ML20211C593
| ML20211C593 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/1984 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211C348 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-312 OL-2, NUDOCS 8606120349 | |
| Download: ML20211C593 (161) | |
Text
,
6Rietjy,q U:N11ED STATES
- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:
DOCKET NO: 50-445-OL2 50-446-OL2 TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, et al.
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unites 1 and 2)
PREHEARING BRIEFING LOCATION:
BETHESDA, MARYLAND PAGES:
205 - 342 QAIE:.
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1984 i
8606120349 860606
$jyog@1g ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
gon Opcial Reporters 444 horth CaitolStreet
//4-yyb/)
Washington, b.C. 20001 (202) 34~-3700 MATIONWTDE COVERACE
^=-
CR20990.0 CRT/sjg 205 I
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 4
In the Matter of:
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING Docket Nos. 50-445-OL2 5
COMPANY, et al.,
50-446-OL2 6
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2) 7
x 8
Room 422 9
Phillips Building 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland Friday, November 9, 1984 i
The briefing in the above-entitled matter was convened 12 pursuant to notice at 9:00 a.m.
APPEARANdES:
14 on behalf of the Applicants:
McNEILL WATKINS II, ESQ.
16 ERIC L.
HIRSCHHORN, ESQ.
SCOTT M. DuBOFF, ESQ.
37 Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
18 Washington, D. C.
20036 19 On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commissio'n Staff:
20
~
STUART A.
TREBY, ESQ.
Office of the Executive 21 Legal Director U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory commission 22 Washington, D. C.
23 24 c-7.w:a reponen, Inc.
25
-- continued --
f i
l
206 I
APPEARANCES (Continued):
2 On behalf of Citizens Association for 3
Sound Energy:
4 ANTHONY Z.
ROISMAN, ESQ.
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P.C.
2000 P Street, N.W.
5 Suite 611 Washington, D. C.
20036 7
ALSO PRESENT:
8 JACK REDDING Texas Utilities Electric Company 9
JAMES LANDERS Dallas Morning News 11 MEMBERS OF EG&G TEAM:
12 DAVID G.
BOWERS, Foundation for Research
~
on Human Behavior k
y3 BRUCE KAPLAN, EG&G Idaho WILLIAM E. STRATTON, Idaho State University CHARLES M. RICE, LRS Consultants I4 NEWTON MARGULIES, University of California, Irvine 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 c=J oer:a Reponers, Inc.
25 i
~
^ - ~ ~ ~
~ ' ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~
207 1
CONTENTS 2
WITNESSES EXAMkNATION DR. DAVID BOWERS 3
by Mr. Hirschhorn 208 L Q M r: faitrnen g3,y BRUCE KAPLAN WILLIAM E. STRATTON 5
CHARLES M. RICE NEWTON MARGULIES 0
by Mr. Hirschhorn (Resumed) 268 by Mr. Roisman 298 8
_E _X _H _I _B _I _T _S 9
EXHIBITS IDENTIFIED Exhibit 10 208 33 Exhibit 11 220 Exhibit 12 342'
{
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15 16 17 18 i
19 20 21 22 23 24
- n FederJ Reporters, Inc.
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20990.0 208 BRT 1
PROCEEDINGS 2
MR. TREBY:
We are how going to begin the second 3
day of the briefing session.
And, as we had indicated, 4
the schedule for today is that Dr. David Bowers is 5
available for the first two hours to be examined by the 6
attorneys for both the applicant and the intervenors, and 7
will also be available for the final two hours where the 8
rest of the panel is available.
9 If anybody concludes early and wants to get to the 10 other people, that's quite all right with the staff.
11 My further understanding is that today the order will 12 be that the applicant's attorneys will go first, and
(,,
13 Mr. Roisman will go second.
With that, I make Mr. -- or 14 Dr. Bowers available to Mr. Hirschhorn and Mr. DuBoff.
15 EXAMINATION OF DR. DAVID BOWERS 16 BY MR. HIRSCHHORN 17 Q
Good morning.
I wonder if we could start by 18 introducing your vitae for the record and marking it as an 19 exhibit.
I think I have that one.
I'll give it to you.
20 (Exhibit 10 identified.)
21 BY MR. HIRSCHHORN:
~
22 O
I wonder if you could just give us a brief 4
23 narrative description of your background, both teaching, 24 researching, and practical background specifically as it 25 relates to organizations like the one that was studied
20990.0 209 BRT 1
here?
2 A
In terms of education I received my bachelor's 3
degree in b,usiness administration and my master's of arts 4
in psychology from Kent State University.
Then I received 5
my doctorate in organizational psychology from the 6
University of Michigan in 1962.
'7 Following that, I remained at the Institute for Social
'8 Research at the University of Michigan until -- well, in 9
fact until August 31st, this year, when I took retirement 10 from the university.
11 Between that period and 1978, that is 1962 to 1978, I 12 was a primary research staff person; that is the research 12 faculty of the university.
And in that capacity, 14 conducted a number of studies of organizational behavior, 15 organizational development, and other related such 16 problems, all having to deal with organizations, their 17 functioning, their outcomes, and so on.
18 The primary method, I suppose, that I used in those 19 studies, patly because the Institute for Social Research 20 is a large and fairly famous name in the survey area, was 21 the survey; by interviews, sometimes> but principally by 22 paper and pencil questionnaire.
23 I have done a number of such ctudies.
I can't even 24 count how many -- from 1962 on.
In the course of that I 25 suppose I developed a fair amount of expertise in the area e
O
5 20990.0 210 BRT 1
of organizational diagnosis, that is, diagnosing 2
organizational strengths and weaknesses from the patterns 3
of survey responses particularly.
4 Beginning in 1978 until this last August I split my 5
time, 50/50, between the university where I directed the i
6 Institute's organizational development research program, 7
and Renais Likert As'sociates, which is a consulting firm 8
outside the university.
Rensis Likert was the founder and 9
first director of the institute, was its director for 25 10 years; and on his retirement in 1970 he did something that 11 he always wanted to do, which was to establish an 12. applications entity, essentially free from the constraints 13 of bureaucracy and sc on in the university, to apply the 14 findings that he and others had generated over those man' 15 years.
16 In 1978 at his request I began to split my time 50/50, 17 and became, in that year, vice chairman and president of 18 Ronsis L1kert Associates.
19 As I say, I took early retirement in August of this 20 year and am now essentially full-time at Rensis Likert 21 Associatest retired from the university.
22 During my university years I taught.
I taught in a 23 variety of kinds of areas.
Several times I taught a basic 24 course in personnel psychology, which had to do with 25 issues like seicetion and so on, which is not particularly c-.-
20990.0 211 BRT 1
my area of preferred work, nor is it my &rea of greatest 2
expertise.
I also taught for, oh, a number of years, my 3
graduate seminar in the theory of organizational 4
development and change.
I taught as well, basic courses 5
in the graduate school of business for several years, 6
basic courses in what was called organizational behavior 7
and industrial relations, it was basically organizational 8
psychology but taught in the business school.
9 I have written a number of journal articles, research 10 reports, some bookst have done a great deal of research 11 for the U.S. Navy, and I suppose the other salient fact is 12 I was a member of the three-person task force that Drew d
13 Lewis, Secretary of Transportation in 1981, appointed to 14 look into the Federal Aviation Administration in the wake 15 of the PATCO strike.
And the other two members of that 16 task force authored a two volume report that appeared in 17 early '82.
18 I'm not sure what more to say.
Could you describe the report you did for the 21 Department of Transportation?
22 A
Basically the tack force was charged by the 23 Secretary with going into the agency and looking into 24 management practicos -- management and employment 25 practices, I believe the title of it was, in the agency.
q
20990.0 212 BRT 1
It was a very broad mandate, but they were concerned that 2
that incredible event had happened, and what kinds of 3
conditions had caused essentially 12,000 people to break 4
the law against overwhelming odds, walk out and not come 5
back.
And, as a task force, we decided to do' essentially 6
three things.
7 The three of us visited many facilities, talked to a 8
large number of people.
So we had interviews, relatively 9
informal interviews; not structured ones.
10 We also did a survey of practices and opinion: and 11 ~
attitudes of people working in the facilities and people 12 in the regional offices, the Washington headquarters, and
("
13 also a parallel sample, which I organized, of the PATCO 14 strikers in matched facilities.
15 Then we retained McKinsey and Company to do an analysis 16 of more formal systems, things like traffic variability 17 and peaks and valleys and so forth.
18 Volume 1 of the report contains the basic findings from 19 tne task force's effort, both our conclusions and 20 recommendations as a task force, and a report of the 21 survey results.
I directed the survey operation.
And 22 also an account of the McKinsey findings.
23 Volume 2 contains other analyses and essentially backup 24 data that were not contral to Volume 1, but we thought 25 should be presented.
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20990.0 213 BRT 1
BY MR. HIRSCHHORN:
2 Q
What kinds of conclusions did you reach about 3
the problems or lack of problems in the FAA?
4 A
Basically we concluded that the FAA's management 5
practices and style were atrocious; that the treatment 6
thsy accorded people was punitive, autocratic, arbitrary, 7
and that in at least one analysis that was reported in 8
Volume 2, that a basic cause of the strike was, indeed, 9
the treatment that those people had received.
So we came 10 down very negatively against the agency.
11 Q
In describing your work with the Institute, you 12 indicated that you used surveys as your primary. research 13 tool?
14 A
That's right.
15 Q
And that they typically were written questions 16 and answers?
17 A
Typically paper and pencil questionnaires; more 18 often closed end questions, where you check a response 19 category.
20 0
So that in your view, face to face interviewing 21 is not an essential component of fin' ding out what's going
~
22 on in an organization?
23 A
In an organization, no.
The difference la that 24 well, there are two differences between the use of an 25 interview and the use of a paper and pencil questionnaire, e
e 8
-m-em**
214 20990.0 BRT If you are going to go to respondents who 1
in my judgment.
for example.you have no particular stake in the outcome, 2
to do a national cross-sectional survey of attitudes 3
want 4
toward refrigerators, you could -- and, indeed, many 5
Congressmen do mail out 200,000 paper and pencil send of which go to a waste basket, 6
questionnaires most get back 500 and conclude something -- well, 7
out 200,000, 8
that doesn't do anything.
you If you want a reliable sample of opinion from some, 9
population that has no reason otherwise to provide 10
- know, 11 it to you, then you almost always have to go to an Because there's no other way that you can get 12 interview.
the attedtion of the respondent.
13 in The other is if you don't totally know the content 14 you know the areas but you are not quite certain 15
- advance, there you may need optional l
16 what fleshes out the area, which means that to get that kind of 17 probes and so on, elaboration you have to go to an interview.
o 18 Interviews are basically much more expensive per bit of 19 interviews information than are questionnaires, but 20 flexibility and detail whereas questionnaires 21 provide more standard data from a larger number 22 permit you to collect 23 of people.
interacted with the 24 Q
I'm curious about how you 25 rest of the team that prepared this report.
I gathered
20990.0 215 BRT 1
from the discussion that we all had yesterday that the 2
team members, at least Dr. Margulies and Mr. Rice, read 3
raw data and then'the team would meet and then they would 4
go back and read more data.
We'll clarify later whether 5
that's correct, but that's the sense I got.
6 Did you participate in the same way or are you working 7
entirely separately and producing only a written document?
8 A
I was working separately producing a written.
9 document.
I had, I think, a telephone conversation or two 10 of a sort of minor' type with Mr. Kaplan, and similarly 11 couple of phone' conversations with Mr. Stratton, and a 12 couple of administrative kinds of calls around contract 13 issues and so on, with Mr. Obenchain and a Ms. Rydalch.
14 But other than that I had, let's call it an 15 encapsulated task, a very definite task, and I did that 16 and did not interact with the other team members.
17.
Q You didn't compare notes as you went or anything 18 like that?
19 A
No.
No.
20 0
The final report notes on page 30, and I think l
21 that probably was taken pretty directly from your report, 22 that the 1983 survey, "was constructed specifically for 23 you in the QA/QC organisation and was also specifically 24 constructed around" -- specified categories.
And then the 25 four categories mentioned are:
Supervision, attitudes of e
~
12 20990.0 216 i
BRT 1
top management, relationship between QC and craft, and 2
attitudes of craft personnel.
3 In terms of the inquiry that you, and ultimately the 4
team were asked to make, would you consider these 5
appropriate target categories?
6 A
Yes.
I believe I would.
7 Q
And in terms of adequacy of the sample, I take 8
it you would consider that -- I guess the word used here 9
was " valid responses" -- or " usable responses" of 139 10 questionnaires out of 150 that were sent out is a pretty 11 good and pretty high result?
12 A
I would say.that that's -- yes.
Th,ats a fairly 13
- high and adequate sample.
15 Q
Dr. Bowers, I don't know a great deal about 16 statistics, and that's probably going to become evident in 17 a moment or two.
18 Could you turn to appendix C, please?
On page C-7, 19 could you explain the acquiescence response tendency?
20 That term, a little bit more, for us?
21 A
Okay.
What that refers to'in this* report is the 22 tendency of a person, if they were to feel intimidated, to 23 give essentially a favorable -- to the organization, the 24 company or whatever -- response.
Which, since, as I 25 pointed out in the report, some of the items were worded b,
-s.
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20990.0 217 BRT 1
in the negative, where mostly "no" would be favorable to 2
the company; and others were worded.in the positive, where 3
mostly "yes" would be, then the issue is:
Is there a 4
discernible and kind of persuasive tendency for people to 5
answer "mostly no" to the negatives more of ten than they 6
would answer "mostly yes" to the fairly low threat, 7
innocuous ones.
That's the kind of issue that refers to.
8 Q
Okay.
This survey was ' submitted in an anonymous 9
form, was it not?
10 A
It's my understanding that it was.
At least I 11 know nothing of who these individuals were and it's my 12 understanding that there was no way that individuals were
(,
13 identified.
14 Q
And how does that affect your ability to draw 15 conclusions from the data?
16 A
The anonymity?
17 0
Yes, the anonymity?
18 A
It doesn't affect it.
19 Q
How would it be different -- would your 20 conclusions be any different if the respondents were 21 identified, or could have been identified?
22 A
If the respondents had been, for example, 23 required to put their names on their questionnaires, or 24 sign their questionnaires, that certainly would affect any 25 pattern of responses.
Not only around the issue of 9
.- _ ~ ~ ~
.~.-
20990.0 218 BRT 1
intimidation, but around substantive issues.
\\
2 Q
Another term that I'm not entirely clear on is, t
3 on the top of page C-8,
" systematic referrent differences."
4 Would you explain that a bit for us?
5 A
The referrent, the term "referrent" means what 6
did the question refer to, topically.
7 For example, were all of the high threat items -- did 8
all of the high or most of the high threat items refer to 9
supervision and most of the low threat items refer t.o 10 craft?
In other words, were there differences like that?
11 And were 'there systematic dif ferences among the " threat" 12 categories, in terms of what the items referred to.
13 Q
Could you give me -- I'm not sure I follow'that.
14 Could you give me an example?
I guess I understand what 15 you mean by "referrent" but not how it relates to your use 16 of the'" systematic"?
17 A
Well, " systematic" means something other than a 18 random pattern.
In other wor'ds, were they systematically 19 different.
20 In other words -- whenever there was a high threat item, 21 did it refer to something supervision did?
But whether 22 they wanted to talk about low threat items, did they refer 23 to craft, or management, or policies?
T*
24 Q
I see.
Thank you.
25 BY MR. HIRSCHHORN:
e e s,-
4w.
n--
20990.0 219 BRT 1
O obviously you had some more knowledge of the 2
situation you were looking at than was.just contained in 3
the four corners of the questionnaires.
I wonder if you 4
could tell us the source of it and what it consisted of?
5 A
It really consisted of a letter which I received 6
shortly after agreeing to undertake this analysis, that 7
said basically -- well, basically outlined the issue; that 8
there were these questionnaires that had been collected 9
from QA/QC personnel; that the issue was one of -- well, 10 the question of intimidation, and was there evidence in 11 the questionnaire responses of intimidation?
That the 12 site was a nuclear plant under construction.
I believe on 13 another letter,,a more administrative one, it identified 14 it as Comanche Peak; about which I, frankly, knew nothing.
15 I had heard the name probably referred to in a news 16 article a couple of years before.
I wasn't even certain
)
17 where it was.
That's about what I knew.
18 I did not for example, the questionnaires were 19 clumped into clusters with names, with a name on it like 20
" Smith" or " Jones."
I assumed that these were some sort 21 of organizational clusters, but that's about_,_all that I 22 knew.
23 0
I would like to show you a document and ask you 24 if this is the letter you are speaking of -- a copy of the 25 letter, since it seems to be an internal one?
[
i 20990.0 220 i
BRT 1\\
A Yes.
Yes.
2
' MR. HIRSCHHORN:
Shall we' mark that, please, as 3
number 11.
4 (Exhibit 11 identified.)
5 BY MR. HIRSCHHORN:
'6 Q
You said you had a couple of telephone 7
conferences, I guess," with Mr. Kaplan and Dr. Stratton.,.
8 I assume you had some discussion'with somebody before
'9 you agreed to.
I guess what I'm asking is, I would really 10 like you to go through step by step --
~
11 A
How it happened.
12 0
-- in addition to the' letter, hbw it happened k.
13 and.what information you got at what point, so we can hav'e 14 as full an idea as possible of what you were and were not 15 told in connection with your evaluation of these surveys.
16 A
Okay.
My typical pattern in the summer'is to 17
- spend about six weeks on a working vacation'at my place in 16
' northern Michigan.
This was where I was when a member of 19 my university -- then university office' staff, called me 20 and'eaid that she had received an inquiry from Mr. Kaplan.
21 And the issue was a nuclear plant un' der consIruction.
22 There were some questionnaires.
It was an issue of 23 intimidation.
And would I' be interested in, essentially, 24 analyzing those questionnaires around an issue of 25 intimidation.
O
20990.0 221 BRT 1
I told her I had many things to do up there, but, yes, 2
,I could probably uddertake,that if they wanted me to.
I 3
believe she called Mr. Kaplan back and passed that along 4
to him.
5 As I recall, I don't believe at that point Mr. Kaplan 6
and I had talked on the phone, I believe, by the time this 7
transpired he was on vacation and I had had a couple of 8
telephone calls well, of an administrative type, with 9
Mr. obenchain, and I believe a call or two with Mr.
10 Stratton.
But that was basically how it happened.
The 11 questionnaires, copies of the questionnaires plus th e -- I 12 want'to say -- the nondisclosure statement.
It may have
(
13 been some other document like that -- were sent to my 14 office and then sent by my assistant up to me at the lake.
15 That was -- that, plus in one of those conversations a 16 discussion about the tight time constraints involved, was 17 essentially what went on before my undertaking it 18 literally.
19 Q
I take it, then, that subsequent to receiving 20 this letter -- did the questionnaires come with this 21 letter which has been marked as Exhibit 1 1 ?.._
22 A
No.
I believe the questionnaires were sent 23 separately.
24 O
And subsequent to receiving this letter and 25 before beginning your review of the questionnaires, did t
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20990.0 222 BRT you have any further conversations with any of the team or A
' rom the prime contractor, about the study?
2 anyone else f
3 A
I remember a conversation.
It was not with 4
Mr. KapAan.
It may have been with Dr. Stratton.
It may 5
have been with Mr. Obenchain.
I'm not just certain who it 6
was.
7 The question I was putting forward -- one that most 8
concerned me was intimidation.
Was the issue:
Did the 9
substance of the. responses reflect intimidation?
Or, did 10 the pattern of responding?
Which was the focus, or both?
11 And, as I recall, whoever I talked to said:
- Well, 12 that's a good question.
It could be either one or both, I 13 suppose.
And I said:
Well, that's what I think, too.
14 And that essentially directed my analysis to looking at 15 both substance and the pattern of responding.
16 O
And the conclusion that you reached, then, 17 includes your conclusions as to both?
18 A
Yes.
Yes.
19 O
And during the course of examining these 20 questionnaires and before your final report was 21 transmitted -- which I guess was August 2nd e-did you 22 have any other conversations with members of +.he team?
23 A
As far as I can recall, I did not.
24 O
So that you never spoke at all, then, with 26 Dr. Margulies?
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20990.0 223 BRT 1
A Never.
2 O
Or with Mr. Rice?
3 A
Never.
In fact -- not. during the preparation of 4
this at all.
5 0
And you were never advised of the state of the 6
teum's -- or their individual reviews?
7 A
No.
9 O
Another term, if you will bear with me.
On pag.e.
10 C-8, if I can find it -- it's the third bullet paragraph 11 there:
"5 percent confidence interval"?
12 A
Right.
I 13 Q
Can you define that for me?
14 A
In a statistical test, the question is:
What 15 are the odds of finding something, simply by chance?
And 16 the way this is done is in terms of a probability 17 distribution.
And a very common one used in the social 18 sciences is what's ca'11ed the 5 percent level of 19 confidence.
That means you would expect a difference that 20 large or larger to occur only 5 percent of the time by 21 sheer chance.
22 So it's a kind of convention, although there are other 23 levels that are sometimes used, a common convention is to 24 say we will accept something as real if it would occur by 25 chance only 5 percent of the time or less.
And, so, in 9
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20990.0 224 BRT 1
the case of this particular thing, the question is:
What 2
distance on either side of the percentage would occur --
3 could occur by chance 5 percent of the time.
So that's 4
what that refers to.
5 Q
I wonder, does that in any way relate to " confidence,
6 band" that you referred to on page C-9, I believe?
7 A
Yes.
That's essentially the band -- the band is 8
that area.
9 Q
The same -- the range?
10 A
Right.
Right.
Thank you.
12 BY MR. HIRSCHHORN:
13 O'
Now, we know that you did not design this survey.
14 A
That's correct.
15 Q
But, given what it was and what it contained, 16 what was asked and what was answered, and given what you 17 were asked to examine it for, would you say that it was 18 useful?
19 A
Yes.
I would say that it was useful for i
20 examining the question that I was asked to look at.
l l
21 Q
And that is the question as set forth in Exhibit 22 11, of July 27 --
(
23 A
I'm sorry, I didn't understand.
i 24 Q
And the question that you were asked to examine l
25 waa --
i l
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6 20990.0 225 BRT 1
A Oh, yes.
Yes.
Right.
2 0
-- I guess it's the first paragraph of page 2; 3
is that correct?
4 A
That is the overall question, I gather, that is 5
being addressed in all of this.
My part of it, of cou.rse, 6
was to see whether that there was any evidence that 7
that was true in the survey in the questionnaires -- in 8
the questionnaire survey.
9 MR. KAPLAN:
Could you say,.just for the record, 10 what was true?
You were pointing to something there.
I 11 didn't know what you were saying.
12 WITNESS BOWERS:
Page 2 says, "The basic 13 question which you are to attempt to answer is:
Did 14 management by its actions create an atmosphere of 15 intimidation for the QA/QC inspectors such that they 16 performed their duties in a way that there is some 17 likelihood of impact on the safety and quality of the 18 plant."
It was not that question in all its possible 19 ramifications, but that question as it applied to the 20 questionnaire survey results.
That was my task.
21 MR. KAPLAN:
Thank you.
22 BY MR. HIRSCHHORN:
23 Q
Given the content of the survey, if the answer 24 to the basic question that you just read us were in fact 25 "yes," what is the likelihood that that would fail to show
.=
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20990.0 226 BRT 1
up in a survey of this kind?
2 Did I have too many double negatives in that question?
3 A
You had quite a few of them.
Try it again.
4 O
In view of what the questionnaire was, and what 5
kinds of questions it asked --
6 A
Right.
7 Q
-- assume, if the answer to the question the 8
team was examining -- that is to say whether there was an 9
atmosphere of intimidation such. that there is some 10 likelihood of impact on the safety or the quality of the 4
11 plant -- assuming the answer to that question were "yes,"
12 what would you consider the likelihood, stated either way, 13 that evidence of that would or would not show up in a 14 survey Of this kind?
15 A
I think evidence of it -- I think it's highly 16 likely that evidence of it would show up.
And the reason 17 is because it is not necessary -- not just evidence in any 18 single respondent's questionnaire, but the pattern across 19 all respondents.
20 I'll give you an example of what I mean.
With a 21 pattern, perhaps like the one that's here, where 22 prevailing opinion appears to be positive, or favorable 23 toward the company', but not universally so; where negative 24 views are not concentrated among a tiny number of people 25 but are spread across a large number of people; where
20990.0 227 BRT i
1 there is no necessary pattern of a person being negative 2
on one and also negative on another; and to put it across 3
139 respondents and to produce a plausible pattern of 4
nonintimidation of that kind, would require interpersonal 5
collusion by 139 people.
That is, the likelihood of that 6
ever being pulled off is very, very low.
7 Q
May I take it, then, that given the portion of 8
the team's work that you conducted, that you have a pretty 9
high level of confidence in the conclusions of the overall 10 report as well as your own conclusions?
11 A
I have a high level of confidence in the overall 12 conclusions and in my conclusions about,the 1983 survey;
~
13 yes.
14 O
And do you have -- well, let's see if I can 15 clarify that a little.
16 Do you have a fairly high level of confidence that 17 those conclusions reflect the facts, even though you were 18 not on-site, did not have interviews, et cetera?
19 A
I have a high level of confidence they reflect 20 the facts as seen and interpreted and analyzed by other 21 team members.
Facts other than the 1983 survey, of course, 22 are things that I did not analyze, have in hand, or 23 anything, when I did my specific piece of this.
But the 24 fact that other things appear to be consistent with what I 25 saw in the limited piece I did gives me confidence that it
20990.0 228 BRT 1
is essentially correct.
3 0
You worked independently as you said before; is 4
that correct?
5 A
That's correct.
6 Q
And as you were doing your own analysis, you 7
were not influenced by the fact, I take it, that your 8
colleagues had reached very similar conclusions looking at 9
a different. data base; is that true?
10 A
That is absolutely the case.
Because I had no 11 conversations with most of them, and, in fact was, I guess d
12..
at the time, unaware of the existence of two of them.
13 Q
You could not have been influenced?
~
14 A
That's right.
15 O
Okay.
Thank you.
16 MR. KAPLAN:
Could I just -- they hadn't been 17 hired.
What's that?
18 MR. TREBY:
I was going to suggest that you are 19 taking into their time --
Oh, that's fine.
It's fine if he 21 wants to ask questions.
~
22 MR. KAPLAN:
Just a quick comment, just for 23 David, we really hadn't talked too much.
They hadn't 24 actually been hired at the time we talked.
m-
20990.0 229 BRT 1
O on page 31 of the report, under the paragraph 2
that begins " level 1:
Simple analysis responses," the-3 first sentence of that paragraph is -- reads as follows.
4 I'm quoting:
"The questionnaire permits specific 5
identification of the attitudes and concerns of people in 6
the QC organization."
Could you elaborate on that for us 7
just a bit?
8 A
Well, the questions in the questionnaire dealt 9
with a. variety of perceptions, attitudes, possible 10 concerns, substantively as distinct from the patterning of 11 responses.
And that's what that -- that sentence 12 essentially says.
13 Q
And did you feel that there was an opportunity 14 for a very broad expression of these attitudes?
Is that 15 also part of what you are saying?
16 A
Yes.
I think so.
Yes.
17 BY MR. HIRSCHHORN:
i 18 O
I take it, by the way, that your lack of 19 communication with the rest of the team continued after 20 you submitted your report; is that right?
21 A
That is correct, until, I guess, last week, I 22 had a conference call.
Other than periodic telephone 23 calls from, I guess it was Mr. Kaplan, asking when I could 24 come in and give a depoeition, I had no such contact after 25 submitting the report.
l e
m
---w m-
20990.0 230 BRT 1
Q So you had no involvement in any of the drafts, 2
et cetera, a stack of which we were looking at earlier?
3 A
No.
5 0
.Was a major aspect of your analysis to determine 6
whether the 1983 survey responses were distorted in a way 7
that could have masked feelings of intimidation?
That 8
level -- I'm really thinking of your level 2 analysis.
9-A I hesitate about the term " masked."
10 Part of my charge, as I saw it, was to determine 11 whether feelings.of intimidation were' reflected in the 12 responses, in ways that produced what one would suspect 13 was a distorted response.
In that sense, yes, masking.
14 would be an appropriate term.
15 Hypothetically, for example, people did feel 16 intimidated but were so intimidated that they wanted to 17 give a squeaky clean case that they weren't.
In that 18 sense masking is appropriate.
19 O
So an important part of your analysis was to 20 examine whether that had taken place, and you concluded L
21 that it had not?
22 A
That's correct.
23 (Discussion of f the record. )
l 25 0
On page C-10 -- this is a real tough question --
l a.
.-p-
. - ~.
. =.~.-
20990.0 231 BRT 1
in the two footnotes --
2 A
Right.
3 0
-- should those be correct to read " category 3" 4
and " category 4,"
instead of 4 and 57 5
'- -- A Let's see here.
Yes, they should.
I think that's all we've got.
7 Thank you, gg 8
MR. TREBY:
e don't we take a break.
9 (Discussion off the record.)
10 BY MR. ROISMAN:
11 0
Doctor, when you got the July 27th letter, what 12 was your understanding of what it was that you were to be
't' 13 looking for?
What did you understand you were to be
~
14 looking for?
15 A
I understood I was looking for evidence of 16 intimidation in the questionnaire responses.
17 O
And what did you understand " intimidation" was?
18 A
An excellent question.
I went to the large 19 dictior.ary I kept up there at the lake, and looked up 20
" intimidation."
And from that I concluded that the 21 intimidation would be defined as behavior, either --
22 behavior either avoiding doing something or going ahead to 23 do something specific, as a result of acts which create an 24 emotion of fear or apprehension in the individual to whom 25 they are directed -- in other words, fear of punishment or
=.
/
20990.0 232 BRT 1
adverse consequences.
So there were three components in 2
my mind:
One was the overall phenomenon of the behavior; 3
the second was the act, verbal or behavioral that was 4
directed toward the subject individual; and the third part
~
-. 5 was the feeling or emotion of the individual itself.
6 Q
Now, when you looked at the questionnaires, if 7
you did not find all those elements then, as to a 8
particular answer to a particular question, did you then 9
draw the conclusion that that did not represent 10 intimidation?
11 A
No.
I think as I stated in my report at some 12 point here -- excuse me just a moment until I find it -- I 13 said in there that --
14 O
Which page are you looking at, Doctor?
15 A
This is on page C-4.
That "the survey recults 16 in this report" analyzed in this report "can contain 17 no direct reading on possible acts of intimidation."
That 18 is, you would not, as you would if it were some sort of 24-hour i
l 19 a day video taping, you would not be able to literally see l
l 20 the act of intimidation.
Nor can you get a direct reading 21 on the feeling or the emotion that is inside~the 22 individual's head.
23 What you can get from it is evidence that a behavior 24 occurred on the part of the respondent, behavior in 25 responding to the questionnaire, that produces a pattern e
20990.0 233 BRT 1
suggesting that the emotion felt was that of intimidation.
2 That's what I.was able to look at.
3 Q
So, in other words, what you really were looking 4
at was whether or not the persons felt intimidated about 5
answering the questionnaire?
6 A
That's correct -- intimidated in answering the 7
questionnaire, I suppose I would say.
8 Q
For instaner, if the whole 139 answers had been 9
written as though these people were working for the lord 10 himself, you would have been suspiciouse and if all 139 11 answers had come back and had said -- no answer at all, 12 you would have been suspicious.
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
You were looking for that kind of a pattern in 15 the answers?
16 A
Yes.
Though not necessarily that extreme to 17 arrive at those conclusions.
18 O
I understand.
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
I take it if the questionnaire hadn't been 21 designed and hadn't asked anything particularly about the 22 workplace, but had simply been a questionnaire to ask the 23 people about if it had been to find out how they liked 24 lunch, you know --
25 A
Yes.
9 9
.,n-
...e,
~
=
- 20990.0 234 BRT 1
0
-- it could have served the same purpose that 2
you were interested in?
You were trying to find out did 3
they feel comfortable about answering questions which 4
might have elicited from them some negative response, and, 5
if they did, then you would expect to see it in the 6
answers to the questionnaires?
7 A
Yes.
If the questionnaire had contained nothing
,8 about, let's say, innocuous items having little to do with 9
any real -- say, work-related thing -- having to do with 10 issues of quality, issues of inspection, those kinds of
'll things; but, rather, dealt with the parking lot, lunch, 12 what do you think -- what is your -- what do your friends 13 and' family think about the fact that you work here, stu'f f 14 like that.
Then I would have said, if I were to find some 15 pattern which suggested intimidation on that, I wouldn't 16 have known what to make of it.
Maybe they were very 17 suspicious persons or something.
But it was evidence of 18 intimidation around those issues, on the questionnaire.
19 Q
How would your conclusions differ if you 20 believed that the questioned people felt that their 21 identities would be known?
22 A
If I believed that these people felt that their l
23 identities would be known?
Let me think about that for a f
24 moment.
25 Considering the pattern of responses, I suppose what it
=
f
20990.0 235 BRT 1
would lead me to conclude is that there is even less 2
feeling of intimidation -- and there's practically none 3
here now -- because in the face of that, they still come 4
through with this sort of portion that's, I don't know, 20 S
to 25 percent of whatever is there, that is negative.
6 Q
Negative about what kind of thing?
What were 7
you finding that they were negative about, that wasn't 8
intimidation?
9 A
Well, negative about whatever the issue was.
I 10 don't have a copy of the questionnaire in front of me.
11 But negative about practices of management; negative about 12 policies of the company; negative about one's supervisor, 13 and so ons 14 So, if I believed that these people did not feel that 15 their identities were protected, I suppose I would feel 16 that there must be even -- must be remarkably little 17 intimidation because they certainly felt free to say what 18 they said.
19 Q
But the issue was whether they were intimidated 20 about reporting nonconforming conditions at the plant.
21 And they didn't -- you found that they didn't-say very 22 much about that; right?
What they did was they talked 23 about practices of management that they didn't like.
24 Now, isn't it true that you could have a group of 25 people who were intimidated against reporting safety
.=
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-~.
i 20990.0 236 BRT 1
problems, but not intimidated about grousing and bitching 2
about management?
3 A
I suppose it is possible.
But I think it would 4
be highly unlikely.
I'm trying to consider your question 5
carefully here.
6 As I understand it, the purpose of the questionnaire 7
was to elicit perceptions and views and opinions from the 8
QA/QC people, about matters having to do with their 9
ability to perform their reporting function.
And the 10 questions -- some of them, as I recall -- dealt rather 11 directly with the issue of your willingness or ability or 12. whatever to report some particular problem.
- Others, i
13 perhaps, had less directly to do with it.
But all were 14 around the issue of how free do you feel to speak up in 15 some sense, or to do your job.
I'm not sure where I'm 16 taking that at this moment.
Would you ask me your 17 question again?
18 O
Let me try again in a different vein.
Where did 19 you get your understanding cf whzt the reason was for the l
20 survey?
How did you obtain that understanding?'
i 21 A
1 obtained that from the -- well, from two i
22 places:
From the July 27th letter, and from a telephone 23 conversation which my assistant at the office had had 24 initially with Mr. Kaplan.
And, in that telephone 25 conversation, I can recall talking to my staff member when 1
~
+
. = - +
- = - = -
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20990 0 237 BRT 1
she called me, I asked, " intimidation about what?"
And 2
she was not clear at that point.
And the letter clarified 3
it.
4 Q
No, that's a different question.
My question is:
5 How did you know what this survey was designed to uncover?
6 Not how did you know what you were supposed to lock for in 7
the survey.
How did you know what the aathor of the 8
survey intended to. find out with the survey?
9 A
At the time I received -- at the time I agrea.d 10 to do this, I had no idea what the author of the survey 11 intended to loch at.
As I looked at the content of the 12
.. questions after I received the goestionnaires, it became 13 clear that the author of th'e survey wanted to a.sk these 14 QA/QC people about the climate that existed in a number of 15 areas, supervision, management practices, policies, 16 whatever -- the climate that eristed that could 17 conceivably affect their ability or their feeling cf 18 freedom to do their job in the best possible way.
It 19 became apparent when I saw the content of the questions.
20 Q
That's what you perceived was the motivation of 21 the questionnaire.
Not that you got any information 22 regarding what that person stated was the motivation or 23 intent?
24 A
I distinguished betwaen the person, author of i
25 the survey's motivatien, and what he or she proposed to
- ~
- m... -
D 20990.0 238 BRT i
1 measure by getting responses about it.
2 The distinction I'm making is that the individual who 3
designed this survey may have had many, many motives in 4
mind for de. signing the survey.
You know, to collect the 5
information, to get a promotion -- anything.
I couldn't 6
say anything about the person's motivation.
But I could 7
look at the content of the questions and determine what it 8
was the individual was attempting to measure.
9 0
It may merely be semantic but it seems -- you 10 don't mean what he intended.
You mean what you perceived 11 what, if you had written the survey, you would have 12 intended.
,You have no idea what he intended.
No one 13 shared his testimony --
14 A
You are-quite correct.
I have no reading on 15 that individual'.s intent.
I am inferring the intent from 16 what I saw from the questionnaire.
17 Q
Right.
Now, were you aware that with regard to 18 the " Williams" group, the 12-people group, that sometime 19 prior tc the time the survey was done, that most if not 20 all of those people had been personally interviewed by the 21 man who was there, the ultimate boss under whom these 22 people who answered the questions worked, for the purpose 23 of finding out what complaints they had about Harry w
24 Williams?
25 A
I was not aware of that at all at the time.
Not "o
-. -... ~.
20990.0 239 BRT 1
at all.
2 Q
Assuming for a moment that that's correct 3 does
~
3 that alter in any way your judgment about the willingness 4
of them to express on the written questionnaire any 5
problems that they had with Harry Williams, if they had 6
already had a meeting at which they discussed those issues 7
.with the man who initiated the survey?
8' A
I don't think my reading on it would be much 9
affected by that, beca.use one could imagine almost 10 offsetting consequences frcm that.
In other words, people, 11 as a result of that, might. feel that they had ventilated 12 whatever was in their minds and therefore they didn't have 13.
to put it on paper.
Some might feel that way.
Others 14 might feel it was now legitimate to respond negatively 15 about williams, or whatever, so there would be no, in my 16 mind, no clear impact that I would expect that to have.
17 0
Wouldn't it confuse the Williams results for the 18 purpose of your analysis of whether or not people were 19 freely being critical in the surveys, as indicative of 20 their lack of a feeling of intimidation?
Would it make 21 the Williams data somewhat confusing?
22 A
Not really.
23.
O So you'd feel just as solid about the Williams 24 data, even though the people who are talking about 25 Williams have previously expressed those concerns
.c
-+
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-w-
20990.0 240 BRT 1
personally to the supervisor, under questioning from the 2'
supervisor?
3 A
If what you describe were what I knew, the 4
answer to your question is:
Yes, I would still feel about 5
that as I do.
6 MR. TREDY:
Could you keep your voice up?
7 WITNESS BOWERS:
Okay.
8 BY MR. ROISMAN:
9 O
Now, in doing the analysis that you did, how did 10 you factor in the substantive answer that indicated a 11 dissatisfaction with management practices?
Did you count 12 that as a sign of a lack of a feeling of intimidation 13 bec'ause the people were willing' to say that in the 14 questionnaire?
15 A
To me, that was evidence that, indeed, there was 16 not some strong feeling of intimidation.
They were 17 willing to, in those instances where they did, to say so.
18 0
I take it that if they believed that it was 19 anonymous, and that no one vould know Cao said it, that 20 would give them a little more leeway to say it than it 21 would have if he knew that their names would~bo known:
22 isn't that true?
23 A
Yes.
I would agree with that.
24 O
How did you deal -- we talked about this a 25 little bit yesterday -- with what we called the Catch-22 w..-
20990.0 241 BRT 1
phenomenon in this survey?
If they don't say anything is 2
wrong it could eith,er mean that nothing is wrong or they 3
are afraid to speak up.
If they do indicate a problem, 4
then it either indicates that there'.s a problem or that 5
there is not a problem because they are not afraid to 6
speak up.
7 How do you deal with that in the context of this survey 8
and giving an analysis of it?
)
A If they say there is a problem -- I'm just 10 repeating back what you said.
If they say there is a 11 problem, it's either that there is a problem or there is 12
.not a problem because they are --
13' O
Willing to say there is a problem.
14 A
That was the statement you made.
15 Q
That's right.
When the problem is intimidation, 16 that's what makes it the potential Catch-22 problem.
17 A
I guess my answer to that is, if you were asking 18 questions directly about intimidation, I mean referring 19 directly to intimidation, I woeld say that would be 20 perplexing.
But if you are asking questions about other 21 things, things conceivably related to intimidation, then 22 it seems to me it's less a problem because if -- and also 23 you have to take into account how many people, you know, 24 what proportion of them rather than any single one.
But 25 if, in large numbers they are willing to describe the O
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l 20990.0 242 BRT 1
existence of problems and are not universally positive, or 2
- something, it suggests that there is that freedom to 3
express it.
4 on the other hand, if the large majority of them are in 5
large part favorable and selectively negative, that 6
collective pattern to me indicates an absence of 7
intimidation.
8 I'm not sure whether I have answered your question or 9
not.
10 Q
You have done -- I mean I think you've answered 11 what I think is about all that one can say on that.
12 If pou had been called in by Comanche Peak in 1983 and 13 asked to design a survey of the workforce to determine 14 whether or not they felt inhibition in reporting safety 15 problems, how would you have gone about doing that?
What 16 would your technique have been for developing a survey and 17 how close to what ycu would develop is this survey?
18 A
I suppose the first thing, if I had been called 19 in to do that, the first thing I would have done, because 20 it's the first thing I do in a generation of surveys that 21 are to be applied to a unique site, 'is to do"some 22 relatively unstructured interviewing around the 23 organization, making it clear that I'am an outsider; that 24 whatever they say is confidential and will not be revealed 25 as their response to anyone; but, get from them issues,
20990.0 243 BRT 1
descriptions, or -- descriptions of situations or 2
practices or whatever that they would consider to be 3
intimidating.
4 I would not go around and say, or ask them if they had 5
been intimidated, because I think then you are getting 6
into the whole problem that we are talking about here.
7 But I would ask them, probably, for the kinds of things 8
which, if a person in Comanche Peak felt intimidated, Ehe 9
kinds of things that would produce that intimidation.
And 10 from that I would then generate survey questions.
11 Q
And how -- these survey questions, would you say 12 that this survey is the one you would have generated?
13 A
I,would say that the questions that were asked 14 in this questionnaire could well have emerged from that 15 process; yes.
Since I did not do that process, I don't 16 know what whoever did it, assuming they did it, or 17 something analogous to it I don't know what 18 materialized from that.
But these questions would be --
19 are very plausibly things that would be in a questionnaire' 20 that would result; yes.
21 Q
In that kind of a questiennaire, would the style 22 of question, the "mostly yes" "mostly no" approach be the 23 kind that you'd probably use?
24 A
Personally I probably would not opt for that.
25 It's adequate.
But sort of at root ic the trade-off e
e
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20990.0 244 BRT 1
between the fineness of discrimination that's required and 2
the amo6nt of information that is lost.
That is, a 3
5-point scale is parhaps optimal because if you go beyond 4
that in numbers of categories of response, you gain very 5
little information while confusing the respondent.
And as 6
you go down from 5 toward 2, you lose this fineness of 7
discrimination, in that sense some information.
But if 8
all you are really after is an overall answer of "yes" or 9
"no,"
this would probably be adequate.
I probably would 10 have gone to some larger number of scale points, maybe 5.
11 O
How much is the answers to the questions 12 distorted by the "mostly" in there, which implies that it, 13.
.must be at least 51 percent of the. time the condition
~
14 described exists, and thus the person who says:
Yes, it's 15 happened but doesn't happen all the time -- how would this 16 survey distort away that data point?
17 A
Well, the "mostly yes"/"mostly no" two-response l
18 category thing essentially forces the individual to throw 19 it one way or the other or else not respond.
20 If they are truly torn -- well, there are some things 21 I've seen in things like that before^too, it wasn't
~
22 necessarily that..They responded -- they checked both 23 boxes.
Or they write something in the margin saying:
- Yes, i
24 sometimes, but not all the time.
Or whatever.
I didn't 25 find that, really.
.ey n
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1
)
20990.0 245 BRT 1
It forces them to judge one way or the other on the 2
- basis of some combination of the frequency and the 3
significance of it.
So it's not just how often it happens, 4
but how large it is in their minds, how important it is in 5
their minds, in combination with frequency, that causes 6
them to leap one way or the other.
7 If -- would having it that way cover up significant 8
acts of intimidation, significant incidents of 9
intimidation?
I guess that's the thrust of your question.
10 Q
Yes.
11 A
It might.
But I think my feeling would be it 12 probably wouldn't, or would do so rarely.
Because if the 13 intimidation were truly significant to a significant 14 number of people, I would think it -- that feeling, and 15 not just the frequency of it -- would push them toward 16 whatever the other category is.
17 Let's say it was one of the positive worded items, it 18 would tend to push them towards "mostly yes" -- "mostly no."
19 0
What is your understanding of the nature of the 20 kind of work that these people were doing which they might 21 or might not have been intimidated from doing right?
22 A
My understanding, I suppose, is that they are 23 responsible for checking, inspecting the quality of 24 various aspects of construction as it occurs, whether it 25 amounts to welding something or to putting pipes on
_,_m_
20990.0 246 BRT 1
hangers, or whatever.
Something like that.
It could be 2
concrete.
It could be anything.
Wiring.
3 0
Was it your understanding that most of their 4
work involved fairly objective -- this is either right or 5
it's not right?
They had to say either it's okay or not 6
okay, on a very objective evaluation basis?
7 A
I suppose it would be my expectation or 8
understanding, knowing the rather stringent requirements 9
that the NRC generally puts in these areas, that there are 10 fairly definite, clear requirements, standards, whatever, 11 that the work must meet, however it is defined.
And that 12 they, indeed, have those -- whatever -- if I want to say 13 checklist or whatever -- that they have those and those 14 are known to them.
And they are looking to see whether, 15 indeed,, hey have been adhered to.
t 16 They are not called in to look at something and say:
17 Yes, I don' t think that looks too bad.
But rather it's 9
18 much more precise than that.
19 O
So th'at your expectation is that they, this 5
20 group of 139 people, would know whether they were doing 21 something wrong that they should be doing right, and would 22 then have a sense of:
Well, am I doing it wrong because 23 I'm intimidated?
Or because I'm told every time you do it 24 wrong we'll give you an extra $50, whatever it was -- that 25 they would know whether they were doing it right or wrong?
-s m,
ao s
m
. = -.
20990.0 247 BRT 1
A I would assume that they would know whether they 2
.were doing it right or wrong; that it would not be a 3
situation which you might run into in much less -- oh, I 4
call it critical areas -- where it isn't important whether 5
it's really right or wrong.
You.know?
It's,not a 6
situation like that.
That they know it is held to be 7.
important and they know What meets or exceeds the required 8
standards.
I would assume that.
5 9
Q How would you go about getting the answer to the.
10 question:
Are you being inhibited from doing what you 11 should do, the right thing -- where the person Who is 12,being inhibited doesn't realize that they are not doing 13 the right thing?
That is, that they are subjectively 14 biasing their judgment on a series of judgmental decisions, 15 but they don't know that they are doing it?
16 A
Because they don't know the-standards?
17 O
Because the standards are not so objective.
18 They are not as objective as the assumptions that we have 19 just been talking abouti but they are more subjective.
20 How would you go about getting the answer to the 4
21 question:
Is this person in fact being intimidated and 22 acting in a way that they would not act if these events 23 didn't exist or the persons themselves don't realize it?
24 A
Well, you know, there are two parts to the 25 problem you just posed.
The issue of intimidation could
.5~,
m 1
20990.0 BRT '
248 1
still be looked at in this way, or something analogous to 2
it.
The issue of their doing it wrong because they don't 3
know what's right --
4 Q
No.
.No.
5 A
No?
6 O
That isn't what I meant.
Let me give you an 7
example.
8 At this plant there were two ways of reporting 9
nonconforming conditions.
One was called an NCR,-and one 10 was' called an IR.
For reasons Iiwill not bore you with, 11 management just loved the IR and they didn't very much-12 like the NCR.
But the criteria of when you would use the-13 IR and when you would use the NCR were not so objective 14 that it was clear in every situation that it was clear 15 this was an IR or there was an NCR situation.
Many of the 16 people who worked for Harry Williams had had a great deal 17 of dispute among them for quite some time over whether 18 they should use the IR, or whether they should use the NCR.
19 Harry Williams had already given them a now infamous 20 speech on that situation, and so had another man-named Ron 21 Tolson, whose name you may also have come across.
So it 22 would be an issue en which there would be za lot.of
~
23 management pressure.
24 And it would be an issue in which I think it's fair to 25 assuihe that management did not want to see NCRs, except O
\\
y
...*I
20990.0 249 ERT 1
when it was absolutely necessary and there was no option.
2 But it wasn't always clear to the person in the field when 3
there was clearly to be an NCR.
And it was always a gray 4
area there.
You might decide to make it an IR.
5 Now, these people are now being asked the question:
6 Are you being discouraged 5r'om doing what you think is 7
right?
Well, they know what they are supposed to do, but 8
they get faced with a number of situations in the field in 9
which it is not crystal clear.
And they tend to bias 10 their, decision towards the one which gets them less 11 negative response from management.
12 How can you find out in a questionnaire that those 13 people are being discouraged from doing what their natural
'14 judgment tells them they should do, by the knowledge that 15 there will be a negative response if they go toward the 16 NCR rather than toward the IR?
How do you design the 17 questionnaire to get at that question?
18 A
I suppose -- well, there are several approaches 19 one might consider, one could design questions that 20 directly dealt with that'.
You know, how.often do you 21 submit something as an IR that really should be an NCR?
22 Questions like that.
You directly ask it.
23 Another would be to frame questions that dealt with 24 hypothetical problems that should be one or the other; 25 that you truly knew would be one or the other, and ask
'T
20950.0 250 BRT 1
them in the question what they would do with it?
That 2
would be another way to do it.
3 0
Yes.
4 A
Beyond that, I am not sure what I would do.
I'd 5
have to think about that for some time.
Those are at 6
least two possibi1[ ties.
7 Q
How, at all, does this survey, the 1983 survey 8
give you an answer to that kind of issue?
The issue of 9
the person who is not consciously aware that they are not 10 doing something that they should do, or that they are 11 being -- that their subjective is directing them away from 12 courses of action where there is a judgment to be made, if 13 one course of action looks like it is going to give them a 14 negative response?
15 A
In this survey, it would not be that specific 16 issue that would be addressed.
It would be that issue as 17 part of an overall feeling or climate of intimidation.
18 In other words, the situation you described is a very 19 specific, concrete situation.
Specific, concrete 20 situations are not really assessed in a questionnaiIre like 21 this that deals with the more general issue.
22 O
That's right.
I didn't mean my question to be 23 related to the particular NCR/IR, but to the generic issue:
24 How well does this survey help you learn whether there is 25 a subconscious biasing that's taking place as a result of
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20990.0 251 BRT 1
negative responses?
How does this discover Whether those 2
biases really exist and whether these people find those 3
negative responses?
4 A
It seems to me that's a part of the question 5
that's addressed by the pattern of responding as opposed 6
to the substance of the response; 'that if there are 7
subconscious or unconscious feelings like that that are 8
steering people away from doing anything controversial, 9
that it should show up in this overall pattern of 10 intimidation anyway.
11 Q
Is that how you looked at.this?
Is that the 12 issue was whether these people were being discouraged from 13 doing anything' controversial?
Your premise Was to exacine g-s 14 and see Whether there was a pervasive discouragement of 15 doing the controversial?
16 A
No.
I wouldn't say that that was What guided me 17 in this.
I used that term, I guess, as an outgrowth of 18 your illustration of irs and NCRs, Which did sound 1.9 controversi.al. somehow.
20 But the issue that I was addressing here was Whether 21 t.he pattern reflected an underlying feeling of 22 intimidation, which may have come from acts that one is --
23 that they were directly aware of, or of things that they 24 were not directly conscious of but which nevertheless 25 influenced their behavior in the response to the e
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20990.0 252 BRT 1
questionnaire.
2 O
Would the questionnaire find indications of --
3 let me' take that back.
4 Give me a couple of examples of what, in your mind, 5
would be the kind of intimidating actions that you think
$would have been present at Comanche Peak, if there were 6
7 intimidating actions present.
In other words, some idea, 8
what did, you think there was if you had gone down and you 9
had been able to do your full, in-depth survey what did 10 you think was meant in specific about intimidation?
11 A
well, it seems to me intimidation can cover a 12 fairly wide range of acts and their effects, their 13 emotional effects.
14 For example, maybe at one extreme would be a statement 15 from the company tacked up on the bulletin board saying 16 that anyone who reports anything will be fired.
All right?
17 That would be pretty intimidating.
18 Q
Reports anything?
What do you mean?
19 A
Anything unfavorable, any problems.
Sort of " don't 20 nobody bring no bad news" kind of injunction.
21 Q
Let me just stop you there because I really want 22 to get at what -- because you were not part of the team's 2;
evolutionary process.
You didn't read the thousands and 24 thousands of pages of deposition which may explain why you 25 were willing to work for a substantially lower daily rate
- M
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20990.0 253 BRT 1
than anybody else.
You sat at your cabin in Michigan --
2 they had the other things.
3 But in the context of this it sounds to me like you 4
were looking for just what yau just described; that is, 5
you were looking for a company that basically was trying 6
to get the word out to everybody that bad news is 7
unacceptable?
8 A
No, I was anchoring one end of a distribution at 9
that point.
Not stating that as the --
10 0
Give me the other end of your distribution.
11 A
Okay.
The other end would be intimidation that 12 is induced because of, let's say, expressions or maybe not 13 even-verbal -- implications of disapproval.
14 Q-
-- -Disapproval of what?
15 A
Of the individual.
In other words --
16 0
No; of the. individual for doing what?
17 A
For doing anything.
I mean, if it's doing --
18 let's say doing their job exactly -- someone might frown, 19 scowl or even verbally say something about "you are too 20 fussy" or whatever.
That would be mildly intimidating, to 21 me.
Certainly nowhere near as great as a direct threat to i
22 you that:
If you do that or don't do that, you will be 23 fired."
24 O
All right.
You look like you are old enough $o 25 remember Jerry Lee Lewis.
Do you remember Jerry Lee Lewis?
i
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20990.0 254 ERT 1
A Yes.
2 O
Remember his song about blue suede shoes?
4 3
A Ye's.
4 O
Remember what he says in the song:
You can do 5
anything you want to do but don't step on my blue suede 6
shoes."
7 How effectively does this survey deal with the " don't 8
step on my blue suede shoes," if the blue suede shoes are:
9
" Don't do anything that will slow down the production of 10' this plant but grouse on anything else you want"?
Just 11 how good a survey is it for that?
12 A
It deals with that issue, among others.
Does it
~
13 deal with that issue alone, in a way or to a degree that 14. would permit you to know, in great detail, whether that 15 was a problem?
The answer would be "probably not."
You 16 wouldn't know in great detail, though you would know, I 17 think, that that was a problem as part of a broader 18 picture of intimidation.
19 0
When you did your analysis of 'he survey from 20 the perspective of whether the way in which answers were 21 presented, did they reflect existence of 'n intimidating a
~
22 atmosphere, did you draw a distinction between people who 23 were willing to grouse about everything but blue suede 24 shoes, and those who just were willing to complain about 25 the blue suede. shoes?
Those who were just willing to
+
20990.0 255 BRT 1
focus their complaints on the issue of whether production 2
was taking precedence over other considerations like 3
safety?
4 A
Well, I did look, particularly in the responses 5
to that last writing question, 20, look at that kind of 6
distinction.
In fact I think that's indeed kind of 7
implied by the four categories that I clustered things 8
into; that is, complaints about wages, hours, so forth, on 9
up to suggestions of intimidation.
Or more serious 10 complaints about procedures, safety, and the like.
There 11 is that kind of distinction in that.
12 O
But what way does that cut in terms of the issue:
13 Did the survey answers reveal a willingness on the part.of 14 people to com31ain about' matters of intimidation that 15 interfered with them doing their.3cb.
What do the number 16 of negative answers tell you about that?.
Does it tell you 17 that they were free to express that complaint, that they 18 were not free to express it, or you can't draw any 19 conclusions about it?
20 A
I'm not certain one can draw a conclusion about 21 that distinction.
What one can say is that they did not 22 they felt free to complain about a wide array of things, 23 so that it was clear, you know, that they did not feel 24 that they were in a situation in which one never 25 complained about anything -- you know, you couldn't s-
=
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20990.0 256 BRT 1
criticize or complain about anything.
2 O
Yes.
3 A
It's clear that a few people, five of them, felt 4
free to complain about things related to safety or 5
procedures or even just to say "somebody was intimidating 6
me."
7 Q
Could five -- it may not be five, right?
It 8
could only be as many as three?
9 A
I was lumping those two categories together.
10.
O But I was saying it could be the two that are in 11 category 3 are part of the three that are in category 4.
12 This chart didn't suggest that you had parsed it carefully 13 enough to know whether there's double counting?
14' A-As I~ recall, there is not double counting.
I 15 believe -- I think it is five.
16 Q
All right.
Five out of the 139 is not, in and 17 of itself, is not evidence -- just because five complained, 18 that therefore they didn't feel an inhibition to complain 19 about items 3 and 4: is Lt?
It doesn't gLve you any clue 20 on that, does it?
21 A
I think the answer is "Yes."
But let me -- the 22 questionnaire results do not tell you about something that 23 might exist but that one would axpect to have not exist if 24 it did.
25 Q
One of the conclusions that you reached was
.~
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20990.0 257 BRT 1
there were enough people complaining about conditions at 2
the plant that you could not conclude that there was an 3
atmosphere in which complaining about conditions at the 4
plant was being discouraged.
5 A
That's correct.
6 Q
Now my question to you is:
Were there enough 7
people complaining about serious safety procedural 8
problems or actual acts of intimidation, that you could 9
say that there was not an atmosphere at the plant that 10 discouraged them from complaining about those two things?
11 A
That's where I got into that tongue-twister.
I 12 cannot conclude that what I do not see exists.
13 Q
But I'm asking you to conclude the opposite.
14 I'm asking you your conclusions, your positive conclusions.
15 can you make the positive conclusion that there was not an 16 atmosphere that discouraged people from reporting the 17 kinds of things that are in your categories.3 and 4 on 18 page C-107 19 A
Okay.
Now I think I am on to the question.
20 Q
Okay.
I'm sorry if I got you confused.
21 A
No, it's all right.
I cannot conc 1ude anything 22 about what went on in that plant.
All I can conclude is 23 what is reflected in the survey responses.
24 O
Okay.
Even looking at the survey responses, do 25 the survey responses give you a basis to say that the e
1 y
20990.0 258 BRT 1
people who believed that there were serious problems with 2
procedure and safety, and the people who believed that 3
they were being intimidated from reporting those problems, 4
were free to speak up?
5 A
Does it permit me to conclude that?
It does not 6
permit me to conclude that -- I want to put an adverb on 7
it -- I don't want to be redundant.
I was going to say 8
" conclusively."
9 I cannot say that beyond any shadow of a doubt.
Right?
10 That I can't say, 11 O
I'm not asking you to do that.
Whatever was the 12 level of confidence with which you said this survey shows 13 that people were not discouraged or didn't feel 14 discouraged from complaining; to that level of confidence, 15 can you say that they were not discouraged about 16 complaining about serious procedures and safety problems?
17 A
I can conclude that there is, in my judgment, a 18 high likelihood that people who are intimidated by an L9 organ 4zation for example, on something of great e
20 consequence, will not say, therefore:
But I'm free to 21 complain about other things.
22 I mean, it seems to me that most human beings, if 23 someone hits them with that kind of intimidation, will say:
24 Well, the heck with it.
I'm just going to stay clear of 25 it.
I'm not going to complain about anything.
Not draw T
=-
20990.0 259 CRT 1
one from column A but don't you dare' draw any from column 2
B and be sure you take one from column A.
I just don't 3
think that's very likely.
~
4 Q
Why is that?
If you touch a stove when it's on 5
and you burn your finger, it doesn't mean that you will 6
not, therefore, touch a door?
7 A
No, but --
8 Q
You learn there are certain things that you 9
can't touch because they are going to burn you, stoves and 10 things that look like stoves.
If you were always getting 11 negative responses when you raise safety problems but you 12 didn't get any negative res'ponses when you bitched about 13 the fact that you were only making $11 an h.our, or when 14 you complained about the fact that the parking lot was not 15 situated conveniently for your job site or whatever, why 16 would you come away with a conclusion that you should only --
17 that you shouldn't grouse about anything?
Wouldn't you be 18 getting a mixed set of responses and you would learn which 19 way to go?
Don't bitch about safety but keep complaining 20 about salary?
21 A
Let me go back to your stove.
If, having never 22 encountered a stove you make a mistake of laying your hand 23 on a hot burner and so forth, I think what you don't learn 24 is:
"Never lay your hand on a hot burner."
You learn 25 never to lay your hand on the burner at all, because you-
=-
20990.0 260 BRT 1
can't be sure.
And it seems to me in situations in 2
organizations, where the organization is seen as likely to 3
clobber someone who complains about something in a 4
particularly important area, I would guess that the effect 5
becomes generalized, at least for that period of time, 6
whatever it is.
Just, you know:
" Stay out of the way.
7 Don't complain about anything.
Be safe."
You know?
8 Q
But your premise is " clobber."
What if it's 9
just that when you report a safety problem you find 10 yourself in three different meetings at which people are 11 expecting you to justify why it was that you reported that 12 safety problem, and it's made you feel uncomfortable.
You 13 just felt like -- that wasn't worth it.
It wasn't worth k~
14 it for me to go to those three meetings and have three of 15
.my' supervisors question me about "How come you wrote the 16 NCR, why wasn't it an IR7" Not in a nasty way, but people 17 don't like having to justify themselves to other people.
18 "I'm told you don't like it here.
I wouldn't if I were.on L9 the other sida "
20 It's not a clobbering.
It isn't that management docked 21 you five days pay.
It's that
' hat theydealtwit]hyouat t
22 other end of your spectrum.
23 Now, why would that make you reluctant, particularly 24 when asked the question:
Do you think you are making 25 onough money?
To say:
No, I don't think I'm making i
w.
20990.0 261 ERT 1
enough money.
2 Why would the rational person assume that they would 3
also be subjected to some kind of an inquisition situation 4
over that issue?
5 A
No, I don't think that they would be subjected 6
to an inquisition situation over it.
But then in this 7
instance, it is not someone going around asking them if 8
they are paid enough.
It's the issue of:
In this climate, 9
whatever it is, can you safely complain about something?
10 In the exampie you gave it would be clear to an 11 individual in that kind of a climate that it was -- it was 12 not to your advantage, best interests or whatever, to 13 complain about "this" category of things.
Would you 14
'therefore feel that if you complained about other 15 categories of things would it amount to anything?
16 My hunch is that complaining about the wages and hours, 17 or benefits, you know -- you may not run into a stone wall 18 of intimidation but you probably will run into bureaucracy, L9 Laga.l. requirements, contrac.t. laws, prevailing. waga rates, i
20 we don't do it that way, we can't do it this way -- all 21 the things we run into in large organizations.
And there 22 is a risk there, too, not necessarily of being clobbered 23
.here, either, but of being seen as a whiner, a chronic nag, 24 or whatever.
And that would not be pleasant either.
25 To.the extent that it is simply unpleasant treatment, s
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20990.0 262 ERT f
if one wants to call it that, that's at issue.
I'm not 2
sure these others are devoid of that either.
And if it is 3
something more serious that is sort of -- I won't say 4
" promised," but whatever it is sitting in the background --
5 my hunch would be that it would generalize to any 6
complaints.
f7 Are you suggesting that when a person raise a
. 6 taint, if nothing is done that after a while they stop 9
raising the complaint?
That the failure to do anything 10 about the complair.t is itself an inhibitor in their s
11 riising the complaint subsequently?
12 A
It can be an inhibitor.
But you can't rely on 13 its being an inhibitor.
Th'at is, if you raise a complaint
(,
14 -- and someone -- whoever -- doesn't do anything about it; 15 they raise it again, they don't do anything about it; you 16 raise it; a third time they still don't do anything about 17 it; some individuals will say, "Well, what the heck.
I 18 might as well not raise it.
I might as well save my 19 breath."
20 Other people, however, will be precisely the opposite.
21 I'm referring to the FAA thing I did two years ago.
In 22 that instance the controllers had complained about 23 conditions for years and gotten nowhere.
It didn't stop 24 them complaining about conditions.
What it led to was 25 rebellion.
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20990.0 263 BRT 1
So sometimes the experience of'either nonresponsiveness 2
or even unpleasant treatment as a response to complaining 3
leads people, not to simply give up to apathy, but to 4
outright rebellion.
5 Q
But you certainly end up with less complaints 6
overall.
You are saying some people will persevere 7
through it but some will certainly drop out of the 8
complaining class; right?
Over time?
9 A
Some will drop out.
What the proportions will 10 be one way or the other I have no way of knowing.
I'm 11 simply saying it could lead them to more serious -- what 12 would one call it?
-- more serious behavior about the l
l}
issues, rather.than to less.
('
14 (Discussion off the record.)
15 BY MR. ROISMAN:
16 Q
The section of the report itself, not appendix 17 C, which deals with the 1983 survey -- did you write that 18 section?
19 A
I did not.
20 Q
Did you review that section before it was made 21 into a final report?
22 A
I don't believe I did; no.
23 Q
Were you asked about it?
Did anybody talk to 24 you about it before it was made into a final report?
25 A
I don't believe so; no.
6 d
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20990.0 264 BRT 1
Q So the only part of this document that's called 2
"EG&G report" that you personally reviewed before it was 3
completed and/or that you wrote, is part C that has your 4
name on it; correct?
5 A
That's right.
That is correct.
6 Q
Now, does your answers earlier to questions by 7
the other counsel regarding whether you were supportive of 8
the results of the entire report, that's not based upon 9
your doing the work yourself?
10 A
That's correct.
11 Q
You have read over the report, it sounds 12 reasonable to you if everything that they saw would have
{"'
13 caused t, hem to reach those conclusions?
14 A"
That's correct.
15 Q
At the beginning of your report on C-4, you say 16 "the survey results analyzed can contain no direct reading 17 about possible acts of intimidation.
It also contained no 18 direct reading about the feeling or emotion of the 19 respondents.
What they can contain is evidence that the -
20 responses were distorted in ways congruent with 21 intimidation having been felt."
22 When you read that, what I understood you to be saying 23 was, essentially, that I am disregarding these surveys for 24 their substantive content and I'm looking at them as 25 indicative of a process.
If the employees felt
20990.0 265 ERT 1
intimidated, IwealdExpect to see it show up in the way 2
in which they answered the questions, rather than the 3
ppecific content of the knewers.
And that you were not 4
going.to drew conclusions about whether they substantively 5
did or didn't give you examples of intimidation or not, 6
but that you were only going to look to see whether or not 7
that they answered certain^ questions or didn't, what 8
patterns you could say had emerged from that?
Am I --
9 A
No.
That's not what I tried to say in that 10 paragraph'.
11 Q
All right.
Good.
Maybe you could explain it 12 then, again.
Because I was not sure about it at all.
13 A
Other than the behavior, the timidity behavior 7,
14 ' which Ir-treated as sort of the overall, or first indicator 15 supported by two other things, namely an act that induced 16 it and an emotion that was a reaction to it -- okay?
17 dcher than that behavior, the survey itself is not -- it's le not a snapshot of those acts that you might get if you --
19 if you somehow got a reading upon the behavior of Joe i
20 Dokee, September 5, 1981 -- whatever.
Okay?
It is not 21 that.
22 It can describe whole categories of, like supervisory 23 style or something.
But it is not a direct reading on 24 that specific act.
Okay?
25 0
Yes.
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20990.0 266 BRT 1
A It also is not a direct reading on the emotion 2
that is inside the individual, such as what you might get 3
if you did an examination of hormonal level changes.
4 0
Yes.
5 A
Rather, what it is is a reading upon what the 6
respondents said, and the pattern with which they -- the 7
pattern they used in saying it, that, as an act yes, as 8
a behavior, a set of behaviors in this case, can be 9
reasonably assumed to imply the other two legs of the 10 stool.
In other words, to imply that there was'a feeling 11 in these people of apprehhnsion and whatever, intimidation 12 and that, therefore, there had to have been an act, an act 13 at least perceived by'them, that would induce it.
Q
'Nowt-in your examination on the intimidation 15 question,, do you look only at whether there was indication, 16 as the letter to you on the 27th suggests -- of management 17 intimidating?
18 A
I did not specifically orient myself exclusively 19 to management inti.midati.on, though. L wou.ld,assu=a tha.t. L 20 was limiting myself to intimidation in the organizational 21 setting and not, let's say, intimidation coming from being 22 brought up to say "nobody likes a complainer."
Not that 23 kind of intimidation.
24 0
Well, in your instructions in the July 27th 25 letter, you are told, for instance -- let's see -
"this t
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20990.0 267 BRT 1
is distinct from intimidation that some inspectors may 2
have felt from actions on the part of crafts personnel."
3 Now, the questionnaire that you looked at might have some 4
questions about crafts.
~
5.
A That's right.
6 Q
Did you follow that instruction?
Did you 4
7 disregard ~that, the statements regarding perception of 8
intimidation or perception of pressure or conflicts with 9
the craft personnel?
10 A
I did not ignore those ideas.*
11 Q
All right.
What did you do with it?
12 A
I treated them as I did all of the other items.
13 Q
When you say you treat them as you did all the
- 14..other. items, did they show up in your listing on page C-10, 15 under categories 3 and 47 If k craft person -- if they 16 said, "Well, craft was trying to get me not to do it the 17 right way," if that statement were made, would it show up 18 under statement 37 19 A
It would show up in here.
Where, specifically --
20 I'm not quite certain where I would put it.
But I did not 21 drop any of the written-in responses on the grounds that 22 they dealt with crafts and the letter said that was not 23 the issue.
24 Q
No, but it is very important.
I'm puzzled that 25 you wouldn't know which category you would put them into.
'.~
.. - ~ =
20990.0 268 BRT 1
There were some statements that said that craft was 2
discouraging us from finding problems, or would argue with 3
us,and so forth.
Did you call that number 127 or did you 4
call that number 37 5
A I would call that number 3, if they said 6
something about, you know, somebody -- craft is always 7
getting its way, or that crafts people get all the goodies, 8
or something like that.
Then I probably would put it in 9
number 2.
But if it dealt with' issues of safety and so-10 forth, then I definitely would,put it under category 3.
11 MR. TREBY:
Why don't we take a couple of 12 minutes.
Realign ourselves.
13 (Discussion off the record.)
14 EXAMINATION OF PANEL RESUMED 15 MR. TREEY:
We are up to, now, the last phase, I 16 guees -- the last two hours.
17 DR. MARGULIES:
Let's try to stick to that 18 because I really want to try to catch my plane.
19 (Discussion off the record.)
20 BY MR. HIRSCHHORN:
21 Q
Dr. Bowers, there was some colloquy between you 22 and Mr. Roisman about the section of'the report itself 23 that reviews your findings, your conclusions, and you 24 indicated that you had neither written it nor been 25 consulted about it.
9 9
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20990.0 269 BRT 1
A That's correct.
2 Q
Have you had an opportunity to read it?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
And would you say that it accurately reflects 5
your own findings and conclusions?
6 A
It accurately summarizes them; yes.
7 Q
Even if, hypothetically, Mr. Roisman's premises, 8
namely that the criteria for inspections or for the 9
inspector's work were subjective rather than objective, 10 and that intimidation was strictly limited to the safety 11 area and accident was perhaps even encouraged, if not 12 tolerated in other areas, even if those premises were, 13 wouldn't you have expected the 1983 survey to have 14_. reflect.ed what. intimidation.there was?
15 A
I would have expected it to reflect whatever 16 intimidation there was, because I think it's very 17 difficult to set things up in an organization as 18 selectively intimidating.
19 Q
I'm not sure who would be the best person, 20 perhaps Mr. Kaplan or Dr. Stratton, could summarize for us 21 the process by which the team reached its conclusions?
22 And by that I mean, I got a sense, although I don't think 23 it was crystal clear, from yesterday's discussions, that 24 at least Dr. Margulies and Mr. Rice went off and spent 25 some time on the data and then the team mot, either O
r p
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. -.. ~.
20990.0~
270 BRT 1
physically together or by conference call, and then they 2
went off and met again.
I wonder if you could describe 3
that in as much detail as can yo~u recall.
4 A
(WITNESS KAPLAN) Correct.
Okay.
Basically the 5
study team people were hired on the understanding of what 6
the scope of the study was to be, they were to deal with 7
the climate of intimidation.
They were told that a number 8
of depositions, reports would be sent to them.
That they 9
were to read those.
And we would get back together after 10 a few-week period and begin writing a report.
11 In terms of getting started, I believe Chuck Rice took 12 the initiative of saying:
Well, let's get a little more 13 refinement on what our definition of " intimidation" is, so
- -that we are all reading for the same kinds of things.
And 15 Chuck checked around, as I understand, because now we are 16 in the time period when I was on vacation -- Chuck checked 17 around with Newt and Bill, and got a concurrence that that 18 seemed to be an adequate working definition, a general 19 guideline to help get started.
20 Am I giving you too much detail?
21 Q
No.
That's fine.
22 A
Okay.
So basically, then, people went off, did 23 thair reading independently.
Then the next time they met 24 was in Idaho Falls on Friday, the 5th or so.
They met in 25 Idaho Falls and we had an evening meeting.
I guess it
~ ~.~
20990.0 271 BRT 1
wasn't Friday -- it was a Sunday night.
2 A
(WITNESS RICE) Sunday night?
3 A
(WITNESS KAPLAN)'And at that time people were 4
asked for the first time what their conclusions were; or 5
what they were finding.
Basically we were getting ready 6
to write a repobi.'
7 Q
That would be Sunday, August 5th?
8 A
(WITNESS STRATTON) Right.
9 O
So that would be after Dr. Bower's report'was 10 dated if not received?
11 A
(WITNESS KAPLAN) Dr. Bower's report had been 12 seen by me.
I don't know if Dr. Stratton had seen it.
13 Margulies had not and Rice had not.
They received it for 14
._.the first time,_actually, Monday.
15 And at that point I checked around the table to ask 16 primarily -- well, to ask Rice and Margulies, and Bill, I 17 believe, and I had had some discussion -- asked these 18 other guys what their findings,were, what their 19 conclusions were, in a summary kind of way.
And basically 20 their overall findings were the same; basically, that 21 there had not been a clir. ate of intimidation.
22 Because wo were so close in what the assessment of the 23 situation was, it was decided to write an integrated 24 report.
25 There might be more reasons for having decided to write
20990.0 272 BRT 1
an integrated report, but that was certainly a factor.
2 Then we proceeded the next day to say what would the 3
categories of the report be'and divided up'the work in 4
terms of people taking a shot at writing a first draft for 5
'different sections of the report.
That's how we got 6
started. -
7 Q
So that it is accurate to say that three 8
independent -- strike that.
9 It is accurate to say that three different individuals, 10 each selected for a particular field of expertise, and 11 each examining at least part if not most of the raw data, 12 reached the same basic conclucion?
13 A
Correct.
~
14
Dr. Bowers, have you read the de.finition of 16 intimidation in the report?
17 A
(WITNESS BOWERS) Yes.
18 Q
I believe it's at page 5.
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
You are familiar with it.
Is that definition 21 consistent with appendix C and the conclusions that you 22 set forth in appendix C7 23 A
I think it is.
The difference, to the extent 24 there in a difference in the body of the report, treats 25 the behavior as a separate and sort of co-equal category.
9
..m 20990.0 273 BRT 1
I treated it as an overall category, with two 2
triggering subcomponents -- all three parts are in my 3
definition as it is in their'.
s 4
Q All three parts are in the definition you use?
5 A
Yes.
6
~
Q Can you turn to page 5 of the report?
The five 7
bullet paragraphs there, those indicators are all 8
consistent with your definition as well?
9 A
Let me examine them a moment.
~
10 They are a'11 consistent with it.
They state in much 11
, greater detail what I stated and dealt with in more 12 general terms.
13 Q
. Turning to the 1983 survey responses, in your
(.
14.. analysis of.the responses did you -- did they.suggest to 15 you any feeling on the part of the respondents that their 16 identity would be disclosed?
17 A
Saw nothing that suggested that.
That's all I have.
Thank you --
19 oh, Mack, you have some questions.
20 BY MR. WATKINS:
21 Q
Dr. Margulies, yesterday I believe you stated 22 that in assessing the data, all the data, you focused more l
23 on inhibitors than on facilitators; is that correct?
24 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) Yes.
I said I was more 25 interested in looking -- since the question was,'"Is there i
20990.0 274 BRT 1
a climate of intimidation," I was more interested in 2
trying to discover what would be the producers, the 3
factors th'at would contribute to that.
That's right.
4 MR. TREBY:
Keep your voice up.
5 BY MR. WATKINUt 6
Q So you focused mo,re on the negative than en the 7
positive?
8 MR. TREBY:
Wait.
Don't nod.
Answer.
9 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) I'm sorry -- yes.
10 Q-In assessing climate, isn't that like counting 11 rainy and snowy days and ignoring sunny days altogether?
12 A,
'The question wasn't to produce a report that 13 described t'he climate profile at Comanche Peak.
That 14
_ a_s.n't.the charge.
w 15 0
Wou).dn't positive management attributes, 16 positive management actions, tend to mitigate the negative 17 aspects?
18 A
Well, if you look at some of the ir.dicators, I 19 mean there are things that fall into that general category.
20 We were interested in seeing the degree to which 21 management took prompt and effective action; the degree to
~
22 which the management protected the job security of 23 individuals -- so, I mean it wacn't something that was 24 totally ignored, 4
25 But I'm saying an a focal point, as a target for P
n
~
20990.0 275 CRT 1
exploring the issue, we tended to look more at the 2
contributors to the climate.
But we didn't ignore the 3
others.
I'mean those were part of the indicators.
4 O
In that sense, in any event, your approach was 5
more conservative than not, wasn't it, in assessing 6
climate of intimidation?
7 A
I wouldn't use that word.
I'd say it was more 8
focused.
I'd say it was more focused.
9 Q
Mr. Rice, do you agree?
10 A
(WITNESS RICE) Yes.
11 Q
Doctor, you mentioned yesterday that there's 12 very little in'the literature regarding intimidation, 13 industrial organization intimidation.
What is there 14 - little 'about-in' the literature, exactly?
What were you 15 looking for that you didn' t find?
16 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) There are various ways of 17 defining " climate" in the literature.
There are various 18 ways of dimensionalizing " climate."
There's very little 19 instrumentation., for example, that specifically measures 20 climate of intimidation, or intimidation specifically as 21 an element of climate.
27 Secondly, I find very little specific research on the 23 impacts of an intimidating climate.
And I think I did a 24 recsonably thorough literature search.
25 G
You mentioned that you did find literature on m
O l
l
.-~
4 20990.0 276 BRT l
1 power?
2 A
ch, yes.
3 Q
Can you tell me what that is?
4 A
Ch, there's lots of information on sources of 5
organizational power, how power is used in: organization.s, 6
particular modes of utilizing power in conflictzresolution, 7
various dimensions of power; and, subsequently, 8
organizational politics, these' days, is very popular.
9 Q
Did you use any of those macerials in conducting-10 your survey?
Your study?
11 A
I find that they were sort of general, and I am 12 familiar with the literature, but not terribly pointed to 13 help focus this, study.
('
14 _
Q-__
...Did.you. plan.to write anything.for publication 15 regarding your participation in this enterprise?
16 A
Well, to be perfectly honest, I was sitting over 17 there actually watching the behavior of the attorneys and 18 I -- no, I'm just kidding.
19 (Laughter.)
20 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) I'm just quipping.
21 O
You have my consent.
22 (Discussion off the record.)
23 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) The notion crossed my mind.
24 I think really -- by the way, I checked thi's out'with some 25 of my colleagues a't school and they are also rather e
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20990.0 277 BRT 1
intrigued with this idea.
So I think potentially it might 2
be something that's worth exploring in more ' detail.
3 BY MR. WATKINS:
4 O
Have you put anything down?
Written anything in 5
an outline?
6 A
No.
7 Q
Dr. Stratton?
8 A
(WITNESS STRATTON) No.
9 Q
Dr. Bowers?
10 A
(WITNESS BOWERS) You mean for publications?
11 O
Yes.
12-A I have no intention.of publishing anything from 13 this.
14.
Q..'
_.To what. extent, Dr. Margulies, would your 15 written product differ from conclusions that you reached 16 here?
What would you analyze that you have not already 17 done?
18 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) Well, I think number one is, 19 I tried to point out, in at least the portions that I 20 wrote, the complexity of dealing with this issue:
the 21 interpretation of all the elements in the definition, what 22 the acts are, what the probabilities of perception are, 23 what the probabilities of subsequent action are.
So I 24 think there's -- I think some more interesting work could 25 be done in sharpening and conceptualizing this whole s
_. ~.
20990.0 278 BRT 1
notion.
That's number one.
2 Secondly, personally I don't believe that -- this is 3
sort of a case study.
So we don't really have available 4
more global information in other organizations of the same 5
type, or different organizations, different types of 6
organizations.
I think that might be an interesting 7
avenue.
8 We all implied here, over the last day and a half or so, 9
of the very important ands critical stressful relationships 10 between production and quality control.
That's worth some 11 additicnal exploration, I think.
12 O
Just so I understand, you and Mr. Rice, 13 Dr. Margulies, did not divide up the depositions and s
14...--transcripts?.-You: duplicated the effort?
Each of you 15 reviewed everything that there is to review?
16 A
Right.
17 O
You might not be up to speed on what's happened 18 since the report was published --
19 A
That's accurate.
20 0
Dr. Margulies, what kind -- can you give us an 21 example of things that you read that you decided simply tothequestionthatyouwe$estudying?
22 weren't relevant 23 Testimony, for example?
24 A
Again, there were two specific things that at 25 least come quickly to mind.
There was one eposition that
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20990.0 279 BRT 1
had to do specifically with a particular personnel 2
procedure.
And I felt there was a good deal of detail 3
about the procedure, but very little indication of how 4
that was applicable to the question that I was interested 5
in.
6 Another, I thought the bulletin board incident was not 7
terribly relavant.
8 Q
What was the bulletin board incident?
9 A
There were concerns about where the bulletin 10 boards were placed and where on the bulletin board the 11 telephone number or instruction -- it had to be in the 12 lower right-hand side -- that kind of thing.
And it was a 13 lot of detail that I felt wasn't terribly relevant to what 14
.If was.,dping.
15 O
Mr. Rice, to go back to something I asked 16 Dr. Margulies, did you feel that you focused more on the 17 negative aspects of the plant than the positive?
18 A
(WITNESS RICE) No, I don't really think so.
I 19 think it was an attempt to view all of it as relevant data.
20 Obviously, the filter through which you are processing all 21 of this in your own mind, however, is related to the 22 consideration as to whether a climate of intimidation 23 existed.
So perhaps from that standpoint.
I wouldn't 24 call it a focus on the negative, however.
25 0
Yesterday I think both of you, at least I know
~
20990.0 280 BRT 1
you did, Dr. Margulies, indicated that you did not 2
consider credibility of individual allegers.
You would 3
have ignored, therefore, facts such as that the alleger 4
was a two time felon or had misrepresented facts elsewhere.
5 You just ignored that; is that correct?
6 A
Yes.
I didn't make any judgment about the 7
quality or truthfulness of either the information that I 8
was looking at or the person who was providing it.
I just 9
took it --
10 0
You took it at face value?
11 A
-- at face value.
12 Q
Did you also ignore evidence tending to indicate 13 that the facts as related by-the individual could not have 14-been true?
15 A
I think in a general sense I have to say I 16 couldn't make that judgment.
17 O
So you didn't make that' judgment; is that right?
18 A
That's right.
19 O
In that sense, therefore, you gave the allegers 20 the benefit of the doubt?
21 A
I didn't make the judgment..
22 O
Well, an alleger comes forth and says "I was 23 intimidated."
You accepted that as face value, no matter 24 that it might not have been true or that this person might 25 be of doubtful credibility?
~
20990.0 281 BRT 1
A I couldn't make that judgment.
If a manager 2
said, "the alleger says there was never a meeting and I 3
know darned well there was," I didn't make the judgment 4
that the manager was incorrect either.
That was just a 5
misunderstanding or distortions of a piece of data.
I 6
just treated it that way.
7 Q
Prior to our session here yesterday, Mr. Kaplan,,
8 I'll ask you first, did you have any contact with anyone 9
that you know represents the intervenors?
10 A
(WITNESS KAPLAN) No.
11 Q
Did you have any contact with anyone from any of 12 the following organizations:
Citizens Association for a 13
. Sound Energp; Trial Lawyers for Public Justice; or the 14 Government Accountability Project?
15 A
No.
16 Q
Mr. Rice?
17 A
(WITNESS RICE) No.-
18 Q
Dr. Stratton?
19 A
{ WITNESS STRATTON) Prior to when?
20 Q
Yesterday.
Prior to yesterday's session here?
21 A
I -- on a visit to Comanche Peak with Dr.
22 Margulies, we sat in on one deposition.
Tony Roisman was 23 present in that session and we simply were introduced.
24 Q
Dr. Margulies?
25 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) I agree.
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20990.0 282 BRT 1
Q Dr. Bowers?
2 A
(WITNESS BOWERS) I have had no contact with any 3
of those.
4 Q
Mr. Rice, I was interested in your statement 5
yesterday that Mr. Tolson might not have had any more 6
influence over blind truth, let's call them, than 7
supervisors somewhere down the chain.
Do you remember 8
that?
9 A
(WITNESS RICE) Yes.
10 Q
Dr. Margulies, do you agree with 'that, that a 11 supervisor, Mr. Tolson in particular, might have less 12 influence?
13 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES)
I'm saying it's either/or.
14 I'm saying sometimes people at the top are so divorced and 15 detached from the operations that they really have minimal 16 operational influence.
17 on the other hand, it's also true that people at the 18 top can have, and sometimes do, strong influence on the 19 kind of attitudas and c,u.Ltura of the. organiut. ion, how tha 20 organization proceeds.
So it's a matter of either/or.
21 O
Have you seen enough about Mr. Tolson in this 22 record to reach any judgments, to make any judgments about 23 whether he falls into one category or the other?
24 A
I don't think I could comfortably make the 25 judgment.
I w
v w
20990.0 283 CRT 1
O What are the attributes, then, of the kind of 2
isolated manager that has little influence, or less 3
influence?
4 A
Where the role has begun to evolve to a more 5
longer range, strategic management of the enterprise; 6
where the manager is concerned and needs to spend a 7
greater part of his or her time interfacing with other 8
units outside of the organization; where the role has 9
evolved, such where the manager's role has evolved more in 10 the change and implementation of n'ew technology.
That 11 person would be involved, in terms of the way they would 12 spend their time, in issues that are more detached from 13 the day-to-day operation of the organization.
14 Q
In this case, what about practical things, like:
15 "Does the person write a lot of memos for distribution?
16 Does the person leave his office to go out into the field?"
17 Are those relevant to that question?
18 A
Well, sure.
And what I said is a person who is 19 more involved in the day-to-day operations would spend 20 time in more of a directing, managing, monitoring role on 21 the day-to-day operations.
That person, depending on one's 22 own leadership style and its effectiveness, could have a 23 lot of influence.
24 O
Mr. Rice, can you add to that?
Have you reached 25 any conclusion about Mr. Tolson?
20990.0 284 BRT 1
A (WITNESS RICE) I think'I probably said yesterday,'
2 and I would repeau:
I think there were intimidating 3
aspects to Mr. Tolson's personality.
4 Q
Right.
I understand that and I'm going to 5
address that in a minute.
The question is, was he highly 6
influential, in your view, or less influential, as 7
compared to supervisors in the field, for example?
8 A
If I recall correctly, Tolson was probably the 9
third level up from QC inspector.
At most construction 10 sites, the actual interac' tion of each one of the 11 inspectors with somebody three levels up in the 12 organization would be very few and far between.
They 13 would almost, almost be. limited to having, perhaps, sat in 14 on some meetings with them without any direct. interaction 15 between them.
In addition, viewing memos that might be 16 posted on the bulletin board, or that sort of thing, might 17 also be there.
18 The primary influence that I would expect to see on the 19 part of -- influence on OC inspectors would be the 20 immediate QC supervisor immediately above them.
Just like l
21 a foreman on top of a craft worker.
22 O
Okay.
Now, as to Mr. Tolson, the intimidating 23 aspects of Mr. Tolson's behavior, that relates to the way 24 that he conducted himself, the way that he talked; is that 25 right?
1 ws em
20990.0 285 BRT 1
A That was my co'nclusion; yes.
2 O
There is a distinction between having such a 3
personality and intentionally'trying to intimidate people, 4
isn't there?
5' A
I would say "yes."
6 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) I would say that.
7 Q
Dr. Margulies, do you make that distinction in 8
Mr. Tolson's case?
9 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) I really would like to 10 decline on that because I really did not, certainly at 11 this point, make judgments about either the personality or 12 the truthfulness of what was reported.
13 The answer to your question is, in my opinion, as I 14 said, there are two possibilities.
There are very 15 explicit identifiable acts of intimidation.
And as I said 16 yesterday about three or four times, when those acts are 17 coupled with threats or potential use of negative 18 sanctions, they are very explicit.
19 There are also behaviors that are implicitly 20 intimidating, that do not have those characteristics, but 21 can be, in the perception of the perceiver, intimidating.
22 So I agree with that part of it.
I don't think I have 23 enough information, frankly, at this point anyway, to make 24 judgments about, A,
whether those things really occurred 25 explicitly; or, B,
whether the personality of the players
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20990.0 286 BRT I
was such that they are naturally intimidated -- that is 2
that people would perceive the behavior as such.
That's 3
an honest response.
4 O
I'm sure they all are.
5 A
Thank you.
6 Q
With respect to Mr. Tolson's, what you 7
characterized as his personality, would that personality 8
have the greatest effect on the meekest person?
9 A
That is people who tend to have a style that is 10 mors likely to be interpreted or perceived as intimidating?
11 I don't know if it's meekest, but some --
12 O
How would you characterize it, the person on 13 whom it would have the greatest effect?
14 A
Generally people who tend to just be more 15 sensitive to that kind of behavior.
16 Let me give you an example.
On the one hand, it could 17 be meekest.
On the other hand, sometimes the most 18 aggressive styles tend to be the most sensitive to other 19 aggressive styles.
It's very hard, I think, to categorize.
20 The best thing I could say is that there probably is a 21 group of people who would be very sensitive to that and 22 would interpret that behavior as intimidating.
But I have 23 trouble differentiating, at least right now.
24 O
Mr. Rice, you, I think, answered affirmatively a 25 minute ago that there is -- to the question:
Is there a
=
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20990.0 287 BRT 1
distinction between having an intimidating personality and 2
intentionally committing intimidating acts; is that right?
3 A
(WITNESS RICE) Yes.
4 Q
Have you formed a judgment about whether 5
Mr. Tolson intentionally committed intimidating acts?
6 A
I guess my feeling is that the answer to that is 7
"no."
The answer is "yes, I have formed an opinion," and 8
the answer, further, is "no, I don't believe it was 9
intentional."
And when I say "an intimidating personality,"
10
'there are also areas in which it is obvious that he has a --
11 at least the record would tend to indicate that he has a 12 caring personality with respect to a lot of the people.
13 So, like anybody, it isn't a black and white case.
14 It's a case of having what appears to be intimidating 15 aspects to his personality.
16 O
Okay.
Nonetheless, you discounted a lot of that 17 and focused instead on the state of mind of the individual, 18
.the alleger, the person who claimed intimidation in his 19 contacts with Mr. Tolson; is that right?
20 A
Yes.
i 21 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) Yes.
22 A
(WITNESS RICE) Oh, I'm sorry, I thought you were 23 asking me.
24 Q
No, I was.
I got your answer and I wanted --
25 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) Sure.
l I
~~ 5 x
l 20990.0 288 BRT j
1-Q You have each, by now, for better or for worse, 2
gotten a feel for how the lawyers in this proceeding have 3
gon'e about trying to prove the cases.
And the way it 4
worked at least initially was the intervenor would produce
~
5 a witness who said "I was intimidated," and then the 6
company would put on witnesses to say, "no, you weren't."
7 Is that a fair statement of how it started out anyway?
8 A
(WITNESS HARGULIES) I think it's fair.
9 MR. ROISHAN:
Just for the record, that's not 10 how it started out.
11 A
(WITNESS RICE) The company witnesses were the 12 first ones that we saw.
13-BY MR. WATKINS:
14 Q
Right.
Due to a procedure that I have never 15 encountered before and hope never to again.
16 A
(WITNESS RICE) It added burdens to the review of 17 the depositions.
18 Q
Would you agree that what we are left with, 19 though, in, looking at. the totality of it-,
is we have a 20 bunch of allegers and we have a bunch of responsive 21 evidence, either that the allegation is true or not true; 22 is that fair?
23 A
(WITNESS RICE) Yes.
24 O
Dr. Margulies?
25 A
(WITNESS HARGULIES) Yes.
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20990.0 289 BRT 1
0 The intervenors certainly did not produce 2
witnesses who said "I wasn't intimidated" for obvious 3
reasons.
In that respect, Dr. Margulies, would you say 4
that the record of the case developed this summer is 5
somewhat biased toward actual incidents of intimidation?
6 You haven't heard from all of the other inspectors out 7
there; is that correct?
8 A
See, I'm having problems with the line of 9
questioning so you'll have to help me.
My problem is.that 10' I feel on a dilemma.
And the dilemma is between trying to 11 make judgments of individual instances of intimidation, 12 and I'm not going to argue whether there were or there 13 weren't.
In fact, in my view -- wait, wait, let me finish.
14 Hear me out.
15 In my view, in terms of the charge and focus of the 16 project, to try to make a judgment about climate of 17 intimidation, it wouldn't matter if there were 10 or 12 or --
18 I don't know what the number is -- actual incidents of 19 i$1t.imidation What I'm more. interested ir. is the, as I 20 said yesterday,.the overall pattern, the gestalt, what's 21 going on in this place.
So I'm more comfortable trying to 22 deal with that rather than each item.
23 Now, given that 24 Q
I appreciate it.
I agree with everything you 25 say.
Given that, how representative is this hearing
.=
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2 20990.0 290 BRT I
record, tie depositions and the transcripts?
2 A
I was very comfortable with the survey data 3
because I think the survey data in both cases at least 4
covered more ground in terms of climate of intimidation.
5 It covered more ground.
There was more breadth.
6 We can always argue about what the quality of those 7
responses are, whether the questions did what they were 8
supposed to do, whether they actually measured what they 9
were supposed to messure, et cetera, et cetera.
But I 10 think there's some breadth there.
11 I think what we've got is a whole series of things that 12 make up this data p'ool.
13 I don't,think the depositional material is unimportant.
14 Q
I wasn't suggesting that it was.
15 A
What I'm saying is it's a piece of a number of 16 things that come together to try to help give a picture of 17 what's going on here.
18 O
My question again was:
How representative is 19 the hearing material?
20 A
Let me see if I understand what you are saying.
21 If one only gets depositions from people who are now ofaself-selectedkrocess.
22 allegers, then it's sort So 23 in that respect, it has that characteristic.
Is that l
24 Q
Presenting a witness to say "I have been i
25 intimidated and here's what happened" is one thing.
How y
9
-ee.
-. ~. -
20990.0 291 BRT 1
do you show -- on what do you rely, including the absence --
2 it's hard to prove, isn't it?
The absence of intimidation?
3 A
Well, I think the methodology for doing that, I 4
think David has discussed in a lot of detail this morning,
~
5 using more g1obal data while looking at patterns of 6
responses and making inferences from those patterns.
So I 7
think from a behavioral science point of view the 8
methodology, while not flawless, is fairly straightforward.
9 O
Let's go back to your observation that we have 10 10 or 11 or-12, or however many actual incidents of 11 intimidation in the depositions, for example.
Your 12 indication was that some -- or your belief is that some 13 intimidation is inevitable, some conflicts of that sort 14 are inevitable?
15 A
It doesn't surprise me.
16 Q
It follows, to me anyway -- and correct me if 17 I'm wrong -- that given those data, given the '79 survey, 18 given the whole data base that you evaluated, it was 19 important, to puA thnne. i nrHvidual incidents in context and 20 that's exactly what you've done, isn't it?
21 A
That's exactly what I tried to do.
22 Q
Mr. Rice, do you agree?
23 A
(WITNESS RICE) Repeat the question.
24 Q
Let me go back a couple of questions.
How 25 representative of plant conditions do you think the
20990.0 292 URT 1
hearing record developed over the summer is?
2 A
(WITNESS RICE) I was adding up some numbers, 3
writing down some numbers while you were talking with, or 4
asking Newt questions.
5 In the area of depositions from the alleged intimidated 6
people, you've got roughly 40 to 50 depositions.
We've 7
got an equal number that come from the other side of the 8
fence, from the management side of the fence.
9 In addition to that you've got something like 145 10 people that were interviewed' by the Office of Inspection 11 and their reports, another 38 that were in an additional 12 interview process that -- plus something like 121 in one 13 of tha surveys and 130 in another one of the surveys.
So 14 you ire looking at a data base in terms of people that 15 were talked to and had an opportunity of something close 16 to 500 people.
17 Obviously some of those are duplicates.
But I think 18 the data base that we were looking at is a large number of 19 people and it's not limited to simply the people that were 20 allegers.
21 Q
So your answer is, you do feel it was fairly 22 representative, if you include all of the OI~ interviews 23 and all of the exhibits as well as the deposition 24 transcripts?
25 A
I feel it was relatively representative; yes.
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20990.0 293 BRT 1
Q Dr. Margulies, I recall you saying -- please 2
correct me if I'm wrong -- that when you looked at the '79 3
survey data, you expected to find more in terms of 4
intimidation than you did.
Did you make that observation 5
yesterday?
6 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) That sounds like something 7
that I might have said; yes.
8 O
Why did you expect to find more?
9 A
Well, I think, given the natural tensions and 10 conflicts and interface difficulties between the craft and 11 QA/QC,.I expected to see more indication of that tension 12 surface in that questionnaire.
And it just wasn't there.
13 So my expectations were that the numbers on those 14 categories would be scmewhat higher.
15 In fact, in '79, if I would just do a kind of rough in 16 my mind, the number of times those kinds of items were 17 identified was not unlike the '83 survey.
18 So, my expectation from the situation was that there 19 would be somewhat more indications there.
20 Q
Did you look at the '83 curveys, materials?
21 A
No.
22 Q
Did you, Mr. Rice?
23 A
(WITNESS RICE) No, sir.
24 O
Are you going to?
25 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) I didn't think it was
~
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20990.0 294 BRT 1
necessary.
2 A
(WITNESS RICE) I have no intent to.
3 O
A few times yesterday, Dr. Margulies, you 4
referred to the question of anonymity -- I can't pronounce 5
that word -- in connection with the '79, surveys.
Could 6
you describe your thoughts on that, what you meant?
7 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) Sure.
I also said that 8
while I had a high level of confidence in the data, I 9
don't think -- you know, from an ideal perspective, the 10 way in which the '79 survey proceeded was that there were 11 recorders who went in, talked to people, and wrote down 12 the responses.
And my recollection of that -- I'm not 13 totally accurate -- is that those people'were Utilities 14 people.
I think they were not on-site but off-site 15 someplace in Dallas or something like that, which is 16 admirable.
But there is still that kind of internal 17 connection.
And, so, when one is collecting data from an 18 individual, there may be some question about the --
19 particularly Li Lt,'s, an. intarm' -- about,the level of 20 confidentiality and anonymity of that data.
21 So, while I feel very confident about the conclusions 22 in the report vis-a-vis intimidation, I'm not so sure that 23 people felt that they could be, you know, absolutely 24 totally open about their concerns.
~
25 I think the data would have just I think I might
=3
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. BRT 1
have said this yesterday -- a twinge more credibility if 2
the same data had been collected with a bit more anonymity.
3 That is, where people could either fill it out or the data 4
could have been selected by external parties.
5 O
But you did see enough to indicate to you that 6
the interviewees were candid?
7 A
I would say so.
8 Q
And you were satisfied on that?
9 A
Yes.
10 0
Mr. Rice, did you share that concern?
11 A
(WITNESS RICE) I would say yes, probably for 12 different reasons that Newt did.
The people as I recall 13 from Dallas were Texas Utilities people.
The bulk of the 14 inspectors on-site that were interviewed in the process of 15 that survey worked for Brown & Root, or Ebasco, or other 16 contractors as opposed to actually working for Texas 17 Utilities.
18 There is a -- consequently there is an opportunity 19 there. for 1.nspectors, ta make their concerns known,. if they 20 have them, at a level in the organization they normally 21 wouldn't have access to, because they are now talking to 22 the Utility.
This, generally, would tend to make for more 23 openness than would otherwise be the case, in my 24 estimation.
25 O
Mr. Kaplan, I believe you indicated you did not
~
20990.0 296 BRT l
1 actually evaluate any of the data base?
2 A
Right.
3 Q
You evaluated the evaluators, those were your 4
words yesterday?
5 A
(WITNESS KAPLAN) Yes.
6 0
What was your criteria?
What standards did you 7
use to evaluate their work?
8 A
Well, it had to make sense to me.
It had to 9
have some face validity.
It had to be fairly 10 comprehensive.
I'd say the main thing I was doing was --
11 it had to fit my previous training and experience in the 12 area.
I anticipated what questions others might ask of 13 the data;. I thought what other points of view could 14 someone take on the subject other than the ones they were 15 taking; and just as I read the thing, as you saw, if I had 16 a doubt or question concerning it, I would write:
this 17 doesn't feel well, this doesn't sit right with me -- the 18 sort of gut level response.
L9 Q.
Did.you da the same. thing,in meetings with the 20 group?
Did you challenge --
21 A
I used some of the meetings that we had to do 22 that, to go through and take questions and problems that I 23 had and confront people with those; yes.
24 Q
Mr. Rice, did your evaluation of the data base 25 and conclusions that you reached in any way depend upon e
m
.em,,-m-
-e,.
s m
20990.0 297 BRT 1
whether an individual allegation of intimidation caused a 2
defect at the, plant?
3 A
(WITNESS RICE) No.
As a matter of fact, we 4
tried to stay away from that kind of a judgment, with the 5
understanding that that was being looked at independently 6
by other people.
7 O
So you ignored any possible downstream effect, 8
would be-the answer?
9 A
We ignored it and I don't think the record would 10 have been such that we could have done anything with it if 11 we had tried to.
12 O
I'm sorry to hear you say that.
13 Dr. Margulies?
('~
14-A (WITNESS MARGULIES) Yes, I agree with that.
We 15 had, in my opinion, very little information to make that 16 judgment and I think -- there was a technical report that 17 we saw where somebody else made those judgments.
But I 18 don't -- there wasn't enough, really, and it wasn't, again, 19 the charge.
The charge was simply to look at the climate, 20 recognizing that there are, again, implications downstream, 21 but we really didn't get into that.
22 O
Recognizing that there could, there might be?
23 A
Sure.
Or might not.
24 0
or might not.
25 MR. WATKINS:
That's all we have.
.--2 mew- - -
4
20990.0 298 BRT 1
MR. TREBY:
All right.
Mr. Roisman now has his 1Rr 2
hour, I thinkpE',iather than take our break so we can 3
maintain the schedule for the panel, we'll just move on.
4 EXAMINATION e
5 BY MR. ROISMAN:
6 Q
Dr. Bowers, I forgot to ask you, when you did 7
your work did you take notes?
8 A
(WITNESS BOWERS) I took notes, counted things 9
and so on, sitting up at my cottage; yes.
10 Q
Have you got copies?
11 A
No, they don't exist because when I finished the 12 report I threw them away.
13 0
What about your assistant; did she keep notes of 14 that telephone conversation?
15 A
No.
No.
16 0
of that telephone conversation?
Either with you 17 or with the person who called her about the project?
18 A
No.
All that she did was to call my at the lake 19 and tell me the gist of it, asked me what me response or 20 interest was.
When I knew I was coming here I asked her 21 if she had been the one that had taken the call.
She was 22 rather strained and said:
Yes, I think so.
So there are 23 no notes or anything that she would have.
24 O
Okay.
Mr. Kaplan, looking now at this thing you 25 started talking about briefly this morning, in the letter L
20990.0 299 BRT 1
of July 31 to Mr. Leach, which has been previously marked 2
as Exhibit 5, there is a paragraph at the end of the first 3
page of the attachment.
It says, "the ' basic question the J
4 team has to attempt to answer is - "; can you please tell 5
me where did that basic question come from?
6 A
(WITNESS KAPLAN) It came from me, in terms of 7
where did it come from.
I spoke with -- I wrote the words 8
and I based that on conversations with the -- essentially 9
with Stu Treby and Tom Ippolito, in terms of what their 10 needs were, to the best of.my understanding of what we 11 would -- I had to put that into a framework I could work 12 with and see if it made sense as an area of investigation.,
13 O
Did the input outside of your own knowledge come 14 through a single meeting or several meetings?
15 A
I had, I guess -- I had conversation with Mark 16
- Williams, 17 O
Mark. Williams is --
9 18 A
NRC staff.
Just to clarify the record, Mark 20 Williams is a contracting person on the staff who had made 21 the initial contact to see --
22 A
(WITNESS KAFLAN) Prior to --
23 MR. TREBY:
Let me finish the sentence -- to see 24 whether EGLG Idaho would be available to do the work and 25 had the necessary expertise to do the kind of work.
- - ~,..
.. - ~ ~.
20990.0 300 BRT 1
BY MR. ROISMAN:
2 O
Go ahead.
3 A
Prior to my conversation with Treby and Ippolito, 4
I had spoken with several people I had already started to 5
consider as possible resources for doing this task.
6 Q
And who were those people?
7 A
I'd have to check my notes.
8 O
Are those notes that you produced for us?
9 A
Yes.
10 0
okay.
That's fine.
And then how many times did you talk to'Ippolito before the time that you wrote this 11 12 July 31 --
13 A
I only recall. talking with Ippolito.in Texas, 14 and' meeting him there for the first time and talking with 15 him.
So it was basically the day -- it was based on a day 16 in Texas.
17 Q
Was that the first time you met with Mr. Treby?
18 A
Yes.
19 O
And there are notes of those conversations?
20 A
There are notes of those conversations.
I have 21 a few; yes.
der 22 O
okay.
Are those the ones that you have4 urned t
23 over?
24 MR. TRESY:
That's right.
25 MR. ROISMAN:
Both the Ippolito and yours?
.y 9
20990.0 301 BRT 1
MR. TREBY:
First of all, it was two days, it 2
wasn't one day.
It was July 18th and 19th.
As I 3
understand it, the 19th'was a very short follow-up meeting 4
where there were just -- it was a follow-up meeting where 5
they just went off to do something.
But, yes, there are.
6 Those,are the notes that have not yet been turned over and 7
they occurred at least with regard to myself, at the Glen 8
Rose Motor Inn.
Both Mr. Kaplan, Dr. Stratton, and I 9
think Mr. Rice, came to the motel with Mr. Ippolito.
So I 10 think it is possible they had spoken to him ahead of.ime 11 while I was at the meeting.
12 MR. ROISMAN:
The only notes you, held back were 13 notes that you or the staff attorneys --
4 14 tut. TREBY:
I didn't notice any notes of prior 15 discussions before they got to the hotel.
It seemed,to me 16 that the notes were strictly the meeting in the hotel room.
17 MR. ROISMAN:
Okay.
18 BY MR. ROISMAN:
L9 O
At the meeting that you had that Mr. Treby 20 attended, was it your understanding Mr. Treby was giving 21 you any legal advice?
Was he acting in -- as your lawyer?
22 A
(WITNESS KAPLAN) No.
23 0
Was he, in your judgment -- well, what did you 24 think he was doing there?
What was he doing?
I don't 25 want you to tell me what he said for the moment.
I just
.=,
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20990.0 302
.BRT 1
want you to tell me what sort of things was he talking to 2
you about?
3 A
Giving us some understanding of what the case 4
was that they were involved with, 5
Q Yes.
6 A
And trying to think through, verbalize how we 7
might be a resource to them.
8 0
Yes.
Okay.
And what role did Mr. Ippolito play 9
in that meeting?
r 10 A
In that meeting I recall -- you guys check me --
11 I recall Ippolito sitting back a lot and letting Stu 12 orient us to wha?. was going on, what they were involved 13 with; and coming in more in a focusing, clarifying kind of 14 role.
15 O
Did you get facts at that meeting?
In other 16 words, were you told:
Well, here is a kind of incident 17 that we are dealing with, or here is an event or something 18 like that?
19 A
I'm not sure.
But I think that I would have 20 gotten some examples of the kir.d of things that were going 21 on.
22 O
What was it that you heard, orwha$was it that 23 you learned, that caused you to formulate the basic 24 question as distinct from any intimidation that some 25 inspector may have felt from actions on the part of crafts
--e e.-w=.
2
2699040 303 BRT 1
per.sonn417 Can you remember what you heard or what you 2
knew that vade you feel that should be part of the 2
definitich.7 4
A Actually, I think in my own experience coming 5
back, 1 missed that part of it.
And I think I got that 6
encouragement from Bill -- if not Bill Stratton -- if not 7
from Chuck -- if that was the area in which we were trying B
to work.
9 Q.
Dr. Stratton, was it you, as you remember?
16 A
(WITN$SS STRATTON) I remember -- my recollection 11 is that., yes, that what we were to look at was climate of 12 intimidation with some clarifying provisos, in a sense 13 that &re, yea know, Airted under the section of' specific 14 - problems, where-we said we are not to look at specific 15 cases of intimidation and decide whether in fact they were 15 or vere not.-- munsgement was or was not culpable; that we 17 weru not to 1cok at -- or t. hat a climate of intimidation, 1G thece was a distinction -- we needed to get a definition 19 ci cl.imato nf. int.inidM. ion.in our heads,. or work one out, 20 that at least could distinguish that frcm something that 21 you might more loocely characterize as management style.
22 And we were to make no judgments about whether in fact 23 there was a safety problem er net.
That was clearly out 24 of our expertise.
And that we were to look at, in a sense, 25 management 's responsibility for this.
.=,
. _x
=,.
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20990.0 304 l
-BRT s
1 So that, if we were. dealing'with intimidation -- an 2
intin.idating act on the part of a craftsman, we would look 3
at manacement's responsibility in that when they becqme 4
aware of it, did they react appropriately?
Did they do S
things to try and prevent it or whatever?
But not' that 6
.'that would be -- if there were a lot of individual 7
incidents, I suppose, with craftsmen brow-beating 8
inspectors that management neve( knew anything about or
~. =
9 whatcyer, thz.t thaf.' wasn' t the thing'-- we needed to make 10 a distinction about management's involvement in whatever 11 climate there was versus other people's involvement, the 12 focus being on management's responsibility.
~~
13 O
And you got that in your conversations with
- Messrs.- Treby and Ippolito?
Orryou got that on your own?
15 A
No, I believe -- my recollection is that that's 16 one of the factors that came out of that conversation.
17 And I believe that it was the distinction on the second 18 day when we met actually at the site.
19 MR. TREBY:
I. thought about.i.t a.Little bit 20 further and I think the second day I also was at the 21 meeting, and that was mainly one where you provided us a 22 schedule.
We had talked in terms of what the scope might 23 be on the first day and then, at that point, we still had if34 24 this potential hearing coming up on August 20th, and were z
25 to go back and develop a schedule overnight as to how they
-w
+
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20990.0 305 BRT 1
would meet various milestones, and that we'd have a s
2 document, or testimony or whatever on the August date.
3 BY MR. ROISMAN:
4 Q
Dr. Stratton, if you were conducting your own 5
survey, unconstrained by the contract here, trying to find 6
out whether or not the workforce was being discouraged 7
from reporting safety problems -- not "who is to blame" --
8 would you.look at the issue of whether crafts people were, 9
unbeknownst to anybody except themselves, discouraging the 10 inspectors from reporting safety violations?
11 A
(WITNESS STRATTON) ' Well, I don't know if I'd go 12 out -- the way you pose the question, I don't know if I'd 13 go out and ask that question, specifically look for that.
14~
0- -
If you had that information coming to you, would 15 you --
26 A
I assume I would cast the net that would include 17 that.
18 Q
And what about the question of management style?
19 Do you feel that management style is irrelevant to the 20 question of how comfortable the workforce feels about 21 reporting problems if they see them?. Is that a relevant 22 part of answering that question?
Forgetting about this 23 intimidation thing for a moment; just to that question.
24 A
The way that you ask the question, I think I 25 would have to agree that, sure, management style is a part
.=
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20990.0 306 BRT 1
of the climate that people work in.
2 O
And it can influence whether they do or do not 3
feel comfortable about reporting a safety problem or 4
complaining about their wages or whatever?
5 A
Well, see, I'm not sure at what point, when it 6
gets specific to talking safety, that you are talking now 7
to talk about a subset of their behavior that I would 8
include in the intimidation climate part of things.
9 O
I'm not even thinking so much -- for the moment 10 I'm stripping the word " intimidation" out and I'm just 11 dealing with perhaps a broader or a different set.
And 12 the set is employees who feel, for whatever the reasons 13 are, a reluctance to report safety problems.
And I'm 14 trying to look -- if you were looking at that question:
15 "Do the employees at this plant feel a reluctance to 16 report safety problems" -- would you look at whether craft 17 people were the source of any reluctance that they might 18 feel?
Or wculd you look at management style, as to just 19 how they dealt with their employees in trying to find that 20 out?
Would those be relevant factors that you would 21 examine?
r 22 A
I'm having trouble responding and I'm not sure 23 why.
I think I'm not thinking along the same wavelength 24 or characterizing things the same way you are.
25 As soon as you start asking a question about reluctance
.=,
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---e--
r
20990.0 307 BRT 1
to respond, then the issue of "why" and "what's behind 2
that" and " intimidation" is what's on my mind and you are 3
trying to divorce that from intimidation and that's my --
4 O
I don't mean to divorce it.
I mean not to focus 5
exclusively on it.
I assume there are other things that 6
might not be called intimidation that might be the reason 7
why you were reluctant.
For instance, I think yesterday 8
one of you drew the distinction between harassment and 9
intimidation.
And you might simply say:
It is not worth 10 it.
11 For instance, are any of you familiar with a recent, 12 within the last year'or so, report, that came out from the 13 Federal Government on the issue of whistle-blowers?
And 14 in that report they discuss the question of:
What is it 15' that causes employees to be reluctant, if they are 16 reluctant, to blow the whistle?
And one of the very high 17 positive answers was:
We are reluctant if we think, by 18 blowing the whistle, that nothing will happen; in other 19 words, that there vill not be any action taken.
20 That, I don't think -- in your definitions I don't 21 think any of you would call that intimidation.
Those 22 employees weren't being intimidated but they were being 23 turned off.
They were being discouraged.
So that might 24 be an example of an action which could be a management 25 style which would -- which would be -- and what I'm asking e
-e
-e----.
. ~.. - - - - -
g.
20990.0 308 ERT 1
is, do you agree with this or not agree with this --
2 A
Yes, and I think it's one of the things we 1
3 looked at.
We looked at management response.
It's one of 4
the bullets we had under our " climate" definition was --
5 Q
You looked at management response to allegations 6
of intimidation?
7 A
Okay.
Or management -- I believe we also looked 8
at -- yes, that's right.
9 Q
And similarly, when you looked at response, you 10 didn't necessarily look at style; isn't that right?
You 11 excluded -- if the results of Mr. Tolson, to use the 12 example that's been used a lot here -- if the results of 13 Mr. Tolson's work was to " address the prbblem," the fact 14 that his style may have been intimidating was not, in your 15 judgment, a factor which was part of your mandate?
You 16 were looking to see, when Tolson got done, did we think 17 that he had responded to the allegation of intimidation by 18 X over here, not what was his style in responding to it?
19 A
I'm not sure I can answer that.
First of all, 20 as I told you yesterday, I didn't read all these 21 depositions.
22 Q
No, I understand.
23 A
So I am not familiar with how Tolson reacted and 24 there are some stylistic things you are not going to catch 25 from a written record either.
So I don't know if I can em o
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20990.0 309 ERT 1
respond to that.
2 Q
Maybe that's a little too detailed.
I think you 3
answered the question.
4 Dr. Margulies, do you have anything to add to that 5
question, or the answer that Dr. Stratton there, in terms 6
of what role management style and craft personnel 7
intimidation of workers which did not become known to 8
management necessarily, or at least knowledge that you saw 9
told you that it did -- what role that would play?
10 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) Well, you.a'sked earlier, I 11 think the question that you posed was:
Well, if you were 12 going to kind of go in and look at the question, would you
(-
13 kind of explore the role or relationship of craft and -- I 14 think that's-a -legitimate factor to look at.
15 O
If the question were as I defined it rather than 16 as the question was defined for your work?
17 A
No.
Even as defined, I'm saying if we started 18 out with the question and said -- in fact, if I might just 19 reitara.te, I think. what Da.vid, said, earl.y this morning 20 would be ideally the way to go, which would have been kind 21 of explore what's going on here in a kind of general sense 22 and then get more pointed about the data collection.
23 Q
Let me interrupt, you meant when he talked about 24 going and interviewing and making sure everyone knew were I
25 you anonymous, et cetera, to get your.own first
==
+
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20990.0 310 QRT' 1
impressions?
2 A
You develop the dimensionality of the issue.
3 And in fact, I guess Bill also said you sort of throw out 4
a wide net.
5 So, I think the number one question worked with the 6
data set that we had.
And I think secondly there were in 7
a number of places, as I said yesterday, interface issues 8
between QC and craft that are not insignificant issues.
9 So, it kind of emerged but it wasn't a focal point.
10 That was one question you asked.
11 The other question about the impact of management style, 12 I mean from an academic point of view, I think that
{~
13 management style does influe,nce climate in the general 14 sense.
You can think about a climate as being open er 15 closed or on some continuum, and the management philosophy 16 and operating policies and behavioral style all influence --
17 that is one factor and an important factor in the climate.
18 The fact that you have an open or closed climate does L9 not necessarily -- I don't think you were implying this, I 20 just want to underline it -- does not necessarily imply an 21 intimidator.
That's what you were saying.
22 O
And you were excluding the management style.
In 23 other words, you were not trying to answer the question:
24 Is this workforce reluctant to report safety problems for 25 whatever the reasons.
You were trying to answer a
.. = -
+
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20990.0 311 BRT 1
narrower question than that?
2 A
I think it was a narrower focus.
But I think if 3
you remember, recall in the report we did make a point of 4
discussing style because we did think it was an important 5
consideration.
6 Q
It showed up?
7 A
Do you remember that?
8 0
Yes.
Yes.
I do remember that you talked about 9
that.
10 A
So it did emerge and we thought it was important 11 enough to identify but it was not part of the scope of 12 what we were asked to do.
13 O
So,'for instance, when you've answered questions 14 here in the last couple of days on the question, "did you 15 see in the ' 79 surveys as much as you might have thought,"
16 what you were talking about was not "did you see as much 17 concern about management style or complaints about 18 pressure from craft."
You were talking about the smaller 19 subset --
20 A
That's right.
21 Q
the intimidation originating out of 22 management or allowing to be continued with management's 23 knowledge?
24 A
That's right.
That's right.
25 Q
That was the subject?
-?
g,
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20990.0 312 BRT 1
A That's right..
2 O
Mr. Kaplan, when you did you team selection --
3 A
(WITNESS KAPLAN) Could I?
4 0
Yes.
5 A
On the last question, I just wonder if my 6
silence there implies my agreement.
7 Q
No, your silence there. implies that I didn't 8
care to take a piece of my hour to ask you that.
9 A
Go ahead.
10 0
No. Y,our silence here reflects nothing other 11 than those kinds of irrelevancies to the substance of the 12 discussion.
1 13 A,
Fine.
14 Q
W
,, hen you did the team selection, I noticed 15 throughout the contracting documents there was -- I was in 16 government long enough to know what it takes to get a sole 17 sou;2e contract for anything more than $50, and you all 18 managed to get one through and I notice throughout all 19 those contracts there was reference to the enormous cost 20 of delay associated with having to go through a more 1
21 laborious contracting process than the sole source 22 approach.
23 Were you a part of the decision process that decided 24 how to frame that?
25 A
No.
=
20990.0 313 BRT 1
Q So you were aware --
2 A
Let me say I wasn't part of the decision-making 3
process.
I probably provided some of the information they 4
used to make that decision.
5 O
Who came up with the information that a day of 6
delay would cost $625,000?
7 A
I'm not sure, 'but I was under the impression 8
that that was the -- that delaying the schedule for 9
loading fuel and such like that, was such that I was under 10 the impression that hold ups in hearings or the dragging 11 out the hearing process in general meant that the chances 12 of operating a plant would be delayed and that there was --
/'
13 Q
But how did you get that knowledge?
I mean now 14 did you learn that there was a fuel load schedule and how 15 did you learn what price tag had been placed on a day's 16 delay in meeting that fuel load schedule?
17 A
I believe I asked something about that when I 18 met with Ippolito.
19 O
So, Mr. Ippolito, did he give you the dollar 20 number?
21 A
I don't specifically recall his -..I don't know, 22 really, where 625 came from.
I may have j* in my notes 23 but I don't recall the number.
24 Q
Why did you ask about it?
What made you think 25 it was relevant?
.=
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6 20990.0 314 BRT 1
A' I thinK cost is relevant in research.
2 Q
I'm sorry?
3 A
'I think cost is relevant in business research.
4 It's one of the factors.
5 Q
Why was delay relevant?
I mean, you had a 6
contract.
The contractor told you to deliver your product 7
by a certain date, August whatever.
8 A
Right.
9 O
I think a draft to the staff by August 10th and 10' a final by August 20th.
Why did it matter why your 11 contractor was demanding those deadlines?
What difference 12 did that make?
13 A
I thought I just said.
My understanding is
. there were people there trying to -- who had built the 15 plant, mostly, who were trying to find out if it was 16 adequate or not, who were geting ready to be closer to an 17 operational phase, and that if the government could.
18 conduct its work in a way that didn't interfere with that, 19 that was desirable.
And to the. ex. tant that. it did, that 20 government processes delayed the opening of the plant, 21 that somebody was going to incur a cost, and that was the 22 Utility and ultimately all of us.
23 O
Did you make any judgment as to whether the 24 amount of time that you were going to have available was 25 - so short that the quality of your work would be adversely
.=
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20990.0 315 BRT
'l affected and that even if it would take five more days, 2
that it was important to do it right?
3 A
To phrase the question a little bit differently, 4
I felt that I needed to do a quality job and if it took 5
longer, then it took longer.
6 Q
Well, my question is that you were prepared to 7-work on a very tight time schedule?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
Is it fair to assume that if you had more time 10 you could have done more?
11 A
Could have done more?
12 O
Yes.
You could have done --
~
13 A
Sure.
- 14 '
Q and your job would have been more thorough; 15 right?
You wouldn't have been just sitting around for 16 five more days if you had five more days?
17 A
I feel like we did a very thorough job.
1R Q
That wasn't my question.
I don't think you'd be 19 here if you didn't think you did.
But could you have done 20 a more thorough job by the five more days?
Were you 21 squeezed by the time limit or was there plenty of time?
22 A
Oh, no.
I was continually conscious of the time 23 and working to do a good job within that time.
24 0
You realize that the plant -- if your report had 25 concluded that there was widespread and pervasive w
-. ~.
20990.0 316 BRT j
1 intimidation at the plant site, that the plant would not 2
have gotten an operating license and there would have been 3
no delay cost?
4 A
I don't know that the whole thing would have 5
hedged on -- I guess I even doubt that my particular 6
findings would have been the basis on which the plant was 7
licensed.
8 Q
You understand if it didn't get an operating 9
license --
10 A
Then there's no d'elay.
11 0
-- no delay cost 7 12 A
Correct.
("
13 '
Fm. TREBY:
'I might jus't add at this point that
'14 when we had that meeting and talked about scheduling, we 15 really didn' t give them a choice.
We told them that this 16 was our requirement.
So it wasnt a matter of if he 17 wanted 5 days or 10 days --
18 MR. ROISMAN:
I understand that.
That's why I 19 didn't realize how much it matters how much the delay 20 costs.
Who pays the fiddler calls the tune.
21 MR. TREBY:
I think that's. just an.. explanation 22 for sole source contracting.
23 MR. ROISMAN:
I was just a little curious about 24 what all those factors were doing in a contract 25 MR. TREBY:
We'll give you the extra three'
W
. =
20990.0 317 BRT 1
minutes but I'm surprised at the 600-some-odd dollar 2
number because the only number I remember having been 3
mentioned at any of these meetings, and I'm not sure if we 4
did -- but I think we did talk about the prehearing 5
conference that had taken place in June.
During the 6
prehearing conference there was lots of discussion about 7
"every day of delay is $1 million."
And there was lots of 8
banter back and forth about:
"All right, I've just cost 9
you $7 million" -- or something like that.
10 I'm sure in the course of our discussions about why the 11 schedule was so important and these people were not very 12 happy when we told them we have these depositions, we 13 expect that there's going to be 80 or 90 of these things 14 to read and -we want -a report -by such and such a day, and 15 they said:
Well, what's the great urgency and why'is the 16 board deciding to do this on such a rushed schedule?
17 We indicated one of the questions is fuel loading and 18 during this prehearing conference this $1 million a day 19 has come up.
20 MR. ROISMAN:
By the way, just as an historical 21 footnote, you know fuel loading was'in fact postponed.
22 A
(WITNESS KAPLAN) So that there was no cost.
23 MR. ROISMAN:
In a " lessons learned" context, 24 that seems to be one of the hardest lessons that gets 25 learned here.
.=
e
^:.--...-
~ ~ _..
20990.0 318 BRT 1
A (WITNESS KAPLAN) The hardest lesson is what?
2 MR. ROISMAN:
Is that those fuel load dates seem 3
to come and go with grade regularity and there doesn't 4
seem to be -- it's always hard to figure out when is the 5
deadline.
There's a book how -- you can negotiate 6
anything.
And one of the theses of the book is that there 7
is only one deadline.
The trick is figuring out which it 8
is, in negotiation..
9 BY MR. ROISMAN:
10 Q
. Mr. Rice, what role did Mr. Andrognini play in 11 your work?
I notice there are notes that appear to be in 12 someone 'else's handwriting and I assume those were his?
13 A
(WITNESS RICE) That's right.
Several things.
14 _._The. first. thingds.that..because of the short deadline we 15 felt that the only way to get through the bulk of the 16 depositions in time to begin to put together a draft 17 report, that he would read some and I would read some.
I 18 also had other commitments.
So he was able to review 19 depositions when I wasn't there.
I was able to, in that 20 initial phase, screen some out and say:
These do not 21 appear to be of significance.
22 It also gave somebody on-site for me to Sounce ideas 23 back and forth on and --
24 Q
By "on-site" you mean --
25 A
In my office.
e
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20990.0 319 BRT 1
Q In your office.
All right.
2 A
I think I would like to answer the part, what 3
would have happened if you had five more days.
4 Q
In all respect, I'm on a short time limit and --
5 A
This is sticking to that answer.
6 Q
With all due respect, I don't want to know your 7
answer to that question at this point.
8 A
Okay.
9 Q
What I am interested in knowing is whether any 10 of the views that are expressed in here are dependent on 11 work that Mr. Andrognini did that you did not yourself 12
'also do?
13 A
No.
14
,,0..
So every transcript that he read that was 15 relevant you also read?
16 A
That's correct.
And even some of the ones that 17 he said didn't appear to be particularly relevant, I read 18 also.
19 O
The two of you, would you say it was a 20 collaborative effort on your part, in terms of doing the 21 analysis of the record and reaching some preliminary 22 conclusions?
23 A
I would say that; yes.
24 Q
Are you and Mr. Andrognini, have you lists of 25 publications that, say in the last few years, that you all e
20990.0 320 CRT 1
have authored?
In journals or books'or speeches you have 2
given or letters to the editor?
3 A
No.
I quit, when I got out of the purel'y 4
technical side of things some years ago, quit producing 5
papers for -- of that kind.
We turned out probably three 6
or four reports a month related to analyses, evaluations 7
of nuclear plants, nuclear operations.
8 Q
But these are reports for which someone 9
contracts with you and you provide them with the report?
10 A
That is correct.
That is' correct.
11 O
How about Mr. Andrognini.
Has he published 12 anything?
13 A
I think he's in the same category.
I think the 14 - answer. would.be "no."
15 MR. ROISMAN:
I'll give you a request on 16 publications list of people in the normal, formal way.
17 BY MR. ROISMAN:
18 O
Mr. Rice, in looking at the data that you had, 19 how aware were you of the limitations in the data base 20 that you were looking at?
For instance, did you believe 21 that you had before you all of the people who were 22 complaining about alleged intimidation, that you were 23 reading their complaints through the various different 24 sources that you had?
25 A
(WITNESS RICE) I have no basis for knowing
'.~
__,.y
20990.0 321 BRT 1
whether it was all of them or not.
2 Q
So it may have been that there were 200 allegers 3
and'only 10 showed up as witnesses for Case, for all you 4
know?
5 A
For all I know that could be the case.
6 Q
Dr. Margulies, you also made no assumptions 7
about whether what you saw was necessarily either a 8
representative sample or the whole universe or anything 9
else?
10 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) Oh, I'll tell you, my 11 assumption was that what I was getting was the entire 12 available data base, the entire available record relevant 13 to this issue.
Let me say it again:
The entire available 14 data base relevant to this issue, that's what I thought I 15 was getting.
16 0
Which means only that you did not -- if there 17 was somebody else who had a deposition that was taken, you 18 assumed you had gotten it?
19 A
Yes, sir.
20 Q
Not that, if there was a Corey Allen out there 21 who had never showed up to be a witness in a hearing, that 22 in fact there wasn't such a person?
23 A
No.
I'm just saying of everything that was 24 available, on the radar, I thought I had it.
25 Q
And you meant by "available," in writing some
.. ~
.s.
-..,m,s-
++m*-
20990.0 322 CRT i
1 way?
Available in that sense?
2 A
Correct.
3 O
So that.the chart that' appears on page 16, and 4
the ratios there, are all qualified by the " data available" 5
limitation, as opposed to:
These are the ratios'in the 6
universe.
These are just the ratios in the available data?
7 A
That's exactly right.
8 Q
And if the available data was not representative 9
of the universe, the ratios in the universe might be 10 dramatically different?
Higher, lower --
11 A
Certainly.
12 O
Now, I would like to try to understand and I'll 13 start with you, Dr. Margulies, and then Mr. Rice, because
~
14 I think you are the two who did the most looking at the 15 data, how you get with -- I'm still not clear how you 16 dealt with' ambiguous evidence in the record.
You have 17 indicated to a certain extent that you, Dr. Margulies, 18 took the transcript at face value.
And sometimes taking 19 it at face value meant that you took contradictory 20 perceptions.
21 I mean, you have Darlene Steiner saying that while 22 management claims that they were being very $'upportive and 23 helpful of Darlene and doing the right thing, and Darlene 24 said "everything that they did was having exactly the 25 opposite effect on me."
t a
.w m--
===m~'
20990.0 323 BRT 1
Now, on the one hand you have a question, " management 2
response."
How did management respond to Darlene Steiner's 3
claim?
You have her view and management's claim.
How did 4
you deal with it in your analysis here, reaching your 5
conclusions?
6 A
Let me try to describe it.
It would have been 7
lovely had we had X number of incidents, reported 8
incidents, and in addition to that we even had the results 9
of whatever the procecution is to decide:
Yes, it was; no, 10 it wasn't.
It would have been lovely.
Then it would have 11 sorted out and I would have had:
Guess was, X were 12 reported and three were legitimate and three were not; and 13 I could even make some judgments perhaps about the impact 14 and magnitude, et cetera.
At that point in time I didn't 15 have that.
And I guess, if I wanted to think through my 16 rationale,,I could make a judgment that says:
Well, let's 17 say 50 percent are and 50 eercent aren't legitimate.
But 18 the most important thing for me at that point was to begin l
19 to discern the patterns, the patterns.
20 For example, I want to look at how widespread 21 allegations of intimidation are,-so let me look at the 22 material and decide, in any disposition -- okay?
In any 23 report, how many people are named as allegers?
How many 24 people are really identified as complaining about 25 intimidation?
e
20990.0 324 CRT 1
How many people are identified in any one report as 2
complaining about -- as being identified, and " accused" of 3
intimidating?
'So that's the -- so I began to sort through 4
some dimensions of the case without making judgments about 5
whether it was a legitimate or nonlegitimate instance.
6 I also looked to see, for example, in people -- the 7
people who were providing depositional material, 8
information:
how many are management personnel and how 9
many are nonmanagement personnel?
I mean, I would like to 10 understand that.
What's the array of data provided?
Are 11 they mostly managers?
Like, are they -- just making up 12 some numbers, 75 managers providing information about one 13 case of intimidation?
What's the array of providers in 14 those categories?
15 And then I tried to do the same thing in some of the 16 other documentation.
I looked at some of the available 17
. office of Investigation reports to try to make the same 18 judgments:
Who were the data providers; how many allegers
+
19 are named; how many intimidators?
Are they localized?
20 Are they all within one or two units within OA/QC or are 21 they spread throughout QA/QC7 Just to try to get a sense 22 of the breadth in which complaints and allege ~tions are 23 being made.
24 Q
Can I stop you there for one second?
25 A
Sure.
~,
20990.0 325 ERT 1
Q How do you know whether the breadth that you are 2
looking at is a relevant breadth, if you don't know 3
whether oc not the way in which the data that you are looking a't was assembled in a representative way?
4 What if 5
OI was not a representative example of people coming 6
forward with complaints?
What if theirs was some 7
unrepresentative example, for whatever the reason m: ght be?
8 What if the witnesses who were called at the hearing were 9
called in a way that, if you knew that way, you would say:
10 "Oh, well, gee, that didn't give me a very representative 11 look."
You didn't seem to have any way of knowing how 12 your data got assembled and what criteria were used; how
]-
13 do you know what,it showed you was a representative slice?
14 A
Well, I think for example, in the OI reports, if 15 I remember correctly -- and I'm sure the numbers are in 16 here -- just the numbers of people that were included in 17 providing data for those reports were enough to 18 demonstrate some breadth of the investigation.
So, again, L9 I can. sc.y,. you. Know there were a reasonable amount of 20 data providers.
So I think I'm getting a pretty good 21 profile.
22 Now again, the kinds of questions that you continually 23 drive at are important questions.
But they tend to be out 24 of the context of, at that point in time, what was 25 available.
=
20990.0 326 BRT 1
For example, implied in what you say is ideally, 2
ideally, do you have all of the relevant data that you 3
need constructed in the best possible way that we know 4
about in organizational behavior to do this job?
And, if 5
you say " ideally," then I have to say well, we worked with 6
what we had.
I think it was a pretty good array of data 7
with pretty good breadth, but it certainly wasn't ideal.
8 Q
No.
But the question is more fundamental than 4
9 that.
10 A
Okay.
11 Q
I understand you all are very confident with and 12 when asked questions seem to be very confident on the 13 conclusions.
You all had a body of data.
You all took a 14 look at it.
j 15 That from my perspective is not worth anything more 16 than if I were to bring you a photograph of the plant and 17 then ask you to tell me what does this nuclear plant look 18 like.
That depends on where I stood, how wide the lens, 19 not to mention 1000 other factors.
And nobody who wants 20 to know what the plant really looks like would give a damn 21 what you thought after you looked at_my photograph; not, 22 at least, until they knew everything that had to be known 23 until they knew how the photograph was taken to get that.
24 A
But if I knew enough about the plant -- not 25 everything, but enough -- and you showed me the photograph, e
. _ ~
20990.0 327 DRT 1
I'll bet I could make inferences, although I have never 2
been there, about what the other side of the plant looks 3
like.
4 O
That's fine.
And my question to you is, putting 5
aside your own knowledge and looking only at the 6
phctograph for a moment to continue the analogy, how do 7
you know that the photograph gave you enough of a picture 8
that ycur assumptions from other experiences have validly 9
allowed you to make some more generic conclusions?
The 10 bottom line is, how do you defend the claim that this 11 report is relevant in the oversli questien that's being 12 asked, forgetting about whether it.is valid.
Io,it
('
13 relevant?
How do you defend that if you don't knew more 14 about how the data that you looked at was assembled and 15 whether it was or was not a representative sample?
16 A
With regard to -- now, again, one more time.
I 17 think it's a matter of looking at the array of information, 18 all the indicators that went into making the final 19 j udgment..
And.,
f.n. soma ca.ses, ' ar, example, I. would 20 probably rato my confidence in the data higher than in 21 other casso.
But I don't want to take Lt apgrt that way.
22 I think : need to look at the array of what I*ve got.
23 The survey is, I think, agtin, not ideally constructed 24 or administered, but I f.elt pretty de:ently -- that the 25 data was pretty decent and could allow me to make pretty n
20990.0 328 BRT 1
sound inferences about what was going on.
So, while I 2
think I don't know everything about what -- pursuing the 3
line of questioning this morning, while I can't judge the 4
" motivations" of the survey designers, I think the 5
dimensionality is fairly clear, if you look at the items.
6 And I have confidence in the dimensionality.
7 So 'I do think I know something about how, certainly in 8
the case o5 the surveys, the data collection process was 9
constructed.
I think I can say that.
10 Q
What did you learn in the transcripts, th'e 11 deposition transcripts, about what was the nature of 12 management response to the portions of the 1979 survey 13 complaints that went to management style, craft /CC k'
14
. interface, and actual intimidation?
15 A
Say it again?
What was the managetnent. responce 16 to the '79 survey?
Gosh, I really -- I don't recall that.
17 I'm sorry.
18 Q
Okay.
Let's take a different one.
Mr. Rice, 19 I'm going to skip you because my time is running short, 20*
but probably during the hearings you can expect that 21 you'll get a chance to answer that.
22 A
(WITNESS RICE) That's why I have been writing 23 down the questions.
24 0
You'll also got a copy of the transcript, I'm 25 sure.
.m
20990.0 329 BRT 1
I don't know which one of you or who wrote or takes the 2
most direct responsibility for the section beginning at 3
page 20 and over'to the top of page 21 that deals with the 4
Kahler, Keeley, and Spangler investigation?
5 A
I think I'm probably the most responsible there.
6 Q
Oh, good, Mr. Rice.
Tell me something:
In 7
looking at that particular document, as I understand it 8
you use it as a good example of a management response to 9
an allegation of intimidation and cover-up, since the two 10 were together in the one document -- is that right?
11 A
That is correct.
12 O
What did you thinIk of the portion of the report 13 which Kahler, Keeley,.and Spangler summarize, and this is 14 what-they says.. "It appears that there's a difference in I
15 philosophy be, tween QA/QC management and.some audit team 16 leaders.
QA/QC management takes a practical approach to 17 the application of the quality criteria of appendix B.
18 Audit team leaders who also adhere to this philosophy have 19 no problems with the report review process.
20 "on the other hand, the purest philosophy of some audit 21 team leaders is directly opposed to that of management.
This may be the source of their problems wit 5 the report 22 23 review process.
These team leaders often feels that they 24 must go to great length to justify to their own management 25 the validity of their findings.
Apparently QA/QC
~. -
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20990.0 330 BRT 1
management has not been able to convey their philosophy 2
regarding quality assurance to all of the audit group 3
members.'"
4 Do you remember that part of the report?
5 A
As I recall -- let me try and get the whole 6
thing back into perspective.
Wasn't it Kessler and --
7 Q
X?
8 A
X?
Sorry abc'ut that.
9 Q
X.
We have two people who haven't signed the --
10 A
They were called out to do an audit.
The result 11 of the audit was presented to the quality assurance, 12 quality control manager on-site,.
He did not agree with 13 some of the findings that were there and, as I recall, 14..__within the prerogatives of,his. responsibilities, modified --
15 maybe it was a guy in Dallas.
But the report was -- it 16 was Vega --
17 Q
It was Tolson who didn't agree with it, but Vega 18 was the one who made the modifications?
19 A
Who modified it.
That's right.
And the 20 immediate response was, as far as I can tell, X and 21 Kessler indicated the problem to -- probably to Vega.
And 22 Vega immediately assigned Keeley, Spangler, and Kahler as 23 a committee to go down and take a look at what the 24 situation was and handle it.
25 I think there is -- apparently there were some e
t
20990.0 331 ERT 1
personality problems involved in this thing.
Those 2
particular words, yes, I remember reading them, but to try 3
and put them into a context that says how important that 4
was to this entire process, I guess I'd have a tougher 5
time doing at this point.
6 Q
Let me be more specific, then, with my questions.
7 The part of your report, page 20, that seems to focus on 8
the existence of the Kahler, Keeley and Spangler report --
9 that is, the fact that it was ordered relatively quickly, -
10 that these three people went out, they did a fairly in-depth 11 hudit, and that was a positive thin'g; and my question to 12 you is isn't it equally important if not more' important to 13 know not only was there a follow-up but what were the
(~
~ --results: of..ther follow-up?
And-I didn't see any discussion 15 in here and I was trying to find out how aware you were of 16 what the results were.
You were aware that the paragraph 17 was used to explain why the " cover-up" was not an 18 objectionable activity?
19 A
Yes.
i 20 Q
And were you also aware that Kessler and X, one 21 just before and one after the completion of the audit, 22 left the plant site?
23 A
That's correct.
24 O
And one of them said they left the plant site 25 because they didn't feel the problem of intimidation had
~ ~.~
-L 20990.0 332
~
BRT 1
been dealt with properly?
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
How did you factor that into your judgments that 4
this represented an example of a good, positive, 5
management response to an intimidation allegation?
6 A
Like most of these incidents it had some parts 7
of it that were favorable.
It had some parts of it that 8
were questionable.
The -- I read the original draft that 9
they had presented.
I read the comments that Vega had 10 made on it in the final version as it came out.
11 My net-feeling there was that the entire process that 12 h'ad been followed by QA/QC management was within the 13 normal frame of what a QA/QC organization and QA/QC
(~,
14._... management.should do.
I.had no -problem with it as far as 15 that was concerned.
16 Q
How about as far as the way Kessler and X 17 responded to it?
18 A
Without attempting to beg the issue at all, I 19 would say that I -- I put the response of X and Kessler 20 into the category of Deing people who felt that they had 21 been intimidated.
22 Q
But I'm focusing now on the manage $ent response 23 side of the issue.
I understand both you and 24 Dr. Margulies said we'll count Kessler and X as two -- or 25 at least one of them as an alleger on the intimidation
- =..
=
20990.0 333 BRT 1
side.
2 Now the other piece of this is management response.
It 3
all became part of the same equation.
4 So, management response,.one response was to say on the 5
cover-up question that there was a philosophical 6
difference; and you said you come down on the side of the 7
philosophy of Mr. Vega and the second audit team and not 8
on the Kessler and X side?
9 A
That's correct.
10 0
What about the response with regard to the 11 person who felt intimidated?
The report did reach -- that 12 is the Kahler, Keeley and Spangler report -- KK&S --
(~-
13 A
There are too many Ks --
~ "'
14' Q"
That's right -- did come down with certain 15 factual determinations, as I remember, with regard to the 16 allegation of intimidation.
Do you remember that?
- Well, 17 let me --
18 A
only that they didn't, as I recall, did not 19 agree either with Tolson.'s explanat. ion or with Vega's 20 change to the report.
~
21 O
You are focusing on cover-up.
I'm_ talking about 22 Vega -- Tolson was accused of saying, "If auditors work 23 hard enough at finding problems and making these known to 24 construction personnel, someone is going to get hurt, 25 physically or politically."
.=
m_m_.
a
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20990.0 334 BRT I
1 Now, the second audit team confirmed that that was said.
2 What happened?
What did the audit team recommend happen 3
and what actually happened in terms of evaluating 4
management response to the initial complaint of 5
intimidation on the part of Tolson?
6 A
I think, if you will look further in the report 7
I've forgotten precisely where it is -- you will find a 8
comment to the effect that management's response to 9
demonstrated intimidation was not always as prompt as it 10 could have been.
I have forgotten precisely where that 11 occurs.
12 O
Let's presume that was there.
13 A
This is one of the instances -- page 22.
14 O
All. right.. Do_you have.the statement on page 20, 15 "It appears that the report is thorough and detailed, 16 indicating a serious attempt on the part of management to 17 deal with the issues at hand. "
And my question to you is 18 how did they deal with Mr. Tolson that is representative 19 of a serious attempt on their part to deal with the issue 20 at hand?
21 A
I reference you to the last sentence just above 22 3.2.1.4 on page 22.
23 Q
" Prompt" implies that it happened, but it 24 happened lat'e.
What response did you find in the record 25 that was taken in response to Mr. Tolson that was made in
.c e.
20990.0 335 BRT 1
response that an auditor claimed he felt intimidated?
2 A
I don't know about anything that happened until 3
his ultimate transfer from the site.
4 Q
Which was, as you understand it, at his request?
5 A
That's what the record says.
6 O
And, actually it wasn't that he was physically 7
transferred from the site, he changed his position; isn't 8
that correct?
9 A
That's what my -- my recollection is he --
10 became part of the hearing process.
11 O
When you get around to reading, if you do, and 12 during the hearing, you'll find that everyone else 13 confirms that this happened only because Tolson asks for 14 - it-to-happen.
Nobody was prepared to~say that he was 15 fired or forced to ask for a transfer.
16 When you all were counting up for your chart on page 16, 17 the allegers, we've got a number of allegers -- I think 10.
18 How did you count the T-shirt people?
Did you count any?
19 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) If they were named, then I 20 counted it.
21 Q
Well, there were several places in the 22 transcript where -- I know many times it was mentioned 23 that there were eight people wearing T-shirts that day, 24 and I know that at some place in the transcript all eight 25 names are given.
I can't remember whether they occurred
20990.0 336 BRT 1
at the time of the depositions that you looked at or later.
2 A
I can't remember either.
If they were named, 3
then I counted it.
4 Q
The T-shirt people were people about whom it was 5
alleged they were being intimidated.
If you remember the 6
incident, there was an anonymous phone call to the Nuclear 7
Regulatory Commission on-site saying:
"They got eight 8
guys.
They got them locked up in a room.
They are 9
searching through their files and so forth.
Come and do 10 something for them."
11 I'm just trying to understand how you did your 12 accounting?
Did you put "8" down and say, "We've got 13 eight people of whom it's alleged they were being
-- - - intimidated"?
Or-did you not count-them'at all?
15 A
No.
If there were eigh,t names, then they would 16 be counted.
If somebody said:
"So-and-so and so-and-so 17 were intimidated," then they were counted.
18 0
Well, I'm almost certain that the anonymous 19 caller didn't use the word " intimidated."
The anonymous 20 caller said that "Something very improper is going on.
21 These people are being held against their will in a room, 22 and their personal belongings are being searched and 23 seized"; and had called the NRC to complain about it.
24 Just what I've told you.
If that appeared in the 25 record, did that appear on our list?
20990.0 337 CRT 1
A No.
If it was described that way it's only the 2
alleger.
3 If someone said:
"Oh, there's eight people over there,"
4 that's the alleger.
5 Q
I see.
Not the eight people about whom the 6
event is being alleged to have happened?
7 A
Right.
8 Q
So when you had one person of a team of 10 like 9
Bill Dunham, who came forward and was complaining about 10 things that were happening in the paint coatings, you 11 counted Bill?
12 A
Counted as the alleger.
' 13
.O But not any of the people who he said felt the 14 same way he did, et cetera.
Okay.
A 1 right.
~
15 A
Yes.
16 MR. TREBY:
Let me give you a five-minute 17 warning.
18 MR. ROISMAN:
Okay.
All right.
19 BY MR. ROISMAN:
20 Q
Dr. Margulies, I'm going to ask you some 21 questions about your handwritten notes.
22 A
Sure.
23 MR. HIRSCHHORN:
Whose notes were you looking at?
24 MR. ROISMAN:
I hoped I was looking at 25 Margulies' notes, but I'm not sure --
~5
j 20990.0 338 BRT 1
MR. RICE:
They are way too neat to be mine.
2 MR. ROISMAN:
Got his little name tag, but it i
3 was not his notes.
Let's see if I can find them.
4 MR. TREBY:
I put those little name tags on 5
things that I got from him.
They may have been papers 6
that he produced.
7 MR. ROISMAN.
I was looking at a set of notes 8
yesterday.
I thought I was looking at his notes.
I'll 9
just check and see.
10 (Discussion off the record.)
11 BY MR. ROISMAN:
12 O
On your notes, this group came clipped together.
13 Does that look familiar?
Up at the top it's got,
- define,
/*
~
14 No. 1, intimidation and nonunion" over on the right side --
15 A
(WITNESS HARGULIES) Yes.
16 Q
It was clipped together like a set.
17 MR. HIRSCHHORN:
How many sheets is that?
18 MR. ROISMAN:
Oh, it looks like about lO,or 12.
19 BY MR. ROISMAN:
20 0
Now, over on the third page you've got written 21 over on the left-hand side just' after the middle of the 22 page, "my note:
Does not take things at facs value.
Word 23 games.
Attorneys are narrow minded."
Can you see that?
24 You understand why that jumped out at me.
25 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) Wait a minute.
Let me find
20990.0 339 BRT 1
it.
I'm sure it's right 2
O I knew you would agree with that?
3 A
Let me try to find that.
4 O
I think it may be actually you've got it, it 5
might be 4.
It's got an 8-2 at the top?
6 A
Oh, got it.
Got you.
Okay.
7 Q
What's that note referencing?
First of all, 8
about'whom are you talking when you say "does not take 9
things at face value; word games."
10 A*
I think -- I was sitting in on one of those --
11 on a deposition.
12 O
Yes.
13 A
And I -- I think I was talking about whoever was 14 being interviewed at the time.
15 O
Is this date 8-2 at the top there not the date?
16 A
Yes, that is the date.
17 Q
I didn't remember your being there that late.
18 That's the second of August, according to these notes.
19 And that's just a few days before you all were going into 20 a final draft?
21 A
That's not the date, then.
It may be the date I 22 sent this together, or --
23 O
What are you referring to, "does not take things 24 at face value.
Word games."
25 A
I felt that there was a lot of evasiveness going w
20990.0 340 BRT 1
on in the data collection -- in the deposition.
2 O
Evasiveness by whom?
3 A
The person who was being asked for informa' tion.
4 Q
Now, up above that you have the name " David, 5
deliberate annoyance, do some thus, wrong to do" -- do you 6
see all that?
7 A
I think that was the person, in fact I know it 8
was, and these are just my notes about what was going on.
9 O
On the next page you have "10:30, David Chapman, 10
- manager, QA."
Is that the David you were referring to 11 back on the previous page?
12 A
Yes.
13, O
And was this -- do you think this is based upon 14 reading the trsnscript of Chapman?
15 A
No.
16 Q
You think this is based on --
17 A
I know it.
I may have missed the date, but I 18 know those notes were my sitting in on -- I know that.
19 What's the date?
20 A
(WITNESS STRATTON)
According to my notes, it 21 was the 2nd.
22 MR. ROISMAN:
I'm sorry --
23 A
(WITNESS MARGULIES) Just trying to trap me again, 24 Tony -- no -- I know I was there.
25 BY MR. ROISMAN:
.~
9 e
20990.0 341 BRT 1
Q
" Attorneys are narrow-minded"; but substantively 2
what do you mean?
3 A
Substantively -- it wasn't personality, although 4
I felt that way anyway --
5 (Laughter.)
6
-- the questioning was so narrow that it was going off 7
into areas that I just felt were away, away from what, at 8
least in my perception, was the issue present, what the 9
data collection was all about.
And was spending so much 10 time focusing on an area that to me was extremely narrow.
11 And I couldn't -- to be polite about it I couldn't see 12 the relevance.
13 Q
So if you had been doing the questioning and (v
14 Chapman had been in front of you, you would have been 15 asking different questions and getting different 16 information than what actually happened?
17 A
I think that's the problem I have with the 18 depositional material.
19 O
Can you remember now what sort of question it 20 was?
I don't mean a particular question, what kind of 21 things did'you think Chapman should have been asked that 22 he didn't get asked at that time?
23 A
I don't really remember.
It's.just my kind of 24 impressionistic feelings at the time.
25 I remember, for example, the notes on the rest of that, y
4 w.-
m.
m-~4, 20990.0 342 BRT 1
on the bottom of the page were some things that I think 2
got -- were discussed.
There were some questions.
These 3
notes referred to that.
"Yes, we have a management 4
development program.
It is very humanistic.
We go to a
~
5 section and some psychologist comes in and tells us about 6
psychology."
That's the overall philosophy of the man.
7 So I felt:
Yes, that's nice, but I don't know what 8
that has to do with the particular issue.
It was kind of, 9
you know -- I know, I know, I know --
10 O
I felt the same way.
11 A
That's funny.
12 MR. WATKINS:
And you were asking the questions.
13 DR. MARGULIES:
So those were those notes".
It 14
- was-David-Chapman at that time.
15
$If _Ao(ts m g Exhibit 12 identified.)
(MR.
16 TREBY:
My clock tells me that you guys have done your duty. b he record -- as far as the briefing 17 T
18 session is concerned, the record is closed.
19 (Wharcupon, at 1:25 p.m., the briefing session 20 was concluded.)
21 22 23 24 25
'T
r CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of:
NAME OF PROCEEDING: TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, et al.
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2)
DOCKET NO.:
50-445-OL2 50-446-OL2 PLACE:
BETHESDA, MARYLAND DATE:
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1984 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
(sigt)
AM (TYPED)k
/
JOEL,BREITNER.
Official Reporter ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
Reporter's Affiliation
"~
,--a,
~e m
a
(
9 po fY v:1 6: now.rs, David.Gl.nn
'norn: June 2,1931, in Ak:cs, C::ic Marital Status: Ma :ied June 1957, two And on EDUC1= CE 3.5. in Business ** ** *=ation,1957: Kent State University, Kant, Chio (1949-50;. 1954-57); majc= in Industrir.1 PsyJological P:ccedures (concentrated =ajcr in psychology, -Ws, and business
- *a8<tration)..
it.A., 195 8 : Kent State University (1957-58); maf : in psychology, =ince in
~
socic1DTT-Ph.D. c==pleted Dece=ber 1961r degree awarded Jar.ua.71962: 2. University of Michigan (1958-61)--ir.dus=ial psy=hology.
De::cral disser:aric=: "Sena Aspects of Affiliative Behavier in Mc k G: cups."
~
af e
. [,
\\
==== z m al x :
1950-545 Mi.!ita=y service in the 17.1. Air Tc::er career g"' r*=m e spe4 = 1 ! st, involved in the
=4-4-'? :a:1 n and s==ri.:g cf tests ci ahility, aptitudes, and p:=ficiencies; later perscanal sergeant-majer, responsible for keeping perscanal rec =rds for an ai = raft ce===1 and warning g; cup.
1957-58: Graduate assistan: 22 Dea = ct 5 : dents, Ken: State "niversity, Kent, Chic; develeped an inspecti== p:cgra= and inspected.cff-ca= pus housing.
Resea Y Excerience 1958-61: Assistan: 5 tdy Director, Survey Research Center,1:stitute for Social Research, ne University cf Michigan; perfer=ing the
!=11cwing 1:se:1:ns:-
1.
Participated in questiennaire cens=ucti:n, a *-'a.istratica, analysis, and repc : writing in a two-year field experi=en:.
b k.
May 1983 - 1
.l.
.= -
= _ : :. _ __. _ e_.
Vita
.D. Bowers May 1983 - 2 1962-66: Study Directc:, Survey Research Caster; peric:=ing the following' functicas:
1.
Respc=sible fcr designing and carryi=g cet an in-depth intervi'ew study of insurance executives, plus write-up a 4 presen- "' m cf research findings.
Z Res
'k' e for design and ad=isist.a*4 m cf a survey of a sec=ai sa=ple of lif a insuranca agencies.
3.-
Respcasible for a stedT cf ""7=mant change, i=velving a ques **-=i a survey, periodic chse.97atien, a 4 interviewisy in two pla= s of a. cle* "y
=-"*=~ ring...--1 4
Respmiki_e for designing a:d c=ducti=y a: naticnal representative sa=ple interview study of Peace Ccept applicants.
S.
Respcasihle f== design and
=#- *"' *::a** ~t cd a study cf the.:cle of the wc king foremas," an hcurly paid, unica-mee.ber supervi.scr, in an electrical appliance firm.
6.
Responsible !== pla=ning, desig=ing, and =^-d a' steri =g e s:.:dy of a "matriz cr-=-'-*
- m --coc:- -=-' m through mecbershi; is vertical and heri=cntal taa=s.
1966:
P cgram Assc=iate, Center for Research en Utili. atien cf Scientific l
Rnowledge; perf ~"g the fclicwing ' ---'m*:
1.
Resr4 'i =, with others, fc p!=--8 "g, ~ designing, and c=: m-*"g a program cf studies involving b:th research a:d u 111=atics activities i= busi=ess crgani=aticas.
2.
Responsible, with others, fer planning and develcping an eight-
. Year l=gi-'"" = 1 s:t'.dy cf c gan4 2:icas.
e.
1971:
- 7. % Direc:cr, Canter for Research c: U** ' ! 2 tien of Scie:-* ** c-2nowledvet p 4wy the: followist 2"*-*W
^
l.
Respensible fcr planning, desir-'"g, an.d c=-ducting a pecgra= ci studies invciv1=g-bcth rasear : and u?'!'n:1:n activities is J
business c:g="* - = *
- m s.
2.
Raspcasible for "'="-**:7 and develeping a lcngitudinal study cf c g=-* 2 icnal practices and develcpment within c gani=a icns.
e e
. e e o e
=e a
- me
=we e
o me.
,0 Yi*a - D. Bowers,
May 1983 - 3 6:
D.'
1972-77 Acting Director, Canter fc Researd en Utili=a-h of Scientific Knowledge.
1979-80: Acting Director, Center 23: Researd cn U** ' 4 -=_ti=n of Scien** ** =
Knowledge.
1979-present: Viceeairman a:zi P=esident, Ransis Likart Ase~-* =*es-1978-prasant: Vice-e%' = and Resident Agent, Fo"~'=** = for Resear=h on Human Behav1==.
Prof esrienal Me-tershier -
Ame:izz: Psycholoqr.=al Associa:1c= Tellcw (01visicas le and 19).
Inter-Universig Semi =ar en the Armed Tc =es and 5cciev.
C.-
f
- =
m en e
b
Vita - D. Bowers May 1983 - 4 Teaching F.xcerie=en Psychclogy SES (Surver et Parsc==al Psy-W~ry), U-M ca= pus, Fall Ta:2, 1965, ami at Flint Exts:sien Cantar, Spring Te=z,1966.
AC 561 (Crgani=atic:al Secry), Schoci cf Business W'-' *tratic=, U-M campus, Spring Ta=n,1970.
Psychology 968 (SecrT cf C gn=1:atic:al Change), U-M campus, Fall Ta.=s, 1970 ami'1371.
1 Membec C&"'"*"=I PsFiy Izec=tive w *==, 1972 Advisce, first-yea =' C gn=i=atic:a1 Psychology students.
Psr-*i"g7 766 (Secry cf C gani=a** anni Change and Dev=17mt), IT-M campus, Fall er=,1972.
CR-IR SCL (Hu=an Behavier ami Crvanizatic=), Schoci cf Business P'-'-"' etra*' ~ 1, U-M ca= pus, Winte: To:2, 1973.
PsTh*g7 766 (Secry of C: gar.L:atic:a.1 Change and Devale;=ent), U-M campus, Fall Ta =, 1973.
C5-:R. SCL-2. (En=act 3ehavic ami Cry =M
-* ~~)
School cf Business W ~4stra:Len, U-M ca= pus, W1 :ar Te==, 1974..
('
Psychclogy 766 (Decry of Crganizatic:a1 Change ard Deve5ent),. U-M campus,. Fall Oa==,. IS74 P%4 766 (Decry of Organi=atic:a1 Change and Development), U-M campus, Wi= a: Te==,. 197 E.
Psychclog7 766 ("hacry of Crganizaticaal Change ard Devalep= ant), U-M ca= pus, Fall Car =, 1976.
Psychcicg7 7EE (W cf Crgani=atic:al Change and Devalep=ent), U-M ca= pas, Fall. Ten, 1977.
PsychcIcgy TE6 (b ec:7 ci C:gani
- -4*"wl Change and Devalepsent), U-M cz= pus,. Fall Tar =,1978.
Psychology 766' (Sacry of Cry =-*
='i-1 Change and Devalepment),. U-M 7 m Fall Te==, 1979.
Psychclogy 766 (becry cf C:ganizatienal Change ard Develep=ent),
U-M ca= pus, Fall Tar =, ISSC.
Psychsicgy 766 (Theery c C:g isatienal Change and Develep=ent), U-M f
ca= pus, Fall Te =, 1981.
um 6
gg g
-* b 'e
=. a e e
A Vita. - D. Bowe:s -
May 1983 - 5 PUBLICA CNS 1,
Leadership and c gn=1:ational parfc.mance in an insurance 7-ny.
Paper presented at the m"mi meeting of the American Psychological Associa:1ca, Septec:bar 1962.
2.
self-esteem and the diffusica of leade: ship style. ilarraal af Applied Psychology, 1963,.E(2)..
3.
(With K. E. Seashcre) Changing the struct=:e and functioning of an cigani=stica-nc t cf a field expedw t.
Resear=h %..ph.
Ann A bc:: Ins **.tute fx W mi Research, 1963.-
4.
(Ed.) Applying mcde:n management p **"-4plesr to sales ceganiza** ~ts.
A:n A bc : Founda** ~1 for Research cm H==an Behavice,.1363.
5.
C:gani=atienal cent cl in an insurance m*:Y. Sociertfry, June 1964.
- 6.
Self-esteem and supe:visien. Persannel. Administration, su17-Ai: gust 196s.
7.
(With J. G. *="*""=" and F. M. Marcus) Bases of superviscry pcwer: A ccanparative study in 2 Ave-c gn=i=aH-=1 sattings. Pape read at the American Psychological Are-' m** m C=nventica, Septac:bar 1965.
8.
(With 5. E. Seashcre) Predic.ing c vanizatiena.1 effectiveness with a.
~
- ^ tout-ta :c: thec:7 at Leada: ship, M: isis:Pstiye SCieace Quatter1y, Septa =ber 1966'.
9.
('AL:h 5 E. S== &t, a. ant' A Z. Ka::cw) NEnsgesent by porticipation. Nes I:ck: Harper and Row,1967.
16.
(with 5. E. Seasherr) " Pes: leadership within wc k 7: cups. /tesannel Maisistrstion, Septembe:-October 1967.
11 (With R. Likart) Crga ti stional thecry and hu=an escurce accounting.
Americsa Psychologist, June 1969, 2, s, 585-591.
11.
(With R. Ncc=a=)
5::stasies for h,,.n, a=. w, -'
- ' - - lacaytriar, 196Sr Sr 50-55 '
- 12. (With 5. E. Seasb=re) Predicting c:g*-'~ =T offec.iveness with a tuu:-fac:cr thec 7 c2 leade:N. In 132dership. New Tc k: Penguin Ecoks, 1969. (Also rep:Ln:at Ln Con:tSts in air force leadership.
Maxwell Air Tc:ce Base, Ji='m m : AFRO:'~, 1969.)
14.
(Wi h S. E. Seashcre)
The d:.** ' i z ef. c.,.ni=s-'-M cha=ge. A vicin t
Psychologist, 1969, 1.s, 117-113.
15.
(With R. Liker. and R. Nc =sa) How to increase a fir ='s lead ti=e in recog * -' se and dealing with pechle=s ei =anaging its hu=an c vaniza.:.ca.
- ichigan Susiness Review, January 1969, 21_(1), 12-17.
M
-9,
_-.....,.~~'L Vita - D. Sowers May 1983 - 5
/'
16.
(With S~. E. Seashcre) Changing the s* :=:=e arN ** --* ~' g of as c ganiza-<
. :n W. M. tvan (rs.), Organizstional Experiments. New Tc k: Harper a 4 Row, 1970.
- 17. Systes 4: TheideasifReasisLikset. sw ic-k: sasic socks, 1970.
la. (Wtth :t. Liker ) < - 'M s::stegies related to e.ganizational theories and an u gacent systens. In Attitudes, conflict, and sociti change. new Tc F. ami London: Academic Press,1972..
1.9.
(wt*h J. r r:anklin) smey-sir.idad devolepmene.: using human rese=cas amasu:emen: La c:g=~ < -= ~
- m= ' change. Journ 1 of Contemporsey Business, Summe: 1972, 1(3), 43-55.
21.
The survey of organizstions: A machine-scored, 2: ndardized questicantire instrument. Ann A:bc:s Cente: to: Rossa:ch on CtLLLan:Len c1 Scientific Knowledge, Ins:L ute 10: Sccial Research, 1971.
21.
c3 te+-d ques ard their resnL:s in 23 c vani=aticn:: "'he F4 -"* gan :--
s:udy. Journal of Applied Eshaviorsl-Science,1973,,9,,,(L), 11-s2.
22.
(WL:P. R. Liker:)
N-~cving the =- a y of P/L repcrts by es-d
*d g the change in e'M T
value ct the bu=a= ori=-d -=-* ~. Michigsa Susiness Keriew, March 1973, E(2), L5-24.
~
- 23. ' (WL:h J. L. Franklin) Basic mapts cf survey f e='W_b In Pfeiffer a:A. 3cnes (Ets.), Handbook for group facilitstors. Ls7s.
1L. St1:e:1.af crgnaizstfaa: Msaagesent af the hansa rc:aurce. Ann A:bar:
univa st.r ce P4-" gan. Pres 3, 1975.
25.
(With J. L Tranklin ard P. A. Pe== ella) Matching p;chLe=s, prec=scrs, are interven:icas in cc: A sys:
4-app;cach. Journtl of Applied Behevioral Science,1975, n, 395-409.
26.
(With P. A. Pecc:alLa) A en: value a,.. ch ta hu=an resec ces ar m -: Lng.. Accounting foru:, Dece:bs: 1975, 25-40.
27.
Ri wy,.".; --*,. a=d the genen"-'Sd "ty et Isadarshi;r pn -' es.
Or7: fratf 0.T and Adricistrttive Sciences, 1975, 6(2-3), LST-LEO. ALsc in J. G. Bu=t an:1 L. L. Larsen (Eds.), lasdership frontiers. Kent, Chic:
Kant State University Press,1975.
2E.
(With D. L. Bausser) An empirical typology of wc k 7: cups [i.n civilian and M i4tary c ganizaticas. Unpublished pper.
29.
(With D. L. Hausser) W :k g cup :ypes and interventien eff ec:s in c:ganization devalc,~ent. MainisirEtive SClence Quarterly, y.a:ch 1977, g,76-94.
5 30.
(With G. J. Spencer) S:::cture ard. p:ccess in a social syste=s tranewc:k. Organization and kainisirsiire Sciences,1977, 8(L), L3-21.
i
=
Yita - D. Bower
- May ISE3 - 7 4
- 31. Organi=ati=al develep=ent:
P:==isas, perf = =ances, pess-' ' ' ties.
OrftaiZstional Dynssies, L976, L(4)o. 50-62.
- 31. Mc k-raLated. a::L::das at mLLL:a:7 pers=naL. Social Psychology of
- ilitary Service, 1976, 6.
Also rep:cduced L7 Sage Publications, Inc.,
NHC 77A78, ISP 504, T-9, R-a.
33.
(With J. L. F:=alet'")
Ama:ican wc k values and prataren=as. #ichipsa Essinest Review, Ma==h 1977, 29(2), 14-22.
3&.
(WL:k E. E. Sa= =hm)
Na** ' ' *y et c g=- 8 " * * *= t change. In R. T Gazamblawski. ant A. elm cres.), Seasitivity training sad the Isharstory approach: Resdingt shcat concapts and applications (3:t ed.).
Itasca,. ILL.: r. r P= % 1977
- 35. Wc k b- ="4 tien in prac ica:- What is business dcing? In W. J. Heisler and J. W. Rcuck (Eds.), A estter of dignity: Ingairies into the h usnizatics of work. Notre ::ame: University of Nctre t,a=e,1977.
36.
(With G. J. Spencer) Stru=:urer and process in a iccial systa=s framewc:k. In E. A. Burack and A. R. Negandhi (Eds.), Orgs#ilstional desiga: Theoretical perspectives sad espirics/ findings. Kan:, chto:
Kant State Univstrity Press,1977.
- 37. What wou16 cake 11,500 pe:scns quL: thel: $chs? Organizstions! Dynscics,
,~ -
..Si= er 1982.
7 e
l 1
i 1
'{
e l
Vita - D. Bewerr May 1983 - 8 MAJCR RISIARCH u.c c i 1
(Wittr M. Patchen).Fac:=s detac "-*"g first-line supervisien. Survey Resea'::h Canter,1960.
r 2.
(With 5. E. Seash=:o) Study of life insuranca agents a:d age *d **.
Repc
- Mathods. Surver Rasaarcit Cantar, 1961.
3.
(With 5. E. San
- W e) Study of life insuranca agents ard agencias.
Repcet II: Descriptive summa.--4 Mison between better and poc:ar p= M in; agen=ies. Su=vey Research.Cantar, 1962.
4 (Wit!r N. Craswell) StudT cf agents and. agencT =anagectant: Report cf field resea==2:. Surver Resear:21-Canter,1963.
5.
A narrative repc : en the role cf the wc: king ferscan. Survey Resear=h Cian:a:, 1965.
6.
(With 5. I. Saashcre) A study of Peace C ps d=<-' *-=ti:ns: 'Twc narrative
- sports. Ins.itute fc Sccia.1 Research,1963.
7.
A repc: ca leadership and perscnal backg cu d cf respcndants. Cantar fcc Ressarch cn U"i ? *"*d m cf. Scien**
- Knowledge, 1966.
s.
(Wi:h K. R. Studen ) A tttt Of the two-fsttar thegry of f0b
'{
strisfacciar. I:s:1:nts fcc W RasanM 1967.
~ 5.
Catz frorlCG pflat year. Center tar Resea::h an U:L11:a:ica et Scien
- r.=cw1. eve, a67.
- 10. Changes-la caer pr: files. 1965;-1957, for continacas process manufacturing sites. Can:a: fer Rassarch on Utilizati.cn of Scienti.fic Knowle:!ga,1967.
- 11. Core questionnaire forszt and $csttian responst bits. Can:n: tc:
l Research en C:ilizati=:1 ci Scian****~ Kncwledge, 1968.
l 11 A theory of :y::sc fuactioning rat arisairstienti change. Can:ar * :
Resear:!t en utilizatica cf SciertH *'r-K=cwledge, 1968, t
- 11. Fredicting crTrsfratie: effectivtac t scrats tiet. :he Executive 5:267 Cbuteracca, 1568r.
- 15. Nessarer:2t-kt:et erfanizztionsi develog:Ent 1 sternal Reve ue Servier, 1968.
[
' 11.. The purpast zad ianctianing of ICG. zuszi:::e c 1::e:.a1 Au11:::s, 1968.
i Ls. Variables in sanagerial behavior affecif a; personnel retention. na.;
j Canta:anca en P=:sennel Ratantica Resaarch, Decache: 1968.
LT. Use of the r Salts 2f Sacial Science research. CitLca c: Ae:cspace Research, 196g.
e e
e e
.e o
em e e w
.me e
.e w-
_r YL:a - D. sowers.
May Lss2 - 9
~Ls.
Sysiasius or orginizstionsi behavior in the sir force.
U.S. AL: ?a::e Acaden:r, 1969.
. L91 Fraftssional. Personnai Manage: eat Course. AL: c LversL:y, naxweLL AL:
Fe :e Base, 1969.
i
.za. The effects of graar compositice sad work situatica upon peer leadership.
2stits:e ter SocLal Researd, Septas:bar 1969.
- 11. Three studies in change: As account of dsts-based organizatica develancent activitier la three continacas peacess fires. :nse:ute-ta:
- ~-4 m i Research, September 196S.
- 22. Hark argsafzstion as dytsmic systas:. :nsti. uts far V M *1 Resea::h, Septemba: 1967.
- 23. Perspectives in organizztionsi develop:ent. 2stL:: e to: SccLa1 Researd,. Septa =bar 1970.
1s. The servey of organizstians: Toward a machine-scored, standardized questionnaire instru:ent. 1:s:L:ute ::: SccLaL Resen:6, Dae- %: 1970.
- 15. (uL:h R LLks: ) Conflict strategies reitted to arranizsticani theories tad EsnRfement systens
- ns L:ute 23: SocLaL P Maa +,. Decembe: 1970.
.1s Change in five pisats:. Ao saslysis of the current state of develop:ent
(
.afforts a the GM-Institute for Socia' i Research project. ::s L:::e tc:
s
- H = 1 Resear=h, May 157L (restricted distrib t-").
- 27. Develag ent techniques and orgsaizaticarT changt.~- Ar overview of results fra the Michigan inter-co:pany longitudinsi study. :ns:L:::e to: SocLnL Researd, Septa =ber 1971.
1s. Develop en: techniques and orgsairstfoasi cli:ste: Aw evsluttfon of' the cc:psrstive irt:r:sace of two potentini for:es for orgsnizational chsnge.
Instica:n t== Sc ial Researd, ce::be: Is71.
1s. (uL:h.:. L. ?:a=kLLn) Survey-guided develop:est: Using hu:sn resources sersurzutzt is'orgsafzztiacap tkssgr. ~s:L: ate 2 : Soete1 Resee::&,.
Is71 3c. Change'agestry fr the thirt yest of' the GM-lastitute for Socisi Research l
project: So:e cc:pstrtive saslyses of content sad style. ~::s:L:ute- ::
c-M = i Rasaarch, June 1171.
l l
31..
(RL:h 3. C. ?:ank1Ln ant 7. A. Pec :aLLa) A tszonary of intervention:
l The science of organizations 1 develop:ent. :ns:L:u:e to: ScH x1 l
Research, May 1973.-
32 (ML:h 1. A. 2:ex1er) Navy retention rates and hu:In resources canagebent. :ns:L:ute : r SccLa Ressa::h, May 1373.
- 33. Values End their itpsci for navy sad civilita respondents.
- s:L:u:e to:
SecLal Reses:ch, June 1973..
O
Vita - D. Bowers
'May 19E3 - 10 e
w 3s. (uL:n 1. L. 7:= *?*n)
The navy as r functioning organizstica: A diagnosis.. :=stitu:= t=: Sc=1a1 Resear..h, June 1S73.
- 35. Organizstionsi prstricts and the decision to re-enlist. :ns L:u:e ::
5~-' =' Rassare, ::ece=ba 1973.
Expressed preferences sad organizationsi practices experienced by navy 36 officers. Institute to: Social Rasaa:ch, Decacter 1S73.
- 37. Orgssizationsi diagnosis: A review sad a proposed method. ins:L:u:e to:
- ~-+=? Researd,. Septants 197&.
1s tut:2. c. n= ~ ) Militsry csapower and codera vslats. ::s:L:2:e to:
Social Rasaard, Oct:ba: 1974.
- 39. (NLth ;t. C. Baussa ) Group types sad interreatfor effects la organizational developstat. :ns:L:uta :: SocLa1 Rases:ch, naves e:
1974.
- 40. Multivariste disgnostic processer: The PAVAL progr'se. ::s:L:::a 2::
Social Ressa:Ch, June 1S71.
<L.
Navy scopower: Values, practices, sad hassa resources require:ents.
Ins it=== ter M =' Rassa =h,. June 1373.
s2 (ut:2 J t T-=- n*1)
Sarrey-guidet developreitt: Orts-krsed.
arranizstiansi chinge. :=stita:e t== w 3' Rasaarch, June 1377.
H:rk values sad prefersects of officers sad enlistedt in the ll.S. Arzy.
41.
Ins:L:u a :: social Rassa:..**, Septemba: IS73.
SL.
(MLth P. k Pecc:ella) future perfor:Ence tread indicators: A current value approach to hussa resourcer accourcing. Las:L:ute :: Sc:LaL Rassarch, Septecha: 1976.
- 45. (NLth P. A Pac :a11a) fatatt perfor:anct trend indicators: A. Current YsIce Ipororch to. ha:rs resources accountinr. Aepart iL. :ns:L:::s t :
Social Researd, November 1976.
46.
(ut:b 7. A. Pe m ) fatare perforsance trend indicatort: A current vslut approach to hazas resourc:1 sccounting. Repcet lil- : 1:L:::e t::
W at Rassarch, January 1977
- 47. (With A.
S~. Oaveni~.. ard J. 3. LaPciste) /atureperforshertrend indicators: A current ysius approach ta buzan rescurces accounting.
Report IV. Instituta 20: Social Rasaarch, June 1977.
48.
(ML:h A. S. Dave =pc:: and Gw. E. Mhealer)' Co:psestive issues and ethats it organization 21 dispnosis. ::s:L:u:n to: SocLa1 Ressa::h,.ncvece:
.. 1s77.
o s
g P
=
D D
~_,_[
Vita - D. Bowers -
May 1983 - 11
'49.
(uL:h A. 5. Davenpcet and :. 3. LaPcinta) future perfor:snce trend fadicatort: A carrent value saproach to human resources accounting.
Report V: The vslue attribution process. ins:L:::e to: sectaL Resea:c, January 1978.
- 30. Human r'escurcer ac==unting'1=r the military. In L. A. Broadling and
- n. Penn (F.ts.), Military productivity sad work motivation: Conference procardisfr. Final repce to NavT Persennel Resear=h and Development Center, San Ciego, August 1978.
sz. (with.7. L. Fr=M '* ami F. A Pecore11a) /gture indicstors of asFf perforssace: An extension of current value concepts to navy ists.
Institute t=r Sccial Resear h, Ju17197s.
51.
(uL:n A. s. cavenper:) Future performance trend indicators: A czerent value approach to hunts resources accounting. Report Vil: Utilizstion pedhisms tied ta methodologicsi issues-zus:L:u:e.ta: social Resear h, August 137s.
(withP.A.Pec:alla,A.S.Oavecpert,.and.J.R.[aPcinte)forectstin7 53.
perforssnct tw orgssizsticas: An applictrica of current-vslue hussa resources secountinr. Institute ter social Resear::2, August 1978.
54.
(NL:n G. E. E. Ross) A madeT of intemeganizzticari infiaescer or orgsalzstions] processer. Report 1.
- ns:1:::e tot socLa1 Resea::h,
%dgus: 1379.
v.55 - (uteA s. navenper x It. Claira, and. R. Farrell) A model of inter-orgssizstionsi influeness on orgsntzstionsi processes. Final report on hierrrcky and models of com:snd: Iafluesces or tray unit effsetireness.
Insti:::e ic: Social Research a:xi vec:== Research, Inc.,. Ap:111980.
56.
(uL:h L. M. 2cnes and 5. E. Fuller) Massgerent und esplayee reistianships within the-Feder:T Avirtion Meinistration. Vol. E.
Institu:a ic: C,-' m1 Researd and M-e'"er and C=.,
Inc., March 1982.
57.
(utth L. M.'J:nes, and s R. Fuller) #tnsgemert and tryloyer relaricaships within~ the Feders! Avirttaa Mziaistertion. Vol. II: A carpilarias of dots ~ saggienterrey te VoF. E. zur:k:ute see s~-'s Research and M:.Kinser a:d C3.,. Inc.,. March.1982.
55.
(uL:ht s.1: aux a:t 1. K DenLsen)
Cries of Frrfect Upgrada: Rescits of laterview Studies in 14 F1 set Units. := ~ ~ :epc::
at Naval Resear=h,. ISE1.
~ta :na Citice 59.
(vi:h L. s. x:au=>
Grisaizations! Correlater of Prvject Upgesdt. EL=al reper; to the Ct:1:a et Naval Research,1983.
60.
(uL:b 3. R. :e:Lsen) forecasting unit terfor:sace: a current value j
human resources acccuating syste: for Navy organizations. Tinal :ep=::
to :he ctfice et Naval Resear=h,1983.
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Central File C. F. Cbenchain File July 27. 1?84 t
Dr. David' Sowers Institute for Social Research 426 Thcmpson University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109
, MANAGEMENT-RELATED ALLEGATIONS AT COMANCHE pEAX - Oben-27-84 s
Dear Dr. Sowers:
I am writing to you en behalf of Bruce Xaolan who is en vacation fcr the
~
next week.
He wanted me to express his pleasure at your ac:epting a role in our current project with the Nuclear Regulatory Ccemission.
- de are espedaily appreciative of ycur willingness to respond witnin our ratner tight time constraints.
First, by way of introduction. I would like to give you some backgrcunc information regarding the project.
At a nuclear pcwer plant nearing eco-pletion, allegations have been put forward by a number cf indivicuals involved in the QA/QC area (Quality Assurance / Quality Control) that manage-ment created an' atmosphere of intimidation during cens*.ruction of the plant which inhibited QC inspectors from performing their duties according to n
written star.dards and regulations, to the extent that the safety cf the plant might be compromised.
In the context of issuing an operating licerise to this plant the NRC is taking depcsitiens frem those alleging irregularities and frca the applicant ecmpany in anticipetierr of a formal hearing.
These cepo-sitions are being reviewed by a team of experts frca both the nuclear industry and academia to make a judgment as to the accuracy cf the allegaticns.
As part of their own management of the situation, the apclicant comoany conducted a survey of its QA/QC personnel in an attempt to determine the atmosphere / climate in which they perceived themselves to ce c erating.
A copy of the set of returned questiennaires has been sent to ycu fer analysis.
It is my understanding that you and your staff will undertaxe an analysis of the responses and draw wnatever cenclusiens you can reasonably make fecm them.
This study will include a statistical analysis of tne enecked respenses and also analysis of the open-ended remarks tnat responcents mace en the survey forms.
9
((
l Dr. David Bowers s
July 27, 1984 j
Oben*27-84 Page 2
~
The basic question you are to attempt to answer is:
did mahagement by its actions create an atmosphere of intimidation for the QA/QC inspectors such
'that they performed their duties in a way that there is some likelihood of impact on the safety and quality of the plant.
This is distinct f. cm intim-idation that seme inspectors may have ' felt from actions on the part of crafts personnel. The intent is to establish if a pattern of intimidation existed, as opposed to whether certain individuals were in fact intimidated. There is also some distinction to be made in terms of what is really a elimate of intimidation ccmpared te what might be described as a fairly hard-nosed management style in the plant.
This issue of a definition of " intimidation" should be considered.
Naturally the applicant ecmpany tends to see all its actions as management style.
Those making the allegations tend to see all these same management behaviors as
- intimidation.
A third view is to define intimidation as involving scme viola-4 tien of written procedures for construction, inspection or testing due to some incident, action, or statement on the part of management.
It is this third view that is probably the most useful and applicable definition.
In any case, an explicit definition of climate of intimidation should be included in your Q
report.
I 'exp'eN that in order to draw your conclusions from the questionnaires you -
would..likesto have seme information regarding the development and administra-tion of the questionnaire itself, such as the process cf sa=ple selection, response rate, provisions of anonymity, etc.
Please address these questions -
to me as soon as possible by phone at 208/526-9696 and I will see that you get the needed information, r
We need your ccmpleted repcrt in our hands by August 5, 1984.
It should be mailed to: Bruce Kaplan, EG&G Idaho, Inc., WCB, P.O. Box.1625, Idano Falls, ID 83415.
Under separate cover. Eill Stratten has. mailed, to, ycu. via. Jane Delaney a request for a copy of your resume and a " Statement of Non-Disclosure" to be signed by all individuals working with the questionnaires.
Both the resume and the signed statements shculd be returned to me as soon as possible.
Should you have any cuestions or nact :tti',Snal information"of any kind, please con't hesitate to contact me at 208/526-9696.
b
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Dr. David Bowers
(!
?
-July 27, 1984 Oben-27-84
. Page 3 Again, we are very pleased with your involvement in this project.
Both Bruce and I look forward to working with you.
Very truly yours, 4t C. F. Obenchain, Manager NRC Technical Assistance Programs Branch-acf B.Stratten,ISU cc:
J. O. Zane, EG&G Idaho
(
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$2ceeg Cha.k(sic. (IR79) 9povit b
The fol'lo.<ing is an analyisis of a survey involving QC inspectors which was -
administared in 1979.
This information provides a historical perspective on the question under investigation. The purpose of the survey seems to be investigatory in nature, inquiring into the feelings anf perceptions of QC inspectors about their jobs, quality of supervision, support of QC management, and,a general e Enintop Thxperiences,or cN$c the Cemanche peaM site.
3ecuse the survhy was not designed to addres's the specific concerns of this eu: ro <.wiek goc.cris-A att it: lwr ra w mot study there is a judgment 4 -^~s which'A -rre FN includes sorting those questions in the o u--
survey which seem to be germain to 4=is cu :"On W those which t.a not.:;;;:-
car tursrem fram -
ci vant,gA careful inspection of 10". of the questionnaires was t t:
conducted to ascertain whether or not the questions id excluded would also exclude relevant fnformation.
(
si+27 of 7ka Soa m
. An ina4 inspection led to the can'clusion that three questions on the survey g
-e seemed relp, ant to.the study; questions if (2), question 2, and question 5.
v Our careful inspection of the 105 sample led tb the conclusion tha o relevant dista would be excluded by eleiminating the other questions.
N A contant analysis was perforned on the responses to these 3' questions and summarized below.
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