ML20207K482
| ML20207K482 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1986 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207K384 | List: |
| References | |
| 242.0(B), 242.0(B)-R01, 242.0(B)-R1, NUDOCS 8701090429 | |
| Download: ML20207K482 (23) | |
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 242.0 (8)
SPECIAL PROGRAM
($ '
' REPORT TYPE:
SEQUOYAH ELEMENT REVISION NUMBER:
1 TITLE:
ELECTRICAL SEPARATION Inadequate Electrical and Physical Separate Between Redundant Wiring, PAGE 10F 18 Cabling, Equipment and Components.
REASON FOR REVISION:
Revised to incorporate TVA commerits.
PREPARATION PREPARED BY:
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CONCURRENCES CEG-H:
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SIGNATURE DATE SIGNATURE DATE APPROVED BY:
ECSP MANAGER DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
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l 8701090429 861217 PDR ADOCK 05000327 l
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TVA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUM8ER: 242.0 (B)
SPECIAL PR06RAN REVISION NUM8ER:
1
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PAGE 2 0F 18 1.
CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUE (S):
Concerns:
Issues:
WI-85-100-004
- a. Review by independent consultant XX-85-122-011, 012, 013 required to assess electrical and
" Electrical separation and physical separation adequacy of physical separation of redund-redundant wiring, cable, and components ant wiring and cabling and for as well as equipment, equipment and components are inadequate at all plants. CI
- b. Inadequate separation in trays of expressed that detailed reviews Q and non-Q cables for all voltage need to be made, and are so levels as a result of procedures extensive that a consultant being violated.
probably should be used, providing independence from TVA." c. Cable trays are overloaded as a IN-86-254-004 result of inadequate separation.
"CI believes procedures are being violated (in general) when Q and
- d. Inadequate cable arrangement results non-Q electrical cables are not in covers extending 3 to 4 inches being separated in cable trays, above trays.
O-This includes low, medium, and high voltage cables. By not separating the cables, the trays are. being overloaded."
IN-86-259-006 "Many electrical cables have been placed in cable trays without adequate separation.
Many cable tray covers extend 3 to 4 inches above the tray because of cable arrangement."
IN-86-314'004
" Cable separation is inadequate and in many cases nonexistent."
2.
HAVE ISSUE (S) BEEN IDENTIFIED IN ANOTHER SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS? YES_X N0_
Identified by NSRS and SCR SONEEB8634 s
Date Eoc dates, see_Docu. men _tatj.on Identifiers below I
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 242.0 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUM8ER:
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PAGE 3 0F 18 Documentation Identifiers:
o Identified by J_VA_S_QN NSRS Date Feb rua ry.,21,._19_86_
TVA SNP - Nuclear Safety Review Staff Investigation Report No. I-85-133-SQN, Electricalf_P_hysjcal Sey_aratien of Redundant Ci rcuil/Jguj.p_ men 1, (02/27/86) o Identified by TVA SQN SCR SQNEEB8634 Date 6pril 30.,1986 TVA SNP Significant Condition Report SQNEEB8634, Minjm_um SeDaration Distance Between Different Div_isj_onal_ Cable Tray, R0, (04/30/86) 3.
DOCUMENT NOS.. TAG NOS.. LOCATIONS OR OTHER SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIVE IDENTIFICATIONS STATED IN ELEMENT:
b No further inforration available.
4.
INTERVIEW FILES REVIEWED:
F'iles WI-85-100, XX-85-122, IN-86-254, IN-86-259, and IN-86-314 were reviewed and no additional unreviewed information for Sequoyah was identified for the concerns in this report.
5.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
, See Appendix A.
6.
WHAT RE6ULATIONS. LICENSING COMMITMENTS. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS CR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA?
See Appendix A.
7.
LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION. MEETINGS. TELEPHONE CALLS. AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO ELEMENT.
See Appendix A 8.
EVALUATION PROCESS:-
a.
Reviewed transcript of NRC investigative interview to extract Q
information applicable to the employee concerns.
1083d (11/26/86)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUM8ER: 242.0 (8)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUM8ER: 1 mQ PAGE 4 0F 18 b.
Reviewed design criteria, FSAR, Westinghouse specification criteria, and any other applicable documents to establish extent of the current Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Separation requirements.
c.
Reviewed SQN design documents to determine compliance with the requirements.
d.
Reviewed existing reports (e.g., NSRS Report I-85-133-SQN),
findings, and responses to findings to assess their adequacy and the extent to which they satisfy the employee. concerns.
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e.
Raviewed available Construction, QA/QC, Operations, and Material Control element reports for the Employee Concerns l
Evaluation Program, f.
Performed walkdown on sample panels and trays to determine compliance with the separation criteria.
g.
Assessed overall adequacy of SQN separation program.
{}
9.
DISCUSSION. FINDINGS. AND CONCLUSIONS DiscJnj_9n:
The employee concerns raised several issue:: regarding inadequate physical and electrical separation between redundant Class 1E equipment and wiring, and between class 1E and non-class 1E. There is a potential for loss of capability of redundant components to perform their intended safety function in the event of a conunon failure of improperly separated wiring ard equipment.
(
i SQN is not committed to comply with either Regulatory Guide 1.75 (App. A, 5.11), or IEEE Standard 384-1974 ( App. A, 5.vv). To establish independence and redundancy so as to prevent common failure modes in class 1E systems, SQN is committed to the following standards:
o IEEE Standard 279-1971, " Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Systems," states:
"4.6 Channel Independence.
Channels that provide signals for the same protective functions shall be independent and physically separated to accomplish decoupling of the effects of unsafe environmental Q
factors, electric transients, and physical accident 1083d (11/26/86)
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t TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 242.0 (8)
SPECIAL PROGRAN
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REVISION NUMBER: 1
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e PAGE 5 0F 18 consequences documented in the design basis, and to reduce the likelihood of interactions between r
4 channels during maintenance operations or in the event of channel malfunction."
b f
o IEEE Standard 308-1971 " Criteria for Class 1E Electric h
Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" states:
~
"4.6 Equipment Protection. Class IE electric equipment shall be physically separated from its redundant counterpart or mechanically protected as required to prevent the occurrence of common failure mode."
and "5.2.2(3)
Independence.
Distribution circuits to redundant equipment shall be physically and electrically independent of each other."
aI The evaluation team reviewed the issues presented in Section 1 to WJ assess the adequacy of the separation program at SON.
Each issue is assessed below, a.
Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) investigated the validity of employee concern XX-85-122-011 (see Section 1 for statement of concern). NSRS Report No. 1 133-SQN on this issue concluded that:
o Separation in the control room area appeared to meet all aspects of the design criteria SQN-DC-V-12.2, Section 4.2.8.
o All redundant trays except KC-8 in the auxiliary instrument room and HN-B in the cable spreading room met the design criteria SQN-DC-V-12.2 requirement for solid tray bottoms and tray covers for redundant trays at crossover points, j
e o
Physical separation as defined in design criteria L
SQN-DC-V-12.2 was met for the 6900V and 480V shutdown t
boards, reactor MOV boards, reactor vent boards, control and auxiliary vent boards,125V vital batteries t
p and vital battery boards, and vital inverters.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 242.0 (8) a SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUM8ER:
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1 PAGE 6 0F 18 Based on its investigation, the NSRS recommended installation of covers on trays KC-B and HN-8 in accordance with the e
j design criteria requirements.
The NSRS also recommended clarifying the design criteria for separation of cable 4
i I
trays in the auxiliary instrumentation room. A TVA review revealed that the minimum separation of vertical stacked i
interdivisional trays in the auxiliary instrument room was 12 inches instead of 3 feet as required by the design criteria. Consequently, Significant Condition Report (SCR)
SQNEEB8634 RO was issued. The Engineering Report (ER) for this SCR concludes that this condition has no adverse effect on safety and can be resolved by a revision to the design criteria. A design input memo (DIN), Raughley to Electrical
.i Engineering Files (App. A, 5.1), authorized a minimum vertical separation of 12 inches for vertically stacked interdivisional trays in the auxiliary instrument room, providing the trays are furnished with solid bottoms and covers. The authorization was based on judgment that hazards in the auxiliary instrument room are minimal.
CN The NSRS conclusion that redundant trays are adequately e
separated was confirmed by three walkdowns of the spreading and auxiliary equipment rooms by the evaluation team (App. A, 7.b 7.c, and 7.d).
With minor exceptions, I
separation in the auxiliary instrument room is in compliance i
with the design criteria as modified by the previously
/
discussed DIN.
Isolated instances were identified during the walkdown where apparent discrepancies exist between the l
as-installed condition and the design critoria:
o Cable trays LT-A and LT-8 above cabinet 1R48 are 1 foot j
apart horizontally but have no covers.
h o
Trays above cabinets Rll (XY-1, stacked about 32 inches below XZ-3) and R13 (XZ-2, stacked about 3 feet below l
XZ-4) have no covers, f
Similarly, the evaluation team verified the NSRS conclusion l
of adequate physical equipment separation by a sample review of TVA drawings: 47W200-3 for 6900 volt and 480 volt l
shutdown boards, and 47W200-2 for 120 volt vital inverters.
The evaluation team noted that separation of this equipment conforms to the design criteria requirements.
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1083d (11/26/86) i
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 242.0 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
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,p PAGE 7 0F 18 The NSRS investigation did not cover separation aspects such as separation between divisionalized and nondivisionalized cable trays, cable separation in free air, physical separation of wiring and components internal to panels, and electrical isolation.
No SQN commitments were identified regarding separation between divisionalized and nondivisionalized cable trays.
Although the separation design criteria are silent in this area, the NRC concluded in SQN SER paragraph 8.5.3 that adequate provisions were made to satisfy its concern regarding nondivisional cable trays routed between redundant divisional cable tray stacks. These provisions included coating all cables in the spreading room and providing sprinklers. No minimum spatial separation requirements were given.
A walkdown by the evaluation team (App A, 7.d) identified a nondivisional cable tray riser, AAP, whose cables were in direct contact with divisional tray NO-A (elevation 734 feet, ja at the floor penetrations between columns A3 and A4 at Q line). All cables were coated with fire retardant material, and the adequacy of this configuration from a separation standpoint appears to satisfy the SER commitments.
Furthermore, the effect of non-class 1E system failures on class lE systems has been addressed by the following:
o The TVA analysis SQN APPR-1 ( App. A, 5.y), and the corrective actions that resulted from this analysis (covered by ECNs L6313 and L6315), were performed to ensure that the " associated circuits" that fall under the Appendix R program will have no adverse effect on safety.
o An analysis performed for nonsafety-related equipment located in harsh environments (App. A, 5.k) concluded that no environment-induced failure to this equipment could prevent accomplishment of required functions by safety-related equipment.
Similarly, no specific commitments were identified for redundant cable separation in free air. The only reference to this is in paragraph 8.5.3 of the SQN SER and the praragraph only addresses unsupported cable bundles running vertically between cable trays in the same stack.
The NRC Q
concludes in the SER that cable coating with fire retardant 1083d (11/26/86)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
242'0 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 (3) 4 PAGE 8 0F 18 4
4 material adequately addresses this situation.
Coating exposed cable surfaces is described in Section 4.2.5 of the separation criteria. However, Revision 6 of the criteria indicates that after 10/18/84 cables qualified to IEEE 383 flame test or equivalent do not require coating. The only other place in the criteria where cable separation in free air is addressed is in the second paragraph in Section 4.2.6, and that is limited to the cable spreading room. The criteria require a 3-foot minimum separation between cables of different divisions; otherwise cables must run in metal conduits or enclosed wireways. Walkdowns by the evaluation team of the auxiliary instrument room (App. A, 7.b, 7.c and 7.d) identified cables leaving cable trays LT-A and LT-B (above cabinet 1R48) and going to conduits about 1 foot above these trays that are within 6 to 9 inches of cables of a redundant division. The adequacy of the separation between these cables, since they are located outside the cable spreading room and are coated with fire retardant material, I
appears to satisfy the intent of the SER commitment.
i p"p!
However, some inconsistency is evident considering that
- b cables in free air in the cable spreading room must comply with separation requirements yet no criteria is provided for separation of cables in free air in the auxiliary instrument j
room and other plant areas.
The previously identified DIM (App. A, 5.1) incorporates SQN separation requirements for internal wiring into Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-12.2.
The evaluation team, however, interpreted this as applicable only to the shunt trip circuitry of the reactor protection system.
In addition to this, a Westinghouse specification (App. A, 5.e) provides requirements for separation of internal wiring and components i
for main control boards. A walkdown of boards 1-M-4,1-M-5, 1-M-6, 0-M-26, and 1-L-11 A by the evaluation team (App. A, 7.a) confirmed that their internal separation is in accordance with Westinghouse requirements. Although there is a commitment in FSAR Section 8.3.1.4.6 to separate internal wiring in all class lE control boards, panels, and relay racks, it is unclear why the commitment was limited to Westinghouse panels and systems.
Design Criteria SQN DC-V-12.2 does not include requirements for separation of internal wiring for all class 1E control boards, panels, and relay racks as stated in the FSAR, and no commitment / requirement (C/R) data sheets on this subject
(}l, could be found.
1083d (11/26/86)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUM8ER:
242.0 (8)
SPECIAL PROGRAN
+
c REVISION NUMBER:
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_D PAGE 9 0F 18 Similarly, limited comitments exist for electrical isolation between redundant circuits and between Class 1E and Non-Class 1E circuits.
Although these comitments have been identified in commitments / requirements (C/R) data sheets, they are not currently reflected in the separation design criteria, as required by SQN Engineering Procedure SQEP-29.
These comitment/ requirements are:
l o
C/R No. SQN EEBPBN1002 identified a commitment in SNP FSAR Amendment 2, Section 7.1.4.2.1, to define functional, qualification, testing and detailed technical requirements for the TSC/SMS isolators.
i o
C/R No. SQN EEBPBN1085 identified a comitment in the SER (03/79), Section 7.2.2 to upgrade the reactor coolant pump underfrequency and undervoltage trips in the reactor trip system to class 1E.
In addition, the underfrequency and undervoltage trips were relocated from the nonseismic Category I turbine building to the seismic Category I auxiliary building.
o SQN EEBPBN1134 identified a commitment in SER Section 7.3.2 (03/79) to ensure that inter-train interlocks are designed so that a failure in one train will not adversely affect the safety function of the redundant train. The SER reported that the emergency core cooling and other ESF systems were reviewed and several valves were found to be interlocked with valves I
in the redundant train. Analysis showed that the I
safety system function could still be accomplished even if a failure of the interlock occurred. This l
comitment which was the same for Watts Bar, was i
properly addressed in WBN FSAR Section 7.1.2.4, but was not included in the SNP FSAR.
o SQN EEBPBN1082 identified a commitment in SNP FSAR Amendment 2, Section 7.6.7.1 to ensure that a failure in the non-class 1E portion of the low temperature interlocks for the RCS pressure control will not prevent the protective system from performing its i
i protective function.
This is accomplished by use of i
isolation devices in the output to the interlocks from the protection set racks, i
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SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 (3
PAGE 10 0F 18 o
SQN EEBP8N1033 identified a comitment in FSAR Amendment 2, Sections 7.2.1.1.8 and 7.2.2.2.3(5), to design and qualify isolation amplifiers for the reactor trip system so that a failure in the nonprotective signal circuits will not prevent the protective system from performing its protective function.
The nonprotective signal circuits are used for control, indication, and computer monitoring and are derived from protection channels through isolation amplifiers.
b.
Separation requirements for nonsafety-related cable routed in the same cable tray with safety-related cable are adequately addressed in design criteria SQN-DC-V-12.2 and SQN-DC-V-11. 3.
Routing of Q and non-Q cables in the same raceway is allowed under the provisions of design criteria SQN-DC-V-12.2, Section 4.4.1.
However, SQN-DC-V-12.2 does not permit a non-Q cable, once routed in a Q tray, to be subsequently routed in a Q tray containing cables of another division. Similarly, design criteria SQN-DC-V-ll.3 has adequate provisions for separating cables of different 2
voltage levels. Consideration of these two criteria is built "J
into the SQN cable routing program. However, although no violations of compliance to these criteria have been identified, the current lack of verification of this cable routing program results in uncertainties regarding the status of installed cables and makes compliance to these two criteria indeterminate.
(Verification of the cable routing program and adequacy the of status of installed cables is discussed in more detail in Sequoyah Element Report 239.0.)
c.
Failure to provide adequate separation does not of itself cause cable tray overfilling (overloading).
Not exceeding cable tray fill limit is a requirement independent of separation. Cable tray overloading / overfilling is addressed in Sequoyah Element Report 238.3.
d.
SCR WBNEEB8582 identified a problem at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant similar to the employee concern regarding inadequate cable arrangement that results in covers extending 3 to 4 inches above the crossover trays. A TVA memo from Chandler to Those Listed (App. A, 5.v) requested Sequoyah review this problem for potential applicability. The problem was reviewed for applicability to Sequoyah, and it was determined that the condition did not exist (Memo from Hall to Chandler, App. A, 5.w).
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
242.0 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 110F 18 During two walkdowns of the cable spreading room and auxiliary instrument room (App. A, 7.b and 7.d), the evaluation team observed that separation between covered trays complies with the requirements stated in the design criteria.
As noted during these walkdowns, cable tray covers were properly installed (special cable tray cover installation details are described in E-45W880-27, R3, (App. A, 5.xx]), and no raised covers were noted on safety-related cable trays.
Findings:
a.
Review of the adequacy of the electrical and physical separation at Sequoyah revealed that:
o SQN is committed to comply with IEEE Standards 279 and 308 for independence and redundancy, but not committed to Regulatory Guide 1.75 or to IEEE Standard 384.
o The NSRS conclusion that divisionalized cable trays are C$1 adequately separated in compliance with design criteria 4
was confirmed by walkdowns by the evaluation team, with two minor exceptions where cable tray covers should have been installed but were not.
o Separation of divisionalized and nondivisionalized cable trays appears to satisfy SER commitments. Design criteria documents are silent in this area, o
Separation of redundant cables in free air appears to satisfy the intent of SER commitments. No criteria could be found for separation of cables in free air except for those in the cable spreading room.
o separation of internal wiring in specific Westinghouse-furnished control boards was confirmed, during walkdowns, to comply with design criteria.
However, no design criteria were found for wiring separation in other class lE control boards, panels, and relay racks as committed in the FSAR.
o Electrical separation and isolation commitments on C/R data sheets have not been reflected in the separation design criteria.
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TVA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
242.0 (8)
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SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUM8ER:
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PAGE 12 0F 18 l
b.
Lack of verification of the currently as-installed status of f
cables in raceways makes compliance to the design criteria and procedures indeterminate. The status of cables in
/
raceways is addressed in Sequoyah Element Report 239.0.
c.
Cable tray overloading is not a result of inadequate separation. Overloading is a problem independent of I
separation and is addressed in Sequoyah Element l
Report 238.3 (B).
d.
No evidence was found during the walkdowns to indicate that inadequate cable arrangement caused covers to extend above safety-related cable trays.
,Qonclusio_ns :
I The concerns questioning the adequacy of physical and electrical separation are valid to the extent that criteria documents do not reflect connitments regarding separation of internal wiring in class 1E control boards, panels, and relay racks or electrical u,4 isolation. Also, adequacy of as-installed cable separation in I
raceways could not be verified. Separation criteria for cables in free air were applied inconsistently since requirements for I
separation were found for the cable spreading room but not for other plant areas.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 242.0 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUM8ER:
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PAGE 13 0F 18 APPENDIX A 5.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
a.
NSRS Report I-85-133-SQN, " Electrical / Physical Separation of Redundant Circuit / Equipment," (02/27/86) b.
SQN Design Criteria for Separation of Electric Equipment and Wiring (SQN-DC-V-12.2), R6, (09/30/85) c.
SQN Design Criteria for Normal and Emergency Ac Auxiliary Power System (SQN-DC-V-11.4.1), R2, (07/22/86) d.
Westinghouse Specification Criteria for Internal Wiring (678855), R0, (07/30/71) f.
Wiring Diagram, Control Boards Critical Wiring Braid Installation (E-45W1640 R3), (05/3/84) g.
TVA memo from Young to Pedde, (BLN 850225 087), "8LN Office of Construction (OC) Action Team Response to Electric Report," (02/25/85) h.
TVA memo from Wilson to Abercrombie (B25 860505 011), SQN -
" Employee Concern XX-85-122-001 - Electrical and Physical Separation of Redundant Circuits and Equipment," (05/05/86) 1.
TVA memo from Wilson to Raulston (B25 860509 004) SQN -
SCR SQNEEB8634 R0, (05/09/86) 1 j.
SCR SQNEEB8634 RO, " Minimum Separation Distance Between Different Divisional Cable Trays," (04/30/86) i k.
OE Calculation, "Nonsafety-Related Electrical Equipment
[
Important to Safety per 10CFR50.49(b)," (825 851107 300),
(11/07/85) 1.
TVA memo from Raughley to Electrical Engineering Files (843 860710 921), " Design Input Memo on Separation of Electrical Equipment and Wiring Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-12.2 " (07/08/86) i m.
Letter Mills to Adensam (A27 840827001), " Design Information
' Q of Reactor Trip System Resulting From NRC Questions on Generic Letter 83 Salem AlWS Events," (08/27/84)
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SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUM8ER: 1 PAGE 14 0F 18 e
APPENDIX A (cont'd) n.
TVA memo from Standifer to Ennis, " Watts Bar Nuclear Plant -
Addendum to Employee Concern Investigation Report I-86-570-WBN," (01/02/86) o.
TVA memo f rom Standifer to Ennis, " Watts Bar Nuclear Plant -
Employee Concern Investigation Report Number I-85-570-WBN,"
(12/13/85) p.
TVA memo from Ennis to Standifer, " Watts Bar Nuclear Plant -
Employee Concern Investigation Report Transmittal," (11/15/85) 4 q.
TVA memo from Chitwood to Raulston and Standifer, (B43 860224 940), " Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 -
Significant Condition Report No. SCR WBNEEB8582," (02/24/86) r.
NRC-01E Reportability Information Distribution (845 860206 828), SCR WBNEEB8582, " Minimum Separation Distance between Different Divisional Cable Tray Crossings,"
' '/
(12/31/85) s.
TVA memo from Chitwood to Raulston, (B43 860124 930)
"10CFR50.55(e) Final Report on Subject SCR," (01/24/86) t.
Significant Condition Report WBNEEB8582 (B43 851219 906),
" Minimum Separation Distance Between Different Divisional Cable Tray," (12/13/85) u.
Mechanical Layout of Control Boards Drawing Nos.
M4 47W605-10 R19, M4 47W605-13 R13, M4 47W605-14 R21, M4 47W605-19 R10, and M4 47W600-55 R10 v.
TVA memo f rom Chandler to Those Listed, (843 851219 905) i
" Potential Generic Condition Evaluation," (12/19/85) i w.
TVA memo f rom Hall to Chandler, (B25 851226 013), " Response to Memo From Chandler to Those Listed," (12/23/85) x.
Drawings 47W200-2, 47W200-3 y.
OE calculations, " Analysis of Ac/Dc Instrument and Control (I&C) Power System to Identify Associated Circuits," 10CFR50, Appendix R (843 860630 901), (06/30/86)
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 242.0 (8)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
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PAGE 15 0F 18 APPENDIX A (cont'd) z.
TVA memo to Cox f rom Hosely, (821 860723 002), "8LN NCR's 919 and 1040," (07/27/86) i aa.
NCR 3686 RO, (BLN 841109 107), (11/01/84) bb.
TVA memo to Hodges from Cox, BLN NCR 3865, (8LN 850117 114),
"8ellafonte Nuclear Plant - Nonconforming Condition Report (NCR) 3865," (01/17/85) cc.
TVA memo to Hodges from Cox, BLN NCR 2295, (BLN 840418 109),
"Bellafonte Nuclear Plant - Nonconforming Condition Report 4
(NCR) 2995," (04/17/84) dd.
C/R No. SQN EE8P8N1085 (source of C/R SER 3/79) l ee.
C/R No. SQN EE8P8N1134 (source of C/R SER 3/79) ff.
.C/R No. SQN EE80RW1065 (source of C/R SER 3/79) l gg.
C/R No. SQN EE80RW1063 (source of C/R SER 3/79) hh.
Letter f rom 8. J. Youngblood, NRC, to S. A. White, TVA, with i
the attached transcript of the investigation interview l
conducted by the NRC on 02/21/86 at the First Tennessee Bank Building in Knoxville, TN, (06/25/86) 11.
Regulatory Guide 1.75. R0 and R2, " Physical Independence of Electric Systems," (02/74 and 09/78)
- jj.
C/R No. SQN EE8P8N1002 (Source of C/R FSAR Amendment 2 Section 7.1.4.2.1, page 7.1-19, paragraphs 5 and 7)" TSC/SMS Isolators - Define Functional, Qualification, Detailed Technical Requirements (e.g., maximum Cred. Voltage) and Testing Requirements" kk.
C/R No. SQN EE8P8N1085 (Source of C/R SER 3/79) "Undervoltage and Underfrequency Trips upgraded to Class 1E and Moved to l
Auxiliary Building to Satisfy NRC Requirements, Peets IEEE 279" 11.
C/R No. SQN EE8P8N1134 (Source of C/R 3/79) " Assurance That Intertrain Interlocks Are Designed Such That a Failure in One Train Will Not Adversely Affect Devices in Other Train" 1083d (11/26/86)
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PAGE 16 0F 18 APPENDIX A (cont'd) mm.
C/R No. SQN EEBPBN1082 (Source of C/R FSAR Amendment 2, Section 7.6.7.1) "A Failure in the Non IE Part of the Low Temperature Over Press Circuit Will Not Harm the Protection Set Because of Isolation Device" nn.
C/R No. SQN EEBPBN1013 (Source of C/R FSAR Amendment 2, Sections 7.2.1.1.8 and 7.2.2.2.3[5]) " Design Bases and Qualification Testing Requirements for Reactor Trip System.
Isolation Amplifiers" oo.
TVA memo from Raughley to Those Listed, (B43 860619 913),
"EEE Efforts Relative to Design, Baseline, and Verification Program," (06/18/86) pp.
IEEE-279-1971, " Criteria for Protection System for Nuclear Power Generation Stations."
e, qq.
IEEE-308-1971, " Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power
^?
Generating Stations" rr.
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50,10CFR50 Appendix A. " General Design Criteria 17," (07/07/71) ss.
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50,10CFR50 Appendix R tt.
SQN Safety Evaluation Report (SER) uu.
Regulatory Guide 1.6, " Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems" vv.
IEEE-384-1974, " Trial-Use Standard for Separation of Class IE Equipment and Circuits" ww.
SQN Engineering Procedure SQEP-29, " Procedure for Preparing the Design Basis Document for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,"
(07/18/86) xx.
TVA Drawings 45W880-27 R3, " Conduit and Grounding Cable Trays Detail Sheet 14," (04/16/86)
G 1083d (11/26/86)
TVA EMPLOYEE COWCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 242.0 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUM8ER: 1
- (*.
PAGE 17 0F 18 APPENDIX A (cont'd) 6.
WHAT REGULATIONS. LICENSING COMMITMENTS. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA 7 a.
SQN Design Criteria SQN DC-V-12.2 " Separation of Electric Equipment and Wiring," R6, (09/30/85) b.
SQN Design Criteria SQN DC-V-11-4.1 " Normal and Emergency Ac Auxiliary Power System," R2, (07/22/86) c.
IEEE-279-1971, " Criteria for Protection System for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" d.
IEEE-308-1971, " Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" 7.
LIST RE00ESTS FOR INFORMATION. MEETINGS. TELEPHONE CALLS. AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO ELEMENT, a.
Walkdown perfonned by J. Wheeler, Bechtel, and N. Black, TVA, (08/23/86)
Walkdown performed by J. Benkert, Bechtel, and H. Liao, TVA, b.
(09/17/86) c.
Walkdown performed by J. Benkert, Bechtel, and C. Dodson, TVA,(09/18/86)
I d.
Walkdown performed by J. Wheeler, Bechtel, and G. Bell, TVA, (10/09/86)
J O
1083d (11/26/86)
l
~*
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUM8ER:
242.0 (8)
SPECIAL PROGRAM
'~
REVISION NUM8ER:
1 PAGE 18 0F 18 CATO LIST The following CATD forms are included as part of this report:
242.00 SQN 01 (Revised 11/26/86) 242.00 SQN 02 (Revised 11/26/86) 242.00 SQN 03 242.00 SON 04 (Revised 11/26/86)
J OL e
t 1083d (11/26/86)
ECTG C.3 Attachment A
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INITIATION I
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Inunediate Corrective Action Required: % Yes O No i
Stop Wort Reconumended: d-o les % No 2.
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Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.
SIGNATURE TITLE DATE
ECTG C.3 Attachment A pc Page 1 of 1 Revision 2 - A ECSP CORRECTIVE Action Tracting Document (CATD)
INITIATION 1.
Immediate Corrective Action Required: % Yes O No 2.
Stop Wort. Recomrnended: 0 Yes K No 3.
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PROPOSED BY:
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DATE:
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VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT h
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Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.
SIGNATURE TITLE DAIE
RCTG C.3 t.ttechselt A Fage 1 of 1 Revision 2 - A h
ECSP CORRECTIVE Action Tracting Docuanent (CATD)
INITIATION 1.
Isumedlete Corrective Action Required: K Yes O No 7.
Stop Wort Recosusended: 0 Yes M No 3.
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INITIATION DATE /O 8 6 5.
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PREPARED BY: NAME M '/4 A ' M / DATE: //- 2. P -) 6 9.
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PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR /MGR:
DATE:
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VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT 13.
Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily l
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SIGNATURE TITLE DATE O
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ECTG C.3 Attachment A C
Page 1 of 1
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INITIATION 1.
Insnediate Corrective Action Required: % Yes O No 2.
Stop Wort Reconumended: 0 Yes % No 3.
CATD No. '2.4.Z.oO - 50td - 0 4-4.
INITIATION DATE 11/2/,/8/,
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DATE: 11/2. /,/ B (o 8.
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ECTG PROGRAM MGR. U DATE:
CORRECTIVE ACTION 10.
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN:
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PROPOSED BY:
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DATE:
12.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-H:
DATE:
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ECTG PROGRAM MGR:
DATE:
VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT h
13.
Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.
SIGNATURE TITLE DATE o
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