ML20211E000
| ML20211E000 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1986 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19292G087 | List: |
| References | |
| CR-3-81-10, NUDOCS 8610220328 | |
| Download: ML20211E000 (22) | |
Text
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$J TRANSIENT ASSESStiENT PROGRAM REPORT 4'
ON CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 REACTOR TRIP t
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JUNE 16, 1981 1.
Report Number - CR-3-81-10 1 :
Prepared and Released by Florida Power Corporation t.
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.1s l$ko22eDo$k$Ico$bo2 Transient' Assessment Program S
PDR 12-1127044-00 l.
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CRYSTAL RIVER 3 - JUNE 16, 1981 l..e 4
REACTOR TRIP.AND LOSS OF 0FF-SITE POWER Raci CAuSE:
LIGHTING STRUJK ON THE 230 KV FEEDER LINE TO THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER CAUSED LOSS OF 0FF SITE POWER. REACTOR TRIPPED ON LOSS OF POWER TO THE CONTROL R00 DRIVE.
PERFORMANCE ANOMALIES:
r LOSS OF OFF SITE POWER LOSS OF FORCED RC FLOW - NATURAL CIRCULATION QUICKLY.* ESTABLISHED AND NAINTAINED FOR ABOUT 9 HOURS.
"A" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR STARTED, "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DID NOT START. POWER TO B ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS BUS REESTABLISHED BY OPERATOR ACTION BY CONNECTING TO UNITS 1 AND 2 STARTUP TRANSFORMER.
LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER. EMERGENCY FEED PUMPS STARTED NORMALLY BUT STARTUP FEEDWATER VALVES DID NOT CONTROL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL.
.OVERC00 LING RESULTED FROM OT $ OVERFILL WHICH WAS TERMINATED BY OPERATOR ACTION.
LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR AND SERVICE AIR, ALSO AIR FAIL RELAYS TRIPPED.
LOSS OF POWER TO UNITS 1 AND 2 DEMIN WATER TRANSFER PUMPS (POWERED FROM UNIT 3 WATER TREATMENT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER).
ESFAS ACTUATION NOT REQUIRED, BUT 2 WI PUMPS STARTED AND HPI INJECTED Fu0M BWST TO RCS THROUGH ALL 4 N0ZZLES.
OC SEAL OIL PUMP FAILED TO START CAUSING LOSS OF MAIN GENERATOR HYDROGEN.
(l GENERIC BENEFITS:
DEM0llSTRATED NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLING FOLLOWING REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% FP.
PROVIDED COMPARIS0N EXPERIENCE FOR ATOG GUIDELINES FOR LOSS OF 0FF SITE POWER.
l DEMONSTRATED OVERALL ADEQUACY OF PLANT PROCEDURES AND ABILITY OF L
OPERATORS TO RECOGNIZE AND CORRECT PLANT PROBLEMS NOT SPECIFICALLY AD0RESSED IN EITHER AT03 OR THE PLANT PROCEDURES.
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SUMMARY
1,,
ON JUNE 16. 1981 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 WAS IN MDDE 1 WITH REACTOR
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AT 1001 FULL POWER. GENERATING APPROXIMATELY 820 PLE. THE ICS W FULL AUTOMATIC. STATION LOADS WERE BEING POWERED FROM THE UN STARTUP TRANSFORMER EXCEPT FOR RC PUMPS WHICH WERE BEING CARRIED i
THE UNIT AUX TRANSFORMER.
AT APPROXIMATELY 2338 LIGHTNING STRUCK THE 230 KV FEEDER LINE. FROM TH FOSSIL PLANT SWITCHYARD. TO THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER. THE LIGHTNIN STRIKE CLEARED THE BHEAKERS IN THE FOSSIL PLANT SWITCHYARD (THE THE UNIT 3 STARTUP TRANSFORMER) AND THE LOSS OF VOLTAGE ON THE SEC SIDE CAUSED THE CR3 4160 VAC UNIT BUSES AND THE 4160 ES BUSES TO CLEA THEIR FEEDERS.
THE ABOVE ACTION HESULTED IN A REACTOR TURBINE TRIP. THE TURBINE TRI CAUSED A LOSS OF 6900 VAC FEED TO THE RC PUMP BUSES AND WITH THE ALTEnNATE SUPPLY TO THE RCP BUSES TRIPPED (THE STARTUP TRANS f-LOSS OF RC FLOW WAS EXPERIENCED.
THE LOSS OF VOLTAGE TO THE 4160 VAC ES BUSES CAUSED THE DIESELS T0 t-CRANK. THE "A" EMERGENCY DIESEL CAME TO SPEED AND LOADED THE "
AN0 480 VAC ES BUSES AS DESIGNED THE "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL FAILED TO START. THE OPERATORS SUBSEQUENTLY POWERED THE "B" ES BUSES FROM THE FOSSIL PLANT STARTUP TRANSFORMER.
THE UNIT WAS STABALIZED IN THE HOT STANDBY MODE AT APPROXIMATELY THIRTY MINUTES INTO THE TRANSIENT.
i i
II.
TRANSIENT ASSESSMENT A.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THE FOLLOWING IS AN ABBREVIATED SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR THIS REACTOR TRIP TAKEN FROM THE ALARMS TYPER AND LINE PRINTER.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS MONITOR THE FOLLOWING ALARMS FROM THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS MONITOR ARE CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT TO THIS TRANSIENT. WHEN QUESTION MARKS ARE' PRINTED. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS MONITOR BUFFER HAS OVERLOADED AND THE ORDER OF ALARMS AND TIME AR LOST. THE SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT THE EVENTS DID OCCUR.
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PLANT CORJTER ALARMS THE FOLLOWING ALARMS WERE FROM THE PLANT COMPUTER. THESE ALARMS APPEAR TO
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PdOVIDE THE BEST SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR THIS OCCURRENCE.
s, C0fflJTER ALARf6
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TIME ALARM 2338:08 BATTERY CHARGER A IN SERVICE No
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2338:08 BATTERY CHARGER 8 IN SERVICE No 2338:08 BATTERY CHARGER C IN SERVICE No 7
2338:08 BATTERY CHARGER D IN SERVICE No'
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2338:03 BATTERY CHARGER E IN SERVICE No 2338:08 BATTERY CHARGER F IN SERVICE No 2338:08 STARTUP BANK BREAKER 1691 OPEN 1,
2338:08 STARTUP 8ANK BREAKER 1692 OPEN 2338:08 BREAKER 3203 OPEN 2338:08 BREAKER 3204 OPEN
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2338:08 BREAKER 3205 OPEN 2338:08 BREAKER 3206 OPEN 2338:08 CRD TRIP CONFIRMED
.YES 2338:08 AUTO STOP.
TRIP 2338:08 RC PUMP Al SPEED Low 2338:08 RC PUMP.A2 SPEED LOW f
2338:08 RC PUMP 81 SPEED LOW 2338:08 RC PUMP 82 SPEED Low 1
2338:08 BATTERY A VOLTAGE 247.1 2338:08 BATTERY 8 VOLTAGE 231.5
'2338:08 i20VACREGINSTBUS3A(VBOP-il DEAD 2338:08-120 VAC REG INST BUS 38 (V8DP-2)
DEAD 2338:08 500KV GENERATOR BREAKER 1661 OPEN
,i 2338:08 500(V GENERATOR BREAKER 1662 OPEN 2338:08 BREAKER 3101 OPEN
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OfijTER ALARfB j
TM ALARM i
h 2338:08 BREAKER 3102 OPEN 2338:12 480V HEATING AUX Bus DEAD
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2338:13 480V PLANT Aux Bus DEAD p
2338:13 480V TURB Aux Bus A DEAD 2338:13 480V TURB Aux Bus B DEAD 2338:13 480V REACTOR AUX Bus A DEAD
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2338:13 480V REACTOR Aux Bus B DEAD 2338:13 480V INTAKE Aux Bus A DEAD 2338:13 480V INTAKE Aux Bus B DEAD I
2338:15 4160V Bus A DEAD j
2338:15 480V ENGD SAFGRDs Bus B DEAD 2338:16 CIRC WATER PUMP 3A 0FF l'
2338:16 CIRC WATER PUMP 38 0FF 2338:16 CIRC WATER PUMP 3C OFF i
2338:16 CIRC WATER PUMP 30 0FF 2338:16 6900V Bus A DEAD 2338:16 6900V Bus B DEAD i
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2338:16 4160V Bus B DEAD 2338:16 4160V ENGD SAFGRDs Bus A DEAD
'l-2338:16 4160V ENGD SAFGRDs Bus B DEAD 2338:16 480V ENGD SAFGRDs Bus A DEAD j
2338:16 BREAKER 3392 OPEN 2338:16 RC PUMP 3A1.
STUP 2338:1G RC PUMP 381 STOP U
2338:16 RC PUMP 3A2 STOP 2338:16 RC PUMP 382 STOP
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2338:23 EMERGENCY GENERATOR A RUNNING YEs
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t, 00fPUTER ALARf6
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ALARM T1W
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2338:25 4160V ENGO SAFGRDS BUS A ENERG li 2338:25 480V ENGD SAFGROS BUS A ENERG 2338:40 HIGH PRESSURE INTECTION REQUIRED No 2339:00 al PUMP B~
STOP i'
2341:29 MAKEUP PUMP A 0FF s
2341:33 MAKEUP PUNP A RUN.
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2342:15 BREAKER 3212 CLOS 2342:16 BREAKER 3212 OPEN I
4 2342:20 BREAKER 3212 CLOS-
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2342:2G 4160V ENGD SAFGRDS BUS B ENRG 2342:26 480V ENGD SAFGRDS BUS B ENRG I
,2342:35 MAKEUP PUMP C RUN 2343:05 HEAT / COOL RATE EXCESSIVE YES l
2343:13 HEATING RATE (OEG F/HR) 146.9 j
2347:02 480V PLANT AUX BUS ENRG 2347:11 BREAKER 3392 CLOS 2349:37 MAKEUP PUMP C 0FF 2351:P 480V HEATING AUX BUS ENRG t
2351:P 120VAC REG INST BUS 3A (VBDP-1)
' ENRG i
2351:9 BREAKER 3395 CLOS I"
2351:40 480V REACTOR Aux BUS'A ENRG
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2351:56 PRESS RELIEF VLV RCV-110 OUT TEMP 246.5 2355:49 120VAC REG INST BUS 38 (VBJP-2)
ENRG g
' L 2355:49 BREAKEa 3396 CLOS 2355:53 480V REACTOR Aux BUS B ENRG 2356:39 NUCLEAR SVC CLNG WIR T!K LVL (FT) 7.79
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il,{t 2358:26 PRESS RELIEF VALV RCV-8 OUT TEMP 200.8 1
j 0000:P AIRSIDE SEAL OIL BACKUP PUNP RUN L
0000:40 AIRSIDE SEAL OIL BACKUP PUMP OFF
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l, SIGNIFICANT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ftNITOR ALARMS r-1{
TPE AUUN
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'2339:45 8KR 1692 AIR PRESS LOW (LP SYS) 2339:45 8KR 1692 AIR PRESS LOW (IP SYS) b 2339:45 230 KV EKR 1691 TRIP &
2339:45 PLT LINE PRIM DIFF T 2339:45 FW PP 3B TURs TW OIL PP 381 TRIP
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2339:45 STEP UP XRE PHASE.8 CONT (XT PW FAIL
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INV 3A BATT SOPP~~~
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TG EMERG EEG OIL PP DC AUTO START
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lij & P PP 38 TRIP s.
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STEP UP XFm PHASE A AUX PW FAIL
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TG EMERG.BRG OIL PP OVfd.D i
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RC PRESS LOW NARROW RANGE
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RC PRESS HI NARROW RANGE
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TURB REMOTE TRIP
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TUR8 TRIP L/0 RLY ACT
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INV 3B BATT SUPP
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RC PRESS HI j
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STEPUP XRR PHASE A EMERG AUX PWR FAIL
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RC PRESS LOW I
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STEPUP XRR PHASE A CONT CKfT PWR FAIL i
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U/A XR R NORM AUX PWR FAIL l ','
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BATT 3A2 DIScH LTI
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Gl PP3A TRIP
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SIGt(IFICANT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS R)NITOR ALARMS n
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TIrf ALARM r.
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SU XRR N0HM AUX PWR FAIL
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SU XRR EMERG Aux PWR FAIL nl'
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MJ FLO HI
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W PP 3D TRIP
??f72 CW PP 3C TRIP
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230 KV, B(R 1692 TRIP (P
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230 KV B(R 1691 TRIP CP s
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PLANT PERFORNANCE 0
- 1. PRETRIP REVIEW
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CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT THREE WAS OPERATING AT APPROXIMATELY 1001 FULL POWER l?
WITH THE ICS IN FULL AUTO. THE UNIT WAS GENERATING APPROXIMATELY 820 1%..THEONLYUNUSUALLINEUPWASTHE"B"DECAYHEATPUNPRECIRCING 4
THE INST IN PREPAdATION FOR SAMPLING THE TANK AS REQUIRED BY SP320 OPENA8ILITY OF BORON FLOW PATHS SURVEILLANCE.
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- ! I A THUNDERSTORM HAD BEEN IN THE AREA FOR TWO TO THREE HOURS.
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2.
INITIATING EVENT i
A LIGHTNING STRIKE ON THE FEEDER LINE FROM THE 230(V SWITCHYARD TO THE
.'i p' UNIT 3 STARTUP TRANSFORMER. THE SRIKE CLEARED THE FE'EDER BREAKERS FROM g ~.
THE SWITCHYARD AND THE FEEDER BREAKERS TO THE 6900 VAC AND 4160 VAC l
8USES. THE BUS BREAKERS TRIPPING CAUSED AN UNDERVOLTAGE ON BOTH UNIT AND ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS BUSES. THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS WERE BEING iI POWERED FROM THE UNIT AUXILIARY' TRANSFORMER. LOSS OF THE UNIT BUSES AND THE ES BUSES LED TO A LOSS OF POWER TO THE CRD SYSTEM INITIATING A i
REACTOR / TURBINE TRIP. THIS TRIP CAUSED UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER l
UNDER VOLTAGE AND t.0SS OF 6900 VAC RC PUMP BUS.
AT THIS TIME CR3 HAS EXPERIENCED A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. THE UNIT t'
HAS NO FEEDERS COMING INTO THE BUSES FROM OFFSITE CLOSED AND THE UNIT
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.IS WITHOUT POWER EXCEPT FOR DC POWER AND 120 VAC VITAL POWER FROM THE INVERTENS. THE REGULATED INSTRUMENT BUSES ARE POWERED FROM NONVITAL SOURCE AND TRIP AT THIS TIME CAUSING A LOSS OF SECONDARY PLANT
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INSTRUMENTATION SIGNALS.
3.
PLANT POST TRIP RESPONSE REFER TO FIGURES 1 THROUGH 7 FOR THE PLANT RESPONSE.
AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE ATTACHED FIGURES. RC FLOW TOOK ABOUT THREE i !
MINUTES TO C0AST 00Wff AND ABOUT ONE AND A QUARTER MINUTES INTO THE TRANSIENT NATURAL CIRC FLOW UAS BEGINNING TO TAKE OVER. THE TRANSITION CAN BE SEEN BY USING THE PLOT OF REACTOR T VS TIME. WHERE-T BEGINS TO INCREASE NATURAL CIRCULATION FLOW IS BEGINNING TO i b PREDOMINATE. THIS FLOW IS BEING SET UP BY THE EMERGENCY FEE 0 WATER SYSTEM FILLING THE OTSG'S.
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THE STARTUP CONTROL VALVES USED T0 CONTROL LEVEL ON LOSS OF 4 EP'S SHOULO HAVE FILLED THE STEAM GENERATORS TO 501 ON THE OPERATING RANGE.
IN FACT. BOTH OTSG'S OVERFILLED. THE OVERFILL WAS 00E TO THE LOSS OF jl INSTRUMENT AIR CAUSING AN AIR LOCK ON THE STARTUP VALVES. THE OPERATIONS PERSONNEL RECOGNIZED THE PH08LEM AND ISOLATED THE STARTUP CONTROL VALVES AND SUBSEQUENTLY CONTROLLED STEAM GENERATOR LEVELS USING
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THE EMERGENCY FEE 0 WATER BLOCK' BYPASS VALVES. ~
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REALIZING THAT A LARGE C00LDOWN WOULO BE EXPERIENCED THE "A" MAKEUP PUMP 1 j WAS PLACED IN SERVICE POWERED BY THE "A" EMERGENCY DIESEL. AND THE INJECTION VALVE TO THE COOLED N0ZZLE WAS OPENE0. PRESSURIZER LEVEL
- v
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CONTINUED TO OROP AND THE DECISION WAS MADE TO USE BOTH N0ZZLES FROM l ', {
THE "A" MAKEUP PUNP. FLOW APPEARED TO BE LOW TO THE OPERATOR EVEN i
THOUGH PUMP LOAD INDICATED 1101. HE THEN CHUT DOWN THE "A" MAKEUP PUMP i
AND VERIFIED THE VALVE LINEUP AND RESTARTED THE "A" PUMP. LATER THE I
OTHER TWO INJECTION N0ZZLES WERE OPENED IN AN ATTEMPT TO INCREASE FLOW. AT A800T 4 MINUTES INTO THE TRANSIENT THE "C" MAKEUP PUMP WAS e
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STARTED AND PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL ESTABLISHED. A REVIEW OF THE r
MAKEUP PUMP CAPACITY CURVES SHOWS THAT THE INDICATED FLOWS WERE CORRECT FOR THE PRESSURES IN THE SYSTEM AND THE FLOW N0ZZLES BEING USED.
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UPON THE LOSS OF 4160 ES BUS VOLTAGE, BOTH DIESELS ATTEMPTED TO START
'AS THEY WERE DESIGNED. THE "A" EMERGENCY DIESEL WAS SUCCESSFUL AND LOADED PROPERLY. HOWEVER THE "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL EXPERIENCED A-
" START FAIL" TRIP. THE "B" 4160 ES BUS AND ASSOCIATED 480 VES BUS WERE THEN POWERED FROM THE FOSSIL PLANT STARTUP TRANSFORMER. THE "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL WAS LATER TESTED AND ONE OF TWO 7 SECOND TIME DELAY
" START FAIL RELAYS." WAS FOUND TO TRIP AT FIVE AND 8/100 SECONDS. THE EARLY TRIP OF THE ENGINE BY THE RELAY MAY NOT HAVE ALLOWED THE UNIT TO COME TO REQUIRED SPEED AND LUBE OIL PRESSURE. THE START FAIL RELAYS WERE RESET AND TESTED AND THE "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY TESTED.
UPON LOSS OF 80TH MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS THE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMPS STARTED AND THE FEEDWATER BLOCK VALVES OPERATED AS DESIGNED. THE
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OPERATORS TOOK EARLY ACTION TO PREVENT OVERFEED BY CLOSING.THE l.
EMERGENCY FEEDWATER BLOCK BYPASS VALVES. UPON SEEING THE STEAM GENERATOR OVERFILL SITUATION, THE OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TOOK TWO APPROPRIATE ACTIONS,
- 1) SHUT THE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER BLOCK VALVES AND o-L TOOK LEVEL CONTROL USING THE EMERGENCY FLOW BYPASS VALVES, AND 2)
TRIPPED THE STEAM DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEED PUMP TO PREVENT WATER INDUCTION TO THE PUMP. EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOW WAS THEN SUPPLIED AS REQUIRED USING THE ALREADY OPERATING MOTOR DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEED PUMP.
1 OTHER PR08 LENS EXPERIENCED DURING RECOVERY PHASE INCLUDE:
p A) INABILITY TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SURGE TANK LEVEL DEMIN WATER PUMPS SUPPLIED AS NON VITAL LOAD.
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- 8) WITH LOSS OF CIRCULATING WATER TO THE CONDENSER THE TURBINE SPEED DROPPED RAPIDLY CAUSING LOSS OF SEAL OIL TO MAIN GENERATOR SEAL OIL PUMP FAILED TO START DUE TO CLOGGED ORIFICE IN INSTRUMENT LINE.
THIS ALLOWED THE GENERATOR HYDROGEN TO ESCAPE TO THE TURBINE BUILDING.
s C) WHEN THE UNIT BUSES EXPERIENCED THE LOSS OF POWER THE WATER
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TREATMENT N0 TOR CONTROL CENTER (fCC) WAS WITHOUT PDWER, DEMIN WATER COULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE WATER TREATMENT PLANT INTO CR3.
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- 0) THE CHEM-RAD AREA LOST VENTILATION AND WITH A HOT ENVIRONMENT AND SONEWHAT UNSTABLE VOLTAGE SUPPLIES THE RADI0 CHEMISTRY INSTRUMENT ACTION WAS IN0PERABLE. COULD NOT GET PRIMARY SAMPLES AND COULD NOT
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GET ANALYZED.
E) FAILURE OF LIGHTNING ARRESTOR SYSTEM TO PREVENT STRIKE CLEARING y
STARTUP TRANSFORMER.
THE UNIT WAS MAINTAINED IN THE HOT STAND 8Y MODE. POWER WAS REESTABLISHED INTO THE PLANT THROUGH THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER AT APPROXIMATELY 0436. NATURAL CIRCULATION WAS MAINTAINED UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 230 THE MORNING OF THE 17TH OF JUNE WHEN 4 FC PUMPS s.
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WERE RESTARTED. THE REASON FOR WAITING TO GO ON FORCED FLOW WAS
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REESTABLISHMENT OF ADEQUATE SECONDARY PLANT CONDITIONS TO HANDLE THE ADDITIONAL HEAT LOADS AND ADDITIONALLY THE RC SYSTEM BEHAVIOR ON NATURAL CIRCULATION WAS EXCELLENT.
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- 4. OPERATOR ACTION AND PROCEDURAL ADEQUACY
[-p THE OPERATOR ACTIONS WERE APPROPRIATE AND ADEQUATE ATTACHE 0 TA8LE IS A COMPARISON OF THE OPERATOR ACTION t
AND DRAFT ATW.
THE ATQ3 COMPARISON WAS BASED IN PART ON THE O
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ATOG AND INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY 86W LYNCHBURG FRO s
BEING PREPARED.
THE OPERATOR ACTIONS INCLUDED ALL ITEMS ADDRESSED l
AND DRAFT ATW.
IN ADDITION, THE OPERATOR RESPONDED TO PLANT SYMPTONS NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED BY PROCEDURES.
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THE ATTACHED TA8LE INDICATES THAT THE OPERATOR ACTION. A 4
PROCEDUdES ARE ADEQUATE TO PROVIDE THE MAJOR PLANT CONTROL NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE PLANT IN A SAFE CONFIGURATION QURI OFFSITE POWER WITH FAILURE OF ONE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATO THE PLANT STAFF IS TO BE COMMENDED FOR ITS ACTION BOTH AND THE QUALITY OF THE PLANT PROCEDURE AVAILABLE TO DE er 7..
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OPERATOR ACTION APO PLANT PROEDlRE C0iPARISON I
(PERATOR ACTION PLANT PROCEDURES DRAFT ATOG r
VEHIFIED HEACTOR AND AP-110 REACTOR TRIP SECTION I TURBINE TRIP BY BOTH GP-101 COMPLETE TOSS OF c.
ls INDICATOR AND PARAMETERS EXTERNAL AC POWER A.
TRIP THE REACTOR B.
TRIP THE TURBINEII AP-110 C.
PROCEED TO SECT II A. REACTOR HAD TRIPPED VERIFY C E TRIP t,
N0DS WERE ON THE TURBINE VALVES CLOSED, BOTTON. POWER IS GENERATOR BREAKERS OPEN AND DECREASING ALL " ROD BOTTOM LIGHTS" ON, c
CLOSE LETDOWN. MAINTAIN >40" B. TUHBINE HnD TRIPPED IN PRESSURIZER LEVEL
.AND LOAD INDICATED INDICATION SECTION II
{-
"O" BREAKERS OPEN 1.
REACTOR POWER C. CLOSED LETDOWN ISOLA-EP101 2.
ALL RODS ON BOTTOM e-TION VERIFY AUTO ACTION INCLUDING 3.
TURBINE STOP VALVES
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AUTO START & LOADING OF BOTH CLOSED D. STARTED A MAKEUP PUMP DIESELS, IF NOT, ENERGIZE ES 4.
LETDOWN FLOW 6 VERIFIED FLOW BUS (S) FROM UNIT 162 50 5.
FEEDWATER RUNBACK i
TRANSFORMER:
6.
NNIX AND Y POWER ON E. WITH LOSS OF 0FFSITE VERIFY EN FLOW AND LEVEL 7.
ICS POWER IS ON POWEH IS NOT CONTROL: IF WI HAS ACTUATED
- 8. AUXILIARY POWER FROM NECESSANY VERIFY SUBC00 LED MARGIN OR SJ TRANSFORMER.
I ECCS FLOW A. VERIFY AUTO START F. OBSERVED 8 DIESEL OF BOTH DIESELS: IF FAILED TO START, NOT LINE UP TO ENERGIZED B4160V ES ALTERNATE POWER IF BUS FROM UNIT FOSSIL AVAILABLE.
PLANT STARTUP TRANS-B. VERIFY EN START &
FORMER LEVEL CONTROL C. ENSURE MAKEUP PUMP G. OPERATOR VERIFIED EN START ADD SEAL IN-FLOW, AND TOOK MANUAL JECTION (ATOG DOES
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CONTHOL WHEN STARTUP NOT SPECIFICALLY VALVES FAILED TO ADDRESS LOSS OF CONTROL LEVEL STOPPED INSTRUMENT AIR OR j
TURBINE DRIVEN EN MANY OF THE BOP (AFTER VERIFYING PROBLEMS THE OPERA-MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP TOR WAS FORCED TO i
WAS RUNNING) TO PRE-DEAL WITH)
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VENT WATER DAMAGE TO 9.
No SS ALARMS THE TURBINE IN THE RESTORE POWER AS S00N AS
- 10. ADEQUATE SUBC00 LING
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EVENT OF OVERFILL POSSIBLE (OVERFEED NOT
- 11.. ADEQUATE PRIMARY TO ADDRESSED IN DETAIL)
- 12. O PRIMARY TO SECOND-H. OPERATOR VERIFIED W I ARY HEAT TRANSFER FLO./ (MAKEUP) AND EXCESSIVE SUBC00 LED MARGINE GO To SECTION III C
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I. CLOSED EP4 BLOCK VALVE. CONTROLLED EPW SECTION III 3C l(
BLOCK VALVE BYPASS (EN 161 AND 162) AND 1.0 VERIFY PRESSURIZE CONTROLLED LEVEL OR RESTORE W/
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OPERATOR ACTION AM) PLANT FRriaRE COPARISON L
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J IFERATOR ACTION PLANT PRLwlRS DRAFT Alw Q
t J. STABILI2E0 THE PLANT 2.0 RB PRESSURE / TEMP VERIFIED NATURAL INCREASE l'
CIRCULATION BY 3.0 $ PRESSURE NOT OBSERVING IC DECREASE INCREASING WHEN TBV'S WERE USED TO LOWER PHESSURE AND GO TO SECTION 5.0 L..
VERIFIED OTSG STEP 5.0 7
CLO6E START UP FEED q,
WATCH CONTROL VALVE
& ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONTROL (WHEN LEVEL
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APPROACHES SET POINT -
GO TO STEP 6.0 IF OTSG LEVEL IS INCREASING.
l" STEP 6.0 SECTION III3C 6.0 CONTROL RC TEMP W/
TBV I
6.1 MAINTAIN APPROPRIATE LEVEL (THIS IS STEP 7.8) 6.2 CONTROL PRESSURIZED LEVEL l[
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k C. SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS P
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THERE WERE NO SAFETY LIMITS EXCEEDED DURING THIS TRANSIENT. A ACTUATION WAS NOT REQUIRED: HOWEVER HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION ( WI) WAS h,
MANUALLY INTIATED TO PREVENT LOSS OF-PRESSURIZER LEVEL INDICATION IN 5
THE INITIAL POST-TRIP OVERC00 LING PORTION OF THE TRANSIENT. TWO WI PUMPS WEHE STARTED AND W I FLOW DIRECTED FROM THE 84 T TO THE RCS THROUGH ALL F W I N0ZZLES.
BOTH MAIN FEEDWATER AND FORCED RC FLOW WERE LOST CONCURRENT WITH OFFSITE POWER AND REACTOR TRIP. THE EMERGENCY FEED PUMPS STARTED AS DESIGi4ED AND SUPPLIED WATER TO THE OTS3'S THROUGH THE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER N0ZZLES. A SLIGHT OVERC00 LING OF THE RCS OCCURRED WHEN THE STARTUP FEEDJATER VALVES DID NOT CONTROL THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVELS AT 50% ON TH OPERATOR RANGE. AS DESIGNED, BECAUSE 0F THE AIR LOCKS DUE TO LOSS OF INSTRUllENT AIR. EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FED THE OTSG'S To 80-90% ON THE OPE L'
RANGE BEFORE THE OPERATOR STOPPED THE OVERFEED BY CLOSING THE EMERGENCY BLOCK VALVES. MINIMUM STEAM PRESSURES APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN 621 PSIG IN TH
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STEAM GENERATOR.AND 461 PSIG IN THE B STEAM GENERATOR. THE MINIMUM RCS
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PHEgSURE WAS ABOUT 1855 PSIG AND RCS T@60 INCHES INDIC DROPPED TO APPR0XIMATELY 510 F.
PdESSURIZER LEVEL REMAINED AB0 f
ONCE THE OPERATORS STOPPED THE OVERFEEDING OF THE STEAM GENERATORS, THEY ALLOWED THE STEAf1 GENERATORS TO BOIL DOWN TO THE 50% OPERATE RAf1GE LE DESIRED FOR NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLING. PRESSURIZER LEVEL INCREASED TO OVER 200 INCHES AND RCS PRESSURE INCREASED TO ABOUT 2450 PSIG.
THE PCRV i
WHICH IS SET AT 2450 PSIG, OPENED AND CLOSED PROPERLY 4 OR S TIMES TO RELIEVE PRIl1ARY SYSTEM PRESSURE.
l'
{
FOLLOUING THE REACTOR TRIP AND LOSS OF FORCED RC FLOW, NATURAL CIRCULATION FLOW WAS ESTABLISHED QUICKLY IN THE RC AS THE FORCED FLOW C0ASTED DOUN.
THIS PROVIDED ADEQUATE COOLING FOR THE REACTOR CORE. THE. REACTO 1
MAINTAINED IN THE NATURAL CIRCULATIONS COOLING MODE FOR ABOUT 9 HOURS BE THE RC PUMPS WERE RESTARTED.
IT TC0K THE "A" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ABOUT 17 SECONDS AFT OF OFFSITE POWER TO START AND LOAD THE "A" 4160 VOLT ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD (ES) bus.
THE "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CRANKED BUT DID NOT STAR IT' TOOK THE OPERATORS ABOUT 4 MINUTES TO REP 0WER THE "B" 4160 VOLT ES BUS B i
SWITCHING POWER TO UNIT 3 4160 ES BUS "B" FROM THE UNITS 1 AND 2 STARTUP TRANSFORMER.
l~
WHILE THERE WERE A NUM3ER OF SECONDARY PLANT PROBLEMS WHICH REQUIRED OPEHATOR ATTENTION AS A RESULT OF THE LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER THE OPERATOR CLEARLY GAVE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO MAINTAINING ADEQUATE CORE COOLING AND
{
PHIMARY SYSTEM INTEGRITY. ADEQUATE CORE COOLING AND SUBC00 LING MARGIN MAINTAINED AT ALL TIMES DURING THE INITIAL TRANSIENT AND THE SUBSEQUENT 9 HOURS OF NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLING.
\\.
APP 90IX C FJ{
TRANSIENT ASSESSE NT PROGR41 p
CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT t.
PLANT: CRYSTAL RIVER III TAP No:
(-L TRIP DATE: 06/16/81 i
i I
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y-
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. %.--c
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m O g'~~)
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2600 POST TRIP 2400 WINDOW
^
2200
.T I--~'S E
L__
k 2000 5
SUBC00 LED g
REGION SUPERHEAT E
1800 REGION a.
1600 5
E O:
g 1400 i
g END POINT-POST TRIP NITH o
FORCEO CIRCULATION (TH0T 1200 STEAR PRESSURE m &TCOLO) Am FOR NATURAL 2
LIMIT CIRCULATION (TCOLO) 1000 g
NORNAL OPERATING POINT-POWER OPERATION (TH0T)
~
SATURATION r- -
END POINT-POST TRIP WITH I
i NATURAL CIRCUL ATION (THOT) 600 i
+
SUBC00 LED 400 I
MARGIN LINE O
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f 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 Reactor Coolant and Steam Outlet Temperature. F i
r -- ;
n r- -
n n
( ~,
r- -
r -
n.
O n
,7 r7 O
c--)
Q d
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LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER JUNE 16,1981 Figure 2 t
65 60 i
i, UNIT AT VS RC FLOW 50 UNIT AT B0
- _ 40 oT 2
O RC FLOW A 60 30 a RC FLOW 8 7
e
'iit o
<a
]
y 40 20
.o A
E 20 10 RC FLOW A RC FLOW 8 1
I O
O I
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e i
^
1 i
i e
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l a
37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 Time (minutes) i
p.
~
g g
g g
g
(
)
LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER JUNE 16.1981 Figure 3 600 590 Tave, PZR LEVEL 580 0T ave 220 570 O PZR LEVEL 200 560 l
5 190 C 550 5
E 180 - # 540
>3 160 530 1
140 520 Z
5
=
120 510 4
2 100 500 f
l 80 490
/
60 480
' i '
37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 Time (minutes) 1 1
7. ~_
- g..
7.-
m
,__ q
~
-r
,)
i LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER JUNE 16,1981 Figure 4 i
PRESSURIZER LEVEL VS RC PRESSURE i
2350 2
2300 l
2250 220 O PZR LEVEL 2
l 3
2200 -E200 O RC PRESSURE O
E 2150 - [ 180 I
R l
2100 160
=
R RC PRESSURE m
E o
2050 140 ac 1
PZR LEVEL 1
l 2000 120 l
1950 100 3
I, 1900 80 I
l 1850 60 t
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t i
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f 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 l
Time (minutes) l
i
,m g
q q
7,,c
_f
~
LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER JUNE 19,1981 Figure 5 i
MO l
590 I, T, AND T VS TIME n
c ave 580 i
]
oi n I
O 570 OT e j
A T,,,
l 560
=
l In j
E.
558 T
. l*
540 o
L i
530 C
,~
520 t
l 510 J
1 i
500 l
4Q0 l
480 1
l 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 i
1 Time (minutes)
-~
~
7, m
m
} xD.
(.
n
~~
3 1
)
LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER JUNE 16.1981 Figure 6 1050 t
j 570 1000 T VS STEAM PRESSURE c
1 i
560 950 l
1 550
^ 900 O STEAN GEN. PRESS. A
(
3 a
O STEAR GEN. PRES'S: B n
540 850 aT ea s
530 800
.T
~
co ~
0 C
)
L 520 - - 750 T
co u
STEAM s
510 - % 700
~
GEN. B c=
i
=
i
=
STEAM 500 g 650 GEN. A
=
I 490 4
600 -
T
\\
ca
.1 i
480 550 i
i i
470 500 -
i I
460 -
450 8
37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 Time (minutes) l l
7.,
g....
P r~
.7 O
9
- c. -i.
' ' ~ ~ '
'~
~ ~ '
~'
'^
~ ~ ' ' '
4_..
).
j LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER JUNE 16.1981 Figure 7 1
l j
STEAM GENERATOR LEVELS O A STEAN GENERATOR LEVEL i
{
100 O B STEAR GENERATOR LEVEL l
90 m
5 4
80 23 "l
t 70 3
9 g
60 5
l 3
50 l
i 3
w l
40
]
30 l
20 i
10 i
/
j 0
I i
e i
e i
e i
e i
i i
i i
i i
J 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 i
i Time (minutes) i i
l
- A