ML20210S861

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Proposed Tech Specs,Correcting Inconsistency W/Safety Analysis Re CRD Mechanism Operability
ML20210S861
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 02/06/1987
From:
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20210S834 List:
References
NUDOCS 8702170723
Download: ML20210S861 (8)
v • d • e


Text

Docket No.' 50-336 B12421 Attachment Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 2 Proposed Changes to Technical Specifications 8702170723 970206 February,1987 PDR ADOCK 05000336 P PDR

o INDEX

. LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3 /4.0 A P P L I C A B I LIT Y . . . . . . ... .. . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 3/40-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 B OR ATIO N C ONT R OL .......................................... 3/41-1 Shu tdo wn Margin - Tavg= 20 00F .............................. 3/41-1 Shu tdown Margin - Tavp2000F .............................. 3/41-3 B o ro n D i lu t io n . . .... . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . ... . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . 3/41-4 Moderator Temperature Coef ficient (MTC) .............. 3/41-5 Minimum Temperature for Criticality ..................... 3/41-7 3/4.1.2 B O R ATIO N S YSTE M S ....... ....... .... . ..... ..... ........... .... 3/41-8 Flo w Pa ths - Shu tdo wn . .............. .... .... .. . ............. .... 3/41-3 Flow Pa th s - Ope ra ting ........ ......... ...... ........ . ..... ..... 3/41-10 Cha rgin g Pu m p -Shu tdo wn ...................................... 3/41-12 Charging Pu mps - Opera ting ................................... 3/41-13 Boric Acid Pu mps - Shu tdo wn ................................. 3/41-14 Boric Acid Pum ps - Opc ra ting ................................. 3/41-15 Borated Water Sources - Shutdown .......................... 3/41-16 Borated Water Sources - Operating ......................... 3/41-l8 3/4.1.3 MOV ABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES ........................ 3/41-20 Full Length CEA Group Position ............................. 3/41-20 Posi tion Indica tor Channeis .................................... 3/41-24 C E A D ro p T i m e . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/41-26 Shutdown CE A Inser tion Limit ................................ 3/41-27 --

Regulating CE A Inser tion Limits ............................. 3/41-23 Control Rod Drive Mechanisms ............................... 3/41-31 l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 IV Amendment No. 3:X,104

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REACTVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION <

3.1.3.7 The control rod drive mechanisms shall be de-energized. ,

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3*,4,5 and 6, whenever the RCS boron concentration is less than refueling concentration of Specification 3.9.1. .

ACTION:

With any of the control rod drive mechanisms energized, restore the mechanisms to their de-energized state within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or immediately open the reactor trip circuit breakers.

V SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.7 The control rod drive mechanisms shall be verified to be de-energized at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

1 i

l The control rod drive mechanisms may be energized for MODE 3 as long as 4 reactor coolant pumps are OPERATING, the reactor coolant system

' temperature is greater than 5000F, the pressurizer pressure is greater than 2000 psia and the high power trip is operabic.

I

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/41-1 4

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h TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION n

w MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE .

FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES . ACTION

1. Manual Reactor Trip 2 1 2 1, 2 and
  • 1
2. Power Level - High 4 2(f) 3 1, 2, 3(d) 2 .
3. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low 4 2(a) 3 1, 2 (e) 2

$ 4. Pressurizer Pressure - High 4 2 3 1, 2 2

[ 5. Containment Pressure - High 4 2 3 1, 2 2

6. Steam Generator Pressure - Low 4 2(b) 3 1, 2 2
7. Steam Generator Water Level - Low 4 2 3 1, 2 2
3. Local Power Density - High .4 2(c) 3 1 2
9. Thermal Margin / Low Pressure 4 2(a) 3 1,2(e) 2
10. Loss of Turbine - Hyraulic Fluid Pressure - Low 4 2(c) 3 1 3

c:

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

  • With the protective system trip breakers in the closed position and the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal.

(a) Trip may be bypassed below 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall

. be automatically removed when THERMAL POWER is 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(b) Trip may be manually bypassed below 600 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 600 psia.

(c) Trip may.be bypassed below 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when THERMAL POWER is 215% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(d) Trip does not need to be operable if all the control rod drive mechanisms are de-energized or if the RCS boron concentration is greater than or equal to the refueling concentration of Specification 3.9.1.

(e) - Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3. .

(f) AT Power input to trip may be bypassed below 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when THERMAL POWER is

>5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement,' restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and/or open the protective system trip breakers. ,

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels and with the THERMAL POWER level:

a. <5% of RATED THERMAL POWER,immediately place the inoperable channelin the bypassed condition; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
b. >5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, operation may continue with the inoperable channelin the bypassed condition, provided the following conditions are satisfied:

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/43-4

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}" TABLE 4.3-1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED

1. Manual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A. S/U(1) N.A.
2. Power Level - High .lI
a. Nuclear Power S D(2), M(3),Q M 1, 2, 3 *
b. AT Power S D(4),'Q M 1

{ 3. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low S R M- 1, 2

{ 4. Pressurizer Pressure - High S R M 1, 2

5. Containment Pressure - High S R M 1, 2
6. Steam Generator Pressure - Low S R M 1, 2
7. Steam Generator Water Level- Low S R M 1, 2
3. Local Power Density - High S R M 1
9. Thermal Margin / Low Pressure S R M 1, 2
10. Loss of Turbine-Hydraulic Fluid Pressure - Low N.A. N.A. S/U(1) N.A.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The boron capability required below 2000F is based upon providing a 2%

$k/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN at 1400F during refueling with all full and part length control rods withdrawn. This condition requires either 5,050 gallons of 6.25%

boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 57,000 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

A minimum boron concentration of 1720 ppm is required in the RWST at all times in order to satisfy safety analysis assumptions for boron dilution incidents and other transients using the RWST as a borated water source.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident and an uncontrolled CEA withdrawal from subcriticality are limited to acceptable levels.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are met.

The ACTION statements applicable to an immovable or untrippable CEA and to a large misalignment (a20 steps) of two or more CEAs, require a prompt shutdown of the reactor since either of these conditions may be indicative of a possible loss of mechanical functional capability of the CEAs and in the event of a immovable or untrippable CEA, the loss of SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

For small misalignments (<20 steps) of the CEAs, there is 1) a small degradation in the peaking factors relative to those assumed in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints for DNBR and linear heat rate,2) a small effect on the time dependent long term power distributions relative to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints for DNBR and linear heat rate,3) a small effect on the available SHUTDOWN MARGIN, and 4) a small effect on the ejected CEA worth used in the safety analysis. Therefore, the ACTION statement associated with the small misalignment of a CEA permits a one hour time interval during which attempts may be made to restore the CEA to within its alignment requirements prior to initiating a reduction in THERMAL POWER. The one incur time limit is sufficient to (1) identify causes of a misaligned CEA, (2) take appropriate corrective action to realign the CEAs and (3) minimize the effects of xenon redistribution.

Overpower margin is provided to protect the core in the event of a large misalignment (*20 steps) of a CEA. However, this misalignment would cause distortion of the core power distribution. The reactor MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/41-3

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 4 BASES _

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

The LSSS setpoints and the power distribution LCOs were generated based upon a core burnup which would be achieved with the core operating in an essentially unrodded configuration. Therefore, the CEA insertion limit specifications require that during MODES I and 2, the fulllength CEAs be nearly fully withdrawn. The amount of CEA insertion permitted by the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits of Specificatiort 3.1.3.6 will not have a significant effect upon the unrodded burnup assumptiort put will'stiIl provide sufficient reactivity control. The Transient Insertion Lil nits of Specification 3.1.3.6 are provided to ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits area' maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and '(3) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable leveh; however, long term operation at these insertion limits could have adverse effects on core -

power distribution during subsequent operation in an unrodded configuration.

~. N The control rod drive mechanism requirement of specification 3.1.3.7 is provided to assure that the consequences of an uncontrolled CEA withdrawal from subcritical transient will stay within acceptable levels. This specification assures that reactor coolant system conditions exist which are consistent with the plant safety analysis prior to energizing the control rod drive mechanisms.

The accident is precluded when conditions exist which are inconsistent with the safety analysis since de-energized drive mechanisms cannot withdraw a CEA.

The drive mechanisms may be energized with the boron concentration greater than or equal to the refueling concentration since, under these conditions, adequate shutdown margin is maintained even if all CEAs are fully withdrawn from the core.

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B3/41-5 L

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