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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20210L4361999-08-0202 August 1999 Cycle 9 12-Month SG Insp Rept ML20210L4451999-07-31031 July 1999 Unit-2 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20211F9031999-06-30030 June 1999 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20205B6631999-02-28028 February 1999 Underground Storage Tank (Ust) Permanent Closure Rept, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Security Backup DG Ust Sys ML20198S7301998-12-31031 December 1998 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20199J2571998-01-31031 January 1998 Cycle 9 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20199J2441998-01-29029 January 1998 Snp Unit 2 Cycle Refueling Outage Oct 1997 L-97-215, SG Secondary Side Loose Object Safety Evaluation1997-10-23023 October 1997 SG Secondary Side Loose Object Safety Evaluation ML20203B9591997-09-18018 September 1997 Pressure Locking Summary & Evaluations Using Commonwealth Edison Methodology for Sqn ML20210J1761997-07-31031 July 1997 Unit 1,Cycle 9 Alternate Plugging Criteria 90 Day Rept ML20138D1991997-04-0404 April 1997 Special Project97-928S, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Assessments ML20138C5371997-03-24024 March 1997 Rev 0 to Pressurizer Level Event ML20217G2401997-03-0303 March 1997 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to SE of Reduced Thermal Design Flow ML20117J3611996-08-0101 August 1996 SE of Safety Valve Setpoint Tolerance Relaxation ML20117K9461996-03-0505 March 1996 Reliability Study ML20117K9511996-02-29029 February 1996 Reliability Common Cause Assessment, for Feb 1996 ML20095J1891995-10-0505 October 1995 Design & Analysis of Weld Overlay Repair for Sequoyah Unit 1 CRDM Lower Canopy Seal Welds ML20081D3831995-03-12012 March 1995 Simulator Four Yr Test Rept for 950312 ML20083N9521994-11-16016 November 1994 10CFR50.59 Rept to Nrc ML20024H8491993-07-19019 July 1993 Evaluation of Ultrasonic Test Results from 1993 ISI on Underclad Flaw Indications in Sequoyah,Unit 1 Rv Nozzles. ML20118D1941992-09-21021 September 1992 Technical Rept on Hydrogen Control Measures & Effects of Hydrogen Burns on Safety Equipment ML20114A6641992-08-15015 August 1992 920619 Self-Assessment. Several Hardware & Software Enhancements to Emergency Response Ctrs Completed During Reporting Period ML20141M1341992-03-27027 March 1992 Spent Fuel Pool Mod for Increased Storage Capacity ML20029C2011991-03-12012 March 1991 Initial Simulator Certification. ML20028H8591990-09-0707 September 1990 Nuclear Quality Audit & Evaluation Review Rept, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Look Back Review of Cable Issues. ML20136J0431990-06-30030 June 1990 Criticality Analysis of Sequoyah Units 1 & 2 Fresh Fuel Racks ML20043B6061990-05-11011 May 1990 Diesel Generator Voltage Response Improvement Rept. ML20006E5771990-02-0505 February 1990 Rev 1 to Sequoyah Units 1 & 2 Spent Fuel Storage Rack Criticality Analysis. ML20246D5351989-02-28028 February 1989 Steam Generator Tubing Insp Results ML20247H1301988-11-30030 November 1988 Rev 0 to Structural Analysis & Evaluation of Sequoyah Reactor Coolant Pump Support Columns ML20236D1951988-11-18018 November 1988 HVAC Damping Values ML20134H6801988-09-0202 September 1988 Technical Evaluation of Procurement of Matls & Svcs ML20245B4181988-08-17017 August 1988 Investigation Rept,Design & Operation of Sampling Sys for Analysis of High Purity Water ML20151Q2691988-08-0101 August 1988 Final Rept on IE Bulletin 79-14 for Tva,Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 & Common Piping ML20155J5721988-07-31031 July 1988 Assessment of Structural Adequacy of Concrete Foundation Cells for Emergency Raw Cooling Water Pumping Station & Access Roadway ML20207F6231988-07-0505 July 1988 Evaluation of Effects of Postulated Pipe Failures Outside of Containment for Sequayah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20207B6301988-06-27027 June 1988 Engineering Assurance Oversight Review Rept,Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Unit 1,Design Baseline & Verification Program ML20147G9961988-03-31031 March 1988 Review of Operational Readiness Corrective Actions. Related Documentation Encl ML20147H6331988-02-29029 February 1988 Plant,Diesel Generator Evaluation Rept ML20147G7861988-02-25025 February 1988 Task Rept on Development of Seismic Acceleration Response Spectra for Diesel Generator Bldg of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Part 1:Design Basis SSE Input ML20147G8041988-02-25025 February 1988 Task Rept on Development of Seismic Acceleration Response Spectra for Diesel Generator Bldg of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Part 2:Site-Specific OBE & SSE Inputs ML20234F2111988-01-0505 January 1988 Rept of Sequoyah Readiness Review ML20147F0581987-12-0202 December 1987 Non-linear Time History Seismic Response Analyses for ERCW Cell, Task Rept ML20236B3481987-10-15015 October 1987 Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Seqouyah Element Rept 207.4(B), Deviation Documentation:Caq Documentation ML20236B3511987-10-14014 October 1987 Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Sequoyah Element Rept 232.8(B), Piping & Valve Design:Criteria for Min Pipe Wall Thickness ML20236B3541987-10-14014 October 1987 Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Seqouyah Element Rept 235.2(B), Electrical Safety:Exposed 480 Volt Bus at Panel Top ML20236B3441987-10-14014 October 1987 Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Sequoyah Element Rept 204.9(B), Use of Reverse Prints ML20236B3581987-10-14014 October 1987 Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Seqouyah Element Rept 241.4(B), Cable Termination & Splices:Amphenol Connector ML20236Q2011987-10-0101 October 1987 Temp Measurement Rept for Long-Term Current Test on Littlefuse,Flas-5,5 Amp Fuses 1999-08-02
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20212J6311999-10-0101 October 1999 SER Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Requirements for Certain Inservice Insp at Plant,Unit 1 ML20217G3721999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20212F0831999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Certain Weld Insp at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) for Second 10-year ISI Interval ML20212F4761999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 246 & 237 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20212C4761999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20210L4361999-08-0202 August 1999 Cycle 9 12-Month SG Insp Rept ML20216E3781999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20210L4451999-07-31031 July 1999 Unit-2 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20210G6631999-07-28028 July 1999 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20209H3831999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20211F9031999-06-30030 June 1999 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage ML20196J8521999-06-28028 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Use Iqis for Radiography Examinations as Provided for in ASME Section III,1992 Edition with 1993 Addenda,Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20195K2951999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20206Q8951999-05-0505 May 1999 Rev 0 to L36 990415 802, COLR for Sequoyah Unit 2 Cycle 10 ML20206R5031999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for April 1999 for Sequoyah Units 1 & 2.With ML20205P9811999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20204C3111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205B6631999-02-28028 February 1999 Underground Storage Tank (Ust) Permanent Closure Rept, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Security Backup DG Ust Sys ML20203H7381999-02-18018 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of Topical Rept BAW-2328, Blended U Lead Test Assembly Design Rept. Rept Acceptable Subj to Listed Conditions ML20211A2021999-01-31031 January 1999 Non-proprietary TR WCAP-15129, Depth-Based SG Tube Repair Criteria for Axial PWSCC Dented TSP Intersections ML20198S7301998-12-31031 December 1998 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20199G3641998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20197J5621998-12-0303 December 1998 Unit 1 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept ML20197K1161998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195F8061998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20154H6091998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20154H6251998-09-17017 September 1998 Rev 0 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 10 Colr ML20153B0881998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20239A0631998-08-27027 August 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20236Y2091998-08-0707 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Requests RP-03,RP-05, RP-07,RV-05 & RV-06 & Denying RV-07 & RV-08 ML20237B5221998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Snp ML20237A4411998-07-31031 July 1998 Blended Uranium Lead Test Assembly Design Rept ML20236P6441998-07-10010 July 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980610,failure of Safeguard Sys Occurred for Which Compensatory Measures Were Not Satisfied within Required Time Period.Caused by Inadequate Security Procedure.Licensee Revised Procedure MI-134 ML20236R0051998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ML20249A8981998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20247L5141998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ML20217K4471998-04-27027 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Requests for Relief 1-ISI-2 (Part 1),2-ISI-2 (Part 2),1-ISI-5,2-ISI-5,1-ISI-6,1-ISI-7, 2-ISI-7,ISPT-02,ISPT-04,ISPT-06,ISPT-07,ISPT-8,ISPT-01 & ISPT-05 ML20217E2221998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ML20248L2611998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199J2571998-01-31031 January 1998 Cycle 9 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20202J7911998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199J2441998-01-29029 January 1998 Snp Unit 2 Cycle Refueling Outage Oct 1997 ML20199F8531998-01-13013 January 1998 ASME Section XI Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Snp Unit 2 Refueling Outage Cycle 8 ML20199A2931997-12-31031 December 1997 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20198M1481997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20197J1011997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199C2951997-11-13013 November 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 971017,vandalism of Electrical Cables Was Observed.Caused by Vandalism.Repaired Damaged Cables, Interviewed Personnel Having Potential for Being in Area at Time Damage Occurred & Walkdowns ML20199C7201997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant L-97-215, SG Secondary Side Loose Object Safety Evaluation1997-10-23023 October 1997 SG Secondary Side Loose Object Safety Evaluation 1999-09-30
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. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - . ._-_ - -___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
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.. TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 231.4(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE: SEQUOYAH ELEMENT REVISION NUMBER: 1 TITLE: FIRE PROTECTION DESIGN Lack of Fire Dampers in Additional Diesel Generator Building PAGE 1 0F 8 r REASON FOR REVISION:
- 1. Incorporation of Senior Review Panel (SRP) and Technical Assistance Staff (TAS) comments of 11/05/86, and compliance with report format-revision 3 of 12/10/86, adding Section 9. Chronology, and Section 10. Corrective Action.
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. , - TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 231.4(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 L [ PAGE 2 0F 8 l 1. CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUE (S):
l- Concerns:' Issue:
l IN-86-305-002 Lack of fira dampers in the #5 diesel
! "There are no fire dampers in generator building could cause diesel-generator building #5 spreading of fire.
l 1eading to the fan room. If a i fire were to break out i downstairs, the fans would pull l the flames through the floor 1 grating of the fan room." l
- 2. HAVE' ISSUE (S) BEEN IDENTIFIED IN ANOTHER SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS? YES X NO Identified by TVA NSRS ,
Date 12/10/85 I
Documentation Identifiers:
(
l NSRS Investigation Report No. I-85-693-WBN, Fire Dampers in Diesel Generator Building l 3. DOCUMENT NOS., TAG NOS., LOCATIONS, OR OTHER SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIVE l IDENTIFICATIONS STATED IN ELEMENT.
, Reference is made to #5 diesel generator (DG) building, which is a separate structure housing only one DG system serving either Sequoyah Unit 1 or 2.
- 4. INTERVIEW FILES REVIEWED:
ECTG cxpurgated file contained no additional information other than -
the K-form for this concern. ECTG working file contained the NSRS l
report I-85-693-WBN. ,
- 5. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
i See Appendix A.
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l I l 1003d - 12/16/06 i 1
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, TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 231.4 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 I PAGE 3 0F 8
- 6. WHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING COMMITMENTS, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS, OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA?
See Appendix A.
- 7. LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO ELEMENT:
See Appendix A.
- 8. EVALUATION PROCESS:
- a. Compared the fire protection design of the building for the
- 5 DG with that of the building for the original DGs
- 1 through 4.
- b. Checked compliance of the fire protection barriers with the applicable TVA General Design criteria and other applicable codes and standards.
- 9. DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS:
Chronoloay:
03/83: TVA drawing 47W866-14, Rev. 2, H&V, Additional DG building issued, showing fire dampers.
08/84: TVA GDC SQN-DC-V-ll.l.2, Rev.1 issued (paragraph 4.6 requires fire zones) 05/85: TVA FCR 3532 for deletion of fire dampers approved.
08/85: TVA drawing 17W910-3, Rev. 8, H&V, Additional DG building revised to delete fire dampers per FCR 3532.
On/M: Concern received by TVA.
12/85: haRS Investigation Report No. 1-85-693-WBN issued.
1003d - !?/16/86
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.. TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 231.4(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1
[ PAGE 4 0F 8 '
Discussion:
- a. The #5 DG is also referred to as " additional" DG in TVA documents. ,
- b. The building housing the DGs #1 through 4 consists of.four l adjacent arrangements of rooms separated by fire wall,s. Eac h ,
arrangement contains a DG room and associated rooms for the air intake, air exhaust, and electrical boards that make up ss one DG system. The building is compartmentalized for fire Q -(
protection, and fire dampers are installed in ducts s(
penetrating walls and in floor gratings from the DG rooms to %
the air intake and exhaust rooms. A The rooms containing the DG sets and electrical boards #1 through 4 are equipped with CO2 fire fighting systems and _' '
require fire dampers released by CO2 pressure for maintaining the gas concentration, or by fusible link, t
- c. The #5 DG building does not contain a C02 fire protection i system, and, for this reason, fire dampers are not required. l An aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) fire suppression system is provided instead. ,
The equipment in the air intake and air exhaust rooms hbove the #5 DG room is an integral part of the DG system:ana must be operational with the DG. Compartmentalization of C individual rooms in the #5 DG building is, therefore, n6t s required. A fire in the #5 DG building would not affedt the DG systems #1 through 4. I
- d. TVA General Design Criteria (GDC) ( App. A, 5.c) paragraph 4.6 l requires a fire protection system that prevents fire spreading from peripheral rooms to the #5 DG room. The HVAC design meets this criterion for rooms on the level of the DG set room, where fire dampers are installed at wall penetrations of ducts. However, there are no fire dampers at tie floor gratings of the air intake and exhaust rooms.
l
- e. The Heating and Ventilating (H&V) flow diagram ( App. A, 5.h) shows fire dampers at the floor grating of the air intake and exhaust rooms to the #5 DG room. H&V mechanical drawing (App. A, 5.1) reflects deletion of the fire dampers per FCR 353? (App A, 5.j). There is a 22-month time period between the revisions of the two conflicting drawings. Per teleplone confirmation of September 15, 1986, hoth drawings are the latest revisions.
1003d - 12/16/86 I
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- % ' #A TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 231.4 (B)
. f. -
'W SPECIAL PROGRAM
. REVISION NUMBER: 1
-( ' PAGE 5 0F 8
-Findings:
The #5 DG system improves r>lant availability during testing, repair, and maintenance of the original four DG systems.
The DG sets #1 through 4 are each in a separate fire zone and . l equipped with C02 fire fighting systems and fire dampers in the floor gratings. This arrangement prevents a fire in any DG or peripheral . room from spreading to other DG systems in the same
. building, and thus complies with Appendix A, to Branch Technical-Position, Auxiliary Power Conversion System _ Branch (APCSB) (App. A, 5.f).
The #5 DG room does not require fire dampers. The design documents are inconsistent regarding the fire dampers in the #5 DG building.
GDC SQN-DC-V-ll.1.2 (App. A, 5.c)'is not complied with. l
Conclusion:
The concern is not valid because the #5 DG building is not required
(; .to be divided into fire zones. However, there are inconsistencies 5- among drawings, design criteria and as-built condition.
- 10. CORRECTIVE ACTION:
A TVA memo (App. A, 5.k) transmits a corrective action plan which will eliminate the discrepancies between the various design documents related to this concern by deleting the fire protection requirement for the #5 DG building environmental control system.
Paragraph 4.6 in SQN-DC-V-11.1.2, R1, will be deleted to reflect the common fire zone concept for the entire DG#5 building. Note that SQN-DC-V-11.1.1, R0, paragraph 3.13 still specifies a fire protection system for the #5 DG building in its entirety for economical reasons. The planned corrective action is an acceptable solution to the concern.
i 1002d - 12/16/86
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- i. .
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 231.4(B) 4 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 I- PAGE 6 0F 8
-APPENDIX A
- 5. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
- a. SNP FSAR Section 9.4.5
- b. TVA General Design Criteria No. SQN-DC-V-11.1.1, R0,
" Additional Diesel Generator System"
- c. TVA General Design Criteria No. SQN-DC-V-11.1.2, R1,
" Additional Diesel Generator Building Environmental Control System"
- d. WBNP FSAR Sections 7.4.1.2.3, 8.1.2 and 9.4.5.2.2 (Ref. 5.b above, paragraph 3.la. specifies a similar DG unit as at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant) j e- National Fire Code (NFC) 90A-85, " Installation of Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems", Section 3-3.7 1 f. Appendix A to Branch Technical Position, Auxiliary Power
- Conversion System Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1, " Guidelines for Fire Protection of Nuclear Power Plants"
- g. TVA NSRS Investigation Report No. I-85-693-WBN
- h. Flow Diagram, Heating and Ventilating Air Flow, Additional DG Building 47W866-14 R2, (11/03/83)
- 1. Mechanical Drawing, Heating and Ventilating, Additional DG Building 17W910-3 R8, (08/30/85)
- j. TVA Field Change Request (FCR) 3532, Deletion of fire dampers MK 47A381-597, (06/03/85)
- k. TVA ECEP-SQN Restart Program - Corrective Action Plan (CAP)
Transmittal TCAB 006(11/07/86)
- 6. WHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING COMMITMENTS, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS, OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA?.
i a. TVA General Design Criteria No. SQN-DC-7.5, R1, " Fire Protection Systems"
- b. TVA General Design Criteria No. SQN-DC-V-ll.l.2, R 1,
" Additional DG Building Environmental Control System"
- c. NFC 90A 1003d '- 12/16/86
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rr ' TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 231.4'(B)
. SPECIAL' PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 PAGE 7 0F 8
- 7. -LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO ELEMENT.
- a. RFI # ! SQN-526, (09-03-86)
'b. Telephone conversation from H. A. Mahlman, TVA, to W. M.
Blumer, Bechtel, dated (9-15-86) 4 ki l-1003d - 12/16/86
- r. . c .-
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. TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS . REPORT NUM3ER: 231.4-(B).
SPECIAL PROGRAM-REVISION NUMBER:- 1 I PAGE 8 0F 8 CATD LIST The following CATD identifies and provides corrective actions for the findings included in this report:
231.04 (B) SQN 01 (10/20/86)
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PAGE ~- 124 .i REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY FREQUEt4CY - REQUEST OFFICE OF NUCLEAR P0HER RUN TIME - 12:57:19 DNP - ISSS - RHM EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS) RUN DATE - 12/02/86 LIST OF EMPLOYEE CollCERN INFORMATION CATEGORY: Ell DES PROCESS & OUTPUT SUBCATEGORY: 23104 LACK OF FIRE DAMPERS IN DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM
) S GENERIC P
KEYHORD A KEYHORD B H APPL QTC/NSRS CONCERN SUB R PLT BBSH INVESTIGATIO!! S CONCERN KEYHORD C CAT CAT D LOC FLQB REPORT R DESCRIPTION KEYHORD D g NUMBER IN 305-002 EN 23104 H HBH HNYY I-85-693-HBN SR THERE ARE NO FIRE DAMPERS IN DIESEL SAFETY CONDITION-T50160 REPORT GENERATOR BUILDING 85 LEADING TO THE DESIGN PROCESS FAN ROOM. IF A FIRE HERE TO BREAK HVAC
,3- OUT DOWNSTAIRS, THE FANS HOULD PULL THE FLAMES THROUGH THE FLOOR GRATING OF THE FAN ROOM. CONSTRUCTION DEPT CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMA 3 TI0tl . NO FOLLOWUP REQUIRED.
1 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY EN SUBCATEGORY 23104
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