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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20210L4361999-08-0202 August 1999 Cycle 9 12-Month SG Insp Rept ML20210L4451999-07-31031 July 1999 Unit-2 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20211F9031999-06-30030 June 1999 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20205B6631999-02-28028 February 1999 Underground Storage Tank (Ust) Permanent Closure Rept, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Security Backup DG Ust Sys ML20198S7301998-12-31031 December 1998 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20199J2571998-01-31031 January 1998 Cycle 9 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20199J2441998-01-29029 January 1998 Snp Unit 2 Cycle Refueling Outage Oct 1997 L-97-215, SG Secondary Side Loose Object Safety Evaluation1997-10-23023 October 1997 SG Secondary Side Loose Object Safety Evaluation ML20203B9591997-09-18018 September 1997 Pressure Locking Summary & Evaluations Using Commonwealth Edison Methodology for Sqn ML20210J1761997-07-31031 July 1997 Unit 1,Cycle 9 Alternate Plugging Criteria 90 Day Rept ML20138D1991997-04-0404 April 1997 Special Project97-928S, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Assessments ML20138C5371997-03-24024 March 1997 Rev 0 to Pressurizer Level Event ML20217G2401997-03-0303 March 1997 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to SE of Reduced Thermal Design Flow ML20117J3611996-08-0101 August 1996 SE of Safety Valve Setpoint Tolerance Relaxation ML20117K9461996-03-0505 March 1996 Reliability Study ML20117K9511996-02-29029 February 1996 Reliability Common Cause Assessment, for Feb 1996 ML20095J1891995-10-0505 October 1995 Design & Analysis of Weld Overlay Repair for Sequoyah Unit 1 CRDM Lower Canopy Seal Welds ML20081D3831995-03-12012 March 1995 Simulator Four Yr Test Rept for 950312 ML20083N9521994-11-16016 November 1994 10CFR50.59 Rept to Nrc ML20024H8491993-07-19019 July 1993 Evaluation of Ultrasonic Test Results from 1993 ISI on Underclad Flaw Indications in Sequoyah,Unit 1 Rv Nozzles. ML20118D1941992-09-21021 September 1992 Technical Rept on Hydrogen Control Measures & Effects of Hydrogen Burns on Safety Equipment ML20114A6641992-08-15015 August 1992 920619 Self-Assessment. Several Hardware & Software Enhancements to Emergency Response Ctrs Completed During Reporting Period ML20141M1341992-03-27027 March 1992 Spent Fuel Pool Mod for Increased Storage Capacity ML20029C2011991-03-12012 March 1991 Initial Simulator Certification. ML20028H8591990-09-0707 September 1990 Nuclear Quality Audit & Evaluation Review Rept, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Look Back Review of Cable Issues. ML20136J0431990-06-30030 June 1990 Criticality Analysis of Sequoyah Units 1 & 2 Fresh Fuel Racks ML20043B6061990-05-11011 May 1990 Diesel Generator Voltage Response Improvement Rept. ML20006E5771990-02-0505 February 1990 Rev 1 to Sequoyah Units 1 & 2 Spent Fuel Storage Rack Criticality Analysis. ML20246D5351989-02-28028 February 1989 Steam Generator Tubing Insp Results ML20247H1301988-11-30030 November 1988 Rev 0 to Structural Analysis & Evaluation of Sequoyah Reactor Coolant Pump Support Columns ML20236D1951988-11-18018 November 1988 HVAC Damping Values ML20134H6801988-09-0202 September 1988 Technical Evaluation of Procurement of Matls & Svcs ML20245B4181988-08-17017 August 1988 Investigation Rept,Design & Operation of Sampling Sys for Analysis of High Purity Water ML20151Q2691988-08-0101 August 1988 Final Rept on IE Bulletin 79-14 for Tva,Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 & Common Piping ML20155J5721988-07-31031 July 1988 Assessment of Structural Adequacy of Concrete Foundation Cells for Emergency Raw Cooling Water Pumping Station & Access Roadway ML20207F6231988-07-0505 July 1988 Evaluation of Effects of Postulated Pipe Failures Outside of Containment for Sequayah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20207B6301988-06-27027 June 1988 Engineering Assurance Oversight Review Rept,Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Unit 1,Design Baseline & Verification Program ML20147G9961988-03-31031 March 1988 Review of Operational Readiness Corrective Actions. Related Documentation Encl ML20147H6331988-02-29029 February 1988 Plant,Diesel Generator Evaluation Rept ML20147G7861988-02-25025 February 1988 Task Rept on Development of Seismic Acceleration Response Spectra for Diesel Generator Bldg of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Part 1:Design Basis SSE Input ML20147G8041988-02-25025 February 1988 Task Rept on Development of Seismic Acceleration Response Spectra for Diesel Generator Bldg of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Part 2:Site-Specific OBE & SSE Inputs ML20234F2111988-01-0505 January 1988 Rept of Sequoyah Readiness Review ML20147F0581987-12-0202 December 1987 Non-linear Time History Seismic Response Analyses for ERCW Cell, Task Rept ML20236B3481987-10-15015 October 1987 Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Seqouyah Element Rept 207.4(B), Deviation Documentation:Caq Documentation ML20236B3511987-10-14014 October 1987 Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Sequoyah Element Rept 232.8(B), Piping & Valve Design:Criteria for Min Pipe Wall Thickness ML20236B3541987-10-14014 October 1987 Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Seqouyah Element Rept 235.2(B), Electrical Safety:Exposed 480 Volt Bus at Panel Top ML20236B3441987-10-14014 October 1987 Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Sequoyah Element Rept 204.9(B), Use of Reverse Prints ML20236B3581987-10-14014 October 1987 Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Seqouyah Element Rept 241.4(B), Cable Termination & Splices:Amphenol Connector ML20236Q2011987-10-0101 October 1987 Temp Measurement Rept for Long-Term Current Test on Littlefuse,Flas-5,5 Amp Fuses 1999-08-02
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20212J6311999-10-0101 October 1999 SER Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Requirements for Certain Inservice Insp at Plant,Unit 1 ML20217G3721999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20212F0831999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Certain Weld Insp at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) for Second 10-year ISI Interval ML20212F4761999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 246 & 237 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20212C4761999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20210L4361999-08-0202 August 1999 Cycle 9 12-Month SG Insp Rept ML20216E3781999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20210L4451999-07-31031 July 1999 Unit-2 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20210G6631999-07-28028 July 1999 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20209H3831999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20211F9031999-06-30030 June 1999 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage ML20196J8521999-06-28028 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Use Iqis for Radiography Examinations as Provided for in ASME Section III,1992 Edition with 1993 Addenda,Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20195K2951999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20206Q8951999-05-0505 May 1999 Rev 0 to L36 990415 802, COLR for Sequoyah Unit 2 Cycle 10 ML20206R5031999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for April 1999 for Sequoyah Units 1 & 2.With ML20205P9811999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20204C3111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205B6631999-02-28028 February 1999 Underground Storage Tank (Ust) Permanent Closure Rept, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Security Backup DG Ust Sys ML20203H7381999-02-18018 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of Topical Rept BAW-2328, Blended U Lead Test Assembly Design Rept. Rept Acceptable Subj to Listed Conditions ML20211A2021999-01-31031 January 1999 Non-proprietary TR WCAP-15129, Depth-Based SG Tube Repair Criteria for Axial PWSCC Dented TSP Intersections ML20198S7301998-12-31031 December 1998 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20199G3641998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20197J5621998-12-0303 December 1998 Unit 1 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept ML20197K1161998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195F8061998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20154H6091998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20154H6251998-09-17017 September 1998 Rev 0 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 10 Colr ML20153B0881998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20239A0631998-08-27027 August 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20236Y2091998-08-0707 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Requests RP-03,RP-05, RP-07,RV-05 & RV-06 & Denying RV-07 & RV-08 ML20237B5221998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Snp ML20237A4411998-07-31031 July 1998 Blended Uranium Lead Test Assembly Design Rept ML20236P6441998-07-10010 July 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980610,failure of Safeguard Sys Occurred for Which Compensatory Measures Were Not Satisfied within Required Time Period.Caused by Inadequate Security Procedure.Licensee Revised Procedure MI-134 ML20236R0051998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ML20249A8981998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20247L5141998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ML20217K4471998-04-27027 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Requests for Relief 1-ISI-2 (Part 1),2-ISI-2 (Part 2),1-ISI-5,2-ISI-5,1-ISI-6,1-ISI-7, 2-ISI-7,ISPT-02,ISPT-04,ISPT-06,ISPT-07,ISPT-8,ISPT-01 & ISPT-05 ML20217E2221998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ML20248L2611998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199J2571998-01-31031 January 1998 Cycle 9 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20202J7911998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199J2441998-01-29029 January 1998 Snp Unit 2 Cycle Refueling Outage Oct 1997 ML20199F8531998-01-13013 January 1998 ASME Section XI Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Snp Unit 2 Refueling Outage Cycle 8 ML20199A2931997-12-31031 December 1997 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20198M1481997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20197J1011997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199C2951997-11-13013 November 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 971017,vandalism of Electrical Cables Was Observed.Caused by Vandalism.Repaired Damaged Cables, Interviewed Personnel Having Potential for Being in Area at Time Damage Occurred & Walkdowns ML20199C7201997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant L-97-215, SG Secondary Side Loose Object Safety Evaluation1997-10-23023 October 1997 SG Secondary Side Loose Object Safety Evaluation 1999-09-30
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Y TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP OPERATIONS CEG -
Subcategory Adequacy of PSO Uniform in Nuclear Plant Environment Employee Concern: XX-85-048-001 Report No.: 312.01 SQN I
l Evaluator: b( . h/ i [M ' 7!hd/7[
J. L.' McVay l / Ddte' Reviewed by: h 7/3C[8f OPS CEG Memberf Date Approved by: . . ~,e 7[30/IS W. R. Lagerg ren d Date 860912O369 860909 PDR ADOCK 05000327 P PDR m.
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I. Adequacy of Public Safety Officer Uniforms This evaluation centers around the concern that Public Safety Services uniform trousers may attract airborne contamination or contribute to injury to the wearer during the performance of firefighting activities normally expected of the PSO, II. Specific Evaluation Methodology i This report evaluates one concern, XX-85-048-001, which states that Public Safety Officer trousers, (which are made of synthetic materials) pose two safety problems. These are:
- 1. Clothing made of synthetic materials does not burn, but melts to a person's skin.
. 2. The trousers build up a great deal of static electricity and will attract airborne contamination in the event of an airborne radiation leak.
The methodology for this evaluation addresses four aspects of the Concern.
- 1. The validity of the concern
- 2. The adequacy of any recommendations resulting from NSRS or line investigation
- 3. Verification of any line response to recommendations
- 4. Verification of any corrective actions The concern is considered as a closed issue as a result of a line management response dated August 19, 1985. The concern and the associated response were reviewed and some additional background information is included for clarity. Physical Security Instruction, PHYSI-13 was also reviewed to determine Public Safety Services responsibilities during fire emergencies.
III. Findings Background Information (Airborne Contamination)
When an individual is exposed to airborne contamination, there are two primary concerns: Internal disposition of radionuclides and/or external radiation exposure from the airborne cloud.
TVA Nuclear Plants are required to monitor radiation areas and to post the area as an " Airborne Contamination Area" whenever the concentration of airborne radionuclides reach 25 percent of the maximum permissible concentration (MPC). Entry into an airborne contamination area is Page 1 of 3
o 5- e strictly controlled by a Radiation Work Permit (RWP). All security officers who would have a need to enter an airborne contamination area would be required to wear full,C-zone clothing and respiratory protective equipment. General Employee Training which is required for Public Safety Officers who require access to the Power Block, fully explains these controls and processes and includes the dress out procedure for removing street clothing and donning protective anti-C clothing. The TVA radiation protection program prohibits wearing street clothing in areas designated and controlled as airborne contamination areas. ,
General Employee Training also addresses controls in place to detect accidental releases of airborne contamination through discussions relating to the purpose of Continuous Air Monitors (CAM), the alarm function of the CAM and instructions to the individual should he/she be in an area when a CAM alarms. The individual is trained to immediately evacuate the area and to call Health Physics (HP) to ensure that any resultant contamination, either internal or external, is detected and the clothing, hair, skin is appropriately decontaminated. Should the Public Safety Officer approach his/her internal quarterly MPC limit, which is continually monitored and documented on individual exposure records by HP, then that individual would be prohibited from working in a radiation or regulated area for the remainder of the quarter.
Adequate training and controls are in place at SQN to ensure that airborne contamination attracted to Public Safety Officer uniforms would represent only a small fraction of the radiological hazard to an individual exposed to radioactive gaseous releases even though doubleknit trousers may attract airborne contamination more than would, for instance, cotton trousers. Although radioactive noble gases decay to rubidium 88 and cesium 138, which exhibits a high affinity for clothing and hair, these elements have a very short half-life (17 and 30 minutes respectively) and within an hour's time, these elements will decay to nondetectable limits.
Background Information (Heat versus Synthetic Material)
Public Safety Officer uniform trousers are made of polyester doubleknit materials which are generally recognized as being susceptible to melting and burning at high temperatures. The concern expressed centers around the requirement for Public Safety Officers to assist the ONP fire brigade in fighting plant fires.
The plant implementation procedure PHYSI-13 defines the Public Safety Officer role in fighting fires as a support function with actual firefighting to be conducted by plant operators specifically trained for this function. Public Safety Officers do not have a primary fire brigade membership responsibility and, as a consequence, the use of polyester doubleknit trousers as a part of their uniform, should not be a problem related to their firefighting responsibilities.
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g Line Management Investigation Report The line management response dated August 19, 1985, to this concern did not find the employee concern to be valid and does not contain any recommendations or corrective actions. The response is adequate. The response references earlier evaluations done by the Plant Uniform Committee composed of Public Safety Officers and line management which support the August 19, 1985 report findings. The additional background details contained in this report was not included in the response, however, line management has responded appropriately'.
Conclusion This evaluation of concern XX-85-048-001 concurs with the line management report findings. The uniform trousers do not present an unacceptable level of risk to the officers wearing synthetic trousers 4 and the concern is not a valid concern.
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IV. Root Cause None V. Generic Applicability This element does have a generic applicability for TVA because the Public Safety Officer uniform worn is the same at each Nuclear .
Generating Plant. However, a site specific evaluation for other TVA Nuclear Plants is not required because site specifics relative to these concerns will not change between plants.
VI. References
- 1. Physical Security Instruction Manual, PHYSI-13, Revision 48,
- 2. Line Management Investigation Report, August 19, 1985.
VII. Proposed Immediate or Long-term Corrective Action None Page 3 of 3