ML20207Q518
| ML20207Q518 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1987 |
| From: | Wallace P TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 86-09, 86-9, NUDOCS 8701270460 | |
| Download: ML20207Q518 (1) | |
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 January 20, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conumission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO.
50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SPECIAL REPORT 86-09 The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire door breach greater than seven days. This event is reported in accordance with the special report requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.12.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
[P.R.Wallace Plant Manager Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Connaission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30373 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 8701270460 870120 PDR ADOCK 05000328 S
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An Equal Opportunity Employer
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I SPECIAL REPORT 86-09 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 i
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT At 1530 EST on December 20, 1986, with both units in cold shutdown (mode 5),
fire door A-10, containment spray (CS) 2A-A pump room, was determined to be nonfunctional for greater than seven days. Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.12 raquires fire doors to be functional at all times. Submittal of a special report is required for any door which cannot be restored to functional status within a seven-day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) period.
Door A-10 was breached on December 13, 1986, under Breaching Permit number 3405 when an Operations personnel noticed that the door would not adequately shut upon a routine inspection. Due to the frequent use of the door in conjunction with the doorframe misalignment, the backup plate for the upper hinge had broken loose. A work request (WR) was written to repair the door. However, due to an implementation problem with a recently released version of Administrative Instruction (AI)-20. "QC Inspection Program " WRs that involved parts for critical structures, systems, or components (CSSC) were temporarily placed on hold while the problem with quality material was resolved. On December 22, 1986. AI-20 was revised to resolve the quality material problem. The door was repaired, and then the fire door breach was released on January 12, 1987. A roving fire watch was maintained throughout the event.
No other plant systems or functions were affected by this fire door breach.
CAUSE OF EVENT The root cause for exceeding the LCO has been determined to be the implementation of a procedural requirement in AI-20 which would have resulted in exceeding the LCO if it had been implemented as stated. Rather than implement existing requirements for the WR, a decision was made on the part of the maintenance planner and his management to wait on a revision to AI-20 and its upper tier document, Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual (NQAM),
Part II, Section 5.3, wnich was already in progress. The revision to the NQAN and the implementing revision to AI-20 were both approved on December 22, 1986.
The root cause for the door backup plate failure has been determined to be an improperly installed doorframe. The doorframe misalignment resulted in excessive force on the backup plate. This coupled with the frequent use of the door resulted in the hinges separating from the backup plate.
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ANALYSIS OF EVENT At the time the fire door was breached, the TS 3.7.12 LCO was entered and the required fire watch was initiated. The fire watch continued throughout the time the door remained nonfunctional. While in mode 5, the CS pump is not required to be operable and had its power removed. Therefore, this event is considered not to have posed a hazard or potential threat to the health and safety of the public.
CORRECTIVE ACTION The backup plates have been welded back to the hinges which has allowed for full closure and latching of the door. The long-term corrective action will be to rework the doorframe to ensure proper alignment.
AI-20 has been revised to correctly state implementation requirements with regard to CSSC components.
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