ML20210N830
| ML20210N830 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1984 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210N829 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8605050269 | |
| Download: ML20210N830 (26) | |
Text
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ATTACHMENT 1 DUKE POWER GoMPAM*
. o. nox 33100 CitARLOTTE. N.C. 28242 ft.u. D. TUCKER November 20, 193!.
' ' 4 8 3 'd- * '
.m o..--
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Re: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-413
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
As requested by Mr. W. P. Ang of your Staf f during his exit interview of October 29, 1984, please find attached Duke Power Company's evaluation of certain identified pipe support discrepancies.
Very truly yours.
Cs Hal B. Tucker WECEIw n gyg. TEE:Bt SmWW RWO: sib 4,' q L', 'j$
Attachment LEW f ic~I sn cc: Director vi::. t Office of Inspection and Enforcement wf U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
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/NRCResidentInspector i
Catawba Nuclear Station Palmetto Alliance
{
21351s Devine Street Columbia, South Carolina 29205 4 421N INPO Records Center h',
Suite 1500 y,a 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Robert Guild, Esq.
P. O. Box 12097 Charleston, South Carolina 29412 8605050269 860418 PDR ADOCK 05000414 G
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,1-PAGE 1 0F 7 DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION I.
Introduction 9
The purpose of this report is to evaluate certain discrepancies identified on piping supports as a result of inspections by W P Ang at Catawba on August 21 - 24 and October 23 - 26, 1984 Specifically, this report addresses those discrepancies that were identified as attributable to the Construction work effort and QA Program.
These discrepancies and others attributable to the Operations work effort and QA Program will also be addressed in answering a violation (50-413/84-100-01) issued by Mr Ang as a result of his inspection. The discrepancies herein are evaluated in light of their significance and in light of their effect on a report entitled " Quality Assurance Assessment of Construction Adequacy for IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14", dated June 12, 1984.
In addition to the pipe supports inspected during Mr Ang's inspection, sixteen other supports on the same system were re-inspected.
Discrepancies attributable to Construction found during this reinspection are addressed as well.
Section II of this report provides a detailed description of each discrepancy and its evaluation.
Section III presents the overall assessment.
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II. EVALIMTI0ft PAGE 2 Of )
ITEM DISCREPANCY EVAt(MTIf116 C_0NC,t tl5.I_0N A.
Identified during t
NRC Inspection 1.
Support 1-R-ND-0506 a) Spring can rod bent The support did have a bent spring can rod. This support Not significant has been reworked several times. however. there is no in-dication that there was damage to the rod at the time of the inspection. The support is located in a high traffic area and could have been damaged by work activities af ter inspection. It is felt the support was acceptable at the time of inspection.
Design has evaluated this discrepancy and determined it to not be significant.
b) Anchors different length Another problem stated that the fasteners were a differ-than those specified ent length than that specified. The M-SIC allowed the flot a discrepancy increase in fastener length with no drawing change re-quired.
c) Apparent relocation of During the audit the inspector stated that support 1-R.
ND-0265 and I-R-NO-0506 may have been relocated subse-fint a discrepancy support quent to QC inspection. The basis for this statement was the absence of coatings on the base plates. on the threads of fasteners, and that there was a base plate r
bolt hole pattern adjacent to the base plate of one of the supports which had been abandoned. idhile our investi-gation cannot positively confirm nor deny the statement.
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it is felt that no subsequent work was perforined. The basis for this is as follows.
r 1.
The program allows for the application of coatings af ter the initial configuration inspection. Both these supports were partially reworked and reinspected after this initial inspection which would require the i
partial removal of coatings. Examples: On support 1-R-ND-0265 the weld between the base plate and l
embedded plate was buffed and reinspected per R-2A l
H4591. On support I-R-ND-0506, the cold set was done af ter the initial inspection that would have resulted in the adjustment of the threaded rod.
2.
The abandoned baseplate hole pattern next to the base plate of the installed support has a different anchor hole spacing dimension than the installed support.
3.
The area in which these supports are located have many items that are not coated completely. This suqqests that final touch up has not been completed in this area.
The area was not turned over.
d) Shine location - 1%* typical The 15" typical dimension locating the shims was violated shown is 2',' installed at one fint *.ignificant shim - top side, most East due to oversight by craf t and QC Design evaluation indi-(Item B on inspector sheet *)
cated shim Iccation has no struc tural significance.
y
II. EVALUATION (CONTINUED)
PAGE 3 Of 7 ITEM DISCNEPANCY EVALUATION CONCLUSION e) Item #16 (rear bracket)
The rear bracket being rotated 908 from that shown on Not significant rotated 90 degrees the sketch can be attributed to overstght on the part (Item D on inspector sheet *)
of craft and QC. The complemity of the support was the major factor leading to this oversight. The orientation of this rear bracket is shown in three different elevations and only one of these views shows the true orientation. The rear bracket is de-signed with the pin running at an angle off of vertical.
The only way to truly orient it is in plan view of the rear bracket. The section that shows the plan view of the rear bracket is not to scale in that it shows the cars of the rear bracket parallel to the short sides of the rear bracket. When,in fact, the ears are parallel to the long sides. Design evaluation indicated that rotation of the end bracket does not impair the support function.
f) 20 anchor bearing not main-The 2D 1, caring requirement for the top West anchor Not significant tained on top of West anchor was marginally violated. This same anchor was attaching North baseplate to a4fressed on en NCI and corrected. The inspector wall. Excessive gap close checked only the anchor installation during his to being acceptable, inspection for rework due to that NCI and found it (Item G on inspector sheet *)
acceptable. Itased on these facts, the 2D bearing was acceptable when this support was turned over to NPD.
Possibly a vibration test subsequent to this inspection caused this anchor to become marginally out of tolerance.
Design evaluation determined this does not represent a safety crwwern, g) Installed washers are stacked Washers stacked on bolted connections is acceptable Not a discrepancy e
l cn buited connections (items per A15C "$peciflCatton for Structural Joints l
11 and 27.) (Between nut and Using ASTM A325 or A490 Bolts *.
frame additional three on each bolt.)
(Iten H on inspector sheet *)
h)
"S* dimension on top item 5 The "5" dimension on a rigure 66 is an optional Nnt significant (Figure 66 beam attachment) inspection point used to verify the proper component is not within tolerance.
15 installed and not to be used as a check on vendor Installed dimension 1 3/8".
tolerances. furthermore, a letter from Design dated Design dimension 15" !1/16*.
Noveseer 6,1984 states the t 1/I6" tolerances given (Item I on inspector steet*)
in CP-459 should be revised to be i 1/8".
- 1) Item fl7 is welded to a type 2 The Type 2 embedded plate attachment that violated Nnt a discrepancy embed with the deletion of the ll* minimum spacing has been U1'd and found two anchors. This violates acceptable. A UT request form was submitted by the 11" mininas spacing from Construction during erection of this support. The the edge of en6cd without UT UT report must have been inadvertently separated sheet showing location of from the package.
Nelson Studs.
(Iten K on inspector sheet *)
l que
II. EVALUATION (CONTINUED)
PAGE 4 0F 7 ITEM DISCREPANCY EVALUAT10N C_0_NCtus10N j) Travel stops It could not be determined for sure that the If this was a installed.
travel stop was left in prior to NPD work on this Construction and QC support. Therefore, a saaple of 112 additional oversight, it was an supports that had been turned over were checked for isolated case. Not a the presence of travel stops. Of this sample, 88 significant problem.
were safety related supports and no travel stops wern foun.I to have been lef t in. 24 were QA Condition 4 (seismically designed structures and components) supports and two cases of installed travel stops were identifled. Therefore, all accessible 04 Condition 4 supports where travel stops were employed were rechecked; a total of 77 additional supports. No other cases of inappropriately installed travel stops were identified.
As a result of this sample, it was determined that if the travel stop was *n the support when turned over, it was an isolated case.
Design evaluation determined that travel stop place-ment in the spring of I-R-ND-0506 prevents the support from acting with up movement for the hot condition. Stress analysis results for this case are that weight stresses in the piping exceed code allowables, but do not esceed yield stress.
Therefore, the system would remain functional.
2.
Support 1-R-hD-0265 a) Apparent relocation of During the audit the inspector stated that supports Not a discrepancy e
support.
I-R-ND-0265 and I-R-ND-0506 may have been relocated subsequent to CC inspection. The basis for this statement was the absence of Coatings on the base plates, on the threads of fasteners, and that there was a base plate bolt hole pattern adjacent to the base plate of one of the supports which had been abandoned ldhile our investigation cannot positively confirm nor deny the statement, it is felt that no subsequent work was performed. The basis for this is as follows:
1.
The program allows for the application of coattags af ter the initial configuration inspection. Both of these supports were partially reworked and re-inspected after this initial inspection which would require the partial removal of coatings. Enesples:
On support I-R-ND-0265, the weld between the base plate and embedded plate was buf fed and reinspected per R-2A 164591. On support 1.R-ND-0506, the cold set was done af ter the initial inspection that would have resulted in tha adjustment of the threaded rmf.
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- 11. EVAtt!ATION (CONTINUED)
PAGE 5 0F 7 ITEM D:5CREPANCY EVALUATION CONCLtl5!0N Support I-R-ND-0265 a) (continued) 2.
The abandoned base plate hole pattern next to the (continued) base plate of the installed support has a different anchor hole spacing dimension than the installed support.
3.
The area in which these supports are located have many items that are not coated completely. This suggests that final touch up has not been completed in this area. The area was not turned over.
b) Items #7 and fS billed out This error is attributed to a drafting error during the Not significant on Rev. 3 and indicated in plan incorporation of the variation notice into the Design view are opposite from what is drawing. During this revision, the num6ers on the installed, making lengths dis-snetch were switched. Oversight by D e inspector caused agree.
him to fall to identify this error. The support was (Item 8 on inspector sheet *)
erected to Design intent.
3.
Support 1-R-MD-0152 a) Clamp improperly oriented.
Support 1-R-MO-0152 does have the pipe clamp misoriented.
Not significant The reason being that the individual who perforimed the erection inspection used his judgement to accept the support configuration. The entent to which judgement is used by inspectors was investigated by the inspection supervisor and found that the major use of judgement l
by inspectors is in the selection of the best inspection technique for each given situation. The only eaample of l
Inspectors use of judgement to interpret Design's intent I
is in the orientation of bolts. Inspectors do not I
generally reject a support when a bolt head is on the l
lef t side of a joint when the Design sketch shows it on the right. Other than the above stated esemple, inspectors do not generally use judgement to interpret Design's intent. but isolated cases may arise where en inspector may accept a support, which is contrary to that shown on the Design sketch, based on this judgement.
f The inspection program is designed with two separate in-spections to address any significant discrepancies. The first inspection is a very thorough check of the hanger to assure it is erected within given tolerances. The second inspection requires the inspector to visually assure that the configuration matches that shown on the Design stetch. The discrepancy noted by the inspector is one that both inspections are intended to catch, therefore.
a widespread problem is virtually impossible because most I
inspectors would have identified this discrepancy.
Inspectors have since been trained not to use judgement to interpret Design's intent.
Design evaluation determined this to be not significant.
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II. EVAttiATION (CONTIIRKD)
PACC 6 or 7 ITEM 015CafPANCY CVAI DATIOff CONCLUSION B.
Items identified during additional inspections I.
Suppnrt 1 2-ND-0761 None attributable to Construction 2-Support 1-R hD-0145 Entire support is 2 degrees out Design instructions in this area are to visually Not significant j
of level, assure that good workmanship is maintained.
l Subsequent to the QC inspection, a ! I degree tolerance was applied by QA to assist QC in t
verifying the support is level.
Design evaluation determined this to be not significant.
3-Support I-R-ND-0161 None attributable to Construction l
4.
Support 1-R-ND-0146 Base plate does not meet bearing This was an oversight by craf t and QC, however Not signif1 Cant requirements for 2-bolt piste.
- Design evaluation determined it to be not
[
significant.
5.
Support 1-R-hD-0147 None attributable to Construction 6.
Support 1-R-ND-0262 Bearing requirements not met.
Situation has been previously addressed on Not significant R-6A #0691. An investigation performed led to sthe conclusion that the inspector misunderstood the proper method of verifying bearing. A sample of 80 supports, originally inspected by thir inspector, was reinspected as a result of R-6A
- 0691, and no other problems similar to this one were identified. As a result of this sample, it was determined that this was an isolated case. The inspector has since been trained on the proper method of verifying bearing.
Design evaluation determined this is not significant.
7.
Support I-R-ND-0149 No discrepanCles 8.
Support 1-R-ND-0507 No discrepancies 9.
Support 1-R-ND-0503 No discrepancies 10.
Support 1-R-ND-0264 No discrepancies
- 11. Support 1-R-ND-0263 No discrepanCles 12-Support I-R-ND-0150 No discrepancies 13.
Support I-R-ND-0505 No discrepancies it.
Support 1-R-ND-0149 No discrepancies 15.
Support 1-R-ND-0153 No discrepancies 16
%cro.
I-a-MD-0504 Na discrepancies attrit'utable
III. Overall Assessment A total of 19 supports were reinspected with 6 having Construction discrepancies. A total of 11 discrepancies were found that could be attributed to Construction.
All but one of the discrepancies were minor in nature and none were found to be significant by Design Engineering evaluation.
In the one case where a travel stop was found installed, the support function was jeopardized, but the system would still have remained operable.
This case was not clearly determined to have been caused by Construction, but since it could not be ruled out, a sample of additional supports was checked. This sample determined that if it was caused by Construc-tion, it was an isolated case.
These discrepancies do not indicate a breakdown in the Construction OA Program, but rather are typical of the type of ' discrepancy discussed in the earlier assessment of Construction adequacy refer-enced in Section I.
Therefore, these discrepancies do not alter the conclusions reached in that report.
It is recognized that minor discrepancies in construction may on occasion, not be identified by the inspection programs.
While this is true, these items represent a very small quantity of the items
- inspected.
Problems are corrected or justified as they are found so as to be in compliance with Design information. Their insignificance and small number demonstrate the program is working appropriately.
M L R Davison R M Dulin Project QA Manager Senior Design Engineer Date it -/9 -8Y Date
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ATTACllMENT 2 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION 1
IE BULLETINS 79-02 AND 79-14 9
j QUALITY ASSURANCE ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRUCTION ADEQUACY
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This review and assessment has been performed as a result of a request made during the NRC inspection exit held on June 8,1984, at the Catawba Nuclear Station.
This request was to conduct a review and assessment of Catawba's compliance with the Construction portions of Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14. While it is Duke Power Company's position that compliance with these two bulletins has been achieved and demonstrated, this assessment by Quality Assurance serves as a broad overview of activities occurring over a period of several years.
The adequacy of these activities is reconfirmed.
This report contains information dealing with erection activities and each is addressed separately.
t Outline of Bulletin Section Content I.
Description of the scope of the bulletin addressed.
II.
Description of how compliance has been achieved.
'III. Matrix of problems found during construction and their corrections.
IV.
Summary and assessment.
21 L
6 BULLETfN 79-02 i
I.
IE Bulletin 79-02 has only one action item involving erection.
This item, Number 4, requires the verification that expansion anchor bolts are properly installed.
II.
In response to IE Bulletin 79-02, action item 4, all concrete expansion anchors in Nuclear Safety Related applications are inspected for proper installation.
These anchors consist of either the wedge or sleeve type.
Inspections are performed in accordance with Duke Power Company's Quality Assurance Procedure M-52,
" Concrete Expansion Anchor Installation Inspection".
This procedure assures that the anchors are properly installed in accordance with design specifications.
Procedure M-52 criteria includes, but is not limited to, inspection of expansion anchor size, type, perpendicularity, torque, embedment depth, spacing, distance to free concrete edge and unauthorized modifications of the anchor.
In addition, inspections are performed to assure proper bearing requirements and for any evidence of bolt hole modifications.
Further assurance of proper anchor installation is as follows:
1.
Duke Power Company Quality Assurance Procedure prohibits deviations from design drawings and specifications without written authorization and approval by the Design Engineering Department.
2.
Catawba Nuclear Station qualifies each concrete expansion anchor operator by installation tests and verbal examination on proper installation procedures.
Lists of trainers and operators are maintained by the QA Engineer.
Deviations from the design drawing or specification found during erection or inspection are corrected or evaluated to determine if the drawings need to be revised.
Deviations that are " accepted as is" are incorporated into the design drawings.
This process is described in the Quality Assurance Program.
In addition, a Significant Corrective Action Procedure, Procedure R-6, requires root cause determination and corrective action for significant nonconforming items, including consideration of other Duke sites in the corrective action.
This dynamic part of the Quality Assurance Program assures that any future problems identified on Catawba Unit 2 will be evaluated for their effect at other Duke sites.
This may result in corrective action which could apply to Catawba Unit 1.
III. CONCR[Il IXPANSIO'i ANCHORS (/9-02)
- ~ ~ of 4 Page 1 IllM PROBLEM EVALUA110N DISP 051110N AD01110NAL 00ff tiNIS _
CONCtVSION Violation Pipe Support Discrepancies NCI 18,100 was originated.
Not significant - acrepted Since this involve f f uisting pr ocedure is 84-19-01 It was determined that the as is without repair - did placement of a non nuclear adequate. Verified (open)
Hanger 1-R-CA-0091 had a non-safety anchors had been not compromise safety safety related anchor too that field routed non Report Sut mitted concrete anchor placed in placed after inspection of function of the support.
close to a nuclear safety saf ety related anchor s 4-19-84 violation of procedure.
the support.
Installing crafts were related anchor, a sampling were installed with two of f our anchors on this cautioned.
inspection of non-safety (nrrect spacing with a support were within 3 selated anchors was 95% confidence level.
inches of other anchors develnped in accnrdan<c theiefore, this is an (non-safety related) when with Military Standard 105D.
isolated case.
Ihis the procedure called for a 1,500 anchors on non-safety type of insignificant 35" minimum spacing.
related anchors no field deviation may esist run items were randomly even after a detailed seierted and inspected.
inspection, but is the results of this sample evaluated when inspection showed I addi-detected.
tional cases of violated spacing requirements. The 1 cases were evaluatert and determined to he acceptable as is (NCI ]8,310).
Ihe sample results (7 nf 1500) shaws a greater than 95%
confidence level that these anchnrs are installed c or rec t ly.
Violation Missing / loose base NCI 15,955 originated.
Structures that had not As part of the evaluation, (misting program 84-17-01 plate fasteners it was determined that received the hacbfit 50 of 317 structures were a< tenuate - minor re-(closed) these columns had not inspection were identified randomly selected for re-visinn to prnredure 6-8-84 Iwo columns in the pipe had a hackfit inspection and inspected. Missing or inspection of f asteners.
to highlight reporting Chase of the Reactor done on other structural loose nuts identified were this sample included 1,18) any missing or loose Puilding were noted to
- items, replaced and tightened.
teolt/ nut assemblies and fastener identified.
be missing the nut on Crafts and inspectors were 229 concrete espansion the number of missing one of four concrete trained to look for and re-anc hor s.
One st ruc ture or Innse fasteners anchors for each column.
port any cases of missing was found to have 11 loose found in the sample or loose fasteners espansion anchor nuts.
does nnt indicate identified.
Ihis was a aon-safety programmitic probleas related structure. (QA but, rather, isolated Condition 4) (NCI 18,lM) c ases.
Additional work done to t his struc ture pr ior in grouting may have caused loosening. This sample inspection provided a greater than 95* confidence t hat st ructures do not have missing / loose fasteners.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _
A h
Page 2 of 4 111. CONCR[IE ()iPANSION ANCHORS (79-02), (continued)
IllM PR08tlH TVAltl Ail 0N DISPOSII!ON AD0!Il0NAt COMPtfN15 CONCLUSION Violation Failure to follow procedure NCI 11,431 originated. It Accepted ae, is - no rework Determined not to
[ wisting program 83-40-01 for hanger installation and was determined that the required. The craft crew compromise the safety adequate. Ihis type 83-34-01 inspection. (one item) inspector had missed this and inspector were function of the support.
of insignificant (open) prnblem most likely because cautioned of this type of deviation may exist Report Submitted Hanger 1-R-WN-3006 had two of the dif ficulty in seeing situation.
even after a detailed 2-15-84 concrete expansion anchors a nearby embedded angle and inspection. Concrete that exceeded maximum miscellaneous debris espansion anchor allowable projection by obstructing the view.
This projection problems 3/8 inch.
caused him to fall ta account have been very for the thickness of the infrequent in the embedded angle when checking judgement of QA allowable projection. The
[ngineers. This projection length was represents an isolated case.
acceptable except for the thickness consideration of the embedded angle within the cone of influence of the anchor.
CDR (50.55e)
Overtorquing concrete Numerous NCI's were origi-Anchors that did' not meet As part of the Nn significant safety 82-07 expansion anchors nated (#14,069,14,403, acceptance criteria investigation 391 problem, however did (closed) 14,404, 16,188, among developed for maximum torque supports with approri-require catensive Routine QC inspections others). In the originating were replaced. 9 anchors mately 1,650 anchors investigation and 5-23-81 identified concrete case overtorque had been found to be undertorqued were inspected for reinspection to expansion anchors which done apparently in an were retorqued to proper torque.
18 of the evaluate. Was had apparently been attempt to reduce the specifications.
anchors on 14 support s identified by QC overtorqued.
baseplate to concrete gap.
Construction personnel were did not meet the inspection personnel Subsequent inspections found retrained and an inspection acceptance criteria during routine similar cases of over torque. point was added to check for During this inspec-inspections which Because of the potential for any distress in concrete tion, 9 anchors on 5 shows level of under-overtorquing, an investiga-that could result from over-supports were inund standing of possible tion was conducted.
to be undertorqued.
problems with Testing was done to establish Calculations for both the espansion anchors.
acceptance criteria for maximum 18 overtorqued arut the 9 Retraining and revised allowable torque. A sampling undertorqued anchurs inspection adequate program was developed to showed system operability for future work, determine the entent of would be maintained, sampling results overtorquing on concrete therefore, no signifirant showed no significance espansion anchors.
safety problem esisted on previous work.
with these anc hors.
Page 3 of 4 Ill. CONCRE TE [XPANSION ANCit0R5 (19-02), (continued)
IIIM probit M EVALUATION DI5P05til0N ADDlil0NAl 00ft1INIS CONCIU510N CDR (50.55e)
Improper mixing of components NCI 15,6/9 initiated.
procedures for mixing lests on material at dry Not a significant 82-33 of Sikalop 122 used to repair Because of potential and using Siba materials consistency showed re-safety problem, (closed) abandoned drill holes for elfect on anchor capacity were revised. Construc-pairs made with it would however, did require 5-4-84 concrete expansion anchors.
of anchors installed in or tion personnel were have acceptable strength.
an extensive investi-Detected when an anchor near repaired holes, an trained in these procedures. 119 anchors on 74 hangers, gation to evaluate.
Installation hole revealed investigation was conducted. Note: Retraining was randomly selected from the Retraining will handle weak repair area.
This included testing of conducted initially when time period when Sika 122 future work and evalu-Sikalop 122 at dry mix detected and after procedure was used, installed in or ation shows past wntk consistency and testing consolidation.
near hole repair areas to be satisfactory, of anchors installed at or were tested to 125%
Corrective action near repaired areas in field.
capacity in the field.
adequate.
Identified These tests found installed by field installation anchors to be satisf actory.
craftsmen during Additionally, 203 abandoned installation. Any holes repaired with Sika 122 f utur e problems would were tested using Swiss likely also be Hammer in the field identified.
resulting in a 96%
probability that repaired areas are sufficiently sound such that no reduction in pull-out capacity need be considered.
The weak repair which initiated concerns was an isolated case from results of testing, above.
URI Potential inadequate (orrective action These problems had been The additional items were In regirds to bearing gap Existing procedures 82-31-01 overlooked on NCI 14,069 identified and handled on on support 1-A-RN-3699, a adequate. Ihis is (closed)
During investigation re-because of its main concern NCI's 14,069 and 16,188.
review of 80 additional simply an isolated 2-24-84 lating to NCI 14,069 re-being overtorqued anchors.
The 9 cases of low torque supports were reinspected case of oversight due garding overtorquing of The evaluation concluded were retorqued, three other and all were found to concentrating on a concrete espansion items, that this was an isolated cases were i:.srviled as acceptable.
major concern.
9 cases of low torque and case and procedures provided follows:
3 cases of other anchor adequate control for any 1-R-BW-1519 - replaced related problems were similar conditions, cupped washers identified. These were 1-A-RW-3103 - chipped 7 acceptable as is.
not recorded on t he NCI.
conc re te 1-A-RN-3699 - Euressive liearing gip - rewor6ed to correc t bearirg.
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Page 4 of 4 Ill. CONCREIE EXPANSION ANCHORS (79-02), (continued) litM PROBLEM EVALUAIION D15P051il0N ADDilI0NAL COPM[NIS CONCLUSION IFI (closed)
Inspection records for NRC the existing program Evaluate number of Existing program tinit 1 Bulletings 79-02 covers all the inspection signoffs vs adequate. Evaluate 6-8-84 the inspector felt that in necessary inspection the number of attributes for possible the areas of concrete expan-points. Since the inspected. If it appears improvement.
slon anchor, hanger, and piping inspector feels this the program can be improved walkdown inspections, Duke's may improve Duke's pro-by increasing signof f s, inspection procedures should gram, this concern will revise necessary procedures have more inspector sign off's be evaluated by Duke's accordingly.
than currently exist. Many QA group responsible attributes may be covered by one for QA inspection proce-inspector sign off where the dures. However, since Inspector feels there should be Unit I work is essential-more sign off's.
ly complete, this will be done on Unit 2.
NCI 15,706 One anchor on baseplate Determined to not be Support was reworked to A sample of 80 additional Existing program (closed) for hanger 1-A-fW-3021 significant to safety correct gap. Caution supports were re-inspected adequate - no signifi-11-23-83 was found to exceed function of support.
Inspectors on gap for this problem. A total cant problems foueuf.
allowable gap between Excessive gap was missed inspections.
of 5 anchors on 4 supports This type of the washer and base-by inspection.
of this sample showed gaps insignificant deviation plate. (0.056 inch gap between washer and base-may exist even after vs allowable of 0.041 plates to exceed allowable, detailed inspection and gap).
All 5 anchors were evaluated when found is by design to be acceptable evaluated and as is, corrected if necessary NCI 16,095 Crafts had removed support Since anchors had already Proper documentation was A random sample of 49 Existing program (closed) baseplate without proper been removed, verification issued and crafts were supports was reinspected adequate. Provides 9-3-83 documentation. Purpose of problem with projection retrained in documentation to look for anchor further evidence that was to correct an anchor was not confirmed. However, requirements /Ilmits on projection problems. No anchors are not crafts thought exceeded a sample of hangers was re-work requirements.
problems were found in installed that exceed maximum projection length, inspected for embedment of this sample.
maximum projection.
anchor criteria. A misunderstanding by crafts as to what the documentation allowed them to do was the cause of the documentation problem.
m
r IV.
SUMMARY
AND ASSESSMENT 79-02 A program with detailed procedures has been in place at Catawba for the installation of concrete expansion anchors.
This program includes training of craftsmen installing anchors and inspection by QA of installed anchors on safety related items.
This most significant problem identified in this area was the overtorquing of several anchors (a sample of 1,650 anchors revealed 18 cases of overtorque beyond acceptable limits), but evaluation shows the overtorqued loadings to not be safety significant.
Both the overtorquing and improper mixing of SikaTop repair materials required extensive evaluations to conclude their effects, but both showed no safety significance.
Several other problems of smaller scope have been identified where sampling was employed to verify the adequacy of the installation and inspection program.
These include spacing, projection, loose nuts, and washer to baseplate gap problems.
Sampling results in these cases show approximately 24 anchors with problems out of over 1,900 anchors sampled.
This represents a very low percentage of problems.
Additionally, none of these problems were significant to safety.
Many problems have been discovered, evaluated, and corrected as part of the corrective action procedures of the QA Program.
No safety significant problems have been identified in this entire area.
All problems identified have been evaluated and resolved and appropriate corrective action taken.
No safety significant problems have been identified in this entire area.
While the goal of installation and inspection is zero defects, we have experienced a minor number of insignificant problems in the concrete anchor area.
Samples of installed anchors show the number of problems to be well within reason for the magnitude of anchor installation that has occurred.
This assessment shows that the requirements of NRC IE Bulletin 79-02 regarding proper installation of concrete expansion anchors have been met at Catawba.
Ak (r At O "aN Approval:
u 6-n-89
/
L R Davison G V-GrMfr Catawba Project QA Manager Corporaf.e QA Mana r
Review and Concurrenc NI 6b2fM Design Engineering Constructiort
& - / 2 - ff b
r s
BULLETIN 79-14 I.
IE Bulletin 79-14 requires assurance that the as-built conditions of piping systems conform to design information.
Areas covered in this report deal with inspection of the installed piping system and the related supports.
II.
Duke Power Company's Quality Assurance Program provides for inspection to assure the installed system and supports conform to design information.
Procedures involved include:
1 M-4 Visual Inspection and NDE of Welds M-8 Piping System Installation Inspection M-51 Component Supports Two types of inspection activities apply to the installations.
(1) Detailed configuration inspection (2) Final walk-through inspection The detailed configuration inspection assures all elements of the erected configuration are verified against the drawings and specification requirements.
All aspects of piping and support / restraint design are addressed.
Important elements of the design verified include:
Pipe run geometry Pipe and support / restraint welds size Pipe size / schedule Support / restraint type, location and design details Penetrations Clearances Pipe attachments Valve type, locations and orientation Support / restraint attachment Materials A final walk-thorugh inspection is performed prior to the system being turned over to the Nuclear Production Department.
This wal-k-through involves a final configuration inspection to assure the system and supports are complete and no damage has occurred.
Clearances are reverified to the design information.
Deviations from the design drawing or specification found during erection or inspection are corrected or evaluated to determine if the drawings need to be revised.
Deviations that are " accepted as is" are incorporated into the design drawing.
This process is described in the Quality Assurance Program.
In addition, a Significant Corrective Action Procedure, Procedure R-6, requires root cause determination and corrective action for significant nonconforming items, including consideration of other Duke sites in the corrective action.
This dynamic part of the Quality Assurance Program assures that any future problems identified on Catawba Unit 2 will be evaluated for their effect at other Duke sites.
This may result in corrective action which could apply to Catawba Unit 1.
Page 1 of 8 111. PIPING / HANGERS AS-BUILI (79-14)
Il[M PROBL E M IVALUA110N 015p051110N AD0lil0NAL COMMLNIS CONCLUSION Violations Pipe Support inspections NCI 18243 interference Inspection instructions frection and final F l9-01 Hanger 1-R-CA-0091 had concrete problem between strut for electrical inspectors walk inspections are (open) an(hors placed in and conduit resulted were revised to include designed to identify Report violation of procedure.
cither from movements a check for visual this type of concern.
Submitted Hanger 1-R-CA-0232 has a bundle after inspection or clearance with hanger In addition electrical 4-9-84 of conduit against a strut.
from oversight by the ccoponents. Electray was inspection will review QC inspector, reworked to obtain clear-for clearance viola-tions. This was an anc e.
isolated case.
Violations Failure to follow procedures NCI 16516 - Hanger had Acceptable as is.
Since this item Minor - Design WO4'-C and drawings for hanger a restrictive tolerance involved both craft and determined all 10 cases (closed) inspection.
specified on detail drawing OC overlooking a restric-to be acceptabte in the 2-24-84 Hanger 1-R-NV-1385 calls which was not identified by tive tolerance, and erected condition.
for the hanger to be craf t or QC, Support approximately 3500 supports Ihis situation has not located 4' 6 5/16" from the erected to general tolerance, have this special tolerance, resulted in any signi-elbow with 0" tolerance in the a sample was performed. A ficant problem with NE direction. The locatinn of sample of 80 hangers was hangers being checked. Ihree additional constructed in a the hanger was 4' 8 1/2" violations were found manner that would pre-(NCI 16638). An additional vent them f rom per-sample of 200 hangers was forming their performed and 6 violations rerptired function.
were found (NCI 16774).
1hese sagles supply a 95%
confidence level that the supports are installed
- properly, Violations Review of Misorientation for NCI 16940 - Hanger was Hanger was reworked to A sample of 50 hangers was Minor - This was an BF7FFI-~
Hanger 1-R4C-0392 installed with an improper bring within tolerance, inspected to see if this isolated case result-(closed)
Maximum misorientation allowed offset of 13/16" instead of Design determined item was a prevalent problem.
Ing from confusion 2-24-84 was 1*
Hanger was checked 1/16".
The 1* tolerance not to be significant.
One additional error was over the words on the and found to be out of was added as a drawing found (NCI 16968) with a drawing variance. As tolerance, var iance. The wording of sway angle however, it was a result of discus-the variance confused the attributed to an un-sions with other related situation.
inspectors, who pro-inspector strch that he perly interpreted the applied the normal toleran(c design information, and to the l' from the results of the sa,ple, we conclude this is an isolated error.
I
Page 2 of 8 AS-BUILY (79-14), (continued) 11EM PR08tfM
[VALUA110N Dl500Sil!0N AD0lil0NAL C0mf N15 CONCLUSION Violations f ailure to Follow Procedure
[ight hangers were noted on Of the 8 hangers, 4 were As a result of this item, Of the items identift-83-40-01 for Hanger Installation and this item.
This resulted found to be acceptable as a sample was performed.
ed, nene wer e found to (open)
Inspection in 7 NCI's (17436,17438, is.
The other 4 required 88 supports were be significant.
Report 1his violation involves various 17435, 17431, 17433, 17425, some form of rework.
inspected to assure Corrective actions Submitted discrepancies identified on 8 17434) for the various These items were deterwined all welding was tanen to prevent 1-13-84 hangers.
problems. These problems not to be significant.
performed. Ihree reoccurrence were resulted from a combination additional problems appropriate. Based on of subsequent work activi-were found (NCI 17950, the findings, we con-ties, misneasurements, 17951). This sample clude there is no clarification and inspectors supplies a 95% confi-systematic problem overlooking the problem.
dence level that welding with our erection /
is acceptable. Appropriate in(poction program.
action has been taken to prevent reoccurance.
Site procedures have been generated to better account for welds prior to signing inspection forms.
Violations Inadequate storage of inadequate storage was Site procedure Site procedure requires Minor - It was BF E-01 mechanical snubbers due to a misinterpretation was revised to conform to a routine inspection of determined that more (closed)
Snubbers were found stored in of ANSI N15.2.2.
It has sections 6.3.2 and 6.5 of storage area. These precautions could be 2-24-84 the Auxiliary Building on been determined that more ANSI N15.2.2.
Affected inspections have shown taken to prevent pallets with other materials.
precautions can be taken.
personnel have been trained compliance with the possible damage.
This could possibly lead to on the new requirements, new requirements.
Construction and damage of the snubbers. Site Nuclear Production do procedure does not adequately have established pro-provide precautions to prevent grams to check damage.
snut bers f or damage which would identify problems if they existed.
Violations Failure to provide procedures No clearance criteria lhe three specific items in connection with this Minor changes have BFW61---
to control clearance between existed at the time these were evaluated per non-violation and unresnived been made to the (closed) piping systems systems were erected, conf ormances. Nn backfit item 81-19-02 field program to provide a 12-23-82 three cases were identified Since then, specific is required since subse-engineers rechecked 10 clearance criteria.
where items were in contact criteria has been supplied quent inspections would drawings previously In addition, subsequent with piping systems or close by Design and identify any clearan(c inspected for their tests and inspection enough to af f ect operations.
Construction, problems.
installed dimensions.
(thermal expansion these items were noncon-No dimensions were found test and walks by formed.
outside their tolerance Catawba Stress Analy-which were not pieviously sis group) by Nuclear identified.
Production will identify any past clearance probices.
The program is now adequate to prevent reoccurrence of this type of problem.
Page 2 of 8 AS-Bulli (79-14), (continued) 11EM PROBlfM (VAlHAll0N DISPOSIll0N ADDill0NAL COMMfNIS CONCLUSION Violations failure to follow Procedure fight hangers were noted on Of the 8 hangers, 4 were As a result of this item.
Of the items identifi-HF3D lil-for Hanger Installation and this item.
This resulted found to be acceptable as a sample was performed.
ed, none wer e found to (open)
Inspectio, in 1 NCI's (17436, 1/438, is.
The other 4 required 88 supports were he significant.
Report this violation involves various 17435, 17431, 17433, 17425, some form of rework, inspected to assure Cor rective actions Submitted discrepancies identified on 8 11434) for the various Ibese items were determined all welding was taken to prevent 1-I F 84 hangers.
problems. These problems not to be significant.
performed. Ihree reoccurren(e were resulted from a combination additional problems appropriate. Based on of subsequent work activi-were f ound (NCI 1/950, the findings, we con-ties, mismeasurements, 1/951). This sample eude there is no clarification and inspectors supplies a 95% cnnfi-systematic problem overlooking the problem, donce level that welding with our erection /
is acceptable. Appropriate inspection program.
action has been taken to prevent reoccurarxe.
Site procedures have been generated to better account for welds prior to signing inspection forms.
Uiolations Inadequate storage of Inadequate storage was Site procedure Site procedure requires Minor - It was BFET-mechanical snubbers due to a misinterpretation was revised to conform to a routine inspection of determined that more (closed)
Snubbers were found stored in of ANSI N15.2.2.
It has sections 6.3.2 and 6.5 of storage area.
These precautions could be 2-24-84 the Auxiliary Building on been determined that more ANSI N15.2.2.
Affected inspections have shown taben to prevent pallets with other materials, precautions ran be talen.
personnel have been trained compliance with the possible damage.
This could passibly lead to on the new requirements.
new requirements.
Construction and damage of the snuhbers. Site Nuclear Production do procedure does not adequately have established pro-provide precautions to prevent grams to thetk damage.
snutsbers f or damage which would identify problems if they existed.
Violations f ailure to provide procedures No clearance criteria The three specific items In connection with this Minor chances have
~
FFM W to cnntrol clearance between existed at the time these were evaluated per non-violation and unr esolved baen made to the (closPd) piping systPms sy$lems were erected.
conformances. No tac 6 fit item 81-19-02 field program to provide a 12-2F82 Three cases were identified Since then, specific is required since subse-engineers rechecked 10 clearance criteria.
where items were in contact criteria has been supplied quent inspections would drawings previously In addition, subsequent with piping systems or close by Design and identif y any clearance inspected for their tests and inspection enough to affect operations.
Construction.
problems.
installed dimensions.
(thermal espansion These items were noncon-Nu dimensions were found test and walks by f or med out side their tolerance Catawba Stress Analy-which were not previnusly sis group) by Nuclear identified.
Pr oduction will identify any past c1paran(e problems the program is now adequate to prevent reoccurrence of this type uf problem.
J
lo page 3 of 8 l
AS-Bulti (79-14), (continued)
ITEM PR08tlH IVALUATION Dl5p051110N ADDII!ONAL C0ffilN15 CONCLUSION 5E55(e)
AT G correct tubing clamp was tinacceptable as Construction perf urmed an I W 21 amps were almost 16e correct tubing B4M used in the erection of several installed.
in-plant inspection of all identical except for dia-supports have been (open) tubing supports on the NW Irain appropriate tubing supports.
diameter of slots tubing installed and the Report system.
inspection personnel Replacement of incorrect fits in.
misconar.unication as to Submitted NCI 18765 Design Engineering clamps has been performed.
when the material 5-11-84 determined that no tube Reinspection by Quality verification is to be damage occurred due to the Assurance of all tubinq performed has been incorrect clamp being clamps is complete.
clarified.
Installed.
Training of inspectors is This problem is a result complete.
of a miscommunication as to when the material veri-fication was to occur. Some inspectors felt the verifica-tion was to be done at torque others felt it was done at final inspection.
50.5 De 10 prevent the load pin NWl5MI -lesign drawing ATl supports that utilire since [his was a new OT~the 207 supports 5
BFl2 spherical bearings from CN-1684-00 HAl-2 was revised size 3/9" through 1" Bergen-tequirement, the that were reinspected (open) becoming disengaged on size giving specific installation Patterson clamps (that were appropriate construction there were only 13 Report I fig. 306/307, 3/4" through requirements for the 5" installed prior to the "5" procedures and inspection found that did not Submitted 3" Bergen-Patterson pipe dimension on Bergen-patterson dimension requirement being guidelines were meet the new "5" 5-29-84 clamps must be installed such clamps, sites 3/4" through 1".given) were reinspect-revised to include this dimension requirement.
that the spacer washers and The "5" dimension is the ed using the new "5" sequirement.
All of the 13 clamps the spherical bearing fit distance between clamp dimension requirements.
During the reinspection have now been verified tight between the clamp ears.
halves at the load pin.
There was a total of 207 of these clamps, there to be in cnepliance This dimension had never supports that had to be were eight additional with the new "5" been maintained by craft or reinspected.
problems found (NCI 18387) dimension requirements inspected by QA.
The additional problems were evaluated using re-quirements specified by Design and found to be acce ptable.
50.55(e}
Welding program did not Ihis deficiency created NCI 16627 - Fported l ithe 57R area this AHhough the potential 54 UT ensure the added 1/8" prepar-the potential for safety 4/25/81 as significant review involved over for significant (open) ation for effective throat related partial penetration deficiency.
15,000 suppnrts. All problems existed, the final Report partial penetratinn welds as structural welds to be 1
Reinspect all ASME ASME code welds were detailed review and 6-15-84 required by AWSDl.1 and ASME undersized.
fillet & partial penetra-examined. Review indicates reinspections have Unit 1 Section 111.
tion welds by sectioning there are approximately demonstrated that, with (scheduled) if necessary to confirm 270 non-code welds; the esception of ore actual weld size for every 180 were examined.
frame, all Unit 1 ASMF partial penetration 1.
Every partial pene-partial penetration weld.
tration weld in tinit I welds were structural-2.
Review nn a statistical has been confirmed to te Iy adequate as pro-basis all non-ASME welds structurally adequate as duced.
to confirm with 951 installed.
The Auw. Support "G" confidence the structural 2.
Ihe Unit 1 evaluation frame welds have been adequacy of all partial established greater than 100% reviewed with re-penetration welds.
95% confidence level in the pair to 15 of 81 structural adequacy of all welds.
non-ASME welds encept those lhe Unit 2 review is on one Anu. support frame essentially complete.
frame "G" This one frame No inadequate welds welded by one crew vequired have been identified.
a In0% reinspection result-ing in rework to 15 of 81 welds Unit 2 review will l e c omplete 8/1/81
Page 4 ef 8 AS-BUILI (79-14), (continued) li[M pROBtf M
[VAIUAll0N D15P051110N ADDIl10NAL COMMfNIS CONCLUSION 50.55 Ind blocks for Ili Grinnel NCI 18167 - During a lhe threads on the Prior to NCI 18167, there The f ab Shop Ireeps 84TD7(e)
Fig 307 snubber extension support / restraint inspection extension piece were was not a method to records of all (open) pieces, modified by Duke excessive play between the checked with "GO-h0/G0" check the acceptability extension pieces that R. port Construction, were found rod end threads and the end giuges and found un-of the threads on construc-are modified. Ibere-Submitted to be incorrectly drilled block threads was identified acceptable. Ihe extension tion drilled and tapped end fore we were able to 5-11-84 and tapped. The Construction by the QA inspector, piece was reworked. In blocks. Ihe construction determine all exten-Department started drilling addition, all figure 307 procedure was revised sion pieces modified and tapping end blocks for extension pieces modified to make it a requirement since 8/10/83. All F1. 307 extension pieces on since August 10, 1983 were to check all end blocks were checked and the 9
August 10, 1983.
to be checked with "GO-N0/G0" for F ig. 301 extension ones found unacceptable gauges to determine pieces, drilled and were reworked.
acceptability. Any found tapped by construction, unaueptable were to be with "GO-NO G0" yauges.
reworked.
50.55 Pacific Scientific identified NCI 17249 - of the 8,500 All supports installed As a result of the site Even though all the B T K (e) 8,500 mechanical snubbers as potentially defective that utillie a site I search for the potentially suspect snubbers (closed) potentially having defective snubbers; 181 were shipped or 3 snubber were checked defective snubbers, all were could not be located 5-18-84 capstan springs.
to Catwaba Nuclear. Station.
to see if it was a located except for 10.
A a program is in place 109 site I snubbers potentially defective program was developed to to assure they do not 78 size 3 snut bers.
snubber. All that were prevent to 10 that were get installed.
found were replaced. A unaccounted for from being search of the warehouse installed, which included was also made, training and revision of procedures.
- 50. 55(e)
Special weld bosses were In some cases, the installed Reworking and reinspection During the review of the discrepancy was GFI7 installed instead of special
.onditions were found to be to assure compliance with Design Drawings for discovered af ter (open) weld boss restrictors.
acceptable. H wever, others Design has been accomplished. special weld boss inspection but during Report Subsequent investigations required reworking to assure for Unit 1.
For those cases restrictor locations, final documentation Submitted revealed that some restrictors compliance with Design where the installed condition a situation where the review.
5/24/84 had been over-drilled.
requirements.
was acceptable, Design Design isometric and All problems in Unit Related NCI's:
Require training for Engineering has revised their flow diagram did not One have been 17404 individuals who are involved drawings to reflect field agree was found. Ibe identified and 17679 with the installation of conditions.
isometric called for a resolved.
17933 special weld bosses and Training of appropriate craft-special weld boss, how-The appropriate 18052 restrictors.
men and inspection personnel ever, the flow diagram personnel have been 18208 Situation resulted from has been completed.
called for a special trained, therefore, 18488 unfamiliarity with the weld boss restrictor.
procluding future materials and the very Design has reviewed reoccurrence, close similarities of the isometrics with flow materials and Iot numbers diagrams for similar for these two different
- problems, type weld bosses.
Construction has also reviewed construction isometrics with Design flow diagrams to assure the Lagree.
d
page 5 of 8 AS-BUILT (19-14), (continued)
IllH PRODlfM IVAIUAl!0N DISPOSill0N ADDil10NAL COMitf Nis CONCLUSION 50.55 Vent valve IND105 not A misunderstanding Drawing CN-1680-47 was Reinspection has been this problem re-BFU7(e]
installed per Design and existed conce rning revised to clarify re-completed and all sulted from a mis-(closed)
Construction criteria the installation and quirements and training discrepancies have been interpretation of 5-11-84 As a result of this problem inspection requirements was performed. A evaluated.
Design requirements.
it was determined that vent for vent vahes. Valves complete reinspection However, all items valves at Catawba may exceed are installec per drawing was performed on all vents have been corrected or dimensions required by CN-1680-41, Construction
/ drains installed prior evaluated and are now Design.
and QA misap; lied informa-to 9-13-83 and results acceptable. Action Related NCI's:
tion shown ou drawing.
reviewed by Design, to correct the problem and to prevent its re-16510 11136 currence is complete.
11144 11251 17259 11263 11264 11215 17216 11305 50.55 Reinforcing fillet welds on ASME Section ill Welds ASME 5ection 111 Welds ANSI B31.1 Welds BM(e) pipe nozzle welds found to Based on stress calcu-AllTuQect welds were feT Ueh gn, (fi~ existing All fillet welds at (closed) be undersized after inspection lations and tequired identified by Design condition of welds at the branch to header 1-24-83 effective throat calcu-Engineering and all junction of the header and junctions, and fillet Related NCI's:
lations, all accessible accessible welds were branch was acceptable melds on reinforcinq 14524 welds were found to be reinspected to the based on a review of pads for pipe-to-pipe 13662 acceptable.
apprnpriate criteria.
the reinspection data.
norrie welds are acceptable as instal-14033 Forty five (45) fillet for those welds at the led.
An investigation of Welding welds at the junction outer edge of the re-parameters and Design re-of the header and branch inforcinq pads, five (5)
Retraining will quirements showed that were reinspected. Eighteen of twenty eight (28) assure all future accessible weld sites are (18) were found not to meet were found not to meet walds will comply representative of inacces-weld preparation 7iinwever, the design require-with design sible weld sizes. there-all met the effective throat ments. Only one of requirements, fore, inaccessible welds required by Design Civil.
these five (5) had are acceptable as instal-had an effective throat led.
Iwenty eight (28) fillet undersized by more than ANSI B31.1 Welds welds at the outer edge 1/32" Since the re-Found tF be acceptable as of the reinforcinq pad inspection data is based installed by Design [ngi-were reinspected. One (1) on minimum weld sizes neering because failure to did not meet ASME Section rather than average meet drawing requirements ill requirements but did values, this weld was did not constitute meet the required mini-determined acceptable, a violation of mum effective throat.
Ihcrefore, all welds ANSI 31.1 requirements, were determined to meet Craft and QC personnel were Design requirements.
retrained in the design re-quirements and draw-inq series (N-1616-1.
Accessible welds not meet-ing the code requirements wer e t uilt-up.
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page 7 of 8 AS-BUILI (79-14), (continued)
ITEM PROBtf M (VAltlAIION DISPOSlil0N ADDlIIONAL COMHlNIS CONCIU510N Non-Various problems associated items required various Each individual item was Sampling was performed Total sampling showed Conforming with support restraint erection amounts of rework or were determined not to be to determine if a repeti-1161 supports were item Reports and inspection.
acceptable as erected.
significant.
tive problem existed in reinspected with 21 (nd any of the areas.
problems found. No area was found to have Associated a repetitive problem.
Criterion XVI Investigation Where sampling was employed Check'd Accept Reject NCl#
13920 Verify correct Tube Steel is 81 81 0
6/16/82 installed.
14066 & 14151 (1) Alternate Typical - Reinspect using isometric 80 77 3
5/21/82 orientation, (2) Verify supports.
are on correct pipe.
83 83 0
14240 Inspect for correct location.
8/11/82 82 82 0
14462 & 14229 Inspect for correct orientation.
6/15/82 of rear bracket.
42 42 0
14576 Reinspect to see if supports were.
8/9/82 installed per VN.
80 80 0
14731 Check for bearing behind base.
6/28/82 plates.
15433 Reinspect supports attaching to.
48 44 4
1/28/83 the floor, ceiling. Inspect dimension that is shown or calculate dimension.
80 77 3
13738 Reinspect gang support to assure.
9/16/82 that where supports attach to each other, all welds were made.
~
84 84 0
15793 Inspect for scaffolding on.
12/30/82 on supports.
PO 80 0
15807 Inspect to see if sight holes have.
been drilled in strut.
79 79 0
15996 Re-inspect for general configuration.
2/28/83 weld location, make sure typicals are oriented correctly.
80 78 2
R-6A 325, Complete reinspection except for.
326, 421 sway angles, material, gaps, and 2/28/84 anchor torque.
Page 8 of 8 AS-DUILT (19-14), (continued)
Cl REPOR15 (continued from page 8)
ITEM PROBl[M EVALUAll0N Dl5P051110N ADDITIONAL COMM[NIS CONCLUSION Non-Conforming Item Reports and Associated Criterion XVI investigation (continuation)
NCl#
Check'd Accept Rejeg 16210 (1) Check for apparent damage.
80 13 7
16042 (2) Check to see if snubber 15985 assembly screws are tight 5/24/83 R-6A 326 Check for missing snap rings.
182 180 2
11/23/83 Missing parts.
TOTAL 1161 1140 21 w
r, IV.
SUMMARY
AND ASSESSMENT 79-14 The Quality Assurance Program at Catawba provides for detailed inspections to assure that as-built conditions conform to Design requirements.
This program involves a
two phase inspection system by personnel trained in the requirements specified by Design.
These two phases consist of an erection inspection and a final walk - through.
Several significant problems have been identified in the areas of piping and support restraints.
These included:
50.55(e) 84-12 Bergen Paterson pipe clamps improperly installed 84-09 Incorrect tubing clamps used in erection of tubing supports 84-07 Incorrect modifications to end blocks for ITT Grinnell Mechanical Snubbers 84-04 Partial penetration welds 83-07 Vent valve 1ND105 not installed per Design criteria 82-04 Various tolerances for supports may have been inappropriately interpreted 82-03-02 Correction of Limitorque valve installations A 100% reinspection of these areas was performed.
Problems identified have been corrected or evaluated for acceptance as is, and inclusion in a revised drawing.
These items now meet all Design requirements.
Several less significant problems have been identified and sampling has been performed to assess the scope of the problems.
Samples done included:
Violation 83-04-01 Failure to follow procedures and drawings for hanger inspection 83-22-01 Review for misorientation for hanger 1-R-KC-0392 83-40-01 Failure to follow procedure for hanger installation and inspection These samples and other samples performed as a result of various nonconforming items resulted in the reinspection of 1579 supports with 34 problems being identified.
None of these problems were determined to be significant by Design Engineering.
This represents a very small rate of insignificant problems left after inspections are complete.
\\
1
r e
IV.
Summary and Asssssmtnt, 79-14 (continued)
(-
Page 2 It is a regular fanction of the Quality Assurance Program to identify, evaluate and correct problems that occur as a normal part of construction.
Many problems have been handled by this part of the QA Program.
Problems identified with the as-built program have been corrected or justified and are now in compliance with Design information.
These samples and reinspections demonstrate that while zero defects is the goal of the programs some problems will be found.
The very small quantity of these problems and their insignificance shows the program to be working appropriately.
This assessment shows that the requirements of NRC IE Bulletin 79-14 regarding as-built information has been met at Catawba.
Approval: 6 m
G42/g4 1
/t
{A LA 6
'l 5%.
L R Davison G W Qcrdr
- \\
Catawba Project QA Manager Corporat4 QA Managht 0!!L!ff Review and Concurrence:
Design Engineering Construction l 6-/244-