ML20210K479

Amends 113 & 101 to Licenses NPF-76 & NPF-80,respectively, Allowing Use of Check Valve with Flow Through Valve Secured as Addl Means to Isolate Affected Containment Penetration

ML20210K479
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	08/03/1999
From:	Gramm R NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210K484	List: ML20210K479 ML20210K488
References
NUDOCS 9908060137
Download: ML20210K479 (9)

Text

.

p en p

UNITED STATES 3

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666-0001 49.....,o STP NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-498 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE I

Amendment No.113 License No. NPF-76 i.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

i A.

The application for amendment by STP Nuclear Operating Company

• acting on behalf of itself and for Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P), the City Public Service Board of San Antonio (CPS), Central Power and Light Company (CPL), and City of Austin, Texas (COA) (the licensees), dated March 2,1999, as supplemented by letter dated July 13,1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

• STP Nuclear Operating Company is authorized to act for Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P), the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company and City of Austin, Texas and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

9908060137 990803 PDR ADOCK 05000498 P

ppg

l

\\

. 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-76 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2.

Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.113. and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be imple'mented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W

Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate IV & Decommissioning l

Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications l

Date of Issuance: August 3, 1999 1

i l

l f "%

p 4

UNITED STATES s

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I

2 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20665 4001

.....,o I

STP NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY l

DOCKET NO. 50-499 l

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.101 License No. NPF-80 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by STP Nuclear Operating Company

• acting on behalf of itself and for Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P), the City Public Service Board of San Antonio (CPS), Central Power and Light Company (CPL), and City of Austin, Texas (COA) (the licensees), dated March 2,1999, as supplemented by letter dated July 13,1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

• STP Nuclear Operating Company is authorized to act for Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P), the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company and City of Austin, Texas and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

. 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-80 is hereby amended to lead as follows:

2.

Techn! cal Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 101, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A

h Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate IV & Decommissioning Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: August 3, 1999 l

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS.113 AND 101 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-76 AND NPF-80 DOCKET NOS. 50-498 AND 50-499 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amt ndment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE INSERT 3/4 6-17 3/4 6-17 3/4 6-18 3/4 6-18*

B 3/4 6-3 B 3/4 6-3*

B 3/4 6-4 B 3/4 6-4 P

' Overleaf pages provided to maintain document completeness No changes on these pages.

p i

]

t i

l i.

CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS l

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.6.3 The containment isolation valves shall be OPERABLE witn isolation times less than or equal to the fequired Isolation times.

l l

i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4.

ACTION-i 1

With one or more of the isolation valve (s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation barrier

• OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

l Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or j

a.

(

b.

Isotate each affected penetration within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or check valve with flow through the valve secured **, or I

c.

isolate each affected penetration within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or i

d.

Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the j

following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

4.6.3.1 The isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to retuming the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isolation time.

4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a.

Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" isolation valve actuates to its l-isolation position; i

b.

Verifying that on a Containment Ventilation isolation test signal, each purge and exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position; and

[

' c.

Verifying that on a Phase "B" Isolation test signal, each Phase 'B' isolation valve actuates to its i

l-isolation position.

d.

Verifying that on a Phase 'A' isolation test signal, coincident with a low charging header pressure signal, that each seal injection valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power-operated or automatic valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

'An isolation barrier may either be a closed system (i.e., General Design Criteria 57 penetrations) or an isolation valve.

• • A check valve may not be used to isolate an affected penetration flow path in which more than one isolation valve is inoperable or in which the isolation barrier is a closed system with a single isolation valve (i.e., General Design Criteria 57 penetration).

' SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-17 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 59,113 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 47,101 k.

CONTAfNMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.5.4 t0MBUSTIBLE CAS CONTROL E DR91EN ANALY7ERS LIMITfMG COND1710N FOR OPERATION 3.6.4.1 Two independent containment hydrogen analyzers shall be OPERA 8LE.

APPLICAgit17Y: MDDE5 I and 2.

~

AEIl0N:

With one hydrogen analyzer inoperable, restore the inoperable a.

analyzer to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least NOT STAND 8Y within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

]

b.

With both hydrogen analyzers inoperable, restore at least one analyzer to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STAND 8Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

i SURVEfLLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.4.1 Each hydrogen analyzer shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, a channel CPERABILITY verification at least once per 92 days on a $TAGGERED TEST SASIS using sample gas containing one volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrofien, and by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months us' ng sample gas containing tan volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.

SOUTH TEXA3 - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-18 Unit 1 - Amendment No. W. 42 l

~

Unit 2 - Amendment No. IT. 31 l

4 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

(

BASES CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued) fore, the SITE BOUNDARY dose guidelines of 10 CFR 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during containment PURGING operation.

Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for containment purge supply and exhaust supply valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow opportunity for repair before gross leakage failures could develop.

The 0.60 L limit of Specification 3.6.1.2b shall not be exceeded when the leak,a leakage determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added'ge rates to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA or steam line break.

The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leaka safety analyses. ge rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the The Containment Spray System and the Containment Coolin provide post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere. g System both However, the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the entainment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

3/4.6.2.2 RECIRCULATION FLUID PH CONTROL SYSTEM The operability of the recirculation fluid pH control system ensures that there is sufficient trisodium phosphate available in containment to guarantee a sump pH of it7.0 during the recirculation phase of a postulated LOCA.

This pH level is required to reduce the potential for chloride induced stress corrosion of austenitic stainless steel and assure the retention of iodine in the recirculating fluid.

in a recirculation fluid pH between 7.0 and 9.5.The specified amounts of TSP will res 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Cooling System ensures that:

containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during norm (al1) the operation, and (2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the Containment Spray Systems during post-LOCA conditions.

4 i

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 6-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 30,74 Unit 2-AmegtNga4,63

l l

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES E4 6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM (continued) i STPEGS has toree groups of Reactor Containment Fan Coolers with two fans in each group (total of six fans). Five fans are adequate to satisfy the safety requirements including single failure. The fan cooler units are designed to remove heat from the containment during both normal operation and I

accident conditions. In the event of an accident, all fan cooler units are automatically placed into operation on receipt of a safety injection signal. During normal operation, cooling water flow to the fan cooler units is supplied by the non-safety grade chilled water system. Following an accident, cooling L

water flow to the fan coolers is supplied by the safety grade component cooling water system. The l

chilled water system supplies water at a lower temperature than that of the component cooling water system and therefore requires a lower flow rate to achieve a similar heat removal rate.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

l In the event one containment isolation valve in one or more penetrations is inoperable, and the i

l inoperable valve (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the affected penetration (s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and deactivated automatic isolation valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, or a check valve l

with flow through the valve secured (a check valve may not be used to isolate an affected penetration flow path in which more than one isolation valve is inoperable or in which the isolation barrier is a closed l

system with a single isolation valve). For a penetration flow path isolated in accordance with Action b or c, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available one to containment and does not have to be a General Design Criterion containment isolation valve.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. These Hydrogen Control Systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, ' Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA,' Revision 2, November 1978.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 6-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 74,113 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 69,101 1