ML20207R970
| ML20207R970 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1987 |
| From: | Donohew J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-03-05.B, TASK-3-5.B, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8703180370 | |
| Download: ML20207R970 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES 8
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March 9, 1987 Docket No. 50-719 LICENSEES:
GPU Nuclear Corporation Jersey Central Power and Light Company FACILITY:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
SUBJECT:
FEPRUARY 11, 1987, MEETINC WITH GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION (GPUN)
TO DISCUSS THE ISOLATION CONDENSERS ORYWFLL PIPU!G PENETRATIONS with GPUN (y, Februarythe licensee) to discuss its conceptual design of the four drywe On Wednesda 11, 1987, a meeting was held at NRC, Pethesda, Maryland, or containment, penetrations of the isolation condensers (IC).
In January 1986, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC1 notified NPC of a condition involving a failure mode for the Nine Mile Point I drywell.pene-trations. Loads calculated for the penetrations due to a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) in the process piping within the penetrations were determined to exceed those for which the penetrations were designed. The licensee became aware of the NMPC analysis and, in February 1986, voluntarily initiated an investigation of the Oyster Creek penetrations. The results of this investigation were discussed with the staff in the meeting of August ??,
1986. The PFC reeting minutes are dated October 1,1986. At that tine, the four piping penetrations for the IC pioing were identified to be below the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR1 design criteria and would fail if a guillotine rupture of the pipe occurred within the penetration. This was also reported to the staff in Licensee Event Report No.86-024, dated October 17, 1986.
Since August 22, 1986, the staff has had several telephone discussions with the licensee on this subiect. This resulted in the licensee's letters of Septenher 17 and November 25, 1986.
In the latter letter, the licensec com-mitted to coordinate the final resolution of the four piping penetrations with the resolutten of NUREG-0313, Revision 2, requirements on welds inside these penetrations and with the staff's Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP)
Topic III-5.B on the two containment isolatier valves outside containment on the IC steam lines. The penetration modifications would be completed in the Cycle 12R outage in 1988.
8703100370 870309 PDR ADOCK 05000219 P
. The staff issued its evaluation on these penetrations in its letter dated December 24, 1986.
In this letter, the staff stated that as the licensee explained in its letter dated November 25, 1986, completing the rodification in the Cycle 12R outage is contingent on the staff firalizing the design of the penetrations and the licensee completing the engineering for the modifica-tions in time for the outage. The staff will, therefore, be involved in this activity with the licensee because this design will involve NUREG-0313, Revision 2 and SEP Topic TII-5.B. To expedite the design of the peretration, the staff requested a meetire at NRR headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland, to discuss the licensee's conceptual design for the four penetrations.
This rieeting of February 11, 1987, is the first meetino that has been held on the conceptual design of these piping penetrations. The meeting that was to be held on January 26, 1987, was cancelled because of the weather. is the list of the participants that attended the meetina. The following is a sumary of the significant items discussed and the actions, if any, taken or proposed.
In its letter dated November 25, 1986, the licensee stated that a recent unverified finite element analysis using reinforcement not considered in previous work and more realistic thermal-hydraulic modeling showed that the drywell shell at the IC steam line penetrations will not be overstressed due to an HELB. The licensee stated in the meeting that the calculations have been verified end these and other verified calculations show that only one IC conder. sate return line will be everstressed above the allowable limits due to the HELB.
The staff and the licensee discussed hydrogen water chemistry, NUREG-0313, Revision 2, the broad scope rule charge for General Design Criteria (GDC) 4 on high energy piping and the containment isolation valves on the IC steam lines being both outside containment. GDC 4 is related to the two containment isolation valves outside containment on the IC steam lines and the quality of the IC piping. The stof' stated that the leak before break evaluation of the isolation condenser system piping will be based on the GDC 4 broad scope rule instead of the SEP guidelines. Therefore, one area that the licensee must address is the possibility of water hamer in the IC. The licensee will have to provide its justification that water hamer would not be expected in this piping systen.
The staff explained that the broad scope rule chenge is not for systems sus-ceptible to water hamers and intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC).
The inspection conducted by the licensee on the IC piping in the recently past Cycle 11R outage found crack-like indications in one IC weld. This is dis-cussed in the licensee's letter dated October 13, 1986, and the staff's eval-uation dated November 14, 1986. The staff stated that the IC piping is considered susceptible to IGSCC.
Concerning the two containment isolation valves outside containment, the licensee explained that the valves are welded together and welded to the
. fluted head of the steam line penetration. A break,iust outside the valves may affect the operation of the valve operators and cause them not to close.
The licensee stated that it expected to complete the modifications for hydrogen water chemistry in the Cycle 12R outage. The plant would be operating on hydrogen water chemistry when it restarted from this outage.
The licensee has submitted two fracture mechanics studies on the IC in its letters dated October 16, 1984 and May 18, 1982. Based on these studies, the licensee has concluded that through-wall cracks in the IC steam and condensate return piping would remain stable under severe pipe pressure loading and rotational stresses and an instantaneous HELB would not occur. The staff did not address these studies in its safety evaluation dated December 24, 1986, on the IC piping penetrations. The staff has reviewed these studies and concludes the following:
(1) these fracture analyses are not what would be done today because they are based on the SEP guidelines and (2) the assumed material toughness properties were too high.
This meeting was to exchange information between the licensee and the staff on the IC drywell piping penetrations. No decisions were made by either the licensee or the staff. There was no material handed out by the licensee.
1 Eid
. Donoh
, Jr., Proiect Manaaer i
BWR Pro. ject Directorate #1 Division of BWR Licensing
Attachment:
List of Attendees DISTRIBUTION Docket File NRC PDR Local PDR See attached list BWD1:08L B
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3 ATTACHMENT 1 MEETING WITH GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION (GPUN)
TO DISCUSS ISOLATION CONDENSERS DRYWELL PIPING PENETRATIONS FEBRUARY 11, 1987 NAME ORGANIZATION J. Donohew NRC/NRR/D8L D. Covill GPUN P. Czaya GPUN W. Nazelton NRC/NRR/D8L R. Hermann NRC/NRR/ DBL.,
R. Sanford GPUN o
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F.
l Cyster Creek Fuclear Generating Station l
Cc' Pr. Ernest L. Blake, Jr.
Resident Inspector Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge c/o U.S. NRC l
2300 N Street, NW Post Office Box 445 Washington, D.C.
20037 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 J.B. Liberman, Esquire Comissioner Bishop, Liberman, Cook, et al.
New Jersey Departnert of Energy 1155 Avenue of the Americas 101 Comerce Street New York, New York 10036 Newark, New Jersey 07102 Mr. David M. Scott, Acting Chief A sienc1 Administrator, P.egion I Bureau of Nuclear Ergineering L'.1.. huclear ktculatory Conunission Department of Environmental Protection 6?! Fark Avenue CN 411 King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Trenton, New Jersey 08625 PVR Licensing Manager Mr. P. P. Fiedler GPU Nuclear Corporatinn Vice Presider.t F Nrector 1 l'pper Pond Road Oyster Cred huclear Generating Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Station Post Offico Ecx 388 Deputy Attorney General Forked River, New Jersey 08731 State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety 36 West State Street - CN 112 Trenton, New Jersey 08625 Mayor Lacey Township 218 West Lacey Road Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensing Manager Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Mail Stop: Site Emergency Bldp.
P. O. Soy 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731
o Distribution for Feeting Sumary Dated:
March 9, 1987 Facility: Oyster Creek Nuclear Genereting Station *
'Dtidet?F9W(50-219) p.
NRC PDR Local PDR BWD1 Reading R. Bernero/R. Houston J. Zwolinski J. Donohew C. Jtrierson 0GC-BETH (Info Only)
E. Jordan B. Grimes ACRS (10)
D. Vassallo C. Grimes G. Lainas/B. D. Liaw G. Hulman E. Marinos R. Hemann W. Hodges D. Covill P. Craya W. Hazelton P. Sanford OC File
- Copies sent to pertens on faciitty service list l
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