ML20207E482

Rev 0 to Civil/Structural Generic Issues Rept

ML20207E482
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	11/20/1986
From:	Allen J, Carty J, Foster D STONE & WEBSTER, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20207E433	List: ML20207E447 ML20207E482 TXX-6182, Forwards Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Design Basis Consolidation Program Plan & Rev 0 to Civil/Structural Generic Issues Rept, Prepared by S&W
References
NUDOCS 8701020189
Download: ML20207E482 (77)

Text

- - - -. --

e

:I l l-g.  : TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING CO.

l

. COMANCHE-PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION  !

I  ;

I e l

/r og%  !

I a y i

7 I' *%,

DNG Cd f l I

[

I I l

I l i I CIVIL / STRUCTURAL lI i GENERIC ISSUES 1

I REPORT I

I I

,I

! STONE & WEBSTER LI =

A 28a8: na88:

PDR 4s

s El l-Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 i TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY (TUGCO).

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 2I UNITS 1 AND 2 STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION'S CIVIL / STRUCTURAL GENERIC ISSUES REPORT I

I

/

/2 -/Y-8 G J. E. Allen C ief Engineer tructural Division n ~

E

1. 8Vaf4f D. C. Foster Chief Engineer Engineering Me nics Division I / A

' [

,c-6 J l J g. S.4 arty Yfoject Engineer [

i

&'T l /

g .

l .bb el S. 1. Stamm nhw Project Engineering Manager f'/

_ Cflkm.a (

R. W. Ackley, Jr.

Project Manager I

I erss-1estses-e2 1

I B

4 Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 I

INDEX OF CIVIL / STRUCTURAL' GENERIC ISSUES REPORT COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION

I -

Interim I Document Title Revision No.

Date of Issue Issue Date REPORT- Civil / Structural Generic 0 11/20/86 Issues Report APPENDIX A 11/20/86 I

Reactor Containment Concrete 0 Design (Mat, Shell, Dome, Discon-tinuities, and Penetrations)

APPENDIX B Reactor Containment Concrete 0 11/20/86 Internals

- APPENDIX C Other Seismic Category I O 11/20/86 Concrete Structures

. APPENDIX D Seismic Category I Structural- 0 11/20/86 Steel I APPENDIX E Pipe Whip Restraints and Jet Impingement Shields 0 11/20/86 APPENDIX F Reactor Containment Liner 0 11/20/86 APPENDIX G Fuel Transfer Tube Support 0 11/20/86 and Other J,iners Miscellaneous Supports APPENDIX H 0 11/20/86 (Equipment)

LI. APPENDIX I Penetration Sleeves and 0 11/20/86 Anchorage i APPENDIX J Concrete Anchors 0 11/20/86 APPENDIX K Computer Code Benchmarking 0 11/20/86 APPENDIX L Testing Programs 0 11/20/86 APPENDIX M Heavy Load Drops 0 11/20/86 l

l APPENDIX N Generic Technical Concerns 0 11/20/86 I

APPENDIX 0 Seismic Analysis 0 11/20/86 6753-1634503-B2

T;xts Utilities'Genarcting Comptny Revision: 0

Date: 11/20/86 Table of Contents I

t #

Title Page 1 Table of Contents 2

. List of Generic Issues 3

1.0 INTRODUCTION

4 2.0 SCOPE 4 3.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION METHODOLOGY 5 4.0 ORGANIZATION OF THE CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS 5 Table 1 Generic Issues 6 I

I I .

I I

I I

I I

I 3 e>,3 1e>4,e3.e2 2

'. ..~ ) . =

Texas Utilities Generating Company Revision: 0 j.; f _f Date: 11/20/86 L.ob" '

b e.

S. .. . . . -

1 . .-

LIST OF GENFEIC ISSUES I; ':, * - ..

l(fsp.'..'_ . .

.g Appendix. Title } ;.; .

.. h i ~

A' Reactor Containment Concrete Design (Mat, Shell, Dome, Uf? .'. l,

' Discontinuities, and Penetrations)

(.l .-{ ,, .

Reactor Containment Concrete Internals  :

B

..s-%. : f

=

,!"i 3 )..

C Other Seismic Category I Concrete Structures [i:

_ . ., 2 4 I.

2 D Seismic Category I Structural Steel  ![, N

. , . , ~. . .. ., .

E Pipe Whip Restraints and Jet Impingement Shields gg. . 2 l

=

2 9c....

F Reactor Containment Liner k, 'a i.i j$:? U

_ G Fuel Transfer Tube Support and Other Liners  %{G? .

. . .9 suz H Miscellaneous Supports (Equipment) R .';j p,'j

= .:. _ . . . _1

% .: . .\

_ I Penetration Sleeves and Anchorage z.Q;.f .{

J Concrete Anchors l[:(."

(7ll 4 K Computer Code Benchmarking

,W.

7 . . .,

L Testing Programs 3.v. . ;? .

g ..

=

M Heavy Load Drops :4,

.,7 'll p 3$t' N Generic Technical Concerns . d"s_

O Seismic Analysis .

y

! I I

I

< 1

- (

i 6753-1634503-B2 3

~T:xes Utilitics G:nrrsting Compzny Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 CIVIL / STRUCTURAL GENERIC ISSUES REPORT l

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) has been retained by Texas Utilities Generating Company (TUGCO) to develop and implement a Corrective Action Program for the Civil / Structural Generic Issues identified for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) Seismic Category I structures in response to the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) findings and other identified findings and problem areas. The CPRT program is comprised of two separate subprograms, one deals with quality of construction issues and the other with design adequacy issues. The Quality of Construction Program review has been performed by Evaluation Research Corporation (ERC). The Design Adequacy Program review has been performed by TERA Corporation .

TERA findings were documented via Discrepancy Issue Reports (DIRs).

Discrepancy Issue Reports - (DIRs), have been identified by TERA Corporation, the third-party reviewer and by external sources. This corrective action plan defines the methodology and procedures for responding to any design issue -related to the CPRT program with the objective of demonstrating structural adequacy in accordance with the Final Safety Analysis Report

- (FSAR) and other licensing commitments. Both technical and programmatic requirements are addressed by the plan.

In formulating this plan, SWEC has reviewed the TERA (D) and external source (E) DIRs pertinent to structural design, TRT issues, and issues effecting design raised by the ERC review. In conducting this review of issues, SWEC assumed that each issue as written was factual, complete and correct. No effort was made to ascertain the accuracy of each issue in order to quickly envelope the magnitude of probable corrective action requirements. Subsequent reviews may determine that the number of issues enveloped may be reduced or increased. This review of issues has provided an indication of the types of structural design problems which the Civil / Structural Corrective Action Plans (C/S CAPS) must address.

2.0 SCOPE The corrective action to be implemented by SWEC consists of fifteen indi-vidual corrective action plans for Civil / Structural generic issues identified in Table 1. These fif teen generic issues address all DIRs (both D and E type) reviewed to date. The review covered D-DIRs D-0001 through D-2202 and E-DIRs E-0001 through E-1271. TERA D-DIRs ad E-DIRs, TRT Issue Specific Action Plans (ISAPs), and ERC concerns will be incorporated into the individual plans where applicable.

The SWEC corrective action scope includes development of design criteria incorporated in the design basis documents (DBDs), review of calculations, upgrading of calculations to licensing basis standards where required, incorporation of ERC issues, providing the necessary information for upgrading of drawings and specifications if required, and providing resolution to all DIRs. SWEC's scope of work will encompass safety related civil / structural design.

I 6753-1634503-B2 4 IG

T;xz Utilitica Generating Comprny Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 3.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION METHODOLOGY I The general methods for corrective action presented in this section will be performed in accordance with the SWEC Management Plan for Plant Quality and project procedures for CAP implementation, DBD review and development, the Design design and I

TNE Deviation Reports (TDDR) review, assessment validation.

3.1 In order to establish design criteria, pertinent Civil / Structural design information will be reviewed. This includes:

• Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

• Design criteria (DBD's developed by others)

I

• DIRs Calculations Drawings I

• Specifications

• Potential design impacts stemming from ERC Population Reports

• The final TERA IRRs and Engineering Evaluation Reports will I be reviewed to ensure that this CAP considers all issues.

Where required, the design criteria (Design Basis Documents) will be I prepared and/or requirements.

reviewed to provide complete structural design I 3.2 Existing design calculations will be evaluated to determine the adequacy of the design basis documentation. Where inadequacies are identified, either supplemental or confirmatory calculations will be developed to confirm the plant's design. This evaluation will consider the individual and collective significance of DIRs, ERC findings and other identified concerns relating to civil / structural design. The review will be based upon the applicable Design Basis Documents. The I final calculations will provide a documented technical basis to support the design.

I 3.3 SWEC will interface with other organizations to exchange information on DIRs, results of SWEC reviews (3.1 above), and planned corrective actions in accordance with project procedures. The organizations with which SWEC will interface include TUGCO, Gibbs & Hill, ERC, and TERA.

I Others will b2 included as required.

3.4 At the completion of the corrective action for each structural topic, a I summary report will be written.

corrective action This report will describe the taken for each topic including final design calculations, DBDs, and any required hardware changes. It will also summarize TERA DIRs, ERC concerns, TRT issues, and SWEC reviews.

4.0 ORGANIZATION OF THE CORRECTIVE ACTION PI.ANS The main bodu of this report contains an overview of the scope and corrective action methodology.

I

I e,33 1e2 3e3.e2 3

Texco Utilities Generating. Company Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 I Table 1. lists the Civil / Structural Corrective Action Plans which address the generic issues; the appendices give the individual correction action plans for the generic issues.

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I e,s3-1e2 sos.e2 e

. Date: 11/20/86 $

I TABLE 1 3

]:.

APPENDIX GENERIC ISSUES  ?

I A. Reactor Containment Concrete Design (Mat, Shell, Dome, Discontinuities, and Penetrations) e B. Reactor Containment Concrete Internals C. Other Seismic Category I Concrete Structures 8 c D. Seismic Category I Structural Steel g

E. Pipe Whip Restraints and Jet Impingement Shields F. Reactor Containment Liner ..

G. Fuel Transfer Tube Support and Other Liners 1

H. Miscellaneous Supports (Equipment) g I I. Penetration Sleeves and Anchorage J. Concrete Anchors K. Computer Code Benchmarking g

L. Testing Programs M. Heavy Load Drops I N. Generic Technical Concerns 2

I 0. Seismic Analysis j li I i l k i

?

w I =

I 6753-1634503-B2 7 _

y

-, Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86

-- t

=

APPENDIX A - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN -

REACTOR CONTAINMENT CONCRETE DESIGN

1.0 BACKGROUND

_' 1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for the Reactor Containment Concrete Design with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies. The calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs}

issued by TERA. SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Reactor .

Containment Concrete Design generic issue and has formed the corrective j action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized

= below. Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in paren-theses ( ).

k (A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations

• Piping reactions not considered in design (SRB-112C)

• Concrete design not in compliance with code and licensing commitments (SRB-112C)

• Most critical section not considered for determination of required reinforcement (SRB-112C)

• Poor or nonexisting documentation; governing load cases not addressed (SRB-112C) i

• In design of the equipment hatch the dome thickness

{2 ft-6 in. } was used to calculate transverse shear rigidi-ties, the cylinder wall thickness should have been used

{4 ft-6 in.} (SRB-112C)

~

• Critical load case was not addressed (SRB-3C1)

Computer output used for design is unconservative (SRB-3C1)

• Computer analysis missing; independent review indicates an error existed in the analysis (SRB-3C1)(SRB-92P thru 103P)

(SRB-3C2)(SRB-87P)(SRB-112C)

• Polar crane loads applied at wrong locations (SRB-3C2)

• Seismic loads incorrectly calculated (SRB-3C1)

• Jet loads incorrectly applied (SRB-3C1)

• Apparent error in calculating area of reinforcement (SRB-112C)

• Incorrect stress allowable used and combined load effects not E

considered (SRB-1C2)

• 6753A-1634503-B2 A-1

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86

• Voided seismic data used as design basis (SRB-1C1)

• -Inconsistencies in " Quake" seismic analysis program output

• Combination of three directional seismic effect not consis-tent with licensing commitment, plus not all required combi-nations evaluated correctly (SRB-1C1)

• Envelope seismic values are less than individual component (SRB-1C2)

• Design did not consider governing load equations due to erroneous conclusions (SRB-1C2)

• Calculation / computer analysis missing (SRB-1C2)

• Incorrect design pressure used in calculation (SRB-1C2)

• Inadequate justification of method used to evaluate thermal loadings (SRB-1C2)

• Discrepancy between review calculation and calculation of record (SRB-3C1)

(B) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings

• Calculation requires more reinforcement than shown on draw-ings (SRB-112C)(SRB-104C)(SRB-122C)(SRB-3C1)

• Dimensions in calculation for sleeve anchorage different than that shown on drawing (SRB-108C)

• Drawing calls for reinforcement but no calculation exists to support this (SRB-112C)

• DCA referenced to revise drawing does not exist in log (SRB-122C)

(C) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / output

• Apparent lack of documentation (sources of inputs, criteria, applicable design codes, assumptions and computer runs are .

missing plus calculations are not organized) (SRB-112C)

(SRB-1C1)(SRB-1C2) (SRB-104C)(SRB-3C2)

• Reinforcing overstress accepted without adequate justifica-tion (SRB-112C)

• Design of reinforcing incomplete (SRB-112C)

• Computer analysis not available

• Original calculation in error but never voided (SRB-112C)

(SRB-160C) 6753A-1634503-B2 A-2

l W

Revision: 0

$ Date: 11/20/86 b

w

• Tornado loads were not addressed (SRB-3C1)(SRB-3C2) h g

• Items on structural checklist shown to be complete but are g

g not (SRB-3C1)(SRB-3C2)

$

• Basis for reinforcing not justified (SRB-160C) p (D) Calculations Not Consistent With Licensing Commitments I

e 1

l W

• Hethodology used for analysis and design not consistent with licensing commitment (SRB-109C)(SRB-3C1)

'n ii i g

• Comparison of rock bearing stress given in FSAR not calculat-D g ed correctly (SRB-1C1)

• Tangential shear stress not addrecsed as committed to in FSAR f

{ (SRB-112C) h

• Design temperature used in calculations not consistent with

[_ E SER L 5

• Design of tangential shear reinforcement not consistent with 5

T g licensing commitments (SRB-112C)

W g i

• Containment liner used as strength element which violates

$ licensing commitments E

j-

• Not all load cases in the licensing commitments were ad-

dressed (SRB-1C2)

N g

[ u (E) Structural Items Lacking Backup Calculations 5

[ g

• Radial bars at main steam and feedwater penetrations g (SRB-112C)

$e .

EN

• Replacement rebar at penetrations (SRB-112C)

= l I

• Punching shear adequacy at penetrations (SRB-112C)

• Sole plate bolts of polar crane (SRB-109)

=-

E

• Transverse shear reinforcing at equipment hatch (SRB-112C) 1.2 There are no E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of the Reactor Containment Concrete Design.

2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for the Reactor Containment's I Concrete Design contain technical errors and inconsistencies when compared to the drawings and do not consistently meet licensing commitments.

inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these Design calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.

g e,ss -1es s03-e2 A-3

E n R:vicien:.0 Data: ~11/20/86

( <(3.0' SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES

}3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) develop design basis

. documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly; identified and implemented.

3.2I[ Review and' assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifi-cations pertaining.to the Reactor Containment's Concrete Design for

_ . .4 -

consistency with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated project change documants, i.e., Design Change Authori-zations,-.DCAs, and Component Modification Cards, CMCs). This review

.shall be' documented using the following steps:

' 3.2.1; A review procedure will be developed and used to document and ensure uniform and complete technical and programmatic

. reviews.

3.2.2 A set of prints of current permanent plant draw-ings and related unincorporated DCAs, CMCs, any other project change

-documents and cut rebar drawings will be used to ensure a complete review of the as-installed condition.

h 3.2.3 The ' review for technical- adequacy will address calc.ulation inputs, assumptions, methodology, accuracy, outputs cad conclusions. Input will be reviewed for applicability, accuracy, and source. Methcdology will be reviewed for compliance with licensing commitments and to ensure that it is appropriate for the calculation's objectives. Outputs will be reviewed to confirm that they are reasonable in consideration of.the inputs, methodology, and objective of the calculation. (Note: Any input not deemed final will be marked " Confirmation Required.")

h.

Additionally, changes to calculations as a result of ER findings will be included.

3.2.4 A calculation index will be developed to provide documenta-tion of status (e.g., Confirmation Required, Superseded, Supplemented by, Validated, etc).

3.3' Based on the review of documents covered by Section 3.2 the documents

( will be sorted into the following categories in order to determine the magnitude of corrective action required.

• Valid documents (no additional work required)

{

• Documents requiring revisions

• . Confirmatory calculations required

• New documents required (no document presently exists) 3.4 New documents, or revisions to existing documents, as required, will be developed in accordance with the applicable project procedures.

6753A-1634503-B2 A-4

R;vicien: 0 D;te: 11/20/86

./

e - . s.

• . . Confirmatory calculations required Y * 'Newidocuments required (no document presently exists) 3.4 New documents, or revisions to existing documents, as required, will be

- .' developed in accordance with the applicable project procedures.

z ' Modifications of' existing hardware or addition of new hardware will be identified, if. required.

,. 3.5 Closeout of calculation; input identified under Section 3.2 as requiring confirmation will be by revision to the calculation to identify final

(-'-  ; source, addition of supporting documentation as calculation attach-ments, and revision of analysis / design as necessary.

. 4.0- LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station -

Master Index of Calculation and h ' Computer Book for ' Structural Department March 21,-1986 Calculations shown below are referenced in TERA DIRs.

Section 11540, Rev. 3 dated Book Number Set Revision Title SRB-101 1 0 Reactor Building -

Finite Element Analysis SRB-1C2- 1 0 Reactor Building -

Finite Element Analysis 0

SRB-3C1 1 Reactor Building Containment-

, Static Analysis

. SRB-3C2 -

0 Reactor Building Containment -

Static Analysis SRB-87P -

0 Reactor Building Containment -

KALNINS Analysis Test Runs SRB-92P through 99P, 103P -

0 Reactor Building Containment -

KALNINS Analysis Loading Combinations Meridian

( Numbers 1 through 9 N SRB-110C 1 2 Mat Reinforcement L

SRB-112C 1 15 Reactor Containment Wall Reinforcing

( 6753A-1634503-B2 A-5

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 Book Number Set Revision Title SRB-122C 1 7 Personnel Airlock SRB-122C 3 0 Containment Wall - Inves-tigation of As-Built Shear Reinforcement between el 993 ft-1 1/2 in.

and 100 ft-6 in., No. 1 s

SRB-122C 4 2 Same as above, No. 2 SRB-104C 1 2 Mat Reinforcement Calculations

_ SRB-108C 1 3 Reactor Building Containment f Penetrations SRB-108C 2 11 R.C.P. Tie Anchors SRB-108C 3 3 Reactor Building Valve Isolation Tank Supports SRB-108C 4 3 Reactor Building - Containment Penetrations SRB-109C 3 6 Polar Crane Details SRB-109C 5 7 Fuel Handling Bridge Crane g Supports 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF TIE RESOLUTION Project procedures will be developed for use in implementation of the actions discussed in this appendix.

1

~

l 1

6753A-1634503-B2 A-6

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 APPENDIX B - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN -

REACTOR CONTAINMENT CONCRETE INTERNALS

1.0 BACKGROUND

1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for the Reactor

-Containment Concrete ' Internals with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies. The calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs}

issued by TERA. SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Reactor Containment Concrete Internals generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summerized below. Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in parentheses ( ).

(A) Technical Errors in Calculations

• Design of concrete wall did not consider end moments from Steam Generator Restraint Beam  :

• Finite Element modeling of mat did not consider a long continuous dropped haunch (SRB-1C1) *

• The design of the Reactor Vessel Thermal Restraints violates certain AISC and ACI requirements (SRB-115C)

(B) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings

• Design calculation for sizing reinforcement and design live loads do not agree with drawing (SRB-115C) (SRB-112C)

(SRB-101C) 7 (C) Calculations Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments

• All FSAR load combinations not considered

• Calculation of thermal gradient used in concrete design does not meet FSAR commitment (SRB-1C2)

(D) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output

• Apparent lack of documentation and traceability of "STARDYNE" analysis for basis load cases (SRB-4C2) ..

0

• Input source for pressure load for wall design missinF '

(SRB-116C) z ;

]1 b

• Apparent lack of references and clarity for design input and i assumptions (SRB-115C) 7$

l i' 1.2 There are several E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of the. Reactor Containment Concrete Internals. These E-DIRs can be jg categorized as follows: q 6753B-1634503-B2 B-1

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 (A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations

• General concern on lack of accident temperature design for structural members

• Thermal design of concrete wall in vicinity of upper and lower lateral restraint for concurrent maximum change in temperature would exceed concrete allowable stress limits

• Material substitutions were made for the upper lateral restraint which were not addressed in the modeling of its interface with the supporting shield wall

• Shield wall needs to be evaluated for lateral movement of restraint beam during LOCA

• Upper and Lower Lateral Restraint Beams inadequately designed

• The use of 450 psi for the tensile strength of concrete may not be conservative (B) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings  :

• Reinforcement required by design may not have been installed in the Reactor Cavity Wall up to elevations 812 f t-0 in. and 819 ft-0 in.

(C) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output

• No procedure to transmit as-built loads for inclusion into design record calculation

• Changes to nonsafety related designs might have an impact on safety designs (D) Calculation Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments

• LOCA should be considered with OBE (E) Structural Items Lacking Backup Calculations

• Bolts anchoring t.he upper lateral restraint to the shield ,

wall were shortened without technical justification (F) Construction Problems j

• Constrt.ction debris between Reactor Insulation and Shield Wall 1

• Concern regarding hollow places existed in the concrete l behind steel liner of Unit 2 Reactor Cavity.

1.3 Issue Specific Action Plans: (Refer to Appendix N " Generic Technical Concerns" for more details) 6753B-1634503-B2 B-2 U

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 1.3.1 ISAP II.a - Reinforcing Steel in the Reactor Cavity A revised drawing, which added rebar to the Reactor Cavity between elevation 812 ft and 819 ft, was issued subsequent to the concrete pour for~the affected area; hence, the added rebar required by this revised drawing was never installed. The NRC TRT investigation revealed that there was no documentation which showed an engineering justification for omitting the additional rebar.

1.3.2 ISAP II.b - Concrete Compressive Strength This ISAP will be addressed in Appendix C (Other Seismic Category I Concrete Structures).

1.3.3 ISAP V.b - Improper Shortening of Anchor Bolts in Steam ..

Generator Upper Lateral (SGUL) Supports (i,J.[

An investigation of the shortened anchor bolts involved a review of 'L calculations to determine bolt forces. This review resulted in a g?.

/ ?

detailed reanalysis using a finite element model which included both 3$

upper and lower lateral supports and a large portion of the concrete Q internal structure. Thermal / fluid analyses were performed to develop compartment pressurization loads and steam generator loads while the kh A.j; structural analyses were performed to evaluate the baseplates and bolts Q connecting the SGUL beam to the concrete walls, the embedment and the SA -

beam itself.

2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE U[&

f m.

&)

//

The calculations which form the design basis for the Reactor Containment >

Concrete Internals contain technical errors and inconsistencies when com-  :[3 pared to the drawings , and do not consistently meet licensing commitments. C. :

Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for M these calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.

3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES *V 3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) develop design basis documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have

[$y been properly identified and implemented. QN

@}9 3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifi- f cations pertaining to the Reactor Containment's Concrete Internals fer consistency with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated project change documents, i.e., Design Change Authori-zations, DCAs, and Component Modification Cards, CMCs). This review shall be documented using the following steps:

3.2.1 A review procedure will be developed and used to document and ,

ensure uniform and complete technical and programmatic j reviews.

l l

6753B-1634503-B2 B-3

5 Revision: 0

'E Date: 11/20/86 3.2.2 A set of prints of current permanent plant drawings and related unincorporated DCAs, CMCs, and any other project k s change documents and cut rebar drawings will be used to  ;

P ensure a complete review of the as-installed condition.

3.2.3 The review for technical adequacy will address calculation I. inputs, assumptions, methodology, accuracy, outputs, and conclusions. Input will be reviewed for applicability,

=

. accuracy, and source. Methodology will be reviewed for g

compliance with licensing commitments and to ensure that it E is appropriate for the calculation's objectives. Outputs  ;

will be reviewed to confirm that they are reasonable in -

I consideration of the inputs, methodology, and objective of the calculation. (Note: Any input not deemed final will be marked " Confirmation Required.")

Additionally, changes to calculations as a result of ERC Z findings will be included.

{_

3.2.4 A calculation index will be developed to provide documenta- 7 tion of status (e.g., Confirmation Required, Superseded, Supplemented by, Validated, etc).

3.3 Based on the review of documents covered by Section 3.2 the documents will be sorted into the following categories in order to determine the I magnitude of corrective action required.

• Valid Documents (no addit.ional work required) m I

=r

• Documents requiring revision R 5

m

• Confirmatory calculations required  ;

9" ""

• New documents required (no document presently exists) E R

3.4 New documents or revisions to existing documents as required will be _

developed in accordance with the applicable project procedures.

Modifications of existing hardware or addition of new hardware will be identified, if required.

I 3.5 Closeout of calculation input identified under Section 3.2. requiring -

confirmation will be by revision to the calculation to identify final source, addition of supporting documentation as calculation attach-ments, and revision of analysis / design as necessary.

4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS 4.1 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Comanche Peak Response Team Program and Issue - Specific Action Plans, Revision 3, I February 1986.

4.2 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Master Index of Calculation and Computer Books for Structural Department - Section 11540, Rev. 3, dated March 21, 1986. (Calculations shown below are referenced in TERA DIRs.)

6753B-1634503-B2 B-4

ec Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 Book Number Set Revision Title SRB-1C1 1 0 Reactor Building -

Finite Element Analysis SRB-1C2 1 0 Reactor Building -

Finite Element Analysis SRB-112C- 1 15 Reactor Building Wall Reinforcing

SRB-115C 2 0 Reactor Supports -

Final Loads 5.0 -IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION Project procedures will be developed for use in implementation of the actions discussed in this appendix.

I -

I e

e %

I I

I 6753B-1634503-B2 B-5

-n -

93 R vicien: 0 Date: 11/20/85

. APPENDIX C - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN -

OTHER SEISMIC CATEGORY I CONCRETE STRUCTURES n

1.0 BACKGROUND

1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for other Seismic Category I Concrete Structures such as the Auxiliary Building, Fuel L Building, Safeguard Building, and Pipe Tunnel with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies. The calculational

<. deficiencies fdentified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs} issued by TERA. SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to Other Seismic Category I Concrete Structures generic issues

_ and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized below.- Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in parentheses ( ).

.A. Technical Deficiencies In Calculations

• ~ Error in calculating roof and wall loads (SMI-103C)

• Incorrect slab dead load used in STRUDL analysis

• Incorrect dimensions used for input data resulted in incorrect static analysis for members (SAB-122C1)

• Incorrect modeling of beams and columns in STRUDL static

. analysis (SAB-122C1)

• Slab not designed to meet compression requirement

• - All loads and associated load combinations not considered in design (SAB-122C2)

• Moment of inertia incorrectly calculated in Fuel Building (SFB-103C)

• Apparent lack of analysis / discussion provided for additional rebars around large openings in walls and slabs. No calculations provided for reduced slab thickness. (SFB-103C)

(SFB-104C) (SFB-105C)

• Incorrect live loads used for walls, columns, slabs, and beams. Incorrect reactions transferred to columns and walls (SFB-105C) (SFB-103C)

• No calculations available for 4 in. pipe whip impact on 2 ft thick wall

• Walls and equipment loads not included in beam frequency calculations (LIS-511C) 6753C-1634503-B2 C-1

~

I ,

X Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 .

2- t

• Seismic vertical and lateral loads, thermal loade, and t ' torsion not considered in design of slabs, walls, and columns (SFB-10.sC) (SFB-105C)

• Incorrect support condition assumption for Service Water Tunnel (DMI-8C)

.R

'* Incorrect method applied to determine expected maximum floor L displacements (LIS-511C) 1

• Incbrrect method applied to determine the change in frequency for rotation (LIS-503C)

.! B. Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings

\

'* Calculation requires more reinforcement than~ shown on drawings (SAB-122C1) (Dwg 2323-S-0700 through 0786)

• Design input used from drawing which later was voided and no

=

I documentation in the calculations provided that the drawing is voided (SAB-135C) (Dwg 2323-S-0910)

• Inconsistencies between two drawings for missile-resistant

,. R hatch details (Dwg SI-630, SI417) (SSB-121C)

4.

• Inconsistencies)'between calculac%ns and drawing for jib d@4 ~'

crane regarding type of bolts and plate thickness (GIS-104C)

(Dwg 2323-S-1121) bq

• Inconsistencies between calculations and calculation master V index regarding category of structure for stop Bates o'

. , , , service water intake structure (GIS-104C) y&

_ [O.. u C. Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output

. .n :

MN

• Latest loads for steam generator restraints not incorporated k:ijfy into final design calculations i((

• Cross-reference missing in the calculations. No mechanism

, }l exists to assure that member would be re-evaluated for

'.j@G p revised loads (SAB-137C)

QS :,

• Lack of documentation of justification available for pipe b g; g3 O a. ; whip load influence on structural member design Q4 44:

• Lack of documentation (source of inputs) in calculations for

.;jj.]'{ referenced drawing (GIS-104C) (Dwg 2323-S-1120)

VY.

L?-[3 ;y

• References quoted in calculations not retrievable.

& Assumptions and criteria not discussed (SFB-103C) (SFB-104C)  !

x)dy

? 4 (SFB-105C)

'6 Y$g Me l 3

• Lack of justification or documentation provided for the effect of impact load on wall (DSI-12A) 6753C-1634503-B2 C-2

R;vicien: 0 Dsto: 11/20/86

• Lack of justification or documentation provided to demonstrate that walls and ceilings were analyzed for pipe whip loads

'.I D. Calculation Not Consistent with Licensing Commitment

• Lap splice not in compliance with ACI code requirements

,I (Sketch FE-8151) (Dwg. 2323-S-0711 and 0745)

I

• Inconsistency between design calculations and FSAR regarding ,

l wind velocity (SMI-101C) '

• Combination of three directional seismic effect consistent with FSAR not used in design of columns and walls for fuel building (SFB-105C)

E. Inconsistency'in Design and As-Butit Condition

• Horizontal shear ties shown on the design drawing but not I installed in the field (Sketch FE-8181) (Dwg. 2323-51-0608)

(Dwg. 2323-51-0624)

• No. 9 vertical rebar shown on the design drawing but not I installed in the field (Sketch FE-8226) (Dwg. 2323-S-1107, 1108)

I

• No. 5 ties shown on the design drawing but these ties missing in exposed area in the field (Sketch FE-8225) (Dwg.

2323-S-703, 751)

• No. 11 vertical rebars not installed per design drawing (Sketch FE-8137) (Dwg. 2323-S-703, 751)

• No. 10 rebars for Refueling Water Storage Tank as shown on the drawings were not installed. (Dwgs. 2323-SI-318 and 319)

I

• Inconsistency between design and as-built condition for rebar arrangements (SAB-125C1) (NCR-C-1168)

I

• Inconsistency between drawing and as-built condition for air gsp dimensions between buildings.

F. Structural Items Lackir.g Backup Calculations

• Lack of calculations to show the equation used to predict the conservative results for effect of gap condition on seismic response (LIS-503C)

• Lack of design basis calculations for seismic gap width acceptance criteria g e,e3c.1es.,03-e2 c-3

W

,~

'l R; vision: 0 yW. .Date: 11/20/86 1 1.2 There are several E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of other Seismic Category I Structures. These E-DIRs can be categorized as follows:

A. Technical Errors in Calculations

• Dynamic amplification factor inadequately applied for seismic design

• Nonseismic supports such as field run conduit, drywall and lighting supports installed in safety related areas

• Inaccurate use of strength reduction factor in the design of I -

concrete structures U B. g,alculation Not Consistent with Licensing Commicments

,,

• Welding procedures not meeting AWS D1.1 code requirements

• Tornado load used for Fuel Building not per FSAR requirement

• Air , gap not maintained between concrete structures per FSAR requirement C. Structural Items Lacking Backup Calculations

• Nonauthorized cutting of rebars without technical justification 1.3 Issue Specific Action Plans (ISAPs): (Refer to Appendix N Generic a# Technical Concerns for more details)

1. 3 t.1 ISAP II.a - Reinforcing Steel in the Reactor Cavity:

This 'ISAP is addressed in Appendix B: Reactor Containment Concrete Internals 1.3.2 ISAP II.b - Concrete Compressive Strength:

Allegation raised by an individual who claimed that concrete strength tests were falsified L'etween January 1976 and 1 -

. February 1977 for safety-related area; furthermore, a number of other allegations dealing with concrete placement, slump, I- air content test and deficient aggregate grading were identified.

1.3.3 ISAP II.C - Maintenance of Air Gap Between Concrete Structures:

! Air gap between Seismic Category I structures to prevent seismic interaction during an earthquake per FSAR requirements is not maintained. Field investigations indicated unsatisfactory conditions due to the presence of debris in t.he air gap such as wood wedges, rock, rodofoam I e7s3c.1es so3.e2 c..

['5l.

B R; vision: 0

. Date: 11/20/86 etc. In addition, it is not apparent that the permanent installation of rodofoam between the Safeguard Building and the Reactor Containment, and below grade for the other Seismic Category I structures is consistent with seismic I analysis assumption and dynamic models used to analyze the buildings.

1.3.4 ISAP II.d - Seismic Design of Control Room Ceiling Elements:

a I TRT determined that calculations for Seismic Category II components (e.g., lighting fixtures) and for the sloping suspended drywall ceiling did not adequately reflect inter-

.g actions with the nonseismic items, nor were the fundamental g frequencies of the supported masses determined to assess the seismic response. Additionally, TRT could find no evidence that the possible effects of a failure of nonseismic items had been considered.

2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for other Seismic Category I Concrete Structures contain technical errors and inconsistencies when compared to the drawings and do not consistently meet licensing commitments.

I Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.

~3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE 3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), develop design basis I documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly identified and implemented.

3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations end specifi-I cations pertaining to the Other Seisuic Category I Structures for consistency with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated project change documents, i.e., Design Change Authori-zations, DCAs, and Component Modification Cards, CMCs). This review i shall be documented using the following steps:

I 3.2.1 A review procedure will be developed and used to document and ensure uniform and reviews.

complete technical and programmatic 3.2.2 A set of prints of current permanent plant drawings and related uni'ncorporated DCAs, CMCs, any other project change documents and cut rebar drawings will be used to ensure I 3.2.3 complete review of the as-installed condition.

The review for technical adequacy will address calculation hW inputs, assumptions, conclusions.

methodology, accuracy, outputs and Input will be reviewed for applicability, accuracy, and source. Methodology will be reviewed for

I l 6753C-1634503-B2 C-5

Revision: 0 -

Date: 11/20/86 .

~

compliance with licensing commitments and to ensure that it is appropriate for the calculation's objectives. Outputs will be reviewed to confirm that they are reasonable in cons ide ra tic,n of the inputs, methodology, and objective of ,

the calculation. (Note: Any input not deemed final will be marked " Confirmation Required.") '

Additionally, changes to calculations as a result of ERC I

findings will be included.

3.2.4 A calculation index will be developed to provi.de documentation of -

status (e.g., Confirmation Required, Superseded, Supplemented by, Validated, etc).

3.3 Based on the review of documents covered by Section 3.2 the documents I will be sorted into the following categories in order to determine the magnitude of corrective action required.

i

• Valid documents (no additional work required)

• Documents requiring revisions ~

• Confirmatory calculations required  :-

• New documents required (no document presently exists)

=

E 3.4 New documents, or revisions to existing docunents as required will be developed in accordance with the applicable project procedures.

Modifications of existing hardware or addition of new hardware will be -

identified, if required.

3.5 Closeout of calculation input identified under Section 3.2 as requiring confirmation will be by revision to the calculation to identify final -

I source, addition of supporting documentation as calculation attach-ments, and revision of analysis / design as necessary.

4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS 4.1 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Comanche Peak Response Team Program and Issue Specific Action Plans, Revision 3, I 4.2 Februa ry 1986.

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Master Index of Calculation and I Computer Books for Structural Department - Section 11540, Rev. 3 Dated March 21, 1986. Calculations shown below are referenced in TERA DIRs.

y i

E --.,

I i

d-a ~'

I. 6753C-1634503-B2 C-6

Rsvision: 0 Dzte: 11/20/86 l

' 'I Book-Number Set Revision T_itle l

I SAB-122C-1 1 0 SPOST 7 input calculation for standard parameter cards - CB and CP sets.

j 1

SAB-122C-1 2 0 SPOST calculations for beam property carda - beta values.

SAB-122C-1 3 0 SPOST 7 panel beam relation and beam property revisions.

SMI-1030 1 6 Pipe Tunnels SAB-122C-2 4 0 SPOST 2 Input combined loading information.

SFB-103C 1 16 F. B. room ground floor to el 838 ft-9 in.

I SFB-104C 1 10 F. B. from el 83d ft-9 in. to el 860 ft-0 in.

SFB-105C 1 7 F. B. from el 860 ft-0 in. to el 918 ft-0 in.

. SAB-135C 2 0 Cable Spread Room - Unit 1 -

Local stresses (SP-6 type conn.)

I SSB-121C 1 0 Safeguard Bldg el 896 ft-4 in.

Unit 1 & 2 Hatchcovers.

GIS-104C 6 0 S.W.I. Struct SF.P gates l

GIS-104C 7 0 S.W.I. Attachments of i.

cranes and stop gates.

l SAB-137C 12 1 Aux. Bldg Cable Spread room Unit 1 floor baseplates I analysis.

l I SAB-125C1 1 0 Slenderness effect inves-tigation.

I

I lI

,I e7ssc 1634,03-ez c-7

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 Book Number Set Revision Title J SMI-101C 4 0 Gust-factors, R. B., F B., and 3 all bldgs.

SRB-129C 5 0 Unit 1 R. B. pipe whip impact study pipes 4 in. Dia. and under SMI-105C 4 0 Pipe Tunnels-rebar cutting SMI-117C 1 0 Final Load verification Reactor Bldg Unit 1 SMI-117C 2 0 -do-SMI-117C 3 0 Final Load verifications Auxiliary Building 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE R2 SOLUTION ,

1 Project procedures will be developed for use in implementation of the actions discussed in this appendix.

-)

i 1 .

1 1

4 1  !

$ at, 6753C-1634503-B2 C-8 E.

Revision: 0  ;

I Date: 11/20/86 APPENDIX D - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURAL STEEL

1.0 BACKGROUND

1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for Seismic -

Category I Structural Steel with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies. The calculational deficiencies identified 4

i_

B have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs}

issued by TERA. SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Seismic I Category I Structural Steel generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as sammarized below. Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in parentheses ( ).

B (A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations

• Dynamic load factors incorrectly developed (SAB-135C) (SFB-105C)

(SAB-113C)

• Seismic loads incorrectly applied (SAB-136C)

• Raceway support loads not properly transferred to supporting steel I members (SAB-135C)

• Incorrect computer modeling of steel members (SAB-135C)

• Member design inaccuracies (SSB-105C) (SAB-113C) (SAB-136C)

(SAB-137C) (SFB-105C)

• Member to member connection design inaccuracies (SMI-103C)

(SAB-136C) (SAB-137C)

(B) Poor Documentation and dissing Input / Output

• Two different documents with the same I.D. Number (SAB-135C) TiG-

• No correlations between model input and actual geometry (SAB-135C; .

(SAB-137C)

• A calculation revision not t raceable to a source (SAB-135C)

(SAB-137C) ..*;s .. .

(C) Calculation Not Consistent With Licensing Commitments .

• p I

Design according to the 8th edition of AISC instead of 7th Edition as required by FSAR (SAB-137C) p.h] ^f:

• Specification / Code deviations without sufficient technical justi- V4)

I

• fication FSAR load combinations neglected (SAB-135C) (SAB-122C) ($AB-113C)

I'

.l[

.5 (SAB-113C) 3 e, 3D-1e2 ,e>-B2 o-1 ,

. -r

'~

Revision: 0

. Date: 11/20/86 I (D) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings

• By comparison between the drawings revisions and design record B calculation, drawing revisions not addressed in the calculations (SAB-137C)

B

~

1.2 There are no E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of Seismic Category I Structural Steel.

2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for Seismic Cat egory I Struc-I tural Steel contain numerous technical errors, inconsistencies when compared to the drawings, and do not consistently meet licensing commitments. Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these I calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.

3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES

.r-Nv.@g

^

g

'i5 I 3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) develop design basis documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have

'[

((.

been properly identified and implemented.

I 3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifica-tions pretaining to Seismic Category I Structural Steel for consistency ce.

with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated I project change documents, i.e., Design Change Authorizations, DCAs, and Component Modification Cards, CMSs). This review shall be documented . , . ,- . . . .

I p .', .

using the following steps:

• f. -

3.2.1 A review procedure will be developed and used to document and J. P '

ensure uniform and complete technical and programmatic N.[.' g' reviews. .

3.2.2 A set of prints of curren- permanent plant drawings and it(hb ;F.'

I related uninco rpo ra ted DCAs, CMCs, an any other project change documents will be us t i to ensure a complete review of the as-installed condition.

. k Gy

.Erh.c' I 3.2.3 The review for techniu l adequacy will address calculation inputs, assumptions, n.e t.hodo l o gy , accuracy, outputs, and t {pp. ,

('*fg conclusions. Input will be reviewed for applicability, J.M .

I accuracy, and source. Methodology will be reviewed for compliance with licensing commitments and to ensure that it is appropriate for the calculation's objectives. Outputs I

^

will be reviewed to confirm that they are reasonable in consideration of the inputs, methodology, and objective of the calculation. (NOTE: Any input not deeme1 final will be I marked " Confirmation Required.") '

Additionally, changes to calculations as a result of ERC findings will be included.

q V -

B  :  %

I 6753D-1634503-B2 D-2

l R: vision: 0 Dste: 11/20/86 3.2.4 A calculation index will be developed to provide documenta-tion of status (e.g., Confirmation Required, Superseded, Supplemented by, Validated, etc.).

3.3 Based on the review of documents covered by Section 3.2 the documents will be sorted into the following categories in order to determine the magnitude of corrective action required.

I

• Valid Documents (no additional work required)

-* Documents requiring revision

• Confirmatory calculations required

• New documents required (no document presently exists) 3.4 New documents, or revisions to existing documents, as required, will be developed in accordance with the applicable project procedures.

I Modifications of existing hardware or addition of new h'ardware will be identified, if required.

3.5 Closeout of calculation input identified under Section 3.2 as requiring I confirmation will be by revision to the calculation to identify final source, addition of supporting documentation as calculation attach-ments, and revision of analysis / design as necessary.

4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS I Commanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Master Index of Calculation and Computer Books for Structural Department - Section 11540, Rev. 3 dated March 21, 1986. Calculations shown below are referenced in TERA DIRs.

Book Number Set Revision Title SAB-I!JC 3 3 Steel Framing Design el 790 f t.-6 in.

SAB-122C 4 0 SPOST 2 Input

-I Combined Loading Information SAB-135C 1 1 Cable Spreading Room el 807 ft-0 in.

SAB-135C 3 1 Cable Spreading Room Unit No. 1 As-Built Geometry Input I

g e>e3o-1e345es e2 o.3

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86

~ ~

Book Number Set Revision Title l

I

'. SAB-135C 4 2 Cable Spreading Room Unit 1 - Load l

Tabulation el 815 ft- - -

0 in.

SAB-135C 7 1 Auxiliary Building -

Cable Spreading -

Room Unit 1 - As- .

Built Load 7 7,g.

l Tabulation for el  % > . /y.;.

p:m a;; .

5 g',  ;

821 ft-2 in. -. .c -

f, .h-...v... ..;,l.

. '.f ,

SAB-135C 9 1 Auxiliary Building - t,(. < " ",l .

" Cable Spreading i j., ..' ~ .

Room As-Built el  ?/

c' 823 ft-10 in. Loadings ~c.

and Reactions .h. -

SAB-136C 1 1 Auxiliary Building - Yh.

Gc  ;

! Coping of Beams 5$# 'a _.Arn F'.: A h. 'u  :-

SAB-136C 5 1 Auxiliary Building '.;

c - C -3 Cable Spreading 'J4:f, f ty..-

Room: Secondary '. (J C. f. h Beam Coped el 4 3 j'..y' 821 ft-2 in. Unit 1 i -

%7 '.. g SAB-137C 1 0 Cable Spreading Room:

As-Built $'*.s., O.

• h.,0%Ml j Verification .{y? gg : .

Program Capacities fi. T[y

. , I SAB-137C 21 0 Auxiliary Building Q[O i ,e . '..1,  ; d'y Cable Spreading Room /,.O.if i.'i...

As-Built Connection Mt..l',1x .T'. #- I.

and Member Evalua- ' y : W".: '

Pr.w A-L tion supereiement 40

q

.: , 7 7. c-- ...,

.w .

r SFB-10$C 1 7 Fuel Building from 'Th' .h ^h,li . .1 ". '

I el 860 ft to el  :.% i .<!;.

918 ft h U.[ f

.WSf$ ,.

SMI-103C 1 6 Pipe Tunnels fAp 5 L A A:- %: -'yf, SMI-110C 1 7 Stair No. C-1 In the b}.y^J.' D. ';+"

Containment Building ff .M M

f. . C,..f. ,- . ~., ..

.e ih *'

.,.s.

-s ,Y

. y* ','

. ; ._ i 41 *[

hi "$l:

L.s . 9 g ;. -,.

~-

6753D-1C34503-B2 D-4

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 Book Number Set Revision Title SRB-111C 6 0 Reactor Building B Internal Structure -

Checking. Bolted Connections for Prying Action B

SRB-117C 2 1 Platforms el 813 ft-I O in. and el 822 ft-9 in.

~~'

5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION Project procedures will be developed for use in implementation of the jg actions discussed in this appendix.

I g I

I I

I f

I I

i I (s

e i a {

,~

.. a g e, 3o.1es e>.s2 0

Revision: 0 -

Date: 11/20/86 APPENDIX E - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - PIPE RUPTURE RESTRAINTS AND JET IMPINGEMENT SHIELDS -

1.0 BACKGROUND

cm

[ 1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for the pipe rupture protection hardware with the intent of identifying any calcu- ..

, lational deficiencies. The calculational deficiencies identified -

"_ have been documented in the. D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs}

issued by TERA. SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Pipe Rupture Restraints and Jet Impingement Shields generic issue and has j

~-

formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized below. Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in parentheses ( ). .

= (A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations

• Incorrect modeling assumptions used in analyzing the baseplate j anchor bolts. (SRB-125C) (126C, 129C)

• Not all load combinations addressed. (SRB-129C) (SSB-128C)

R

• Omission of the potential governing pipe break case in the design of the restraint

• Confirmation / justification of dynamic load factor is required.

(SRB-125C) ..

=

• The weld analysis was not included. (SRB-148C)

• No evaluation in calculations to cover time-histo ry of loads and 4,g '.j i separation of two load cases. (SRB-125C) i g [v .M1 ,f x e.. ,

• Incorrect stress allowables were used. (SRB-157C) (^.hp j. 2 " ,

_ .:' '.4 .4 5

• Nonconservative design load (SRB-129C)

U.

r '. r'.O

+ . ,.

a

• Inadequate justification of dynamic amplification factor. 3I"[qr..[ . [

= (SAB-134C) N..^

blf l '<" -

• Inadequate analysis of base plate (SRB-157C) d$34

[ ,'

~

q ,w . w

• Inadequate load application (SRB-3C2) g .. s .

g ";g.

3

• Apparent lack of justification for unconservative modeling q X,f -

=

assumptions. (SSB-134C) g? M G.:y-, r.

ysi g

• Overly conservative design loads. (SRB-134C) g. g .

5 '

(B) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings

• Calculations were not revised when baseplate details were changed.

(SSB-119C) 6753E-1634503-B2 E-1

F Rsvision: 0 Date:

11/20/86 I I

• Calculation design sketches show different dimensions than the drawings. (SRB-111C)

• The drawing shows smaller bolt size than what was designed.

(SRB 125C) 1 l

• A discrepancy between the design and as-built bumper dimensions exists. (SRB-130C)

(C) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output

• Lack of calculations for the steam generator side of restraint.

The RCP side is designed for PSAR and preliminary WNES criteria

.I' WPT-797. Calculations do not include coverage of anchor bolt design. (SRB-111C)

• Lack of justification is offered as to whether the items reviewed for the steam generator inlet restraint are the critical components. (SRB-115C)

I

• Memo with the pipe rupture restraint calculation differs from as-designed and drawings. (SSB-128C)

W

• Lack of input reference for the loads on restraint. (SRB-133C)

• Pages are missing from the calculation. (SRB-133C)

• Assumptions were not stated and/or justified. (SRB-133C)

• The bolting material is not identified in FSAR. (SRB-133C)

• The source a'nd the basis for the design input was not identified.

(SRB-3C2)

~

Omission'of design calculation.

~

• (SRB-148)

(D) Calculation Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments

• Violation of prequalified weld requirements. (SRB-119C)

I

• Incorrect allowables used. (SRB-129C) (SRB-111C)

• Material selection violates FSAR requirements. (SAB-134C) 2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for the high energy pipe break and jet impingement damage evaluation contain technical errors and inconsistencies, and do not consistently meet licensing commitments. Design j inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these I calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.

I

I e,s3s-1e345e3 B2 s-2

, Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 --

3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES .

3.1 Using the Final Safety Aralysis Report (FSAR) develop design basis

documents (design criteria to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly identified and implemented.

3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifi-cations pertaining to pipe rupture protection hardware for consistency with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated

project change documents, i.e., Design Change Authorizations, DCAs, and ma-

= Component Modification Cards, CMCs).

using the following steps.

This review shall be documented ]

3.2.1 A review procedure will be developed and used to document and ensure uniform and complete technical a r.d programmatic reviews. . . . . O g

-y .%p p[h 3.2.2 A set of prints of current permanent plant drawines and j g- p.

related unincorporated DCAs, CMCs, and .i ny other project change documents will be used to ensure complete review of the as-installed condition. .

.p -g ,:._! .

3.2.3 The review for technical adequacy ;11 address calculation 5 inputs, assumptions, methodology, accuracy, outputs and ,$)$<.[ g J.0 4-conclusions. Input will be reviewed for applicability, -f4 accuracy, and source. Methodology will be reviewed for $M.

compliance with licensing commitments and to ensure that it Q.y.:] ,

is appropriate for the calculation's objectives. Outputs g'!M f' y? %

will be reviewed to cor#irm that they are reasonable in

= consideration of the inputs, methodolcgy, and objective of U9 the calculation. (NOTE: Any input not deemed final will be -

marked " Confirmation Required.") ydn ' c J% ^ ~

i

.:e. -

Additionally, changes to calculations as a result of ERC findings will be included. g"r.4 i.s n

i 3.2.4 A calculation index will be developed to provide documenta- g.I;f[> .; '

tien of status (e.g., Confirmation Required, Superseded, yg ._ [,y.j Supplemented by, Validated, etc).

-l@.':.l 6 3.3 Based on the review of documents covered by Section 3.2 the documents 4,5j7 , + ,

will be sorted into the following categories in order to determine the MM magnitude of corrective action required. J{;

iid.l?

f$

g: M y < , . ;-

.:-q? q-2 ^

e iM

, % ":] ,

l W4

_-  ?

3 -

.. .w. ./.

$b.

;Y'

=

6753E-1634503-B2 E-3 .

N.h

. I.

l 1

R: vision: 0 D:te: 11/20/86 l I

l

• - Valid Documents (no additional work required)

~

• Documents requiring revisions

• Confirmatory calculations required.

• New documents required. (No document presently exists)

I 3.4 New documents, or revisions to existing documents as required will be developed ia accordance with the applicable project procedures.

Modifications of existing hardware or addition of new hardware will be identified, if required.

3.5 Closeout of calculation input identified under Section 3.2 as requiring confirmation shall be by. revision to the calculation to identify final I source, addition of supporting documentation attachments, and revision of analysis / design as necessary.

as calculation 4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS 4.1 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Comanche Peak Resporse Team Program and Issue Specific Action Plans, Revision 3, February 1986.

4.2 Comanche Peak Steam ' Electric Station - Master Index of Calculation and

-g Computer Books for Structural Department - Section 11540, Rev. 3, dated

3. March 21 1986. Calculations shown below are referenced in TERA DIRs.

Book Number Set Revision Title SAB-134C 2 6 Auxiliary Building PWR No. SB-1-60-903-D37W I _.

and Jet Shield Supporting Structure SRB-111C 1 4 Cross Over Leg Support SRB-115C 3 0 Reactor Building No. 1-I Shield Wall Restraint (Against WE Final Load)

SRB-125C 1 10 R.B. Int. Struct. -

Pipe Whip Restraints 32"

' MSI-001-908; 004-908 and 909; 002-910 to 914; 003-910 to 914 lI

!g i

6753E-1634503-B2 E-4

Revision: 0 Date- 11/20/86 W Book Number Set Revision Title

.g-SRB-125C 2 8 R.B. Int. Struct. -

B Pipe Whip Restraints 001-907; 002-902 to 905; . - -

I 003-902 to 905; 004-902, 906, 907, 911 SRB-126C 3 8 R.B. Int. Struct. -

.I- -

Pipe Whip Restraints CS-1-127-903-C47W and CS-1-118-902-C47W 2

SRB-129C 3 4 R.B. Int. Struct. -

Pipe Whipe Restraints

.g S1-1-103-901-C47W, g RC-1-007-901-C47W, CS-1-235-905-C47W I SRB-130C 1 4 R.B. Int. Struct. -

Pipe Whip Retraints S1-1-091-902-C47W, g S1-1-106-901-C47W, 5 S1-1-092-902-C47W, S1-1-090-092-C47W SRB-133C 2 TUSI-Pipe Whip Restraints 9

FW-1-017-909-C47W, FW-1-017-910-C47W, I FW-1-017-912-C47W, FW-1-017-911-C47W I SRB-134C 1 8 TUSI-Pipe Whip Restraints FW-1-019-902-C57W, FW-1-018-902-C57W, g FW-!-017-901-C57W, g FW-1-018-901-C57W SRB-148C 2 10 Reactor Building No. 1, PWR RC1-135-902-C47W SRB-157C 4 0 No. 1 Reactor Building

-la Structure Modification for Jet Shields SM-4A-02 I SRB-157C 24 1 R.B. No. 1 Supporting Structure for Jet Shield JS-1A-28 SRB-157C 26 0 Jet Protection Structure for JS-7B-32 and 33 I e753s-1e345e3-e2 s-5

Revision: 0

~I- Date: 11/20/86 ,

= Book Number Set Revision Title SSB-119C 1 1 S.B. No. 1 PWR

.I FW1-13, 14, 15 and 16-904-S57W SSB-128C 4 2 S.B. No. 2 PWR AF-2-29-901-S37W

'~

I Supporting Structure l Design SSB-134C 1 1 S.B. No. 1 Jet Protection Structure for JS-100A-04 SRB-3C2 -

0 Reactor Building Containment - Static

'I Analysis

)

1 l

5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION I Project procedures will be developed for use in implementation of the actions discussed in this appendix.

I I

I I

.I l

l I

I e753s-le34 03-e2 s-e

l' Revision: 0 m Date: 11/20/86 APPENDIX F - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - REACTOR CONTAINMENT LINER

1.0 BACKGROUND

1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for the Reactor Containment Liner with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies. The calculation deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs} issued by TERA. SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Reactor Containment I Liner generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized below. Calculations associated with the issued are denoted in parentheses ( ).

(A) Technical Deficiencies In Calculations

• Liner design does not comply with ACI 359/CC 3700 (SRB-105C1)

I

• Analysis / design of liner anchorage to base mat was not considered (SRB-105C1)

• The P-a (load-deflection) characteristics of the liner stud was not properly modeled for in the analysis (SRB-105C1)

• Liner attachment analysis does not properly address inter-action between the concrete and the attachment to the liner including studs (SRB-113C)

(B) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings I

• Liner attachment design calculation does not qualify all design configurations shown on the drawing (SRB-113C)

(C) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output

• Liner attachment design loads are not traceable to their source (SRB-113C)

(D) Calculation Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments

• Not all FSAR load combinations are considered (SRB-113C)

(SRB-169C)

I 1.2 There is one {1} E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of the containment liner plate attachments.

2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for the Reactor Contain-ment Liner contain technical errors, inconsistencies when compared to I the drawings and does not consistently meet licensing commitments.

Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer modeling techniques for these calculations are inadequately documented.

6753F-1634503-B2 F-1 l

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 _4 a

3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES 3.1 D Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), develop design basis E

j documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have 3; been properly identified and implemented. 55 "E g L 3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifi- g cations pertaining to the Reactor Containment Liner for consistency g with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated ,

project change documents, i.e., Design Change Authorization, DCAs, and f

{

- Component Modification Cards, CMCs). This review shall be documented e .

p using the following steps:

-R

~.

( 3.2.1 A review procedure will be developed and used to document and programmatic k

{

r ensure reviews.

uniform and complete technical and _-

g m.

a g 3.2.2 A set of prints of current permanent plant drawings and related _-

@ unincorporated DCAs, CMCs, and any other project change -

iii documents will be used to ensure a complete review of the kc= I as-installed condition.

P" 3.2.3 The review for technical adequacy will address calculation _a h

[ inputs, assumptions, methodology, accuracy, outputs, and con- g_

! clusions. Input will be reviewed for applicability, accuracy, 31

[ and source. Methodology will be reviewed for compliance with 3 M

licensing commitments and to ensure that it is appropriate for 7 the calculation's objectives. Outputs will be reviewed to g w confirm that they are reasonable in consideration of the inputs, m 7

I methodology, and objective of the calculation. (NOTE:

input not deemed final will be marked " Confirmation Required.")

Any SR .

J

_=F f Additionally, changes to calculations as a result of ERC h y findings will be included. {

E __.

3.2.4 A calculation index will be developed to provide documentation d of status (e.g., Confirmation Required, Superseded, Supplemented 1 E

E

=

by, Validated, etc). 3 w =

p l 3.3 Based on the review of documents covered by Section 3.2 the documents $

{ W will be sorted into the following categories in order tc determine the g g magnitude of corrective action required. g E g M b

m g 3

-y w , e E

l 3 a

e N a

4 g-)

e 7 sqik

=

? 6753F-1634503-B2 F-2 -

a E .

eM

Rsvision: 0 D:te: 11/20/86 l'

• Valid Documents (no additional work required)

• Documents requiring revisions

• Confirmatory calculations required

• New documents required (no document presently exists) 3.4 New documents, or revisions to existing documents, as required, will be developed in .accordance with the applicable project procedures.

Modifications of existing hardware or addition of new hardware will be identified, if required.

3.5 Closeout of calculatiou input identified under Section 3.2 as requiring confirmation will be by revision to the calculation to identify final source, addition of supporting documentation as calculation attach-menta, and revision of analysis / design as necessary.

4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Master Index of Calculation and Computer Books for Structural Department - Section 11540, Rev. 3 dated

. March 21, 1986. Calculations shown below are referenced in TERA DIRs.

Book Number Set Revision Title LIS-104C 1 0 Title Unknown SRB-105C 1 1 Containment Liner Anchors SRB-113C 4 1 Reactor Building Containment Pipe Supports on Liner Plates (DCA-17547, R1 of Set 4)

SRB-113C 8 0 As-Built Attachments to Containment Liner I SRB-113C 9 3 Reactor Building No. 1 - Attachments to Containment Liner As-Built General Review SRB-113C 10 0 Attachments to Con-tainment Liner -

Computer Analysis of Liner Plate I .

6753F-1634503-B2 F-3

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 Book Number Set Revision Title SRB-113C 11 0 Reactor Building No. 1 - Attachments to Containment I

Liner - Details 4 and 6 (As-Built)

SRB-169C 1 1 Unit 2 - Containment Liner for Equipment Hatch 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION Project procedures will be developed for use in implementation of the I actions discussed in this appendix.

L ll ll i

l I

l l

l ll 6753F-1634503-B2 F-4 1

i

0

.I R: vision:

Date: 11/20/86

' APPENDIX G - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - FUEL TRANSFER TUBE SUPPORT AND OTHER LINERS

1.0 BACKGROUND

.l 1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for the Fuel Transfer Tube Support, Refueling Cavity Liner, and Fuel Pool Liner designs with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies. The calculational deficiencies identified have been

. documented in the D-type Discrepency Issue Reports {D-DIRs} issued by TERA. SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRS related to the Fuel Transfer Tube Support and Other Liners generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized below. Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in parentheses ( ).

(A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations

• The assessment of liner plate and anchor loads was incomplete; only operating thermal loads were considered.

~

Liner seam offsets and welds were not addressed. (SRB-105C1)

• Differential thermal displacement between the liner components and building structure was not considered.

(SFB-106C)

• The one-dimensional analysis used disregards the total stud load from the orthogonal direction. (SRB-105C1)

• Potential thermal expansion and connection details for the new fuel elevator support embedment plate were not addresaed. (SFB-106C)

• Differential thermal displacement between liner J components and building structure was not considered.

(SFB-106C)

• Variation of stud spacing at periphery of pipe penetration through liner not considered. (SFB-106C)

• Analysis of the Fuel Pool lift gate bracket involves conceptual and equilibrium errors and incorrect interpretation of hand book data for stud design.

(SFB-106C)

I

• Incomplete and potentially improper assessment of discontinuity stresses and strains. (SFB-106C)

• Anchor bolt design calculations did not consider the combined effect of anchor bolt shear and tension.

(SFB-106C) l 6753G-1634503-B2 G-1

l R: vision: 0

.i. B. .

Dzte: 11/20/86

• The Spent Fuel Pool calculations do not consider pool water sloshing effects under seismic events. (SFB-103C)

{

• The Spent Fuel Pool calculations do not perform a complete analysis for the thermal load case. Axial forces and shear forces are not calculated, and the I analysis temperature does not address increase loads due to average through the wall thickness.

(SFB-103C)

(B) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output l'

• Deficiencies sources.

in (SFB-106C) the identification of input data

• Details such as bolted connections, and full penetration I vs fillet welds are inconsistent between drawing and calculation. (SFB-106C)

(C) Calculation Not Consistent With Licensing Commitments

• The stress-strain criteria used in the liner plate design was not identified. (SRB-105C1) 2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES The calculations which form the design basis for the refueling cavity liner, the fuel pool liner and the fuel transfer tube support contain technical errors and inconsistencies, and do not consistently meet licensing commit-ments. Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.

3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES

.I.

3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), develop new or review and modify as necessary, existing design basis documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly identified and implemented.

I 3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifica-tions pertaining to the Fuel Transfer Tube Support, Fuel Pool Liner and Refueling Cavity Liner for consistency with the design basis documents l and drawings (including unincorporated project change documents, i.e.,

E Design Change Authorizations, DCAs, and Component Modification Cards, CMCs). This review shall be documented using the following steps:

3.2.1 A review procedure will be developed and used to document and ensure uniform and complete technical and programmatic reviews.

I 3.2.2 A set of prints of current permanent plant drawings and related unincorporated DCAs, CMCs, and any other project i E5 change documents will be used to ensure complete reviews of the as-installed condition.

6753G-1634503-B2 G-2

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 3.2.3 The review for technical adequacy will address calculation inputs, assumptions, methodology, accuracy, outputs and conclusions. Input will be reviewed for applicability, accuracy, and source. Methodology will be reviewed for compliance with licensing commitments and to ensure that it is appropriate for the calculation's objectives. Outputs will be reviewed to confirm that they are ceasonable in consideration of the inputs, methodology, and objective of the calculation. (NOTE: Any input not deemed final will be marked ' Confirmation Required.")

Additionally, changes to calculations as a result of ERC

~

findings will be included.

3.2.4 A calculation index will be developed to provide documenta-tion of status (e.g., Cenfirmation Required, Superseded, Supplemented by, Validated, etc).

3.3 Based on the review of documents covered by Section 3.2 the documents will be sorted into the following categories in order to determine the magnitude of corrective action required.

• Valid documents (no additional work required)

• Documents requiring revisions

• Confirmatory calculations required

• New documents required (no document presently exists) 3.4 New documents, or revisions to existing documents as required will be

-: developed in accordance with the applicable project procedures.

Modifications of existing hardware or addition of new hardware will be identified, if required.

3.5 Closeout of calculation input identified under Section 3.2 as requiring confi rmation shall be by revision to the calculation to identify final source, addition of supporting documentation as calculation attach-ments, and revision of analysis / design as necessary.

4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS 4.1 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Comanche Peak Response Team Program and Issue Specific Action Plans, Revision 3, February 1986 4.2 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Master Index of Catculation and .

Computer Books for Structural Department - Section 11540, Rev. 3, dated March 21, 1986. Calculations shown below are referenced in TERA DIRs.

En EW - -

g Eh a4 6753G-1634503-B2 G-3

..]

l 7"E

3 Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86

=

_E t' Book No. Set Revision Title - -

1-- SFB-103C 1 16 Fuel Building from Ground j Floor to el 838 ft-9 in.

SFB-106 1 16 Fuel Building Spent Fuel

= Liner, Undervater Light- . .

ing Support Monorail at ' -

__ el 880 ft-0 in. and -

2; el 818 ft-6 in.

--- Platforms Chilled Water

= SRB-105C1 2 14 Refueling Cavity Liner

~

O 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION .

1 ..

Project procedures will be developed for use in implementa.4 on of the actions discussed in this appendix.

1 .. .

y

. .+

=

, c ,, .F . ,,

Id [;;t _*.

,' .' $ . 'h/-[

,.n M '. ')

f,,h, .{,'

....' .'k,y{

"g 1

. e

(.. , . 3. , ...,.

4 9_ ,T 'i kl. .

Q _-__-'

sl'.s l'.}= q w,

, . - .;. e ? ,

'"r I

?l::;f p* . . , ,

p- '

6;' ,,

g -

=

• r N

si b..c....-' ?. n ,

^-

46. '.g

=

7{ . .. 'Jf I [(dh.

. . E' ) .

.A. .

.?, .

3 MlQ/lb, P m

~ .

=

2

$m{; e

,443 l' l 6753G-1634503-B2 G-4

T Rtvision: 0 D ted: 11/20/86 APPENDIX H - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - MISCELLANEOUS SUPPORTS (EQUIPMENT)

1.0 BACKGROUND

1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for Miscellaneous Supports (equipments) such as polar crane girder supports, monorail I.

supports, battery racks , pump supports, fuel gate storage brackets etc with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies.

calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the The D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs} issued by TERA. SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Miscellaneous Supports (Equipment) generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summerized below. Calculations asso-I ciated with the issues are denoted in parentheses ( ).

(A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations

• Modeling error and unjustified assumptions for polar crane runway support design. (SRB-109C)

• For elastic design approach, plastic section modulus used in design. (SRB-109C)

• Amplification factors omitted without technical justification for seismic design of equipment supports. (SSB-112C)

• Mathematical error in calculation for frequency of support system (DMI-1C)

• Prying action on baseplate and eccentricity of attachment to anchors not considered. Unit error in calculations.

(SRB-119C)

• Model used for analysis does not consider frame action in two orthogonal directions. (SRB-119C)

• Vertical seismic component and horizontal load of monorail omitted without justification for monorail supports.

(SRB-119C)

• Dynamic amplification factor of 1.0 used in the analysis for monorail supports in Reactor Building and Safeguard Building without technical justification. (SRB-109C) (SSB-105B)

• All loads and local combinations for polar crane were not I

fully addressed and justified. Critical load position of crane was not investigated. (SRB-109C)

• Incorrect dimension used for models. Models for plant I elements and bolts do not consider all loads and load directions. (SRB-109C)

I

• Mathematical error found in plate design; this results in the answers being incorrect. (SRB-109C) '

6753H-1634503-B2 H-1

h R:visien: 0 Dated: 11/20/86 5

g

• Overlapping shear cones not considered. Edge distance criteria for anchor stud not correctly used. (SFB-106C)

• Error made in determining proper units of mass. (SSB-105C)

• Distribution of wheel loads assumption for crane rails not justified. (SRB-109C)

• Critical load combinations not considered in design for

lW- service / circulating water intake structure stop gate.

(GIS-104C)

• Eccentricity effects of lateral loads and frictional effect I not considered in monorail supports design. (GIS-104C)

• Potential thermal expansion and connection details not I

considered for new fuel elevator support embedment plate design. (SFB-106C)

I

• Operating reactions for attached piping not considered for pump supports.

seismic loads.

Pipe break reactions not considered with (SSB-112C)

• Iricorrect moment' calculated for design of floor plate.

(SSB-1342)

• Fluid weight of pump not included as dead load for equipment support design. Weights of equipment differs from the vendor's equipment qualification report. (SSB-112C)

(B) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output

'g

• Source of acceleration assumed for the design not identified.

g Source for reactions at support points for rotating crane not referenced. (SRB-3C2)

• Poor documentation between polar crane vendor loads and design loads used in calculations. (SRB-109C)

I

• Apparent lack of documentation of source of design input for polar crane such as accelerations, load combinations, bracket loads. Lack of justification for asstcupti- . on polar crane I wheel geometry and loads. Prelimirary data pot confirmed later with vendor input. (SRB-3C1)

• Apparent lack of reference to basic design code. Lacking i

I explanations of design approach and judgement used in the calculations. (SRB-109C) ll lW Design calculations marked as not safety related while master index identified this calculations as safety related.

(SRB-119C) lI 6753H-1634503-B2 H-2

7 - - - -

R:.vicion: 0 Dated: '11/20/86 (C) Calculations Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments I e Vendor interface ' drawing does not include the effect of payload. FSAR requires that SSE plus payload be addressed.

(Load Drawing 7523-CL-1)

• Frame angles not designed per AISC requirements. Incorrect use of K value. Per ACI 349 criteria a capacity reduction I

factor of two not used for single expansion anchor. Edge distance violated for bolt hole in baseplate design.

(SRB-119C)

- * . Deformation approach and acceptance criteria used for polar crane support design not consistent with Section 3.8.1.

Incorrect theory used in calculating the deformation.

(SRB-109C)

• Incorrect allowable bending stress used for steel member (GIS-104C)

-I

• Three directional effects of seismic loads not considered per FSAR section 3.7B.2.6 requirements for equipment support design. (SSB-112C)

• In elastic analysis, plastic section modulus used for design of baseplate which is not in compliance with FSAR Section I_ 3.8.4.3.3.

I

• For battery racks support design, two directions of seismic

! input were used wich is not in compliance with FSAR.

(SAB-113C)

(D) Structural Items Lacking Backup Calculations

• No design calculations available for the design of the sole plate bolts of the polar crane runway girder supports.

I (SRB-109C)

I

• Analysis for mounting plate, nut, and bolt not included in ,

calculations. (DMI-1C)

• Allowable weld stress and local bending not calculated.

I Torsional effects omitted in design of monorail supports in Reactor Building. (SRB-109C)

I

• Concrete pullout and shear capacity for anchor bolt not calculated. Shear concrete edge distance not checked for anchor bolt capacity.

i

• Prying action and bending in connection, and construction eccentricity not considered in design.

• Plate flexibility not considered in design of plate.

l l 6753H-1634503-B2 H-3

Revision: 0 Dated: 11/20/86 I

• Connection design ignored without technical justification.

Design, section modulus and stresses of weld not calculated.

(SAB-113C)

• Lack of calculations for pullout capacity of anchors, embedded plates design, weld stresses, slotted holes for 8- thermal and local deflections. (SRB-109C) in fit-up of critical items not I

• Effect of tolerances addressed in the calculations. (SRB-109C)

.

• Lack of rational design calculations to document the design, fabricatiun, and installation of polar crane.

• no calculations available for allowable weld, stiffeners, lifting lugs, monorail stop angles, and splice plate con-

-B nect.iong - (GIS-102C)

-i._

94 . 1.2 There are E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of polar crane runway supports and HVAC supports qualifications.

=

1.3 Issue Specific Action Plan - ISAP VII.b.4 - Hilti bolt instruction ISAP is addressed in Appendix N " Generic Technical Concerns."

2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE I '

s The calculations which form the design basis for the Miscellaneous Supports (equipment) contain technical errors and inconsistencies when compared to the drawings and do not consistently meet licensing com-mitments. Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.

I 3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES 4

3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), develop design basis I documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly identified and implemented.

3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifi-cations pertaining to the Miscellaneous Supports for consistency with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated I proj ect change documents, Component Modification Cards, CMCs).

using the following steps:

i.e., Design Change Authorization, DCAs, and This review shall be documented

-I

..L I 6753H-1634503-B2 H-4

W R: vision: 0 Dated: 11/20/86 I 3.2.1 A review procedure will be developed and used to document and ensure uniform and complete technical and programmatic reviews.

3.2.2 A set of print.s of current permanent plant drawings and related unincorporated DCAs, CMCs, any other project change I control documents and cut rebar drawings will be used to ensure complete review of the as installed condition.

3.2.3 The reriew for technical adequacy will address calculation inputs, assumptions methodology, accuracy, outputs and conclusions. Input will be reviewed fnr applieshility, accuracy, and source. Methodology will be reviewed for

.I compliance with licensing commitments and to ensure that it is appropriate for the calculation's objectives. Outputs I will be reviewed to confirm that they are reasonable in webeu .on of the inputs, methodology, and objective of the calculation.- (NOTE: Any input not deemed final will be markea " Confirmation Required.")

Additionally, changes to calculations as a result of ERC findings will be included.

3.2.4 A calculation index will be developed to provide documenta-tion of status (e.g., Confirmation Required, Superseded, Supplemented by, Validated, etc).

3.3 Based on the review of documents covered by Section 3.2, the documents I will be sorted into the following categories in order to determine the magnitude,of corrective action required.

• Valid Documents (no additional work required)

• Documents requring revisions

• Confirmatory calculations required

• New documents required (no document presently exists) i 3.4 New documents or revisions to existing documents as required will be developed in accordance with the applicable proj ect procedures.

Modifications of existing hardware or addition of new hardware will be

-I identified, if required.

3.5 Closeout of calculation input identified under Section 3.2 as requiring I confirmation shall be by revision to the calculation to identify final source, addition of supporting documentation as calculation attach-ments, and revision of analysis / design as necessary.

I .

I 6753H-1634503-B2 H-5

R: vision: 0 Dated: 11/20/86

'I 4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS i-Wl -

4.1 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Comanche Peak Response Team Program and. Issue Specific Action Plans, Revision 3, February 1986 f 4.2 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Master Index of calculation and computer books for Structural Department - Section 11540, Rev. 3 dated March 21, 1986. Calculations shown below are referenced in TERA DIRs.

Book Number Set Revision Title SRB-109C 3 6 Reactor Building Polar Crane Dets.

SSB-112C 1 31 Equipment Foundations Safe-guards Building DMI-1C 2 4 Local Mountingr for Category I Instruments - Seismic Calcula-tions SRB-119C 7 0 Reactor Building - Internal -

Structure - el 860 ft-0 in.

I Support Frame for Neoweld Power Supply Units SAB-113C 3 3 Steel Framing Design el'790 ft-I 6 in.

Containment Building-Fuel SRB-109C 5 7 Handling Bridge Crane Supports SFB-106C 1 16 Fuel Building - Spent

g Liner Under Water Lighting g Support SSB-105C 3 22 Safeguard Building Monorails SSB-105C 6 1 Safeguard Building No. 1 Monorail at el 864 ft-6 in.

GIS-104C 6 0 Service Water Intaka Struc-ture Gates I SRB-119C 7 0 Reactor Building - Internal Structure. el 860 ft-0 in.

Support Frame for Neoweld i

I Power Supply Unit I .

I S

6753H-1634503-B2 ,

H-6

k

-g. 2 B Revision: 0 =j Dated: 11/20/86 5 I. Book Number Set Revision Title -

SRB-109C 7 0 Fuel Handling Bridge Crane and b Auxiliary Upper Crane - Anchor --

Bolts Test Load I SRB-109C 6 3 Containment Building-Aux Upper j Crane Supports 4

B SAB-113C 4 0 Battery Rack Supports j^'

GIS-102C 4 0 Service Water Intake Struc-ture - Stop Logs -(

SRB-147C 2 6 Reactor Building - Platform Access to Reactor Contain-l -

8 ment Pump No. 1 ] '

SSB-111C 1 2 Safeguard Building - Walls 3 8 el 773 ft and el 790' ft-6 in. 4 E-5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION Project procedures will be developed for use in implementation of the -

3 actions discussed in this appendix. j I e 2

J

. -s B  :

3 g a 8 ll 3

e g 3 E a 6753H-1634503-B2 H-7 .

.5

E R: vision: 0 Dated: 11/20/86  !

W APPENDIX'I - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - PENETRATION SLEEVES AND ANCHORAGE

1.0 BACKGROUND

.g 1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for the Reactor g Containment Panetration Sleeves and Anchorage with the intent of identifying ~ any calculational deficiencies. The calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reprots {D-DIRs} issued by TERA. SkEC has reviewed the D-DIRs 1 I- related to the Penetration Sleeves' and Achorage generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the

p' issues, as summarized below. Calculations associated with the issues M are denoted in parentheses ( ).

rm (A) Technical IMfic'~z mps in Calculations

• Peaetration at equipsim uc6ch not evaluated for concretc deformations or mechanical loads (SRB-169C)

I

• Penetration sleeve anchorage design assumes a uniform bearing stress distribution for shear and moment loads, this assump-tion needs justification (SRB-108C) (SRB-169C)

• Design calculation does not adequately address all penetra-tion design considerations (SRB-108C) (SRB-161C)

.I

• Element stress gradients were used rather than element strains to design liner anchorage at equipment hatch (SRB-1690)

(B) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings

• Lug material specified in calculation does not agree with material specified in as-fabricated documentation (SRB-108C)

(C) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output

• Calculation for heat transfer analysis of penetration (s)

I I lacks originator and reviewer signatures, sources of design input, and acceptance criteria

• Requirements for welding and treatment of stainless steel

' W l material not consistent for Types II, III, and IV penetra-L*ons

• Specification does not list cyclic loads or any load criteria for' penetration design

• No code class shown on vendor drawing ,

I I e,s31 1es.,es-e2 1-1

-l Revision: 0 B D2ted: 11/20/86 )

l I

l (D) Calculation Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments

• Stres= li=its listed in Penetration specification do not E agree with FSAR requirements 3

I Specified design temperature for penetration design is less than FSAR commitment

• Impact test temperature specified in penetration specifica-tion does not agree with ASME Code requirement

• Penetration anchorage allowables do not agree with FSAR commitments (SRB-108C)

(E) Structural Items Lacking Backup Calculations

• No calculation for liner end anchorage weld to equipment hatch S m ci O!A 169C)

I 1.2 There are no E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of penetration sleeves and anchorages.

I 2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for penetration sleeves and anchorage design contain numerous technical errors, inconsistencies I_ . when compared to the drawings , and do not consistently meet licensing commitments. Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.

3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES

- 3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), develop design basis documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have

- been properly identified and implemented.

3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifi-cations pertaining to the Reactor Containment's Penetration Sleeves and Anchorage for consistency with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated project change documents, i.e., Design Change Authorization, DCAs, and Component Modification Cards, CMCs). This review shall be documented using the following, steps:

I .

I I 6753I-1634503-B2 I-2

' ~

e.; K ec . ;g

• W

[..a-l g Revision: 0 _

~

i.' Dated: 11/20/86

..J.: t

.:[

y7 =~ 3.2.1 A review procedure will be developed and used to document and

.; '; , ensure uniform and complete technical and programmatic

.i.

. _.j . -,

~

reviews.

p Yd: . -

icj '. ~ 3.2.2 A set of prints of current permanent plant drawings and E

J I.; 'g related unincorporated DCAs, CMCs, and any other proj ect b

] '.f (, ; ". g change documents and appropriate cut rebar drawings, will be E

. f l.' .' used to ensure a complete review of the as-installed E

.: .; E c condition.

?:;y- ' l"~

?,;M. - 3.2.3 The review for technical adequacy will address calculation E

.fifcJ inputs, assumptions, methodology, accuracy, outputs, and E

' K.1 g conclusions. Input will be reviewed for applicability,

{

. ; .. . ' 5- accuracy, and source. Methodology will be reviewed for

$, L .- compliance with licensing commitments and to ensure that it 5

[k9 3 is appropriate for the calculation's objectives. Outputs -

f. "v: .

g will be reviewed to confirm that they are reasonable in =

' N. / consideration of the inputs, methodology, and objective of l Mi the calculation. (NOTE: Any input not deemed final will be ,

i';.h. ] marked " Confirmation Required.")

. e.;. .

c

. ,k 9.',

Additionally, changes to calculations as a result of ERC -

M,. y.if. findings will be included. _

. .v. .

JN!Q 3.2.4 A calculation index will be developed to provide documenta- h d# :. -g tion of status (e.g., Confirmation Required, Superseded, -

.. l. yg Supplemented by, Validated, etc) _

." c .3.'. ,

T,f 6.2.; '?

3.3 Based on the review of documents covered by Section 3.2 the documents l e will be sorted into the following categories in order to determine the  ;

f.w.vh magnitude of corrective action required.

k.ffb,,[.

• Valid documents (no additional work required)

If 1

?;y 'A Documents requiring revisions

b. lii g f% 3: g

• Confirmatory calculations required x:.o Ji:.

• New documents required (no document presently exists)

J[h:

w i.. - -

.n

f. g.(: 3.4 New documents, or revision to existing documents, as required, will be 0:.'..;T.: , developed in accordance with the applicable project procedures.

p ysj Modifications of existing hardware or addition of new hardware will be identified, if required.

I I

I .

Revision

0

~

Dated: 11/20/86 g El 3.5 Closeout of calculation input identified under Section 3.2 as requiring _$

confirmation will be by revision to the calculation to identify final a source, addition of supporting documentation as calculation attach-

.I ments, and revision of analysis / design as necessary.

I 4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Master Index of Calculation and I

'I Computer Books for Structural Department - Section 11540, Rev. 3 dated March 21, 1986. Calculations shown below are referenced in TERA DIRs. ,

Book Number Set Revision Title

. SRB-105C 1 1 Containment Liner Anchors -1 SRB-108C 1 3 Reactor Building Containment l

Penetrations l SRB-108C 4 3 Reactor Building Containment B Penetrations _j I SRB-161C 1 4 Containment Penetrations for As-Built Loads MS-1 and MS-2 SRB-161C 2 0 Containment Penetration for As-Built g SRB-161C 3 2 Containment Penetration for N l As-Built MV-17 to MV-20 Due 4 m to Increase in Temperature

, SRB-161C 4 1 Containment Penetrations f MIII-1 thru 31-23 Penetrations  ;

SRB-161C 5 0 Pipe Support Attachment to Penetration Assembly

]

i SRB-169C 1 0 Unit-2: Containment Liner for Equipment Hatch 4

5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION -j I Project procedures will be develged for use in implementation of the actions discussed in this appendix.

y s

4 I ,a 2

I 6753I-1634503-B2 I-4

R:. vision: 0 Deted: 11/20/86 APPENDIX J - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - CONCRETE ANCHORS I

1.0 BACKGROUND

1.1 TERA reviewed calculations pertaining to the design for the Concrete Anchors with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies.

.The calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports. {D-DIRs} issued by TERA. SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Concrete Anchors generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized below. Calculations associated with the issues are denoted in parentheses ( ).

(A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations

• Nonconservative generic criteria used for anchor bolt pullout I

• capacity reduction factor for cone overlapping (SRB-123C)

Modeling assumption does not consider normal shear force on embedments to be taken by anchor bolts (SRB-115C)

• Effect of prying action and flexibility not considered on anchor bolts (SRB-115C) (SSB-112C) (SRB-157C)

• Pullout capacity of anchor bolt not based on concrete cone failure (SSB-112C)

• Mathematical error in calculating tension of anchor bolt loads (SSB-112C)

• Vertical upward seismic loads not included in determining the tension on anchor bolts for tank support (SSB-112C)

• Apparent lack of technical justification pf6vided for using 1.8 factor of safety for Richmond inserts under SSE condition

• In a deling assumptions , prying action and eccentricity of axial load for embedment plates were not considered (SAB-113C)

I

• Incorrect governing load considered.

evaluated (SAB-137C)

Critical load case not

• Incorrect modeling assumption of load distribution for anchor bolts (SRB-111C)

I

• Vendor's recommended minimum effective embedment criteria for Hilti bolts was violated by project procedure depth

• Incorrect tension calculated for Hilti bolts (GIS-104C)

• Loser factor of safety used in design for anchor bolts not justified (SSB-1342).

I 6753J-1634503-B2 J-1

7. -:

.y .- .+. Revision: O C ' Dated: 11/20/86 c

.f' (B) Discrepancies Between Calculations and Drawings t;r '

• Calculation specifies ASTM A320 bolts while drawings show

[I.:

( :W-ASTM A540 bolts. Drawings do not agree with calculation for anchor bolt patterns (SRB-123C)

N;, M

,. 5

• Dimensions used in calculations different than that shown on N drawing (SAB-137C)

$. f.

g.{j. (C) Poor Documentation and Missing Input / Output

• Calculation references superseded computer analysis for 1 "i plates. No consideration provided for incorporating revised y

. gy. .

I computer analysis into calculation (SAB-137C)

M

• Calculations do not provide a mechanism for transmitting wall

/g plate loads to structural member verification (SAB-137C)

}rg0. ~

• Apparent lack of documentation (vendor source seismic loads, j'j applicable drawings, material properties, code / criteria 1

source) (SFB-106C) f.7 g:g4 lg g

• Apparent lack of documentation of the technical justification

. gc.; for the qualification process of eighty-four (84) plates id.E w. . .

/- ' g ~ (SAB-137C)

f,'

, %f

• Documentation lacking for anchor bolts used on site which are h[.9

1. different from those specified in specification c.;

..K{f[;

'?

• No procedure available for embedded plate verification of SV dimensions and loads g U; 9 1 e .i '(D) Calculations Not Consistent with Licensing Commitments i i "M

• Edge distance criteria violated for wall plates design per l.y'g . AISC Table 1.16.5 (SAB-137C)

. sn

[5h

• Eff-ct of limited slab thickness on pullout capacity of group

( anchorages not considered per code requirements (SAB-137C)

({

o .

I /j,

• Inclusion of floor finish topping with floor slab thickness i I for embedment depth of anchor bolt is not in compliance with b

?. ACI 318 Code (SAB-137C)

, (E) Structural Item Lacking Backup Calculations 4

• No calculations available for anchor bolt development in

. concrete (SSB-121C) k^ 3 Missing calculations for pullout capacity of anchors,

. concrete shear cone capacity, basis for assumptions, etc io si (SSB-105C) i;.; N

.-e6 > . l 6753J-1634503-B2 J-2

- -:_ [ .

'.a  : Revision: 0 Dated:

Q'= 11/20/86

[

6k' ',.;"

$ *- Bending due to compression on bottom of baseplate which is critical not calculated (SRB-157C) 8- ,.

4

• SSE loads are controlling loads but not addressed in design la.97 (SAB-137C)

}. Q j.

• Pullout capacity of studs against factored loads and SSE

... ll i .N = loads not considered. Interaction equation for Nelson stud 8:N1; - -

and Hilti bolts not checked (SRB-111C)

US.

1.2 There are several E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of embedment plates and anchor bolts. The DIRs can be detailed as

!ifi.?-  ; -

follows:

"' .p y,,

. s i;

.j p; 'i

• No guidelines provided for the selection of stiffeners for u;Q. embedded plates in specification.

te .

J'- k.i -

• No . justification provided of factor of safety for anchor

• ci e. bolts of supports.

• Effect of prying action not considered in the Nelson Studs.

1 f.. ik 4

• Concern regarding manufacturer's published load ratings, for vg[.l/;} 4 1 Hilti bolts, based on testing data.

y .6. ( c.

• Technical pro. i. existed in the design of the embedments of h[: ;[. .

[ j:

the steam generator lateral support.

• Concern regarding the loads on the structure due to concrete

? [/

~./ n i q, . 4 anchors and thru-bolts.

,ctf- e 1.3 ISAP VII b.4 - Hilti Anchor Bolt Installation (Refer to Appendix - N 1$6 " Generic Technical Concerns" for more details)

-xy.

n bh.

.i? g The NRC's Technical Review Team (TRT) inspected Hilti anchor bolt installation on pipe supports and electrical raceway supports to the NO g n ,3r requirements of installation of Hilti drilled-in bolts and found several deficiencies. Technical deficiencies identified include minimum embedment requirements, lack of documentation for bolt

".f' o f;* -

f$ markings, length of the bolts, torque verification on bolts by QC.

_ T: gy

.v. :. e g

(-

't.f:, 2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE

. d te: .{s The calculations which form the design basis for the connections and 3

anchorages contain technical errors and inconsistencies when compared to the drawings and do not consistently meet licensing commitments.

I Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and computer analysis for these calculations ,are either inadequately documented or unavailable.

1 I

6753J-1634503-B2 J-3

Revision: 0 Dated: 11/20/86 3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES 3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), develop design basis 1 documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly identified and implemented.

3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations and specifica-tions pertaining to the Concrete Anchors for consistency with the design basis documents and drawings (including unincorporated project I change documents, using the following steps:

i.e.,

Component Modification Cards, CMCs).

Design Change Authorizations, DCAs, and This review shall be documented 3

3.2.1 A review checklist will be developed and used to document and ensure uniform and complete technical and programmatic reviews.

===- 3.2.2 A set of prints of current permanent plant drawings and unincorporated DCAs, CMCs, and any other project change j

i I documents and cut rebar drawings will be used to ensure complete review of the as-installed condition.

3.2.3 The review for technical adequacy will address calculation

. inputs, assumptions, methodology, accuracy, outputs, and conclusions. Input will be reviewed for applicability, accuracy, and source. Methodology will be reviewed for compliance with licensing commitments and to ensure that it

_I_ is appropriate for the calculation's objectives. Outputs will be reviewed to confirm that they are reasonable in consideration of the inputs, methodology, and objective of (NOTE: Any input not deemed final will be the calculation.

narked " Confirmation Required.")

Additionally, changes to calculations as a result of ERC findings will be included.

3.2.4 A calculation index will be developed to provide documenta-tion of status (e.g., Confirmation Required, Superseded, Supplemented by, Validated, etc)

I 3.3 Based on the review of documents covered i;y Section 3.2, the documents will be sorted into the following categories in order to determine the I.

l magnitude of corrective action required.

• Valid documenta (no additional work required)

I 6753J-1634503-B2 J-4

--um

Revision: 0 Dated: 11/20/86 I

• Documents requiring revisions

• Confirmatory calculations required

• New documents required (no document presently exists) 3.4 New documents, or revisions to existing documents, as required, will be developed in accordance with the applicable project procedures.

Modification of existing hardware or addition of new hardware will be identified, if required.

3.5 Closeout of calculatien input identified under Section 3.2 as requiring confirmation shall be by revision to the calculation to identify final source, addition of supporting documentation as calculation attach-ments, and revision of analysis / design as necessary.

4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS g 4.1 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Comanche Peak

.g Response Team Program and Issue Specific Action Plans, Revision 3, February 1986 4.2 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Master Index of Calculation and Computer Books for Structural Department - Section 11540, Rev. 3, dated March 21, 1986. Calculations shown below are referenced in TERA DIRs.

Book Number Set Revision Title SRB-123C 5 0 Concrete Pullout Capacity of I Anchor Bolting Groups SRB-115C 3 0 Reactor Bldg. No. 1 Shiel2 Wall Restraint SRB-112C 1 31 Equipment Foundations -

Safeguard Building SAB-157C 24 1 Reactor Bldg. No. 1-Supporting Structure for Jet Shield JS-1A-28 SAB-137C 10 1 Aux. Bldg. - Cable Spread Room Unit 1 (Wall Plates)

SRB-111C 1 4 Cross Over Leg Support GIS-104C 7 0 Service Water Intake Structure Attach. of Jib Cranes and Stop Gates SAB-137C 12 1 Anx. Bldg. - Cable Spread Room Unit 1 - Floor Baseplates Analysis 6753J-1634503-B2 J-5

~

Revision: 0 Dated: 11/20/86

~

Book Number Set Revision Title SAB-113C 3 3 Steel Framing Design el 790 ft-I'~ 6 in.

SFB-106C 1 16 Fuel Bldg. Spent Fuel Liner Under Water Lighting Support.

Monorail at el 880 ft and I el 818 ft-6 in., Platforms, Chilled Water Tanks Support SSB-121C 1 0 Safeguard Bldg. el 896 ft-4 in.

Units 1 and 2 Hatch Covers SSB-105C 3 22 Safeguard Bldg. Monorails SRB-111C 5 5 Platforms at el 824 in.-9 in.

and el 841 ft-0 in.

5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION Project procedures will be developed for use in implementation of the actions discussed in this appendix.

I 6753J-1634503-B2 J-6

W]l.

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 U . 2.1

..v ..a APPENDIX K - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - COMPUTER CODE BENCHMARKING hh fjy .

h, e&- .:. :

1.0 BACKGROUND

Nb

l

fW 4 1.1 In reviewing the structural calculations, TERA identified several ,gDJ I deficiencies where the computer programs used in the analyses did not T. ',f .

Q!

have appropriate documentation certifying that the programs are quali-fied for the use in the design of Seismic Category I structures. The 9'.J.11 calculational deficiencies identified have been documented in the  ; if -

D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs} issued by TERA.

reviewed the D-DIRs related to the Computer Code Benchmarking generic SWEC has 4 ,n j issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our under- { [f, .

standing of the issues, as summarized below. Calculations associated iglN with the issues are denoted in parentheses ( ). M'i+

, g.RC- . . c,.

-(A) Reactor Building Containment - "KALNINS," "SRTMRG," "KPOST1," .dr.3. (

"KPOST2," "PKH16." 9.'.D -

](N:].

(B) Reactor Building Containment " QUAKE." /l9 (C). Cable Spreading Room Wall Plates - "ANSYS," "BIP1," "BIP2." ,N

, (SAB-137C) k}/N n.2 :;5 y.: ; .

(D) Cable Spreading Room Structural Steel - "NASTRAN." (SAB-135C) g (E) Cable Spreading Room Baseplates - "ANSYS," "BIP1," "BIP2."

(SAB-137C) m.tp Y wp-2 (F) Reactor Containmenc Concrete Internal - "STRUDL," (SRB-137C) "V l

. Qh-1.2 There are no E-DIRs related to Computer Code Benchmarking. .

S; 1 . %:

2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE k

't :[.W Programs used for the analysis and design of Seismic Category I i ']

structures are required to have as a minimum, the following provisions:

(a) Each computer run mtst be traceable to a program revision number 6, y. '.

or version. ifM.W M (b) Each version or revision of a computer program must be retrievable.

(c) Each version or revision of a computer program must be benchmarked g to demonstrate that the program can solve the problems which it is '

7 stated as being capable of doing.

(d) The program must have a user's guide or manual which clearly .. lf states the limitations of the program.

i pi I

_ (e) The computer program must provide consistent output in all cases. f j I t

[ k1 l

l i .

1 6753K-1634503-B2 K-1 ..] I l

.A,4

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86

" 3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE

-l 3.1 Computer programs used in the design and analysis of Seismic Category I E structures will be identified along with the associated structures and components.

3.2 the documentation which demonstrates that the requirements listed in Section 2.0 above have been met will be researched by reviewing C/S sources, and Computer Service Bureau's sources, depending on which

}- party has responsibility for program maintenance.

3.3 Programs which do not have adequate documentation and are judged to be required for the permanent. plant record will be benchmarked using the I requirements cited in Section 2.0.

I 3.4 Calculations which inco rporate programs which cannot be adequately documented and are judged to be required for the permanent plant record will be superseded by new calculations which will utilize qualified computer programs.

I 4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS 1

I Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Master Index of Calculation and Computer Books for Structural Department - Section 11540, Rev. 3, dated March 21, 1986. Calculations shown below are referenced in TERA DIRs.

Book Number Set Revision Title SAB-137C 12 1 Aux. Bldg. Cable Spread Room Unit 1 - Floor Baseplates o Analysis SAB-137C . 10 1 Aux. Bldg. Cable Spread Room Unit-1 (Wall Plates)

Cable Spread Room - Unit-1 I SAB-135C 2 0 Load Stresses (SP-6 Type Conns.)

SAB-135C 3 1 Cable Spread Room - Unit-1 As-built Geometry Input 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION Project procedures will be developed for use in implementation of the actions discussed in this appendix.

I I

6753K-1634503-B2 K-2

-lW Rsvision: 0 Dste: 11/20/86 I APPENDIX L - TESTING PROGRAMS

1.0 BACKGROUND

TERA cited numerous technical and programmatic discrepancies in the

. I-testing programs they reviewed. The discrepancies are:

1.1 Test Report CPPA-26039 -

" Determination of Torque Requirements for Expansion Anchors"

• - Test report and calculations not check.ed independently.

• - Mathematical errors in determination of torque requirements.

.g

• Ultimate pullout strength of the anchors for short embedment not 5 J ""'i'ie d -

1.2 " Specification for Containment Structural Acceptance and Leakage Rate Test," SS-21/2.

• Apparent lacking of documentation for review and approval process.

1.3 Test Report CPPA-38267 -

" Shear and Tension Loading of Richmond Inserts"

• Inadequate method used for calibrating hydraulic cylinders during Richmond Insert Tests.

1.4 Test Report CPPA-29063, " Shear Tests on Richmond 1/2 Inch Type EC-6W I Inserts"

• Losses due to friction and seal leakage not considered in load I* calculations.

• Two deviation items (not calibrating cylinder as instructed and I not testing samples to failure) were not documented in report and approved prior to testing.

• All sample data sheets not included in test report.

I 1.5 Test Report CPPA-11269, " Epoxy Grout Testing"

• Epoxy grout testing does not conform to test specification requirements.

• References, signatures, sample record sheets, and semple preconditioning information are missing from report.

• Specimen dimensions and recording intervals deviation from procedure not reviewed and approved.

I

• Compressive strengths of two grouts for various temperatures reported in test report without identii'ying statistical error.

6753L-1634503-B2 L-1

R: vision: 0 Dato: 11/20/86

• 1.6 Test Report CPPA-21620 "1/2 Inch Diameter Nelson Stud Torque / Tension Correlation Test"

• Report does not conform to qualify assurance requirements for review and approval of reports.

• Test violates normal engineering practice by determining one time torque value to preload the studs.

1.7 Test - Report CPPA-24736 -

" Torque / Tension Tests of A490/A325 Bolts"

• Test report does not adequately document test procedure, objective, equipment and control procedure.

• -Test report does not conform to test control procedure requirements to prepare test plan prior to conducting test.

• Test procedure violates normal engineering practice which requires wrenches to be calibrated at least once each working day.

1.8 Concrete compression strength test results were falsified. ISAP II.b addressed this particular issue and no further work is proposed for these E-DIRs.

'2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The test reports are the basis for installation and/or acceptance of Expansion Anchors, Richmond Inserts, Nelson Studs, High Strength Bolts, Epoxy Grouting, etc. All test reports must be reviewed and updated to I ensure they reflect confirmed standard test procedure requirements, and are consistent with licensing commitments.

3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE Using the items described under Section 2.0, review and modify as necessary, the existing test reports. After modifying above documents, implement revised requirements into test reports. If existing test reports cannot be adequately modified, supplemental test programs shall be developed.

All site testing programs used for Seismic Category I structures will be reviewed for consistency with licensing commitments.

4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS 4.1 " Determination of Torque Requirements for Expansion Anchors" - Test

.I Report CPPA-26039.

4.2 " Specification for Containment Structured Acceptance and Leakage Rate I Test" - SS-21/2.

4.3 " Shear and Tension Loading of Richmond Inserts" - Test Report CPPA

-38267.

I -

6753L-1634503-B2 L-2

Revision: 0 Date: 11/20/86 I 4.4 " Shear Tests of Richmond 1/2 Inch Type EC-SW Inserts" CPPA-29063.

Test Report 4.5 " Epoxy Grout Testing" - Test Report CPPA-11269.

4.6 "1/2 Inch Diameter Nelson Stud Torque / Tension Correlation Test" - Test I- Report CPPA-21620.

4.7 " Torque / Tension Tests of A490/A325 Bolts" -

Test Report CPPA-24736.

.I 4.8 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Comanche Peak Response Team Program and Issue Specific Action Plans, Revision 3, February 1986.

5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION Project procedures will be developed for use in implementation of the actions discussed in this appendix.

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I e753<-1e345es-e2 t-3 f

I- R; vision:

D2ted: 11/20/86 0

- APPENDIX M - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - HEAVY LOAD DROPS

1.0 BACKGROUND

1.1 TERA reviewed calculation sets pertaining to the design for Heavy Load Drops in the Reactor Containment, Auxiliary Building, Fuel Building, I and Service Water Intake Structure with the intent of identifying any calculational deficiencies. The calculational deficiencies identified have - been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports {D-DIRs}

I issued by TERA. SWEC has reviewed the D-DIRs related to Heavy Load Drops generic issue and has formed the corrective action plan based on our understanding of the issues, as summarized below. Calculations associated with t'te issues are denoted in parentheses ( ).

(A) Technical Deficiencies in Calculations

• Not all potential load drops were analyzed

• Local structural response was not checked

• Punching shear was not checked I

• Apparent lack of justification distribution or frequency determination for target load (B) Discrepancies between Calculations and Drawings

• Member concrete thickness used in calculation does not agree with drawing 1.2 There is one E-DIR that specifically addresses NUREG-0612. TERA resolved this DIR with reference to Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) No. 6.

Compliance to NUREG-0612 is not considered an issue.

2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE The calculations which form the design basis for evaluation of Heavy I Load Drops contain technical errors and at least one inconsistency when compared to the drawings. Design inputs, sources of input, assumptions, and any computer analysis for these calculations are either inadequately documented or unavailable.

3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUSS 3.1 Using the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), develop desi,gn basis documents (design criteria) to ensure that licensing commitments have been properly identified and implemented.

~

6753M-1634503-B2 M-1

'l W R; vision: 0 Dsted: 11/20/86 3.2 Review and assess the adequacy of all C/S calculations pertaining to Heavy Load Drops for consistency with the design basis documents and j drawings (including unincorporated project change documents, i.e.,

3 Design Change Authorizations, DCAs, and Component Modification Cards, CMCs). This review shall be documented using the following steps:

3.2.1 A review procedure will be developed and used to document and ensure uniform and complete programmatic and technical reviews.

.I 3.2.2 A set of prints of current permanent plant drawings and related unincorporated DCAs, CMCs, and any other project I change documents will be used to ensure a complete review of the as-installed condition.

I 3.2.3 The review for technical adequacy will address calculation

~

inputs, assumptions, methodology, accuracy, outputs, and conclusions. Input will be reviewed for applicability,

. accuracy,and source. Methodology will be reviewed for compliance with licensing commitments and to ensure that it is appropriate for the calculation's objective. Outputs will be reviewed to confirm that they are reasonable in con-I sideration of the inputs, methodology, and objective of the calculation. (NOTE: Any input not deemed final will be marked " Confirmation Required.")

Additionally, changes to calculations as a result of ERC findings will be included.

I 3.2.4 A calculation index will be developed to provide document-ation of status (e.g., Confirmation Required, Superseded, Supplemented by, Validated, etc).

3.3 Based on the review of documente covered by Section 3.2 the documents will be sorted into the following categories in order to determine the magnitude of corrective action required.

• Valid Documents (no additional work required)

• Documents requiring revision

• Confirmatory calculations required

• New documents required (no document presently exists)

I 3.4 New documents, or revision to the existing documents, as required, will be developed in accordance with the applicable project procedures.

Modification of existing hardware or addition of iew hardware will be identified, if required.

t I 3.5 Closeout of calculation input identified under Section 3.2 requiring confirmation will be by revision to the calculation to identify final i source, addition of supporting documentation as calculation attach-I ments, and revision of analysis / design as necessary.

I 6753M-1634503-B2 M-2 -

J

Revision: 0 Dated: 11/20/86 4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station - Master Index of Calculation and Computer Books for Structural Department - Section 11540, Rev. 3, dated March 21, 1986. Calculations shown below are referenced in TERA DIRs.

Book Number Set Revision Title SMI-111C 1 0 Lifting Rig - Load Drop SMI-111C 2 0 Load Drop - Service Water Intake SMI-111C 3 0 Load Drop - Component Cooling Pumps in Auxiliary Building (Rooms 197, 198, 204, 205)

SMI-111C 4 0 Load Drop - Centrifugal Charging Pumps in Auxiliary Building SMI-111C 5 0 Load Drop - Fuel Building el. 810 ft-6 in.

5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF TIE RESOLUTION Project procedures will be developed for use in implementation of the actions discussed in this appendix.

e 4 6753M-1634503-B2 M-3 .

. _ . . . . . . . 1

I

• Rsvision 0 Date: 11/20/86 APPENDIX N - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN - GENERIC TECHNICAL CONCERNS g

1.0 BACKGROUND

1.1 In response to a directive issued March 12, 1984 by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Executive Director for Operations, the NRC formed a Technical Review Team (TRT) to address various technical

_ concerns and allegations.

With the exception of Item (A) below, the following are specific TRT issues which concern the civil / structural aspects; all issues may potentially impact the design.

(A) ISAP VII.c. Construction Reinspection / Documentation Review Plan This activity is self-initiated and includes a reinspection /

accepted I documentation review of QC construction work activities performed at CPSES.

safety-related An example of the items covered by ISAP VII.c. is " Concrete I Placement and Consolidation."

Several independent questions regarding the placement and consolidation of the concrete mix have been raised. These I. include:

• Concrete quality near a seismic gap

• Quality of starter grout at a construction joint. Some loose unconsolidated mortar was identified at a construction joint by ERC in their construction reinspection program (ISAP VII.c).

• Allegation that 2 or 3 five gallon pails are buried in one of the concrete containment shells.

J3 The presence of voids was detected in the Unit 2 Reactor Cavity Shield Wall. These were repaired but the possible presence of voids in the Unit No. I shield wall wiii be investigated.

• Unconsolidated concrete was discovered at a location on the exterior of the Unit 2 Reactor Containment Shell.

• Allegation of poor concrete quality / consolidation in some core holes.

SWEC will have an active role in the resolution of this issue.

(B) ISAP V.b Improper Shortening of Anchor Bolts in Steam Generator Upper Lateral Supports.

6753N-1634503-B2 N-1

3' . . .

4.K g

_ , , , '7 g- Revision 0 r ._ : 3 .._. .. Date: 11/20/86

..4 j'.p. 7, T\e TRT was informed that there had been unauthorized cutting of

q#:

anchor bolts during installation of the Steam Generator Upper

[ hg":N g Lateral Supports; their investigation revealed that inspection

. ;f. - g records which verify the engagement length of these bolts in the 4 4y. drilled and tapped holes could not be found. Related issues which yp' ; g are to be addressed as part of this ISAP are:

ii4l g

• Thread engagement for Richmond inserts

((.-) .

• Thread engagement of other blind hole bolted connections Oft . designed by the structural and mechanical disciplines

y. %

' f. .{ .] :g SWEC will have an active role in resolving this issue by 4.pv.... f.,

B coordinating the effort with TUGC0 and Gibbs & Hill.

4, .

f', g (C) ISAP II.a. Reinforcing Steel in the Reactor Cavity

.:MM

' 4:A' g

• Reinforcement in the Unit 1 Reactor Cavity Wall between

'* el 812 ft-0 in, and 819 ft- in, was installed and inspected k

i Sp.

Ii V;, l

=

to drawing 2323-SI-0572, Revision 2. After the concrete was placed, Revision 3 was issued indicating additional

[jU[ reinforcing was required. The TRT found that justification

e. . & b for omitting the additional reinforcing had not been

[.Y.3 '

documented by Engineering.

['g '~ O

. y g.} (D) ISAP II.b. Concrete Compression Strength

• Allebation that concrete test reports were falsified during

.[

'7 '.~ p:sg the period January 1976 and February 1977 E

@..;.d.

i.1 "jj

...w

, g (E) ISAP II.c. Maintenance of Air Gap Between Concrete Structures

a. f.e .

K. 6, c.s .

x . ,g.

• Field investigations to determine adequacy of air gaps Jp ij between concrete structures indicated unsatisfactory condi-tions exist due to the presence of debris such as wood d.;

g wedges, rocks, clumps of concrete, and rodafoam in the air P .'. ; O m

g gaps.

C? e..y

g. . i f .

There are two {2} E-DIRs specifically related to maintenance TYf /.;. of air gaps between concrete structures.

I,k l,E

.].{ (F) ISAP II.d. Seismic Design of Control Room Ceiling Elements

.%7 v.: 3 l up

• TRT determined that calculations for Seismic Category II f .3 components (e.g., lighting fixtures) and for the sloping

@/EDgly g suspended drywall ceiling did not adequately reflect interac--

tions with the nonseismic items, nor were the fundamental y'W4h E _

frequencies of the supported masses determined to assess the seismic response. Additionally, TRT could find no evidence that the possible effects of a failure of nonseismic items had been considered.

I There are several E-DIRs specifically related to the design adequacy of seismic design of control room ceiling elements.

6753N-1634503-B2 N-2

, Revision 0 Date: 11/20/86 ,

5 (G) ISAP II.e. Rebar in the Fuel Handling Building

• Allegation that in January 1983 rebar associated with the I_ installation of the trolley process aisle rails in the Fuel Handling Building . were cut without proper authorization t'

(H). ISAP VI.b. Polar Crane Shimming 5

• Allegation that shims for the rail support system of the

.l

.m Containment's polar crane' for Unit I had been altered during installation SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE

=

2.0 TUGC0 must resolve TRT technical concerns and allegations,

<=

. all presently identified in the CPRT Issue Specific Action Plans summarized }

I in Section 1.0.

Documents which form the basis for closure of the TRT and related issues must be reviewed and updated as necessary to ensure they reflect k

confirmed design inputs and assumptions, are technically correct, and are consistent with licensing commitments. _

3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES The NRC TRT civil / structural issues are being addressed by TUGCO's CPRT d Issue Specific Action Plans (ISAPs) II.a, II.b, II.c, II.d, II.e, V.b, and VI.b. The self-initiated reinspection / documentation review is addressed by ISAP VII.c.

For concrete placement and consolidation (Item A of Section 1.0), SWEC will:

• address each question

• determine the root cause of any concrete construction g I

• problems ,

determine the necessary corrective actions

• determine the adequacy of the overall concrete construction program at CPSES g In ISAP V.b. (Item B of Section 1.0), SWEC has already coordinated the effort required to resolve the Steam Generator Upper Lateral Restraint I

bolts. SWEC reviewed calculations by both G&H and Westinghouse and identified those required to be revised and strengthenet. Also, confirmatory calculations required to satisfy SWEC and TERA comments were coordinated by SWEC.

Under ISAP V.b, SWEC will coordinate the effort required to resolve the thread engagement issue for Riclanond inserts and other threaded connections. L 6753N-1634503-B2 N-3

Revision 0 p Date: 11/20/86 L

4.0 LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS ISAP II.a Reinforcing Steel in the Reactor Cavity ISAP II.b Concrete Compression Strength

" ISAP II.c Maintenance of Air Gap Between Concrete Structures ISAP II.d Seismic Design of Control Room Ceiling' Elements ISAP II.e Rebar in the Fuel Handling Building F ISAP V.b Improper Shortening of Anchor Bolts in Steam Generator l

Upper Lateral Supports ISAP VI.b Polar Crane Shimming L ISAe vII.c ERC Results Reports croPulation Reports)

Appendix 18 - Concrete Placement Appendix 21 - Cement Grout

{ Appendix 33 - Richmond Inserts ISAP II.b TERA Results Report - Concrete Compression Strength 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION SWEC will review the results of CPRT Issue Specific Action Plans upon issuance, to assess impact on SWEC scope.

E u

E E

E E

E 6753N-1634503-B2 N-4

e I Ravicion: O Data: 11/20/86 I APPENDIX 0 - SEISMIC ANALYSIS

1.0 BACKGROUND

Because Amplified Response Spectra (ARS) are inputs to the pipe stress and support requalification, and conduit and cable tray analyses, I responsibility for the review of the ARS was assigned to a special SWEC task force. This task force independently developed structural models and performed technical evaluations for selected seismic Category I I structures. The methods of modeling and evaluations were consistent with Stone & Webster's normal practice for nuclear power plant struct-ural seismic analysis. The conclusion was that the design basis ARS are adequate for use even though there might be some discrepancies in the procedures and calculations used for their development.

In reviewing the original seismic analysis calculations, TERA subse-quently identified several discrepancies in the seismic analysis used for Seismic Category I structures, to determine accelerations, dis-placements, forces, and moments caused by the OBE and SSE. The I calculational discrepancies identified by TERA have been documented in the D-type Discrepancy Issue Reports (D-DIRs).

14 D-DIRs related to the seismic Analysis.

SWEC has reviewed the I 2.0 SWEC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE I

The TERA DIRs report that calculations for the seismic analysis of Seismic Category I structures, particularly those for the Auxiliary /

Electric Building, contain inconsistencies with the design drawings and FSAR, as well as undocumented sources of input which have not been verified. Additionally, one of the computer programs used appears to give inconsistent results.

3.0 SWEC ACTION PLAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES l The SWEC action plan outlined below has been established to provide

( further assurance that the design basis ARS are adequate. The l following specific actions will be taken:

l 3.1 Verify the validity of the DIRs.

I l

3.2 Prepare a calculation to demonstrate that the response spectra of the horizontal and vertical time histories, used as input to the I seismic analyses, adequately envelope the design ground response spectra in the FSAR for all relevant damping values.

3.3 Prepare a calculation which independently analyzes the Auxiliary /

Electric Building, using Stone & Webster standard methodology and documented computer programs. The results of this analysis will be used to demonstrate that the design bases are adequate.

3.4 Calculate the mass and fundamental natural frequencies of the other Seismic Category I buildings, and compare them to those in the calculationc of record.

67530-1634503-D2 0-1 t