ML20207K434
| ML20207K434 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1986 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207K384 | List: |
| References | |
| 237.2(B), 237.2(B)-R01, 237.2(B)-R1, NUDOCS 8701090420 | |
| Download: ML20207K434 (19) | |
Text
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e TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM
' ([
REPORT TYPE:
SEQUOYAH ELEMENT REVISION NUMBER:
1 TITLE:
ELECTRICAL PROTECTION DESIGN 400 to 500 Breakers Unacceptably Set.
National Electrical Code and Good PAGE 1 0F 14 Engineering Practices Violated.
Limitorque Valve Operators Inadequately Fused.
REASON FOR REVISION:
Revised to incorporate TVA consnents.
PREPARATION PREPARED BY:
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///2f,l8to th-s SIG(ATURE DATE REVIEWS R4V84W M 1TEf.:
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DATE TAS:
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SIGNATURE DATE CONCURRENCES CEG-H N
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SRP:
SIGNATURE DATE SIGNATURE DATE APPROVED BY:
G ECSP MANAGER DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY) l
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TVA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (8)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1
_(y PAGE 2 0F 14 1.
CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUEfS):
Concerns:
Jssues:
WI-85-100-021 a.
Unacceptable trip ratings were "Between 400 and 500 breakers selected for a large number of were unacceptable set.
EN DES molded case breakers.
practices and attitudes con-cerning these breakers were b.
Engineering practices and attitudes j-poor. The National Electrical in the selection of molded case Code and good engineering breaker trip ratings were poor. The practices were violated."
National Electrical Code and good engineering practices were violated.
IN-85-332-001 "Limitorque valve operators are c.
Fuse size selection for valve found without enough margin to operators does not allow enough provide for emergency operation.
margin for emergency operation.
They are fused to protect motor, not the circuit. Example: ERCW d.
Fuse sizes are selected to protect valves in 5th diesel generator the valve operator motors and building are fusec at 5.2 amps not the circuits (e.g., ERCW
. W while running current is 4 amps.
valves in fif th diesel generator Generic to both units."
building).
j l
2.
HAVE ISSUES BEEN IDENTIFIED IN ANOTHER SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS? YES X N0 t
o Identified by Black and Veatch Date October 10. 1982 Black and Veatch Finding Report - Findings F-136 and F-137, (10/30/82) o Identified by TVA SQN_N.SRS.
Date Circa_J.an. 1984 - June 1986 NSRS Report No. R-84-19-W8N, NRS_ Assessment of the Results of_
Black and Veatch Independent _ Design Review of The_ Watts _B,ar Nuclear Plant Auxiliary Feedwater _ System, dates of review 01/10/84 through 06/15/84 o
Identified by TVA SNP_GCTF.
Date June 6, 1986 TVA SNP - Generic Concern Task Force Report GOR 29-29, Limito_r_gue Valve Operator Fusing, R1 (06/06/86) 4 03130 - 11/26/86 i
- ~ - - -. - _,, --
TVA EMPLOYEL CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM
_ h_ ?
REVISION NUMBER: 1 PAGE 3 0F 14 3.
DOCUMENT NOS.. TAS NOS.. LOCATIONS. OR OTHER SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIVE IDENTIFICATIONS STATED IN ELEMENT:
Concern applies to all safety-related molded case circuit breakers used in 480 volt combination motor starters and to all power fuses for safety-related valve operators.
4.
INTERVIEW FILES REVIEWED:
Files WI-85-100 and IN-85-332 were reviewed and no additional information regarding these concerns was identified.
5.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
See Appendix A.
6.
WHAT REGULATIONS. LICENSING C0094ITMENTS. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA?
See Appendix A.
7.
LIST RE'00ESTS FOR INFORMATION. MEETINGS. TELEPHONE CALLS. AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO ELEMENT.
See Appendix A.
8.
EVALUATION PROCESS:
a.
Reviewed available transcripts of NRC investigative interviews to extract information applicable to the employee
- concerns, b.
Reviewed existing reports, findings, and responses to findings to assess their adequacy and the extent to which they satisfy the employee concerns. These included applicable Construction, QA/QC, Operations, and Material Control element reports for the Employee Concerns Evaluation Program.
c.
Reviewed licensing documents, codes, design guides, and standards to determine the basis for breaker trip ratings and g
fuse selection.
03130 - 11/26/86 i
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1 TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 mm,
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PAGE 4 0F_14 d.
Reviewed sample design calculations and time-current curves to verify compliance of calculated breaker trip ratings with licensing documents, codes, design guides, and standards, Planned to review sample design documents, including drawings e.
and tabulations, to establish that breaker trip rating 1
selection is supported by design calculations and curves.
Lack of detail in preliminary. calculations precluded comparison with design documents.
f.
Planned to review design documents, including drawings and tabulations, to establish that fuse selection is supported by design, calculations, and curves. The unavailability of l
calculations prevented comparison with design documents.
9.
DISCUSSION. FINDINGS. AND CONCLUSIONS:
l l
Discussion:
a.
The concern that a considerable number of breakers were
@a unacceptably set was expressed for the Watts Bar Plant. This concern.was identified also in the Black and Veatch Findings l
Report and subsequently reviewed in the TVA Task Force Report, " Evaluation of Black and Veatch Findings," and in j
NSRS Report No. R-84-19-WBN.
The concern at Watts Bar was directed at the s'etting of molded case adjustable instantaneous circuit breakers applied for short circuit protection in motor control center combination starters. At Sequoyah, nonadjustable time limit (thermal magnetic) circuit breakers were used in the combination starters, dif fering f rom Watts Bar. Thermal magnetic circuit breakers are factory-set and cannot be adjusted in the field.
In its evaluation for Sequoyah, the TVA Task Force for Review of Black and Veatch Findings determined that the concern does not apply to Sequoyah because the circuit breakers do not use adjustable instantaneous trips. However, for this report the concern is considered to cover a potential generic problem: the proper selection and application of molded case circuit breakers for short circuit protection in 480 volt combination motor starters. This evaluation addresses the issue that selection of trip ratings for a large number of thermal magnetic circuit breakers may have been inappropriate.
O 03130 - 11/26/86
.~ -
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM r_ _
REVISION NUMBER:
1 t.
PAGE 5 0F_14 The following criteria were in force when the original circuit breaker trip ratings were selected:
o FSAR Section 8.3.1.1, which states that the motor protector (circuit breaker) is eeiected and set to protect the motor and the cabie; also, that the molded case circuit breaker provides short circuit protection.
o Design Criteria for Emergency Auxiliary Ac Power System (SQN-DC-V-ll.4 and 11.5), which require conformance to applicable standards, including NFPA No. 70-1971 National Electrical Code (NEC). This criteria document was superseded May 17, 1985 by Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-11.4.1 (see below).
o Design Standard DS-E9.2.1, " Motors - 460 V Circuit Design
- Motor Control Center," which contained a table of typical trip ratings for thermal magnetic circuit breakers to protect a range of motor sizes. Trip ratings for motors smaller than one-half horsepower are not included in the table. The standard states that I.'
manufacturers' data or test data take precedence over the table and standards. This standard was superseded November 10, 1983 by Design Guide DG-E2.3.5 (see below).
These criteria formed the basis for the original selection of circuit breaker trip ratings. Whether or not calculations 4
formed part of the selection process is not clear.
In any case, documentation of the original selection cannot be found and TVA is preparing new calculations to verify the existing trip ratings. Although the new calculations have not been completed, initial assessment by TVA predicts that only a small number of trip ratings will be found unsatisfactory.
Circuit breakers with unsatisfactory trip ratings will be replaced prior to restart of SQN. Until final calculations are completed and can be evaluated, the magnitude of the problem remains undetermined.
A preliminary draft of the new calculations was reviewed and it was noted by the evaluation team that:
o Complete reference to current criteria was not included.
ANSI Standard N45.2.11, " Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants," requires design analyses to be sufficiently detailed, including definition of design inputs (criteria) and their sources,
(
so that a person technically qualified in the subject can 03130 - 11/26/86
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPOR1 NUMBER: 237 2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 6 0F 14 review and understand the analyses and verify the adequacy of the results without recourse to the originator.
The current criteria include:
Design Criteria for Normal and Emergency Ac Power Systems (SQN DC-V-ll.4.1) issued May 17, 1985, which requires conformance to listed design guides, standards, and codes including NFPA No. 70-1971 NEC, but permits exceptions to these standards if not in conflict with other criteria in the design criteria
~
document itself, without requiring documented justification or approval.
Design Guide DG-E2.3.5, "480 Volt Motor Branch-Circuit Design and Protection," which provides a table of trip ratings for thermal magnetic circuit 1
breakers to protect a range of motor sizes similar to the table provided in the superseded Design Standard DS-E9.2.1 except that trip ratings for motors two horsepower and smaller are not included. The guide requires verification of the values listed using U) motor nameplate or test data.
Neither of the above listed documents was included in the calculations under Section 3.0, sources of Information.
DG-E2.3.5 was referenced in the body of the calculations but not in Section 5.1.4, Equipment Fault Protection.
o The preliminary calculations lacked an analysis of fault protection for small motor circuits. No coordination i
curves could be found to demonstrate the degree of fault protection for small motor circuits, including adequacy of protection for the thermal overload heaters in the motor starters.
If full fault protection cannot be i
provided, the basis for the exceptions should be addressed in the calculations.
o The preliminary calculations did not include under Section 5.1.4, " Equipment Fault Protection," analyses of the protection for motors or starter heaters.
In addition, in paragraph 5.1.4b, the calculations did not address the effects of high momentary fault currents discussed in Design Guide DG-E2.3.5 for contactors.
Paragraph 5.1.4b also contains a questionable statement:
that the fault protection should be set at 1300 percent i
k ]'
0313D - 11/26/86 4
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j TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1
=,v PAGE 7 0F 14 of full load current according to the NEC. The NEC requires thermal magnetic circuit breakers to be rated not to exceed 400 percent of full load current where the maximum trip rating is not sufficient for the starting current.
o The preliminary calculations did not include results which would permit a comparison of calculated trip ratings with values shown on design documents, e.g.,
drawings and tabulations.
o No mention was found in the preliminary calculations regarding coordination of circuit breakers and thermal overload relays in motor operated valve circuits. This coordination, a requirement of Regulatory Guide No.
1.106, is needed to preclude false tripping when the valve is required to perform its safety function.
Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.106 is addressed in detail in Element Report 237.1.
y Guidance for selection of trip ratings for thermal magnetic T
circuit breakers used for short circuit protection of motors is provided in Design Guide DG-E2.3.5.
As stated in Section 3.4 of this guide, the lowest trip rating available is 15 amperes.
DG-E2.3.5 states also that the 15 ampere limitation precludes application of thermal magnetic circuit breakers for short circuit protection of motors two horsepower and smaller. For motors in this range, no criterion or guidance has been found other than by reference in Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-ll.4.1 to the NEC, and the statement in Design Guide DG-E2.3.5 that the manufacturer's recommendations for I
protection devices should be considered.
Typical manufacturer's recommendations include selection of 15 ampere thermal magnetic circuit breakers for motors two through one-half horsepower. These recommendations conflict with the NEC, which specifies a maximum trip rating of 150 to 250 percent of full load motor current depending on the motor code letter. Where the maximum trip rating is not sufficient for the starting current, the NEC permits the rating to be increased to, but not to exceed, 400 percent of full load current. Assuming the lowest available trip rating to be 15 amperes, thermal magnetic circuit breakers do not satisfy NEC maximum limitations stated above for motors two horsepower and smaller. Criteria could not be found which would fully protect small motor circuits in this range.
l l
2 0313D - 11/26/86
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1
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PAGE 8 0F 14 Design criteria, either currently in effect or in force at the time of original selection of trip ratings, although heavily referencing the NEC, did not mandate conformance to the NEC. Although Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-11.4 and 11.5, which were in force 1970-1985, required conformance to applicable standards, including the NEC, it can be argued that the NEC itself exempts utility generating stations.
Criteria documents do not state clearly where the NEC should be followed and where it should not. This lack of definition could lead to confusion and inconsistencies in the design itself or in design reviews.
If strict adherence to the NEC is not required, an alternative basis should be specified.
b.
The concern that fuse selection for valve operators provided insufficient margin for emergency operation only applies to the fifth diesel ERCW valves, since all other valve operators are equipped with magnetic overload devices (circuit breakers) for circuit protection, but no fuses. Generic Concern Task Force Report GOR 29-29 concluded that the concern is not valid for Sequoyah since the fifth diesel ERCW valves are fused at 15 amperes. This fuse rating is more SU than seven times locked rotor current and affords ample margin for emergency operation according to GOR 29-29.
i Because operation of the fifth diesel is not required for i
restart, the concern is not pertinent to Sequoyah at present. However, prior to a future need for operability of the fifth diesel, calculations will be required to support the conclusion of GOR 29-29 that sufficient margin has been allowed in fuse selection.
In the absence of calculations or other bases it is not certain that fuse selection provides adequate short circuit protection for motor starter, cable, and motor. While the margin appears to be sufficient for emergency operation, it may prove excessive for full short circuit protection and may permit unnecessary damage to the motor and circuit for low level fault currents. No basis was found for the fuse selection, for margin above starting and running currents or for the degree of protection furnished the motor starter, cable, and motor for short circuits.
Findings:
l a.
TVA is preparing new calculations to verify the existing trip j
ratings. The majority of the molded case breaker trip
({.p ratings were acceptably selected, according to an initial l
l assessment by TVA. Circuit breakers with trip ratings found to be unacceptable will be replaced prior to restart.
0313D - 11/26/86
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 9 0F 14 A preliminary draf t of the calculations did not completely address the concern and did not include results which could be compared with trip ratings shown on design documents.
Reference to current design criteria was incomplete.
Analysis of small motor circuit fault protection, including protection of the thermal overload heaters, was lacking. A questionable interpretation of the NEC was found in the preliminary calculations which stated that circuit breakers should be set at 1300 percent of full load currents where the NEC requires thermal magnetic circuit breakers to be rated 400 percent neximum.
Design criteria and guidance were not found for the application of thermal magnetic circuit breakers for fault protection of small motor circuits. Exceptions to Design Criteria SON-DC-ll.4.1 are permitted without documented justification or approval.
b.
No direct evidence was found that engineering practices and attitudes in the selection of molded case breaker trip ratings were poor, since the original selection process l
0 cannot be documented. However, the absence of documentation itself is the subject of a number of employee concerns and is L
addressed in more detail in. Element Report 205.3.
The NEC, although not mandatory for utility generating i
stations, was referenced in design criteria currently in f orce.
Pending completion of the review of final calculations, the degree of conformity of the protection design to the NEC or to good engineering practices is not clear.
Criteria documents do not state clearly where the NEC should be followed and where not.
c.
Fuse size selection for valve operators appears to allow sufficient margin for emergency operation, as concluded by Generic Concern Task Force Report GOR 29-29.
However, the fuse selection process is not documented.
d.
Fuse sizes were selected to provide short circuit protection for motors and the circuits.
Overload protection for motors and circuits was provided by thermal overload relays.
No basis could be found to demonstrate that the fuses provide adequate full range short circuit protection for motor
- tarter, cable, and motor.
G l
03130
-11/26/86 l
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1
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PAGE 10 0F 14 I
i
==
Conclusions:==
a.
The concern that a large number of molded case circuit breaker trip ratings were unacceptable is valid since acceptability cannot be assessed until final calculations are reviewed, and the basis for protection of small motor j
circuits cannot be found. Also, preliminary calculations do not include complete reference to design inputs as required by ANSI N45.2.ll, including reference to Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-11.4.1 and Design Guide DG-E2.3.5.
Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-11.4.1 are not clear regarding adherence to the NEC. An analysis of fault protection for small motors was not included. Completion of the calculations, clarification of the design criteria, and replacement of the circuit breakers found to be deficient (if any) should satisfy the Concern.
b.
The concern is valid to the extent that the application of good engineering practices is not clear since the original trip rating selection process is not documented. The completion of the new, well documented calculations k~)
supporting the existing breaker selection should satisfy the concern.
i The NEC is not mandatory for utility generating stations; I
therefore, no justification for deviations from the NEC is required.
c.
The concern that fuse selection for valve operators does not l
l provide sufficient margin for emergency operation is valid because fuse selection has not been supported by i'
calculations. However, since fuses are applied only to the fifth diesel ERCW valve operators and the fifth diesel is not i
required for restart of SQN, calculations are not required-at this time.
New calculations will be required prior to any
(
need for fifth diesel operability.
5 d.
The concern that fuse sizes were selected to protect the valve operator motors and not the circuit is valid to the extent that the degree of short circuit protection of both motor and circuit is not clear. No calculations or other basis for sizing the fuses have been found. For reasons k
given in conclusion "c" above, calculations are not required j
now, but are necessary before the fifth diesel is placed in j
service.
t O
03130 - 11/26/86 r
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E TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1
,3 PAGE 11 0F 14 APPENDIX A 5.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
a.
SNP FSAR Chapter 8 i
b.
TVA EN DES Calculations, " Black and Veatch Task Force Category 35 Safety Evaluation of High Instantaneous Current Circuit Breaker Settings," (NEB 840207 222), (02/07/84) c.
NSRS Report No. R-84-19-WBN, "NSRS Assessment of the Results of the Black and Veatch Independent Design Review of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Auxiliary Feedwater System,"
(GNS 840705 054), dates of review 01/10/84 through 06/15/84 d.
Black and Veatch Findings Report - Findings F-136 and F-137, (10/30/82) e.
TVA Task Force for Review of Black and Veatch Findings - Task Force Category 35 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Evaluation Sheet R1, (11/09/83) l f.
TVA SNP Generic Concern Task Force Report GOR 29-29,
-Revision 1,(06/06/86) g.
TVA memo from Costner to Standifer (0QA 840504 503), "WBNP -
April 1984 Surveillance Report Summary," (05/04/84) h.
TVA memo from Standifer to Costner (WBP 840718 076), "WBNP -
April 1984 Surveillance Report Summary," (07/18/84) 1.
TVA memo from Whitt to Parris (QO1 850913 052), "WBN Disposition of NSRS Concerns R-84-19-WBN-6 and 7 Resulting From Independent Assessment of the Black and Veatch Review,"
(09/13/85) j.
TVA memo from Drotleff to Seiberling (B26 860502 010), "WBNP Disposition of NRSR Concerns R-84-19-WBN-6 and 7 Resulting From Independent Assessment of the Black and Veatch Review,"
(05/20/86) k.
ECN 4251, (W8P 831018 518), (09/01/83) 1.
TVA Electrical Design Guide DG-E2.3.5, "480 Volt Motor Branch Circuit Design and Protection," R2 (06/19/85)
G 03130
-11/26/86
j.
l TVA' EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 1 7 PAGE 12 0F 14 A
g
.--=
APPENDIX A'(cont'd)
}
m.
TVA Electrical Design Standard DS-E9.2.1 R1, " Motors - 460 V j
Circuit Design - Motor Control Center," (03/13/78 (Superseded) d i
n.
PIR WBNEE88638, (04/07/86) o.
TVA Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-11.4 and 11.5, " Emergency Auxiliary Ac Power System," R1 (07/25/75) (Superseded)
.j i
p.
TVA Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-ll.4.1,
" Normal and Emergency Ac l
Auxiliary Power System," R2 (07/22/86) a q.
TVA Task Force for Review and Black and Veatch Findings -
JI Task Force Category 35 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 l
Evaluation Sheet R1, (11/01/83) r.
TVA DNE Calculation SQN-APS-003, "480 V Ac, APS, Class lE Load Coordination Study" for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Preliminary), (Undated - transmitted 10/27/86)
)
{-.
s.
Letter from B. J. Youngblood, NRC, to S. A. White, TVA, with the attached transcript of the investigative interview conducted by the NRC on 02/21/86 at the First Tennessee Bank Building in Knoxville, TN, (06/25/86) t.
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106, R1 (03/77), " Thermal Overload f
Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves" u.
TVA DNE Calculation OE2-DS196RP, " Containment Electrical j;
Penetration Protection Analysis", R1 (B25 860804 101)
(07/30/86) y 4
v.
TVA EN DES Calculation 02SDJ-P213350, " Analysis of the Auxiliary Power System for 10CFR50 Appendix R",
R3 (823 860610 202) (06/10/86) 6.
WHAT RE6ULATIONS. LICENSING C0f9tITMENTS. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA?
a.
SNP FSAR Chapter 8 b.
TVA Electrical Standard DS-E2.3.2, "480-Volt Ac Auxiliary Power System Performance and Equipment Application Criteria" G
03130 - 11/26/86
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 13 0F 14 APPENDIX A (cont'd) c.
TVA Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-ll.4.1,
" Normal and Emergency Ac Auxiliary Power System," R2 d.
ANSI Standard N45/2/11-1974, " Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants" 7.
LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION. MEETINGS TELEPHONE CALLS. AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO ELEMENT.
Telephone call from Nesbitt, Hutson, Frederick, TVA, to Don-Doncow, Mehegan, Bechtel, (10/15/86)
O 03130
'11/26/86
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM I$
REVISION NUMBER:
1 m
_~~_.
PAGE 14 0F 14 CATD LIST The following CATD forms are included as part of this report:
237.02 SQN 01 (Revised 11/26/86) 237.02 SQN 02 237.02 SQN 03 (Revised 11/26/86) 237.02 SQN 04 (Revised 11/26/86) 237.02 SQN 05 4
E l
1O l
t e
0 03130 - 11/26/86
ECTG C.3 Attachment A
- f'.
~
Page 1 of 1 Revision 2 - A ECSP CORRECTIVE Action Tractinst Document ICATD)
INITIATION 1.
Inunediate Corrective Action Required: )d Yes O No 2.
Stop Wort Recomrnended: 0 Yes M No 3.
CATD No. 2.57.01-SQW-ol 4
INITIATION DATE II/f G/6(o 5.
RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION:
D ed E.
6.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION:,ELQR O NQR Pcts ti g WAQV CAL.c. 0 L Afted S plO Mer t d c f.O D E :
A. C o M P t. s Tel 52E Feg2 E dd6 TO DE s t d, d d 1 2 iTE R I A.
b, A mtMi s o f GMAt.L Mo fodit c e Reoi T" FA O L.T PRoTe GTi o,J, r d c a.o De 06 FeroTec ree d Fee _ To sa u AL. B t/s at.oM HEAfsr(5.
c,. I?6 sot.Ts WAicu dboto GE cow par 2ED toin4 Tr229 R ATt UG 6 wewd 04 Orh J CocoHsuts.
d, OdemwocAL. icTERPEsrATrod OF TtlE WEC red Ar2DidG SETrid6 0 F FAotT Poercevred Ar 13eo Pawmy.pFu LsAP.
O ATTACHMENTS 7.
PREPARED BY: NAME 06/2 -
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DATE: /v2./e/B/,
8.
CONCURRENCE:
CEG-H h R,W W DATE:
// 2.F-PL O
9-
- eraov>':
=cro eaoca^" "cao oirs:
CORRECTIVE ACTION 10.
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN:
O ATTACHMENTS 11.
PROPOSED BY:
DIRECTOR /MGR:
DATE:
12.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-H:
DATE:
SRP:
DATE:
ECTG PROGRAM MGR:
DATE:
VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT h) 13.
Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.
SIGNATURE TITLE DATE
ECTG C.3 Attachment A
+ p/
Page 1 of 1
~~
~~
Revision 2 - A
~
ECSP COREECTIVE
~
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Action Tracting Document ICAID) i INITIATION 1.
Isumediate Corrective Action Required: M Yes O No l
2.
Stop Wort Recosunended: 0 Yes
( No 5
}
3.
CATD No. 2 S7.07.- S Qd 4 INITIATION DATE 11 24 A/r 5.
RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION:
'D AI &
6.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: MR O NQR 1
No e Ai co L ATl005 do J t.o BE Foo UD To J o STI FV l
THE ostl 4 #A3 A L 6NEAMEGE 7ttiP R A Tiu65 TVA i
15 P RE 9AQt AJ6 C AL-C u t-ATIC MS
- T*4 A.E S hV E-f TNas S u T-TQsv H AV G NOT VET SEEO 1
G O M P t.-E T e o, 4i f
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7.
PREPARED BY:
NAME VM i -- e'?. Wi_1
> h.OT iATE:
hl1t.4 86 8.
CONCURRENCE:
CEG-H ':h /2. N*tav b. 0
'DATE:
d -2 MC 3
a 9.
APPROVAL:
ECTG PROGRAM Ndt.
DATE:
CORRECTIVE ACTION 10.
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN:
l l
I t
I O ATTACHMENTS i
11.
PROPOSED BY:
DIRECTOR /MGR:
DATE:
l 12.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-H:
DATE:
i SRP:
DATE:
ECTG PROGRAM MGR:
DATE:
VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT e
13.
Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily h'
implemented.
SIGNATURE TITLE DATE
ECTG C.3 Attachinent A
(_~,
Page 1 of 1 Revision 2 - A ECSP CORRECTIVE Action Tracting Document (CATD)
INITIATION 1.
Immediate Corrective Action Required: % Yes O No 3.
CATD No. 2 31.D7 - SQ 9-O 3 %a.
2.
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APPROVAL:
ECTG PROGRAM MGR.
DATE:
CORRECTIVE ACTION 10.
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN:
O ATTACHMENTS 11.
PROPOSED BY:
DIRECTOR /MGR:
DATE:
12.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-H:
DATE:
SRP:
DATE:
ECTG PROGRAM MGR:
DATE:
VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT
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13.
Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.
SIGNATURE TITLE DATE
ECTG C.3 Attachment A f':
Page 1 of 1 i.
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INITIATION 1.
Inunediate Corrective Action Required:
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2.
Stop Wort Recommended: 0 Yes 3.
CATD No. 2 31. DE-5ad -Od-4 INITIATION DATE IL/2t,/ 8 /,
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PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN:
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PROPOSED BY:
DIRECTOR /MGR:
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CONCURRENCE: CEG-H:
DATE:
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DATE:
ECTG PROGRAM MGR:
DATE:
VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT h;
13.
Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.
SIGNATURE TITLE DATE
ECTG C.3 Attachment A Page 1 of 1 Revision 2 - A
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ECSP COR2ECTIVE Action Tracting Document (CATD)
INITIATION 1.
Inunediate Corrective Action Required: d Yes O No 0 Yes X No f
f f Stop Wort Reconumended: d -05 2.
CATD No. f 3, 7E2. - 5 Q 4
INITIATION DATE II/2d f 0 3.
5.
RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION:
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PREPARED BY: NAME U P C & N M O @lpATE: il124186 8.
CONCURRENCE:
CEG-H h 12,W( W f'DATE:
19 1 k - HI.
9.
APPROVAL:
ECTG PROGRAM MGR.O DATE:
, CORRECTIVE ACTION 10.
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN:
O ATTACHMENTS 11.
PROPOSED BY:~ DIRECTOR /MGR:
DATE:
12.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-H:
DATE:
SRP:
DATE:
ECTG PROGR4.M MGR:
DATE:
VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT 13.
Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily h...
implemented.
SIGNATURE TITLE DATE
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