ML20206J264
| ML20206J264 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1986 |
| From: | Norelius C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Bernero R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8606270069 | |
| Download: ML20206J264 (15) | |
Text
.
0xo JUN 2 41986 0 4
W MEMORANDUM FOR: R. Bernero, Director, Division of Boiling Water Reactor Licensing FROM: Charles E. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III
SUBJECT:
CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY (CEI), PERRY UNIT 1, STATUS OF PREPAREDNESS TO EXCEED 5% POWER This memorandum is forwarded to provide you information on the preparedness of Perry, Unit 1, to exceed 5% power. Enclosures 1 and 2 include a description of the current plant status, operational sumary, and a summary of significant inspection activities since license issuance. Enclosure 3 provides a status of CEI's progress in completing license conditions and resolving Region III open items. Enclosure 4 is a brief summary of significant event reports that resulted in issuance of LERs by the licensee. Enclosure 5 is a status of Perry allegations being tracked as open by Region III. CEI currently estimates that they will have completed all activities required by the NRC to exceed 5% power by mid to late July. We are currently not aware of any Region III issue that would result in a delay beyond the CEI estimated date, contingent upon satisfactory resolution of the issues presented in the enclosures to this memo.
On June 5, 1986, Region III conducted a management meeting with the licensee to discuss personnel errors and potential consequences of these errors. In addition, a concern was raised that the operations management was not requiring or receiving adeauate and timely technical responses for significant plant events. The licensee appeared to be receptive to Region III concerns and presented their proposed corrective actions, which included a reassignment of some of their management personnel and moving their I&C group to the Plant Operations Department. This reorganization was described in a letter dated May 30, 1986, from Mr. Edelman, CEI Vice President, Nuclear, to you. In addition, the licensee stated that they have and will continue to stress to their operations personnel the importance of following plant instructions.
Region III believes that the licensee's proposed actions should result in an improvement in their operational performance. We will closely monitor the effect of these actions.
8606270069 860624 ,
R. Bernero 2 JUN 2 41986 We plan to update this report monthly or more frequently, if required, as we get close to the time of the Commission meeting. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. R. C. Knop of my staff.
Charles E. Norelius, Director Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Status & Operational Summary
- 2. Significant Inspection Activities
- 3. Status of License Conditions and Open Items
- 4. Significant Event Reports
- 5. Allegation Status cc w/ enclosures:
J. Taylor, IE J. Partlow, IE J. Stefano, NRR A. B. Davis, RIII SRI, Perry J. Hind, RIII C. Paperiello, RIII E. Greenman, RIII F. Hawkins, RIII J. Harrison, RIII C. Hehl RIII R. Warnick, RIII M. Phillips, RIII R. Knop, RIII D. Danielson, RIII j
J. Muffett, RIII J. Creed, RIII R. Greger, RIII M. Schumacher, RIII M. Ring, RIII
! W. Snell, RIII J. McCormick-Barger, RIII 1 i
l 7e: r .; -
p9 RIII RIII R"I h&M Knop /pd RIII'k1 WD l' McCormick-Barger hk Warnick No e i s
(,fu ISL ,
l l
l
ENCLOSURE 1 Plant Status and Operational Summary The licensee received their license on March 18, 1986, but did not begin loading fuel until March 21, 1986. Fuel load progressed slower than anticipated due to recurring problems with the refuel bridge and associated fuel bundle lifting mechanism (boom).
During fuel loading, several events occurred, some resulting in NRC notifications per 10 CFR 50.72 that have required and are requiring licensee investigations as to their causes and development of adequate corrective actions. Several inadvertent neutron flux scrams were received during this time frame and were the result of instrument noise and not actual neutron signals. Fuel loading was completed on April 24, 1986.
Initial criticality occurred on June 6,1986. The licensee is currently preparing for Non-Nuclear Heat Up (NNHU) and will proceed from there to Nuclear Heat Up.
Prior to exceeding 5% power, the licensee must complete or resolve license conditions and Region III open items described in Enclosure 3 of this report.
In addition, the following activities must be completed:*
- 1. 580 Work Orders must be completed.
- 2. 40 Master Deficiency items must be resolved.
- 3. 30 Surveillance Instructions must be run for credit.
- 4. 23 systems require System Operability Verifications (S0Vs).
- Status from licensee as of June 2, 1986.
The licensee currently plans to have the plant ready to exceed 5% power by late July, 1986.
Licensee operating performance during fuel loading activities and initial criticality has been generally adequate. Initial troubleshooting efforts were slow and fragmented. Final licensee response to the fuel handling equipment problems was comprehensive. While initial licensee response to the neutron monitoring noise problems was timely, followup evaluation and analysis to determine root causes was not accomplished in depth. Control room communications and control of activities was acceptable with the exception of an equipment out of service activity that resulted in violation of the limiting condition for operation for the plant vent radiation monitors.
Approximately 30 NRC notifications per 10 CFR 50.72 have been initiated by the licensee due to events at the plant since license issuance. Nearly 50% of these events were due to operator error which has caused some concern but which
I.
J 4
in itself is not considered abnormal for a plant at this stage in operation. As stated before, the concerns arising from these events were discussed on i June 5, 1986, with CEI.
t i
f I
J d
.i 4
1 i
i i
(
l A
7 e
.)
a j 2 i
__ ., -, ,_._ _ ._. .__ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ . _ _ . , _ _ . _ . . _ , , , , , . . . , . _ , . . _ . . - , , . . . , . . . . . . . . , = _ _ , , _ . , . . , . , , , . . . , . . . .
i ENCLOSURE 2 Significant Inspection Activities Since issuance of the Perry Plant license, inspection activities at the plant have primarily focused on the fuel load activities and witnessing initial criticali ty. Initially, 24-hour coverage of fuel load activities was provided by Region III to meet IE Inspection Module 72302 requirements and verify that plant operations followed their approved program. Coverage of initial criticality was performed per IE Inspection Module 72526 requirements.
Inspector observations indicated fuel loading activities and performance of initial criticality were well coordinated and that licensee personnel proceeded in a cautious and deliberate manner.
In addition, a detailed review of the plant pr' , ..tive maintenance program was performed to ensure that safety related equipment was being properly maintained.
The inspector had found that the maintenance program was generally adequate.
The inspector identified some areas where improvements in the control of repetitive work tasks was needed.
Significant resident resources were also expended on preparation of the SALP 6 report and the management meeting concerning plant events. There have been 13 LER's issued to the Region to date. These LER's are described in Enclosure
- 4. The Perry SALP 6 Board Meeting is scheduled for June 20, 1986, and the SALP licensee meeting is tentatively planned for July 15, 1986.
f
ENCLOSURE 3 Status of License Conditions and Open Items i
The following is a brief description and status of license conditions and open items that must be completed by the licensee prior to the staff concluding that Perry is ready to exceed 5% power.
Initial Criticality Note: All activities required to be completed prior to Initial Criticality were accomplished as required.
A. Licensee to perform instrument loop walkdowns and complete engineering approved interim as-built drawings which show instrument valves and piping as required by Special Project Plan 1028 for criticality.
License Condition Attachment 1, Item B.S.
Status Ongoing post initial criticality work is being performed by the licensee; the initial criticality portion of this work was completed as required.
Review by the NRC will follow per Open Item (440/86008-04).
B. Licensee to perform a reverification of System Operating Instruction as committed by letter dated March 4, 1986, to Region III.
License Condition Attachment 1, Item B.4.
Status Post initial criticality reverification work is ongoing by the licensee; the initial criticality portion of this work was completed as required.
Review by the NRC will follow per Open Item (440/86006-01).
C. Licensee to provide its program for evaluation of the audibility problems encountered on evacuation of personnel from high noise areas. I.E. Balletin 79018.
License Condition Attachment 1, Item B.2.
Status The licensee formulated a completion schedule that was agreeable with Region III (Letter from Edelman to Keppler, dated May 9, 1986).
Review of the completed work by the NRC will follow per Open Item (440/79018-BB). This closes this license condition.
D. Licensee to complete installation of all raceway separation barriers required to meet IEEE 384-1974 independence requirements.
License Condition Attachment 1, Item B.I.
.. Status Region III reviewed licensee's completed activities per Open Item (440/85018-01) and closed this item in Inspection Report 440/86011.
E. Initial Criticality preoperational test and testing exceptions identified by the licensee in a February 27, 1986, letter to Region III must be completed.
Licensee Condition Attachment 1, Item A.
Status Licensee has completed loading of HVAC charcoal filters and testing of the Solid Radwaste Disposal System (G51), Combustible Gas Control System (M51), Technical Support Center HVAC (M52), Training Center E0F Ventilation System (M53), Liquid Radwaste Disposal System (G50),
and the Emergency Service Water System (P45).
The residents performed a review of the above tests and found them to be acceptable.
F. The licensee must complete the validation of the Perry Emergency Instructions, and issue a summary report.
License Condition Attachment 3.
Status Licensee validation is complete and the summary report was sent to NRR per letter dated April 24, 1986.
Nuclear Heatup A. Licensee must make the Turbine Plant Sampling System Points, that measure specific conductivity, pH, sodium, and dissolved oxygen at various locations of the condensers, operational prior to Nuclear Heatup.
Status Licensee work is ongoing and expected to be completed prior to Nuclear Heatup. Region III review of this item will follow per Open Item (440/85070-02).
Prior To Exceeding 5% Power A. Licensee must implement the activities remaining to complete the Detailed Control Room Design Review and correct all human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) identified in Attachment 3, Paragraph 1, to their license.
License Condition 2.C.(7).
2
Status
, Licensee work is ongoing. Most activities were completed by May 19, 1986.
! A letter to NRR was sent on May 28, 1986, and closed out all issues with the exception of completion of certain HEDs that will be completed prior to exceeding 5% power. A followup letter is due June 27, 1986.
B. Licensee to obtain letters of agreement from all school districts for the supply of buses for evacuation.
LicenseCondition2.C.(8)(a).
Status Letters of agreement have been obtained and should be documented in SSER 10.
C. Licensee to verify that the training of Fire Protection personnel in i
radiological monitoring and decontamination procedures are completed and verify that the necessary decontamination equipment has been provided at the fire department facilities for each reception center.
4 License Condition 2.C.(8)(b).
Status The above activities have been completed and should be documented in SSER 10.
D. Licensee must make further confirmatory analysis of equipment in the containment that have not been qualified for pressure survivability, or have a narrow margin of pressure survivability.
License Condition 2.C.(10)(a).
Status The analysis is reportedly completed and being reviewed by the licensee.
A letter to NRR should follow in early to mid June.
E.
Licensee must ensure that written procedures are available for operation of the hydrogen igniter system.
License Condition 2.C.(10)(b).
Status Work is ongoing by the licensee, and is expected to be completed by June 27, 1986.
F. Licensee must obtain, install, and test IEEE Class 1E qualified isolation transformers in the power supply for Division III APRM circuits.
License Condition Attachment 1, Item B.3.
3
Status e
Licensee activities are ongoing at this time and scheduled to be completed by June 15, 1986.
Licensee to perform a reverification of System Operating Instructions 4
G.
as committed to by letter dated March 4, 1986, to Region III.
License Condition Attachment 1, Item B.4.
Status i
Reverification is ongoing by licensee. Review by NRC will follow per Open Item (440/86006-01).
H. Licensee to install identification tags on instrument valves identified in a commitment letter dated March 14, 1986, to Region III concerning instrument valve lineup verification.
License Condition Attachment 1, Item B.S.
Status Review by NRC will Ongoing workItem follow per Open is being performed (440/86006-04 . by)the licensee.
Supplement No. 9 to the Perry Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0887) requires that certain confirmatory actions concerning the January 31, 1986, earthquake be performed by the licensee and a report sent to NRR.
Status The licensee sent some preliminary information to NRR and a Final Report is expected to be sent by June 16, 1986.
I. There are 11 Region III Open Items listed in Attachment 1 to this enclosure that must be resolved prior to exceeding 5% power. One of these items is mentioned above as a license condition.
4
REGIOss III TMCKING SYSTEt3 84/30/03 eE 1 TACoeE;Y l T3 ENCLgSURE 3 UPDATED = 4/30/e3 STILL OM:3 SORT CY STATUS REY: C RESOLUTION ITEse ITEN TYPF/
- FACILITY NAME LICENSEE INTERIN INSPECTOR CL9MOUT Ese esta/ INS 8ECTOR/ REPORY eso.
SPONSE Sen meSULE NO. BRIEF: DESCRIPTION DESIGNATED NO. INSPECTIose ASSItesEO e/rceees.ee OPEN ITEse PERRY 1 STATUS
- STATUS KEY = EFFECTIVE 03/el/05 A ITEN TMAT 88U5T SE CLOSED PRIOR TO FUEL LOAD l 8 ITEN THAT NUST BE CLOSED PRIOR TO INITIAL: CRITICALITY C ITEN TNAT seuST SE CLOSED PRIOR 70 EACEEDING SS POWER l
D ITEN NOT REGUIRED To RE CLOSED BY FUEL LOA 0e !NITIAL
! t CRITICALITY OR FULL PoseER OPERATION i
UseRESOLVED ITEN PERRY 1 KAUFuese e/054I6-62 KAUFeeAh j 37eSI STATUS C PIPE SUPPORT CALCULATIONS LACK UseIFORMITY WITH RESPECT 70 45e77 KAUFesase AseALYZIse8 JOINT C0esFI6uRAT10N.
Test ACT. PLAN OPEN ITEN PERRY 1 FRPS e/C5422=28 STATUS C DETEmmtesE TMAT N0 ELE GAS NONITORS WITH EXTEas0ED RAseGE ANO IODINESS868 seILLER PARTICULATE se0NITORING HavE.SEEN INSTALLEO IN ACCORDANCE WITH SER Asep SSER3 11 5 (T41 sII.F.1 1 & II.F.1.23.
l __
i a/C5822=32 feel ACT. PLAes SPEse ITEse PERRY 1 , r#PS i STATUS C j VERIFY THAT IN-CONTalossetesi RADI A110se MISH LEVEL NONITORS NAWE-1 effee IseSTALLES IN ACCORCANCE WITH SER I2 3 3 (TRI SII.F.1 33.
I segLesES OPEN ITEN PERRY 1 OPS / FPS j J/55099=48 i i 44784 STATUS C I EVALUATION OF CABLE TRAY SUPPORTS SY SS power FOR FIRE.
4 SAOSE VIOLATIces SEVERITY LEwCL 4 PERRY 1 EROSE e/002:I g ,
- 1 42494 STATUS C i A. SOIS TECNeetCALLY INADEeuaTE Sette GROSE
- 3. wo se07 PROPERLY PREPARED OR INPLEseENTEO.
e w ___ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _
. 1 94#36#es tee 2 REGION III TCACKING SYSTEQ LTTCCNeett;T l TO ENCLOSURE 3 UPDATED = A/30/e6 STILL OPEN SORT SY 3TATUS MEY: C RESOLUTION ITEN
~
LICENSEE INTERIN INSPECTOR CLOSEGUT ITEn No./ INSPECTOR / ITEM TYPE / FACILITY NAME REPe#V me.
DEsp0=5E DUE 88000LE 8e0. SRIEF.DESCRIPTIow DESIGNATED NO. INSPECTIces A55ttesEO PERRY 1 E*5 Se/05ece-41 SeeELL OPEN ITEM 927e1 ST ATUS .'O.,
- C0sePLETE THE TESTING AND ACCEPTANCE OF TME *tWAC AND R40!ATION-*
NOMITORING SYSTEM FOR THE T5C.
PERRY I EPS 4e/05e30-02 SesELL ITEM 92701 STATUS O OPEN C0sePLETE THE TESTING AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE NVAC ANO R40!ATION se0MITORING SYSTEM FOR THE EOF. _
_ - ~.
PERRY 1 se0FFETT bSe/83001-PP CEI leCFR21 REPORT 04R262 STATUS C MANAes MIGN VOLTAGE POWER SOURCE TO THE DETECTORS OF THE POST ACCIDENT MONITORING SYSTEN WAS FOUNO TO GE OSCILLATING SETWEEN 240 To 1830 vac RESULTING IN THE ASSOCIATED MINERIAL
-IWSULTATION BREAKING 00WN.
TOI leCFR21 REPORT PERRY 1 RROSE 4e/Ocest-Pr 04R263 STATUS C 70J. PART 21 OATED e3/10/86 C0*sCERe65 POSSISLE. DAMAGE TO THE ELAST0 seer LINER IN THE CLEARFLOW C000PANY FOOT v4LVE pe0UesTED IN 1 THE LURE OIL Sucep TANK. _,
FRPS PERRY I ise/seele-se SULLETIN / /
STATUS C ISSUE DATE: 05/06/se CLOSE0uis CONTANINATION OF N0waA010 ACTIVE SYSTEN AND RESULTING POTENTIAL FOR UNes0esITORED, UNCONTROLLED RELEASE OF RADI0 ACTIVITY 70 ,
F.NVIRoateetNT.
SEstY FOR INFO. _-
PERRY i Pouus.S w./... 3- .Uuffrw / /.
CLOSCOUTI R/el/s3 STATUS C ISSUE DeTEt 11/15/05 NOTOR-OPER VALVE COMes0N 400E FALURES OURING PLAldT TRAseSIENTS.
e ne
ENCLOSURE 4 Significant Event Reports Since the license issuance, there have been 13 LER's subnitted. The LER descriptions provided below were taken from the LER abstracts provided by the licensee.
LER 86-001-0 Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuations occurred due to upscale trips of the neutron monitoring system Intermediate Range Monitors (IRMs). These trips were attributed to " noise" in the IRMs caused by grounding bus fluctuations. The actuations occurred during initial fuel loading (prior to initial criticality).
LER 86-002-0 Division 11, Channels A and B Redundant Reactivity Control System (RRCS) l Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) actuation occurred, which resulted in a Scram
! Discharge Instrument Volume (SDIV) high level trip of the Reactor Protection
! System (RPS) (control rods were already fully inserted). The RRCS Channel B i
trip was caused by reinstalling a Card Select Decoder (CSD) printed circuit card, which had been removed to verify its calibration date. The Channel A i trip was initiated when the digital display was being redirected from the monitor mode to the off mode.
LER 86-003-0 A Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System outboard containment isolation. During performance of a monthly leak detection surveillance test, a technician working in a cramped location inside a panel touched a lifted wire to the relay housing which blew the 120 vac fuse in the RWCU isolation logic and caused an outboard containment isolation.
LER 86-004-0 On April 13, 1986, the Containment /Drywell Purge System continued to operate and was not secured as required by Technical Specifications when the Unit 1 Plant Vent Radiation Monitor was de-energized to perform preventive maintenance. A Limiting Condition for Operation was not met for 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
LER 86-005-0 On April 21, May 10, May 17, and May 19, 1986, the Control Room Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning (CRHVAC) system shifted into its' Emergency Recirculation (ER) mode due to high Chlorine Gas Monitor trip signals. The cause of the first actuation was a defective filament in the optic lamp. The second, third, and fourth events were caused by paper torn in the monitors.
-, -- - , , , , , ,--w --,,,--,,,----.-n--, , . ., ,,n- , , . , - . - , - -,-w-- -+-----,--~~,--------,----a
LER 86-006-0 On April 22 and April 25, 1986, neutron monitoring system instrumentation upscale trips resulted in one manual and one automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuations.
The instrumentation spikes were attributed to electrical noise; however, APRM card vibration is also being evaluated as a contributing factor.
LER 86-007-0 On April 14, 1986, Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system outboard containment isolation valve G33-F0004 was rendered incperable by removal of a jumper supplying power to its closing circuit. The associated inboard containment isolation valve G33-F0001 was not isolated within four hours as required by Technical Specification 3.6.4.
LER 86-008-0 On April 30, 1986, shift operators discovered the containment fire hose reel inboard / outboard supply isolation valves in the open position. During core alterations, Technical Specification requires that these valves be closed in order to satisfy containment integrity. The subsequent investigation determined that the valves had been open before the start of core alterations (March 21, 1986) and that shift operators neglected to initiate the proper administrative controls to track the position of these valves.
LER 86-009-0 On May 4, 1986, a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System outboard containment isolation occurred. Actuation was due to a technician shorting a lifted wire to a relay housing which blew the 120 vac fuse in the RWCU isolation logic and caused an outboard containment isolation.
LER 86-010-0 i
On May 7,1986, it was discovered that the carbon dioxide (C0 9
) fire suppression system was not available to the Diesel Generator Building and fire hose reel in the Control Complex. They were isolated from their C0 source 2
without compensatory measures from April 26 to May 7.
The cause of the uncompensated impairment was failure to reopen a CO '
control valve following maintenance on CO control panels 2 Pressure 2
LER 86-011-0 Gaseous effluent vent stack flow estimates were not performed every four hours as required by Technical Specifications during two different required time intervals.
During the first event, poor comunications between two plant groups resulted in Turbine Building Heater Bay Vent Stack Flow estimates being performed using an inoperable instrument. Flow estimates were again missed when the Unit 2 2
F a
Plant Vent Radiation Monitor was taken out of service. This problem was caused by an operator failing to properly review the existing plant conditions at shift turnover.
LER 86-012-0 On May 8,1986, neutron monitoring system Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) instruments "C" and "G" were declared inoperable due to an overdue surveillance.
The associated Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip system was not placed in the tripped condition within one hour as required by Technical Specifications 3.3.1.
LER 013-0 On May 12, 1986, at 1320 and 1630, the standby train of the Annulus Exhaust Train Gas Treatment System (AEGTS) actuated when the operating train experienced a loss of power due to the deenergization of a Division II 480V load center.
The cause of the events was determined to be a faulty ground over current relay which was tripping prematurely, thus opening the load center supply breaker. I p
i 3
P ENCLOSURE 5 ALLEGATION STATUS As of June 11, 1986, there are no allegations that are open requiring inspections by Region III staff (non 01 staff). However, there are three allegations being reviewed by 01 and, although resolved from a technical viewpoint by Region III specialists; remain open pending completion of OI's investigation for potential wrong doing. Information concerning the three OI allegations should be obtained by contacting Mr. Eugene T. Pawlik, 01 Field Office Director, RIII, at FTS 388-5686.