ML20210G612

1997 Emergency Preparedness Drill/Excercise Scenario Guide

ML20210G612
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	05/21/1997
From:	ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
Shared Package
ML17312B520	List: ML20210G612
References
NUDOCS 9706230345
Download: ML20210G612 (20)

Text

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CONNDrNTIAL 1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 2 1

1.

SCENARIO TIMELINE

SUMMARY

0705 All 3 Palo Verde Units are operating at 100% full power. This unit has been at 100% power for the east 116 days. Core age is 200 Effective Full Power Days (reference Unit S Cycle 7 Core Data Book). The Unit is operating with the reduced Tn program. RCS Boron concentration is 546 ppm per Chemistry sample. Approximately 10 days ago, RCS activity began to slowly increase. Since that time, Chemistry has increased RCS sampling frequencies to accommodate the change in specific activity. At 0800 this morning, RCS activity will have had been stabilized at 1.08 pCi/gm Dose Equivalent l* for 47 hours5.439815e-4 days <br />0.0131 hours <br />7.771164e-5 weeks <br />1.78835e-5 months <br /> and 45 minutes. Chemistry has recently sampled the RCS and will relay the isotopic results to the Control Room in a few hours after the analyses have been completed. A Reactor Engineering Memo has been issued for this condition and contains information restricting any plant power changes to 20% per hour or less to limit core perturbations, which could increase the risk of escalating current RCS activity !evels. The normal, shiftly surveillance tests have been completed. Operations Managemeat has requested that 100% power operation be maintained as long as is practicable.

0800 Facility time synchronization / begin event timeline.

0815 Technical Specification LCO 3.4.7 Action Statement "a" is entered as RCS specific activity exceeding 1.0 pCi/gm Dose Equivalent l* for greater than 48 continuous hours has occurred. The crew must place the plant in Mode 3 and reduce Tcoto to less than 500 F within 6 1

hours.

0820 The SS enters the Emergency Plan by classifying the event as an NUE based on RCS specific activity exceeding Technical Specification allowable limits (EAL V-52). Offsite agencies are notified of the event within 15 minutes of emergency classification. Operators will calculate RCS Boron addition requirements and commence a plant shutdown.

0845 Emergency Diesel Generator "B" annunciation and Fire Computer alarms are received for Emergency Diesel Generator "B" Control Room and subsequently for Emergency Diesel Generator "B" Room. Operators dispatch an Auxiliary Operator and/or Fire Team Advisor to the area for assessment and proceed to notify Fire Protection personnel of the event. The Diesel Generator "B" Control Room fire causes a DG "B" differential relay trip due to spurious electrical faults which propagate through the DG control panel circuitry. Subsequent on-scene evaluation determines that the fire is out upon arrival, but physical damage exists to the Emergency Diesel Generator "B" control panel as a result of the fire.

0900 The SS determines that Emergency Diesel Generator "B" is inoperable. The EC upgrades the current emergency classification to an ALERT based on fire affecting a safety system required for the current operating mode (EAL V-114). Offsite agencies are notified of the event within 15 minutes of emergency classification upgrade. Onsite and offsite emergency response organizations will be activated.

Emergency response facilities will be staffed and activated within the time frames specified in the PVNGS Emergency Plan.

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CONriXNTIAL 1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 3 0950 The operators notice that RWT Level Transmitter CHB-LT-201 has failed low via control board annunciation as a result of a vehicle accident in the vicinity of the tank. A sensing line has been severed from the tank and an RWT leak begins at - 40 gpm.

1015 S/G tube leakage begins in S/G 1 and slowly escalates to 30 gpm. RMS willindicate rising readings over the subsequent 20 minutes on RU-142, -141, -139 -143, and -4. The crew will evaluate S/G integrity per 40AO-9ZZO2, Excessive RCS Leakrate, and commence an RCS leak rate calculation. Radiation Protection personnel will be notified and potential releases to the environment will be minimized per the procedure. In addition, the SS will enter the appropriate Technical Specification LCO Action Statements.

1035 Operators notice that the main feedwater economizer control valve for S/G 1 has cycled open and that excess feedwater addition to the S/G is occurring. An MSIS and reactor trip follows due to HI-HI S/G 1 level. Additionally, the transient causes steam generator tube leakage to increase from 30 gpm to - 700 gpm. The crew enters the Emergency Operations Procedure. Due to overfilling of the S/G, one of the affected S/G main steam lines break outside CTMT in the MSSS, causing slow depressurization of S/G 1. A radioactive release to the environment begins. The operators should diagnose multiple events in progress and proceed to the Functional Recovery Procedure.

Meanwhile, ESFAS functions have initiated. Current meteorological conditions will transport the radioactive piume over the Site Administration Complex to the Southeast. In addition, RU-139a and -139b were destroyed due to their close proximity (within 3 feet) to the main steam line break, resulting in the inability to monitor the radioactive release.

1048 The EC upgrades the current emergency classification to an SAE based on loss of the RCS and Containment fission product barriers (EALs V-12 and V-19). Offsite agencies are notified of the event within 15 minutes of emergency classification upgrade. The EC will request Assembly / Accountability for site personnel, but the evolution will be simulated. Meanwhile, HPSI Pump "A" loses performance characteristics and eventually fails over the next 10 minutes of operation. This failure will task Engineering with determining probabilities and contingencies for safety injection, should the remaining "B" Train pump fail, as it no longer has an available redundant power source.

1130 The offsite radioactive release to the environment will continue until the plant can be placed into Mode 5 with RCS temperature below 210 F. Field team monitoring of the radioactive plume continues to provide data for both onsite and offsite dose assessment activities.

Meanwhile, Engineering staff will continue to calculate remaining RWT inventory as time proceeds in an effort to determine if sufficient RCS makeup capabilities exist for Mode 5 entry.

1330 Conclude event timeline.

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CSNriDENTIAL 1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 4

11. REQUIRED SIMULATOR PREPARATION A. Documentation:

1. PVNGS C.R. Simulator-A:

Unit 1 specific

2. Reference material (s):

Unit 1 specific

3. Telephone / radio configurations: Unit 2 specific B. Red Danger Tag (s) for the Following Equipment:

1. NONE C. Special Procedure (s) / Equipment:

1. Update Plant Status Board information D. Qualifications:

1. Simulator operations require PVNGS qualifications in knowledge and operation of the PVNGS Simulators. All functions which are required to effectively transform the contents of this document into a comprehensive Control Room scenario scheme may not be embodied within the document, nor can all possible contingent actions requested by participants be anticipated. It is imperative that the Simulator Operator (s) possess the capability to ensure valid Simulator functions are identified and entered into the computer system in a correct and timely manner upon the request for their related effects.

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05NflDENTIAL 1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 5 E. SpecialInstructions:

1. Ensure the Following:

a. Daily Operational Readiness Test (DORT) completed

b. Operating System downloaded and uploaded (software clean-boot)

c. PMS computer and displays set up properly

d. RMS program running,if applicable

e. RMS Loops reinitialized,if appropriate f.

RMS printer ON, if applicable

g. STSC ERFDADS Printer (s) / Dose Projection Computer operational

h. Alarm and Log typers ON I.

Westronics recorders ON (B07)

J. Chart paper advanced on all recorders

k. Communications set up (telephone, headsets, radio, FAX) 1.

All procedures up-to-date and available

m. Plant status boards updated

n. Flowcharts cleaned and positioned correctly

o. All required Operator Aids installed properly

p. Paper pads and pens available

q. CR/STSC Player attendance sheet (s) available r.

Simulator Operations Area logistics proper

s. All cameras functioning and directed properly, if appropriate t.

VCR and tape (s) ready, if applicable

u. Software and Hardware support personnel available for duration

v. All trash cans clean

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1 CONFIDENTIAL 1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 6 ill SIMULATOR SETUP A. INITIAL CONDITION

1. IC-20 (100% Full Power - 200 EFPD - Reduced Tn Program - 546 ppm B' )

B. SPECIALINSTRUCTIONS j

1. Engage INSTRUMENT NOISE ON

2. Engage real-time ERFDADS clock display capability j

C. FUNCTIONS

1. [ MALFUNCTIONS]

a. [S102A]

50 (HPSI Pump A Degraded Performance)

b. [TH04]

0.2 (Fuel Rod Defect) t

2. [ COMPONENT OVERRIDES]

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a. ZDSGAHS174C NORMAL (SIG 1 Economizer FWlV fast-close CH-A)

b. ZDSGBHS132C NORMAL (S/G 1 Economizer FWlV fast-close CH-B)

3. [ ANNUNCIATORS]

a. NONE

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4. [CAEPITRIGGERS]

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a. NONE i

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D. EQUIPMENT RED DANGER TAG (S)

1. NONE t

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05NTIDr.NTIAL 1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 7 IV. BRIEFING A. Review Simulator Rules with Participants

1. The USNRC plans on having an examiner on the Simulator fioor during the Emergency Preparedness DrilVExercise whenever possible (based on available manpower). Their main function du'ing the DrilVExercise is to ensure the operating crew can implement the Emergency Plan satisfactorily. However, they carine: ignore any problems they observe during the DrilVExercise. In the event that they should observe a performance problem, their expected action is to determine if this problem was uncovered by the evaluation team and, if so, what remedial action will be taken to correct the problem. If the NRC had discovered a performance problem and no subsequent training action had been taken, then they would have an issue with the training group and not with the operator. If an identified performance problem relates to a history of poor performance on an individual's or team's NRC Requalification Examination in regards to the same problem, then the NRC may take issue with the operator (s) and the training group. If performance problems do occur, the NRC will expect to see the utility take remedial actions to correct the problems.

2. The primary responsibility is to operate the Simulation Facility as if it were the plant.

3. In addition to exercising the PVNGS Emergency Plan, the following activities will be observed during the DrilUExercise:

a. Teamwork / communications

b. Command and control

c. Diagnostic skills

d. Procedure usage

e. Systems knowledge f.

Log-keeping

4. A rough log may be kept during the DrilVExercise suitable to complete necessary formal!og entries.

5. Designated support personnel will act as Auxiliary Operators, Radiation Protection and Chemistry Technicians, Maintenance Supervisors, P! ant Management, etc.

6. A(n) DrilVExercise Controller will provide a shift turnover before the DrilVExercise begins. The shift turnover will include present plant conditions, power history, equipment out of service, abnormal conditions, surveillance (s) due, and instructions for the shift.

7. No control W.o switches will be purposely misaligned. Out-of-service equipment will be tagged or otherwise identified.

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CONFIDr_NTIAL 1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 8

8. Restroom leaves are permitted provided they are performed in compliance with normal Control Room staffing requirements.

9. The following items pertain to Drill / Exercise logistics:

a) This Drill / Exercise comprises full activation of all onsite and offsite Emergency Response Facilities. All procedural actions should take place unless otherwise directed within this briefing.

b) The telephone system has been switched over such that all outgoing calls placed from the floor area will reach the prescribed areas as indicated on the Simulator telephone listing for Unit 2. When answering incoming calls, disregard the red LED display on the phones so equipped to display incoming numbers, they may not display the correct incoming number in all cases. In addition, the green dedicated telephone system is live.

c) If Assembly / Accountability is directed, it will be simulated (i.e., no site-wide page will take place, as this causes confusion). Do not make any announcements or sound any signals regarding Assembly / Accountability.

d) If and when a site-wide page must be made regarding event classifications, be aware that a slight delay exists for the system to activate. In addition, please speak slowly and clearly to limit echo in outside areas.

e) The site-wide Drill / Exercise termination announcement should be made from the Simulator before the system is reconfigured to its prior status.

f) If ERDS must be activated, be aware that the normal password is accepted by the system in the Simulator. However, since the Simulator ERDS does not transmit to USNRC Headquarters, an established link cannot occur. Thus, activation of ERDS from the Simulator can take place only up to the point where MODEM dialing would occur. If and when this point is reached, a facility Controller should be informed that a simulated activation has taken place, g) Upon conclusion of shift tumover, the crew's Auxiliary Operators will be given time to proceed to their normal watch stations in Unit 2.

The OSC Controllers will accompany them. Once there, they will each receive a radio to allow them normal communications means with the Simulator Control Room staff. The AOs' and the Simulator radio will both transmit and receive on EPLAN TalkGroup 15.

NOTE:

Ensure copies of Step 9 Bdefing items are distnbuted within the Simulator for reference.

10. If any questions concerning the administration of the Drill / Exercise exist, please ask them prior to starting.

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i coNriormirt 1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 9 i

B. Assign Positions

1. The crew will assume positions as determined by a(n) Drill / Exercise Controller and/or crew supervision:

1 1

a. (SS) Shift Supervisor j

b. (CRS) Control Room Supervisor 1

c. (PO) Primary Operator

d. (SO) Secondary Operator 3

e. (RO) 3* Reactor Operator j

f.

(FTA) Fire Team Advisor (optional)

g. (STA) Shift Technical Advisor 1

2. Auxiliary Operators (AOs) will strategically place themselves in their assigned areas of responsibility. Ali other support personnel will

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assume their normal responsibilities within their respective assigned work areas.

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CONNDENTIAL i

1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 -

PAGE 10 V. CONTROLLER INFORMATION A. SimulatorConditions:

i

1. The progress of the scenario depends primarily on the competence and capabilities of the personnelinvolved and on the dependability of the software / hardware associated with the Simulation Facility. If, through unforeseen circumstances, the Simulator should fait during the course of Drill / Exercise operations, execution of the scenario may become hampered. In this case, the scenario timeline may have to be suspended until such time that it may again proceed. Accordingly, a timeline adjustment will then be incorporated onto the time-dependent events remaining in the Drill / Exercise. If the Simulator fails such that immediate repair or scenario recall is not feasible, a decision will be made at that time regarding future progression of the remaining portions of the Drill / Exercise. All Controllers will be informed in either case.

B. Scenario Guide Layout:

1. The following is a brief composite of the Scenario Guide column descriptions:

I

a. TIME:

Signifies real-time approximations with no applied adjustment

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b. SIM INSTRUCTIONS:

Simulator Operator instructions l

c. MSG:

Message number correlated to Section 04

d. CTL:

Controller designator 4

e. TQ:

Player designator f.

EVENT SEQUENCE:

Major events sequenced in chronological order

g. NOTES:

Controller information and/or Simulator Operator instructions a

2. Message identifiers used throughout this Scenario Guide (Section 03) are organized by type. Numeric-identified messages are employed for normal occurrences within the Drill / Exercise and should be used to achieve desired results based on predictable scenario events. Note that these messages may not always be directed on the designated scenario timeline, but may depend solely on events. Alpha-identified l

messages are employed as contingencies such that the messages are delivered only when or if predictable events or results do not take place. Contingency messages are keyed to specific actions, not time frames. Thus, when specific actions for which a particular contingency message is based do not occur on the timeline, the message should be saved and used when and if it is required. This type of message is utilized to maintain the Drill / Exercise on its predetermined course and not on its predetermined timeline.

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CONE [2ENT!A5_

1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 11 VI. SHIFT TURNOVER A. Plant / Site Conditions at 0705 MST:

1. All 3 Palo Verde Units are operating at 100% full power. This unit has been at 100% power for the last 116 days.

2. Core age is 200 Effective Full Power Days (reference Unit S Cycle 7 Core Data Book). The Unit is operating with the reduced Tu program.

RCS Boron concentration is 546 ppm per Chemistry sample.

3. Approximately 10 days ago, RCS activity began to slowly increase. Since that time, Chemistry has increased RCS sampling frequencies to accommodate the change in specific activity. At 0800 this moming, RCS activity will have had been stabilized at 1.08 pCi/gm Dose Equivalent l' ' for 47 hours5.439815e-4 days <br />0.0131 hours <br />7.771164e-5 weeks <br />1.78835e-5 months <br /> and 45 minutes. Chemistry has recently sampled the RCS and will relay the isotopic results to the Control Room in a few hours after the analyses have been completed. A Reactor Engineering Memo has been issued for this condition and contains information restricting any plant power changes to 20% per hour or less to limit core perturbations, which could increase the risk of escalating current RCS activity levels.

4. The normal, shiftly surveillance tests have been completed.

S. Operations Management has requested that 100% power operation be maintained as long as is practicable.

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4 CONCEDENTIAL 1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 12 i

l B. Miscellaneous:

j

1. 20-25 minutes will be allowed for familiarization with the status and condition of the control boards and for the Auxiliary Operators to arrive on station in Unit 2 and assume their watch duties as part of the Drill / Exercise. Initiallog entries may have been prepared by the J

Drill / Exercise Lead Controller or the crew may make the initial log entries for this shift.

j NOTE:

THE DRILUEXERCISE TIMELINE BEGINS WHEN THE CREW ASSUMES WATCH DUTIES AND SHOULD OCCUR AT 0800.

THE DRILUEXERCISE LEAD CONTROLLER WILL ESTABLISH TIMELINE SYNCHRONIZATION WITH ALL CONTROLLERS.

1 1

9 9

4 9

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CONT!DENTIAL 1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 13 E

SSC

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l f> ; thtft tumover,10-25 minutes will be allowed for 0705

" SHIFT TURNOVER ~

1 C-1 CREW The crew is informed of the Plant /Sita

.a 1 amiliarization with the status and condition of the Conditions as referenced in Section MA f

previous.

control boards and for the Auxiliary Operators to amve on station and assume thair watch duties. If an initial Simulator rules and configuration aspects log entry sheet has not been prepared for the crew, are covered and any questions are then they may prepare one. The Dnli/ Exercise Timeline answered.

will begin at 0800.

0725 2

C-1 SS As Emergency Response Facilities The Shift Supervisor (SS) should review plant become activated and manned during the conditions, brief the crew, and have the operators walk course of this Drill / Exercise, the following down their respective areas of responsibility, information will be relayed to the managers and key players by the Shift The operatn.^ c.ay, at this time, make the initial log Supervisor, as required:

entries for their shift and review the plant status boards.

Although this entire Drill / Exercise is Refer to Section 12 for data associated with simulated as taking place in Unit 2, malfunctioning equipment.

procedures applicable to the Simulator will be used in accordance with standard All Controllers should emure mat facihty managers are Simulator practices.

acquainted with the initial Sr anario Plant / Site Conditions.

All radiological information will be

- presented via the Control Room PDP-11 RMS DCU minicomputer, unless otherwise annotated.

0800'

~ BEGIN TIMELINE "

" BEGIN TIMELINE ~

~ BEG!N TIMELINE **

9 NOTE ALLTIMES ARE APPPOXIMATE M E97SEC03. DOC 03 18 97 11:45:49

CONFIDENTIM_

1997 EMERGENCY PREPARED 4ESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 14 E

E

T 0800 ENSURE SIMULATOR SETUP Verify all Simulator setup requirements.

0800 [CAE] weather 1 The Control Room crew assumes shift NOTE: TSC / EOF Controllers should verify watch duties and responsibilife appropriate ERFDADS response from See " NOTES" Column for instruchons Simulator-A in their respective facilities and then retum ERFDADS monitoring capabihties to the as-found condition. In addition, the Exercise Lead Controller will synchronize the timeline with Facility Lead Controllers to t*

of the Simulator-A Control Room clock.

0815 Technical Specification LCO 3.4.7 Action With RCS specific activity exceeding 1.0 pCilgm Dose Statement "a* is entered.

Equivalent l* for greater than 48 continuous hours, the crew must place the plant in Mode 3 and reduce Tm i

to less than 500*F within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

0820 The SS enters the Emergency Plan by Offsite agencies are notified of the event within 15 classifying the event as an NUE ba:;ed on minutes of emergency declaration.

RCS specific activity exceeding Technical Specification a!!owable limits (EAL V-52).

The SS may request to be relieved a: the EC by an The Site Shift Manager is notified of the unaffected Unit SS, by the Site Shift Manager, or by event and the impending plant shutdown.

another EC-qualified individual upon that individual's arrival and debrief.

Meanwhile, the operator -R tap.C3 Plant load changes vill occur in accordance with Boron addition requirements and 400P-9ZZ05, Power Operations. Reactor Engineering l

co mence a plant shutdown per Rx will be contacted fo: core performance predictions and Er.ineering memo and in accordance ECC, Chemistry, and Water Reclamation will be notied with Operations Management direction.

of the shutdown. During the shutdown, in-plant electricalloads will be transferred to the Startup Transformers and equipment will be secured as necessary, i

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CONFIDENT!AL 1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE - 97 "-AEV-05003 PAGE 15 E

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T E

MM u 6 0845 [OVRRD] AN:1C17D1 ALARM _ON Emergency Diesel Gener.:'or "B" NOTE: The Simulator Operator should pre-type the (ANW1C-17D DG B LO PRIORITY TRBL annunciation and Fire Computer alarms Fire Computer Terminal inputs into the Annunciator) are received for Emergency Diesel system, activate the Component Override and Generator "B" Control Room and Malfunction, and then initiate the Fire

[MALF] EG068 subsequently for Emergency Diesel Computer Terminal commands to ensure (DG B Differential Relay Trip)

Generator "B" Room.

correct synchronir=%n of the effects.

FIRE COMPUTER TERMINAL INPUTS:

Operators dispatch an Auxiliary Operator and/or Fire Team Advisor to the area for assessment and proceed COMMAND PARAM1 q

to notify Fire Protection personnel of the event.

ALARM 122BFR01 (Zone 22B)

ISSUE The Diesel Generator "B" Control Room fire causes a ALARM 121BF01B (Zone 218)

DG *B" differential relay trip duo to spurious electncal WAIT 30 faults which propagate through the DG control panel ISSUE circuitry. In addition, a LO priority trouble alarm is NORMAL 122BFR01

eceived.

NORMAL 121BF018 WAIT 100 ISSUE STOP See " NOTES" Column for instructions 0850 The AO I Fire Team Advisor investigating The message delivered to the AO / Fir. eam Advisor i

the DG *B* Control Room fire reports no details the extent of damage noted wie #sity. The AOl signs of fire in progress in either area, but Fire Team Advisor reports that the fire appeared to states that signs of a recent small fire in have originated in the DG control panel for DG *B".

i the Emergency Diesel Generator "B" Contro' Room apparently has caused in-plant Fire Department personnel arrive on the scene.

physical dams e to the DG control panel.

I 0853 [ REM FNC] EG21 STOP The AO is diMed to " Emergency Stop*

NOTE: Activate the Remote Function only if (Emergency S'op DG B)

Diesel Generator 'B".

requested.

See " NOTES" Column for instructions This request is an option Lased on SS determination.

0855 The SS determines that DG *B* is The SS will enter the appropriate Technical inoperable and that s/he must declare it Specification LCO Action Statement.

out-of-service.

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CONNDENT!AL 1997 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 16 MM N os<

i 0900 The EC upgrades the current emergency Offsite agencies are notified of the event within 15 classification to an ALERT based on fire minutes of emergency classification upgrade. Onsite affecting a safety system required for the and offsite emergency response organizations will be current operating mode (EAL V-114).

activated. Emergency response facilities will be staffed and activated within the time frames specified in the PVNGS Emergency Plan. (Power-37%)

0950 [MALF] TR01:CHBLT201 C The operators notice that RWT Level An RWT leak begins at - 40 gpm as a resuit of a (RWT Level Xmitter CHB-LT-201 Fail LO)

Transmitter CHB-LT-201 has failed low vehicle accident in the vicinity of the tank.

via control board annunciation.

[MALF] CV08 0.06 (As time proceeds, Engineering staff will commence (RWT Rupture) calculations for remaining RWT inventory, as an increased importance will be placed on the abihty to provide sufficient RCS makeup capabilities for the plant cooldown to Mode 5.)

1000 Emergency response facilities are staffed The Onsite Emergency Response Organization is and activated.

activated and assume duties and respensibilities in accordance with the PVNGS Emergency Plan and supporting implementing procedures.

1015 [MALF) TH06A 0 0->2.0=600 sec The crew receives RMS alarms and S/G tube 8eakage begins in S/G 1 and slow!y esc 94tes (S/G 1 Tube Rupture) determines that tube leakage has to 30 gpm over a 10-minute time penod developed in S/G 1.

(Power-60%)

RMS willindicate rising readings over the senseque.it 20 minutes on RU-142, -141, -139, -143, and -4.

The crew will evaluate SiG integnty per 40AO-9ZZO2, Excessive RCS Leakrate, and commence an RCS leak rate calculation. Radiation Protection personnel will be notified and potential releases to the environment will be minimized per the procedure. 74DP-9ZZ14 j

Contaminated Water Management Program, will be entered. In addition, the SS will enter the appropriate Technical Specification LCO Action Statements.

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I (bYEMML 1997 EMERGENCY PREPARED 4ESS EXERCISE SCENARIO GUIDE E-AEV-05003 PAGE 17 M-M

1 1035 [MALF] TH06A 2.0->100=300 sec Operators notice that the main Ieedwater NOTE: The Simulator Operator should perform the (S/G 1 Tube Rupture) economizer control valve for S/G 1 has fol.owing at the prescribed time (prior to one cyded open and that excess feedwater main feedwater pump secured):

[MALF] AV01:SGNFV1112 addition to the S/G is occurring. The (SG 1 FW Economizer Control Valve transient causes steam generator tube Pre-type the Fire Computer Terminal inputs SGN-FV-1112 Fails Open) leakage to increase.

into the system, activate the first two Malfunctions in the order stated, activate tne MALF) MS03A 10 An MSIS and reactor trip occur due to HI-remaining Malfunction and Remote Function (Main Steam Line Rupture between HI S/G 1 level The crew enters the at the time of the trip, and then initiate the Fire CTMT and MSIV on S/G 1 Line 1)

Emergency Operations Procedure.

Computer Terminal commands to ensure correct synchronization of the effects.

[ REM FNC] RM17 OFF_LINE Due to overfilling of the S/G, one of the (RU-139a / -139b Fail) affected S/G main steam lines break The impact cf the feedwater control valve failure will outside CTMT in the MSSS, causing slow result in an automatic MSIS and reactor trip in 1 minute.

FIRE COMPUTER TERMINAL INPUTS:

depressurization of S/G 1.

The operator may attempt to fast-close the feedwater control valve, but a relay problem prevents the valve's

-COMMAND PARAM1 A radioactive release to the environment closure. If the operator trips both running main ALARM 174T01A (Zone 74) begins.

feedwater pumps, the plant will trip on LO-LO steam ISSUE generator level instead of Hi-HI steam generator level ALARM 174F02A (Zone 74) and the MSIS will occur as a result of the MSLB.

ISSUE ALARM 174F01A (Zone 74)

RCS leakage via S/G 1 increases from 30 gpm to - 700 WAIT 3

gpm over a 5-minute time period.

ISSUE STOP The operators should diagnose multiple events in progress and proceed to the Functional Recovery 4

See " NOTES" Column for Instructions Procedure. Meanwhile, ESFAS functions h sve initiated.

The main steam line break causes a radioactive release to the environment to begin. Current meteceological conditions will transport the radioactive plume over the Site Administration Complex to the Southeast.

Fire alarms are received in the MSSS due to main steam saturation of the fire detection sensors.

~ Operators may notify Fire Protection personnel of the fire alarms. In addition, RU-139a and -139b are destroyed due to their close proximity (within 3 feet) to the main steam line break, resulting in the inability to monitor the radioactive release.

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T 1048 [MALF) S102A 50->100=600 sec The EC upgrades the current emergency Offsite agencies are notified of the event within 15 (HPSI Pump A Degraded Performance) classification to an SAE based on loss of minutes of emergency classification upgrade.

the RCS and Containment fission product barriers (EALs V-12 and V-19).

The CC will request Assembly I Accountability for site perst,. 't. Since this item is simulated (see item IV.A.9.c k. details), the Controller should record the i

time and discuss NA in the facility entique following the Exercise. The Controller should not allow the EC to sound the NA signal.

Meanwhile, HPSI Pump *A* loses performance characteristics and eventually fails over the next 10 minu'es of operation. This failure will task Engineenng with determining probabilities and contingencies for safety injection, should the remaining *B* Train pump fail, as it no longer has an available redundant power source.

1100

[ REM FNC] CH05 ACKNOWLEDGE An AO is directed to reset the *A* H2 NOTE: Activate the Remote Function only if (Common TRBL Alarm Reset

• A* H2 Monitor *Corarnon TRBL" Alarm.

Monitor) requested.

This action may not occur at the specified time and is See " NOTES" Column for Instructions dependent upon the pace h procedure usage by the crew.

1105

[ REM FNC] ED72 OVERRIDE _CLS An AO is directed to re-energize non-NOTE: Activate the Remote Functions only if

[ REM FNC] ED74 OVERRIDE _CLS Class load-shed Motor Control Centers requested.

[ REM FNC] ED76 OVERRIDE _CLS and Essential Lighting Panels.

[ REM FNC] EDN OVERRIDE _CLS The Simulator Operator should allow % -1 minute

[ REM FNC] ED75 OVERRIDE _CLS between each subsequent breaker closure or use CAE

[ REM FNC] ED77 OVERRIDE _CLS "mecon" designed to simulate these functions.

(Re-energize M19, M71, QBN-D91, M20, M72, and QBN-D90, respectively)

This action may not occur at the specified time and is dependent upon the pace in procedure usage by the See " NOTES" Column for Instructions crew.

4

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o e 1115 [ REM FNC] MS25100 Auxiliary steam is cross-tied from another NOTE: Activate the Simulator functions only if

[ REM FNC] MS24 ON Unit per procedure, requested.

[MALF] AV02:MNPV5A l

[MALF] AV02:ASNPV5B This action may wt occur at the specified time and is

[ MAL 7] AV02:ASNPV6 dependent upon :he pace in procedure usage by the (Align Auxiliary Steam) crew.

See " NOTES" Column for instructions 1

1125 [ REM FNC] WD30 OPEN S/G 1 HI Rate blowdown is aligned to the NOTE: Activate the Remote Functions only if (SCN-V088 SG 1 HI Rate Blowdown to condenser for S/G level control.

requested.

Condenser Outlet)

This action may not occur at the specified time and is

[ REM FNC] WD29 OPEN deoendent upon the pace in procedure usage by the (SCN-V071 SG 1 Abnormal Blowdown to crew.

Condenser Outlet)

See " NOTES" Column for instructions 1130 The offsite radbactive release to the The release will continue until the plant is placed into environment continues. Field team Mode 5 with RCS temperature below 210*F. Based on monitoring cf the radioactive plume

, time limitations associated with the plant cooldown, the continues to provide data for both onsite release will continue for at least another 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

and offsite dose assessment activities.

Meanwhile. Engineering staff will contmue to calculate remaining RWT inventory as time proceeds in an effoet to determine if sufficient RCS makeup capabilities exist for Mode 5 entry. However, the determination should be made that sufficient inventory exists to achieve Mode 5, given the size of the RWT teak and its dm:reasing leak rate as RWT level lowers.

~ CONCLUDE TIMELINE "*

• " CONCLUDE TIMELINE "'

1330

"* CONCLUDE TIMELINE ~

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