ML20209C187

Special Rept:On 860707,fire Barrier Penetration Nonfunctional.Caused by Design Deficiency Due to Ineffective Communication Between Design Groups.Fire Watch Established. Notice Initiated Requiring Installation of Fire Wall

ML20209C187
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	08/13/1986
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
NUDOCS 8609080409
Download: ML20209C187 (4)

Text

DUKE POWER GOMPAhT '

P.O. Isox 33180 CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242 ex;n ramminawr (7o4) ONMI N00LE4B PRODUCTION

- August 13, 1986 Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator cc U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• Region II

~101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 N

W Atlanta, Georgia 30323 @

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station "O Docket No. 50-269 [

Dear Dr. Grace:

'f Please find attached a special report on non-functional fire barriers. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.17.6, which concerns a fire barrier penetration that was not restored to functional l status within seven days, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to public health and safety.

Very truly yours, d1'7AA A Hal B. Tucker WHM/07/slb Attachment xc: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Washington, D. C. 20555 F Mr. J. C. Bryant NRC Resident Inspector

$g Oconee Nuclear Station nnia Eo Ms. Helen Pastis

~O@g Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (D o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission o :c Washington, D. C. 20555 o0 eo oo INPO Records Center

'$# Suite 1500

$g '1100 Circle 75 Parkway g Atlanta,. Georgia 30339 M&M Nuclear Consultants 1221 Avenue of the Americas bgf New York, New York 10020

'fl d@'

~

Dr. J. N21 son Grcco, R gion21 Administrctar August 13, 1986 Page Two bxc: H. D. Brandes R. C. Futrell P. F. Guill M. A. Haghi C. L. Harlin ONS C. L. Hartzell CNS G. W. Hallman S. A. Holland J. J. McCool E. O. McCraw NHS P. J. North R. P. Rogers ONS N. A. Rutherford Group File: 05-801.02 ,

Group File: OS-815.04 i

t i

Duke Power Company Oconee Nuclear Station

, Special Report on Non-Functional Fire Barriers

Introduction:

On July 1, 1986, a~ fire door which connects the Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings was >

removed and replaced with a 0.25 inch steel plate. This modification was performed to seal the Turbine Building west wall for Turbine Building flood considerations.

On July 7, 1986, while Unit I was at 100% full power, safety personnel identified the Fire Barrier penetration as non-functional. This resulted in violation of

~

Technical Specification 3.17.6 because the non-functional fire barrier grace period had been exceeded. A continuous fire watch was immediately established and procedures were initiated to return the penetration to a functional status.

The cause of the incident was determined to be a design deficiency which resulted from ineffective communication. The health and safety of the public.were not affected by this incident.

Description of Occurrence:

On January 19, 1984, a request for a station modification to seal the west wall of Oconee's Turbine-Auxiliary Building for Turbine Building flood considerations was issued. The modification would seal various piping penetrations, install three watertight doors, and seal three doors completely.

In March,1984, Design Engineering began development of the modification. Since the modification affected Oconee' Station structures, both the Civil and Architectural Sections of Design were involved in the modification.

i On May 21, 1984, a memo was issued concerning sealing the three door penetrations.

Civil / Architectural had verbally questioned if the fire doors could be removed with the addition of a 0.25 inch steel plate. The Fire Protection Section personnel's

, interpretation of the question was if the steel plate could be added to the l existing sealed door. The end result wcs that Civil / Architectural construed the letter to give approval to remove the door. Due to the inadequate communication and feedback, this inaccurate information was relayed to the draftsmen, and l incorrect drawings were issued to Oconee which said " Existing door to be removed".

Procedures were developed to remove the door. On July 1, 1986, Fire Door No. 104 was removed per the procedure. This procedure required a continual fire watch

! until the steel plate was installed. Once installed, the fire watch was terminated.

On July 7, 1986, a member of the Mechanical crew questioned a Station Safety Representative as to whether the fire watch requirements were the same for the removal of the second door. This led to further investigation by the Safety Representative and the barrier was declared non-functional. A continual fire watch was immediately initiated. This satisfied Technical Specification 3.17.6.2 which requires a continual fire watch to be established. Specification 3.17.6.3 i

requiring the penetration to be functional within 7 days was exceeded thus l requiring a special report to be submitted to the commission within 30 days.

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t On July 10, 1986, a Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) Variation Notice was initiated which prevented removal of the remaining fire doors and ordered the installation of a fire wall. On July 26, 1986, the fire barrier was returned to functional status, meeting the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire retardant rating.

Cause of Occurrence:

.The cause of this incident has been determined to be a design deficency due to ineffective communication between responsible design groups.

Civil and Architectural Sections of Design asked the Fire Protection Section if it was acceptable to replace the fire door with a steel plate. The Fire Protection Section interpretation of the question was "would the addition of a steel plate be acceptable?" The Memo To File concerning this issue was not specific in stating that the door was required. It stated that " Existing doors which are welded shut 1

can be reinforced as shown n the attached sketch". The sketch referenced in the Memo did not clarify its intent. Followup and feedback on the issue was

] inadequate, resulting in incorrect information being related to the draftsmen.

4 Corrective Action: , ,

(1) As soon as the fire barrict was determined non-functional, a continuous fire watch was established. This is defined as acceptable in accordance with Technical Specifications.

(2) Additionally, an NSM Variation Notice was issued by the field engineer to' avoid removal of existing fire barriers and to install a fire rated block wall at the affected penetration.

• Analysis of Occurrence:

l Technical Specification 3.17.6 was established to ensure fires will be confined and

adequately retarded from s.preading to adjacent portions of the facility. The penetration in question is required to have a three hour fire retarding factor which is qualified by the National Fire Protection Association.

i The station installation procedure required a continuous fire watch when the fire door was removed. This watch was maintained until the 0.25 inch steel plate was installed. This steel plate does have a fire retarding factor, but it is not qualified. There are no combustible materials on either side of the Auxiliary or Turbine Building door, and a prompt fire vacch was established as soon as the inadequacy was discovered.

Operation under Technical Specification 3.17.6 is not considered a degraded mode for safety systems. The public health and safety was not endangered during this incident.

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