ML20207T294
| ML20207T294 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 03/06/1987 |
| From: | Reed C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Davis A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8703230404 | |
| Download: ML20207T294 (24) | |
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'~ V m y Conunonweehh Edson
( One Fi.;! Nabonal Plaza. Chicago, Illinois .
OM.
PRINITYAelllIt4
, (\ / Address Reply to: Post Omco Box 767 b
M at m a= RU sannd I Nd Chicago, Illinois 60690 0767 , k Lh- am mc lb .nv \ ~ 33n
- k lR5 j fadML March 6, 19E j$$ y ru HLQ g A. Bert Davis Acting Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,
799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL. 60137
Subject:
Dresden Station Units 2 & 3
" Additional Information Pertaining to the Restart of Dresden Units 2 & 3" NRC Docket Nos. 50-237 and 249
Dear Mr. Davis:
This letter provides the additional information which you requested.during a telephone conversation held on March 5, 1987, between Mr. Greenman and.other members of your staff, and myself and members of my staff. This information supplements the corrective action plans which Commonwealth Edison personnel presented to you on March 4, 1987, in response to concerns identified regarding: (1) the recent NRC administered Requalification Exams; and (2) other recent events at Dresden Station including the February 27, 1987 reactor. water over temperature event while in cold shutdown. That presentation also included actions implementing the Confirmatory Action Letter dated February 27, 1987, regarding the Operator
-Requalification' Exam, as well as the corrective actions which we believed were appropriate in response to certain recent events. Our "Dresden 2 & 3 Plan to Achieve Error-Free Operation", hereafter referred to as the " Plan", is attached as a reference. This letter supplements that Plan in accordance with the telephone conversation of. March 5, in which Mr. Greenman indicated that you did not have sufficient information to reach a firm conclusion regarding the appropriateness of restarting Dresden Unit 3 this weekend. The following information addresses the eight items identified as requiring clarification.
- 1. Status of Plant Equipment for Startup.
Starting with the restart of Dresden Units 2 & 3, we will provide to Mr. Mark Ring of your staff, weekly, a list of out-of-service safety-related equipment and other non-safety related equipment considered important for enhancing the reliable operation of the units. The restart list of out-of-service equipment for Unit 3 is attached to this letter.
A similar list for Dresden Unit 2 will be provided to Mr. Ring shortly before restart of that unit.
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B703230404 870306 PDR ADOCK 05000237 Y Y '
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7 2.. Schedule to Verify the Validity of Computer Points A contributing cause:for the February 27 event 1resulted from an
-incorrect.. reactor' panel temperature recorder' computer point nameplate. The reactor water temperature tp the recirculation pumps computer point nameplate incorrectly referenced points
'C308 and F 389, which are the computer points for recirculation pump outlet temperature vs. inlet temperature. As a result,-the Reactor Operator was not monitoring the same temperature on the computer CRT as on the recorder. The following program is.being
-implemented in response to this " human factors" error.
All instrumentation located on the Control Room panels has been reviewed to identify specific references to computer points.
This review revealed that there are 202 instruments which have corresponding computer points. There are 100 instruments on the Unit.3 panels, and 102 instruments on the Unit 2 panels.
The next step of the review program.will be to identify the signal generating source and verify that Control Room panel instrumentation and' computer points are both supplied by the-same signal. generating source. In addition, the nomenclature used to describe each computer point will be. reviewed for ~
accuracy. Any discrepancies found.will be corrected when they are identified. This review program will be completed by the end of March 1987, for both units.
-3. Revisions to shutdown Cooling (SDC) Procedure DOP 1000-3.
The Shutdown Coolina Mode of Operation, Procedure (DOP 1000-3),
was revised on March'1, 1987, using the temporary change request system. The revision emphasized the use of multiple indications of moderator temperature and cautions the operator to set the alarm for. reactor water temperature at 190*F. The use of computer points F389 and C308 was prohibited when the recirculation pumps are not operating.
.The procedure was further revised on March 6, 1987 to include the following additional features:
I (a) A prerequisite emphazing that primary containment is
'- required when reactor water temperature is above 212*F.
(b) A caution that the reactor vessel metal temperature may lag from actual reactor water temperature.
(c) A direction to open the RBCCW combined outlet flow valve to F increase cooling capacity.
(d) Establishment of the proper response between SDC system
, operation and reactor water temperature change.
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.(e) An identification of'the multiple indicators ava'ilable for reactor water and reactor vessel metal temperatures.
A detailed review a'nd revision'of this procedure will-be '
completed by May 1, 1987, to ensure the incorporation of human factors considerations.
- 4. The-Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) requirements and the February.27 reactor water over temperature event identified the following two concerns:
(a) The CAL limits the number of qualified personnel who can perform licensed shift duties until more personnel can be qualified under either an NRC approved accelerated requalification training program or an NRC administered examination. A description of the interim measures that are being taken to address operating with a limited number of qualified operators was requested.
(b) The administrative work load on the shift operating crew is-viewed as a distraction and may prevent personnel from performing the principal function of operating the reactor. A description of the measures that have been taken, or will be taken to address this concern was requested.
With respect to item (a), there are currently 10 qualified SRO and 4 RO licensed personnel. For Unit 3 startup,-an SRO Advisor and Unit Operator position will be required to meet the CAL commitments. We intend to fill these two shift positions on a scheduled basis with 8 of the 10 qualified SRO licensed personnel. Four (4) people per shift position is considered
! satisfactory for the short term and meets the NRC requirements
! for adequate rest periods. The remaining 2 qualified SRO L licensed personnel will be available for unforeseen scheduling problems (e.g., illness). Currently, we do not plan to use any of the 4 recently qualified RO personnel.
Further, with your staff's agreement, we have scheduled 11 additional individuals (4 RO and 7 SRO license candidates) for additional training to be followed by an NRC administered exam on March 9, 1987. Based on the results of that exam, the j manning for the restart of Unit 2 (currently scheduled for March 20, 1987), will be reviewed given the number of qualified licenses available at that time. Unit 2 restart will require the addition of a second Unit Operator. We will not restart Unit 2 until we are mutually satisfied that it can be accomplished effectively and safely with the number of qualified licenses available at that time.
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The item (b) concern arose from the investigation of the Unit 3L reactor water over-temperature event.. A dual unit outage was in
. progress and the work load was' greater than normal for the-afternoon shift during which the-event occurred. One of the i activities noted was the Center Desk Operator's answering of incoming phone calls. Since March 5, all incoming ~ calls have
. been shifted to security for response and this concern has been eliminated.
It should be noted however, that it is our expectation that any
- l. Reactor. Operator should ask for relief from the Station Control L . Room Engineer (SCRE)-should he feel that the work load is too great. Furthermore, the SCRE is expected to monitor work t- - activity and make changes should he-conclude that the total work t
__ activity is inhibiting good operating practices. This was not done.during the' event. This requirement has been discussed during the accelerated training program outlined in Item 3 of
- the Plan under the Prior to Startup'section. This expectation
- will continue to be reinforced until we are satisfied that our
! expectations are clearly understood.
! Further, the duties of the Senior Manager on Shift (Item 2 of F the During Startup and Subsequent Operation Section of the Plan) j includes monitoring and controlling, if necessary, by priority work _ selection, the administrative work load.
l In addition, Item 8 of the Plan under the Durina the Startup and Subsequent Operation section discusses the concept of control
, room quiet hours. This concept was successfully adopted at LaSalle County Station and is a measure to control total work activities in the control room. An action plan for adopting this concept at Dresden will be. developed tar the end of March.
! Finally, during restart and up to approximately 30% power, a
- j. second NSO "in-training" will be assigned'to work under the direction and in the presence of the qualified Unit Operator.
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! These' measures are considered sufficient to adequately address the concern of high work activity in the Dresden Units 2 and'3 i control room.
F 5. Commonwealth Edison commits to test promptly the Dresden Unit 3 Anchor Darling Snubbers following the Unit's return to service and consistent with safe operating practices. We have l established a work plan in which snubbers will be removed and I i tested one at a time during the next 6 weeks. Corrective actions will be based on the results of testing. Any snubber il that may fail will be repaired and satisfactorily retested or replaced as required. Additionally, Commonwealth Edison
[ reiterates our commitment to restore the Dresden Unit 2 torus
' anubbers to operability prior to returning that Unit to service, i
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6 ~. Commonwealth Edison commits to investigate promptly and to-resolve-the questions which have been raised with regard to the installed configuration of the embedment plates at Dresden Units 2 and 3 and Quad Cities Units 1 and 2. The review will establish-the operability of embedment plate attachments and will determine whether or not FSAR criteria for these attachments continue to be met. We will provide a weekly status report to Region III including the status of the program milestones remaining to be completed and the schedule for reaching those milestones. The status reports will be provided until our staffs mutually agree that they may be discontinued.
- 7. Commonwealth Pdison has completed a review, pursuant to the guidelines provided in 10CFR 50.59, of the differences between the installed configuration of structural steel in the Dresden Unit 2 and 3 drywells and the existing drawings. The review has concluded, based on the results of a thorough inspection of the Unit 2 drywell and a sample within the Unit 3 drywell, that p
-these differences do not pose any unreviewed safety questions 1 and that the Units may be safely restarted. Those differences which have been identified during the sample inspection of structural steel in Dresden Unit 3 will be corrected during the next Unit 3 refueling outage if required to restore FSAR design margins. Also, the remaining connections of the structural steel in Unit 3 which were not inspected during the current shutdown will be examined during the next refueling outage. The differences identified during the inspection on Dresden Unit 2 which are required to restore PSAR design margins will be completed prior to the return of that unit to service.
- 8. With regard to the failure of the snubber on the Dresden 2 Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) containment spray line, Commonwealth Edison commits to provide the necessary instrumentation to monitor the line prior to the return of Dresden Unit 2 to service. Should the instrumentation not be received early enough to permit installation prior to the return to service of Unit 2, Commonwealth Edison will provide Region III a schedule by which that instrumentation will be installed.
We believe this letter addresses the concerns identified by you and your staff in our March 5, 1987 telephone conversation. We request your prompt review of this information.
Very truly yours, Cordell Reed Vice President Attachment A 2821K cce H. Grotenhuis-NRR Resident Inspector-Dresden
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ATTACHMENT A
" Restart List of Out-of-Service Equipment-Dresden Unit 3"
m RESTART LIST OF OUT OF SERVICE EQUIPMENT - DRESDEN UNIT 3 e
REASON FOR OOS/ IMPACT 05 UNIT OPERATIONS IF EQUIPMENT 00S SAFETY RELATED NOT IN SERVICE EXPECTED hasuus TO SERVICE Yes N_o
- 3B Shutdown Cooling Pump I Replace motor. Prior to U-3 startup.
- 3C Shutdown Cooling Pump I Replace motor; this pump May, 1987.
used as backup to Fuel
. Pool Cooling System during a refuel outage.
- Drywell ventilation damper .X Dampers locked in normal . -
control position. (Damper control not needed.)
- Standby Cas Treatment System X Damper blocked open; SBGT inlet damper System fully operational. - >
(Damper needed only in open position.)
- Fire Protection Systems: X Appendix 'R' modification Completion U-2 refuel work; fire watch established outage.
until system operational.
Valve 3-4199-177 4 West Reactor Bldg. Fire System RFP Area Fire Protection Rx Bldg. Vent Damper 3-5772-14 Smoke and Fire Protection Panel 2203-50 Local Panel 2203-49
REASON FOR OOS/ IMPACT ,
- ON UNIT OPERATIONS IF EQUIPMENT OOS SAFETY RELATED WOT IN SERVICE EXPECTED RETURN TO SERVICE Yes No
- Instrument root isolation X Valve in closed position Completion U-3 refuel valve 3-1699-78 for drywell until modification complete; outage.
water level monitoring. instruments yet to be installed. " Nice-to-have" BWR Owners Group reconumendation.
- Reactor Water Cleanup System X Identify / repair valve Completion U-3 refuel A' Regen. Ht. Ex. problem; 'B' RWCU System outage.
train operational.
- LPRM cables56-41A, 24-33A, X Cables shorted; remaining ' Completion U-3 refuel 56-41D,24-25C, 16-49D,32-25B operable LPRM's well above outage.
Tech. Spec. minimum requirement. Results in 6 of 164 LPRM's inop.
- HRSS Liquid Sample System X Modification work; sampling- April, 1987.
procedure in place in interim.
3A, 3B & 3C Circ. Water Pump I Repair limitorque operator Prior to U-3 startup.
discharge valves and valve yoke.
- TIP's I Personnel safety for work As required for system inside TIP room and drywell, operation.
- 1B MSIV X Repair crack on air Prior to U-3 startup.
- CCSW Vault Cooler X Repair minor leak in cooling Prior to U-3 startup.
coil.
- 3B Reactor Feed Pump Aux. I Inspect oil suction filter Expected prior to U-3 011 Putcp screen and relief valve, startup; as a minimum 2 RFP's will be operational prior to
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startup, with the 3rd RFP operational prior to exceeding 50% power.
fj REASON FOR OOS/ IMPACT ,
ON UNIT OPERATIONS IF EOUIPMENT OOS SAFETY RELATED NOT IN SERVICE EXPECTED RETURN TO SERVICE-Yes No,
- Main Steam Line Drain X Valve OOS in the open Prior to U-3 startup.-
Isolation Valve M03-220-1 position as a positive control of the reactor i vessel vent path.
l - C2 Supply to Drywell X Personnel safety for work As required for system inside drywell, operation.
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ATTACHMENT B "Dresden 2 & 3 Plan to Achieve Error-Free Operation **
r Error Froo Operation Plan Eleminte' O Prior to unit startup
- 1. Corporate augmented on-site review
- 2. Independent overview - key plant status items
- 3. . Augmented training to' shift personnel
- a. On-shift tailgates
- b. Formal classroom
- c. Simulator exercises
- 4. Plant equipment / system operability surveillance
- 5. Shift Operating Order: protocol & procedural adherence
- 6. Enhanced shift turnover O During startup and subsequent operation
- 1. Corporate / Station Special Review Committee
- a. On-going lessons learned
- b. 50% power plateau review
- c. Stop work reviews for key events
- 2. Senior raanager on shif t
- 3. SRO Advisor on shift
- 4. Unit Operator on shift
- 5. Nuclear Engineer on shift
- 6. Continued equipment operability surveillance
- 7. Awareness sessions with all plant personnel
- 8. Implementation of Control Room " quiet hour" t
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. ' EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
DRESDEN UNITS 2 & 3 PLAN TO ACHIEVE GOAL OF ERROR-FREE OPERATION A comprehensive plan has been developed and implemented at Dresden to achieve a goal of error-free operation during the March, 1987_startups of Units-2 & 3 and the period of operation following startup. This plan includes lessons learned from the recently completed NRC administered Operator Requalification Exam and the event of 2-27-87 wherein the Technical Specification limit of 212 (degree) F for reactor water temperature was exceeded without primary containment. Further, lessons learned from the previous Error-Free Startup Plans at LaSalle County Station and Dresden Station were incorporated.
.The elements of the plan are divided into two distinct phases and are outlined below:
PRIOR TO UNIT STARTUP
- 1. Corporate Augmented Onsite Review of Re,adiness for Startup
- 2. Independent Overview of Key Plant Status Programs
- a. Out of services, jumpers, degraded equipment
- b. Surveillances
- c. Control room indications and alarms
- d. Work Requests, modifications and tests
- 3. Augmented training to licensed shift personnel to include the Error Free Plan, Requal Exam Lessons Learned, U-3 2-27-87 Event Lessons and Confirmatory Action Letter Implementation. This training will be accomplished via:
- a. Sessions on shift
- b. Classroom
- c. Simulator exercises
- 4. Plant Equipment /Sy; ten Op;r:bility Surv llianco
, 5. Issuance of' Operating Order Providing Direction for Shift Protocol and Procedural Adherence Requirements
- 6. ' Enhanced Shift Turnover DURING STARTUP AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATION
- 1. Corporate /Etation Special Review Comunittee
- a. Ongoing Lessons Learned Review
- b. 50% Power Plateau Review c.- Stop and Hold Reviews for Key Events
- 2. Senior. Manager On Shift
- 3. SRO Advisor On Shift
- 4. Unit Operator On Shift
- 5. Nuclear Engineer On Shift
- 6. Ongoing Plant Equipment / Systems Operability Surveillance
- 7. Awareness and Expectations Sessions by Senior Station Management
- 8. Develop Action Plan for Control Room Quiet Hours
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. DRESDEN UNITS 2 & 3 PLAN TO ACHIEVE GOAL OF ERROR-FREE @PERATION This plan is being implemented at Dresden Station in order to achieve a goal of no personnel errors during and following the March, 1987 startup of Units 2
& 3. This includes lessons learned from the Operator Requal Exam, from the primary containment event of 2-27-87, and from significant personnel error / equipment failure events.
It also augments the normal administrative programs for Units 2 & 3 currently in place at Dresden and consists of two phases:
- a. Prior to startup
- b. During startup and subsequent operation PRIOR TO STARTUP
- 1. Augmented Onsite Review In addition to the normal Station Onsite Review for startup from a refuel outage an Onsite Review will also be conducted prior to the return to service from the current U-3 short outage. Both onsite reviews will be augmented by Senior Corporate Management and will be conducted to assess the readiness of the units for startup. In addition to the Station Managec and his selected participants, the review will include at least one of the following:
Nuclear Stations Division (NSD) Division Vice President, or the NSD Assistant Vice President and General Manager, or the Vice President of Nuclear Operations.
The review will include an assessment of the independent overview of key programs discussed below.
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2.. Independent cverview cf key programs that control plant'ctstu3
-Overview' teams led by SRO's, Quality Assurance.or Technical Staff Engineers will review four key areas of operations. The key areas are:
- a. Review of outstanding out of services, jumpers and lifted leads.
The items essential to plant startup'will be placed on the pre-startup checklist and will be~ completed as required to support startup. On a sample basis, completed out of services, jumpers and'
, lifted leads will be verified to be correct and cleared in the-field.
The degraded equipment los will be reviewed and verified to reflect' current plant status.
Randomly selected plant valve alignment checklists for Unit 2 will be esverified by personnel outside the Operating Department. Some areas or systems to be checked could include Standby Liquid Control, Control Rod Drive, and Reactor Water Cleanup, as well as selected valves in the torus and drywell,
- b. Review of Unit Technical Specification surveillances.- This will consist of a review of the Technical Specification Survelliance program to verify all survalliances are current as required. -past due survelliances will be tracked to ensure compliance for startup. On a sampling basis, survalliance documentation will be verified for completeness.
l c. Review of Control Room Indications and Alarms. The control room I inspection will include a review of equipment status, recorders, indicators and caution stickers. Annunciator panel alarms will be j reviewed to determine their validity. All items identified as the l result of this review which are required for startup will be l
tracked on the startup checklist. Special emphasis will be placed i' on elimination of alarms that would be illuminated during power
! operation of the unit.
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. d. ' Review cf Work Requ;;t and T :tc. The Unit CCf;ty reltted work
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requests, including modifications, will be reviewed to ensure they have been completed and an adequate test performed based upon the
' work done.
- 3. Training of On-Shift Licensed Shift Personnel Three phases of training, with some redundancy purposely established, will be completed prior to the restart of Unit 2 & 3 operation. The training is being provided to assure proper personnel performance when conducting On-Shift Licensed Duties,
- a. Beginning with shift 1 on 3-1-87, all licensed personnel assuming shift responsibilities will be trained on:
- 1) Confirmatory Action Letter concerning NRC Requal Exams and lessons learned.
- 2) SRO Advisor and Unit Operator responsibilities / interface.
- 3) Unit 3 Primary Containment Event of 2-27-87 and lessons learned.
- 4) Operating Order which defines the Operating Departments' policy and philosophy on the use of procedures.
Additional training on the Error Free Plan and the " Enhanced Shift Turnover" will be conducted starting on 3-4-87.
All of the above training will be performed as a tailgate session on-shift by Operations Management.
- b. Special classroom training at the simulator will include all of the items listed in 3.a. above plus a review of significant industry events associated with start-ups,
- c. Practice sessions on the simulator itself during various plant start-up conditions will include:
- 1) Les:on3 lccened from the NRC Requal Exams (i.o...the effective use of procedures and other controlling documents in accordance with the new Operating order as well as enhanced communication).
- 2) Implementation of the SRO Advisor and the Unit Operator interface. See attached Shift Manning Organization Chart.
- 3) Lessons learned from the U-3 (2-27-87) primary containment event (i.e., procedure use, multiple indication awareness and communication).
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- 4) The practicing of various portions of an error free reactor start-up concept.
- 4. Plant Equipment / System Operability Surveillance
- a. Maintenance Foreman will verify equipment readiness for return to service upon completion of all work.
- b. The SOS program will provide verification of specific equipment and system integrity by inspection of selected areas of the plant from a specifically prepared list.
- c. Increased security personnel presence in-plant.
- d. Shift Foreman and in-plant operator surveillance will be enhanced.
- 5. An Operating Order will be issued to communicate expectations of shift protocol and adherence to procedure requirements.
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- 6. Enhan:ed Shift Turnov:r1 T 3 ,
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, a. _Beginning 3-3-87,.the SRO Advisor and the SCRE 0111 report for theirassignedshiftsonehourearly.:During\QisonehourTerlod
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the SRO Advisor and the SCRE will conduct a walkdcen of the control
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room panels and gain an understanding of the activities in :
progress. Also included will be a review of the Unit and Center Desk Logs from the last shift when the ind vidual fulfilled shift' duties.- These activities will be performed prior to relieving f.he off-going shift personnel. When the SCRE and SRO Advisor are ,
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satisfied that they have a sufficient understand $ng of Unit status
!t 3 and activities in progress, then, and only'then'will they egnCuct s_
their normal shift relief and release the offoing -g SCRE an'd SRO Advisor. ,
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- b. - Before Unit 3 is brought above eMd shutdown (or refuel for Unit 2) the above program will be put in of f act for the on-coming Unit Operator and NSO-in-Training.
- c. Continuation of this Enhanced Shift Turnover will be evaluated one month after startup of Unit 3.
DURING STARTUP AND SUBSEQUgNT OPgRATI0tft ,
The period of startup and subsequent operation will require the assignment'of
! additional personnel, the conduct of operational performance reviews and prompt problem identification and correct. ion. The elements of this program I are described below and may be modified by the Review Committee identified in Item 1. The factors that will be considered for program modification include effectiveness of the requirement, performance results to date, and the iseact of the change on total operations.
The program consists of the following items:
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i .7. ' C rporath/Stttion -Specini Review Constittee i,
's. . Ongoing Lessons Learned Review
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Reviews will be' conducted at least every 14 days to evaluate past performance in order to authorize further activities utilizing s
lessons learned to date.
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The review participants will include at least one off-site persoft, ifs k.
( from the positions of Nuclear Stations Division (NSD) Division Vice Q President,/ASD Assistant Vice President and General Manager, or the Vice President of Nuclear Operations, in addition to the Station Manager and his selected participants.
These revi s will focus upon elements of the startup experience required to achieve the goal of error-free operation and will include evaluations of such items as personnel errors, ESF i
4 W actuations, equirment outages (including Control Room annunciators s and indicators) inhibiting future activities, and potential 6 obstacles whir.h'could lead to undesirable or degraded situations I leading to personnel errors.
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( Continuation of the 14 day review will be evaluated three months
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- b. 50% Power Plateau Review l *s l
l The power ascension program will hold at 50% (t 5%) reactor power to allow an additional review of performance and lessons learned by l V the Special Review Convaittee. The review will be completed and 1
identified corrective actions implemented prior to continuing power
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. c. Spe3101 Situ 2ticn R; views Should a significant personnel error or unplanned ESF actuation 1 P occur between the periodic 14-day Review Committee meetings, such r
s personnel error or unplanned ESF actuation will be reviewed by the
, , Committee within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the event. The corrective actions 7
Jdentified by such coview that involve administration, procedures,
[and training will be implemented within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. Longer term corrective actions will have a schedule for implementation
' identified withdi 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
Any deviation report suspected to result fror.Tpersonnel error will be immediately communicated to the Station Duty Officer. /
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$L [ Reactor power increases on Unit 2 or 3 will be terminated once a steady state condition'can be achieved immediately following the )
event until the Review Committee approves resumption of power increases af ter personnel errors resulting in the following:
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- 1) ESF Actuati;on r
- 2) .
Control Rod Masipulation Error
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- 3) Missed Technical Specification Surveillance
- 4) InoperableTechnicalSpecificati$nComponentorSystem
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95 5) Technical Specificition LCO Violation
,( 6) Wrong Unitfor. Wrong"RedundantISystem Errors
(, 77) Anyotherpersbknelerrordeemedofequalimportancebythe s Station Duty Officer c' /
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' Notification for personnel e'rrors and ESF actuations will be as l
follows:
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s- ', 1) For personnel errors resultir.g in a hold on reactor power t, J i increaues, the Station Duty Officer will notify the Station Manager and the Corporate Nuclear Duty Officer within one hour.
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- 2) All cther ESF catu; tion 3 er p:rconn31 crrses will promptly be _
reported to the Station Manager by the Station Duty Officer, normally the following morning. The Station Manager will notify the appropriate Corporate Management Individual.
Continuation of these review and notification provisions will be evaluated three months after startup.
'2. Senior Manager On Shift An Operating Engineer (or equivalent) will be assigned on shift from commencement of this startup until the hold plateau (50% i 5%).
This is a line management position'in charge of all shift activities with a special focus on adherence to procedures; use of'available multiple indicators, and activity level as it related to operator's ability to perform duties. He reports to the Operations Assistant Superintendent.
All work groups on shift will be responsible to the Senior Manager for their activities.
- 3. AdditiogalSROAdvisorCoverage At all times the control room will be staffed with a licensed SRO Advisor who has either passed an NRC administered Requalification Exam or was initially IIc'ensed since January, 1986. He will work in conjunction with
-the SCRE and will serve as the Senior Licensed Operator on shift as described in the Technical Specifications. This SRO Advisor will be in effect untiljsuch time as the SCRE has successfully completed an NRC approved accelerated upgrade training program or an NRC administered examination.
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- 4. Addition 31 Unit Operater During startup and subsequent unit operation, the unit will be manned b," a Licensed Operator who has either passed an NRC administered requalification exam or was initially licensed since January, 1986. In addition, an NSO-in-training will. manipulate the reactor control under the direction and in the presence of the Licensed Unit Operator-or the Licensed SRO Advisor. The NSO=in-training can perform activities at the back panels without being in the presence of the Licensed Unit Operator or the Licensed SRO Advisor provided that the activity does not directly affect the reactivity or power level of the reactor. The additional Unit Operator will be in aft'ect until such time as the NSO-in-training has successfully completed an NRC approved accelerated upgrade training program or an NRC administered examination.
- 5. Nuclear Engineer coverage A Nuclear Engineer will be assigned on shift for this startup, from commencement to hold plateau (50% i 5%). He will be at the console for all control rod manipulations. In addition to the normal core monitoring activities, he will be the second verifier for all control rod manipulations.
- 6. Ongoing Plant Equipment / Systems Operability Surveillance The plant equipment / system operability surveillance described in Item 4 for Prior to Unit Startup will be continued during startup and subsequent operation. Continuation of this additional verification will be evaluated one month after startup of Unit 3.
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. 7. Awaren:s3 cud Exp;ctttion S:ccicna O' Senior Station Management will conduct sessions with all work groups to ensure that they are aware of the 2-27-87 event and the plan for error-free operation. These sessions will also be to communicate the Company's expectations in. relation to attention to detail and procedural adherence. These Sessions will be completed by mid-March, 1987.
- 8. Action Plan for Control Room Quiet Hours An Action Plan will be developed for the incorporation of a " quiet-hour" concept in the control room. Senior Operating Department management, shift supervisors, and reactor operators will participate in the development of this concept. The action plan will be developed by end of March, 1987.
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SHIFT MANNING CHART Shift Engineer l l Unit Foreman (2) ,
Station Control Room SRO Advisor *'
Engineer Unit Operator
- Unit Operator
- en er Desk NSO ining NSO ining NSO Recently
- Passed NRC Exam l.
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