ML20209H609
| ML20209H609 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1983 |
| From: | Christopher R, Matakas R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209H544 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-790 A-1-83-003, A-1-83-3, NUDOCS 8705040058 | |
| Download: ML20209H609 (6) | |
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[g ' % , UN ED STATES NUCLEAR REGUL.ATORY COMMISSION
_$ OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS FIELD OFFICE. REGloN I o S31 PARK AVENUE
, KING oF PRUS$1A. PENNSYLVANIA 19400 ASSIST TO INSPECTION REPORT
SUBJECT:
SALEM UNIT 1 NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION / ANTICIPATED TRANI WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS) EVENT l CEPORT NUMBER: A-1-83-003
REFERENCE:
NUREG-0977 (NRC Fact-Finding Task Force Report on the ATWS Event at Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, on February 25.
1983)
On February 22, 1983, a trip demand condition without scram existed for about i three seconds at the Salem Unit 1 Nuclear Generating Station, which is operated by Public Service Electric and Gas (licensee). The condition was not recognized by the licensee until after an anticipated scram without transient (ATWS) occurrec on February 25, 1983, and the February 22, 1983 event was subsequently reevalu-ated.
secondsThe reevaluation on February determined that an ATWS had also existed for about three 22, 1983. ;
1 A Region,I Fact-Finding Task Force determined that the two events may have been a result of improper maintenance on the Westinghouse's 08-50 circuit breakers.
The licensee determined that the reactor trip breakers failed to open automatica11 due to mechanical binding of the latch mechanism in the under voltage trip )
attachments on the breakers. During both the February 22 and February 25, 1983 evaluations, Salem Unit I had to be manually tripped after the automatic system failed to function as intended.
In January of 1974 a Westinghouse Technical Bulletin (NSD-74-1) was issued which described a reactor trip breaker failure caused by excessive friction of the latch mechanism and recommended tha t the reactor trip breaker be given regularly scheduled periodic inspections / maintenance. In addition, the Technical with a molybdenum Bulletin recommended disulfide lubricant. lubricating the under voltage device occasionally In February of 1974, a Westinghouse NSD Data Letter (NSD-74-2) was issued providing further guidance relating to the maintenance of the Westinghouse 08-50 circuit breakers.
contains both of the above mentioned Westinghouse documents. Attachment (1)
The NRC Task Force reviewed and determined that the reactor trip breakers had not been included in a licensee preventive maintenance program and a ,
lubricant different from that recommended in the Westinghouse Data Letter l (NSD-74-2) had been applied to the breakers in as late as January 1983.
The purpose of this Assist to Inspection Report was to determine the circum-stances surrounding the Westinghouse transmittal and the licensee receipt of the two aforementioned documents (Attachment (1) pertains).
I g posso gyn - 26 ~ 790 DR -790 PDR I
o 0n March 17, 1983 Nuclear Service Integration Department (NSID) was interviewed CONNOLLY at Westinghouse's Monroeville, PA, Nuclear Center.
, STOKES advised that Technical Bulletin, NSD-7B-74-1 was issued on January 11, 1974. However, he commented that the Nuclear Service Division (NSD) data letter, dated i
February 19, 1974, canceled the forementioned technical bulletin. He noted t
that the technical bulletin had contained incorrect information regarding the type of lubricant for maintenance of the Reactor Trip Breaker and that the data letter provided the correct type of lubricant to be used.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Nuclear Service Division is now called Nuclear Service Integration Department.
Mr. STOKES explained that in 1974 there was no formal system to determine if the customer, in this case Public Service Electric and Gas, received the forementioned documents.
policy, the two directives were sent to the Westinghouse construction s staff.
He explained that these two documents in 1974 would have been forwarded i
to the construction site manager, Jim 00LAN, and Westinghouse's two site electrical engineers, Jim NADZAN and Howard MASQUELIER.
individual would have received a copy of both documents nHe a d said tha t that each I
! have discussed the documents with the customer so as to insure that thethey should documents were implemented and that the required action was taken.
He reiterated that at construction sites there was no formal procedure to distribute the documents directly to the customer from Westinghouse.
STOKES this incident.advised that he had contacted DOLAN, NADZAN and MASQUELIER conc According to STOKES, 00LAN, who is currently the construction site manager for Millstone, could not recall discussing the technical bulletin i or data letter with Public Service Electric and Gas personnel. He said DOLAN reported that, in cases such as this, the briefing would have been assigned to with the therespective customer'sfield engineers with the understanding that they would work counterparts.
According to STOKES, DOLAN said that NADZAN or MASQUELIER personnel . should have discussed the documents with the appropriate customer the Angra Nuclear Power Plant Construction SiteHeinsaid Angra, Brazil. ST NADZAN remembered the documents; however, he said NA0ZAN could not recall anything additional except that the documents fell into MASQUELIER's area and he should have implemented them.
STOKES said he contacted MASQUELIER (who is retired) and MASQUELIER recalled that he talked to a Public Se Electric and Gas maintenance man by the name of Harry with a Polish surname, which he could not recall, concerning the documents; however STOKES commented that MASQUELIER said he could not recall specifics of the brief but that MASQUELIER assumed that the licensee was provided copies of the documents.
According to STOKES, MASQUELIER currently lives on the West Coast.
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STOKES explained that in 1974, 30 nuclear power plants had 08-50 breakers and should have received the forementioned NSD data letter via the site manager and electrical engineers. He said Westinghouse inquiries with the 30 plants disclosed that only Salem 1 and 2 and Indian Point 3 did not have the documents.
He noted that in 1974, Indian Point 3 belonged to Con Edison and was subsequently sold to the Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY). He noted that Con Edison's Indian Point 2, which was under construction in 1974 with Indian Point 3, had the documents on file. He said in all probability, the Indian Point 3 documents were lost when Indian Point 3 was transferred to PASNY's ownership. -
STOKES also comented that in October 1981, Public Service Electric and Gas was provided with an Outage Planning Manual for its Salem Plants. He noted that this was a revised issue after results of meetings with Public Service Electric and Gas. He said the manual was issued on October 29, 1982, and he
' provided Attachment (2), a cover sheet of the manual; Attachment (3), the Salem Unit 1 distribution list; and Attachment (4), a memo implementing the manual. STOKES advised that in Section 8 of the manual, subtitle 8.1 para-graph 31, a copy of which is Attachment (5), it was documented that Westing-house data letters were included in Appendix F. STOKES released Attachment (6) which is a copy of Appendix F which indexes the Reactor Trip Breaker Mainten-ance Data Letter; however, he said the Outage Planning Manual did not contain i
the data letter but only indexes it. It was noted that the Westinghouse distribution list for the data letters listed DOLAN, NADZAN and MASQUELIER as recipient. '
In conclusion, STOKES summarized that in 1974, the data letters and technical bulletins were sent from Westinghouse's Nuclear Service Department (NSD) directly to the site manager and the engineers and not to the licensee. He said it was the responsibility of the site managers and the engineers to dis:uss ,
the documents with the licensee and provide them with copies. '
On March 21, 1983, Howard MASQUELIER, former Westinghouse Electrical Engineer ;
at the Salem Unit 1 Nuclear Generating Station from August 1973 to June 1976 i j
(now retired and living in California), was telephonically interviewed by Investigator Richard A. MATAKAS. MASQUELIER did recall receiving the documents in Attachment (1) during the time he worked at Salem Unit 1. He said he was sure that he discussed both the data letter and technical bulletin with a Public Service Electric and Gas maintenance supervisor identified as Harry CHOMIAK. He said that he thought that they (the Westinghouse site representa-tives) provided the documents to Public Service Electric and Gas with a letter of transmittal; however, he could not recall the Public Service Electric and Gas reply but believes that they agreed to some type of corrective action.
MASQUELIER did not provide any additional pertinent information, i
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: Contact with John MCADOO, Westinghouse Assistant Manager of Nuclear Safety on April 13, 1983 failed to confirm the existance of a Westinghouse letter of transmittal and/or Public Service Electric and Gas's response relating to the data letter and technical bulletin contained in Attachment (1).
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On April 5,1983, Harry CHOMIAK, former Public Service and Gas Maintenance Supervisor at Salem Unit 1, now retired, was interviewed at his residence l
by Investigator Richard A. MATAKAS.
CHOMIAK viewed both the technical bulletin l and data letter contained in Attachment (1) and advised that to the best of his !
memory he had never seen them before nor had he discussed their contents with anyone. He did not recall either Howard MASQUELIER or the names of any other )
Westinghouse site representatives during the time he worked at Salem Unit 1 as the Salem Unit 1 maintenance supervisor. He did not provide any additional
! pertinent information.
On March 23, 1983, Edward WATJEN, current Westinghouse Site Service Manager since December 1980, was interviewed by Investigator Richard A. MATAKAS at Salem Unit 1. WATJEN said that subsequent to the Salem Unit 1 February 1983 events, he did locate the Westinghouse Data Letter (72-2) in "an old Westinghouse volume of data letters"; however, he said he was not familiar with the fore-mentioned data letter prior to the February events and had not had an occasion to discuss its contents with anyone prior to the events.
Regarding the " Outage Planning Manual" that Westinghouse provided to Public Service Electric and Gas in 1981, WATJEN stated that the original purpose of the manual was to assist the licensee in planning for outages; however, the manual did not appear to have been used that much. He said that the manuals were brought to the site in 1981 by home office personnel and distributed per the distribution list (Attachment (3) pertains) to the licensee for comment.
A review of WATJEN's Westinghouse Planning Manual revealed that the manual did 4
not contain the 74-2 Data Letter in Appendix F and that Appendix F was void of all documents including Attachment (6), the Appendix F index listing.
WATJEN did not provide any additional pertinent information.
On March 22 and 23,1983, the Outage Planning Manuals assigned to the following individuals were reviewed by Investigator Richard A. MATAKAS and none of the ,
manuals were found to contain the Westinghouse Data Letter 74-2 contained in Attachment (1): l 1
Donald WARD - Outage Planning Coordinator, Public Service Electric and Gas John GALLAGHER - Public Service Electric and Gas Maintenance fianager
] John DRISCOLL - Assistant Plant Manager, Public Service Electric and Gas All of the above mentioned individuals advised that they were not aware of the Westinghouse Data Letter (74-2) prior to February 25, 1983. In addition, John DRISCOLL stated that the Planning Manual was never used as an operating document and that an exhaustive search subsequent to the February 25, 1983 event, failed to surface the document in any Public Service Electric and Gas file.
He added that all Public Service Electric and Gas Planning Manuals on station
! that were provided to Public Service Electric and Gas by Westinghouse were reviewed and none of the manuals were found to contain the document.
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5-On March 22, 1983 a review of the following documents in the Salem Unit 1 Technical Document Room (TDR) by Investigator Richard A. MATAKAS failed to surface either of the Westinghouse's documents contained in Attachment (1):
Manual for " Replacement of Undervoltage Attachment on Breakers in Reactor Trip Switchgear" Manual for " Instructions for Types 08-50, DBF-16 and DBL-50 Air Circuit Breakers" Prepared by: fMM Ri' chard A. Matakas, Investigator Office of Investigations Field Office, Region I 1 1 <
Approved by: l? lD LTl:i [ ia ? .. $U I, r , '
R/.t.
R. Keith Christopher . Director /
Office of Invesgiations Field Office, Region I D
I
( U.S NOCLE A3 LE1ULATORY COMMIS$3ON AIR (ASSIST TO INSPECTION) STATUS RECORD INSTRUCTIONS:
This form is to be completed whenever s+gnificant activity has occurred relative to a case or at least every 30 days. If no change has occurred during the
( 30 day reporting period, endicate "No Change" m the status block. Keep the original with the a,e fde and send one copy to Headquarters.
Office of investigations.
I CJ.$E NUM8ER cayggony op p ggg m j X) o . OPERATING RE ACTOR 1 . INOlveOVAL UCENSEE C - RE ACTOR UNDER A-1-83-003 - co*5'auc'io" --
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01:RI V VENDOR x .OTHER
^55'6* * 'o Suo Salem withouYeneratina Nuclear Richard A. Matakas g'c'transient Station,teven scram (ATWS) at SafemUnit 1 Anticipa STATUS (Specify dere, and provedr a bnet ciencretoon)
March 14, 1983: On February 22, 1983, a trip demand condition without scram existed for about (3) seconds at Salem Unit 1. The condition was not recognized by the licensee until a similar event occurred on February 25, 1983, and a subsequent reevaluation of the February 22, 1983 event. A Region I fact finding task force determined that ATWS may have been a result of a lack of maintenance on the Westinghouse DB-50 circuit breakers.
Westinghouse allegedly sent a technical bulletin to the licensee in 1974 addressing correctiv.
maintenance procedures on the breakers; however, the licensee claimed to have never formally recei'!ed the b"lletin Thn nurpnen nf thic ATQ ie tn Antnrmino uhat h, nnnnd tn thn Westinghouse TB addressing the DB circuit breaker maintenance issue.
March 31, 1983: To date, interviews indicate that the licensee never formally received the aforementioned technical bulletin. Investigation is continuing.
( i.pril 1, 1983: To date, interviews indicate that the licensee never formally received the aforementioned technical bulletin. Investigation continuing.
April 13, 1983: Investigation indicates that the licensee never formally received the aforementioned technical bulletin / data letter from Westinghouse. Report typed 4/13 and is being reviewed.
April 15, 1983: Closed i
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