ML20210C088
| ML20210C088 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1987 |
| From: | Brownlee V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Stewart W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8702090317 | |
| Download: ML20210C088 (2) | |
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'Vjrginia Electric and Power Company MTTN:.Mr. W. L. Stewart, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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7 P. O. Box 26666 Richmond, VA 23261 y
,p Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
, FEMA FINAL REPORT'- NORTH ANNA POWER STATION EMERGENCY EXERCISE OF JUNE 18, 1986 Enclosed is a copy of the. Federal Emergency Management Agency's Final Report for the North Anna Nuclear Station EmergencyJ Exercise of June 18, 1986. As described in the enclosure, FEMA did not' identify any deficiencies; however, forty-one items have been recognized which require corrective actions.
FEMA also identified twelve areas reconsnended for improvement.
We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA. ' Resolution of these items should be completed.
prior to the next full scale emergency preparedness exercise.
We also encourage you to work closely with the Stai.: and counties in the development of a scenario for the next full scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the above items were disclosed.
Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.
Sincerely,
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Virgil L. Brownlee, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
FEMA Final Report 1c w/ encl:
W. Harrell, Station Manager J. Hardwick, Manager - Nuclear Programs and Licensing w=
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C DEC 161986 MFJORANDUM EOR: Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear latory Connission
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FROM:
R Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards
SUBJECT:
Exercise Report for the June 18, 1986, Exercise of Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the North Anna Power Station Attached is a copy of the exercise report for the June 18, 1986, exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the North Anna Power Station. This exercise report was prepared by the Region III staff of the Federal Emergency Managenent Agency.
The. vere no deficiencies identified during this exercise. However, there are several areas requiring corrective actions and several areas recomended for inprovement. A draft copy of the exercise report was provided to the Comnonwealth of Virginia for review and conment. Based on their review, a schedule of corrective actions is included in this final exercise report.
Therefore, the offsite radiological energency plans and preparedness remain adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an accident at the North Anna Power Station, and the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on February 23, 1983, will remain in effect.
If 'you should have any questions, please contact Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2860.
Attachments D/, I 13Q rn n Ac Jo v-
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r CONTENTS E XE RC IS E SU M M A RIES....................................................
iv BACKGROUND............................................................
1 PARTICIPATING JU RISDICTIONS/ORG ANIZATIONS...........................
1 LIST O F OBSE RVER ASSIG N M ENTS..........................................
3 EVA LU ATIO N C RITE RI A U S E D..............................................
3 EX E RC IS E O BJ ECTIVES....................................................
4 SCENARIO................................................................
6 SCENARIO CH RONOLOG Y OF EVENTS......................................
6 DE MO NST R ATIO N O F RESO U R C ES..........................................
6 STATUS OF INADEQUACIES FROM PRIOR EXERCISES........................
7 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES STILL TO BE EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVED................ 10 E X E R C I S E R E P O RTS....................................................... 11 S tat e A c t iv it ie s......................................................... 11 Caroline County Ac tivities............................................... 22 H anov er County Ac tivities............................................... 23 Louisa County Activities................................................. 25 Orange County Activities................................................ 28 Spotsylvania County Activities............................................ 30 EXP LANATION OF INA DEQ U ACIES.......................................... 33 1
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION................................... 34 l
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT................................ 62 G W d # J- ( w~
111
EXERCISE SUMMARIES Commonwealth of Virginia State EOC The overall response capabilities at the Virginia State EOC were professionally demonstrated by a well-trained staff. Sheltering of livestock should be considered at the first indication of a release. Radiological Emergency Response Plans should be revised
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to incorporate off-site protective actions which are to be initiated following the evacuation of on-site personnel.
Joint Media Center i
Activation of the Media Center was timely. Some improvements have been made I
to the center's facility. Heightened coordination is needed between State and Utility representatives.
A technically oriented individual should be available to respond to media questions.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Dose assessment activities were conducted well as were the use of protective action guides. Coordination between EOF and radiological field team members and team exposure control should be improved. Alternatives should be developed for providing technical expertise to the Media Center to respond to questions from the press.
State / Local Field Monitoring Teams Field team members were knowledgeable concerning the use of radiological monitoring equipment, although some county equipment was in need of calibration.
Additional training is needed regarding radiological exposure control.
[
g Ingestion Pathway Field Sampling Team The milk sampling team adequately demonstrated sampling techniques. Team members should be provided radiological exposure control training. Sampling of food and water was included in the exercise scenario, but was not demonstrated during the exercise.
Access and Traffic Control Access and traffic control points were generally manned in a well-coordinated fashion. Consideration should be given to access control in protective action areas which extend beyond the ten-mile EPZ as identified in the plans.
1 IV
Medical College of Virginia Most activities relating to the demonstration of treatment and care of the contaminated injured patient were simulated, due in part to the tardy arrival of the ambulance. Radiological exposure control and the containment of contamination within restricted areas were poorly displayed. This exercise objective was not adequately demonstrated.
Red Cross Field Headquarters Activities at this location were well organized. Additional activities of the Red Cross should be incorporated in future exercises.
Caroline County The EOC and facilities were adequate to support emergency operations. Staff were generally well-trained.
Coordination of news releases between the county and Media Center should be improved.
Hanover County Mobilization of EOC staff and activation of the EOC were accomplished in a timely manner.
EAC activities were adequately demonstrated although staff were prepositioned. All EOC staff positions should be filled in future exercises.
i Louisa County EOC activities were well managed. Most EOC staff appeared very knowledge-able concerning their respective responsibilities.
A current list of mobility / hearing impaired individuals is being developed. Routes for route alerting should be reviewed to ensure timely completion by route vehicles.
Orange County Resources appear adequate to protect the public residing within the relatively small area of this county affected by the 10-mile EPZ. EOC operations were effectively managed overall, although the communications officer was absent from exercise play.
Spotsylvania County The Spotsylvania emergency response staff were generally well-trained and knowledgeable, although the PIO was not in attendance. The facility is very cramped, requiring separation of staff functions and resulted in complications in communication.
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One organization should be assigned responsibility for maintaining lists of hearing / mobility impaired.
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1 BACKGROUND Federal requirements dictate that periodic Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness exercises be conducted in support of nuclear power plants to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities. The exercises test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within emergency preparedness plans and organizations. The exercises simulate a coordinated response by State and local authorities, along with the utility, to include mobilization of personnel and resources adequate to verify the capability to deal with an accident scenario requiring responses up to, and including, evacuation. This was the fifth full participation exercise for the North Anna Power Station and the various off-site organizations.
The Commonwealth of Virginia's State and local plans and preparedness for the North Anna Power Station were approved on February 23,1983, as providing reasonable assurance that appropriate off-site protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency and are capable of being implemented.
This approval was conditioned with the successful demonstration of adequacy of the public alerting and i
notification system in accordance with the standards set forth in Appendix 3 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission / FEMA Criteria of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, and the subsequently published standards in FEMA-43. Plans regarding ths alert and notification system for the jurisdictions surrounding the North Anna Power Station are currently undergoing the review process by FEMA Region III.
L The purpose of this report is to record the capabilities of State and local governments to respond to an accident at the North Anna Power Station based upon the actual demonstration or simulation of their abilities during the June 18,1986 joint, full participation exercise. Inadequacies will be identified from this exercise and corrective actions will be recommended which would help to improve preparedness and edsponse capabilities.
This exercise was observed by a team made up of Individuals from FEMA Region III, with support from the American Red Cross and Argonne National Laboratory, along with members of the Regional Assistance Committee.
I PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS / ORGANIZATIONS l
STATE AGENCIES Agriculture and Const mer Services, Department of Air Pollution Control Board, State Conservation and Historic Resources, Department of (Parks Division and Forestry Division)
Corrections, Department of l
Emergency Services, Department of Game and Inland Fisheries, Commission of l
l
2 General Services, Department of (Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services)
Health, Department of (Bureau of Radiological Health and Division of Emergency Medical Services)
Highways and Transportation, Department of Information Technology, Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, Department of Military Affairs, Department of Social Services, Department of State Police, Department of Water Control Board, State Imeal Governments Caroline County Hanover County Louisa County Orange County Spotsylvania County Private Organizations Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES)
American National Red Cross Salvation army Virginia Power Corporate Headquarters North Anna Power Station (NAPS)
A4acent States Maryland, State of (Maryland Emergency Management and Civil Defense Agency)
Other Agencies Chessie Railroad System G
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LIST OF OBSERVER ASSIGNMENTS Observers at Large Paul P. Giordano, Regional Director James R. Asher, RAC Chairman
. State EOC Jan Lamb, Team Leader (FEMA)
Fred Gill (HHS)
Medical Demonstration Fred Gill (HHS)
EOF Martha Poston-Brown (NRC)
Bill Belanger (EPA)
State / Local Monitoring Teams Jim Bogard, Team Leader (DOE)
Chris Saricks (ANL)
Field Sampling Teams Bob Conley, Team Leader (USDA)
John Tatar (ANL)
Traffic / Access Control Walt Adams (DOT)
Media Center Hugh Laine (FEMA)
Louisa County Karen Larson, Project Leader (FEMA)
Ken Rose (ANL)
Spotsylvania County Rick Kinard, Team Leader (FEMA)
Dale Petranech (ARC)
Bill Chambers (ANL)
Hanover County Joe McCarey, Team Leader (FEMA)
Gloria Joyner (FEMA National)
Caroline County Steve Hopkins, Team Leader (FEMA)
Ross Hemphill (ANL)
Orange County Bill Curtis, Team Leader (FEMA)
Jerry Staroba (ANL) l EVALUATION CRITERIA USED The Commonwealth of Virginia and local government's response during this exercise was evaluated in relationship to the Commonwealth of Virginia Emergency Operations Plan, Annex I-V to Volume II, Radiological Emergency Response Plan, dated June 1983, Rev.1985, and the Radiological Emergency Response Plans for Caroline, Hanover, Louisa, and Spotsylvania Counties, dated April 1981, revised 1986, and the Orange County Plan dated April 1981, Rev.1984. These plans were prepared under the
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authority of the Commonwealth of Virginia Emergency Services and Disaster Law of 1973 (Code of Virginia, Chapter 3.2, Title 44), as amended, and were developed in accordance with NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, November,1980.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 1.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and State and local EOCs in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communication systems among and within emergency response organizations and between all designated facilities and field activities.
3.
Demonstrate the public information aspects and abilities of each information center to coordinate, communicate, and cooperate in the receipt and dissemination of news releases.
4.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the public warning system procedures (notification of general public messages to be disseminated).
5.
Demonstrate the adequacy of accident assessment abilities of the licensee and State Bureau of Radiological Health.
6.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the decision-making process of State / local government to see if they conform with the recommendation for protective action / measures and the ability to implement protective measures.
?
7'.
Demonstrate the adequacy of reentry / recovery decision process.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to provide the advance coordination of information releases.
9.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
- 10. Demonstrate an ability to effectively respond to both in-person and telephone news media Inquiries in a timely manner.
- 11. Demonstrate an ability to establish and operate a joint information center.
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- 12. Demonstrate that internal message and information flow (collection, consolidation, and dissemination) in the EOCs and ensure coordination with all affected agency representatives.
- 13. Demonstrate the ability of the EOC to direct field teams to perform plume, Ingestion, and reentry monitoring and/or sampling.
- 14. Demonstrate the ability of the field teams to take environmental samples and transport the samples to collection points.
- 15. Demonstrate that response organizations can alert, notify, and mobilize emergency response personnelin a timely fashion.
- 16. Demonstrate that EOCs can be staffed in a timely fashion.
- 17. Demonstrate that response organizations can dispatch personnel to all appropriate locations to effect/ implement protective response measures, i.e.,
evacuation, monitoring, assessment, evacuation assembly centers, in a timely fashion.
- 18. Demonstrate that the State / local government can carry out free play in the decision making process with regard to protective measures for the plume emergency planning zone.
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- 19. Demonstrate the abilities of local governments to provide control l
of access to restricted areas and effectively perform a coordinated evacuation.
- 20. Demonstrate support from elected and appointed public officials regarding the operations process and decision making.
' ' ' 21. Demonstrate the capabilities of all jurisdictions to execute emergency response plans to protect the public's health and safety.
- 22.. Demonstrate the existence and adequacy of emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.
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- 23. Demonstrate the abilities of the response organization to effectively utilize / support agencies and authorities where/when local capabilities are exceeded.
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6 SCENARIO i
The on-site exercise scenario calls for Unit I to be operating at 100 %
equilibrium; the core is at middle life and the reactor coolant fission product inventory is normal. Unit 2 la in a refueling shutdown; Unit 2 is defueled and the charging system is tagged out for major piping design change rendering the charging system crosstle l
Three " Notification of Unusual Event" actions are to follow: 1) a fire at a hydrogen storage trailer not brought under control within 10 minutes; 2) a unit shutdown i
due to unidentified reactor coolant system leakage; and 3) Identification of a l
contaminated injured person who must be transported off site. An " Alert" is declared l
when pressurizer level cannot be maintained at 20% with one charging /SI pump; reactor coolant system leakage is exceeding 50 gym. " Site Area" is declared when a manual safety injection is initiated due to loss of reactor coolant. " General Emergency" is declared with verification of loss of containment integrity with known fuel failure and breech of the primary system boundary.
SCENARIO CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS l
Projected g
Actual 3:50 Notification of Unusual Event 3:53 8:00 Notification of Unusual Event (status change) 8:00 l
9:10 Notification of Unusual Event (status change) 9:03 i
9:30 Alert 9:30 10:35 Site Area Emergency 10:41 10:51 Evacuation of NAPS Non-essential personnel 11:06 11:10-11:20 Siren and EBS Activation 11:16 11:50 General Emergency 11:30 13:30 Exercise Terminated (on-site) 14:50 16:00 Exercise Terminated (off-site)
'15:40 DEMONSTRATION OF RESOURCES
- State and County EOCs.
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- Communications systems and equipment.
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- Staffing of facilities.
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- Activation of notification system (stren system and EBS).
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- Route alerting.
- State and County Media Centers, including rumor control.
- Milk sampling team and equipment.
- Evacuation Assembly Centers.
- Primary Remote Assembly Area.
- Designated access control and traffic control points.
- Combined State / local and local field radiological monitoring teams.
- Bus evacuation routes.
- Self reading dosimeters, dose record forms, TLDs and simulated KI for emergency workers STATUS OF INADEQUACIES PROM PRIOR EXERCISES The previous full-scale exercise held in conjunction with the North Anna Power Station was conducted on November 15, 1984.
Under the classification system of inadequacies utilized at that time, 1 Category "A" deficiency, 28 Category "B" defielencies, and 16 Category "B" recommendations were identified. The majority of these inadequacles have been adequately addressed / corrected with the exception of the following items. (NOTE: tbme inadequacles found to be prevailing during this exercise have been listed under those Areas Requiring Corrective Action or Areas Recommended for Improvement at the end of this report.)
l Previous Category "B" Defielencies Status State / Local Radiological Monitoring Teams 5.
Field teams should be briefed with Field Teams again were not briefed on regard to meteorological conditions meteorological or plant conditions prior to by the EOF prior to their deployment departure to the field.
to the field; local team members should be instructed as to their roles / responsibilities.
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6.
Additional training should be provided This inadequacy remains evident in the to team members with regard to de-State / local radiological monitoring teams.
contamination procedures, maximum dose allowed without authorization, and instructions regarding procedures to be followed if dose limits are exceeded.
Agricultural Sampling Team 8.
Field sampling teams should be Not adequately addressed.
The milk provided with two-way radios in their sampling team's radio was not effectively vehicles to permit the timely demonstrated due to " dead spots" in the exchange of information.
sampling area. The Water Control Board personnel Indicated that the radio in their l
vehicle was inoperable.
I 9.
Record keeping cards should be issued Not adequately addressed. Record cards to sampling teams members along were not available to the milk sampling with the dosimetry equipment.
team members.
l Hanover County 15.
Elected officials should take a more Not addressed.
Local officials remain active role in future exercises.
uninvolved with demonstrated emergency l
response functions.
l 16.
If the County continues to use the This deficiency remains at the County l
operations room used in this and past EOC; however, the county plans to exercises, a drop off for the Insta-construct a public facility building in j
phone and additional telephone lines 1987, which should correct identified should be installed at the EOC. It is inadequacles with this facility.
noted that this was an identified deficiency in the previous exercise.
18.
The RADEF Officer should refami-This inadequacy could not be evaluated as liarize himself with the procedures the RADEF officer was not present during established for emergency worker the exercise.
radiological exposure control.
Louisa County I
20.
Some emergency workers observed Inadequately addressed.
Emergency In the field were unfamillar with the workers at the Traffic Control Point (both radiation exposure limit. Emergency state and local personnel) and route alert I
workers should be fully briefed on personnel were unaware of the maximum the maximum dose allowable without dose allowable without authorization.
authorization.
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9 thotsylvania County 23.
It is recommended that a drop off of A drop-off line has not been located in the the Instaphone be located in the EOC operations area, however, runners EOC Operations area which would were effectively utilized to transmit permit direct communications information throughout the EOC.
between the EMC and the decision-makers at the State EOC, EOF and other risk counties.
r 25.
Briefings to field workers should Not adequately addressed. There was no include procedures in the use of KI discussion of KI during briefings, and the i
and maximum doses allowable maximum dose was not specifically without authorization.
defined.
Emergency workers were instructed to report back to the EOC if their dosimeters indicated an " abrupt change."
Previous Category "B" Recommendations Status i
Caroline County l
35.
All significant incoming and This activity not adequately addressed.
outgoing EOC messages should be Only the most basic information was logged. Significant on and off-site posted; other significant incoming and
- events, including emergency outgoing messages were not posted.
classification
- levels, should be posted and updated in o dr er to enable newly arrived staff to quickly crient themselves as to the status of j
the emergency response.
l
- g Hanover County 37.
A larger room providing seating for Not corrected, but should be provided for anticipated press representatives within the new facility. See note #16.
would better accommodate media functions. Additional maps, such as the EPZ and Evacuation Route maps, would be extremely helpful in accomplishing more effective briefings.
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The capability for the exchange of This inadequacy was not successfully hard copy news releases among the addressed during this exercise as the County EOC, State EOC and the North Anna Computer Network was not Joint Media Center was not avall-operational at Louisa County for the bulk able at the County.
In order to of the exercise.
permit effective coordination of news releases between the County and State PIOS, some means for transmitting and receiving hard copy news releases should be established
'and used at the County EOC.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES STILL TO BE EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVED 2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communication systems among and within emergency response organizations and between all designated facilities and field activities.
3.
Demonstrate the public information aspects and abilities of each information center to coordinate, communicate, and cooperate in the receipt and dissemination of news releases.
7.
Demonstrate the adequacy of reentry / recovery decision process.
- 13. Demonstrate the ability of the EOC to direct field teams to perform plume, ingestion, and reentry monitoring and/or sampling.
- 14. Demonstrate the ability of the field teams to take environmental samples and transport the samples to collection points.
- 20. Demonstrate support from elected and appoint public officials regarding the operations process and decision making.
11 EXERCISE REPORTS
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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA STATE EOC Activation of the State EOC occurred in a timely and efficient manner. After being informed of several Unusual Events, a decision was made to notify certain key Individuals in order to place them on standby status. The entire staff was notified during the alert stage and told to report to the EOC. The staff at the State EOC functioned as a well-coordinated team with the Operations officer and his staff leading the response 1
activities.
It is noted that the Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries had representatives stationed at the Louisa and Spotsylvania County EOCs to support notification of boaters within the 10-mile EPZ on Lake Anna;' however, no notification / instruction was provided to these representatives to initiate public notification on the lake.
A sophisticated communications network is available in the state EOC ensuring primary and backup systems to all criticallocations.
The strens and EBS were activated to inform residents to shelter out to 2 miles i
and 10 miles in areas included within Sectors C, D and E during the Site Area Emergency.
The Office of Emergency Services and the utility reportedly have an l
agreement that if the power plant evacuates non-essential personnel, an automatic j
protective action will be initiated out to two miles off-site. This protective action l
agreement has not been included in the Radiological Emergency Response Plans.
4 During the activation of the EBS message, the designated radio station announced that this exercise was being conducted in conjunction with the Surry Power i
Station.
The State PIO observed this error and reported it to the radio station personnel. The strens and EBS system were activated (simulated) again at 1215 to 1
l announce additional protective actions.
l The Department of Agriculture decided to shelter livestock and place them on stored feed at 1245. However, the State EOC was informed of the potential for a release at the North Anna plant at 1144, and at 1206 the State was notified that a release of 5 R-per-hour was occurring.
The additional protective actions of evacuation were initiated in sectors C, D, and E at 1215. It is recommended that the Department of Agriculture consider Initiating protective actions for livestock when a potential release is Indicated.
Overall response capabilities of the staff of the State Emergency Operations Center were demonstrated in a professional manner.
STATE EOC INADEQUACIES / RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
Agreements have been reportedly made between the State and utility to initiate protective actions off-site in conjunction with i
the evacuation of non-essential personnel on-site. This procedure l
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12-should be included in the appropriate state and county radiological emergency response plans.
2.
It is recommended that the State consider the sheltering of livestock and placement of animals on stored feed at the first Indication of a radiological release from the North Anna Power Plant.
l 3.
Although representatives from the Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries were positioned to demonstrate public alerting on Lake Anna, no order was issued from the State to activate this action.
Future exercises should take full advantage of available resources to provide for the comprehensive training experience provided by the exercise.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)
The State dose assessment and protective action function was in general 1
performed very well. A system is in place to activate staff at any hour of the day. Staff present at the EOF were adequately trained and knowledgeable regarding their duties.
State organizations were set up quickly, monitoring teams were dispatched in a timely manner, and a communication link to the State EOC was rapidly established. The new EOF was well laid out, and provided sufficient space for staff activities as well as for additional observers.
Dose assessment appeared to go very well, with the State i
representatives frequently comparing results with those of the licensee. Protective action guides were also handled well.
An informal policy is reportedly in place which calls for the evacuation of off-site jurisdictions out to 2-miles upon the evacuation of on-site persons, although this l
policy is not evident in any existing plans.
Coordination between utility and State radiological, monitoring field teams should be enhanced with improved communication between monitoring team overseers at the EOF. Communication to local field teams in the provision of protective actions, i.e.,
evacuation, of certain sectors was extremely slow, taking up to two hours to be t
transmitted to the local teams. The State Radiological Officer was involved in media briefings which required the transit to and from the EOF twice during the exercise; designation of an alternate information contact or use of telephonic press interviews should be considered.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY INADEQUACIES / RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
Radiological exposure control for radiological monitoring team members, through the coordinated movement of the teams should be improved. (See State / Local Field Monitoring Teams report.)
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EOF State representatives recommended the removal of local teams from the plume area at 11:30 due to a projected heightened integrated dose in sectors C,D, and E out to 10 miles.
This information was not transmitted to local authorities and forwarded to local monitoring teams until between 1315 and 1340.
b.
State Radiological Monitoring Team #1 was authorized to continue monitoring despite having crossed the plume twice within two miles of that plant, and incurring a possible dose of three times the threshold level.
This team included a teenaged member.
c.
Two' monitoring teams, one Virginia Power and State Team #1, were dispatched to approximately the identical location at about the same time to take an air sample within the plume.
It is recommended that ALARA be used at all times in providing optimal exposure control for field emergency workers. Improved communication between utility and State EOF personnel with oversight for the field teams is needed.
2.
An informal policy exists which calls for the off-site evacuation of jurisdictions out to two miles in the event that plant personnel are evacuated. This policy is in fact more protective of the public than current plans indicate. However, State personnel were unable i
to identify where this policy is available in written form. Any such policy should be incorporated in all appropriate radiological emergency response plans.
3.
The State Radiological Officer was twice called from the EOF to give media briefings. This is very undesirable since it requires the Director to transit the " hot" area outside the protected EOF twice for each briefing, and causes unnecessary opening of the EOF doors. It also takes the Radiological Officer away from essential duties at the EOF. Recommended alternatives include the use of a telephone interview to communicate with the press or the designation of an expert stationed outside the EPZ to communicate with the press.
STATFJLOCAL FIELD MONITORING TEAMS VIRGINIA STATE FIELD TEAM #1 This team was made up of a trained Virginia BRH health physics specialist and a trainee. The BRH representative had deployed from Richmond at the second notification l
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of unusual event while the trainee was locally based. All equipment used by this team
' was brought from Richmond in coordination with deployment of the state mobile lab.
i Mobilization and deployment of the teams from the Mineral Fire Department j
staging area was timely. Team I had reached its assigned starting point well before the release from containment began at the plant. Monitoring equipment on the vehicle Included a low-range GM survey meter (with backup), high-range ionization chamber, air pump (powered from the vehicle battery), paper filters and charcoal canisters (simulating silver zeollte collection media available in Richmond). A GeLi detector was available at the mobile lab. Survey instruments had calibration stickers showing that they had been 3
calibrated in the past 12 months, which is consistent with State procedures. - There was no sticker on the air pump, but the team leader reported that it had been calibrated at the same time as the GM counter (2/21/86). Only air readings and collection of air i
samples (3) were demonstrated by this team. All_ readings taken were open window (beta-gamma). A source check was not demonstrated. Air samples were bagged (single bag i
only) and labeled, then transported to the mobile lab within, at most, one hour and ten j
minutes after collection. Communications were very good, and use of the state's new repeater with the high-band radio was successful at eliminating dead spots. Backup communications capabilities were also demonstrated. Exposure control was not entirely adequate. Team members did not know (until 12:40 p.m., when they~ had already been in the plume for several minutes and were advised from the EOF) what was the maximum dose allowed without authorization. When this dose was given,(it was a value 500 mR);
this value could not be read on the high and low dosimetry available to the team. This team was authorized from the EOF to continue monitoring activity after it had been i
determined that their exposure had possibly exceeded the stated PAGs by a factor of three. The presence of an 18-year-old individual on the team renders this decision highly i
questionable. (See the listing of EOF Inadequacles/ Recommendations.)
l LOUISA COUNTY AND STATE FIELD TEAM #2 Mobilization was effectively demonstrated by the Louisa County radiological monitoring team. Three of four teams were assembled within twenty minutes of a radio pager announcement issued by the Louisa dispatcher, and the first team was deployed to the field within forty-five minutes of the announcement. There was no briefing by the dispatcher informing the team of meteorological conditions or of the conditions at the North Anna Plant (NAP) prior to their initiation of. monitoring activities.
County radiation instrumentation was in need of calibration, as was the rotometer on the state team's hi-vol air sampler. The teams were both very familiar with the area in which the exercise was staged, and transit time between sampling points was optimal, even when alternate routes were necessary.
Communications by radio were dependable and efficiently maintained.
Appropriate use of phonetics and general good radio com-munications practice was noted.
Proper use of anti-contamination clothing was demonstrated by the county team, and the state team's equipment included goggles, earplugs, and a sealing lubricant in addition to routine exposure control equipment.
Neither the County nor State team had all the appropriate low, middle, and high-range pocket dosimeters available, however.
15 STATE / LOCAL FIELD MONITORING TEAM INADEQUACIES / RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
The county team was not briefed on North Anna Power Plant con-ditions or on meteorological conditions prior to being dispatched from the assembly area. Future exercises should provide for the briefing of field personnel regarding plant and meteorological conditions prior to dispatch to the field.
(This is a repeated deficiency from the previous exercise.)
i 2.
The G-M instruments available to the Louisa county team were in need of calibration. Of four CDV-700s/CDV-715s, two had no call-bration stickers, and two bore stickers that indicated calibration was last performed in 1980. All monitoring equipment should be calibrated in accordance with State and manufacturing company recommendations.
3.
Neither the County team nor State team Number 1 were aware of i
the exposure allowable without authorization. Information pro-vided by the EOF to Team #1 Indicated a value of 500 mR, which is not consistent with the State plan, which allows for 25 R.
Radiclogical exposure control training to field workers should include this information (this is a repeated deficiency).
4.
The Louisa County team had only high-range pocket dosimeters in their possession; low-or mid-range dosimetry should also be l
supplied to these persons to ensure effective individual exposure control.
I t
frfATE INGESTION PATHWAY FIELD SAMPLING TEAMS During this exercise, the water and food sampling teams were not deployed as they were notified to simulate sample collection (even though arrangements had been made to demonstrate and obs'erve these activities). Milk sampling was the only activity
'actually demonstrated. Milk sampling was accomplished in a timely and professional manner. Necessary equipment in kit form was available for milk sampling and its use was adequately demonstrated. Equipment for water sampling was observed as being adequate, but its use was not demonstrated as the team was not deployed.
Food sampling equipment was not observed in any capacity.
I The milk sampling vehicle was equipped with a two way radio, however, the Fredericksburg area was apparently a " dead spot" as radio contact could not be made while in that area. No back-up radio was available. The water sampling staff indicated that the radio on their vehicle is not operational. Record keeping cards for radiological data were not available for water or milk sampling teams.
~
The water sampling team had no training in radiological exposure control, were not informed of emergency worker PAGs and did not know where to report for i
1
16 decontamination.
The milk sampling team member had some radiologleal exposure control training but was not sure of decontamination station locations.
FIELD SAMPLING TEAM INADEQUACIES / RECOMMENDATIONS l
1.
The milk sampling teams vehicle was equipped with a two-way radio, but could not effect radio contact, as Fredericksburg is apparently a " dead spot." The water sampling staff Indicated that i
although a radio is available within their vehicle, it was not operational.
Future exercises should demonstrate the effective operation of radio communications.
This is an' inadequately l
addressed problem identified in the previous exercise.
l 2.
Record keeping cards were not available for the milk sampling teams water control board staff utilized a sheet of notebook paper to record their readings.
Sampling teams should be provided standard record keeping cards at the time of dosimetry distribution in order to ease and ensure the completion of this task. It is noted that this was an inadequacy in the previous full-scale exercise.
3.
The milk sampling team members demonstrated general knowledge 1 -
of exposure control procedures, but were not aware of decon-tamination locations.
Water control board staff have had no training in radiological exposure control, were not informed of emergency worker PAGs, and were unaware of the need to report to or location of decontamination stations. Although it is intended j
to send sampling teams into an area only during recovery opera-tions, it is recommended that exposure control training be provided to individuals assigned to this function in order to ensure individual r
emergency worker protection.
JOINT MEDIA CENTER i
The State Public Information Officer and his staff were notified in accordance I
with the plan and the Joint Media Center in Mineral, Virginia was activated in a timely manner. Twenty-four hour coverage for all positions was demonstrated via a roster. The i
State PIOS are well trained, experienced professionals who, in general, adequately i
demonstrated proper public information functions. There have been some improvements in the physical set up and quality of the facilities at the Media Center. The State PIO and his staff have been assigned a private work area as recommended in the last critique.
It was recognized by both the State and utility public information representatives i
that the communications between the Mineral Media Center and the Corporate Media Center needs improvement both in communications equipment (speakers, microphones, etc.) and in terms of coordination. Regular Joint Media Briefings should follow the established schedule, i.e., on an hourly basis, and the State P!O should be provided 1
i 17 4
sufficient time to prepare the State's response to utility releases. The State and Utility spokespersons should coordinate their releases more closely to avoid confusing or contradictory statements.
l There was some difficulty experienced in providing for a technical representative from the Health Department to answer technical questions relating to radiation and its effects. At scheduled Intervals, a technical person should be made available to answer 4
media questions of this type.
While the media had no private place to conduct interviews, the large room that was available could easily accommodate several areas with movable partitions.
Instructions were not given regarding school children as schools were out of session for the summer at the time of this exercise.
There was only one person dedicated to the rumor control function; however, that number can be expanded if required. The scenario seemed adequate to test the 1
media center capabilities.
JOINT MEDIA CENTER INADEQUACIES / RECOMMENDATIONS i
j 1.
The State and Utility Public Information Officers should provide l
for the coordination of their news releases, both in terms of the j
timing of scheduled news conferences, communications equipment, and consistency of the content of public statements.
2.
Some difficulty was experienced in obtalning a representative from j
the State's Health Department to respond to questions concerning i
the health effects of radiation.
Provisions should be taken to i
provide for the periodic availability of a State Representative i
trained in this area to adequately respond to questions of this nature. (See also the EOF section of this report.)
I i
i ACCESS AND TRAFFIC CONTROL i
Virginia State Police and Louisa County Police demonstrated the ability to effectively respond to an emergency at the North Anna Nuclear Power Plant. Initially, j
State and local police responded to a " site emergency" by manning traffic control points (TCP's) along the plant's evacuation route. They expedited the movement of evacuated t
j plant employees to the primary assembly area. These officers were then reassigned to access control points (ACP's) when evacuation in Louisa County was ordered to two miles. They were again reassigned at " general emergency" to man ACPs five miles from l
the plant. Louisa County was upwind from the plant during the emergency and therefore j
two and five miles were considered appropriate evacuation limits. Downwind from the i
l plant in Spotsylvania county, State Police first manned ACPs at five miles then were reassigned at general emergency to 10 mile ACPs.
All participating officers were l
familiar with the nearest reception centers and had been issued appropriate dosimetry.
1 l
i r
18 The Virginia Department of Highways also provided excellent barricade support at both manned and unmanned ACPs.
ACCESS AND TRAFFIC CONTROL INADEQUACIES / RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
Local police did not participate in manning ACPs in Spotsylvania County. The State Police adequately manned the selected ACPs.,
however, it is desirable to demonstrate coordination and cooperation by the local police.
It is recommended that local participation be demonstrated in the manning of ACPs in future exercises.
2.
Additional training of police in Louisa County is suggested that would address:
celtical dose levels, the value of protective clothing, KI use, and decontamination activities.
3.
The barricade locations established to provide for access control at the 10 mile radius of the plume emergency planning zone do not correspond completely with the boundarles of the areas designated I
to be included in protective action deelslons. Consequently, those areas at or beyond the 10 mile EPZ in which protective actions, i.e., evacuation, are ordered, but which are outside of the con-trolled area, will not be provided any security / protection.
Consideration should be made as to the provision of access control points in these areas.
l 4.
Protective actions were ordered in accordance with the plans, by areas; however, the implementation of access control was based on expanding rings of control located at radil of 2, 5, and 10 miles from the power station. These two systems are not consistent in the definition of geographic boundaries, and therefore do not provide for the adequate control of access to the potential protective action areas, it is recommended that access control I
procedures and the location of access control points conform with the numbered areas established around the EPZ as designated in the plans.
5.
No access control points have been Identified in the plans within 4
the 10-mile EPZ. It is recommended that access control positions be evaluated within the EPZ and the plans revised as necessary to ensure adequate access control to all areas in which protective actions may be ordered.
i i
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19 MEDICAL COLLEGE OF VIRGINIA A medical demonstration was scheduled to be provided during this exercise at the Medical College of Virginia in Richmond, Virginia. The ambulance used,to transport the injured, contaminated (simulated) victim departed the plant at 9:26 a.m. and was expected to arrive at the hospital at approximately 10:36 a.m. Ilowever, the ambulance overheated during the transport, requiring the use of a second ambulance which did not arrive at the hospital until 12:02. The ambulance radio was not functional and therefore telephone communication was used to notify the hospital of the vehicular breakdown.
The ambulance crew checked for contamination prior to and following removal of the patient from the ambulance. Only gloves were used by the crew as special protection gear.
A security area was established in the non-acute emergency room (ER) area to receive the patient. Radiation signs were posted, but the area was not roped off and the floor was not covered leading into the treatment room; the equipment to accomplish this activity is reportedly stored in the morgue area of the hospital.
The hospital response team wore dosimeters, but in general was unfamiliar with radiological exposure control actions, i.e., response individuals required Instruction as to how to dress, masks were not worn, door handles and light switches were not covered, and no security personnel were designated to control the area. (Police representatives assigned to control the area were dismissed due to the late arrival of the ambulance.)
One clear plastic bag for the storage of contaminated clothing was available, but was not provided with a contamination tag; it is also noted that the ER crew was originally advised to pile the clothes in a corner near a ventilation return air duct. No lead pigs were present for the placement of metal or glass objects, although the hospital has four such containers that could be utilized.
Due to the belated arrival of the ambulance, the area set aside for the exercise demonstration was returned to real world availability, and consequently very little was actually demonstrated by ER staff. No whole body survey of the patient was done, no swabs used, no discussion of (1) the simulated lacerations / burns, (2) bathing or monitoring, (3) removal of the contamination from the area, nor was there discussion of the final clearance of the Individual from the area.
l The Radiological Emergency Plan is currently in draft form; this plan should be finalized and submitted for review by the Regional Assistance Committee.
MEDICAL COLLEGE OF VIRGINIA INADEQUACIES / RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
Future exercises should demonstrate the actual activities required l
to respond to a simulated contaminated patient received at this facility. Emergency room response should be of such a nature as to clearly demonstrate response capabilities in treating a con-taminated, injured patient. To support this function, the use of 6
(
two ambulances, one at the plant and one at the hospital, should be considered to minimize the dedicated use time of the emergency room.
I t
20 2.
The ambulance radio was not functional during the exercise, i
requiring the ambulance crew to utilize a commercial telephone to notify the hospital of the need for a back-up ambulance and delay of arrival.
The radio equipment on the ambulance should be analyzed and the necessary corrective actions taken to ensure operational use of this equipment.
3.
The emergency room staff assigned to respond to radiological con-tamination incidents should be trained as to appropriate radio-
~
logical exposure control actions. Training for these persons should include proper personal protective actions, as well as instruction in the conscientious control of contamination within the emergency room.
4.
Ropes and floor coverings were not utilized during the exercise to establish a controlled area, although this equipment is reportedly available and stored in the morgue section of the hospital. It is recommended that this equipment be readily accessible to the emergency room receiving area, and its use demonstrated in the control of this area during future exercises.
5.
The Radiological Emergency Plan for the medical staff is currently in draft form. This plan should be finalized and submitted for x
review by the Regional Assistance Committee.
RED CROSS FIELD HEADQUARTERS The Red Cross opened a disaster field headquarters to support the Red Cross effort. Red Cross officials notified the State EOC and the person designated to act as l
IIalson with the Red Cross when the office was opened for this exercise. However, the
!!alson was not properly briefed on Red Cross procedures as he continued to make ec,ntact with the Red Cross Chapter in Richmond, not the Fredericksburg field office.
To enable the State designated liaison officer to properly coordinate activities with the Red Cross, it is recommended that he be briefed by Red Cross as to their organization and structure.
RED CROSS FIELD HEADQUARTERS INADEQUACIES / RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
The Red Cross operation during this type of emergency situation is not coordinated from the county or State EOCs, but rather from the local Red Cross Chapter and the disaster field headquarters.
For future exercises, these locatters should be considered as action points for the emergency scenario and response.
2.
It is recommended that the Red Cross be involved in scenario development during future exercises to insure that the Chapters
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c 21 and the field headquarters have the opportunity to contribute to Y
the proposed exercise play.
. CAROLINE COUNTY EOC Notification of the EOC, and subsequent mobilization of the staff, occurred promptly and in accordance with the plan. Full staffing was achieved during the Site
+
Area Emergency phase, and capability for establishing two shifts was demonstrated by presentation of a roster.
The Emergency Services Coordinator provided effective leadership for the well-trained staff. Copies of the plans and procedures were available and consulted, and the coordinator provided periodic briefings to update the staff. The status board, however, was not used to best advantage for this purpose. The staff used message logs and forms dffectively, access to the EOC was adequately controlled, and the head supervisor was an EOC participant.
The EOC receive'd notification of major events as follows: Alert at 0943; Site Area Emergency at 1050; General Emergency at 1144; Governor's Declaration of State of 3
Emergency at 1110; Take Shelter Directive at 1210. State officials determined that evacuation was not necessary for Caroline County EPZ residents. At each stage, the Coordinator and his staff performed the appropriate coordination activities in a timely
- ' manner.
The EOC and facilities were adequate to support the County's emergency response actions. The communications systems and equipment were also adequate, with
.the exception of the North Anna Computer System, which did not provide hard copy of l
, 'public information messages prepared at the Media Center, and did not accept the County's radiological field monitoring data for transmittal to State officials at the EOF.
l The County dispatched one field monitor to obtain readings at the four plan-designated locations.
The readings were radioed to the County EOC, where the
' Radiological officer relayed them to.the EOF via telephone.
As dusignated in the plan, the County's role in Public Alerting is limited to performing supplemental route alerting, which the coordinator decided not to demonstrate for the exercise.
The coordinator reported that only one house is inadequately c6vered by the siren system, and he directed the dispatcher to contact the residents via teleyhone after stren activation.
There are no schools, factories, or institutions within the 10-mile EPZ portion of Caroline County.
Yublic emhgency instructions and EBS messages were prepared and released by
~
'the State at the Media Center, in accordance with the plans. However, there was no evidence of coordination between the County EOC and Media Center regarding specific Instructions for Caroline County residents.
Hard copy of EBS messages and news releases were not available at the. County, despite attempts by the EOC staff to obtain them via the computer system. Furthermore, the EOC staff did not monitor local EBS l
radio stations to assure that appropriate instructions were broadcast.
s e*
l 1
22 l
Although evacuation of the County was not directed, several evacuation-related activities were demonstrated: the four designated access control points were established
/
(one was manned, as per the exercise objectives), and the EAC was activated. The coordinator reported that there were no mobility-impaired or hearing-tmpaired individuals among the 125 County residents within the 10-mile EPZ. The capability to evacuate residents who are without a private means of transportation was demonstrated, although it was not called for in conjunction with the exercise scenario.
Radiological exposure control measures were not demonstrated at the EOC, as the facility is located outside of the 10-mile EPZ, and is not a dosimetry distribution point for emergency workers.
Nevertheless, appropriate staff were knowledgeable concerning maximum permissible dose, procedures for using KI, and decontamination procedures. County officials were advised, upon inquiry, that there was no need for KI use by Caroline County emergency workers.
Space for conducting press briefings was available at the EOC, but was not used during the exercise due to lack of media interest. A demonstration of reentry and recovery procedures was not applicable as the County did not evacuate.
Radiological Field Monitoring Mobilization of the field monitoring team occurred at 1145 upon notification from the EOC via radio, after having been placed on standby during the Alert phase. The message provided present plant conditions. The team consisted of one monitor sent out to take readings at four pre-designated locations.
The monitor was supplied with adequate equipment to accomplish this mission; air sampling, and collecting vegetation, crops, water, milk, and soll for testing are not county team responsibilities. The team monitor followed the SOP for detection of radiation exposure, and was familiar with the region being monitored.
Radio communication with the EOC was adequately demonstrated throughout the monitoring process.
The field monitor was equipped with appropriate protective clothing and equipment, low and mid-range self reading dosimeters, chargers and record cards; and l
adequate training in the use of all such equipment was evident. However, a permanent l
record dosimeter was not provided to the monitor.
CAROLINE COUNTY EAC Activation and mobilization of the Evacuation Assembly Center (EAC) at the Ladysmith Elementary School were demonstrated in a timely manner with a well informed and fully trained staff.
Round-the-clock staffing was not explicitly demonstrated, but the capability was shown to exist by a verbal list. The capability for registration, monitoring, decontamination and general care of the evacuees was demonstrated in a well-prepared and organized manner. The EAC is reportedly capable of handling over 500 people; if this proves insufficient, however, the Ladysmith Primary School is prepared to serve as a supplemental location. The EAC was well equipped with food, clothing, and nursing facilities.
23 Each worker in the EAC was issued dosimetry (both low and medium range) with which they demonstrated adequate knowledge in reading and recording activities. They were not, however, provided with TLDs.
CAROLINE COUNTY INADEQUACIES / RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
The status board was not used effectively to keep the staff fu'.ly informed of exercise events. Only the most basic information, the current emergency classification level, was posted. It is recom-mended that the status board be used to maintain a chronological listing of all significant events and information.
2.
There was a lack of coordination between the County EOC and the Media Center regarding emergency instructions for the public, hard copy of news releases and EBS messages were not available at the County, and the EOC staff did not monitor local EBS stations to assure that appropriate instructions were broadcast. County officials should review their role in providing the public with emergency information, and should demonstrate this capability, including coordination with the media center and monitoring of EBS stations.
During future exercises, a reliable means of exchanging hard copy news releases and EBS messages with the Media Center should be established and demonstrated at the Caroline County EOC.
3.
The field monitor was not provided with a TLD or other permanent record dosimeter, as required. TLDs also were not provided to emergency workers at the EAC. A quantity of TLDs sufficient for all county emergency field workers should be provided and main-tained at the distribution points. The use of TLDs by emergency workers should be demonstrated during future exercises.
t, HANOVER COUNTY EOC The Hanover County EOC was activated and staffed in a timely manner according to the County RERP.
Staff mobilization procedures were accomplished utilizing a current call list with twenty-four hour a day response capability and were adequately demonstrated. The EOC staff was well trained and knowledgeable. The RADEF Officer and County Officials were not present during the exercise. The EMC l
effectively managed emergency operations and the EOC representatives were given aseignments according to their areas of specialty. The staff was briefed on current events and reference materials such as the County response plan, written procedures and checklists were utilized. Message handling was efficient, message logs were kept, and emergency status changes were recorded. Response actions were initiated based on the emergency classification levels and requirements of the County plan. The EOC facility did not have telephones within the operations area; phones were located in adjoining l
24 rooms which required the use of runners to provide a means of internal communication.
Prolonged telephone conversations would require personnel to leave the operations area for significant periods of time to accomplish the phone calls. The County plans to construct a Public Facility Building in FY87 with a communications center to respond to the identified problems in this area. A status board was visible and was kept current; maps were available but not posted which indicated the location of EACs, access control
- points, radiological monitoring
- points, and population by evacuation area.
Communication capability by Instaphone, and fire / radio were demonstrated effectively.
The instaphones were placed out of service for approximately one hour in order to test the back-up communication system. The procedures discussed for K1 use and distribution at the EOC were consistent with the County plan. Procedures for Public alerting and Instruction were simulated, including route alerting, calls to schools (not in session), and institutions.
HANOVER COUNTY EAC When the observer arrived, the Evacuation Assembly Center at the Liberty Junior High School was well staffed and had received a small bus load of people, a mixed group of children and elderly individuals. The EAC Coordinator was in contact with all aspects of the center by hand-held radio, and was knowledgeable and proficient in the running of the center. Staff were prepared to assist the evacuees as needed. A roster of EAC personnel Indicated ample back-up staff to allow for two 12-hour shifts. Activation of the EAC appeared to start at 7:00 a.m. as indicated on the facilities' log.
Prepositioning of personnel should be avolded during future exercises.
The EAC staff monitored evacuees at a monitoring station set up outside of the school.
If evacuees were found to be contaminated, they were sent to the decontamination area (showers) at the side entrance to the school. They were then monitored again, their clothes removed and showered; and remonitored. Contaminated clothing was placed in a container marked " Radioactive Waste." The evacuees were then issued a change of clothing and directed to the gym for registration. The showers j
drained into underground septic tanks and the school has its own supply of well water.
l The EAC appeared well equipped to handle a large number of evacuees, with a reported capability to care for at least 400 persons. It is a large school situated on one floor, and is equipped to handle the handicapped:
restrooms were equipped with handicapped facilities and the entrances and exits would allow easy access.
l Communications capability was adequately demonstrated via the American Red Cross mobile communications unit.
Communications equipment available inside the school included telephones and hand-held radios.
l The gymnasium was very large with extra seating available in the bleachers. The cafeteria is large with ample freezer and storage areas, and feeds approximately 900 people on a daily basis during the school year. The Registered Nurses could contact a doctor by telephone for prescriptions or other medical needs if necessary, and contact can be made with hospital and ambulance services.
25 HANOVER COUNTY INADEQUACIES / RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
The EOC facility continues to display the logistical problems identified in the previous exercise, i.e., a lack of communication equipment in the operations area, and limited space to accom-modate press representatives.
The County should continue its plans to construct a Public Facility Building, to include a communications center, in fiscal year 1987.
2.
The Radef Officer was not present at the EOC during this exercise.
The demonstration of effective staff interaction requires all members to be present. Elected Officials should take a more active role in future exercises, and all EOC positions should be manned.
I 3.
The exercise was terminated at the county EOC before the notifi-cation from the State that off-site exercise play was terminated.
This could present problems if the exercise scenario required i
additional input from the County. The County should continue its involvement in exercise play until notified by the State that the exercise has been terminated.
4.
Personnel assigned to the Evacuation Assembly Center were pre-positioned during this-exercise, with individuals arriving as early as 7:00 a.m. Future exercises should demonstrate the actual manning of the EAC in accordance with the County Plan.
.i LOUISA COUNTY EOC The Louisa County EOC was activated in a timely manner following notification of the " Alert" emergency classification at the North Anna Power Station. Organizations
. represented in the EOC were in accordance with the County Plan. The Central Dispatch Office provides for a 24-hour response mechanism for the County.
All staff were generally knowledgeable concerning their respective duties. An overall message log was used to record exercise activities; EOC staff did not use standard message forms to record their actions. Access to the EOC was very well controlled. Calls were placed in a timely manner to activate all emergency response teams. Communication capabilities were adequate in most respects, and although the North Anna Computer Network was not operational for the greater part of the exercise, RACES was used as a very effective means of back-up communication to the EOF for forwarding local field radiological data.
Louisa County provided for the timely activation of the siren public notification system upon request by the State; however, the EBS station used during this exercise was l
not monitored during the exercise, nor was the Computer consistently operational to communicate public information releases with the State. No lists of hearing or mobil.ty impaired persons were available at the County EOC. Route alerting was demonstrated for a short section of Route 685; three routes however, were posted on a bulletin board i
1
. _ - - - -.. -., - - - - - - _. -. - - - ~
26 which were identified by EOC personnel as the routes which would normally be taken.
These routes appeared to be excessively long and did not encompass the entire EPZ, nor did the routes provide coverage for all of the areas identified by the recent Alert and Notification test as having limited stren coverage. Dosimetry equipment was available at the EOC in numbers prescribed by the plan. The RADEF Officer was generally knowledgeable regarding radiological exposure control procedures, and demonstrated good coordination with field radiological monitoring teams.
The State Police representative indicated that K1 would be distributed by himself to State police emergency workers in the field upon direction from the State EOC. A press belefing was provided by the Director of Emergency Services; the briefing was accurate and 4
I
~
complete. The Public Information Officer maintained telephonic communication with the State PIOS, in lieu of the generally inoperative Computer Network. Sheriff, State Police and Public Works Representatives actively discussed access and traffic control 1-activities in conjunction with the escalating protective actions. However, designated locations for access control barriers placed along the 10-mile EPZ do not completely correspond with the areas identified for protective actions.
ROUTE ALERTING A route alert team was observed while traverstr.g a portion of Route 685 in i
Louisa County. This was actually demonstrated by the reading of a written message over j
the vehicle's PA system, advising the public to tune to the local EBS station. The l
alerting process was conducted at a moderate speed, although only a very short segment of the road was covered.
Emergency workers were equipped with dosimeters and TLDs. The workers were aware of how and when to check their dosimeters and they were aware of procedures for decontamination. However, few workers were aware of the maximum allowable dose without authorization.
Each worker was supplied with only a 0-20 R or a 0-200 R dosimeter, with no worker observed as having both types of dosimeters. They were not supplied with K1 but were aware of its use.
\\
FIELD MONITORING TEAM Mobilization of a local radiological monitoring team was reportedly prompt although not observed. The team was adequately equipped with appropriate monitoring equipment. The team followed instructions for operation of the unit and were familiar with the region being monitored. The team was in constant radio contact with the RADEF Officer at the Louisa County EOC and other county monitoring teams. There was a back-up portable radio system available if needed. The team members were equipped with high range dosimeters (0-200 R) but no low-or mid-range dosimeters.
They were familiar with the operation of the dosimeters and were aware of the maximum l
dose allowed without authorization.
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27 LOUISA COUNTY INADEQUACIES / RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
Recording of actions and times by all EOC staff were incon-sistently maintained, and standard log sheets were not used. In order to establish an accurate log of activities for use in the briefing of replacement personnel in extended operations, and to provide a permanent record of activity, it is recommended that a standard log form be developed and distributed to all EOC participants.
2.
The North Anna Computer Network, the primary means of written message distribution for public information activities, was not operational at this location during the bulk of the exercise. As a result, messages received via this information chain were untimely and the use of back-up communication means was necessary. It is recommended that the functional operation of the network be analyzed and problems corrected as needed.
It is also recom-mended that additional training be provided to the Individual (s) detailed to operate this equipment.
3.
The designated radio station used to air the emergency broadcast message was not monitored during the exercise, thereby precluding the observation by EOC personnel of the timing or content of this message. It is recommended that the EBS station be monitored during future exercises.
4.
According to the Coordinator of Emergency Services, the County is currently developing lists of mobility and hearing impaired persons. In order to ensure the prompt and complete notification to and provision of special assistance to these persons, these lists should be developed as soon as possible, and a system set in place l
to periodically update the lists.
l 5.
The State Police represe -ntative indicated that the current plan for distribution of KI to police emergency workers in the field would require him to transport this drug to each of the field locations to which workers were assigned.
This would, under the exercise scenario demonstrated, leave the County EOC without State Police representation for some period of time, and also would delay the administration of the drug to the field workers. It is recommended that procedures be modified to include distribution of KI to
(
emergency workers at the time of dosimetry distribution to permit timely ingestion of the drug upon directive by the appropriate l
authorities.
6.
Route Alerting was essentially simulated during this exercise, with l
only a small portion of Route 685 actually run. Ilowever, a map l
was posted in the EOC which represented three routes which cover l
l l
28 i.
the majority of the county and which reportedly would be the actual routes completed. The routes, however, are long, do not cover the entire 10-mile EPZ, and do not cover all of those locations within the 0-5 and 5-10 mile areas which do not meet the
)
I audible criteria for strens according to the recent alert and notification study. The routes should be reevaluated and revised to l
provide for the timely and comprehensive notification to all required areas.
l 7.
Route alert team members and several emergency workers l
stationed at the traffic control point were unaware of the 1
maximum allowable dose without authorization. All emergency workers should be fully briefed on the maximum dose allowable without authorization. This inadequacy was also noted during the previous full-scale exercise.
8.
Emergency workers in the field were provided with one dosimeter only, either a 0-20 R or 0-200 R self-reading dosimeter. Each worker should be provided two types of dosimeters to allow for j
adequate radiological exposure control.
ORANGE COUNTY EOC The notification of the " Alert" emergency classification level at the North Anna Power Station and the subsequent activation of Orange County EOC staff were accomplished in accordance with the RERP. Only 35 families (125 people) reside within that portion of Orange County which is affected by the 10-mile EPZ. In general, the l-County resources appear adequate to address emergency activities to protect the j
public. The EOC operations were effectively managed overall, although the absence of the communications officer from the operation resulted in inefficient message handling
, and logging. EOC staff appeared adequately trained and knowledgeable; facilities and communication equipment were adequate to support emergency operations.
Route alerting was initiated in conjunction with the second (simulated) sounding of the strens and was completed in approximately 30 minutes.
No mobility or hearing impaired i
individuals reside within the 10-mile EPZ.
Adequate dosimetry was available, and l
Individuals were present who were knowledgeable in its use. A press belefing was given
(
to local radio station personnel by the EMC; the briefing was accurate and complete.
l ORANGE COUNTY EAC f
l The designated Evacuation Assembly Center for Orange County is the Orange County High School in Orange, Virginia. This center was not activated for this exercise j
as this activity was uncalled for by the exercise scenarlo. A full scale demonstration was performed during the last biennial exercise however. This prior demonstration included l
adequate proce sing, monitoring, registering, and boarding of sixty persons.
i-
29 An interview with the principal was conducted and a guided tour of the school followed.
The principal and his staff were very knowledgeable concerning EAC activities. This facility and the resources available appear sufficient to adequately respond to the needs of Orange County's evacuated population.
RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING TEAM Orange County has a single field team assigned to man one monitoring point located within the county's area of the 10-mile EPZ. The county did not dispatch this field team during the exercise as the plume did not affect the county.
The chief field team member acted as the RACES operator at the EOC for this exercise. He and the RADEF officer both had attended radiological training courses and were very knowledgeable about worker radiological exposure control and field team procedures.
The field team has all the proper dosimetry, protective equipment, radiation detection instruments and communication capability to successfully carry out field monitoring activities.
TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL There is only one traffic control point located within the 10-mile EPZ in Orange County. This point was not actually manned during the exercise. No schools are located within the area, nor are there any mobility or hearing-tmpaired persons residing within the EPZ.
ROUTE ALERTING Route alerting was demonstrated during this exercise and was completed by the County Sheriff using a police cruiser equipped with a public address system. The Sheriff stopped at each of the homes located on the route and simulated delivering an appropelate message. The route took approximately 30 minutes to complete. Two buses are available to assist in the evacuation of the public (equipped with radios and dosimetry) in the event of an evacuation order due to an emergency at the North Anna i
Power Station.
ORANGE COUNTY INADEQUACIES / RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
The Communications Officer was not available for participation in this exercise due to a personal emergency.
The Emergency Management Coordinator, therefore, in addition to his responst-bilities, provided for the communication activities throughout the exercise. It is recommended that in future exercises, all EOC positions be appropriately filled by designated primary or back-up
30 staff persons so that each EOC function may be adequately addressed.
2.
One uniform, multi-purpose message form and log should be used to record all messages received, regardless of source..
SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY EOC Activities and staffing of the Spotsylvania EOC occurred in a timely manner, and all positions were filled by their designated representatives, with the exception of the Public Information Officer.
The duties of the PIO were assumed by the Deputy Coordinator. However, the Deputy Coordinator was fully occupied with other critical responsibilities and thus could not provide complete attention to public luformation activities. Operations at the county were effectively led by the Coordinator, who was ably assisted by the Deputy Coordinator. The entire staff was well-versed on their duties and worked well together as a team. There was a misinterpretation of the Governor's declaration of a state of emergency (this action was confused with a General Emergency notification), which was quickly resolved.
The physical facilities of the EOC are functional but cramped, requiring some staff positions to be located outside the operations room. This resulted in some awkwardness in getting Information to those staff members located in separate office spaces. All necessary resources are readily available to the responders, including plans and SOPS, maps and status boards.
Communications functioned well in most cases, with numerous commercial telephone
- lines, the instaphone link, volunteer radio systems (RACES / CAP) and the police / fire / medical radio networks available, plus a computer link with the utility available at the EOC.
Route alerting initiated in conjunction with the stren sounding at the Site Area Emergency was performed in a thorough manner. The route was driven at the proper speed by a deputy sheriff well acquainted with the area. A written message is available to Instruct the public to tune to the appropriate EBS station. The route alert driver was not givep> a belefing, or any equipment, in regard to radiological exposure control.
Representatives of the Virginia Game and Inland Fisherles Commission were on hand at the county EOC prepared to simulate notifying boaters on Lake Anna; however, they never received Instructions from their office in Richmond to do so.
Traffic and access control points, manned by the State police, were promptly established, as was the evacuation assembly center.
Arrangements were made to evacuate mobility-impaired individuals, although better coordination is needed between the Department of Social Services and the Rescue Squad concerning this activity. Each agency has its own list of Individuals and made Independent arrangements to provide transportation for these Individuals, in some instances providing duplicative assistance to the same person. The County staff was aware of the location of dairy farms and the appropriate protective actions to be implemented. Adequate supplies of self-reading dosimeters, record-keeping cards and KI were obtained for emergency workers.
Permanent record dosimeters were recently shipped to the state; the county is unsure when (or if) they will be returned to the county. The radiological exposure control
r 31 briefing for the field monitoring teams was basically very complete, although there is some apparent confusion over the use of KI.
A capability for rumor control was dem' nstrated by the county through the establishment of a telephone line in the o
communications center.
MONITORING AND DECONTAMINATION (COURTLAND HIGH SCHOOL)
Monitoring and decontamination procedures were demonstrated at the Courtland High School.
Exercise personnel were knowledgeable of their assigned duties and demonstrated proper use of the equipment.
FIELD MONITORING TEAM The driver / monitor and radio operator who were assigned to provide field monitoring activities during this exercise were properly briefed regarding radiological exposure control procedures (with the exception of KI use) and were outfitted with appropriate equipment. Readings were taken at the designated locations in a suitable manner, although some difficulty was initially encountered by the team in locating the l
monitoring route. Two sets of radios were available to this team, but communication activities were not effective until the team reached the third monitoring location.
l BUS ROUTES Two buses were dispatched to pick up persons in need of transportation. The driver who was observed had a dosimeter and recorded the readings periodically. The j
l route took an hour and a half to negotiate.
The driver expressed a desire for supplemental training in addition to the current annual training which is provided; a j
better understanding of the overall response scheme would better prepare the drivers to respond to questions presented by evacuees. Suffielent buses are available to evacuate those persons without transportation, although only four of the buses reportedly have radios.
SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY EAC l
l Registration procedures and mass care activities were adequately demonstrated l
by the Courtland High School officials, Department of Social Services, Red Cross and l
RACES.
SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY INADEQUACIES / RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
Neither the designated public information officer, nor his alternate, participated in the exercise. The deputy coordinator assumed some of the responsibilities, but was fully occupied with other elements of the response operation. As a result, he could not
r 32 give his complete attention to the public information function. In future exercises, the designated PIO, or his alternate, should actively participate in exercise play.
2.
The ~ Governor's declaration of a state of emergency was erroneously understood by the county staff to mean a change in exercise classification status to General Emergency. This mis-interpretation was quickly corrected; it is suggested, however, that when the Governor's declaration of a state of emergency is issued in the future, the state clearly reiterate the current emergency action level at the conclusion of the message. Also, additional training may be provided to county personnel to clarify the difference between these two actions.
3.
The operational area of the Spotsylvania County EOC is very cramped, requiring some staff members to be located in adjacent offices. This presented some awkward situations in keeping these EOC representatives up to date, as many times they were not in the operations area when briefings were conducted.
This separation of staff persons also resulted in a lack of total coordination in dealing with certain tasks, leading to some duplication of effort. An attempt should be made to provide for a larger EOC operations area, thus allowing all staff to work in the same environment.
4.
Better coordination is needed between the Department of Social Services and the Rescue Squad in terms of evacuating handicapped individuals.- Currently, each organization has its own list of special needs people and makes its own arrangements (the Social Services worked through the schools while the Rescue Squad utilized rescue equipment) to evacuate the handicapped.
In some cases, an individual might be on two different lists, resulting in redundant and wasteful procedures in this area. One organization should be given the overall authority to enact evacuation procedures for this population segment.
5.
During the briefing of the field monitoring teams, there was no j
discussion concerning KI.
Subsequent discussion with county officials indicated some confusion at the County level over the
'J procedures for issuing K! to emergency workers, and instructions for its consumption. Further training is needed in this area.
6.
Because of the possibility of an unexpected release of radioactivity and the relatively close proximity of some of the route alert teams to the plant, route alert team members should be provided with a belefing on radiological exposure control, along with the accompanying materials and equipment.
r 33 7.
Communication between the Spotsylvania County EOC and radio-logical monitoring teams requires improvement. Radio traffic was not possible for extended periods of time. This could lead to the inadvertent exposure of team members while within the plume pathway.
8.
The bus route took one and one-half hours to complete. Since adequate resources reportedly exist to evacuate persons in r.eed of transportation, steps should be considered to shorten designated routes by adding more buses and routes.
9.
The bus driver has not been given detailed training on the overall emergency response in the event of an accident at North Anna. It is recommended that the drivers be made more fully aware of emergency procedures in order to be able to respond to passenger's concerns and/or questions.
EXPLANATION OF INADEQUACIES Areas Requiring Correct!ve Action - Demonstrated and observed inadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.
Areas Recommended for Improvement - Problem areas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. While not required, correction of these would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.
l
AREAS REQUIRING ClRRECTIVE ACTION Reference MUREC-0654 Proj'd Actusi Recomumendation Part II Correction Date Date-STATE EDC 1.
Agreements have been reportedly D.4.
State and local plans are being Sept.
made between the State and revised to provide governmental 1987 utility to initiate protective authorities the flexibility to actions off-site in conjune. tion implement protective measures with the evacuation o f ' ~non-consistent wi'h the licensee's t
essential personnel on-site.
The reconsnendations, but based
. procedure should be included in equally on governmental expedi-the appropriate state and county ence offsite.
No agreement is radiological emergency response required.
y plans.
EMERCENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY 2.
Radiological exposure control for J.9.,
l radiological monitoring team K.4 members, through the coordinated movement of the teams should be improved.
(See State / Local Field Monitoring Teams Report.)
a.
EOF State representative Radiological exposure control Feb.
rec - nded the removal of for radiological monitoring 1987 local teams from the plume teams will be improved through e
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECHVE ACTION Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recomunendation
.Part II Correction Date Date area at 11:30 due to a pro-continued classroom training and jected heightened integrated drills involving State, local, dose in sectors C,
D and E and utility radiological out to 10 miles. This infor-monitors.
nation was not transmitted to local authorities and for-warded to local monitoring teams until between 1315 and 1340.
u*
b.
State Radiological Monitoring Team #2 was authorized to continue monitoring despite having crossed the plume twice within two miles of the plant.
This team included a teen-aged member.
c.
Two monitoring
- teams, one Virginia Power and State Team
- 1, were dispatched to approximately the identical location at about the same time to take an air sample within the plume.
ACEAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference NtREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Reca==aadation Part II Correction Date Date It is recosamended that ALARA be used at all times in providing optional exposure control for field emergency workers.
Improved comununicatics between Utility and State EOF personnel with oversight for the field teams is needed.
3.
An informal policy exists which A.1.b.,
See response to No. I above.
calls for the off-site evacuation D.4 of jurisdictions out to two miles in the event that plant personnel are evacuated.
This policy is in fact more protective of the public than current plans indi-cate.
However, State personnel were unable to identify where this policy is available in written form.
Any such policy should be incorporated in all appropriate radiological emer-gency response plans.
3 AREA 8 REQUIRING CORREC11VE ACTION m -.,
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recomunendation Part II Correction Date Datc 4.
The State Radiological Officer C.3.b, A telephone line between the EOF July was twice called from the EOF to J.9 and the news media center will 1987 give media briefings.
This is be made available to a State BRH very undesirable since it re-technical spokesperson to answer quires the Director to transit inquiries relating to radiation the " hot" area outside the pro-and its effects.
tected EOF twice for each briefing, and causes unnecessary opening of the EOF doors.
It also takes the Radiological Officer away from essential w"
duties at the EOF.
Recommended alternates include the use of a telephone interview to communi-cate with the press or the desig-nation of an expert stationed outside the EPZ to communicate with the press.
_~
s ARRAS REQUIRING CORRRCT1VR AC110N i
Reference 1
NIREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date 1
STATR/IDCAI. RADICEACICAL M(MITORINC Tus f
5.
The county team was not briefed J.9.
In future exercises, local Feb.
on NAP conditions or on meteoro-Radiological Officers and State 1987 l
logical conditions prior to being BRH team leaders will brief per-dispatched from the assembly sonnel prior to departing the area.
Future exercises should staging / assembly area.
This l
provide the briefing of field element will be emphasized personnel regarding plant and during training sessions.
]
meteorological conditions prior j
to dispatch to the field.
(This is a repeated deficiency from the previous exercise.)
6.
Equipment available to the Louisa H.10.
Radiological monitoring teams July j
County team did not include high-have been issued equipment that 1987 l
range monitoring capability is available and appropriate.
(ionization chamber), and the C-H The Department of Emergency instruments available were in Services (DES) and State BRH need of calibration.
Four CDV will ensure that monitoring l
700s/CDV 715s were available, but equipment is calibrated in l
two had no indicated calibration accordance with State and manu-I stickers, and two bore stickers facturing company recommenda-that indicated calibration was tions.
last performed in 1985.
All monitoring equipment should be calibrated in accordance with State and manufacturing company
{
recommendations.
1 i
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Reconunendation Part II Correction Date Date 7.
Neither the County Team nor the K.3.a, This finding is inconsistent Feb. -
State Team
- 1 representatives O.4.c.
with the guides in the State and Sept. 1987 were aware of the exposure allow-local RERPs.
Allowable exposure able without autharization.
limits will be emphasized during Information provided by the EOF training sessions.
to Team #1 indicated a value of 500 MR, while the State plan calls for a maximum exposure value of 25R.
Radiological exposure control training to field workers should includejthis area of information.
(This is a repeated inadequacy.)
8.
The Louisa County Team had only K.3.a.
Mid-range (0-20R) pocket Immediate high-range pocket dosimeters in dosimeters have been issued to their possession; mid-range Louisa County.
dosimetry should also be supplied to these persons to ensure effective individual exposure control.
AREAS REQUIRING C@RRECTIVE ACTION 1
~
Reference l
NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recomunendation Part II Correction Date Date l
IMCESTION PATHWAY FIELD SAMPLIMC TEAM 9.
The milk sampling team's vehicle F.1.d Two-way radios will be checked July was equipped with a
two-way to ensure operability.
1987 radio, but could not effect radio j
- contact, as Fredericksburg is apparently a " dead spot." ; The water sampling staff indicated that although a radio is avail-able within their vehicle, it was not operational.
Future exercises should demonstrate the i
effective operation of radio communications.
This is an inadequately addressed problem identified in the previous exercise.
l e
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recomunendation Part II Correction Date Date 10.
Record-keeping cards were not K.3.a.,
Record-keeping cards are avail-July available to the milk sampling K.3.b able to all monitoring and 1987 team; water control board staff sampling teams.
Each team utilized a
sheet of notebook member will be encouraged to paper to record their readihgs.
pick up a card when dosimetry is Sampling teams should be provided issued.
standard record-keeping cards at the time of dosimetry distribu-tion in order to ease and ensure the completion of this task.
It is noted that this was-an e
inadequacy in the previous full-scale exercise.
11.
The milk sampling team members 0.5 Ingestion pathway field sampling July demonstrated general knowledge of teams will be provided instruc-1987 exposure control procedures, but tions on decontamination loca-were not aware of decontamination tions and protective action locations.
Water Control Board guides.
staff have had no training in j
radiological exposure
- control, were not informed of emergency worker PACS, and were unaware of l
the need to report to or location of decontamination stations.
I
AREAS REQUIRING CSSREC1WE ACTION 1
l 1
d Reference j
NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date i
~,
j e
1 l
Although it is intended to send sampling teams. into an area e-ty l
during recovery operations, it is l
recommended that exposure control l
be provided to individuals l
assigned to this function in i
order to ensure individual l
emergency worker protection.
i JOINT BEDIA CENTER i
- 12. The State and Utility Public C.4.b.
Coordination efforts will con-August
,i Information Officers should tinue.
1987 f
provide for the coordination of their news
- releases, both in terms of the timing of scheduled news conferences, communications equipment, and consistency of the content of public statements.
l i
l i
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1
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4 i
f 1
l AREAS REQUIRMIG CORRECTIVE ACTIO3 t
i l
Reference 3RREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recossmendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 13. Some difficulty was experienced C.4.s.
A telephone line between the EOF July in obtaining a
representative and the news media center will 1987 from the State's Health Depart-be made available to a BRH ment to respond to questions spokesperson to conduct tele-concerning the health effects of phonic briefings and respond to radiation.
Provisions should be inquiries relating to radiation taken to provide for the periodic and its effects.
availability of a State Repre-sentative trained in this area to adequately respond to questions of this nature.
(See also the g
EOF section of the report.)
arsw" Am TRAFFIC CONTROL
- 14. Local police did not participate J.10.j Agreed.
Spotsylvania County March l
in manning ACPs in Spotsylvania Sheriff's Office will be 1987
]
County.
The State Police encouraged to continue to adequately manned the selected support State Police in manning l
ACPs., however, it is desirable ACPs and TCPs.
to demonstrate coordination. and cooperation by the local police.
It is recommended that local 1
participation be demonstrated in f
l the manning of ACPs in future exercases.
j i
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION i
Reference NtREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Rec - dation Part II Correction Date Date
- 15. Additional training of police in O.4.d.,
Agreed.
Additional training July -
Louisa County is suggested. This 0.5 will be provided to local Sept.
training should address:
criti-police.
1987 cal dose levels, the value of protective clothing, KI use, and decontamination activities.
- 16. No access control points have J.10.j.
been identified i t.
the plans within the 10-mile EPZ betueen adjacent areas.
It is recom-mended that access control positions within the EPZ be evaluated and plans revised as necessary to ensure adequate access control of all areas in which protective actions may be ordered.
~
7 i
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTWR ACTION 1
1 Reference IRREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 17. Protective actions were ordered, J.10.j.
in accordance with the plan, by established areas; however, the implementation of access control was based on expanding rings of control at radii of 2, 5, and 10 l
miles from the power station.
The use of these two systems results in inconsistent land l
boundaries when applying protec-tive actions within the 10-mile
)
EPZ.
Access control should correspond with the land boundaries identified by areas in the plan.
l 1
l
- i i
1
I D
AREAS REQWRING CORRECTWE ACTION l
j Reference l
NIREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date MDICAL GMLE:E OF VIBCIMIA ImanerpurYESfannnamarinna? IONS 18.
Future exercises should demon-K.5.b.,
Discussion and training sessions Oct. -
strate the actual activities L.3.,
will be conducted with MCV and Nov.
required to respond to a
L.4.,
the utility to ensure ER 1986 simulated contaminated patient N.2.c.
facilities and supporting received at this facility.
equipment are available to Emergency room response shoul,d be demonstrate or simulate the of such a nature as to clearly treatment of contaminated, demonstrate response capabilities injured patients.
in treating a
contaminated, injured patient.
To support this
- function, the use of two
~
ambulances, one at the plant and j
one at the hospital, should be considered to minimize the dedicated use time of the emergency room.
l t
e e
AREAS REQUIRING CORREC1WE ACTION l
Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recomunendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 19. The ambulance radio was not F.2.
Comununications equipment will be July functional during the exercise, checked to ensure operability.
1987 requiring the ambulance crew to utilize a comunercial telephone to notify the hospital of the need l
for a back-up ambulance and delay of arrival.
The radio equipment on the ambulance should be analyzed and the necessary corrective actions taken to ensure operational use of this equipment.
20.
The emergency room staff assigned K.5.b.,
MCVs ER staff will be given July j
to respond to radiological 0.4.h.,
refresher training on 1987 l
contamination incidents should be L.3.
appropriate radiological l
trained as to appropriate exposure control actions.
radiological exposure control I
actions.
Training for these persons should include proper personal protective actions, as well as instruction in the conscientious control of contamination within the emergency room.
' AREAS REQUIRING CORRECIWE ACTION
)
Reference NIREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recosamendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 21. Ropes and floor coverings were K.5.b.,
See response to No. 17.
not utilized during the exercise L.3.
to establish a controlled area, l
}
although this equipment is l
reportedly available and stored l
in the morgue section of the hospital.
It is recosamended that this equipment be readily accessible to the' emergency room receiving
- area, and its use i
demonstrated in the control of g
l this area during future exercises.
1 i
l l
l j
- 22. The Radiological Emergency Plan P.3.,
Yes.
Nov.
j for the medical staff is P.4.
1987 j
currently in draft form.
This j
j plan should be finalized and j
l submitted for review by the l
Regional Assistance Committee.
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AREA 8 REQMisING CORRECTIVE ACT900 v ei
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Reference
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Proj'd Actual NtREC-t*654
-7 Recommendation */
Part GI Correction '_
Date Date s
s
<v
?
.t RED CROSg FIELD neantplanTERg n~,
t.
r -,
f 't
- 23. The Red Cross operation during N.3.
The role and locations of the.
",iJuly-4
- 7 this type of emergency is not Red Cross during exercises will
' 'l?P7 '
coordinated from the State or be reviewed.
The exdecise
~
I,3 '
County EOCs, but rather from the scenario will provide for. play; a
local Red Cross Chapter and the (demonstrated or simulatedT at ~
Disaster Field Headquarters.
these locations.
Future exercise should consider these locations as action points within the scenario materials.
CAROLINE CotRffY 24.
There was a lack of coordination E.5.,
computer logs indicate messages March between the County EOC and the C.4.b.
were sent to Caroline County.
1987 Media Center regarding emergency County will be encouraged to instructions for the public, hard monitor EBS messages in the EOC copy of news releases and EBS to ensure appropriate instruc-messages were not available at tions are broadcast.
the County, and the EOC staff did not monitor local EBS stations to assure that appropriate instructions were broadcast.
County officials should review W
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date their role in providing the public with emergency informa-tion, and should demonstrate this capability, including coordina-tion with the media center and monitoring of EBS stations.
During future exercises, a
l reliable means of exchanging hard copy news releases and EBS o
messages with the Media Center should be established and demonstrated at the Caroline County EOC.
- 25. The field monitor was not K.3.a.
TLDs are not required to be worn April 1987 provided with a TLD or other by personnel in EOCs outside of permanent record dosimeter, as 10-mile EPZ.
This is a local required.
TLDs also were not option.
TLDs are maintained by provided to emergency workers at the County.
the EAC.
A quantity of TLDs sufficient for all County emergency field workers should be provided and maintained at the distribution points.
The use of TLDs ' by emergency workers should be demonstrated during future exercises.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
)
Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date HAkOVER COUNTY 26.
The EOC facility coM inues to F.1.d.,
Agreed.
June -
display the logistical problems J.10.,
July identified in the previous N.5 1988
- exercise, i.e.,
a lack of communication equipmer.t in the operations
- area, and limited space to accommodate press representatives.
The County should continue its plans to construct a
Public Facility
- Building, to include a
communications center, in fiscal year 1987.
27.
The RADEF Officer was not present K.3.a Agreed.
Will continue to Immediate at the EOC during this exercise.
encourage key EOC staff and and The demonstration of effective elected / appointed officials to ongoing staff interaction requires all participate in exercises.
members to be present.
Elected Officials should take a
more active role in future exercises, and all EOC positions should be manned.
9
AREAS REQUIRING CTRRECTIVE ACTION Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date i
28.
The exercise was terminated at N.3.
State representatives (con-the County EOC before the notifi-trollers) in Hanover County cation from the State that off-during the exercise had the site exercise play was termin-liberty to excuse most exercise ated.
This could
.present participants after all objec-problems if the exercise scenario tives were achieved.
State EOC required additional input from requires that only the EMC the County.
The County should remain until official notifi-continue its involvement in cation from the State that exercise play until notified by exercise has terminated.
the State that the exercise has N
been terminated.
29.
Personnel assigned to A the E.2.,
Agree.
April Evacuation Assembly Center
- were N.1.a.
1987 prepositioned during this
- exercise, with individuals arriving as early as 7:00 a.m.
Future exercises should demonstrate the actual manning of the EAC in accordance with the County Plan.
7 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Reconenendation Part II Correction Date Date IDUISA COUNTY 30.
The North Anna Computer Network, E.5.,
Agree.
Immediate the primary means of written G.4.b and message distribution for public ongoing information activities, was not operational at this location during the bulk of the exercise.
l As a result, messages received via this information chain *;were untimely and the use of back-up communication means was necessary.
It is recommended that the functional operation of the network be analyzed and problems corrected as needed.
It is also recommended that additional training be provided to the individual (s) detailed to operated this equipment.
t
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION i
Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date' 31.
The designated radio station used G.4.b.
For some reason the radios in April to air the emergency broadcast the courthouse will not receive 1987 message was not monitored during the primary EBS station in the exercise, thereby precluding Richmond.
We plan to monitor the observation by EOC personnel EBS messages in the future on of the timing or content of this one of the relay stations message.
It is recommended,that serving the local area.
the EBS station be monitored during future exercises.
32.
According to the Coordinator of J.10.d.
Agree.
May v.
Emergency Services, the County is 1987 currently developing lists of mobility and hearing impaired persons.
In order to ensure the prompt and complete notification to and provision of special assistance to these
- persons, these lists should be developed as soon as possibic, and a system set in place to periodically update the lists.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date 33.
Route Alerting was essentially E.5.,
There are 10 routes in Louisa -
- Sept, simulated during this exercise, E.6.
not 3.
During ANS demonstration 1987 with only a small portion of test on May 1,
1986, each of Route 685 actually run.
- However, these routes were alerted in a map was posted in the EOC which less than 15 minutes.
Haps of represented three routes which the area are held by the cover the majority of the county Sheriff, State Police represen-and which reportedly would be the tatives, and County Coordinator.
actual routes completed.
The Local plans will be updated to routes, however, are long, do not include these route sections.
cover the entire 10-mile EPZ, and do not cover all of those locations within the 0-5 and 5-10 mile areas which do not meet the audible criteria for sirens according to the recent alert and notification study.
The routes should be reevaluated and revised to provide for the timely and comprehensive notification to all required areas.
4
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION.
l r
Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date 34.
Route alert team members and J.9.,
Training will be made available July several emergency workers K.4.,
to route. alert teams and part of 1987 stationed at the traffic control O.4.g.
this training will emphasize the l
point were unaware of the maximum need for briefings on the emer-l allowable dose without gency prior to departing on 1
authorization.
All emergency missions.
workers should be fully briefed on the maximum dose allowable without authorization.
This inadequacy was also noted during the previous full-scale exercise.
- 35. Emergency workers in the field K.3.a.
One mid-range (0-20 R) pocket Oct. -
provided with one dosimeter dosimeter is required to be worn Nov.
were only - either a 0-20 R or 0-200 R by workers in the field.
High-1986 self-reading dosimeter.
Each range and/or low-range issues I
worker should be provided two are optional.
Mid-range types of dosimeters to allow for dosimeters are available at j
adequate radiological exposure county distribution points.
l control.
1
AREAS REQUIRING CERRECTIVE ACTION Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date ORANCE COUlrIT 36.
The Communications Officer was A.2.a.
Agree.
April not available for participation 1987 in this exercise due to a per-sonal emergency.
The Emergency Management Coordinator therefore, in addition to his responsibili-ties, provided for the commun-ication activities throughout the exercise.
It is recommended that in future exercises, all EOC positions be appropriately filled by designated primary or back-up staff persons so that each EOC function may be adequately addressed.
I I
9
j
. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION J
Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recomunendation Part II Correction Date Date SPOTSYLVANIA COUNIT 37.
Neither the designated public A.2.a.,
Agree.
April information
- officer, nor his C.4.a.
1987 alternate, participated in the exercise.
The deputy coordinator assumed some of the responsibili-ties, but because he was fully occupied with other elements of the response operation, he could not give his complete attention y
to the public information function.
In future exercises, the designated
- PIO, or his alternate, should actively participate in exercise play.
4 e
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Reconusendation Part II Correction Date Date 38.
Better coordination is needed J.10.d.
The Department of Social April between the Department of Social Services has the primary 1987 Services and the Rescue Squad in responsibility for maintaining terms of evacuating handicapped list (s) of' persons with special individuals.
Currently, each needs.
This agency will organization has its own list of coordinate its list with other special needs people and makes local organizations which may its own arrangements (the Social have knowledge of persons with Services worked through the special needs.
schools while the Rescue Squad utilized rescue equipment) to g
evacuate the handicapped.
In some cases, a specific p4hson might be on two different lists, resulting in redundant and wasteful procedures in this area.
One organization should be given the overall authority to enact evacuation procedures for this population segment.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION i
l Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date 39.
During the briefing of the field J.10.e.,
Training will be made available.
. July monitoring teams, there was no O.4 1987 discussion concerning KI.
Subse-quent discussion with county officials indicated some confu-sion at the County level over the procedures for issuing KI to emergency workers, and instruc-tions for its consumption.
Further training is needed in this area.
40.
Because of the possibility of an J.10.e.
- Agree.
See response to No. 33.
July unexpected release of radio-1987 activity and the relatively close proximity of some of the route alert teams to the plant, route alert team members should be provided with a
briefing on radiological exposure
- control, along with the accompanying materials and equipment.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date 41.
Communication between the F.1.d.
Radio equipment in mobile units April Spotsylvania County EOC and and at base station will be 1987 radiological monitoring teams checked to ensure operability.
requires improvement as radio traffic was not possible for extended periods of time.
This could lead to the inadvertent exposure of team members while within the plume pathway.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date STATE EDC 1.
It is recomunended that the State J.9.,
Agree.
Jan.
consider the sheltering of live-J.11.
1987 stock and placement of animals on stored feed at the first indica-radiological release tion of a from the North Anna Power Plant.
2.
Although representatives from the E.6.,
Agree.
April Commission of Game and Inland J.10.c.
1987 Fisheries were positioned to demonstrate public alerting on Lake Anna, no order was issued from the State to activate this action.
Future exercises should take full advantage of available resources to provide for the comprehensive training experience provided by the exercise.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recomunendation Part II Correction Date Date 3.
The barricade locations J.10.j.
Plans and procedures will be Sept.
established to provide for access reviewed and revised where 1987 control at the 10 mile radius of necessary.
l the plume emergency planning zone do not correspond completely with the boundaries of the areas designated to be included in protective action decisions.
Consequently, those areas beyond the 10 mile EPZ in which protec-tive actions, i.e.,
evacuation, g
are
- ordered, but which are outside of the controlled area, will not be provided any security / protection. Considera-tion should be given to the identification and provision of access control points in these areas.
e e
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date RED CROSS FIELD HEADQUARTERS 4.
It is recommended that the Red 0.5 Agree.
April Cross be included in the 1987 development of future e'xercise material to ensure adequate opportunity to contribute to the proposed exercice play.
CAROLINE COUNTY County staff will be trained on April 5.
The status board was not used effectively to keep the staff posting events on status, board.
1987 fully informed of exercise events.
Only the most basic information, the current emergency classification
- level, was posted.
It is recomme'nded that the status board be used to maintain a chronological listing of all significant events and information.
1 e
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recomunendation Part II Correction Date Date 1
IDUISA COUlffY i
6.
Recording of actions and times by Agree.
A standard log form will July all EOC staff were inconsistently be developed.
1987 maintained, and standard log sheets were not used.
In order to establish an accurate log of activities for use in the briefing of replacement personnel
]
in extended operations, and to i
provide a permanent record of j
activity, it is reconsnended,that a standard log form be developed and distributed to all EOC participants.
i I
1 I
i
~
AREAS RECOMMENDED FO3 IMPROVEMENT Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date 7.
The State Police representative J.10.e.
This recommendation ~
will be Dec.
indicated that the current plan discussed with State Department 1987 for distribution of KI to police of Health, emergency workers in the field would require him to transport this drug to each of the field locations to which workers were assigned.
This would, under the exercise scenario demonstrated, leave the County EOC without State Police representation for g
some period of time, and also would delay the administration of the drug to the field workers.
it is recommended that procedures be modified to include distribu-tion of KI to emergency workers at the time of dosimetry dis-tribution to permit timely ingestion of the drug upon directive by the appropriate authorities.
t
ARRAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l
l
[
Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual i
Recosunendation Part II Correction Date Date I
MM 8.
One
- uniform, multi purpose This suggestion will be July
?
message form and log should be considered and implemented as 1987 l
used to record all messages appropriate.
received, regardless of source.
l This would provide for a standard i
record of activities during and following the response.
I SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY f
9.
The Governor's declaration of a 0.4 Tabletop exercises will be con-March state of emergency was erron-ducted involving. county staff.
1987 i
eously understood by the county This reconunendation will be staff to mean a
change in discussed.
exercise classification status to Ceneral Emergency.
This
{
misinterpretation was quickly j
corrected; it is suggested, j
however, that when the Covernor's declaration of a state of emer-gency is issued in the future,
]
the state clearly reiterate the j
current emergency action level at the conclusion of the message.
f Also, additional training may be J
provided to County personnel to i
clarify the difference between i
these two actions.
1 i
i w
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date 10.
The operational area of the H.3.
Agree.
More appropriate Immediate Spotsylvania County EOC is very facilities will be surveyed.
- cramped, requiring some staff members to be located in adjacent offices.
This presented some awkward situations in keeping i
these EOC representatives upj to date, as many times they were not in the operations area when briefings were conducted.
This separation of staff persons also l
resulted in a
lack of total coordination in dealing with l
certain tasks, leading to some duplication of effort.
An attempt should be made to provide i
for a larger EOC operations area, j
thus allowing all staff to work in the same environment.
l 1
1
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date 11.
The bus driver has not been given 0.5.
Training is made available to detailed training on the overall county staff on a continuing emergency response in the e ant basis.
Efforts will be made to of an accident at North Anna.
It ensure that all persons have a is recommended that the drivers general knowledge of tha risk be made more fully aware of environment and their respon-emergency procedures in order to sibilities during a radiological be able to respond to passenger's emergency.
concerns and/or questions.
12.
The bus route took one and one-J.10.d.
Four school buses for evacuation April half hours to complete.
Since are equipped with mobile two way 1987 adequate resources reportedly radios.
Additional buses are i
exist to evacuate persons in need available and could be deployed of transportation, steps should should the need arise.
This be considered to shorten recommendation will be reviewed designated routes by adding more with school transportation buses and routes.
officials.
P