodine-131 above the population.
minimum detectable actisity For comparison, it should be noted that iodine-131 is used for a variety of two billionths of a curie.
of diagnostic and treatment purposes in medicine. In a diagnostic medical thyroid scan, for example, patients receive an average dose of about 100,000 millirems (100 rems) to the thyroid gland.
Alpha-emitting Radionuclides and Particulates - Because alpha-emitting radionuclides pose special health concerns, scientists specifically monitored their presence in environmental samples. Of all the samples analyzed, not one demonstrated the presence of alpha radiation above that normally present in nature and those from previous atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. During the time of the accident, GPU and the EPA analyzed air and soil samples for alpha radionuclides. When these samples were compared to those from other regions of the United States, the results showed no difference in the amount of alpha radionuclides normally present.
25
( ontmuous air samplers monitor the amount of radioactnity in nearby communities. At the time of the accident, eight sampling stations momtored au samples f or particulate radioactisity at sarious locations.
None of the air samples showed radioactisity abose normal ba kground leuls. In tact, DOI os er fhght sursey s showed that the amount of radioactisity around I N11 was no higher in 1982 than m years preceding DOE oserflight surseys the I N11-2 accident. Had significant amounts of particulate radionuclides showed that the amount of been released, the 1982 sursey would hase shown increased lesels. The radioactisity around I N11 radioactnity that was detected is normally found in the ensironment and was no higher in 1982 than in is consistent with expected concentration, of naturally occurring ra-years preceding the TN11-2 dionuclides and radioactne tallout from past weapon tests.
accident.
Radiation Monitoring Data trom a network of 20 dosimeters around I N11 prosided the most reliable record of human radiation doses. Fenacar meteorological data and population demographic data were used to determine the optimum location for t he ~1 I D's. ( ollectn ely, t he 20 stations pros ided data used in assessmg radiation doses to the general public Ining in the Three N1ile Island area.
Durmg the accident, the GPL ensironmental 6simeters were augmented by mdependent Il D programs conducted by the EPA, HilS, and the NRC Concerns hase been raised about whether the GPl' and NRC ll D's adequately measured s arious noble gases, about discrepancies between the NRC and GPL' results, and about the possibility of gaps m recordmg radioactisity in areas between dosimeter stations (so-called
'w mdow s').
The concern raised about the Tl D response to noble gas concentrations uas in part salid. I his issue uas addressed and resolsed by the Presi-dent's Commiwon and the National Bureau of Standards. Fl D's used by GPU and the NRC allowed small amounts of senon gas to diffuse through the holders into the dosimeter. I his caused the TI.D's to record radiation lesels greater than had actually occurred. In reality, people were esposed to less radiation than the Tl D's actually recorded I he discrepancies between exposures measured by GPl' and the NRC can be explamed by comparing the two sampling techniques First, the NRC i I D's had receised some radiation prior to placement in the field.
- }
They were turther exposed to radianon dunng the transport trom the NRC ottico to the tield station. Control Fl.D's were not used to sub-tract exposures obtamed prior to actual field placement. The GPl! Tl D's were shielded during transport to and f rom the field station. and con-t rol I i D's were used to measure any radiation that may hase been recorded pnor to placement m the ensironment. Subsequent resiews by independent scienufic un estigatn e teams confirmed that the GPl! Fl D r esult s were rehable and accurate for the calculation of radiation doses to the general pubh<
I he powbihts that "a mdow s" existed was also addressed Theoretically.
larger amounts of radianon could pass between II D stations than are
- b
measured by dosimeters at those stations. However, reliable meteorological data obtained during the TN11-2 accident show that, dur-ing periods when the highest releases occurred, the wind blew toward the monitoring stations rather than between them. hieteorological con-ditions that could have permitted large quantities of radioactivity to pass undetected between the TLD stations did not exist.
In addition, the exposure projection model used all available data, in-cluding existing meteorological conditions, plant monitoring data and dosimeter data to estimate the amount of radiation to which the general public was exposed. Exposures were calculated for all possible plume directions during the Th112 accident period and were used by other in-vestigative groups. In general, exposures calculated from the TLD measurements compared favorably with those estimated from the amount l
of radiation actually released.2""
l Environmental Liquid Monitoring Liquids released during the accident were monitored for radioactivity.
In addition, GPU collected water samples from various locations upstream and downstream from the main discharge site to monitor for radionuclides. Estimates independently calculated by GPU, the NRC and various state agencies generally showed that the quantity of iodine-131 released in water was less than 0.3 curie. Radiation doses from these releases amounted to less than 1 millirem (0.001 rem) to the maximum exposed person and a collective dose of less than 1 person-rem for the entire population."
Water and other aquatic samples collected at the time of the accident confirmed the radioactive releases to be small. Although iodine-131 was detected, it was found in samples collected both upstream and downstream from Thil, which indicated that it came from sources other than Thil. Area hospitals, for example, routinely administer iodine-131 to patients for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes, and this could even-tually be discharged into the river. Analyses of river water samples in years following the TN11-2 accident and the shut-down of TN11-1 con-tinued to show trace quantities of radioactive iodine upstream of the plant. Since iodine-131 ceases to be radioactive after a few weeks, its continued presence after years of reactor shut-down verified that the source could not be Th11.
GPU conducted a study to verify the reliability of the TN11 liquid sampl-l ing stations and provided a mathematical model capable of estimating both downstream concentrations and travel times of the Th11 effluent.
This study tracked the dispersion and dilution of a dye from the Thil discharge point in 1980. When applied to the release estimates of the TN11-2 accident, the model predicted river water concentrations with a high degree of accuracy. The agreement between river samples and model predictions further supports the small release estimates based on station dat a.
27
Summary of Radiation Doses GPU, the NRC and seseral independent insestigatne groups calculated the amount of radiation indniduals and the general population were ex-posed to as a result of the TN11-2 accident.-
There was general agreement that the primary exposure came from noble gases which are chemically and biologically unreactise. Exposure from noble gases was principally external in the form of gas traseling in the plume
- In calculating the maximun' indisidual dose, the highest off-site TL.D reading was used. The Tl D at the east-northeast station, a distance of 0.5 mile, registered a cumulatise dose of 83 millirems (0.083 rem)." This dose represented an upper limit to the general population for the period N1 arch 28 through April 7,1979, smee no member of the general public could hase been closer to the plant. Indisidual and population dose lesels were calculated from dosimeter and meteorological data and popula-tion distributions by distance from the TN11-2 nuclear power plant. The collectise population dose was calculated by summing up each individual dose for the twa million people livmg within a 50-mile radius of Three N1ile Island. The radiation doses receised by the gencial public can be summarized as follows:
g Whole Body Dose Estimates to Individuals Highest dose to any one indisidual: less than 100 millirems (0.1 rem)
- Aserage dose to indisiduals lising within a 10-mile radius of TN11:
8 millirems (0.00S rem)
- Aserage dose to mdisiduals lising within a 50-mile radius of TN11:
1.5 millirems (0.0015 rem)
Whole-Hody Collective Population Dose Estimates Range: 1,600 to 5,300 person-rems to the general population lis-ing within a 50-mile radius 5
- N1ost probable estunate: 1,300 person-rems to the general popula-tion lising within a 50-mile radius.
s Thyroid Dose Highest possiHe dose: less than 20 millirems (0.02 rem) to an I
indisidual
- Aserage dose to mdniduals lising within a 10-mile radius of TN11:
~~
less than 1 millirem (0.001 rem)
I otal collectise population dose: 1,400 to 2,800 person-rems to the thyroid to the general population lising within a 50-mile radius.
One way of esaluating the potential health impact of these whole-body doses is to compare them with the natural background radiation dose Radianon dose salues f or noble gae are w hole both doe and reflect the gamma radianon gn en o?! bs noble gasn N.oble gases also enu beta rad. anon w hn.h contnbutes Jose
! s t ht em I he 4 m Jose in the absense or shielding te y dothinyl was approximateh
'odi Ilnles t he w hole-bods d,ise
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of 1(M) milbrems (0.1 rem) per year. ~I he as erage indiudual dose of 1.5 millirems (0.0015 rem) to an indindual lising within a 50-mile radies, therefore, would be equhalent to less than an additional fise days exposure to natural background sources of radiation. Furthermore, the total collectise dose from the accident to the two million population lis-ing within 50 miles would be less than one percent of the total radiation dose these people receive each year f rom medical and natural sources of radiation ASSESSMENT IW OTHER STUDIES OF RECORD Within weeks of the IMI-2 accident, a number of federal and state in sestigations were begun to determine the causes of the accident and to assess the po entialimpact on the health and safety of the general popula-tion and the workers. Of primary concern was the need to determine radiation doses and possible heahh effects to indisiduals lising in the TMI area. Radiation doses w ere based largely on ground-les el measurements obtained by TI.D's, aerial surseys by helicopter and samples of soil, grass, surface water and milk. The radiation doses to r 7 Q[- T the general public were primarily due to the release of the radioactise gases krypton and xenon. Other radioactive products, such as iodine.
were rel-ased in barely detectable quantities. Because the radioactne gases
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readily disperse into the atmosphere, exposure of people was transient she and affected only those indisiduals in the path of the radioactise plume.
Each of these insesrigatise groups, after examining and analyzing all the as ailable scientific data, issued comprehensis e reports that are as ailable to the public. The following summarizes the findings of the principal insestigatis e reports-Ad Hoc Population Dose Assessment Group 22 1.ess than two months after the accident, an ad hoc group consisting of dosimetry experts from the NRC, the Department of Health and Human Sersices and the Ensironmental Protection Agency issued a preliminary report. The Ad Hoe Report co.' eluded that the collectise population dose within a 5(Lmile radius was 3. 4X) person-rems. This was based on an aserage of tour separate estimat that ranged from 1,NN) to 5,300 person-rems. I he group estimated th.tt the maximum exposure to any member of the public was less than 100 millirems (0.1 rem). These e 'imates were based on et fluent, dos! meter, and milk and food data.
T he interagency group report concluded that there were no immediate The imeragene) group report health effects and that latent or 'ong-term ef fects, it ans, would be concluded that there were no muimal.
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immediate health effects and that latent or long-term ef-Nitclear Regulator) Commi;sion fects, if any, w ould be "N "I ""
!n \\pril 197t* the NhC established its ow n insestigatis e groups, w hich issi e,i ses erara eports.-
Although health etteets were not Iheir main toe ', detaileQ nd well-supponed operationa' and radiological sequences of (,ents wert pros ided, including population dose measuremem s.
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in N1a3 19-'9 to study and es aluate the TN11 accident and its consequences.
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Predicted Dela. sed or I. ate llealth Effects any acute effects from es.
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collectne dose or populanon exposure, w hich n the sum of an exposures during the I'MI accident.
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f Ior the Iwo nulhon mdniduah In mg withm 5n nules, tell witlun Ihe range M [4.k, p.;c. m
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nught potennaH3 be mduced by radianon trom the I Mi-2 accident Ihese
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at radianon (htetune Ink of approximately 1 ddinonal cancers per i
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g Table 7 Potential Radiation Health Effects of the TMI-2 Accident to the 2 Million Population Living Within 50 Miles 22 L
Naturally-Occurring Potential Health Effects
~
Health Effects from the TMI-2 Accident
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g Total Cancers 541,000 1
k, F atal Cancers 325,000 less than 1 i
Nonfatal Cancers 216,000 less than 1 E
Genetic Effects 78,000 less than 1 g
g.
It' The prediction of one excess cancer is a calculated salue which is based h
on the collectise population dose of 3.300 person-rems. If such an effect does appear, it will not be detectable abose the 541,000 naturally occurring cancers in the two million residents of the TMI area. It is unlikely that any health effects will eser be obsersed due to the radia-tion released trom the FMI-2 accident. Nevertheless, in spite of the g
predicted absence of measurable health effects, a number of human g-health and other studies has been undertaken in the TMI area to deter-mine whether any health ef fects could be detected.
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IT11-2 Illn AI. I 11 % I l'l)ll3 Within months after the accident, the Pennsyhania Department of Health initiated sescral epidemiological studies to esaluate the possible long-term health ef fects of the TN11-2 accident. Of particular concern were p;egnariey outcoaes, infant health and cancer. The studies focused on people who lised in the immediate area of TN11.
One of the first steps was to deselop a TN11 population registry. In all, Cata were collected for the 35,(XX) persons lising in the immediate area of TN11. Data included information on age, race, residence, marital status, smolung habits, pregnancy history, medical history, presious medical md occupational radiation exposure, and a detailed accounting of time and whereabouts during the accident and the 10 days following.
This TN11 population registry provides pertinent information for future epidemiological studies. Some of these studies base been completed while others are still in progress and, in some cases, will continue for many years.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTII STUDIES T he following is a brief summary of findings of,oe epidemiological studies performed by the Penns>hania Department of Health.
Pregnancy outcome A total of 3,582 pregnant women who deliscred within one year follow-ing the TN11 accident and who had lised within 10 miles of TN11 at the tinie of the accident were compared with a control group of 4,000 g
pregnant women who were not exposed. Studies of the population ex-
/b posed in-utero during the accident showed no measurable differences
[
for prematurity, congenital abnormalities, neonatal deaths or ans other jg tactors examined. This "TN11 N10ther-Child Registry" will continue to E.e4 follow the children and issue reports at fhe-year imersals on any physical, psychological and behasioral effects.
Infant hypothyroidism Radioactise iodine, w her accumulated in suf ficient quantities in the tetal thyroid, has the potential f or producing infant hypothyroidism. Of ap-proximately 4,tXX) infants born within one year of the accident, only one case of infant hypothyroidism was reported withm a 10-mile radius of TN11, which is well within the range of expectation f or a normal group of infants of this number.
Sesen cases of congenital hypothyroidism were reported in Lancaster County, which is outside the 10-mile radius of insestigation. After detailed analyses of these cases, the Penns>hania Department of Health concluded that these '
. cases of congenital hypothyroidism were not related to the FN11 nuclear accident. It turther concluded that these types of anomalies are not expected to result f rom direct or in-direct exposure of the fetus to radiation. Ihis conclusion was also sup-ported by an mdependent Hypothy roidism insestigatis e Committee u
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a lamile radius of 'I N11 w hen compared with stao) groups hsing in other g.:(
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took the torm of demorahnnion and mental stress. I hose who were most
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Y.. l In September,1985. the Pennss. kania Department of flealth issued a T E.. : ' '. e..L; '....Y.?
i report of a cancer study perf ormed around I N11.* The purpose of the
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'M canter deaths. It also sought to deternune if the t'indings were consistent j...
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normalk m two comparable populations. Any statistical dit terence Q. ' ' }. jQ..f ( 9
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E I \\ll accident, the 35 communities ulthin 1() miles of 1 N11 hase undergone inore Intenshe monitormg. Because of the potential impor-eg m. j'.
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tance of w md direction and rad 10acth J plume dispersion during the first 4,' *. -
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f) ses Cral sources INCltiding t he Penno h ania Depart metit of licalth, w hich
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maintains sital stathtiCs on 'anar b) age, sex. Tace anatomical slIC and
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the years 1979-1981. : he data was categorved by age, sex, and specific population f or eight major cancer categories. 5inularly, the expected number of new cancer cases was based on incidence data by cancer site, age and sex tiom the Surseillance,1 pidennology and End Resuhs (SEER) program (19~8-1981) of the National Cancer Institute (NCl) and Penn-syhania and l'mted 5tates population data trom the 1980 census.
Results of Cancer N1ortality stud 3-I he Department of Heahh study has show n that, to date, there has been no esidence that the number of cancer deaths in the I N11 area has been d.tterent than thm u hich would to date, there has been base been expected Ihe 2.892 cancer deaths that occmied within a no esidence that the number of cancer deaths in the I N11 10-nule radius of INll were nearly idenncal in number to the 2,909 cases area has been different than statistically predicted f or the tiseaear period ;ollowing the I N11-2 acci-that which would hase neen dent. 5inularh, f or a 20-nnie radms ~,924 cancer deat hs w ere recorded where 8,17~ would base been predicted toi that same period.
expected.
Anaksis of data f or smaller geographical areas aho showed no sigmti-
, ' +tterences f rom expected s alues. Ihe tour down wmd communities represeming approximately 25.000 residents had 144 cancer deaths, sunilar to the 142 cases t hat w er e expected i urther, w hen the cancer mortahty stansucs were anal >/ed by cancer type. incluanig leukemia, there were no sigmticant dif ferences between obsersed and expected numbers of cancers according to type. Since these sery small dit terentes are due to normal staosucal sananon, it cannot be concluded that the radianon released during the I'N11 accident mereased the insidence of cancer in the general population.
Results of Cancer N1orbidity 5tud) -- Analpis of the number of newly diagnosed cases of cancer aho showed no dit terence between obsers ed y
and expected cases I his meludes those cancers that nught normally hase E
f
- 4 been expected as a consequente of large radiation doses in particular, p y}
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leukenua the most hkeh cancer that could base been detected as earh as fise scars tollowing exposure to radiation, w as diagnosed in only two indisiduals. w hile tom cases were expected among residents of the tom dow n w ind comn umnes m the absence of exceu radiation
('ancer incidence was exanuned among 3,582 pregnant women and their children w ho were born within one year f ollow mg the I \\11-2 accident and w ho hsed withm 10 miles of I N11. Based on the nanonal cancer registry data f or women age 10 to 44. 3.9 mother s nught has e been es pected to be diagnosed wit h cancer. w hwh is t he same as t he f<iur cases obser s ed \\mong their children, t wo has e been diagnosed with cantei.
w hile one case would hase been predicted I hus, as atlable mtormanon based en mothers and their children w hc mas hase been exposed dut-ing the accident prosided no mdication of a statisocalh sigmtNant results of our e
increase in canter tot enher group.
epidemiologic stud)
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not proside esidence of in-Conclusion t he Pennss h ania Depar t ment et Healt h. at ter st udy n!W creased cancer risks to cancers among residents wit hin 20 nules of I \\11, consluded t hat the '
resider, s near the i N11 results of our epidemiologi< studs mcludmg both mortahts and mor bidits nuclear plant.
a data as well as cohor t f ollow up analy s do not proside esidence of m s
creased cancer risks to lesidellts ned! Ihi I \\ll rluclear plarl!.
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I the latency period between exposure to a cancer-causing agent and the Ej deselopment of cancer may extend for n'any years, the Pennsyhania
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Department of Health will continue epidemiological studies et health f
effects, including cancer.
b REPORTS OF ACUTE HEALTH EFFECTS m
Although these Penns>lsania and other gosernmental health studies hase not shown any adserse health effects resulting from the accident, a I
number of residents lising around TN11 hase claimed both acute and delayed or late health ef fects did occur. The following list identifies acute y
hea! h effects that hase been most frequently claimed during and follow-
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ing the TN11-2 accident.
N1etalhe taste or odor
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Disruption of menstrual cycle in women Hurning watery eyes r,_
b Respiratory intlammation k
Skin reddening (erythema) and skin disorders i
Nausea and somiting
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2 Diarrhea and rectal bleeding
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Organ collapse Heart dystunction (tachycardia and aortie sake defect)
Metallic Taste By far the most frequently cited effect by some TN11 area residents was i
that of a metalhe taste or odor occurring at the time of the accident.
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No scientific esidence exists, howeser, that identifies radiation as a cause for a metallic taste or odor. Some people hase suggested that iodine h
released by the TN11-2 accident may hase been the cause. Yet, w hile i
reports of metallic taste coincide with the early days of the accident, some
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people have reported this sensation occurring both before and years af ter the accident.
lodine car induce a metallic taste w hen administered as a medicine. The total 15 to 30 curies of iodine-131 released during the accident corresponds y
to 0.1 to 0.2 milhgram of iodine dispersed into the atmosphere. If this i
amount were dispersed mstantly into the environment, there would be less than 0.0004 milligram per cubic meter of air at the boundary of the J
FN11 nuclear plant site. As distance from the site increases, the concen-Z trations would continue to decrease by n.any orders of magnitude. This b~
amount of iodine is extremely small compared with iodine taken as a
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nutritional supplement in kelp tablets (0.1 milligram each), or when iodine is prescribed medically as an expectorant in quantities of about 300 s
milhgrams per dose.
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caused by iodine in the ensironment, massise releases insoking millions g
of curies would hase had to occur. The minute quantity of less than i milhgram of radioactise in.hne roleded durmy the seseral-day period of the accident could not be the cause of a metallic taste.
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N1any foods, drugs and industrial chemicals are know n to cause a metallie taste. " Hazard I ine", an information service that prosides data on more than 77,(XX) industrial substances, lists more than 2(X) chemicals that can cause a metallie taste. N1any are commonly used in the automobile, steel, foundry, plating, chemical, mining and battery manufactunng industries.
Seseral of these industries are located in the general Harrisburg area.
A brief resiew also identified 14 pharmaceutical drugs that are known to induce a metallic taste.
The mineral selenium also causes a metallic taste. Farmers in the Etters, Pennsylsania area have stated that there is a selenium deficiency in the crops grown for ani.nal feed As a result, some people supplement their own diets with setemum. Selenium may be the source of a metallic taste in those indisiduals.
Disruption of Menstrual Cycle Women exposed to doses of about 2(X),(XX) millirems (2(X) rems) may experience temporary disruption of their menstrual cycle. The scientific evidence clearly shows that menstrual disruption is not linked to radia-tion doses like those associated with the TN11-2 accident. N1any factors are known to alter the regularity of the female menstrual cycle, including I_
hormonal, dietary and psychological factors.
1 Burning and Watery Eyes Radiation can affect the eyes, but only at extremely high les els of ex-posure. For example, therapeutic radiation exposure of 6,(X10,(XX) to 7,000,000 millirems (6,000 to 7,000 rems) can irritate the eyes, cause con-junctisitis (an inflammation of the inner linings), and cause increased Rg;"
sensitisity to light. Howeser, exposures of this magnitude would also produce severe skin changes and, for penetrating radiation, would be WM lethal if delivered to the whole body. On the other hand, common fac-7 tors know n to cause irritation of the eyes include eye infections, allergies n
and chemical irritants.
Respiratory inflammation A few persons hase complained that they had trouble breathing soon after the accident. Radiation can cause a respiratory inflammation but only for exposures well abose 200,000 millirems (200 rems) and only after sescral weeks f ollowing exposure. Thus, the scientific esidence clearly shows that the alleged breathing problems were not caused by radiation from the TNil-2 accident. Other causes of respiratory inflammation in-clude infection, allergies and chemical irritants.
Skin Effects
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Reports of skin disorders included skin reddening (erythema), bhster-mg, rashes, loss of hair and ulceration. Erythema and hair loss require doses of 300,(XX) millirems (300 rems) or more. Other skm disorders re-quire exposures in excess of 1,000,000 millirems (l,000 rems). N1any of these disorders are similar to allergic respsnses to sunlight, drugs, chemicals, cosmetics, other physical agents and the normal aging processes.
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Summary and Conclusions of Acute llealth Effects Because ioni/ing radiation m sutlicient doses may at tect most % man cells, health ett'ects can coser a wide range of disorders characteri/ed by a broad range of chnical signs and symptoms. T he probabihty and seserity of acute health et'tects soon atter exposure are dependent, in large measure, on the radiation dose and the rate ot its dehs er). On the other hand a lengthy list of agents and diseases can smgly or in com-hinatlun Callse 5)mptoms that ale sinlilar to those claimed by a number of people durmg the actident Gisen the high radiation doses requued to cause some of those signs and sy mptor. and the low radianon doses these people were actually exposed to Jurmg and tollowing the TN112 accident. it can only be concluded that these symptoms were not caused by radiation exposure t rom the I \\112 accident. In summary:
Dosimetry and ensironmen-I he esidence compels the contiusion that the radiation doses were tai sampling data indicate not sut ticient to induce any acute heal'h et t'ects in the exposed doses thousands of times population. Dosimeto and ensironme.ual samphng data mdicate lower than those required for doses thousands of times lower than those regiured f or the reported the reported health effects.
heakh ef f ects.
Some of the act"e health etl'ects cla:med are neser anwiated uith radiation at any Jose lesels I he time of onset, dulaflon and seqtience of health etteCIs slalm-ed are not associated with the chnical cotirse of the actite rtidic tion N)ndrome in rnan.
N1ost of the reported acute health elt'ects, it due to radianon, would hase required exposures to doses that would hase been ratal to
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For damage to has e been caused by ingestion or inhalanon of ra-
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dionuclides, the associated health eMects wou;d require concentra-h)
I nons of radioactis ny milhons of nms, peater than those actually deternuned t' rom the thousands of ensironmental samples analy /-
ed atter the aCCldent.
50me of the acute heakh eb IREPOllTS OF EFFECTS ON VEGETATION tects claimed are neser AND ANIMALS associated with radiation at A f ew local residents bas e slaimed that radiation releases f rom the I N11
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accident Catised abnormal growth of plants and s egetables. I hes cite a talllire of trees to prodlice Irllit, a lac k of honey bees to pollenate clos er, def ohanon of trees, abnormal stem and leat grou t h. ar.J e,en death of Nonic plants. In light of the radiation doses and dose rat 3 obsersed during t he actident, the occtir rence o! stich radiation-awociated et tect s w o uld not be Consistent with otir extensise knowledge of the responses ot com-plex biological sy stems such as humans, ammals and plants -\\s a rule.
the inore biologically complex the orgamsm, the mor e sensitis e it is to radiation. W hole boa > doses ot 4(WUKW) to 98)1WW) millireins (4(N) to 9 W) f ems) are f atal to most people, yet some lower f or ms of Iltc m s sut ter on!) nHnot biological et tects f rom exposures of l.M UlOU MHlh rems N
(1,(XX) rems) and more. Radiation doses sufficiently large to kill insects or plants would hase killed thousands of humans within hours, days or within a few weeks of the accident. This did not occur.
Abnormal growth of s egetation was alleged to be caused by radioactise calcium, phosphorus, and /ine. Although plants use these elements, the radioactis e releases from TN11 could not be the cause. These radionuclides accumulate in sizeable quantities only after years of reactor operation and are retained in the reactor core. T he TN11-2 reactor had only been in use f or three months at the time of the accident. Presently,90 per-
^
cent of these radionuclides are still in the reactor sessel (approximately fise percent hase decayed and another fise percent hase been remosed through sarious cleanup procedmes).
Ihere was no esidence of release of these radionuelides to the atmosphere at the time of the accident. A release of these radionuelides sufficiently high to cause damage to vegetation would hase been detected in water and air samples; none were detected.
It is important to note that plants in the springtime use nutrients which were stored in plant tissues from the presious growing season. Thus, it would hase been nutrients stored since 1978 that would have been us ed in the spring of 1979; i.e., non-radioactise nutrients taken up some time prior to the accident.
Seseral state and federal agencies, including the Penns>hania Depart-ment of Agriculture and the l' S. Ensironmental Protection Agency, msestigated all claims of abnormal plant an.1 animal effects occurring at the time and soon following the TN11-2 accident. They were unable to serify any form of radiation damage, attributing most reported cases to natural causes or animal feeding problems." Infrared photography 7'
and ground surseys conducted in the TN11 area from 1977-1980 as part of an ensironmental monitoring program also failed to identify unusual damage to segetation. T hese surseys did find esidence of plant damage caused by antnraenose (a fungus infection) and locust leaf miner (a small beetle). The studies concluded that these conditions Aere not unusual 4
and were not related to any radiation released by the TN11 accident. '"'
Questions hase also been raised concerning the failure of honey bees
~
to maintain a closer seed yield. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) monitors unusual bee mortality. Only two known cases of unusual bee mortality have been reported in the sicinity of TN11 in re-cent years; one occurred in the late 1970s near N1echaniesburg and a more j
recent case occurred near Chambersburg." Howeser, both situations resulted from the oseruse of pesticides. The use of extensise pesticides in the TN11 area could hase had similar consequences. The USDA fur-ther explained that bees has e little effect on clover yieids since most Penn-s>hania farmers harsest closer bef ore it goes to wed. It is common prac-
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tice among local farmers to grow clos er from commercial seed preparations.
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Alleganons concerning unusual healt h et tetts m sar ous taim anJ domestic animals due lo the radianon released during the I \\ll ' am dent were reported in Ihe media. I he NR(' has insestigat d these reporn and f ound t hat, 'No reasonable connection could he m ide between the problems of lisestock and pets that were brought to the attent or, at the statt of the Nuclear Regulatory ( onumssion 1he mt -t likely cmses of the reported animal husbandry problems are nutritioral de niencies and inf ectious dheases, as indicated by disease sy mptoms as s. ell as by the improsed health of hsestock that were gnen teed supplements.
In addition. the Pennsyh ania Department of Agriculture records show that yiehl per acre from 19'6 through 1982 f or the counties surroundmg TN11 f or w heat, barley, oats, hay and apples were relatheh tonshtent tor all years.' Potato and corn yields were lower m 198n than uther years and peach yields were lower in 1981, but these dechnes probah!> retlected the drought condinons of 19S0-1981. I hese resulh support the conclu-slons Contained in the otticial assessment reportt Iield samples taken during the accident and harsest yields all indicate that the small doses of radiation were not the source of plant and ananal anomahes c
CANCER SUllVEY CONDUCTED IW l OCAI RESIDENTS Perhaps the most publicized and controserua! report of human health et tech ins oked a cancer surs ey conducted by the Aamodts.wo tormer local residents of the Ihret N1ile Island area. I he Aamodts mitially made their resuhs public in lune 1984 in the f orm of a petinon to the NRC At the request of the NRC, thn report was resiewed by the Ucmer f or NET Disease ContrM (CDC) of the U.S. Public Health Sersice. ('IX' phy +
yQ cians and scienthts concluded that the Aamodts' cancer sursey contamed Ptp a " number of defiaencies" and failed to present eudence of an increased h.
n"mber at cancer cases or cancer deaths among IN11-area residents.
Mhi In Nosember 1984, the Dnision of Epidemiology Research of the Penn s> hama Department of licalth was requested to anal >/e the AamoJts' cancer surses dat t in a report subsequently issued by the Penns> h ania Department of Health, Dr. George Tokuhata of the Dnision identitied serious flaws in the Aamodts' cancer sursey, meludmg deficiencies in the methodology and design of the surs ey. and errors and taulty interproations.
In.lanuary 1985, the Aamodts filed a monon with the NRC w hhh con-tained more detailed inf ormat on on their health et tects surt e> uhn mtormation prosided serification of their data w hich the Aamodts had requested of the NRC m their lune 21.19S4 monon
).
Deficiencies in Methodology and Design In the Namodts' study, s olunteer citizens conducted door-to-door surs es s in three small r ural communities u here residents had repor ted " ads erse health ef fects" The three surs es areas conusted ot 35. O and 15 holneholds and represented 4C people. I or t he t n e s ean t ollow mg t he al
'I N11-2 accident, the studs claimed the small population in question suffered death rates from cancer 5.2 to 6.5 times higher than expected.'
Radioepidemiological studies are designed so that the study group surseyed differs from a control group used for comparison in that the sursey group had been exposed to radiation and the control group had not. Sursey data must be collected without bias and indisiduals in the sursey group must be carefully matched with individuals of the control group with respect to age, sex, occupation, smoking habits, and other risk factors Because of extensise media coserage since the accident, not only the solunteers but the indisiduals intersiewed may hase assumed that any medical or health problem that they may hase experienced during this time was related to the radioactise releases during the TN11-2 accident.
Consequently, int eruew ers and those being questioned may hase responded in a way that would support such a bias. The questions used in the sursey also could hase suggested certain responses.
The three areas surseyed are located within York County. Survey Area 1,4.5 to 6 miles northwest of TNil, consists primarily of houses along a single rural road. Surs ey Area 3, about 7 miles north-northwest of FN11, likewise consists of a single road. Based on official eensus data, the Penns>lsania Department of Health identified errors in the survey data with respect to the number of households and residents for Areas 1 and 3.
Howeser, the most serious bias in data acquisition was uncovered in Surs e) Area 2 (Ne a berry Tow nship). Specifically, Area 2 is represented by 14 streets that collectisely should hase been surseyed. Instead, only four streets were selected and, whereas at least one cancer death was confirmed on each of the four selected streets, the Department of Health did not identify any cancer deaths during the period of the study on the 10 st ree,s that had been excluded Errors and Faulty Assumptions Ihe Pennsylsania Department of Healtn, in resiewing death certificates and medical records, identified a number of errors in the Aamodt sursey:
Inclusion of extra cancer deaths - While the surs ey identified four cancer deaths in Area 3, only two could be confirmed (one in-diudual was apparently confused with a relatise who died; another indnidual was not a resident at the time of the TN11-2 accident).
1-ailure to adjust for age-sex in computing expected cancer mor-tality - The sursey tailed to take into account either the age or sex distnbution of the mdisiduals surseyed. This ignored the fact that cancer deaths are affected by sex and increase with age. Thus, it the age and sex distribution of the population under study dif-fered from that of the companson group, the calculated number of cancer deaths expected would be in error; this was the case in the Aamodt N surs ey.
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E inclusion of cancer deaths diagnosed prior to the TNil-2 accident-Ut the 20 cancer deaths identified by the sur ey, six cases were medically diagnosed as hasing cancer before the 1979 accident. In one case, the cancer was diagnosed in 1969, 10 years before the accident.
Failure to adjust for confounding risk factors - Although lung cancer occurs among nonsmokers, there is a staggering increase in lung cancer rates among smokers Both lung cancer deaths in the suney ins ohed indisiduals who were long-term heas y smokers.
Faulty interpretations - An insufficient period of time had elaps-ed since the accident to justify any association between the obsened
. cancer deaths reported in cancers and the radiation from the TN11-2 accident. For high radia-the Aamodt sun e), ex-tion doses, the mimmum latency period for leukemia is about two ciuding leukemia, could not years and for most solid cancers this minimallatency period is 10 hase occurred so soon after years. Furthermore, following early diagnosis, cancer patients may the TNil-2 accident to be continue to lise for years or even decades with proper medical treat-associated in an> way with i
ment. Thus, cancer deaths reported in the Aamodt suney, ex-radiation released at the time ciudmg leukemia deaths, could not have occuned so soon after of the accident.
the FN11-2 accident to be associated in any way with radiation released at the time of the accident.
CONCLUSION The Pennsybania Department of Health, in its esaluation of the Aamodts' sun ey, stated:
'While the authors of this small area sunev claimed that
~
emum cancer mortality has markedly increased around TN11, and k
h p$
implicated the 1979 nuclear accident at TN11 as being respon-sible, the data presented in their suney do not support their h
conclusions.
the comprehensis e epidemiologic studies conducted by the Penns>hania Department of Health do not proside evidence that cancer mortality has increased gnificantly around TN11.'
In addition. the Lt.S. Supreme Couri has twice dismis< d the Aamodis' contentions of health effects from the TN11-2 accident.
The sarious reports and claims of acute (early) and delayed (late) biological and health ef fects in the human populations, animals, and plants during and following the accident at TN11 were caref ully and ex-tensis ely examined by appropriate federal and state agencies. The scien-tific esidence and analyses failed to support any radiation-related biological or health effects claimed to hase occurred following the releases of low-lesel radioactisity at the time of the accident. In particular, the human cancer survey carried out by TN11-area residents had serious methodological flaw s; the epidemiological analysis by the Pennsylvania Department of Health demonstrated consincingly that no excess of cancer cases has occurred m the FNil area since the TN11-2 accident m 19'9.
43
=_
_a
i4!_i-E Hi-~Nt1 E S 1
Aamodt Petition Norman 0 and Marone M Aamodt Petitioners vs United States
~_
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Docket No 50-289) a Aamodt Mottons for investgation of Licensee s Repods of Radioactive Reieases Dunng the Initie. Days of the TMI-2 Accident and Postponement of Restart Decision Pen 6ng Resolution of this Investigation. June 21.1984 b Aamodt Motion for Peconsideration of Commission Order CLi-84-22 and Opening of a Hearng January 15 1985. as amended 2
Amencan Cancer Saciety ' 1986 Cancer Facts and Figures' 3
Ames B N Dietary Carcinogens and Anticarcinogens Science 221 1983
.m 4
Commonweae of Pennsylvania Department of Agoculture Crop Reponing Ser-vice Crop and Livestock Annual Summary '. Annual Summary Reports for t 976-t 982 6
N 5
Environr, ental Protection Agency Repon ORP/SID 72-1 ' Natural Radiation Ex-posure in the United States 1972 L
GEND-009. ' Measuroment of I-129 and Radioactive Paniculate Concentrations
,n the TMI-2 Containment During and After the Venting 1981 7
GEND-013 TMl-2 Reactor Building Purge - Kr415 Venting 1981 D
8 Houts P S. Maller RW Ham. " S. and Tokuhata. G K. ' Extent and Dura-g tion of P 9chological Distross of hersons in the Vicin<ty of Three Mile islandf 3
=
Proceed hgs of the Pennsylvani Academy of Science 54.1980 a
9 Ir,teranocy Task Force on the Walth Effects of lonizing Radiation Repon of the Interagenc y Task Force on tr o Health Effects of lonizing Radiation". HEW.
mua 1979 N
10 International Commission on Radiological Protection Repon 26. 'Recommen-d dations of the international Commission on Radiological Protection " Pergamon Press (1977) 11 Jablon S and Kato H ' Childhood Cancer in Relation to Prenatal Expnsure
-=
to Atomic Bomb Radiat.on i.ancei 1970 N
12 Kato H and Schull W J Studies of the Mortahty of A-Bomb Survivors Radia-t.on Research 90.1982
_7-13 Letter GOL-1129 August 30.1979 from J G Herbein to B H Gner Region t NRC subiect Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 (TMI-1 and TMi-2)
_m Operat,ng License Nos DPR-50 and DPR 73 Dockets Nos 50-289 and 50-320
'M Radioact ve Effluent ReWase Repon 14 Letter from Caldwell CG MD Assistant Director for Epidemiology. CDC to Mills W A PhD Chief Health Effects Branch NRC September 1984 "A
15 NCRP Task Group Scientific Committee 38 ' Kr-85 in the Atmosphere with SpecMc Reference to the Pubhc Health Sign:ficance of the Proposed Controll-ed Reiease at Three Mile island Comraentary No 1 May 1980
-7 16 National Academy of Sciences Nat,onal Research Council Report of the B,ological E"ects of lonizm;; Radiation The EHects on Populations of Exposure to Low Lesels of loniz ng Radiation 1980 iBt IR th Report) igilE A
u m
REFERENCES (Continued) 17 Nat:onal Cancer Institute. The SmoWng Digest ' 1977 18 National Council on Rad;ation Protection and Measurements (NCRP Report 53L
Review of NCRP Rad.ation Dose L.rv for Dose Limit for Embryo and Fetus in Occupationally-Exposed Worren ~ 1977 19 National Council on Rad'ation Protection and Measurements (NCRP Report 77)
' Exposures from the Uranium ser'es with Emphasis on Radon and its Daughters ' 1984 20 Nuclear Regulatory Commission RegJiatory Guide 813 Instruction Concer-ning Prenatal Radiation Exposure ' 1975 21 N uclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 8 29. Inst uction Concer-ning R,sks from Occupat:nnal Radiat.on Exposure 1981 22 NU R EG-0558 Population Exposure and Health Impact of the Accident at the Three Mile Island Noclear Station 1979 2
23 NUREGO60G investigation into the March 26 1979 Three M le island Acci-dent ' 1979 24 NU REGO636 The Pubhc Whole Body Count Prograrn Follow ng the Three Mile Islund Accident ' 1980 25 NU REGO6.37 Report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from 'he Staff Panel on the Commission s Deterr, nation of an Extraord:na y Nuclear Occur-rence (ENO) ' 1980 26 N UREG 0738. Invest <gations of Reported Plant and An-rral Health Effects in the Three Mile Island Area ' EPA 600/4 80-0049 US NRC US EPA 1980 3
27 NUREG/CR-1250 ~ T hree M:le Island A Report to the Commissioners and to the Pubhc Mitchell Rogov'n and George T Frampton January 1980 28
'.US Corporation 1977 Monitoring of Coohng Tower Operational Effects on I
begetation in the Vicnity of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Annual l
Report ' 1978 29 NUS Corporation 1978 Mon tonng of Cooling Tower Operational E"ects on
[
[.g i p Vegetation in the Victnity of the Th'ee Moe Island Nuclear Station - Annual Report ' 1978
- - g T-ir yt 30 NUS Corporation 1979 Monitoring of Cooling Tower Operational Ef+ects on
[*y
Vegetation in the Vicin:ty of the Three Mile Island Nuciear Station Anruat Report ' 1980 31 NUS Corporation 1980 Monitor'og of Cochng Tower Operational Ef+ects on Vegetation <n the Vic:n.tv of the Three M:le island NaClear Stat:on - Annua!
Repon 1981 32 Pennsylvania Department of Healtn The Three MJe 1siand Populat'on Reg <stry Repon I A General Desc pt:en D' vision of Epidemiokx3 Researt h Ha r'sburg 1981 46
REFERENCES (Continued) 33 Pennsylvania Department of Health Studies irrpact of TMI Nuclear Accident Upon Pregnancy Outcome. Congenital 1
Hypothyroidism and Mortality'. Pennsylvania Academy of Science.1981 b Cancer Mortality and Morbidity (Incidence) Around TMl".1985 34 Personal Communications with Pennsylvania Department of Agnculture 35 Report of the Governor's Commission on Three Mile Island.1980 36 Rubin. P and Casarett. G W. Clinical Radiation Pathology. W 8 Saunders.
Philadelphia 1968 p 852 37 SEER Menograph 57. U S Depanment cf Health and Human Services. Na-tional Institutes of Health,1981 38 The President's Comnission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. Staff Repons of the Public Health and Safety Task Force to the President s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island" 1979 39 United Nations Scienti6c Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. Report to the General Assembly lonizing Radiation Sources and Biological Effects,"
New York 1982 40 Woodard, K Assessment of Off-site Radiation Doses from Three Mile Island Unit 2 Accident " Pickard Lowe and Garnck Report TDR-TMI-116.1979 s-4-
-f
(;ll)w \\ RT Actisation products Materials that become radioactise w hen bombard-ed by the neutrons released during fission Alpha-emitting radionuclide - A radioactne element which enuts alpha radiation.
Alpha radiation - Consists of positisely charged particles. Alpha radia-tion will be stopped by the outer layer of skin; it can be stopped com-pletely by a shee of paper. Howeser, the potential hazard f rom alpha-emitting materials is due to the possibility of internal deposition to the body by ingestion or mhalation lleta radiation - Heta particles are similar to electrons, but originate in the nucleus of the atom. Heta is more penetrating than alpha radia-tion and can pass through ().5-1 centimeter of water or human nesh.
A sheet of aluminum a f ew millimeters thick can stop beta radiation T here is also an inhalation ha/ard f rom beta radiation Curie A measure of radiation named aner Marie Curie, the discoserer of radium. \\ curie represents a deca) rate among fission products of U billion radiation emissions a second. Because of the extremely small amounts of radioaClise materlal in the ensironment, it is otten more consenient to use tractions of a curie; e g.
subunits hke milheune (one thousandth of a curie) or microcurie (one millionth of a curie) or esen picoeurie tone trillionth of a curie).
Dose l he quantity of radiation absorbed (units, rad or rem).
l{ffluent tradiological) Release of radionuclides originating from the reactor s essel into t he ens nonment.
bposure (radiationi A quantity of radiation measured in air.
l'iwinn products - I:lements or compounds that result f rom nuclear tis sion and may be radioactise.
Gamma radiation - Consnts of photons tw ase energy ) that can be ser>
penetrating. Depending on the energy les els, gamma radiation can pass through the body. Dense materials such as concrete and lead are used f or shielding agiunst gamma radiation Genetic effect An eff ect occurring in the gern tells of the irradiated indnidual that is passed on through biological mechanisms of in-heritance to the Jescendan s of a parent.
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