ML20206J847

Amend 61 to License NPF-12,changing Tech Specs to Increase Required Boron Concentration for Accumulators & Refueling Water Storage Tank

ML20206J847
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	03/31/1987
From:	Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML20206J852	List: ML20206J847 ML20206J916
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NUDOCS 8704160199
Download: ML20206J847 (14)

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SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY S0llTH CAROLINA PU9 tic SERVICE AtITHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-395 VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMEhDMENT TO FACILITY OPFRATING LICENSE Amendment No. 61 License No. NPF-12 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by South Carolina Electric & Gas Company and South Carolina Public Service Authority (the licenseesi dated December 11, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comissic,'s rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangerino the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by chances to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-12 is hereby amended to read as follows:

8704160199 870331 DR ADOCK 05000395 PDR

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( ?.) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.

61, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Lester Rubenstein, Director PWR Project Directorate #?

Division of PWR Licensing-A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: March 31, 1987

I ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE A'!ENDFFNT aPENDMENT NO.

61 TO FACILITY CPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 00CKET NO. 50-395 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. Corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Pages Insert Pages 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 i

3/4 1-12 3/4 1-12 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-9 3/4 5-9 B3/4 1-2 B3/4 1-2 83/4 1-3 B3/4 1-3 B3/4 5-2 B3/A 5-2 B3/4 5-3 B3/4 6-4 B3/4 6-4 l

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCE - SHUT 00WN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

A boric acid storage system with:

1.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 2700 gallons, 2.

Between 7000 and 7700 ppm of boron, and 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 65'F.

b.

The refueling water storage tank with:

1.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 37,900 gallons, 2.

A minimum boron concentration of 2300 ppm, and 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 40*F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 2.

Verifying the contained borated water volume, and 3.

Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is less than 40*F.

SUtNER - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 Amendment No. 61

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source (s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2:

a.

A boric acid storage system with:

1.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 13,200 gallons, 2.

Between 7000 and 7700 ppm of boron, and 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 65'F.

b.

The refueling water storage tank with:

1.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 453,800 gallons, 2.

A minimum boron concentration of 2300 ppe, and 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 40*F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With the boric acid storage system ineperable and being used as one of the above required borated water sources, restore the storage system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2 percent delta k/k at 200*F; restore the boric acid storage system to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

b.

With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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SUMMER - UNIT 1 3/4 1-12 Amendment No. 61

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

The isolation valve open, b.

A contained borated water volume of between 7368 and 7594 gallons, c.

A boron concentration of between 2200 and 2500 ppe, and d.

A nitrogen cover pressure of between 600 and 656 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.*

ACTION:

With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed a.

isolation valve, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY within one hour and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

1.

Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure in the tanks, and 2.

Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.

" Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

SUMER - UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 61

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) b.

At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> af ter each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution.

c.

At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig by verifying that the isolation valve operator breaker opened at the motor control center and locked in the open position.

d.

At least,once per 18 months by verifying that each accumulator isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following conditions:

1.

When an actual or a simulated RCS pressure signal exceeds the P-il (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety Injection) setpoint, 2.

Upon receipt of a safety injection test signal.

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I SUMMER - UNIT 1 3/4 5-2 i

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 453,800 gallons, b.

A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2500 ppm of boron, and c.

A minimum water temperature of 40*F.

i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.4 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and 2.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is less than 40'F.

SUMMER - UNIT 1 3/4 5-9 Amendment No.## ff.61

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued) involved subtracting the incremental change in the MDC associated with a core condition of all rods inserted (most positive MDC) to an all rods withdrawn condition and, a conversion for the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERMAL POWER conditions. This value of the MDC was then

-4 transformed into the limiting MTC value -4.2 x 10 delta k/k/*F. The MTC

~4 value of 3.3 x 10 delta k/k/*F represents a conservative value (with correc-l tions for burnup and soluble boron) at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibrium boron concentration and is obtained by making these corrections to the limiting

-4 MTC value of -4.2 x 10 k/k/*F.

The surveillance requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the q

reduction in RCS baron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 551'F.

This limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RT temperature.

NDT 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps,

3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid transfer pumps, and 5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200'F, a minimum of two boron in-jection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable.

The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide the required SHUTDOWN SUMMER - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-2 Amendment No.61

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.77% delta k/k or as required by Figure 3.1-3 after xenon decay and cooldown to 200'F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs from full power equilibrium xenon condi-tions and is satisfied by 12475 gallons of 7000 ppe borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 64,040 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refuel-ing water storage tank.

With the RCS temperature below 200'F, one injection system is acceptable i'

without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 275'F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1 percent delta k/k or as required by Figure 3.1-3 after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F. This condition is satisfied by either 2000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 9690 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CON 1 ML ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are raintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-tained, and (3) lirit the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses.

D EPABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

SUMER - UNIT 1 8 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 61

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 1

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE charging pump to be inoperable below 300 F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the 3

j operation of a single PORV.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each l

component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met.and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance requirements i

for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each i

injection point is necessary to:

(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding i

runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, i

(2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed i

in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

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3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK i..

The OPERABILITY of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of either a LOCA, a steamline break or inadvertent RCS depressurization. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure 1) that sufficient water is available within containment to permit re-circulation cooling flow to the core, 2) that the reactor will remain subcriti-4 4

cal in the cold condition (68 to 212 degrees-F) following a small break LOCA assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, Spray Additive Tank (SAT), contain-i

. ment spray system piping and ECCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except the most reactive control rod assembly (ARI-1), 3) that the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following a large break LOCA (break flow area > 3.0 sq. ft.) assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, ECCS water i

and other sources of water that may eventually reside in the sump post-LOCA with all control rods assumed to be out (ARO), 4) long term subcriticality fol-t lowing a steamline break assuming ARI-I and preclude fuel failure.

The maximum allowable value for the RWST boron concentration forms the basis i

for determining the time (Post-LOCA) at which operator action is required to switch over the ECCS to hot leg recirculation in order to avoid precipitation i

of the soluble boron.

l The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

SUMMER - UNIT 1 8 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. H,61 j

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES I

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.8 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

SUMER - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 61

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3

3/4.6.1.7 REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM The 36-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed during plant operation since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident.

Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment To provide assurance that the 36-inch valves cannot be inadvert-purge system.

ently opened, they are sealed closed in accordance with the Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 which includes mechanical devices to seal or lock the valve closed, or prevent power from being spplied to the valve operator.

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 6 inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves since unlike the 36 inch valves the 6 inch valves will close during a LOCA or steam line break accident and therefore the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during purging operations.

Periodic leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals will provide early indication of seal degradation and will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failures develop. The 0.60 L, leakage limit shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to type B and C tests.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the reactor building spray system ensures that reactor building depressurization and cooling capability will be available'in the The pressure reduction and resultant lower event of a steam line break.

containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The reactor building spray system and the reactor building cooling system are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the re k

building atmosphere.a mechanism for removing iodine from the reattor building atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

B 3/4 6-3 SUMMER - UNIT 1

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the spray additive system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the reactor building spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.8 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained solution volume limit includes an allowance for solution not usable because of i

tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assump-tions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.2.3 REACTOR BUILDING COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the reactor building cooling system ensures that

1) the reactor building air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the reactor building spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

The reactor building cooling system and the reactor building spray system are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the reactor building atmosphere. As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allowable out of service time requirements for the reactor building cooling system have been appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out of service time requirements for the reactor building spray system have been maintained consistent with that E gr ed other inoperable ESF equipment since the reactor f

building spray system aist a vides a mechanism for removing iodine from the reactor building atmosphere.

3/4.6.3 PARTICULATE IODINE CLEANUP SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment filter trains ensures that sufficient iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The reduction in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site boundary radiation doses associated with containment leakage. The operation of this i

system and resultant iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses.

I SUP9tER - UNIT I B 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 61

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