ML20210S962

Forwards Electrical Instrumentation & Control Sys Branch First Set of Questions for Transmittal to Util.Questions Result of Evaluation of Info Presented in Psar.Significant Areas Requiring Addl Info Listed

ML20210S962
Person / Time
Site:	Satsop
Issue date:	10/16/1974
From:	Stello V US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
CON-WNP-1716 NUDOCS 8605290539
Download: ML20210S962 (11)

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I OCT 161974

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Docket Nos. 50-508 50-509 J.

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' T Plant Name:. WPPSS Nuclear Projects Nos. 3 and 5

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l Responsible Branch and Project Manager: LWR l-3, P. O'Reilly l

I Technical Review Branch Involved: Electrical, Instrweentation and L'

Control Systems Branch

' Applicant's Response Date Necessary for Completion of Next Action Planned on Project: November 29, 1974 l

Naquestal Completion Date: October 4,1974

, l Description of Response:

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First Round Questions 1~'

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The enclosed list of questions was prepared by the L:RS. Electrical,

. Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch for transnittal to the

,. _......~ applicaat. These questions resulted from one evaluation of the information presented in the PSAR and are based an applicable IEEE

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Standards, Regulatory Guides. Technical Positions and compliance with those sections of 10 CFR 50 relevant to the Branch's responsibility.

. Our review took cognizance of the material included from CESSAR (which j

is presently under review and prMeats a moving target) and was

,s m-l limited to those systans and equipment ehich were within the ap-plicant's scope of supply and which interfaced with Combustion Engi-neering NSSS Standard Design (CESSAR) requirements.

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Significant areas where additional information is requested include 9

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Conformance to applicable IEEE Standards and AEC Regulatory i

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The design of safety-related equipment to Seismic Category I design criteria.

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Compliance to CESSAR interface requirements.

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The resolution of inconsistencies which are contained I

in the PSAR.

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"First. Set of Questions

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h ENCLOSURE

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WPPSS UNITS 3 AND 5 NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS FIRST SET OF -QUESTIONS s

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3 222.d ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS 222.1 Section 3.1.9 of the PSAR indicates that one usage of the

( 3.1.9) in-core instrumentation will be to provide a means for calibra-( 7.7.1.1) tion of the ex-core flux detectors.

Describe the calioration of the excore flux detectors by using the in-core instrumenta-tion.

This description should also address any safety related aspects relating to the ex-core flux detectors as a result of their calibration by this method..

222.2 (RSP)

Verify that Figure 3.2-1 and related Figures identify all j

(Figure points of interface between the Reactor Coolant System and j

3.2-1) systems whose design pressure is less ~ than the design pressure of the Reactor Coolant System.

For each such interface identified on these figures (or others which have not been identified on these figures) discuss the degree of conformance with the Regulatory staff positions stated below.

Exclude the shutdown cooling system suction lines alr.eady discussed.in Section 7.6 of the PSAR.

(1) At least two. valves in series shall be provided to isolate any subsystem whenever the primary system pressure is above the pressure rating of the sub-system.

(2)

For systems where both valves are motor operated, the-valves shall have independent ~and diverse interlocks a

to prevent the valv.es from being accidentally opened unless the primary system pressure is below the sub-system design pressure.

(3)

For those systems where both valves are motor operated, the valves shall also receive a signal to automatically close whenever the primary system pressure exceeds the subsystem design pressure.

1 (4)

For those systems where one check valve and one motor l

operated valve are provided, the motor operated valve shall be interlocked to prevent valve opening whenever the primary pressure is above the subsystem design l

pressure, and to automatically close whenever the primary system pre,ssure exceeds the subsystem design pressures.

(5)

For those systems which are required for ECCS operation, the above requirements (1,4) are not mandatory and the I

systems will be evaluated on an individual case basis.

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l (6) Suitable valve position indication should be provided in the control room for these valves.

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..t 222.3 It is not apparent from the information presented in Section '

( 3.10.2.2) 3.10.2.2 of the PSAR whether the qualification and documentation procedures used for Catetory I equipment and systems (i.e.,

equipment and systems supplied by suppliers other than Combus-tion Engineering) will be in accordance.with the requirements of l

IEEE Std 323-1974, "IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equip-ment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations". Therefore, verify full compliance with all requirements this standard or identify and justify any exceptions which are to be--taken.

l 222.4(RSP)

Section 3.11 indicates that several industrial standards will be (3.11) used as a basis for the environmental qualification of Class IE i

. Electrical Equipment.

The industrial standards indicated appear to be outdated and incomplete. We require compliance with IEEE Std 317-1972 "IEEE Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in l

Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations",

IEEE Std 323-1974 "IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equip-ment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations", IEEE Std 382-1972 l

"IEEE Trial-Use Guide for Type Tests of Class I Electric Valve l

Operators for Nuclear Power Generating Stations", and IEEE Std i

383-1974 "IEEE Standard Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables, i

Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating

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Stations".

Identify and justify any exceptions to the requirements of these standards.

222.5 Identify all safety-related equipment and components listed in

( 3.11.1)

Table 3.11-1 which are qualified by operating experience.

Your (3.11.2) response should include the basis for establishing the adequacy of operation experience in qualifying each piece of equipment.

222.6 Sections 6.2.2.2 and 6.3.2.20 indicates that the transfer of

( 6.2.2.2) suction for the containment spray pumps and the high pressure (6.3.2.20) safety injection pumps from the refueling water tank to the containment sump will be accomplished automatically following a recirculation actuation signal.

However, both of the above sections and Figure 3.2-6 indicate that the valves at the" outlet of the refueling water tank are to be closed manually.

In this re' gard, provide a discussion of the performance of the containment spray pumps and the high. pressure safety. injection pumps assuming that the operator does not close the valves at the outlet of the refueling l

water tank.

222.7 Section 7.1 12b of the PSAR which is entitled "Non-CE Supplied (7.1.2.12)

Equipment" provides clarifications for certain sections of Reg-ulatory Guide 1.75.

The clarification presented relating to i

Section 3.8 of this Regulatory Goide has not been accompanied l

by the identification or description of plant areas or electrical l

systems to which it applies.

In this regard, provide the following additional information.

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(1)

Identify and describe the plant area (s) and location (s) in electrical system (s) for which the stated clarification applies.

(2)

Provide supporting information (i.e!, drawings, figures 4

diagrams, etc.) in sufficient detail to enable our evaluation 3

of your stated conclusion that this clarification is a valid interpretation of this guide. _

2 (SP) 2 5I It is not apparent from the information presented in Sections f7.3.1.3) 6.2.5 and 7.3.1.3 relating to the Combustible Gas Control System whether this system is designed to seismic Category I design criteria.

The staff requires tha't this system, includina the hydrocen analyzers and recording instrumentation be designed to Category I seismic standards.

(The recorder should be qualified to function following, not necessarily during, a seismic event.)

Verify that your design is qualified in accordance with the above criteria, or modify your design to comply with the staff's requirement.

222.9 Provide the following additional information with regard to

{7.3.2.4) testability of the protection systems.

(1) Explicitly, identify all containment isolation valves which are not tested during normal reactor operation but will be tested during scheduled reactor shutdown.

(As indicated in Section 7.3.2.4.lj of the PSAR.)

(2)

Verify that the above protection system (i.e., Containment.

Isolation System) is the only safety system which contains equipment or components that are not tested during normal reactor operation or supplement your response to include any other system (s) that is (are) applicable.

(3)

For each of the protection system (s) identified in the response to Item (2) above, provide a discussion of how the system complies with the recommendations of Section D of Regulatory Guide 1.22.

222.10 Provide a discussion as to how the instrumentation and controls (6.4) provided for the control room habitability system meets the

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recomendations contained in Position 14 of Regulatory Guide 1.78.

222.11 (RSP)

CESSAR Section 7.1.2.7 states, "The response time test (Section (7.1.2.7) 4.1 of IEEE Std 338-1971) is checked during preoperational testing and as scheduled by the applicant in his Technical Specifications."

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The Technical Specifications do not address the response time (7.1.2.7) testing of the Reactor Protection System or the Engineered.

l Safety Features Systems (excluding the Main Steam Isolation.

System). The Staff's position requires that a test program to periodically test Reactor Protection and Engineered Safety Features Systems resp 6nse times front sensor to final actuator be provided.

Describe the features of your design which

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Identify and j

justify any exceptions.

j 1222.12 Resolve the following inconsistencies:

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(8.3.2.1)

(1) Section 7.3.1.4.4 states' that the annunciator (for an Emergency Core Cooling System Area Fan Cooler) will be arranged to sound an alann whenever the air circulation fan is commanded to run and the air flow is low. However, Figure 7.3-9b indicates that the annunciator will sound an alann whenever the air circulation. fan is commanded not to run and the air l

flow is low.

(2) Section 8.3.2.1.4 of the PSAR indicates' that the battery chargers SA1, SA2, SBl and SB2 will be rated 100 amperes output each and the battery chargers SC and SD will be rated 75 amperes output each.

However, Figure 8.1-2 indicates that battery chargers sal, SA2, SB1, SB2 and battery chargers SC, SD will be rated 75 and 50 amperes output respectively.

222.13 (RSP)

, Supplement or where appropriate revise the information in 6.0) (7.1 Sections 6.0, 7.1, 7.3.2.4 and 8.1.4.2 with regard to'.the 7.3.2.4) )

i referenced IEEE Standards to address the following:

8.1.4.2)

(1) The references to various IEEE Standards throughout Sections 6.0, 7.1.2 and 7.3.2.4 often do not carry the issue date of the appropriate document being used.,

Provide this information for all such cases.

(2)

IEEE Std 323-1971 is referenced in Table 7.1-1 other subsections of Section 7.0 and Section 8.1.4.2k.

This standard has been revised and reissued as IEEE Std 323-1974. The staff's position requires that your designs satisfy the requirements of this document.

Provide a discussion showing how the design conforms to the requirements of the latter document.

Identify and justify all exceptions.

222.14 Section 7.3.2.6.1x states that the standby power system (7.3.1.4) controls will automatically separate each ESF.(Engineered (7.3.2.6)

Safety Features) bus from the preferred power supply when the associated EFF busCvoltage as measured by two out of two

. voltage relays drops below 70 percent for.5 seconds.

Using this stated information in conjunction with the indicated l

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222.14 information presented in Section 7.3.1.4.2.2 (This section (7.3.1.4) indicates that one permissive condition for the diesel i

(7.3.2.6) denerator circuit breaker to close automatically, is that, i

its respective ESF normal power supply bus tie breaker be tripped.) provide a description of how the' design of these systems meet the testability requirements of General Design

.j Criterion 18.

Identify and justify any exceptions.

.I 222.15 Section.7.4.2.4a states that the loss of instrument air will

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( 7.4.2.4) not degrade the instrumentation and control systems required for shutdown of the plant. Verify the validity of this state-ment wih regard to the air-operated valves (SI-657 and SI-658) located in the discharge line of the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. As indicated in Figure 6.3-1A, these valves will fail closed upon loss of their air supply, thus pre-cluding the removal of decay heat from the reactor.

State whether or not these valves require air pressure to hold them open, and if they do, describe the design modifications or alternate methods proposed to assure that the shutdown cooling system is capable of performing its. intended function, assuming a single failure.

.~222.16 With regard to the onsite power system safety design bases (8.1.4.2) the PSAR indicates in Section 8.1.4.2f that the physical events that accompany a design basis accident will not inter-fere with the ability of the system to mitigate the conse-quences of the accident to within acceptable limits, assum-ing a simultaneous single active component failure in the electrical system.

Single failure as stated in the Defini-tions and Explanations Section of Appendix A, Title 10 l

Part 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50) l does not limit failures in the electric power system to single active components.

In this regard, state how the referenced safety design bases complies with the above regulation.

222.17 (RSP)

The Load Break' Switches (LBS) which are presented in Section l

(8.2.1.2) 8.2.1.8 have not been. identified as being identical to the l

Power Circuit Breakers (PCB) used at both McGuire and Catawba l

Nuclear Stations. Assuming that these LBS are identical (to i

those PCB) and the Catawba PCB test program is successful l

and it is demonstrated that the results can be extrapolated to 25 Kv, your proposed design of two offsite power circuits f

will be acceptable.

However, assuming these LBS are not identical, provide a description of the Qualification Tests to be performed to qualify these switches.

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222.18 Figures 8.3-3 through 8.3-6 indicate the Engineered Safety

( 8.3.1.1)

Feature electrical equipment arrangement of the power and control divisions and their associated cable tray and conduit i

systems.

Some of these figures are of poor quality such that i

the information they present cannot be evalbated.

In this regard, provide better quality drawings to permit our evalu-i ation to continue.

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'l 222.19 (RSP)

The staff's position requires that all diesel generator

~i (8.3.1.1) protection devices be bypassed when the diesel generators i

are required to mitigate the effects of an accident except i

for the following:

(1) Overspeed trip, and (2)

Generator differential current trip.

Any other equipment protection instruments that are not by-passed during this emergency condition will satisfy requir-ements of criteria for any Class IE equipment or circuit.

(i.e., qualification, surveillance, indication,etc.)

Provide design criteria mich satisfy this position or

. justify the present exception.

222.20 (RSP)

The equipment criteria in Chapter 8.0 do not adequately (8.3) address the design criteria for thermal overload protect-ion circuits for safety system motor operated valves.

The

. staff's positfoa for implementing the design and test requirements for these circuits is as follows:

1.

Thermal overload protection, if provided for safety.

1' related system motor operated valves, shall have the trip setpoint set at a value high enough to prevent l

spurious trips d ue to design inaccuracies, trip

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setpoint drift, or variations in the ambient temperature at the installed location.

The trip setpoint chosen

.shall be consistent with that of any branch circuit l

protective device used. Periodic tests are required and shall be performed on each of the thermal overload devices to verify the accuracy and reliability of the overload trip setpoint, a

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Thermal overload protection may be bypassed under accident conditions and the bypass circuitry shall be designed to IEEE Std 279-1971 criteria as appropriate l

for the rest of the safety related systems.

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Pr' ovide a discussion which indicates how the design sa this position and justify all exceptions.

222.20 (RSP) i Provide the following information with re

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i 222.21 (8.3)

Speciff the minimum voltage required at the motor.to j

successfully accelerate its pump load within theCo (1) required period.the recommendations contained in Reg for sequencing safety system loads on an onsite power system.

State the minimum margin of motor torque allowed.over the pump load torque during the accelerating period (2) of the pump load, and provide criteria for selecting _

this minimum value.

Describe the temporary or permanent instrumentation design features provided to monitor the temperature (3) in 1.arge horsepower' motor components.

Provide an outline of your initial and periodic tests its that verify the motor's capability to accelerate (4) pump load within the number of starts prescribed by

' NEMA MG-1 without incurring a temperature excursion in excess of design rating.

Provide a description of the 230 kV an 222.22 discussion of the independence of these power supplies.

( 8.3.2) l Provide a description and a diagram of the ' turbine l

in protection system to supplement the information p

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( 10.2)

Section 10.2 of the PSAR.

tion and control circuits for the overspeed protection sy should include identification of the des extent to which the system is testable.

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The description of the auxiliary feedwater system (

states that this system consists of l

222.24(RSP) in Section 10.4.7.2.2) two full-capacity, motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (10.4.7.2)

(Figure 10, The staff has established that complete s is not 4-7) l I

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acceptable.

This includes not only the pump drives but I

whatever_other powered components are required for the operation of the systems. An example of an acceptable auxiliary feedwater systems would be one relying on DC and steam plus one relying only on AC, either one of

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which can provide the required flow.

~l State your intent with regard to meeting this position j

or justify the present design on some other defined bases.

i 222.25 Verify that all adopted resolutions as a result of the

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CESSAR review and any resulting change (s) in interface criteria will be incorporated in the design of WPPSS Units 3 and 5.

All aspects of the design relating to instrumentation, controls, and electrical power systems should be considered.

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