ML20211C366

Forwards Replacement Pages for Portsmouth RTM-Supplement. Discard & Replace List Attached for Reference

ML20211C366
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	09/09/1997
From:	Eva Hickey Battelle Memorial Institute, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATION
To:	Yen-Ju Chen NRC
References
NUDOCS 9709260168
Download: ML20211C366 (36)

Text

m

~

.m.,

Pacific Northwest Natlob! Laboratory 99qcy

.. 2m

.: s.

t September 9,'1997 Ms. Yen-Ju Chen-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11545 Rockville Pike Mail Stop TWFN 8A-33 Rockville, Maryland 20852

Dear Ms. Chen:

RE: REPLACEMENT PAGES FOR THE PORTSMOLTITI RTM-SUPPI FMENT Enclosed are thirty copies of replacement pages for the Portsmouth RTM-Supplement. There is a disemi and replace list attached so the user will know which pages to replace.

Please let me know if you have any questions or comments. I can be reached at 509-375-2065.

Sincerely,

/

f/

,,)

1. We Eva Eckert Hickey, Manager-Health and Safety Technology -

\\

EEH:nje fh

/)

cc:

A. Ankrum File /LB a

.I 9709260168 970909.

PDR ADOCK 07007002 C

PDR b

~

902 Battelle Boulevard a P bl5595 m Rmhland (VA 99352

~

~-

i

[g T.i. phon. sos-37s 20es = em.il eva.e. hickey @pnl. gov e Fax 509-375-3886

.. ~ _

REPLACEMENT PAGES FOR PORTSMOUTH RTM SUPPLEMENT l

DISCARD PAGE REPLACEMENT PAGE 5

2.1-8 2.1-8 2;1-12 2.112 P

. 2.3-8 :

2.38 2.7-24 to 2.7 26 2.7 24 to 2.7-26 2.10-39 to 2.10 2.10-39 to 2.10-41

- Section 2.9 Contents Section 2.9 Contents 2.14-8 2.14-8 2.16-6 2.16-6 4-27 (blank)

Foldout map, page 4-27 4-29 (blank)

Foldout map, page 4-29 4-37 (blank) -

Foldout map, page 4-37 4-45 to 4-51 4-45 to 4-51 8-3 8-3

~ Section ? I: Cascade Facilities X.326 Table X-326-7. Distances to Offsite Receptor Locations from Center of Portsmouth Site Approximate Approximate Approximate

- Heading to Degrees to Distance from Site, Offsite Receptor Name Receptor Receptor km (mi)

Pike County Headstart N

15' 5.8 (3.6 mi)

Riverside Manor N

350' 5.8 (3.6 mi)

Piketon Nursing Center N

10' 5.9 (3.7 mi)

Lake White State Park N

350' 8.5 (5.3)

Pike Co. Community Hospital N

O' 9.9 (6.2)

Piketon Jr. High ESE 120' 4.0 (2.5)

Wakefield (town)

S 190*

4.5 (2.8)

Pike /Scioto County Line S

180*

6.2 (3.9)

Cedar Crest Cr.re Center SW 225*

2.1 (1.3)

Brush Creek State Forest SW 220' 7.5 (4.7)

Good Shepherd Manor SSW 200' 5.8 (3.6)

Jasper Elementary NW 310' 6.1 (3.8)

Pike Co Joint Vocational NNW 340' 3.7 (2.3)

Piketon (town)

NNW 340' 5.1 (3.2)

Pleuant Hill Convalescent Home NNW 345*

5.1 (3.2)

Piketon High School NNW 345' 5.8 (3.6) l l

l 2.1-7 RTM-96 Supplement Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (August 1997)

-~

1

~ Sectione 3.): Cascade FacilawsX 326 2.1.6 Process Building Seenarios Neesis De'seenarios provided for th' is facility describe eventithst canicEd to ' ?

- I s.,, d

• u ip-t.

...h-a sclease'ofhazardousmaterials.ine'essounireleased'willvary,dep H5 on thel,

scenario'aind the atmospheric conditions.ine consequences are illustrated in the)

, dose-versus distance figures provided for each facilitp/ Tofestimate potential health impactsproceed16the'dosifversus-Aw-ifigures? ' '

m A selease from the cascade requires an event that can breach cells, piping, or cooling systems.

- Such events include explosions, mechanical impacts, loss of seal or valve integrity, and external events (such as a large fire). Because the X-326 Building operates at sub-atmospheric pressure and with small equipment sizes, bn: aches to the cascade primary containment system are not expected to release large amounts of UF.. A rupture of the cascade containment would result in an in-leakage of air.

Table X-326-8 lists the cwada scenarios and potential amounts that could be released from the cm=dec This table rates potential events to maximum release amounts for dose-versus-distance figure selection. The section following the table briefly describes the cascade system scenarios. If a scenario is not represented in Table X-326-8, assume 190(Ili as the default value since the X-326 cascade operates at subatmospheric pressure with small equipment sizes. See Section 6.4 for more information on criticality scenario and analysis assumptions.

Dose-versus-distance figures are provided on pages 2.1-13 to 2.1-23. These figures estimate consequences from UF. releases for the three primary toxic components (i.e, HF Concentration, Uranium Intake, and Radiation Dose). Figures were developed for 200- and 1000-lb UF release

amounts, t

The consequences assume a 130-lb/sec release rate from the caccade into the process building and summer ventilation. The 130-lb/sec release rate is highly conservative for X-326. Thus once released, the UF. circulates through the process building according to a "once-through" air-flow pattern. Under the winter ventilation mode, UF, hydrolysis products (UO F + HF) would leak 2 2 out very slowly from the process building, and these products would deplete during transit, reducing the amount of UF. available for release.

M*3 "

RTM 96 Supplement Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (August 1997)

. -. ~ -. - -. -..--

._- - ~.

Section 2.1: Cascade Facilities X 326 4

F Pipe Rupture.

2 n

F is piped into the process buildings from the fluorine distribution system with the 2

supply tank in X-342-B. The F feed line could fail due to various initiators (such as 2

~

operator error, corrosion, and external impact). The pipeline can be remotely isolated j

4 limiting the total amount released inside the process building to 7.4 lb in less than 1 1

romute.

- 2.1.6.5 Crlticality Scenario A criticality accident can only occur with a sufficient accumulation of fissile material

'(2'5U) and moderator. A criticality accident would result in an uncontrolled release of energy. Because of the double contingency principle (See Section 6.4), a criticality accident is highly unlikely.

Consequences from the criticality scenario account for the prompt radiation dose and radioactive (fission product) plumec The facility boundary (100 m) dose is only based on the initial pulse (10" fissions) because the criticality alarms should cause workers to immediately evacuate, preventing exposure to subsequent pulses. The equivalent of 12-in of concrete shielding is assumed between the worker and the criticality event location.

j The site boundary dose is based on the radioactive plume and shielded prompt radiation 2

dose from the entire criticality event (assuming a total of 10" fissions over 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />).

1 i

(

t I

h i

lI i

i.

RTM-96 Supplement Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (August 1997) 2.1-1 I f -.

4 a:

1 4 -

4

-eM.--

1J 4

Secdene 2.h Cancade Facilities X-326 i

2.1.7 Dose Versas Distance The dose-versus di *m Figures X-3261 to X-326 9 on pages 2.1-13 to 2.1-23 for the X-326 process facility represent the estimated impacts versus the downwind distance for UF. releases, a criticality plume and prompt dose, sod specific chemical releases from the process building. The figures provide the following information:

• hydrogen fluoride (HF) 1-hr equivalent concentrations in ppm for downwind distances to 16,000 m - for UF. releases from the Cascade System of 200, and 1000 lb.

• uranium intake in mg for downwind distances to 16,000 m - for UF. releases from the Cw=da Systent of 200 and 1000 lb.

• radiation dose in fraction of rem for downwind distances to 16,000 m - for UF, releases from the Cascade System of 200 and 1000 lb.

. plume radiation dose in rem from a criticality event (10 fissions) for downwind distances to 3000 m

. prompt radiation dose in rem from a criticality event (shielded and unshielded) for downwind distances to 1000 m

• fluorine (F ) P Pe valve leak release in ppm for a downwind dimwe of 3500 m.

i 2

The protective action criteria levels are also provided in the figures to facilitate the estimation of impacts to personnel and the public downwind of the event.

Note:i Stability Class B-4 'mefas Pasquill categ,rylB.at' wind speed'4 m/s.3For categories and :

kibe user can either choose tidmore conservativei

, @3 wind speeds notp-+ 24 in the grap a

M

,,,, gg 1

2.1 12 aru. 96 Supplement Porhmouth Geseous Difrusion Plant (August 1997)

A

^ ~

section A3i cascade racilitin X.333

s..

Factor M-- the amount of UF. released from the cascade given a primary containment system failure -

- include.:.

-. L Cell / system pressure e ' Cell / system inventory

-

• Operating mode (on-or off-stream) -

'. Operator response time (to trip the cell).

Only those units operating at ster than atmospheric pressure could release much UF.. A rupture ofon-line systems at suharmospheric pt.ssure would result in an in-leakage of air displacing the inventory into adjacent cells with a subsequent slow release of the remaining UF. hydrolysis products. However, an off-line cell at

) shy prasure could p=='i=11y release the cell contents bec.use the UF. could not be displaced. At any given

. time, only a small fraction of the cascade is operating at greater than atmospheric pressure with the fraction W on operating power.

Table X-333-8 lists the cascaoe scenanos and potential amounts that could be released from the cascade.

'Ihis table relates' potential events to maximum release amounts for dose-versus4istance figure selection.

'the section following the table briefly describes the cascade system scecarios. If a scenario is not represented in Table X 333-8, assume C '. M.Wmn. since it is an upper bound cell inventory, i

J S

4 MM 96 Supplement Ponsmouth Gaseous Diffbaion Plant (August 1997) 2.3-7

Section &3: Cascade Facilities X.333 Table X-333-8 Cascade Scenario Sumanary t

Release 6

Unsafe Cnadition Scenarios' Amounts. Ib Celts Ovchaing Compressor Failure UF, Hot Metal Reaction 1000 Cells Overpressurmng B-Block valve Closure without Closure of Corresponding A Valve

• M Coolant Tube Rupture into Primary System _

(Default) 4000 MechanicalImpacts Heavy Equipment Drop 6000 Pipe Rupture by Forklift I oss of Seal or Valve Integrity Small Passive Failures I to 10.000 External Evenr Lube Oil Fire I to 10,000 Criticality of 10" fissions in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> (NRC 1979)dInitial pulse of 10" fissions in 0.5 see followed d

successively at 10-minute intervals by 47 pulses of 1.9 x 10" fissions each, for a total of 10" fissions.

) Scenarios and release amounts were obtained from the updated Portsmouth SAR (11/96), the Portsmouth Application SAR (1995) and discussions with Russ Schmidt (ORNL) January 17,1997. See following section for discussion of the scenarios.

b) If scenano and/or release amount is unknown assume 10,000 lbs as a default release amount.

c) Assume UF. i= released from the cell at 130 lb/sec.

d) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),1979. Assumption Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of Accidental Nuclear Criticality in a Ursaium Fuel Fabncation Plant, Regulatory Guide 3.34, Rev.1 July 1979, Washington, DC.

Dose versewJistance figures are provided on pages 2.3 13 to 2.3-36. These figures estimate consequences from UF. releases for the three primary toxic components (i.e, HF Concentration, Uranium Intake, and Radiation Dose). Figures were developed for the following release amounts:

200 lb UF.

1000 lb UF.

5000 lb UF.

=

IBM (Default)

• 20,000 lb UF.

50,000 lb UF.

The consequences assume a 130-lb/sec release rate from the cascade into the process building and summer ventilation. Thus, once released, the UF. circulates through the process building according to a "once-through" air flow pattern. (See Section 9.0, Technical Basis for more information on scenario and analy-sis assumptions.) Under the winter ventilation mode, UF. hydrolysis products would leak out very slowly and much more would deplete during transit reducing the amount available for release.

2.3-8 RTM-96 Supplement Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (August 1997) l

=

Sectkm 2 7 Fred l'arernatum and flwrie (;eneral facilirr X.Hu 2.7.8 ~ Operational Data and Information The following tables and information provide operations data that will allow further assessment of the hazard conditions that may exist during the event. Included in this data is information on plant systems, modes of opeaation, critical safety function criteria, and monitoring precursors for various scenarios at specific locations.

Note: To perform a Hazard Confinement Damage Anaessment, use the Worksheet and leformation la Section 3.0.

2,7,8.1 Modes of Operation l

Table X.342A-8. Modes of Operation. X 342A Autoclave Faellities Mode #

yode Name Mode Description I

Cylinder UF, cylinder movement, cylinder installation and pigtail connection, llandling/

other activities required prior to initiating cylinder heating and cylinder Preparation removal afler disconnection from autoclave.

11 lleating Cylinder containing UF, being heated inside an autoclave (excluding mode VI); autoclave closed, UF. flow valve closed and steam valves "P'"-

4 JI Cylinder /

Includes, but is net limited to, pigtail connections / disconnections, Pigtall roll / tilt, and valve clarity checks; steam valves closed, cylinder valve or Operations safety valve may or mav not be closed.

IV Feeding.

Tramfer of UF. from a heated cylinder containing UF. to the Cascade or Transfer or to another appmved container, autoclave closed, steam valves opened or Sampling closed. UF. flow valve open.

V Cold Feeding Sublimation of UF. from a cylinder without adding heat to cylinder.

VI Controlled Sublimation of UF. fmm a cylinder contained within an autoclave under Feeding special heating limitations (Max. cylinder skin temperature 145'F and Max. cylinder pressure 20 psla).

Vil Shutdown Steam valves closed, autoclave may contain a cylinder, parent cylinder valve / safety valve and/or UF flow valve closed.

Vill Containment Autoclave closed and at least one isolation valve in each autoclave penetretion line closed.

Source: From the Technical Safety Requirements for Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Revision 6. August 12.1996. Section 2.1, Page 2.1 2.

ATM 96 Supplement Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusaon Plant (August 1997) 2.7-23

-~

y

'c w

a

?

2.7.8.2 Critical Safety Function Criteria if

~

y Table X-342A-9. Chentical Critical Safety Function Criteria -X-342A -Autoclave"(I of 3) y a.

~

f t7. nsieme l

d c,_ - -

i m Co.en Im==g comes Sea.,

Forsc=h Modet Sefery Lamas Safentme Bass for Operamon(LCOf LCO Bass (if5)

Ec5 Base S

3 Amed.ve sheE p AB Assade=e 3ns 3ggg Law e Im of ee versusmuseds eame Modes 9e a lespeg eBonable Ret TSR pg 2.1-3 Na 183 peg werbang presume se 72 m in p.g pe.omres==etse a

c,.

be g -

m c, sg

~..o

,_e e

ese by essegory Modes A

236 *f los em to beams to q

Ret TSR pg. 2.5-3 8

235 *F escrem== senperswe j

3E tr.cytede1mgb pm.

Amadowe Modes ShnE be crerstk Te preiem eweeng 3

see assacleve seemse G.IV. VI

$ggg $ 113 paa +

by&estsee test presmee 2

shmeerf Spue densig bestsg a cyl-3 Ar Ref TSR pg. 2.3 5 eders with e=wser=e U

behr games _

g-Assedste Made ShmRbe W Te prevent e=ceedeg

{

o, VI 3 sag 116 9 + 3 I bedresses are preeswe y

dures.best=s = cyS-g v

pas 5

ede.a eme--.e g

Eght gases Q

07.cybader twe.b eaa.

Am.a.dev,e Modes m op.r arade deE F,,.p.

Both ch cW Cd For Cat. A and B.

a ii.

s

~

shahdf B.

229 *F.

dews phase

• ==

Ref TSR pg 21-7 C.

leS *F chaner of ew 07 pse=emmag bydrammac er sere

.ange bem sein be,emeded.

O For Cat. C. is se est due eiere as se phase chage Aseecle esleBIngin AW Modes

$ba5 be egenable Q,tgg pteween"U*

9 ene== m ihundo-o n tv.vl A.

e s pos, enap sma A

Ret 13R pg 219 B.

2 5 png bydrumbe rigene b'g a) Refeeence. TM Safety Reipsrements (TSR) Portmuomb Gassee OtSuman Plant. Revesee 6. Angue 12.19s6 b) R+m Apphcable TSR pagemember 3

c) Reference Rassunse Teduncal Manusi. Portunesh Siwiement. Table X-342A-8. Amadave Facshmen, Fase 2.7-23.

[

e *shma be cpe,wde* w as defeud is ee TSR eww=ese

^>

c 3

O

is E.

8 y

Table X-342A-9. Chessical Critical Sefirty Function Criteria - X-3C4 Autocleve"(2 of 3)

L d

l LT. Betamat W m

av Lammang operse===I rh for Lamengceneres Functsom h Modes' Safety Ijrnies

$afety limit Basis Operation (LCof IIO Bams seemos(LCS)

LCS Basis Amenclave she5 high Asenclave Modes ShmE be operable; Assumus a IF.veimase f

pressure

n. IV.VI samust s IS psig man the cytader wise C

shutdowe 6e outstimwe end h

Ref. TSR pg, 2.5-11 ceases the comemmunegt a

pre'e=*ma tw. ismee 7

91 Assoclave she5 high AuencInve Modes ShaE be operable

$ag Provides everpressure CE pressine rehef system D. IV. VI 96 us.

5150 peig.

sebefen esencleve Ref. TSR pg. 2.1-13 84 in, 1865 pas.

ns 1n a 1 o High condemaste level Auenclave Modes Basin channels shaR pm,enes 3

shueoff n.IV VI be operable

===rpressurummen by o

c Ret TSR pg 2.1-13 high HF pressure Sune 4

}

(T/musers y

fame = ring a17.seiense, a

g by shumag off sne seemm, lesseng emcesesse wueer

?

y D,

for the veection inw cylinder pressure Amtsclave Mode Shet be cyerable; Presenes ever-I shusoff U

3 shag 5temni pressurussem efcyfe-4' Ref TSR pg,2.113 shus effeRet firW der and resulhag

{

hourofhessing hydremisc rupeure is te it

=bem cytmeer c==e ofcyheder havag pressee senimens a closed or plugged g

< 20 psa vulve.

Autocts,e snicke AB Autoclave 50%of heads in a t*pon UF. release in 3

detectnee system Medes facihty sheE be autoclave erne,a local g

Ref:TSR pg 2.1-20 operable educator wiE sound 3'

menfying operstmas g

reese=aet teiw 4,

a)

Reference:

Techancel Safety

• _,_ _

_- (TSR) Portsmou6 Gesecus Ddfission Plant, Revision 6. August 12,1996.

(

b) Referenor Applicable TSR member-

{

c) Reference-T N Parissieve!,f -- Tanisx-u2A-a Ameci facisse,rne.2.7-23.

y d) *5 hen he

• is as dermed in die TSR documeent g

E T

F N

4 Y

k D

I I

~

it' N

0 Y

s Table X-342A-9. Chesnest Critical Sefety Fasction Criteria -X-342A, Autocleve* (3 of 3)

N c-y D

tv.nesesse temme e t

Sekty Safety Linut Lasutsig Candinons for 1____, cement

}-

FuncnonsteL._4 Op W W Imists Bass Operemon(LC0f LCO Bass seemes 0.C3)

LCSBass g

k Pigned bac isoispos Ausselswe Modes SheE be operuNe Msenues sie ipsenery of Ret TSR pg,2.t-23 II,III,IV. V. VI LT.selunse spen indere of i

2 ene _C - * " or pigend duringQ

{

e wenslieroperamene If

,a relemme occurs, unusual

{

pushbumon acavenen

-4 gueedieciese isoleno.

eehn 3

k Crialeelity Prevendes med Dnseelse 3

=

Cimcatwy acc.deur eien.

In areas, creceiny emahm Dewas and pro des en 3

detecnne sheE be andMe sipielen a syseems egeipenent,er operoNe mannern credible 5

Ref TSR pg. 2.14 y >100 pn crecahey acudent,dermeral 3

k U et enrictsneet 10 =t es producaig en asseyened g

teemi ese of 20 RADS, 7

R

% "" U elerhnt personnel to

{

{

in areas =nere the creceiny acuden nienn e,semmie.

sheE be cperable Z

memunem f

forseeable shoorbed (endible) do=e in free me g

eu 12 RADS m

High condcasene level Assocleve Modes Bee channels shma be Saar Schnur yve, emes dreamiene saimiott II, IV. VI opereNe.

• si, 5:50 pois, peesses and.huis err 84si,2165pog, seeman to essocia.e se ht TSR pg 2.113 72 in. 5873 psig prevens a nuclear 9

W'*y by O

=====nas =eser evedmide fur moderenen.

i I

C En Cheeleel Reteeme (=. ~ ' J " beoordene emnerviel)

E g

None

,{

a)

Reference:

TechnicalSafety?, ---- --(TSR) Portunoodi Geseous Diffusion Pimmt Revision 6. Ampust 12,199tk b) Reference. Apphomble TSR page surnber c) Refevence;hsponseTechnicalMainst,PortsmoediSupplement TapeX-342A4, Asencie eFehrese2.7-23.

c d) " Sher tiew A* is as dervial in 6e TSR aw ca 1

e

?

i l

i.

h i

b h.

2.10.8.2 Chemmical Critical Safety Function Criteria I

t 8

l Table X-344A-8. Chemnical CritiemI Sefety Function Criteria - X-344 Autoclave * (l ef 3)

P.

UF. h Operanomal Safen Lirnit Imnasms Condammes far Linuame Coment Fumetsonteference' Modes" Safen Urnies Besas Operunem GIOf*

LCO Base Semmes(1I5)

If5 Beeis Assocleve she5 high Autoclave Modes SheF ~ae operable; Assumes a LT.nelease pressure W D,IV, VI Scu s 15peig than the cyhnder wenn j

.h.ed the==tocleve and -

Ref. TSR pg 11-13 die comenemsieme valves to close,pevemeng UF, release 9

Autoclave shes high Assocleve Modes Sher be operable 3ig prendes overpressure pr. essure relief syssem II,lV, VI 90 ut, 5150 peig, reliefee escoclave l

Kef:TSR pg. 2.1-13 84 in, s165 pois, i

av 72 iP, 5373 p*4 i

k Iligh condenseeelevel Amenclave Modes Beek channels sho be pwvenes 3

shuaoff n,IV, VI eperable overpressuna nomby g

Ref.TSR pg. 2.1-15 high IIF pressure Gene g

UF.fweser senceson, following e LT.relsese, g

by shushng off the sement, lenihng etceserve mener y

For die r=r+.a=

IC' Isar cylunder pressure Autocleve Mode Shed be operable; prevents over-g shutofr n

seanner Stenenshuesofr pressurummon of cylinder g

Ref.TSR pg. 2_l-18 ener first hour ofheating and resulting hydramisc when cylmder pressure rupeurein the case of remains < 20 pois cyboder having a closed

?

or plugged

• g Autoclave smoke AR Autoclave 50%of heads is e facdity Upon UF.nelease in deteceden system Modes sher be operable ousacleve ene, e local Ref: TSR pg. 2.120 medicssor wm sound moeshung opershoes

{

perso==ei ne W a

a) Reference TechmecalSefeey *

- (TSR) parennioudi Geneous Diffusion plant, Rensson 6, August 12,1996.

I('

b) Reference ApplicableTSRy muenber 1

c) Refereacm: Response T

- Manua!, portsmouth Supplement.TeW X-344A-7 page 2.10-33.

4 d) "shan be opereNe* is as dermed in the TSR document.

QIln e

w

-e c;

L

. i.

I('

N 2

Table X-344A-8. Chemical Critical Safety Function Criterie - X-344 Autoclave"(2 of 3) k C

%o L F. Rehese (eeedleseg l '

l Linuteg 1

O,

o es Co.d.

s fm I, teg C Function / Reference

• Modet Safety Lemos Safety Lirnie Basis Opersuae(LCOf LEO Basm Seemos (145)

LCS Base Autoclave she9 AB Assoclave

$ig: $ggag I. mast is 110% of pressure vuses Modes 96 ut 165 psig te enemirnum i

susaclave size 54 so.

III pseg alloweble wortang Ref:TSR pg. 2.1-3 72 he.

179 peg pressure to prevent I

feaure of the con-temuness susoclave Cylinder heating tem-AB Autoclove Qi Cat Seineset.

Ullege er veut peresure by category Modes A

256 *F volume lost due to Ref. TSR pg. 2.5-3 B

235*F heehng to esces-sive i..,~ _^_ ;

UF.eylinder high Ausacleve Modes SheII be eyerable; 4

• e p>xas e=ceedag w

pressure nuesclave II, IV. VI Sensosat 5115

$ *%.esistic test pressure y

steen shutoff pse + 5 pse-eurmes heatmg in cyl-inders weh excessne Ref TSR pg. 2.5-5 i

hght gases.

h Autoclave Mode Shall be operebae; To prevent escredmg y

VI Scenoemt 116 9 +

Irydrostene test pressure P

3.1 pse durms heating m cyl-uulers wah escessive 4

light gases.

[

UF. cylinder high tem-Assoclave Modes Both channets G LCat $ shag For Cat. A and B.lunste S

perasure susacleve ll. IV, %1 sheB 14 eterable A,

233 *F.

esponsson durug phase f

stearn abusofT B,

220 *F.

change of the UF.,

Ref_ TSR pg. 2.I-7 C.

145*F preveness hydramantic or g

!r acro milege lurus from being C

e=ceeded. For Cat. C. is no set tiet there is no phase change O

Autocleve sheB high Autocleve Modes SheB be operable QL.Cg Prevents V allege and i[:j stearn pressure 11,IV.VI A.

S 0 psig, hydraulic supeere t

E' shaklowa B.

23 psig l

g Ref.TSR pg 2.1-9 1

m) Reference Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) Portsmouth Geseous D ffusion Plant Revisime 6. August 12.1996.

E b) Reference-Apphoeble T5R page number c) Reference Response Technaces Manuel, Portsmouth 5,/._.4 Table X-344A-7, Page 2.10-33.

a

?

d) -shmal be operable is as detmed > the isR document 1

d

~

=

E.

R Table X-344A-8. Chessical Critical Safety Functier Crieeria -X-344 Autodeve" (3 of 3) tv.mes see neene P.

Sefery Safety tiird Lammesas t'h for Lammems Commel e

rence h -

Operunasal Modes' Linues Beses Operance(ICOf 1C0 Basis Seemos(ICS)

LES Basis Pagemst line i a=====

Aasendewe Medes Sher be operelde Maisnases te tymenary of Ref. TSR pg. 2.1-23 ft, Et, IV, V. VT LT.vetense upon indure of j

te r_, J

~ M or pagame duruig semplef o

m = m roperemons. ir selease eixarn,missual

&ed = close iseannen acerwunse segu n.

5

. Cr ie=ehy Prevendes med Beestema em g

"U Crescalary occadeed alorse la areas, Chucebry actsdent Deeects and pnmden en

(

syseesne egoipneest,er deescesse sher be enduMe sigsel en a Ref: TSR ps 2.1-4

>700 ye operable seemunum credsble 1

U at aecahey accident, defined emnclunesc> I.0 wt as producug me imorgreemd enemi dose eI20 R. ads, i

g

% '" U

• res.g,ers la areas where te Chacalmy occaneet slann evacusse_

d eneminnans sher be operable foreseeable (audible) p shearted dose in a

5 See air exceeds 12 g

l 4

[

Ifish condenssee level Aseacleve Modes Beeh chemmels abmR be

$ig h pre, eses dresnime pluggag

.h.aofr n,iv. vi epereue.

Se a, siso pag.

and shmes ofrseemse to meteve to pa.esa.mt a h Ref. TSR pg. 2.1-l$

84 is,1165 pas, see ni sin n

.r.r.o.ey,

snessemag unser moeilable for snodorense.

4 i

Chemleal E'asear (see-reasingital hacerdoes motert I) 1 l

t h

D

[

J e) Reference Technecal Safety Regemenients (TSR) Portunoush Gessous Dnsosos Plant, Revision 6. August 12,1996.

7 i

l b) Reference ApplecableTSR number M

l l

c) Reference R T.

Menemi, Portsmouth Supplenient. Table X-344A-7. Page 2.10-33.

k

• is as def' ned in die TSR docuaneet I

d) "SheII be u

b k

u l

C g

s.

t

.l.

E' f

t I

l

\\

1 I

l r

Sobion,210' Toll Exichment Senkes facilit *X 344A 2.10.8.'i Moaltoring Precursors Table X-344A-9. Monitoring Precursors UF. Feed, Withdrawal and Handling (1 of 2)

Criticality Accidents Scenario location

• Initiating Conditions Monitoring Precursors C-22 Criticality X-326 Top, PW, Operator negligence Observation ofimproper at Product Line Recorder resulting in an unsafe "always safe" spacing array of Withdrawal Manifolds, and configuration containers; assay limits, Interim accumulating an sufficient mass, availability of Surge / Purge unsafe mass moderator C-23 Criticality X-344A Vault Improper cylinder Observation ofimproper in X 344A handling "always-safe" spacing array of containers; assay limits, sufficient mass, availability of 4

moderator UF. Release Accidents R 27 Liquid UF.

Cylinder Feed, Structural failure of Visual checks for crane Cylinder Rupture Sampling, and a lift fixture occurs equipment damage, a check of Transfer Areas cylinder restraining connections, l

and reviews of maintenance records R 28 UF. Pigtail Cylinder Feed, Pigtail rupture by Visual surveillance and Failure Sampling, and abuse, falling object, maintenance checks Transfer (ERP, or moving the LAW, and Tails cylinder while Withdrawal) Areas attached R 29 UF.

Cylinder Feed, Breaking a cylinder Checking cylinder valve shield Cylinder Valve Sampling, and valve wiu'e cylinder or screw-on capintegrity and Failure Transfer Areas being moved -OR-in place prior to move Valve not completely closed a)

Refer to Table 3.1, page 3-14, Cell Equipment Nomenclature, Size and Quantity versus location, for information on cell descriptions and locations.

b)

De possible chemical accident monitoring precursors were not logically identifiable, but would mainly be categorized as operational or administrative errors etc., other than gross initiating events, such as earthquakes or fires.

Sourec:

Reference:

SAR PORTS, Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 3,5/%.

2dN2 RTM-96 Supplement Portsmouth Gaseous Di&sion Plant (August 1997)

I Section 2.9 Feed Vaporization and Sampling Facility X-343 I

Section 2.9J Feed Vaporization andSampling FacilityX-343 Page 2.9

! Feed Vaporhaak and Samalia: Famhty X 343....................... ;......... 2.9-1 2.9.1 Facility Description........................................................ : 2.9 1 2.9.1.1 LW=..... 5.......................................................... 2.9 2.9.1 2 S ize....................................................................

2.9-1 2.9.1.3 Nearest Site Ba=dary c.... <................................................ 2.9-1 :

2.9.2. - Hazardous Material Summary.................... 2................. c....... c 2.9 1.

2.9.3 Bounding Accident Consegwnces............................................' 2.9-2 2.9.4 M$r Plant Systans X-343...................................... t.......... 2.9-3 2.9.5 Receptor Distances..... <...............................:,.... _............... ; 2.9-4 2.9.6 Facility Semanos X-343................................ c................ 2.9-6 2.9.6.1 Liquid Cylinder Drop Scenarios................................................ 2.9-8 2.9.6.2 Cylinder Valve Failure.................................................. :.. 2.9-8 ;

2.9.6.3 Cnticality Spio........... <............................................. - 2.9-8 2.9.7 - Dose v. Distance.. ;......................................... c.. a........... 2.9-9 2.9.8 Oper=that Data and Infonnation............................................ 2.9-30 i

_2.9.8.1 Modes of Operation.. i....... =....... i... c................................. 2.9-30 2.9.8.2 rWaial Critical Safety Funeth Criteria............ c..... s.... c........., s. c. 2.9-31 2.9.8.3 Monitonng Procznors............................. s................. s....'.2.9-34 '

2.9.9 _. Maps, Floorplans and Other Mua2Deta....................... ;............. 2.9 2.9.10 - Refctmees...................................... s................

..._.._...'.2.9 Table X-343-1 < h=dmg Accident c-- for UF, Releases ;.. < ~ s. c............ c. ~ 2.9-2.

Table X 343-2 Boundmg Acrid =r Cm-for C4&y Event.......... s <...... c.. - 2.9 3 Tame X 343 3 Distances to Site Boundaries in 8 Sectors........ ;.............. ;....... - 2.9-4 Table X 343 4 Dietmar= fmm X-343 toNearby Buildmgs Onsite........._...s........... 2.9-4 Table X-343-5 ' Distances to Ofisite Receptor Lei==.. s................ <.......... <... 2.9-5 '

Table X.343 6 Scenario Summmy............................................ c.....:. 2.9-7. -

Table X 343-7 Modes of Operaten............................... ;.... _......,.... '.2.9-30 l

9 4

Secrkur 214 Seware Treatment facilitv X-MI9 R

~

)

Y

\\

\\

/

9 i

{

f g8 1:

k

(

2

\\

22 4

6 o

--l 1

Em I

l

/

Od I

f 5.

E n#

• j d

--R j

]

am i<

i a

~

6 a 11 y

/

a o

c C

1,l 8

l l I

E a

e t

1 f

M I

h E

N c h

U

}l 5

{

v 5

=

f Q

1[

il t

h

--S[

a

[

f y

c I

8 o

l I

j' v

I I

/

/

O I

c 9

/

8 1

S l

h

--0 E

i t i

g

/6 /

a'

.8

)

/

8

%*l

/ /'

t 1'

jf ill l [

jl

--l X

[y f

y M

ll u:

f 3

r,$#

o k

k E

Wdd 'uopenueouco supolyo RTM-96 Supplement Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (August 1997) 2.14-7

m

+

Sortian ?14:Sennar Treenernet farituy X-6619 r

)f-8619 e-C1 Rack --- -

2

~

J f-r OC30 l

t

~

a

=

i F mey a.uad.y nuanne wuew.

s

._. open hen o

in l

un Figure X-6619-2 Waste Water Treatment Facility 2.I4-s am 96 suppaemen Pommmah onmous Dimmion rhun musum 1997)

Sectkm 2.16? Chemkal Operation facihties X.703 Table X-705-5. Distance to Offsite Receptor Locations from Center of Portsmouth Site Approximate Approximate Approximate Offsite Receptor Heading to Degrees to Distance from Name Receptor Receptor Site la km (mi)

Pike Countylleadstart N

IS' 5.8 (3.6)

Riverside Manor N

350' 5.8 (3.6 )

Piketon Nursing N

10' 5.9 (3.7)

Center -

Lake White State Park N

350' 8.5 (5.3)

Pike Co. Commtmity N

O' 9.9 (6.2)

Ilospital Piketon Jr. liigh ESE 120*

4.0 (2.5)

Wakefield S

110*

4.5 (2.8)

Pike /Scioto County S

180' 6.2 (3.9)

Line Cedar Crest Care SW 225*

2.1 (1.3)

\\

Center Brush Creek State SW 220' 7.5 (4.7)

Forest Good Shepherd Manor SSW 200*

5.8 (3.o )

Jasper Elementary NW 310' 6.1 (3.8)

Pike Co Joint NNW 340' 3.7 (2.3 )

Vocational Piketon (town)

NNW 340' 5.1 (3.2)

Pleasant Hill NNW 345' 5.1 (3.2 )

Convalescent Home Piketon High School NNW 345' 5.8 (3.6)

EM 96 Supplement Pomneuth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (August 1997) 2.16-5

Section 2.16 ChemicalOperations facilities X 703 2.16.6 Decontamination and Recovery X 705 Facility Scenarios

\\

Note: ils scenarios provided for this facility describe wents that can lead to a -

release of hazardous materials. De amount released will vary, dapeadhg on the i

scenario and the atmospheric conditions, ne consequences are illustrated in the dose-versus<listance figures provided for each facility. To estimate potential health -

impacts, gdto'the dose-versus<listance figures. -

De X-705 Decontamination Facility has many diverse operations occurring at the same time.

nese activities involve uranium solutions and various chemicals. Nitric acid is used as a decontamination solvent. Two supply tanks (5000 and 4500 gal) are located outside on the NE side of X-705. The 1995 Portsmouth Hazard Assessment (DOE,1995) identifies the chemical event with the highest potential consequences as a catastrophic nitric acid tank rupture. A criticality event also could occur because uranium solutions are handled.

Table X 705-6 lists the X 705 chemical release scenario and summarizes the source term (i.e.,

release amount and rate). The section following the table briefly describes the X-705 scenarios.

(See Section 9.0, Technical Basis Section, for more information on scenarios, analysis assumptions, and model information.) Dese-versus-distance figures are provided on pages 2.16-9 to 2.16-11. These Sgur-s estimate consequences from the criticality event and nitric acid tank rupture.

Table X-705-6. Scenario Summery Scenarios

• Source Term Summary Nitric Acid Tank Rupture 34,000 lb forms a puddle @ 3.5 lb/ min evapomtion rate Criticality nis event producee a total of 10" fission in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

See Section 9.0 for further detail.

a) Scenarios and release amount were obtained from th Portsmouth Hazard Assessment Document (8/95).

The X-705 Decontamination Facility has many diverse operations occurring at the same time.

nese activities involve uranium solutions and various chemicals. Nitric acid is used as a decontamination solvent. Two supply tanks (5000 and 4500 gal) are located outside on the NE side of X-705, he 1995 Portsmouth Hazard Assessment identifies a catastrophic nitric acid tank rupture to be the chemical event with the highest potential consequences. A criticality event 2.16-6 Rnt 96 Supplement Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (August 1997)

m -.. m 4

l---] usEC Facitebes r

v=- y ei

/

e.

f

-. we -.

f DOE Faches or Areas I.

. f.$

'f_

'f I

1

' p5.qf Q

i; L

j=

y' l

'N fi

\\

k l

t.):

L

,_. J.

\\

(

- ~~. p. - y

.jwm_

,s._.

" ~

o, c~

i

/y*1 r,'

g?

ll o

.. -k 4%

/

~

\\' w l--.-

1 40

+

-,m-EiE!.l 01 mee to Plant SO' ',-,

f-q s u.ia ys no rm I

7 1,

F

/ AC 4-2 1_gC

e., N g

~,

u l. _ _t e

m.

o g

V%

/

/\\ '

P?-

i,'W.,,,a m -t*r9 m J gk :)gM M)*--

}

m E,

g-h~

~

N j

w I I i

/

iL - -

tl i ~-!_ ~" N_ @ M h g f

2 YpsT fM[fi E'

v

. = _ x pp e p!

1 4@mir'k-

"i=_Id-!

\\

k.

\\

u :

i p

7

/ge@;

gM3 w

//#,/g*- n;m(ER&mi.

s N

\\

I l

l

\\3NN

""""! l

=.ghtLAmt

/f t.

__2.,..

m..mmmu t

/.___.

pz i s e f geRMw+

s.PT 5=EMy c/

n-i

_i

___m-x - I-l/__7_)

l l

l I

sc9xmnss i.

r, Figure 4-1 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant - Facilities Retained by DOE u

i

m. ~,,,,

-- ~ n w m i.

$* 9 m

m y

n l

e e ow we

+

p,.

mm

l

_!<~

[

u_.

l 1 uste Factmes g UF6

, /

DOE Fac htwas or Areas e cmaty

)'. g f - : n i

j M

g I

c I

j hg*

• 'l I

s i

[- r-j --,

$Q

{

'\\

O Freon

f M__ ~_,,

. c E) CIF3 7

/

m o-

-mm4

_ep eew g g hyN f

L

~ #

-W

~

-- McE 11.I eF2

=--

=

.s "_

,k m _,. _1

.En O HF

~~

w m

.--..,-T 3_q

-]M-,*eoo=* ggp_.f t

l J

o a2 J{fvI,

gy _ h [-'~~.

[- ----th$t~']I

\\

$ DieselFuel g Gasoline l!

f-h h

f Uranium-Bearing h_r,;

h' i N[

l Mk b

x, _,

w'r PJ O

Materia!s ha--

~

- = %-Ng i

• V

,I s

x y %gj f---

N4

'i W ysF 4 N -@ l l ij i

g lf I/

.I l

l w

SG97070065 te Figure 4-2 Portsmouth Gaseous Oiffusion Fiant Hazards Matrix CI s

ATN-9e Impyarmuus Pwamuseman Gmemus Ddresse Muu (4egun f9'*)

en a

k

. {

}

~.

=

=

dis.

ww.e w w:

Approximate Plan Site Populaixx1 Distnbution Buksirs A*9'48' Nwnte swt onswt G100 405 X-101 13 l

l I

h1 i

USEC Fac*tes

~

, - ~

X-104 7

3-53

~

p,ei DOE Faondes or Areas h$

• • 't ]s l t -==*

y

=. "

m300 7

5 t

R W e Poputam b-X 10

• /

~

.G333 46 to

/, i

.A

.C-*

L

'N I

g

)

^[' ' i ;'- / @' '

d X-342 9

3

?

l

+

X-343 3

3 N$

?

1 N

df

\\

r

'^2-7 -

X-533 2

1 N

TN l9 N ra

=

r%<=Q k&E :GFb b.

TF S gA%.

_i s x-vio 13s 3-20

- u i

3

~

3 l %~

x-720 307 37 i

,w _ =@]L B _..ma 5

• ~~

x-ras s

u; z-n e+

g g..

,,_g a _m

...-. _ u._

3

.m..

y x-80,

,2 w

X-00 2

l.se 1

)

~~

t % em k. L=.~%pffc b T psECg x

W c c w w~ D 55 w

h% fi I

IM; as_n y-

1. q"m 1

25o

~

t i YM

,_.}.I H

(ooE and oe.3)

<=s_ _ _ ~

- w a i

/*

E2%

I l

\\

I b -- 4 X-345 s

,s gmf.

pj z

X-751 20 (Oho National Guard) 2 7 'am x-7so 1

N5

cYL.-.M'C NW-W

~

~~

w

-~ m_

- 'l-=-E

=_= m =%

s

~

\\

X-3345 20 (ONo NatonalGuard)

._y '"* ! _ __ ^

^ ' '

i 6

l[

l l

l l

l X-7725 130 J

c-tot 130 (Transera truck onvers near x-206E) scemessice t, 6 Figure 4-7 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Population Distribution

• -9

~. -

'2

=

.4 I

t*

a m

.a

o.

j_-

n,w' ' /

c L V'"

,'\\p;,[c;p"y

[,

sssg 2:M YM 6 i

3...-

l

.f e

ov c.;.

l

!/

l 3

-=-

Ai Vy s

/h' '#.,... ;.. g+.,,.E yA, p

' g-

/ [$. e

', M=

\\

Y)

'N

%)ll?,,"~NdA.

y T

t' - g _e,J"/ g m%.. d. 9l

dc )a/,r -.

R,.. +

7=.

ar

/

f7jgjMk

,.:..g;+-*,

__(

i~C1 g SMM

g. "OW p'pr>-e j [.

l _I 3

sanitary tano riti,

m p--_

W r

0.7 mile to Plant Sitet. ',.

l I

~

y a

"~

/ hu a,---\\~'~_ y aW

=~

~

u l

il i[

= 1]

y 5

[(s

)%.LTKl TRMaJ, 7-(

I t-4r LT"- >w 7

.mn-1 mwr*c r o

3 w

i j @C g

=

/

s de I__iI gt l Wf$

3

_._ i y

L.

5~.'4 q

J.h: yM a --

g x

- yVp !g i,

XN FJ r rp - k,N [ f ), N{-" M.J-.

-- ' j,,/

g7 x

s N

w~0 t

I h,j ym.. y...

.......... m.:,,,

~

Mb i

_/

[d T

/

ir l

/

\\(

m...

_.t.,

((M

"[

7 C.I Figure 4-1 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant - Facilities I KN ftSupplement Portsmouth Gaseous Dithsion Plant (August 1997)

Section 4 0: Site Resource Information USEC Facilities DOE Fccilitios or Areas i

I

<- 7 "

ANSTEC APERTURE CARD Also Available on

• ..-,a-

=

Aperturo Card ww 1

A '*

• k 1

w bg s.s g

q4'

y '- -. ~ _, q

{

y_

L%M l{6 ch 'N C U.M U

'N 4 =. - %

T_-

~

.9 id

f>~

.. /

, L._-

m

~%2T~% =.+ PrmM(; -- id 'o 4, e..

un g

i I

f h"%

6' M t__

(

U

.. -. --.. 4

y g

'-rc~--

y

( ~.t. { _7 d_['4" hh_h['

L _ _ _ __

r,.,,,, i l... p L

tm L.;

_,a

& G6 r-

~ 6 ;A-- - '

g Sf4freted

/'Th'th""-

"r

@j k

I

(

N T

M.

(

- ~ ~~ ' "

7 - ' 7

/

im

.m tf 6f, *s)s.3""'

l ""'q%(nM.

N C

,jr

,y,;l 4

=r - M 55 3 y l. Y

/

w

=%

__ g A

.L_ - -

l/

l ll mm_..

r.

h. w SG97070065,1a ketain:d by DOE C

C 26OS %

I 4-27

I J

Q,4-d'p. c'(M-e 3,

'/

t

[g g

Q UFe map; 85 ]

j g

Criticality N

Lube Oil

[ I'NfM~','rI.ed"'I

, ~-

n g

Freon

,p s

., W. r..Jl/' g }- s q 7 g g ', T. p

~-

^

j

.._m-

/

M*M

':4 r"4 Q

CiF3 dx.735S

[

6 Sanitay Land Fill L

O. lA.a p g

Acids o.7 miie to riani sitem_.-

I i

s

- g

"~

/ Au b,

/

QF2 sf(!

['l-A

, r s

Q HF f,f x

9, ; -

r

- _ ;;u c i n

Cl2 j

i

[ ' v 4, k"',

~?

f

"'2p

.5

. c Diesel Fuel c

Q/1 L y

~

7

\\

W

..,, 4 Gasoline i

\\ 'As Uranium-Bearing T r, r

3 ma_

h Materials i M9-W2'--- T5IM na

(

Me

/ """~"

%.N L

]r Figure 4-2 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Hazards Matrix Q. )

~

RTM. E%:pplement Portsnw.nh Gaseous Dihsion Plant (August 1997)

......m Section 10: Site Ruource information USEC Facilities 3

DOE Facilities or Areas Alw<. m.:-

APERTURE CARD l

Also Ava!!ablo on Aporture Card

' 4(

\\

!+-i r-=::;

P w >

$ 6 7,3 : / f,. $M

( $-

@ 1

~^ R i

s,-

t u;-

X

_ n n,ew a

- o

, y-i d'

.a #

5 S @p" x.7 c#-

.a~ !)mL.

)

3)OOOOOOGD D

i r

- ( a- & -.p.

\\_ y

\\

y,,-

_ - - - 3 q

'~

'* 1. _ _

$d"" k &jwdM,

~

%>5~!

R i

/

N~^

Wg//

f...I hh, w,t i M

or- %

a

,l i

MEGEnw h

m, C b --

PQ G

1 A".., M * -l C99

$,]

hE31-4 2

p

_ y'[ W Emy

,1lL=.JJ=='z_ ~ _= - - 4 = = n_1 9pr

/

a Ex l

SG97070065.1b 4-29 e-m T

1 - --

Approximate Plan Site Population Distribution Building Regular Nurnber Shift Offshift X 100 405 X 101 13

. ~

X 102 0

/

X 103 36 11 3

m

^

J,\\-

[I we e X 104 7

3 53

[K'y

,M X 105 30 1

, ' >> l,

t_

X 112 34 15

. (' ad t N s

l X-300 7

5 1

f.b 3

5 10 I',

^?~

/

h'~

f X 333 46 10

\\,

/Rm N

'T X-342 9

3

'l

,/{

X 343 3

3 X-344 50 5

P ". '"" $

/,!

i

.4

). [ _ Q Q h.

/

q,,

X 530 2

2 l

E F X 533 2

1

(

. f

> IN'P"

'Ll_ '

~

~

'~

X 540 6

~

X 600 1

4 My358 Gi X 611 1

Sanitary 1.and Fill

/

i 6.

0.7 mile to Plant Sitet/

I 11 2

X 700 28 1

/ AD l

I '",.

-- [i i'"i

\\

~ ~ ~

X-705 51 4

X 710 136 3 20 i u l

l i 1

'=a X 720 307 37 y,,,,

gh__LL.

I tb X 735 5

4 [:1

(

fj(

X 746 41 X-801 12 j

g ""- -

mmn X-750 18 f

s a

, i',

l T X-847 8

/tue

% k g.,,

i X-1000 100 2

l

~ ~ - *

• * " * ~ ~

X 1007 6

8

[*a h

~~~

X-3000 50 I.d-

%vb X 5000 1

~

y

\\%

X-6000 1

A',"y'.gi O h

'l_..ofC'.

\\'

X 7721 250 1

r X-7726 j

(DOE and Others)

M~rC 2 ---- 1------ @ -wh I

N-k~

\\

X-345 8

"%N X-751 20 (Ohio National Guard) m T

S X-760 1

X 2207E

/

\\

X-3001 5

/

a.,;='

a X 3002 5

X-3346 20 (Ohio National Guard)

X-7725 130 C-Lot 130 (Transient truck drivers near X-206E)

6. h Figure 4-7 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Population Distribution i

U-

• ~ -*'inf-96 Sum 4ement Portsmouth Gueous Di(Tusie !" ant (August 1997)

Saciton 4 0: Site Resource Wormation

/

ANSTEC APERTURE USEC Facilities

CARb, DOE Facilities or Areas

<- 6 Also Avnitnble on Build,ngs w.th Populations Aperturo card i

i i

,yg n:

y semisvis one N,1 Sg N

h g w'*"* '

m.P.,,,f;gn

!M s

g

{'

'".L j

,g,,

9

• • ~#W 3g

}

y f

p_dp4%rs-w,. e.- M, gad n,,

1 <

yo..

M(hh...A

?

I '.

• ~

y; y'"- -) %

L' a.-----4---------\\

g ---] n-- ',-_g'

...~ p f~~..'.~

- sr--

- s..~..

I' b '

ame!l

• • # I' lH

$2Q r

3_.1 c

._._.i_.

r o-e

._i g

\\ / //

AVR" i ML~} $.

t fif.)

A[.[-,w inu d

,a _;

,/

o o

g 1

Dll ~b N &

/

-- G i

j y-y l

h$ND"-k d.il M (93E5resaa=h

[

'U__['N s/

Q.L W [ {@ AW MF-h c5 r %

d*** _ _

,.. w f

i SG9707065,1cc 410 Z /oo ' 6 8 -

3 4-37

- - - - _ - _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. - -. _ -. _ - _ _.. - ~. _. - - - - _ - - _ - - - _ _

ection 4 0: Sar Rosaarco 14ematum 4

= - s'ri O

l i

' 5 t

• x sjt I,

i t

U.

p O i

{

c,

_8 r,

L: J C

E.

F J 1:

"N" T,

o l

t i

e k

I g

- - -' N o@

A I

sh T

11 he

• r k

.Q l

i 0

d prrT1-s'v'*\\

i rir 8

n

_..M.!

g

'\\,

5 4

- s a

===1

{

I i

O'-

l-e i

.a ' - J t'

m l

j i[

l a

i

=

2 4

4e )

4 3

s

/

\\

L

--J,

A J,.

,II

$4 s

J-

'f

?

a c4:

s

),,...>,;I '9.

{

IN 4-45 g o ous Diffusion Plant (Augun 199D

i

.t 2

7

!=

2

..sie O u-sas-26 l

d_

1

.-se.-s r

,i,n LU

)C:

ll ll

!l l

ll !

':l

l' i

t

e i

m m

._c, 3t-53 34 l [

s.333 O

..ygg F

9 q a.L

=

- s.

go i

i..

i hhhhth I jf j b

y has b

=g o

r

.1

+

., Hec,s-,.a a

1 y

y t

_ =

p

%.g n

s e

~'

a

.- m n i 1: :

l l-4, l: :

~

, o=: : ;..c -T NTr+T l

,Ti,Ti,'

1 I-

--w a

~

o

=

.5ul.

2 o

a k

y F

a

.E.

S Figure 4-15. Recirculotlog Cooling Water Distributies Systems (A;;"_ ^*: SAR 1996)

I j

-.2.

3 l

?

f.

W a.

2, S

E E.

{

I 33-5 33-4 g

I

-~

k

'K-105

-.____4 33 yt i

33-s ar ve W [ 33~3 i-700 J :'

d ww e

C F - --

i

X-720-1

-~~

I i

33-7 33-2 I

r i

i

---

f X-705 n r.

s K

w.

5 I

M J-l 1 l

f 6

33-8 g

V

- <g f

g F

I,<

f __

$5 h,

I !I IL5

'x-7'c!

i i

th L, s

_f' s.

/=*

55i, d' e,C PM

{,6,

1

p

-=.),,,-

a rsic

/

T Vr" k, ',

g r

e i

1,

- _{_.-ifi ?!! -

T g!,!"

.l l 1.

i i

[.r'

.e sm

<=i

,h,-e.

sm

.t o

m i

i I

I I

i l

27-1$27-2':27-3l25-1$25-2$25-$25-4!25-5 25-6 25-23-1l31-131-2,31-3[31-4 3k-5 21-2521'3 21-4 29-5:29-6

't 1

e I

I

~t 1

j i

f I

8 I

I I

I i

i i

X-326 I-330 Figure 4-16. Nitrogen Distribution Systeam (Applic. ties SAR 1996) t

= - _ - _ - _.

Sectkm 4.0: Site Resowre 1,efamarkm w w u.r-ru.av e. w.n v u.gl 4,

,w.e.. w u ara-s = -_

ur I':

.p l

1,3 I

l i

w s

(

f-s

,+<e

-a 5

t d

C b

?

E 3

.h R?

m I

5 g

( -

5.

l

.... __...... q,,8 g

4

.J.

w o.

s v.

I

-~

!g II ii

- ' I m? g4, 5 _._ 5 w ".!!!1;s

=

r.

4 d8 S

n 5,

i,..l' v

z v

s

'n!..., te n

s y

i !!!!!!

g

• u p W

s g

l_4 fg,h,{

g il t

g.3._..g g

,5

{ us.

N E-

=

5 E

w g

LE-...n,...-,

e y

i>,,

g N

g 8,

9

=

5 l

t I>="

F =.,

1 y

y E

8._

w EOt E

8 ppg vg

}

'T g- -,. - fS W

]

J i -

i')Mgk j ~18h a' T

U I

I (

$ IE s

3 E

I 8

g alG

.2 s

t If r.

i M

E h.

I b.

l

.3 g

'- 4L rt g

j

!I

,t g

2 g-F 1s

- g-y.9Cy....- y p

l q

ri.,

2 1._...,

e U

s y

E

^

5 ( 4.y.w,E) l 6

g

~

x w

2 1

w s

8g E Ne j

a o

y e

W g n' p.g glg

" p l

i 4-48 RTM. 96 Supplement Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (August 1997) 1 I

Nection to: sur Restme 1+rmarim i:!8i:

7

'i::8i:

6

!:ii:8 5

4.;>.

.i:!$i:

ff 9

, Si?! isi8 4

k::

3

!:.::8 2

A B

C D

E Prnhahmty Levels Risk High N +;_' Mediurn Y

t.ow Extrermh Low Figure 4-18. Risk / Probability Matrix (Application SAR 1996)

Note: Refer to Tables 4-5 and 4-6 for an explanation on the Hazard Levels and Probability Scale.

RTM. 96 Supplement Portsmouth Gascous Dinusion Plant (August 1997) 4-49

Section 4.0: Sao Resower Infomatio$

T "T" lT" **t*"

l l

l l

l l

I I

I I

i lI l

l 5

l l

l l

1 i

I l

i l

i I

I l

I l

I l

i I

d Downwind Distance Region 1:

A negatively buoyant mhdure of UFe, air, water, and i

UFs hydrolysi8 Products h M the W vertical momentum is "transforp# to the entrained air and water.

Region 2:

The negatively bouoyant plwne we fa5 to the ground unless the decrease in dortally resuleng from chemical reeceans and entrained air is suscient to from a buoyant plume prior to pfm touchdown Region 3:

Agroured s (ydi 4 g) plume is transported downwirvj, whis entraining air and water at a reduced rate, urds the plume becomes buoyant.

Region 4:

The buoyant plurre lifts oil from the ground uned further entrainment and UF W produces 6

an inert, neutrah buoyant plume.

Region 5:

The pluta may be W% modeled as a Gaussion plume.

Figure 4-19. Exameple of Possible Plumne Trajectory fmai a Moderate. Velocity Vertical Release of UF6 Vapor (Application SAR 1996) 4-50 RTM-96 Supplement Ponanouth Geneous Diffusion Plant (Augun 1997) i n

Section 40: Site Resource information 100

~

Solid

_ (14 7.3 *F.2 2 p sla Triple Point

...N..

• 10

.. ~.

g l

50 100 150 200 250 300 Tempwature ('F)

Figure 4-20. UF. Phase Diagram (Application SAR 1996)

RTAI-M Supplement Portsmouth Gascous Di&sion Plant (August 1997) 4-51

. - ~.

Section 8.0: Puttune GDP Haurdr in Perspectinfor Onsise Workers andthe Public De6nitions of ERPGs 1,2, and 3 follow, a

• ERPG-1 is the madmum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all

+

individuals could be exposed for up to I h without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objactionable odor.

• ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is belk al that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to I h without experiencing or d uVng irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair an individcJ. ability to take protective action.

• ERPG-3 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to I h without experiencing or developing life-thr=*-alag health effects.

8.4 Radiological Effects from Uranium Istake Health effects from an intake of radioactive material is projected by evaluating the acute and long-term total effective dose equivalent (TEDE). The CEDE is the sum of the 50-year cumulative effective dose equivalent (CEDE) due to an intake from the passing plume. The external dose contribution to the total dose from a uranium intake is insignificant and can be ignored.' The threshold for short-term efrects is 50 rem. There is no threshold for long-term effects, which primarily is cancer. Higher doses result in a greater probability of contracting cancer orlife shortening.

An intake of uranium results in a chronic dose because ofits low specific activity. Uranium deposits in the body (primarily the bones) where it slowly delivers a dose to the whole body.

The risk to the kidneys from exposure to uranium outweighs the risk from a deposition of uranium and resulting radiation dose (Fisher et al.1992; McGuire 1988). Indeed, lethal a===es as a result of uranium chemical toxicity would not result in a radiation dose exceeding I tem effective dose equivalent (McGuire 1988).

8.5 Rs.diation Doses Figure 8-1, page 8-5 displays the effective dose equivalent associated with various activities, thresholds, and standards. Effective dose equivalents in the 0.1 mrem to 800,000 mrem (800 rem) range are included. Notes and sources for Fyure 8-1, page 8-5, follow the figure.

- Information on the average background radiation exposures to the public, aci='~i annual doses to the maximally exposed member of the public, and maximum annual dose for gaseous diffusion plant workers also are included on Figure 8-1.

RN-96 Supplanant Portanouth Gessous Dtfrusion Plant (Ausust 1997)

T

section 8 0: Putting GDP &w6 in Penpectivefx Onsite KMen and the Pdlic 8.6 Radiation Releases Radioactivity (in curies) released during an average year of operation at Paducah is compared to releases during several past accidents at facilities handling UF..

Table 8-1. Radiation Releases in Perspective Amount of Uranium Released Release (Ibs)

Ann tal gaseous diffusion plant routine release (airbome 64(4 pathway)

UF; / hot metal reaction at C-315 (1/3/78) 30*)

Exothermic reaction at C-337 (12/12/62) 3,400*)

Hydraulic rupture of UF. cylinder (11/60) 6,800*)

Coupling failure in C-337 (12/1/93)

< 2*)

(a) 1995 National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutant (NESHAP) Annual Report for Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, June 25,1996.

(b) Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Safety Analysis Report, Rev.1 (9/15/95),

Section 4.1.

8-4 RTM-96 Supplernent Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (August 1997)

__ _ _ _ _ _ -