ML20210T479

Summary of 870122 Meeting W/Util & Signals & Safeguards,Inc Re long-term Resolution W/Static O-Ring,Inc Switches as Result of Studies.List of Attendees & Viewgraphs Encl

ML20210T479
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	02/04/1987
From:	Bournia A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8702180194
Download: ML20210T479 (31)

Text

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, 4 Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

-LICENSEE: Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

> FACILITIES: La Salle County Station, Units 1 and 2

SUBJECT:

SUMARY OF MEETING ON JANUARY 22, 1987 ,

The NRC held a meeting with Ceco and:its consultant, Signals & Safeguards, Inc.,

to discuss Ceco's long term resolution with Static-0-Ring Inc. (SOR) switches

as a result of its studies of these switches. A list of attendees is provided

!- in Enclosure 1 and copies of the vu graphs used by CECO and its consultant-F during the meeting are presented in Enclosure 2.

In .its presentat. ion, Ceco indicated that as a result of their investigation _all water level switches will be replaced.with an analog trip system to improve plant availability. The remaining SOR switches which measure delta pressure in line i breaks and minimum flow in emergency core cooling systems will remain installed-

) under a revised surveillance program. This revised surveillance consists of ,

j calibration intervals which will depend on the switches' performance but will j not exceed three months. These remaining switches are divided into 16' groups

. which are based on function, location and procedures. If a switch exceeds its action limit in a group, that group of switches will have its calibration _ inter-i val reduced by one month. If a switch exceeds its action limit for two consec-

- utive calibrations, it will be scheduled for, replacement within 14 days. If any_

switch exceeds its reject limit, the associated channel shall be declared inoper-

, able until it is replaced. This switch will be disassembled and inspected, and-the inspection results will be sent to the NRC. For the water level switches

!.- which will be replaced, the licensee indicated its schedule for replacing these switches, and until they are replaced will be on a monthly calibration interval.

The licensee is projecting the engineering time for these analog trip systems and the time for obtaining the instruments are approximately 15 months for reactor protection system (RPS) instrumentation and about 30 months for engineering safety feature (ESF) and the reactor core isolation cooling instrumentation. The pro-  !

jected schedule for incorporating these_ instruments into the design is as follows

1. Unit 2 RPS-Second Refuel (Projected for July 1988)

2. Unit 1 RPS-Third Refuel (Projected for March 1989)

3. Unit 2 ESF-Third Refuel (Projected for February 1990) l 4. Unit 1 ESF-Fourth Refuel (Projected for December 1990)

! The licensee also indicated its justification for continued operation with SOR i switches by showing some of its performance results to date, results of the detailed investigation performed by it and the vendor, plus its finding with- 1 respect to diaphragm failure. The latter problem was indicated to be caused by i

accidentally introducing foreign particles into the switch body which caused the diaphragm failures. This problem is being looked into further, and the licensee 8702180194 870204 jD ADOCK 05000373 PDR ,

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La Salle County Nuclear Power Station iMr. Dennis L. Farrar Comonwealth Edison Company Units.1 & 2:

cc:

Philip P. Steptoe, Esquire . John W. McCaffrey Suite 4200 Chief, Public Utilities Division-One First' National Plaza 160 North La Salle Street,_ Room'900 Chicago, Illinois 60601

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Chicago, Illinois 60603 Assistant Attorney General 188 West Randolph Street Suite.2315 Chicago,-Illinois 60601 Resident Inspector /LaSalle, NPS' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission .

Rural Route No. 1 P. O. Box 224 Marseilles, Illinois 61341 Chairman La Salle County Board of. Supervisors La Salle County Courthouse Ottawa, Illinois 61350 Attorney General 500 South 2nd Street Springfield, Illinois 62701 Chairman Illinois Comerce Comission Leland Building 527 East Capitol Avenue Springfield, Illinois 62706 Mr. Gary N. Wright, Manager Nuclear Facility Safety Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety 1035 Outer Park Drive, 5th Floor Springfield, Illinois 62704 Regional Administrator, Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 799 Rossevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

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indicated that these diaphragm failures are random events and easily detected by the monthly functions.

. Finally, the licensee requested the NRC approval of its Long Term Action Plan as described in its submittals of December 22, 1986 and January 15,'1987 prior

, to startup following the current Unit 2 refueling outage scheduled to be com :

< pleted by May,1987. The NRC staff indicated that it should be completed with its review within a month of the meeting date, t

/S/

Anthony Bournia, Project Manager BWR Project Directorate No. 3 Division of BWR Licensing

Enclosure:

As Stated cc: See next page 1

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BWD-3: DBL 20: D DBL ABournia/vag E am 02/04/87 0 /87

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ENCLOSURE 1 MEETING ATTENDEES NAME AFFILIATION

' Anthony Bournia ~NRC/ DBL /PD-3 Raymond G. Ramirez 'NRC/ DBL /EICSB Wayne Hodges NRC/ DBL /RSB E. C. Marinos NRC/ DBL /EICSB R. Wayne Houston NRC/ DBL Kenneth L Graesser Div. VP NSD. Ceco John Knox NRC/ DBL /EICSB Chuck Allen La Salle Licensee Admin. CECO i Martin G. Santic la Salle Station Master IM David L Rahn Signals & Safeguards,- Inc.

E. G. Adensam NRC/ DBL /BWD-3 Geoffrey C. Wright NRC-Region-III Jim Abel Commonwealth Edison-SNE Ed Seckinger Commonwealth Edison-SNE G. Lainas -NRC/ DBL Mike Turbak Ceco-Operating Plant Licen. Dir Raam Gaitonde Sup. Staff Engr (SMAD) Ceco R. D. Bishop . Serv. Supt. La Salle Station Everett Spitzner Super. of Inst. Maint (CECO Charles W111 banks NUS Corp.

Cordell Reed Comm Edison VP-NUC. Oper.

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ENCLOSURE 2 I

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o SORMEETINGAGENDA January 22,1987 Tosc Presenter

1. Introduction JimAbel i

2. Summary JimAbel

3. Long Term Action Plan EdSeckinger 4

4. Justification for Continued Operation DaveRahn

5. Conclusion Ji,Abel I

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INTRODUCTION A.-SORDPSwitchPerformanceEvaluation

l. Since the restart of Unit 2, the SOR DP switches have beenperformingsatisfactorilyatthenewsetpointsand calibrationfrequency.

e Only one switch has failed.

. 1 Only three switches have exceeded the action limit.

2. The new setponts.have been verified by system performancetests.

B. Evaluation of Alternative Level Sensing Devices

1. The reactor water level switches will be replaced with ananalogtripsystemtoimproveplantavailability. ,

2. The remaining SOR DP switches (line break and ECCS minimumflow)willremaininstalledundertherevised

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surveillanceprogram.

3. Overly conservative Technical Specifications will be revised.

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Summary LONGTERMACTIONPLAN J

A. Plant Modifications e Replace all SOR and Barton level switches with an Analog -

TripSystembeginningwiththeUnit2.secondrefueling outageandfinishingwiththeUnit1fourthrefueling outage.

B. Surveillance. Requirements e All SOR DP switches will be calibrated or functionally testedeachmonth, e Level 3 switches will be calibrated monthly.

8 RemainingSORDPswitcheswillbecalibratedquarterly, andthesurveillancefrequencywillbeincreasedifthe setpointexceedsthe'actionlimit.

• Switches that exceed the reject limit will be disassembledandinspected. ,

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Summary LONGTERMACTIONPLAN C..TechnicalSpecificationChanges s Tech. Spec. changes will be requested for three applicationsbecausetheexistinglimitsareoverly conservative.

These revisions will improve ~ plant-reliability,

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e operabilityandsafetybyreducingunnecessarychallenges

, tosafetysystems. .

D SOR Switch Design and Fabrication Changes ,

e Since June 1, 1986,.S0R has improved the design of th~e

. switchandincreasedQCinspectionsduringassembly, e SOR is currently investigating ~ potential switch improvements, e SOR is evaluating additional changes in the manufacturing process.

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. SUMARY JUSTIFICATIONFORCONTINUEDOPERATION WITHSORDPSWITCHES

1. Since Unit 2 startup the switches have been performing

. satisfactorily. Only 3 out of 117 switches have exceeded the actionlimit,andonlyoneswitch'hasfailed.

2. SOR long term test program and calibration data show that driftisnotaproblemandverifiestheadequacyof.thenew calibrationintervals. ,

3. System performance tests have verified the adequacy of the newsetpoints.

4. Failures are easily detected with the existing surveillance  :

tests.

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5. The increase in the calibration frequency from refuel to quarterlyinsurestheearlydetectionofundesirable performance.

6. Operating and maintenance personnel have'a better I

understandingofswitchbehavior.

7. Rusty bearings are not a common mode problem. Corroded bearingshavebeenfoundinonly1outof18 switches disassembledandinspected.

8; Switch diaphragm failures are random events and easily detectedbythemonthlyfunctionaltests.

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LONGTERMACTIONPLAN A. Design Changes

1. Replace all SOR and Barton reactor water level switches withananalogtripsystem l 8 ToreduceinadvertantscramsandESFactuationsby increasingoperatingmargins.anddecreasing  :

instrumentvalveoperationsduringsurveillancetests, t

2. Complete Work Per Following Schedule:

• Unit 2RPS-SecondRefuel(July,1988) e Unit 1 RPS - Third Refuel.(March, 1989)

• Unit 2 ESF - Third Refuel (February, 1990) e Unit 1 ESF - Fourth Refuel (December, 1990)

3. During the next refueling outage on each unit, the input -

tothelevelinstrumentationchannelsthatinitiate closureoftheMSIV'swillbechangedfromSORDP L -

switchestoanalogtripsystemaspartoftheATWS modifications.TheSOR-switchesthatperformthis '

functionwillstillbeneededintheinterimtoinitiate closureofothercontainmentisolationvalves.

4. The remaining SOR DP Switches (36) will notLbe replaced

• Sufficient-margin exists between current operating limitsandtripsetpoints q e Plant availability would not improve because l inadvertantscramsorESFactuationsarenotlikely I tooccurduringtesting.

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• LONGTERMACTIONPLAN B. SOR DP Switch Surveillance Requirements

1. Each SOR DP switch will either be calibrated or functionallytestedeverymonth,

2. Level 3 switches will be calibrated monthly

.3. Calibration interval for remaining switches to depend on

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performancebutnottoexceedthreemonths.

• Switches are divided into 16 groups based on function, location,andprocedures.

s If a switch exceeds action limit, calibration intervalfor.groupwillbereducedbyonemonth I

4. If switch exceeds action limit during two consecutive calibrations,itwillbescheduledforreplacement within14 days.

5. If switch exceeds reject limit, the associated

. instrumentchannelshallbedeclaredinoperableuntilit isreplaced.  ;

6. If switch exceeds reject limit, it will be disassembled and inspected. The inspection results will be sent to theNRC.

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LONGTERMACTIONPLAN C. Technical Specification Changes

1. Tech, spec. changes are being considered for. level 3, level 8,andMSLhighflowapplications.

e GE analysis shows existing allowable values and trip setpointsareunnecessarilyconservativewithrespect toactualsafetylimits, e These changes will' increase plant reliability, operability,and-safetybyreducingunnecessary challengestosafetysystemsandimprovingthe allocationof-stationresourcesandmanpower.

2. Revising the level 3 and 8 Tech. Spec. setpoints will increaseoperatingmarginwithrespecttonormalwater i level.

3. Revising the-main steam line high flow setpoint will allowtheplanttooperateatfullpower. -

e With the current setpoints, operation of the units hasbeenadministrativelylimitedat90%to96%of l fullpower.

! e The analytical limit can~be increased from 123 to 178 psidwithoutincreasingtheconsequencesofamain l

steamlinebreak, i

4. When Tech. Spec. changes are requested e Justification for changing analytical limit will be provided, i 8 Calculationstoverifyadequacyofnewallowableand setpointvalueswillbesubmitted.

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LONGTERMACTIONPLAN 1

D. SOR Switch Design and Fabrication Changes

1. Since June 1, 1986,LSOR has made the following improvementsinthe. design.andassemblyoftheswitch:

( Polished cross shafts (reducesfirsttosecondcycle. shift)

• Inspection of all adjusting screws for burrs

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2. SOR is testing potential switch. improvements such as a thickerKaptondiaphragmanda0.0024inchthick stainlesssteeldiaphragm.-

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3. SOR is reviewing the manufacturing process for reducing potentialcontamination.

4. CECO is also reviewing the method that the switches are handledatthestationforpreventingpotential contamination.

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! JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION WITH SOR DP SWITCHES PERFORMANCE RESULTS TO DATE -

DETAILED INSPECTION RESULTS i .

DIAPHRAGM FAILURE INVESTIGATION AND

, IMPLICATIONS 4

122&7-00

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION WITH SOR DP SWITCHES SETPOINTS APPROPRIATE FOR EACH SERVICE

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Cal. data since restart verifies that use of action / reject limits which are based on repeatability and drift are adequate for maintaining safety margins Excessive switch setpoint drift over- '

time is not a problem

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Setpoints based on static shift, repeatability, and drift allow switches to perform within technical specification allowable limits Safety performance has been demonstrated by system operational tests "

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JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION WITH SOR DP SWITCHES 3

] LOW INCIDENCE OF TROUBLESOME SWITCHES Since restart, only 3 of 117 switches '

. have been rejected for any reason:

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2B21-NO38A -- Exceeded reject limit by 1.8' W.C. during

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cal. surveillance t

2B21-NO38 A -- Performed beyond Replacement expected range on Level .

Drop Test, but met the 3 tech. spec. limit 2E31-N013BB -- Would not maintain dp during functional test

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Subsequent tests on 2B21-NO387 and its

. replacement showed them to haw acceptable static shift and repeatability behavior. Inspection of both switches revealed only a burr on one adjusting screw.

The tubing of the instrument rack where the two 2B21-NO38A switches were I installed will be tested for leakage and/or blockage, per station procedure LST-87-010 1

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JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION WITH SOR DP SWITCHES l

LOW INCIDENCE OF TROUBLESOME SWITCHES '

(continued)

Failures such as 2E31-N013BB are readily detectable on either the monthly functional or quarterly calibration-

- surveillances The diaphragm failure of 2E31-N013BB is the fourth such failure in 171 switch-years of service, representing a diaphragm failure rate of 2.7 X 10E-6 failures per switch operating hour.

This compares favorably with failure rates of other manufacturer's d.p.

devices. Analysis of diaphragm failure is ongoing.

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To date, leak testing and detailed L inspections after disassembly have found no indications that a common mode failure mechanism resulting in rusted bearings exists Instrument maintenance and operating l personnel have been briefed on what to expect from the behavior of dp switches and systems actuated by dp switches. l l

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CALIBRATION DATA

SUMMARY

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l Reactor Water Level 3-Reject Limits: +/- 2.9' W.C.  !

Has been exceeded by +1.8" W.C. by only 1 l one switch on a 2-month calibration l interval (2B21- NO38A).

All other cal data from both units indicate values of +/-2.5" W.C. or less over a 2-month interval.

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(Average of all 12 Level 3 switches on both units over a 1-month calibration interval is +0.4" W.C.) Calibration interval was revised to monthly.

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Reactor Water Level 2 Reject Limits: +/- 8.6' W.C.

Worst-case Sw. Perform.: + 4.5" W.C.

Longest Survell. Interv: 3-months .

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Reactor Water Level 1 Reject Limits: +/- 10.2' W.C.

Worst-case Sw. Perform.: + 1.4" W.C.

Longest Surveil. Interv: 3-months i

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Reactor Water Level 8 Reject Limits: +/- 2.2" W.C. I Worst-case performance: - 0.2" W.C.

Longest Survell. Interv: 3-months 1

12257-04

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CALIBRATION DATA

SUMMARY

(Continued)

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Main Steam Line Break Detection Smallest Reject Limits: +/- 10.4 PSID Worst-case Sw. Perform.: + 10.3 ' PSlQ Longest Surveil. Interval: 3-months RHR/RCIC Steam Line Break Detection Reject Limits: +/- 8.6* W.C.

. Worst-case Sw. Perform.: + 4.3" W.C.

Longest Surveil. Interval: 2-months l RCIC Steam Line Break Detection Reject Limits: +/- 10.6* W.C.

Worst-case Sw. Perform.: + 5.9' W.C.

Longest Survell. Interval: 2-months RHR Shutdown Coc ina Line Break Reject Limits: +/- 9.6' W.C.

Worst-case Sw. Perform.: - 4.0" W.C.

Longest Surveil. Interval: 3-months

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ECCS Min! mum Flow Valve Control Smallest Reject Limits: +/- 2.4* W.C.

Worst-case Sw. Perform.: - 1.8' W.C.

Longest Survell. Interval: 3-months 12957 03

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1 VERIFICATION OF CALIBRATION INTERVALS L

SOR, Inc. Long Term test data indicates that the average drift rate of Model 103-B212 switches is approximately 1.5" - 1.6" W.C. for the first- three months, thereafter drift rate decreases

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Calibration data for Reactor Level 3 switches was used in conjunction with the SOR, Inc. Long Term test data to .

I establish a calibration interval of once per month o Calibration data for the remaining switches was examined and found to confirm that the drift allowable values used in establishing the setpoints was consistent with a quarterly calibration surveillance schedule

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f TABLE I Evaluation Summary of-SOR, Inc. Long Term Test Data -

Estimate

• of Three-Month (13-week) Drift Values Values in " W.C.

Category Quantity Mean Greatest Least Sample Std. >

of Swtchs Drift Drift Drift Deviation I. Cycling Frequency Daily 5 1.22 1.57 0.67 0.33 2-week 5 1.76 2.47 1.33 0.42 4-week 5 1.78 2.27 1.10 0.42 l 6-week- 5 1.41 1.70 1.17 0.23 II. " Improved Design" non-polished 4 1.58 1.87 1.17 0.30 cross shaft polished 16 1.53 2.47 0.67 0.44 cross shaft = -

III. All 20 1.54 2.47 0.67 0.41 Switches 18 of-the 20 switches are within 2 sample.std. deviations of the mean of 1.54" W.C. for all switches (0.72 2.36" W. C.) )

All 20 switches are within 3 sample std. deviations of the mean of 1.54" W.C. for all switches (0.31 --2.77" W.C.)

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• The 13-week estimate was made by. interpolating linearly between the data points for 11-weeks and 17-weeks on SOR's long term test data sheets.

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i SOR, INC. DETAILED INSPECTIONS l To date, a total of 17 SOR Model 103 differential pressure switches have been disassembled and inspected at SOR, Inc.:

2B21-NO38B, found in June 1986, to have failed its functional surveillance

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Three of the four Model 103-B212 switcnes that had exceeded the screening criteria for static shift during the Unit 2 setpoint characterization test program I Eight Model 103-B212 and 103-B203 switches that had exceeded the screening criteria for static shift and repeatability during the Unit 1 setpoint characterization test program 2B21-NO38A, found in November 1986, to have' exceeded the reject limit during a calibration surveillance

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Three switches that had exhibited inability to maintain differential pressure during functbnal testing Replacement for 2B21-NO38A, which performed beyond its expected range during a Reactor Water Level Drop Test 1

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SOR, INC. INSPECTION FINDINGS L

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Of the 17 switches inspected at SOR:

1 1 switch (2B21-NO388) exhibited corrosion in one roller bearing, impairing switch's ability to perform

- 3 switches (1E12-N010CA,1E12-N010CB, I and 1E31-N013BB), which would not

. maintain dp during functional tests, exhibited punctures or tears of their diaphragms A number of switches with burrs on their adjusting screws were noted. Also, some switches were observed to have brownish rust deposits (apparently originating from the process) on their wetted parts Detalle6 examination of the remaining 13 switches was conducted to-determine if a common mode failure potential exists for the development of rusted bearings.

No evidence of a leakage path from the process (wetted) portion of the switch to the bearing (non-wetted) portion was found to exist.

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DIAPHRAGM FAILURE INVESTIGATION

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12/09/86 -- Switch 2E31-N013BB failed monthly functional test due to inability to maintain differential pressure. Subsequent disassembly and inspection revealed that the cause of the failure was the development of holes / tears in the diaphragm.

Four such failures (where a switch would not maintain dp during a surveillance) have occurred since the first SOR switch installation in March,1985

= investigation was begun to inspect and analyze the-diaphragms of the failed switches, determine the failure rate due to this cause, and evaluate the potential for future similar failures.

- - The CECO System Materials Analysis Department (SMAD) was asked to assist in the investigation 12287-09

DIAPHRAGM FAILURE INVESTIGATION CECO-SMAD Investiaation l

A total of 20 diaphragms were inspected l

i at SMAD:

4 diaphragms from switches that failed

. functional tests (wouldn't maintain dp)

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14 diaphragms from switches that were

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removed from service or not'placed into service for various other reasons (e.g.

did not meet static shift or repeatability screening criteria)

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1 Diaphragm of a new switch from LaSalle storeroom

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1 Diaphragm from a switch th_at had been pressure-tested at SOR, Inc. to destruction (required about 2000 psig to

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DIAPHRAGM FAILURE INVESTIGATION CECO-SMAD Investiaation Results:

l The 4 diaphragms from switches that had failed functional testing all had perforations (punctures and/or tears) in the working (wetted) portion

- Of the 14 diaphragms from switches that had been rejected or not placed into service for various other reasons,13 did not have any perforations and 1 diaphragm revealed a puncture. This puncture could have been caused during handling of the diaphragm

- The diaphragms of the failed switches had metallic and non-metallic particles

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deposited on or imbedded in their surfaces -

- The diaphragm of the new switch from the  !

LaSalle storeroom had non-metallic particles imbedded in its surface

- The size and shape of the rupture tear .1 of the diaphragm that had been pressure-tested to destruction was much I different in appearance than the punctures / tears of the diaphragms of switches that had failed in service 12287-18

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I-DIAPHRAGM FAILURE INVESTIGATION The source of'the metallic and non-metallic particles has not yet been determined SOR dp switch NPRDS-LaSalle reported diaphragm failure rate found to be 2.7 X 10E-6 failures per switch operating hour--comparable to or smaller than-failure rates of other dp devices Failure occurrence not found to be l time-related or function-related l

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171 switch years of service, coupled with the numerous environmental qualification and pressure tests performed on the Kapton diaphragm material has shown it to be suitable for this application l

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lt is concluded that diaphragm failures are random in occurrence and appear to be associated with the presence of foreign debris in the switch body. ,

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Failures of this type are easily detected in calibration and functional test surveillances 12287-11 I

l DIAPHRAGM FAILURE IMPLICATIONS  :

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36 SOR dp switches are scheduled to be '

kept in service in each unit at LaSalle for the long term. Of these,16 are main steam line break detection

( Model 102 series) switches, which are not susceptible to diaphragm failures, since they make use of steel pistons rather than diaphragms

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The method of handling switches at LaSalle prior to installation is being evaluated to determine if the potential exists for accidental introduction of foreign particles into the switch body SOR, Inc. is investigating assembly '

methods and alternative diaphragm .,

designs, such as thicker Kapton material or thin metallic materials i

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l CONCLUSION a

e TheSORDPswitcheswillreliablyperformtheirsafetyfunction atthenewsetpointsandcalibrationfrequency, e ContinuedoperationofLaSallewithSORDPswitchesisjustified.

i e Thereactorwaterlevelswitcheswillbereplacedtoimprove

. plantavailability.

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e .NP.CapprovalofLongTermActionPlanasdescribedinour submittalsof12/22/86and1/15/87isrequestedpriortostartup followingthecurrentUnit2refuelingoutage.

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'.. . s February 4, 1987

. - . s MEETING

SUMMARY

DISTRIBUTION C NRC OM PDR E 56sN3/^374.

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Local PDR BWD #3 r/f J. Partlow E. Adensam Attorney, 0GC E. Jordan B. Grimes ACRS (10)

Project Manager A. Bournia E. Hylton NRC PARTICIPANTS inthony Bournia Raymond G. Ramirez Wayne Hodges E. C. Marinos -

R. Wayne Houston John Knox E. G. Adensam Geoffrey C. Wright G. Lainas K. R. Naidu bec: Applicant & Service List