ML20207K851
| ML20207K851 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/02/1987 |
| From: | Irwin D HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| CON-#187-2093 ALAB-855, OL-3, NUDOCS 8701090542 | |
| Download: ML20207K851 (12) | |
Text
.-.
MS 3 M
LILCO, January 2 1987 0
DOCMETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~87 JAN -5 P2 :56 Before the Commission CFF' C1 In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
LILCO's PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ALAB-855 The Long Island Lighting Company hereby petitions the Commission, pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.786, to review the Appeal Board's December 12,1986 decision, ALAB-855.
In this decision the Appeal Board agreed with the Licensing Board (1) that LILCO must j
prove how many members of the public might be monitored for radioactive contamina-tion in a radiological accident and (2) that LILCO had adequate notice that this was a litigable issue. LILCO submits that the Appeal Board has made the following errors with respect to important questions of f act, law, or policy:
1.
ALAB-855 imposes a requirement that an applicant or licensee must prove i
how many people might need or want (the decision is unclear on this point) i l
to be monitored for radioactive contamination in a radiological accident, rather than being able to rely on an agency guideline of approximately 20%
I of the affected population. It does not appear to LILCO either that there is any existing regulatory requirement to this effect or that any other appil-cant or licensee has been subjected to this requirement.
2.
ALAB-855, citing a Commission dictum, implies that an applicant may have to show an ability to monitor the population of the entire plume exposure EPZ wittilii'about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Again, LILCO is aware of no existing regulato-j ry requirement to this effect or of any other applicant or licensee who ' is been subjected to this requirement.
I 1/
Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-855, 24 NRC (Dec.12,1986). The Commission already has under review certain aspects i
of two earlier Appeal Board decisions in this case, ALAB-818 and ALAB-832.
8701090542 870102 ~
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3.
ALAB-855 implies that, in addition to monitoring, the applicant must prove that it can decontaminate a large number of people within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Again, LILCO believes that there is no existing regulatory requirement to this effect and that no other applicant or licensee has been subjected,to this requirement.
4.
ALAB-855 greatly weakens the Commission's reoutrement that the appil-cant (who has the burden of proof) be given fair notice of the issues to be 1
litigated. It weakens the rule that the issues to be litigated must be stated in admitted contentions and invites intervenors to circumvent the rule that late-filed contentions must meet the test of 10 CFR S 2.714(a).
We discuss each of these four errors below.
I.
The Monitoring Issue: ALAB-855 establishes the rule that l
the applicant must prove how many people might be monitored in a radiological emergency.
The substantive rule set down by ALAB-855 is that the applicant must prove how many members of the public might need to be monitored during a radiological emergen-cy. LILCO submits that this is a new requirement that has not hitherto been imposed by regulation or case law. Since all applicants will now have to comply with it, the Commission should review it.
LILCO's evidence on the necessary size of the reception center relied on a guideline figure of 20% of the plume exposure EPZ population as a (conservative) esti-mate of the number of people who would need public shelter if asked to evacuate their homes. There appear to be no reported cases in which an applicant has been required 1
to predict the number of people who might be monitored in a radiological emergency.
To the extent that the reported cases address relocation center capacity, they appear to rely on the number who might need shelter, which is generally agreed to be about 20 4
l percent of the population.2/
2/
See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. (Wm H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
LBP-82-48,15 NRC 1549,1589136 (1982), aff'd with modifications, ALAB-727,17 NRC 760 (1983); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-37,20 NRC 933, 956, 960-61 (1984), aff'd, ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59 (1985). The former case merely says that "[alpproximately 20% of [an] evacuating population will proceed to a relo-cation center." It also notes that if the possibility of contamination exists, individuals l
would be advised to report to a relocation center through the media.
The latter case, Catawba, also cites the 20% figure (20 NRC at 956), though for (footnote continued) l
Moreover, ALAB-855 is unclear about the exact nature of the new requirement.
j It is not clear whether an applicant must try to predict (1) how inany people might re-ally need to be monitored (because they had been in an area exposed to particulate con-tamination), or on the other hand (2) how many people, because of anxiety or other rea-sons, might want to be monitored, regardless of their objective need for it.
If the requirement is the former, then it is an issue of probabilistic risk assess-ment. And since for any nuclear plant there is probably some probability, however low.
that the entire EPZ might be exposed to particulate contamination, ALAB-855 implies either that emergency planners must be able to monitor everyone in the EPZ or that there is some risk criterion for cutting off the requirement at a smaller number of peo-ple. But there is no such criterion known to LILCO, and there is no requirement that a l
probabilistic risk assessment be done before an applicant can prove his case on emer-gency planning.
If in addition the applicant must predict how many people might want to be monitored on the day of a radiological emergency, regardless of their objective need,E then the issue becomes a psychological one. The number of people who might want monitoring depends on the nature of the accident, on the emergency information pro-vided at the time of the accident, and on how people react to emergency information.
Emergency information and how people react to it has already been extensively liti-7 l
gated in the Shoreham proceeding in the context of the alleged " shadow phenomenon."
The Intervenors have litigated fully their thesis that people will not follow emergency e
information, and their thesis has been rejected by the Shoreham Board as by other ASLB's. The new requirement imposed by the Appeal Board invites a relltigation of the
" shadow phenomenon" issue in this case, and litigation of it again in future proceedings.
l A requirement to predict how many people would want to be monitored would l
also invite the Intervenors to litigate once again their position that the behavior of the public in a one-of-a-kind nuclear emergency can be predicted by taking opinion i
polls - by asking people what they think they would do in a hypothetical emergency j
)
(footnote continued)
Catawba apparently there is more than enough shelter available for the entire EPZ.
The Catawba board concluded that there would be adequate monitoring personnel and i.
equipment at the shelters (20 NRC at 960-61), but it is not clear from the decision how many people the board believed would have to be monitored.
3/
Throughout the Appeal Board talks about persons " seeking" (ALAB-855, slip op.
at 16) or " desiring" (1A at 18) monitoring.
4
.a
i with very little information. It may be that the Appeal Board intended this result; what is developing in NRC emergency planning cases is a pattern in which the licensing boards that have heard the evidence conclude that opinion polls are not useful for pre-dicting emergency behavior, bu't then the Appeal Board remands the case based on its view that opinion polls shouic be given weight. See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 663-67, 675-76 (1985),
remanded in part, ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,152-54 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co.
(Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-836,23 NRC 479,516-20 (1986). This is a great mistake, and it may be furthered by ALAB-355. For this reason, *oo, the i
Commission sliould review ALAB-855.
f II.
The " Entire EPZ" Issue: ALAB-855 invites the argument that the 2
aoplicant must monitor the entire EPZ within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The Appeal Board cites a Commission dictum to the effect that NUREG-0654 Planning Standard J.12 " requires relocation centers capable of registering and moni-toring all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ." ALAB-855, slip op. at 13-14. And the Appeal Board appears to have held that an emergency plan must be f
prepared to monitor all the people in the plume EPZ:
t
... monitoring and decontamination services must be re-garded as within the " range of protect.tve actions" that 10 j
CFR 50.47(b)(10) r_equires be developed fer all members of the public within the EPZ.
i ALAB-855, slip op. at 17 (emphasis in original). It is ce-tain that the Intervenors in this l
case, at least, will argue that LILCO is now required to prove its ability to monitor all N in the Shoreham EPZ within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.E Indeed, the Interve-l 160,000 people l
nors in this case argue, using their discredited " shadow phenomenon" theory, that many people from outside the EPZ will also want to be monitored.
LILCO submits that there is no requirement that emergency planners be able to i
i j
monitor the entire EPZ and certainly not within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. If there were such a i
criterion, then the authors of NUREG-0654 would surely have said so in plain English.
Moreover, the Appeal Board decision, if indeed it requires monitoring of the entire EPZ, is contrary to a recent FEMA guidance document, which LILCO attached to its i
4/
This was the peak (summer) estimate for 1985. LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 783 1
)
(1985).
i 1/
The 12-hour requirement comes from NUREG-0654 criteria J.12, which requires an ability "to monitor" all persons arriving at a relocation center within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
last brief on the issue to the Appeal Board. This document endorses the 20% figure used by LILCO.E The Appeal Board appears to have disregarded this guidance without ex-planation. Since ALAB-855 departs from FEMA guidance and imposes what appears to be a much different rule from what has applied before, the Commission should review the decision.
At Shoreham, for instance, with a maximum EPZ population of aobut 160,000 persons, some 222 monitors would be required to monitor the entire population in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, assuming each monitor were continuously occupied for the entire period and were able to monitor an average of one individual per minute. The difficulty of meet-ing all of these assumptions should not be taken lightly.I At other sites with high EPZ populations the extent of this problem is equally great,E if what appears to be the Ap-peal Board's view is imposed as & universal requirement. This drastic potential change in planning requirements merits review by the Commission.
IIL The Decontamination Issue: ALAB-855 invites litigation about whether the applicant must decontaminate the public.
NUREG-0654 J.12 provides that the applicant should show the ability to "moni-tor" all people arriving at the relocation center within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. It does not have a corresponding provision for decontaminating the public. Although LILCO has provid-ed for decontamination of members of the public at its relocation centers, it knows of no requirement that it to do so.
!/
It does not appear that it has been the Commission's practice to require licens-l ees to plan to monitor 100% of the EPZ population. Jurisdictions planning for Indian Point, for example, use 10% as the basis; New Jersey has imposed a 25% basis.
I/
In order to cope with this fact, LILCO had proposed a prell'ninary screening technique which would enable monitors at reception centers to conduct an initial screening of incoming vehicles and then monitor individual passengers if the vehicle showed signs of contamination. However, the current FEMA RAC Report for Revisions 7 and 8 of the Shoreham Emergency Plan, sent to the NRC under cover of a December 30,1986 letter from Dave McLoughlin to Victor Stello, Jr., appears to reject this type of screening procedure. Id. Attachment 1 page 12, item J.12. Unless this appearance is mistaken, FEMA appears to be requiring individual monitoring of every person from an EPZ population arriving at a relocation or reception center; this in turn raises the logistic problems referred to in the text.
1/
Using the same assumptions as those for Shoreham, monitoring the Indian Point EPZ (pop. 360,815), for example, would require 501 monitors; monitoring the Zion EPZ (pop. 268,700) would require 373 monitors; monitoring the Beaver Valley EPZ (pop.155, 594) would require 216 monitors; monitoring the Duane Arnold EPZ (pop. 161,649) would require 225 monitors. (Population figures were taken from NUREG/CR1856,"An Analy-sis of Evacuation Time Estimates Around 52 Nuclear Power Plant Sites," July 1981.)
O,
Upon remand the Intervenors in this case can be counted on to argue that decontamination facilities must be provided for large numbers of the public, and possibly that decontamination must be accomplished within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The quotation from ALAB-855 set out above suggests that the Appeal Board has now interpreted the regulations to impose such a requirement. This is a significant policy issue; it is one thing to require the monitoring of large numbers of people in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and a greater one yet to require decontamination. LfLCO does not believe the latter requirement has been imposed on any other applicant. Moreover, NUREG-0396 expressly did not recom-mend "special local decontamination provisions for the general public." NUREG-0396, Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiolodcal Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants 14 (Dec.
1978). Because ALAB-855 might be interpreted to imply such a requirement, the Com-mission should review it.
IV.
The Notice Issue: ALAB-855 weakens the rule that fair notice must be given by filing contentions.
LILCO submits that ALAB-855 has greatly weakened an intervenor's burden of going forward, and even of disclosing what he wishes to litigate, particularly where cir-cumstances change in the course of the proceeding. An intervenor, particularly an in-tervenor that is a local or state government represented by counsel experienced in NRC practice, should be required at a minimum to state in contentions what issues he wants to litigate, and he should be bound by the literal terms of those contentions. If the applicant improves its nuclear plant, or changes its emergency plan, so as to moot an existing contention, and if the intervenor ttQn finds something wrong with even the new arrangement, then he should be obligated to amend his contentions or propose new ones and meet the standards for late-filed contentions. By contrast, ALAB-855 appears to hold that once an intervenor alleges that a particular aspect of a broad safety issue is inadequate, he is entitled to later raise new contentions about completely unrelated aspects of that issue.
The basic facts underlying this " notice" issue are as follows: NUREG-0654 J.12 provides that there should be " relocation centers" for evacuees and "means for regis-tering and monitoring of evacuees at relocation centers." At the time the contentions were written, LILCO proposed to use, among other facilities, the Suffolk County Com-munity College as a relocation center for evacuees. This is a facility owned by Suffolk County, and Suffolk County alleged in its Contention 24.0 that the Community College was not to be available as a relocation center because the County refused to make it
4.
available. In addition, the County alleged (in Contention 75) that LILCO had not planned sufficient living quarters (that is, cooking and eating areas, sleeping areas, and l
l so forth) for the number of evacuees that might need shelter. Notably absent from ei-ther these contentions or any others was the allegation that LILCO would not be able to 4
monitor sufficient numbers of people to meet NRC regulations. Nor did the Intervenors present any evidence on this topic.
By the time of the hearing on the relocation center issues LILCO had abandoned reliance on Suffolk County Community College and on several other State and local government bMiing because.the Intervenors refused to allow them to be used. In-j stead, LILCO's arranged to shelter people in schools and churches (" congregate care l
centers") identified by the Red Cross but first to register and monitor them in one or more central " reception centers." At the time of the hearing, in August 1984, LILCO had not completed arrangements for the reception center; the agreement to use the Nassau Coliseum for this purpose was signed af ter the hearing, in October 1984. The hearing in August therefore addressed the congregate care centers (which were identi-fled in August) and the generic features of the reception center plan that did not depend on the specific location of the facility. Even in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, filed in October 1984, the Intervenors did not indicate that the j
size of the population to be monitored wa' ar issue; they focused their attack rather on the fact that LILCO had not designated a reception center at all at the time of hearing.
l Nevertheless, the Licensing Board, and now in ALAB-855 the Appeal Board, held that LILCO should have presented evidence on the number of people expected to be moni-l tored af ter a radiological accident.
This decision has far-reaching effects. In effect, the contention in this case (and the Intervenors' proposed findings) said that "LILCO does not have a reception center."
When LILCO provided a reception center the contention was disproved. The Interve-nors never amended the contention or submitted a new one. They presented no testi-mony on the issue now in dispute. Yet it is now held that LILCO had fair notice of this issue. This holding 1.
Relieves intervenors of the duty of stating their issues in admitted contentions,9/
9/
The Appeal Board in ALAB-855 notes that Contention 24.0 " ultimately had to serve as a basis for litigation in light of substantial changes made by LILCO." ALAB-855, slip op. at 6. Of course, the only reason the contention "had" to continue to serve even though it was cbsolete was that the Intervenors did not amend it. Thus ALAB-855 rather clearly relieves intervenors of any burden to update their contentions, even in a protracted proceeding like this one that lasts for years.
j
2.
Departs from two recent Appeal Board rulings that an intervenor "is bound by the literal terms of its own contentions,"lS/
)
3.
Relieves intervenors of the need to give notice of what they intend to litigate, and 4.
Relieves intervenors of the duty to justify late-filed contentions by the criteria of 10 CFR S 2.714(a).
Instead of relying on the literal terms of a contention, it appears an applicant must now interpret a contention in light of "the language of, and purpose behind, other conten-tions" to divine its essential" concern." See ALAB-855, slip op. at 6-7.
That there was not fair notice of the monitoring issue in this case is shown by two things. First, the Intervenors did not argue the issue in their proposed findings of fact. Second, the NRC Staff at first agreed with LILCO that adequate notice had not been given. The Staff later changed its position, adopting the Appeal Board's sugges-tion that the ASLB's opinion be given deference. But neither the applicant nor the NRC Staff believed at the time that there was adequate notice. " Notice" revealed only af ter the f act by an ASLB decision is not notice at all.
1_0/
Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Electric Generating Station, Units 1 & 2),
ALAB-836,23 NRC 479,504-05 (1986); ALAB-819,22 NRC 681,707-09 (1985). The Ap-peal Board distinguished Limerick on the following grounds:
To be sure, we took a somewhat closer look at the Licensing Board's determinations in Limerick.
In those situations, however, wt. were called upon to decide whether an interve-nor's contentions had been construed too narrowly - a mat-ter that gets our closest review in order to insure that an in-tervenor is not deprived of its statutory hearing rights.
ALAB-855, slip op. at 10 n. 20. However, what the Appeal Board said in Limerick was that intervenors are bound by the literal terms of their own contentions. The literal terms of the contentions do not vary depending on whether the licensing board inter-prets a contention too narrowly or too broadly. If in fact the Appeal Board is not going to hold an intervenor to the literal terms of its own contentions, as seems cleac from ALAB-855, then it should rescind the contrary language in Limerick.
Apparently the Appeal Board, at least, will now give the benefit of the doubt to intervenors, even those represented by experienced Washington, D.C. counsel, in inter-preting the breadth of contentions, contentions that the intervenors themselves draf ted. This is a reversal of the traditional legal rule that a party that draf ts a docu-ment will have it construed narrowly against him in cases of dispute.
j 11/
The Appeal Board reasoned that LILCO "was aware of the import of the interve-nors' contentions" in part because its witnesses acknowledged on cross-examination (footnote continued)
If for no other reason, the Commission should review ALAB-855 because this
" notice" issue is an important procedural question that will considerably affect other proceedings.
CONCLUSION ALAB-855 has the potential for imposing massive new burdens on an already overburdened emergency planning regime. Moreover, it appears to depart from FEMA guidance, from NUREG-0936, and from the plain language of NUREG-0654. For the reasons recited above, the Commission should take review of ALAB-855 and reverse the Appeal Board, both on the issue of requiring applicants to predict the number of mem-bers of the public who might be monitored af ter & radiological emergency (or, in the al-ternative, be prepared to monitor and perhaps decontaminate the entire EPZ popula-tion within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />), and on the issue of fair notice.
Respectful'y submitted,
$f L
'/''
Dtnald'P rwin F
Ja nes hristman f Kathy E. McCleskey Counsel to Long Island Lighting Company Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 (footnote continued)
"that more people may need to be monitored than need to be sheltered." ALAB-855, slip op. at 8. But what LILCO acknowledges that it may have to do in a real emergen-cy, what the NRC requires that LILCO be prepared to do, and what issues are raised for litigation are three different things. LILCO has always been aware that more people might need to be mordtored than to be sheltered. But it never regarded this issue as being raised by any admitted contention.
The Appeal Board notes that Intervenors' direct testimony did not address this issue because they elected to pursue their case on the basis of cross-examination alone, a permissible practice. ALAB-855, slip op. at 8-9 n.16. But the question of how an in-tervenor elects to make his case on an issue is different from the question whether he has adequately given notice he intends to litigate it. Cross-examination is an accept-able means of developing evidence; it is not an acceptable way of giving notice, partic-ularly when the cross-examination consists, as it did here, only of one or two questions eight days from the end of a nine-month hearing.
u LILCO, JanuCry 2 1987 0
003ETEE
'nnim CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
'87 JAN -5 P2 56 In the Matter of WD' "f^ r1 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY COE g g.
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 I hereby certify that copies of LILCO's Petition for Review of ALAB-855 were served this date upon the following by Federal Express as indicated by an asterisk, or by i
f!rst-class mail, postage prepaid.
i Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman
- Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq., Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing i
1717 H Street, N.W.
Appeal Board l
Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
]
Fif th Floor (North Tower)
Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts
- East-West Towers U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350 East-West Highway 1717 H Street, N.W.
Bethesda, MD 20814 Washington, DC 20555 Gary J. Edles, Esq.
Commissioner James K. Asselstine
- Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appeal Board 1717 H Street, N.W.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1
Washington, DC 20555 Fif th Floor (North Tower) 1 East-West Towers Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal
- 4350 East-West Highway U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bethesda, MD 20814 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20555 Dr. Howard A. Wilber Atomic Safety and Licensing Commissioner Kenneth M. Carr
- Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.
Fif th Floor (North Tower)
Washington, DC 20555 East-West Towers 4350 East-West Highway William C. Parler, Esq.
Bethesda, MD 20814 General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission John H. Frye, III, Chairman 1717 H Street, N.W. '
Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, DC 20555 Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers 4350 East-West Hwy.
Bethesda, MD 20814 1
.r--
r
--n.
,-im.----
o
.- Dr. Oscar H. Paris Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Oreste Russ Pirfo, Esq.
Board Edwin J. Reis, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers 7735 Old Georgetown Road 4350 East-West Hwy.
(to mallroom)
Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814 Mr. Frederick J. Shon Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Karla J. Letsche, Esq.
Board Kirkpatrick & Lockhart U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission South Lobby - 9th Floor East-West Towers, Rm. 430 1800 M Street, N.W.
4350 East-West Hwy.
Washington, DC 20036-58S1 Bethesda, MD 20814 Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
- Morton B. Margulies, Chairman Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Special Counsel to the Governor Board Executive Chamber U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 229 a
East-West Towers, Rm. 407 State Capitol 1
4350 East-West Hwy.
Albany, New York 12224 Bethesda, MD 20814 j
Mary Gundrum, Esq.
Dr. Jerry R. Kline Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing 120 Broadway Board Third Floor, Room 3-116 i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York, New York 10271 East-West Towers, Rm. 427 4350 East-West Hwy.
Spence W. Perry, Esq.
- Bethesda, MD 20814 William R. Cumming, Esq.
]
Federal Emergency Management l,
Secretary of the Commission Agency Attention Docketing and Service 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Section Washington, DC 20472 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.
Mr. Philip McIntire Washington, DC 20555 Federal Emergency Management Agency Atomic Safety and Licensing 26 Federal Plaza Appeal Board Panel New York, New York 10278 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Jay Dunkleberger New York State Energy Office Att'mic Safety and Licensing Agency Building 2 Board Panel Empire State Plaza U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Albany, New York 12223 Washington, DC 20555 Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
- Twomey, Latham & Shea 33 West Second Street i'
P.O. Box 298 Riverhead, New York 11901 l
I
, State Capitol Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.
Albany, New York 12224 New York State Department of Public Service, Staff Counsel Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
- Three Rockefeller Plaza Eugene R. Kelly, Esq.
Albany, New York 12223 Suffolk County Attorney H. Lee Dennison Building Ms. Nora Bredes Veterans Memorial Highway Executive Coordinator Hauppauge, New York 11787 Shoreham Opponents' Coalition 195 East Main Street Dr. Monroe Schneider Smithtown, New York 11787 North Shore Committee P.O. Box 231 Gerald C. Crotty, Esq.
Wading River, NY 11792 Counsel to the Governor l
Executive Chamber i
C' thy' E. W Of y
Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: January 2,1987 I
- " "-