ML20203G541

Emergency Instruction Validation Summary Rept

ML20203G541
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	04/24/1986
From:	CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20203G539	List: ML20203G541 PY-CEI-NRR-0447, Forwards Perry Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Instruction Validation Summary Rept, Prior to Initial Criticality,Per License Condition Described in Attachment 3 to License NPF-45.Addl Repts,Per Dcrdr Will Be Submitted by May 1986
References
NUDOCS 8604290155
Download: ML20203G541 (175)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:,. O PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PIhrt PEI VALIDATICN

SUMMARY

REPORT Prepared For - he Nuclear Regulatory Cosuaission BY Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company April 24, 1986 d O 8604290155 860424'c-PDR ADOCK 05000440 F ppg

TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE PAGE # INTRODUCTION............................................. 1 PEI VALIDATION PROCESS.................................. 2 f Preparation.......................................... 2 Assessment............................................ 6 Me th odo lo gy.......................................... 6 Validation Exercise Findings......................... 7 Re so lu t i on........................................... 9 CONCLUSION.............................................. 12 ATTACHMENTS TAB # Me thodology PEI Validation Plan........................... 4.1.1 PNPP Control Roon Validation.................. 4.1. 2 Scenario Forms Nov 1985 Exercise............................. 4.2.1 Jan 1986 Exercise............................. 4.2.2 s_ Mar 1986 Exercise............................. 4.2.3 PEI Discrepancy Sheets Validation Exercise Referenced to PEI Designation & Rev................. 4.3.1 Dis crepancy Resolution Summary................

4. 3. 2 Mar 1986 Exercise.............................

4.3.3 Jan 1986 Exercise............................. 4.3.4 Training & Review............................. 4.3.5 Nov 198 5 Exe r c i s e.............................

4. 3. 6 ds

1.0 INTRODUCTION

O De Perry Nuclear Power Plant has successfully completed the Plant Emergency Instruction (PEI) Validation Plan determining that the actions specified in the PEIs can be performed by the operator to manage the emergency conditions effectively. De following objectives were validated: 1. De PEls are usable, i.e., they can be understood and followed without significant confusion, delays, or errors. 1. A correspondence exists between the instructions and the Control Room and plant hardware. 3. De instructions presented in the PEIs are compatible with the shif t staffing, qualifications, training, and experience of the operating staff. 4. A high level of assurance exists that the instructions will work, i.e., the instructions guide the operator in mitigating transients and i accidents. his summary report documents the work and findings of the PEI Validation Plan. i

O Page: 1

2.0 PEI VALIt& TION PROCESS ?% ! U The PEI Validation Plan is a section of the Procedures Generation Package and is included as Attachment 4.1.1. The PEI validation process is described by the three phases of: preparation, assessment, and resolution. Ite manner in which these phases were implemented during the validation is s talled in the following subsections. 2.1 PREPARATION The PEI validation exercises were first integrated with the Control Room validation. The integrated validation procedure, included as Attachment 4.1.2 was developed to evaluate the adequacy and usefulness of the control room panels with the Detailed control Room Design Review (DCRDR) and Reg Guide 1.97 O i < ment the >=1 a the s t tv e < a t < oi 9 v sv t m <= oe> in 1 enabling the trained operating crew to respond to emergency situations. The validation process was defined as an iterative effort, since if design modifications or instructions improvements were determined to be necessary, then consequent re-performance of discrete portions of the validation with additional exercises may be required. The simlator method of validation was selected to evaluate both the operator and the plant response to the PEIs in real time for tasks performed in the primary control area of the control room. Each exercise was video recorded for future analyses. Validation of actions performed outside the primary area was done by the plant walk-through methodology. The Perry similator had previously been updated to incorporate design changes from the DCRDR and other Page: 2 ~

plant design change packages. Differences between the simlator panel design ,m t i V and actual plant control room panel design at fuel load were identified and were determined to be of low significance relative to enacting the PEIs scenarios. Simlator salient response limitations for the enacted PEI scenarios were only identified in the modeling of extremely high containment pressures and temperatures, and of plant release radiation related to core degradation. In these two scenarios, these " limited" parameters and other dependent parameters were provided to the operators as discrete static values by the simlator operator. his static infornation was presented to the control room personnel by the simlator operator either verbally or on " Post-it" stickers. If the trend of the parameter was requested, the simlator operator would O respond with an adequate description. his static simlation of a few L) " limited" parameters did not significantly detract from the real time scenario enactments. We integrated validation exercise scenarios were selected such that the major or representative paths in all sections of the PEIs were utilized. A Simlator Scenario Form was prepared for each scenario. Wis Simlator Scenario Form detailed the scenario title, the PEIs evaluated, initial plant conditions, and scenario milestone events including event descriptions & expected operator actions. Be eight scenarios used in the November 1985 validation exercise and the two scenarios used in the January 1986 validation exercise are included as Attachments 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. We integrated validation review team conducted a prevalidation exercise in Page: 3

october 1985 obse wing a total of 10 scenarios performed by two crews to (v) familiarize all members of the review team with the control room activities, verify the validation methodology, and verify the placement of the audio-video equipment. We integrated validation multidisciplinary review team initially consisted of the following personnel: Operations Engineer Human Factors Unit IEC Engineer License Training Instructor Itanan Factors Specialist General Electric Systems Engineer In the January validation exercise a Shift Supervisor was added to the review team to provide additional perspective. During the integrated validation exercises two operating crews performed each scenario. Each operating crew consisted of the following five individuals designated in the Technical Specifications as the minim m shift crew composition: Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor Reactor operators (2) Shift Technical Advisor he operating crew performed or simlated all actions (including com m nications with individuals in cther areas of the plant or off-site, notification of local or federal agencies etc.) as if they were under actual operating conditions. Each scenario comenced with the Unit Supervisor and one Reactor Operator in the control area. We remainder of the crew waited outside the simulator room until two to three minutes following the Public Page: 4

Address summons from a control room operator in the control area to simulate a ( conservative response time. he final PEI validation exercise was performed in March 1986 to evaluate the few significant resolutions incorporated into PEI-B13, Reactor Pressure Vessel Control as Rev. 1 Draft 1. We two scenarios included in Attachment 4.2.3 were selected such that the revised representative paths in PEI-B13 were evaluated. he PEI Validation multidisciplinary review team consisted of the i r'ollowing personnel: Operations Engineer Human Factors Unit I&C Engineer License Training Instructor 'IW operating crews of four operators performed separate scenarios. During this PEI validation exercise the crews performed or simulated all actions as in the integrated validation exercises. 4 ' O Page: 5

I .j-(' 2.2 ASSESSMEtc 2.2.1 Methodology t. Isumediately following the enactment of each scenario, the members of the I review team and the operating crew completed the respective checklist included in Attachment 4.1.2: Review 'Itaa Evaluation Checklist - Attachment 2 Operating Crew Evaluation Checklist - Attachment 3 'Ihe review team leader then directed the scenario critique. First, the operating crew evaluated the usability of the PEIs with major comments. Next, l l individual comments and discrepancies were addressed. 'Ihe operating crew presented problems and discrepancies identified during the enactment. 'Ihe review team presented other observations identificd during the enactment. 'Ihe l I operating crew reviewed the identified observations of the review team. Finally the review team resolved the explanation of possible causes and potential solutions with the operating crew. O Page: 6

l l 2.2.2 Validation Exercise Findings i ( We November 1985 validation exercise evaluated 15 scenario enactments l performed by two crews. We PEIs were demonstrated to be effective, workable, and compatible with the Perry Unit 1 control room. W e PEI instructions were l proven to be capable of effective implementation when the major flow paths of i l the Perry Plant Specific Guideline were tested with dynamic scenarios, i although areas were identified where instruction improvement was required. One crew demonstrated an overall acceptable performance, but the other crew ,w l experienced difficulties related to training. We list of the 51 comments identified is included in Attachment 4.3.6. We following recommendations were implemented to resolve the identified PE1 discrepancies: PEI procedural discrepancies were resolved and issued as Revision 0 to (- provide clear and accurate detail while allowing the desired operational [ flexibility. I PEI training was provided as required, both in the classroom and in the l sin 21ator. he second PEI validation exercise was conducted in January 1986 with four scenarios enacted by t e crews using the Rev. O PEIs. he integrated validation review team and the Operations General Supervisor rated the overall performance as very good. We minimum shift crew manning was adequate to perform the required tasks. While most of the consents and discrepancies l noted were of a minor significance, difficulty was observed in performing l~ one task in PEI-B13, Reactor Pressure Vessel Control. his validation exercise demonstrated the PEIs to be usable, compatible with the control room Page: 7

n panels and the control room crew, ark! effective in mitigating accidents, Q pending adequate resolution of the newly identified discrepancies. Se list of the 15 comuments identified is included 'in Attachment 4.3.5. We following action was taken to resolve the identified PEI discrepancies: PEI procedural discrepancies identified during the validation exercise and from previous training & review comuments were resolved with revisions to the in?tructions in Rev 1 Draft 1 of the PEIs. A validation exercise was scheduled to prove the adequacy of the stream-lined PEI-B13, Reactor Pressure Vessel Control. Except for this PEI, all of the deficiencies and enhancements incorporated into this draft were not significant with regard to the execution of the PEls. %e March 1986 validation exercise performed two scenarios with two crews, exercising PEI-B13, Reactor Pressure Vessel Control, Rev. 1 Draft 1. A crew experienced difficulty at the start of the validation exercise. Immediate corrective action in the form of training was taken. We validation exercise was then performed utilizing an equivalent scenario. Both formal validation scenario enactments demonstrated an overall acceptable performance. No significant confusion, delays, or errors were identified. We list of the 5 comments identified is included in Attachment 4.3.3. No deficiencies were identified. Enhancements were incorporated into PEI-B13, Reactor Pressure Vessel Control, Rev. 1. We PEI validation process was concluded. OV l Page 8

2.3 RESCLUTION m i ) LJ We discrepancies and cossments identifiel during each validation exercise were recorded using the PEI Validation Plan Dis.;tepancy Sheets. Following the November 1985 validation exercise the PdIs were revised from the numerical designated series to the Master Parts List (system) named series to provide more meaningful descriptions consistent with the Master Parts List name designations of the Off Normal Instructions (ONIs). Attachment 4.3.1 is included to properly document the PEI names that were used in each validation exercise and the corresponding Revision level (and draft number, if l appropriate). Some additional consnents were generated during the training I sessions and subsequent review. Although not required by the PEI Validation l Plan, those consnents identified as discrepancies were recorded on a Discrepancy Sheet for completeness to identify all the discrepancy items which l were identified during the validation. @e PSI Discrep.ncy Sheets for each validation exercise as well as the training & review comments are included in.3. he Operations Engineer proposed resolutions to the consnents and discrepancies identified on the Discrepancy Sheets and submitted the proposed resolutions to the Operations Senior Staff Engineer (SRO licensed) for review and approval. W e PEI validation resolutions were analyzed by categorizing the resolutions and classifying the coments. The resolutions were categorized as followst deficiency, l enhancement, l later - possible enhancement deferred for further review, not a discrepancy. l i Page: 9 L

A deficiency required correction to come into compliance with the Perry /C Specific Technical Guideline, CAP-0507, the Preparation of Plant Daergency Instructions; or the operator PEI performance standard benchmark. An enhancement was an improvement; these items were adequate but were improved to achieve superior quality. A possible enhancement deferred for further review was designated for an adequate item which has the potential of being improved, but only after a proper period of review and training. A comument determined to be without basis or justification was identified as not a discrepancy. Each comment was further classified as one of four types:

format, T'

technical,

training, O

manning. We Discrepancy Resolution Summary is included as Attachment 4.3.2. We overview of the 94 total comument resolutions by categories ist 26% deficiencies, 50% enhancements, 2% laters - possible enhancements deferred for further review, 22% not discrepancies. he overview of the comments by type is: 23% format, 63% technical, 13% training, 1% manning. Page 10

All of the resolutions regarding inprovem nts or corrections in the PEI text were incorporated in or before Revision 1 of the Master Parts List named PEIs. O <O Page 11

3.0 CONCWSION 0 In conclusion the MI Validation Plan accomplished the following objectives: 1. 1he Mrs are usable. 2. A correspondence exists between the mis and the Control Room and plant hardware. 3. The MI instructions are compatible with the shift staffing, qualifications, training, and the experience of the operating staff. 4. A high level of assurance exists that the mis will mitigate transients and accidents. O Page: 12

Pagst 36 Bew. 1 FEI Valid; tion Flas () PEI Validation Plan 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this plan is to guide the administrative process used in the validation of the Plant Emergency Instructions (PEIs) and to assign responsibilities for the process. 2.0 SCOPE This plan identifies the aspects of the validation program process and gives guidance that encompasses both validation methods, walk-through and simulator. Specific guidance for each method is pre-sented in its appropriate checklists (See Attachments 1 and 2). 3.0 RESPONSIBILITY 3.1 The Manager, Perry Plant Operations Department shall approve all FEla and revisions af ter recommendation for approval by PORC. 3.2 The Operations Section General Supervisor (CS0) shall be responsible for the following: 3.2.1 Managing the validation program and ensuring its smooth coor-dination with the training program. 3.2.2 Determining if validation is needed and its scope. 3.2.3 Selecting the validation method or methods. 3.2.4 Appointing and training an observer / reviewer team. 1. Three to six persons for the simulator validation method. 2. One person per operator for the walk-through validation method (one-on-one). 3.2.5 Completing applicable portions of the PEI Validation Form,. 3.2.6 Arranging for rotating operator crews through the training / validation sessions. 3.2.7 Scheduling simulator training time for validation purposes as O appropriate. 1 l

Pages 37 Rev. 1 (Cost.) PEI Valid _ tion Plas 3.2.8 . feviewing discrepancies and resolutions forwarded by observer / I'veview personnel. 3.2.9 Ensuring that all revisions are reviewed by the NDAS Human Factors Unit. 3.2.10 Forwarding recommended resolutions and procedure changes for approval.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 INPO Guideline 83-006 Emergency Operating Procedures Validation Guideline. 4.2 BWR Owners Group Emergency Procedures Guidelines, Revision 3. 4.3 Resuits of PEI verification. 4.4 OAP-0507, Freparation of Plant Emergency Instructions. 5.0 DEFINITIONS See section 5.0 of the Procedures Generation Package. 6.0 DETAILS 6.1 Program Description When developing this PEI validation program, the following major items were considered: 1. How PEI validation will be performed. 2. How to appropriately use simulators or walk-throughs for validation. 3. How operating and training experience will be integrated into the program evaluation. 4. The evaluation criteria to be applied and the methods to be followed in resolving discrepancies. 5. How coupletion of the PEI validation process will be docu-mented. O

Pages 34 Rev.: 1 (Co t.) PRI Valid; tion Plan The progres is based on the industry document Eastgency Oper.atina Procedures Validation Guideline (IIIPO 83-006). This plan addresses the following objectives: 1. PEla are usable, i.e., they can be understood and followed without confusion, delays, and errors. 2. A correspondence exists between the instructions and the Control Room / plant hardware. 3. The instructions presented in the PEIs are compatible with the shif t staf fing, qualifications, training, and experience of the operating staff. 4. A high level of assurance exists that the instructions will

work, i.e., the instructions guide the operator in mitigating transients and accidents.

Regardless of the method, the PEI validation process can be des-cribed by the three phases of: preparation, assessment, and resolu-tion. 6.1.1 Preparation Each validation method will use the applicable evaluation cri-teria presented in Table 1, and the scenario to be used will s be recorded on the appropriate scenario form: 1. Walk-Through Scenario Fora.. (Attachment 1, Sheet d). 2. Simulator Scenario Form, (Attachment 2, Sheet d). Further specific guidance in preparation for each validation method is presented in the checklist for the validation method (Attach-ments 1 and 2). 4 6.1.2 Assessment Specific guidance for assessment using each validation method is presented on the checklist for each validation method (Attachments 1 and 2). 6.1.3 Resolution Resolution will be accomplished by reviewing discrepancies and consents presented on the Discrepancy Sheet, (Attachment 4). The observer / reviewer will propose solutions, if needed, and forward to the Operations Section General Supervisor for approval, with the other designated documentation.

Rev.I 1 Attachuset 3 (Cost.) PRI V.alidation Plan 6.2 validation Method Selection criteria l The staulator validation methodology will generally be utiliseo in preference to the walk-through anthodology. The simulator va' ids-tion astbodology allows for evaluation of both the operator and i plant response to the Fels in real time. Bowever, sous situations i any dictate the use of a complete walk-through or a partial walk-through, partial simulator anthodology. Some situations which any require the use of the walk-through methodology are listed below: 1. A particular instrument. control circuit or system is not staulated. 2. The simulator is not programmed to provide the correct re-t sponse in a specific scenario, and this scenario is necessary to validcte the Fels. 3. A particular instrument, control circuit or system is not simulated correctly. J Validation will be utilised for those operator actions to be per-forand in the primary control area of the control room. Actions to be performed outside of this area vill be validated through the control room task analysis or through the use of a plant walk-through asthodology. 6.3 Scenario Selection Criteria Scenarios should be selected such that all sections and asjor or representative paths in the FEle era utilised. Other factors which should be considered when selecting scenarios are listed below. I 1. The validation anthodology to be utilized, slaulator or walk-through, should be considered. Generally, more detail and i direction will be needed in scenarios which are to be utilized in validations using the usik-through methodology. I 2. The limitations of the simulator should be considered. Sc enar-ios should be developed which fully exercise the Fels while making the most use of the capabilities of the slaulator. This will minimize the necessity to use the walk-through i methodology. 3. The relative probabilities of the events described in the scenarios should be considered. Higher probability events should be chosen in preference to lower probability events. This will maximise the usefulness of the validation by exer-cising the FEIs in the most likely scenarios. t O i

Passt 40 i Rev.: 1 (Co^t.) 4.4 Document tion The documented items needed to provide a history of the validation O program are specified on each validation method checklist (Attach-V ment I and 2). These items will be asintained as a validation pack-age in the document control storage area. 7.0 ATTACHMENTS i 7.1 Attachment 1 - Checkliet for Walk-Through Method of Validation. 7.2 Attachment 2 - Checklist for Simulator Method of Validation. 7.3 Attachment 3 - PEI Validation Form. 7.4 - Discrepancy Sheet. 7.5 Attachment 5 - Table 1 Evaluation Criteria. O O

Bew. 1 (Cent.) PEI Validation Plan Sheet a Checklist for Walk-Through Method of Validation i 1.0 PURPOSE l The purpose of this checklist is to provide guidance for the walk-through method of validating PEls. a 2.0 VALIDATION PROCESS PEI validation will be conducted in three parts: preparation, assessment, and resolution. 2.1 Preparation The designated observer / reviewer will be responsible for the following: 1. Using and completing the PEI Validation Form (Attachment 1, sheet d). 2. Reviewing the scope of the validation designated by the O Operations Supervisor or his representative. 3. Developing or modifying scenarios to support the scope of validation and filling out the Walk-Through Scenario Forn (Attachment 2). 4. Modifying / selecting the developed evaluation criteria to support the scope of validation. 5. Developing or modifying scenarios which are time dependent to support the scope of the validation. 6. Selecting operators that are representative of the training level expected of all the operators. 7. Scheduling the needed resotarces for walk-through. a. observer / reviewer (s) b. operator (s) involved c. control room or control room simulator d. set of PEls and support instructions 2.2 Assessment () The designated observer / reviewer will perform the following duties:

pega 42 Rev.: 1 (Cont.) FEI V;lidation plan Attachanst 1 (Cont.) Sheet b 1. Brief the operator on the scope of validation and how the assessment will be conducted. 2. Follow the developed or modified scenario by first giving the plant initial conditions and then give the changing plant parameters while walking through the instructions. 3. At the completion of each scenario, perfore the following actions: a. Evaluate the usability of the FEl's, b. Direct the operating crew to complete the evaluation criteria checklist included as Attachment 5. 4. Conduct a debriefing with the operators as soon as possible after each walk-through assessment, using the following se-quence: a. Brief the participants on the purpose and objectives for debrisfing. b. Have operators present problems and discrepancies which they had identified during assessesnt. t c. Neve operators provide possible reasona for problems. d. Present other problems and discrepancies identified during assessment. e. Neve operators describe possible reasons for the other problems. f. Summarise the findings of the debriefing for the opera-tors. 5. Record discrepancies and comments on Attachment 4. 2.3 Resolution 2.3.1 The designated observer / reviewer will perfore the following duties: 1. Review comments and discrepancies. 2. Propose resolutions for the Operations Section General i Supe rvisor. 3. Submit the validation package to the Operations Section General Supervisor. l 2.3.2 The Operations Section General Supervisor will perfore the following duties: O

Paget 43 Rev.: 1 (Cost.) PRI Olidation Plan (Cont.) Sheet c O 1. Review proposed resolutions with appropriate staff. l 2. Select resolutions for incorporation in the FEla. 3. Present the revised PEls for review and approval. [ 3.0 DOCtHENTATION a The following documentation will; be submitted as a validation package: 1. Completed PEI Validation Forms (Attachment 3). 2. Completed Discrepancy Sheets (Attachment 4). 3. Completed Walk-Through Scenario Forma (Attachment 1. Sheet d). 4. Evaluation Criteria used. 5. Fels used for the validation. O

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~ Peso 44 Rev.: 1 (Cost.) PEI Validation Plan (Cont.) Sheet d Walk-Through Scenario Form PEI-

Title:

s Date:

Purpose:

Scenario

Description:

On attached sheets, list the following information: \\ Initial Plant Conditions Narrative Summary Control Room Data Sheets which list plant conditions, events, etc. O

Page1 45 Bew. 1 (Cost.) PEI Validation Plan Attachment 2 Sheet a Checklist for Simulator Method of Validation 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this checklist is to provide guidance for the simu-1stor method of validating PEls. 2.0 VA1.IDATION PROCESS PEI validation will be conducted in three parts: peparation, assessment, and resolution. 2.1 Preparation The designated observer / reviewer team will be responsible for the following: 1. Using and completing the PEI Validation Form (Attachment 3). 2. Reviewing the scope of the validation as directed by the P erations Section General Supervisor or his representative. f 3. Developing or modif ying scenario runs to support the scope of validation. 4. Completing the upper portion of the Simulator Scenario Form (Attachment 2. Sheet d) and forwarding to the simulator super-visor. 5. Developing data collection techniques. 6. Evaluating plant-to-simuistor characteristics. 7. Making the required adjustments to the PEI set to use on the simulator. 8. Selecting and scheduling the operating crews. 9. Modifying / selecting the evaluation criteria to support the scope of validation. 10. Selecting operators that are trained to the level expected of all the operators. 11. Ensuring the PEls and supporting procedures are available.

Pages 44 Rev.: 1 (Cost.) l PRI Validation Flas (Cset.) Sheet b 2.2 Assessment The designated observer / reviewer team will perfore the following ( duties: 1. Brief the operating crew on the scope of the validation and how the assessenet will be conducted. i 2. Ensure the observer / reviewer tese does not interfere or inter-act with the operating crew. 3. Brief the operating crew on initial plant conditions for each scenario run. 4. At the completion of each scenario perfore the following actions: a. Evaluate the usability of the PEls. b. Direct the operating crew to complete the evaluation criteria checklist included as Attachment 5. 5. Conduct a debriefing with the operating crew as soon as possible after each scenario run using the following sequence: a. Brief the participants on the purpose and objectives for debriefing. b. Have operators present problems and discrepancies which they had identified during assessesnt. c. Have operators provida possible reasons for problems. d. Present other probises and discrepancies identified during assessment. e. Have operators describe possible reasons for the other problems. f. Summarise the findings of the debriefing for the operators. 6. Record discrepancies and comments on Attachment 4. 2.3 Resolution 2.3.1 The designated observer / reviewer team will perfore the following duties: 1. Review comments and discrepancies. 2. Propose resolutions on Attachment 4 to the GSO. 3. Submit the validation package to the CSO. O 4

~ Pages 47 Rev. 1 (Cost.) Pil Validation Plas (Coet.) Sheet c 2.3.2 The GSO will perform the following duties: 1. Review proposed resolutions with appropriate staff. 2. Select resolutions for incorporation in the PEls. 3. Present the revised PEIs for review and approval. 3.0 DOCUMENTATION The following documentation will be submitted with the validation package: 1. Completed PEI Validation Forms (Attachment 3). 2. Completed Discrepancy Sheets (Attachment 4). 3. Completed Simulator Scenario Forma (Attachment 2. Sheet d). 4. Evaluation criteria used. 5. Fels used for the validation. O 6. Data on plant-to-simulator characteristics. i l l O .nen-----,-.w._,,,vn---_,.-,,-,-n- --_,_w_r--,--,,,,,wn.n-nw.,-- --,--,,-,,- n

Pages 48 Rev.: 1 (Cost.) FEI V;11dation Flas (Cost.) Sheet d ,3O Simulator Scenaria Form PEI-Revision:

Title:

Date:

Purpose:

Scenario

Description:

Initial Plant Conditions: O Simulator Sequence (to be completed by the simulator supervisor): TIME EVENT /REMARES/0BSERVER C(DIMENT O

Pegas 49 Rev.: 1 Att.rheent 3 (Cont.) PEI Validation Plcs Attscheent 3 ) PEI Validation Form Page of FEI-Revision: PEI

Title:

i Scope of Validation: Validation Method of Methods to be Used: Designated Observer / Reviewer (s): Preparation -Os Completed on: By: Assessment completed on: By: Operator (s) Involved: - (Nalif ication: (SRO, RO, Other) Resolution, Completed on: By: c. Documentation P Package Forwarded on: By: l u

L,Cae: @) Rev.: 1 (Cont.) PRI validation Plan Attschaset 4 Discrepancy Sheet: Number FEl-Revision: Step Number: Discrepancy: 1 Evaluator: Date: Resolution: O i i i Date: Supervisor: Approved: YES NO (circle one) Operations Section Date: General Sitpervisor: Resolution Date: Incorporated By: l O

_- _ - ~ Bev.: 1 Attachasst 3 (Cont.) PE: validatics Plcs Attachasst 5 Table 1 I Evaluation Criteria Legend: X - applicable to the validation method 0 - not applicable to the validation method W-T - walk-through validation method S - simulator validation method Applicable to: 1. USABILITY W-T S A. LEVEL OF DETAIL I I 1. Is there suf ficient information to perform the specified actions at each stept 1 I 2. Are the alternatives adequately described at each decision pointt 1 1 3. Are the labeling, abbreviations, and locatica information as provided in the FEI sufficient to enable the operator to find the needed equipment? I I 4. Is the FEI missing inforestion needed to annage the emergency condition? I 1 5. Are the contingency actions suf ficient to address the symptoas? I I 6. Are the titles and numbers sufficiently descriptive to enable the operator to i find referenced and branched instruc-tions? B. UNDERSTANDABILITY I X 1. Is the PEI easy to read? x X 2. Are the figures and tables easy to read with accuracy? I 1 3. Can the values on figures and charts be easily determined? X X 4. Are CAITIION and NOTE statements O readily understandablef

._. ~ -. Rev.: 1 Attachesnt 3 (Cost.) PEI V.211dation Pica (Cont.) Applicable to: W-T S X X 5. Are the PEI steps readily under-standablet s II. OPERATIONAL CORRECTNESS A. PLANT COMPATIBILITY X X 1. Can the actions specified in the in-instruction be performed in the designated sequence? X X 2. Are there alternate success paths that are not included in the Fels? X X 3. Can the information from the plant instrumentation be obtained as specified by the FEI? O I 4. Are the plant synytoms specified by the FEI adequate to enable the l operator to select the applicable FEI? O O X 5. Are the FEI entry conditions appro-priate for the plant symptoms dis-played to the operator? X X 6. Is inforestion or equipment not specified in the PEI required to accomplish the task? O X 7. Do the plant responses agree with the FEI basis? I X 8. Are the instrument readings and tolerances stated in the FEI con-sistent with the instruusst values displayed on the instruments? I X 9. Is the FEI physically compatible with the work situation (too bulky to hold, binding would not allow them to lay flat in work space, no place to lay + the Fels down to use)? X 0 10. Are the instrument readings and j l tolerances specified by the FEI for 1 remotely located instruments accurate? I i . ~.

Pigst~ 53 Rev.: 1 (Cont.) PEI Validation Pica (Cont.) Applicable to: W-T S l B. OPERATOR COMPATIBILITY i X X 1. If time intervals are specified, can the action steps be performed on the plant within or at the designated time i intervals? I X 2. Can the action steps be performed by the operating shift? I X 3. If specific actions are assigned to individual shif t personnel, does the PEI adequately aid in the coordina-tion of actions among shift personnel where necessary? I I 4. Can the operating shift follow the designated action step sequences? I X 5. Can the particular steps or sets of steps be readily located when O required? I X 6. Can the exit point be returned to without omitting steps when required? I X 7. Can instruction branches be entered at the correct point? I X 8. Are PEI exit points specified adequately? O

Peso: 54 Rev.s 1 Attactument 4 PRI Trcising Flc3 FEI Training Plan O 1.0 FURPOSE To provide a description of the program for providing training on the Plant Emergency Instructions (Fels). 2.0 SCOPE This document describes the training objectives and the methods used to accomplish those objectives; describes the plan for ad-dressing revisions to PEls in the training program; and identifies the techniques for evaluating the training to ensure the objectives are being met. I 3.0 RESPONSIBILITY 3.1 The Perry Training Section General Supervisor shall ensure that the objectives of this document are est both for initial and re-qualification training programs and for the initial PEls and future revisions. 3.2 The Operations Section General Supervisor shall ensure that per-sonnel are available to receive the training described by this plan.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 14tter, Youngblood (NRC) to Edelman (CEI), 5/6/83. 5.0 DEFINITIONS None 6.0 DETAILS 6.1 Training Objectives and Methods l 6.1.1 Students must understand the technical bases for the FEIs. 1 O 6.1. 2 Students must have a working knowledge of thu technical con-tent of the Fels. ---z. --.,---,..,_,,,_,_-_-,,,.,,-a,_.-n...~, ,,-,..--.,.,n,

Rev.: 1 Attechneet 4 (Coet.) PEI Troicing Plea 6.1.3 Students must understand the philosophy of sygton oriented emergency instructions. 6.1.4 Students must be capable of executing the FEIs under opera-tional conditions. t 6.2 Initial FEI Trainina Program Outline The training progrm for the FEle consists of classroom and simula-i tor segments. l 6.2.1 Initial PEI Classroom Training Frogram The initial RI classroom training seguent consists of approx-instely 30 hours of direct contact hours of instruction. The asjor topics covered in this training are listed below. 4 1. The philosophy of the event oriented Fels as dif ferenti-ated from event specific instructions. 2. The format and structure of the FEIs. t 3. An explanation of each step in the Fels. This explanation includes both the purpose and, where applicable, the tech-nical basis for the step. O e F nati r **

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ae* 11 it - 1 6. curve utilised in the Fels. 5. A walk-through discussion of several events demonstrating 4 the use and interrelatiosahips of the Fels both to other Fels as well as other event based off-moraal instructions. A comprehensive written ewmeimation is administered os comple-tion of the classroom segasat of the initial PEI Training Fro-rom. This examination tests the operators' knowledge of all the topics covered in the classroom segment. 6.2.2 Initial FEI Simulator Training Progree The initial PEI simulator training segment consists of 8 hours of direct contact instruction. This segment follows successful I completion of the classroom segment. This instruction is given to crews which resemble as cicsely as possible the normal shif t complement in the control room. The scenarios used in this training are selected using the i guidelines listed in the FEI Validation Flan, Attachment 3 of the PGP, Section 6.3. i I3perator performance in the simulator seguent is evaluated as i I art of the overall operator license training program. i p I i

n PB838 S4 Rev. 1 (Cont.) PRI Training Plan 6.3 PEI Revisions O Minor revisions (those that are editorial in nature) will normally be covered through required reading, briefings, or lectures. Major revisions (those that af fect intent or significantly af fect the sequence of actions) will be evaluated and will be addressed using the appropriate methods described in Section 6.2. Normally, major revisions will be covered initially through required reading, with supplemental simulator / walk-through exercises conducted in requali-i fication training as required. g 7.0 ATTACHMElfrS None O O

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Page: 1 Rev.: 2 1. INTRODUCTION The PNFP Control Room Validation will be performed to evaluate the adequacy and usefulness of the Control Room Panels with DCRDR and RG 1.97 improvements, the Plant Emergency Instructions (PEIs), and the Safety Parameter Display System in enabling the trained oper-ating crew to respond to emergency situations. This procedure decribes the method to be used to accomplish the PNPP Control Room Validation. 2. VALIDATION PROCESS a. The Perry Control Room Validation process consists of the following phases: 1) Scenario Development 2) Validation Preparation 3) Simulator Exercises 4) Evaluation 5) Resolution () 6) Reporting b. Due to the fact that design modifications and instruction improvements may be necessary, the validation is an iterative effort and consequently reperformance of discrete portiens of the validation may be required. 3. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 3.1 Criteria Scenarios of suf ficient number and variety to adequately test the major procedural flow paths addressed in the PEls shall be devel-oped. Scenarios will be numbered sequentially for ease of identi-fication. Each scenario will detail the PEI flow paths followed. 3.2 Responsibility The Control Roon Velidation Operations Engineer shall be respon'alble for the development and selection of scenarios to be evaluated. A Simulator Scenario Form, Attachment 1, shall be prepared for each scenario. A detailed description of scenario milestones, including event descriptions, expected operator actions and space for comments shall be attached to the Sim:1stor Scenario Form. O c

Page: 2 Rev.: 2 + 4. VALIDATION PREPARATION f The Review Team will prepare for the validation simulator exercises by performing a trial review of an operating crew responding to a scenario in the simulator. Preferably the crew observed will be 5 different from the operating crews evaluated. Any validation methodology changes deterisined to be required shall be documented. I 5. SIMULATOR EXERCISES 5.1 Operatina crews There will be two operating crews, designated Crew I and Crew 2. Each Operating Crew shall consist of five individuals designated as the minimum shif t crew composition in the Technical Specifications: a. Two licensed or certified Senior Reactor Operators, SS and US. b. Two licensed or certified Reactor Operators, R0s. c. One Shif t Technical Advisor, STA. Each Operating Crew will enact and be evaluated on each scenario, using the Perry simulator. Because the SPDS may not always be available in emergency situations, each scenario shall be enacted once with SPDS available and once with SPDS unavailable. Crew 1 will have SPDS available only on odd-numbered scenarios; Crew 2 will have SPDS available only on even-numbered scenarios. The Operating Crew should perform or simulate all actions (including commanications with individuals in other areas of the plant or of f-site, notification of local or federal governmental agencies, etc.) se if they were under actual operating conditions. All requireo emergency plan notification forms will be filled out and simulated phone calls may be logged. Each exercise will commence with one SRO and one RO in the control area. The remainder of the Operating Crew will wait outside the simulator room until summoned by the operators in the control area. 5.2 Review Team The multidisciplinary Review Team shall minimally consist of the following five individuals: a. Operations Engineer b. Human Factors Unit IEC Engineer c. Nuclear Training Instructor j d. Human Factors Specialist i e. General Electric Systems Engineer j 1 6

Page: 3 Rev.: 2 ) v The composition of the Review Team may be expanded at the discretion of the Review Team Leader. The Review Team shall observe the Operating Crews' performances on each scenario and evaluate their responses in accordance with Section 6 of this procedure. The Operations Engineer will be the Review Team Leader. With the exception of the Nuclear Training Instructor, members of the Review i Team shall not assist nor interfere with the Operating Crew in any i way. 5.3 Simulator Operator The Simulator Operatar is the Nuclear Training Instructor, who will program the initial conditions and the various f ailure modes for each scenario as described on the Simulator Scenario Form, Attach-ment 1. The scenarios are to be enacted in real-time. The Simula-tor Operator will also act as the interface for the Operating Crew on any communications outside the control room. 5.4 Video Documentation Each exercisa will be recorded on video tape to provida a permanent record. 5.5 Simulator Desian Documentation Differences between the simulator panel design and actual plant control room panel design at fuel load shall be documented by the Human Factors Unit. 6. EVALUATION An evaluation shall be conducted by the Review Team and Operating Crew for each scenario. The Control Room Validation is not intended to evaluate the abilities of the Operating Crew or its members, but to evaluate the usefulness and adequacy of the operating tools (i.e., control room design and components, PEIs and associated procedures, and the SEDS) in enabling the trained Operating Crew to respond correctly. Prior to performing the first scenario, the Review Team and Operat-ing Crew should be briefed on the purpose and objectives of the Control Room Validation. They should become familiar with the review forms that will be used. 6.1 Review Team Checklist l (} Each member of the Review Team will take notes on the attachment to the Simulator Scenario Form during the exercise, and immediately j

i Page: 4 Rev.: 2 (v) af terwards complete the appropriate checklists. The evaluation by the Review Team will utilize the three part checklist included as : a. Control Room Evaluation. 5 b. Plant Emergency Instrue. tion (PEI) Evaluation. c. SPDS Evaluation (for those scenarios where the SPDS was avail-able). It is also important to note problems involving the interaction of crew members. Some indicators of dif ficulties are as follows: a. Congested traffic patterns b. Uncertainty about areas of responsibil'.y c. Uncertainty about lines of authorit" d. Dif ficulties with communications and interaction e. Confusion or uncertainty in performing tasks which require more than one operator f. Insuf ficient work space or an inadequate number of operating tools (e.g., procedures, reference materials, telephones, etc.) During the exercises, the Rewiew Team will concentrate on behaviors f'~_ and operational activity that would indicate a potential problem. The assessment of these observations will be made during the de-briefing to determine causality, signigicance, etc. 6.2 Operatina crew Evaluation Checklist Immediately following the enactment of each scenario, each member of the Operating Crew will complete an Operating Crew Evaluation Checklist, included as Attachment 3. Responses should be as de-tailed and complete as possible. Part C will be completed only for those scenarios where the SPDS is available. 6.3 Critique Immediately following completion of each exercise, the Operating Crew shall meet with the Review Team for a critique of the reenario just completed. The discussion should focus on those problem areas identified in the checklists which are deemed to be most signifi-cant. If the Operating Crew responded incorrectly or too slowly at any time, the reason (s) should be determined and corrective measures recommended. A suggested sequence for conducting the critiquing follows: The Operating Crew presents probless and discrepancies identi-a. fied during the enactment with possible causes and potential () solut ions. -._m_.

Page: 5 Rev.: 2 mU b. The Review Team presents other observations identified during the enactment. c. The Operating Crew reviews the identified observations, if applicable, describes possible cause and potential solution for problems. d. The Review Team resolves the explanation of possible causes and potential solutions with the Operating Crew. The Control Room Validation Operations Engineer shall prepare a summary of each exercise critique in accordance with Attachment 4. 7. RESOLUTION Af ter the evaluation process has been completed, the Review Team will analyze all the evaluation sheets, records of critique sessions, and scenario comments. The video tape may be used to clarify comments during the assessment phase. Human Engineering Observations for the Control Room Design and SPDS will be processed according to Figure 1. Discrepancies in PEI usage shall be noted and resolved in accordance with the PEI Validation Plan of the Procedures Generation Package. O 8. REPORTING Two reports of the PNPP Control Roos Validation will be prepared for the NRC. These reports should include the following: a. PEI Validation Report 1) Brief summary of the validation process. 2) Description of scenarios used. 3) List of discrepancies. 4) List of procedural changes resolution of discrepancies. 5) Report shall be submitted prior to initial criticality. b. Control Room Validation Report l I 1) Brief summary of the validation process. I 2) Description of scenarios used. 3) Provide list of Human Engineering Deficiencies, proposed i fixes and implementation schedules. 4) Report shall be submitted prior to receipt of a Full Power License. A copy of this procedure and the document detailtng the dif ferences between the simulator design and the actual plant control room design will be attached to the report.

Page: 6 Rev.: 2 9. REFERENCES 9.1 PNPP Procedures Generation Package. 9.2 PNPP Detailed Control Room Design Review Summary Report, s 9.3 NUREG/CR-3557 CRT Display Evaluation: The Checklist Evaluation of CRT-Cenerated Displays. 9.4 BWR Owners' Group Control Room Survey Workshop (Tulsa, Oklahoma - October 18-20, 1983). 9.5 INPO 83-047 (NtTTAC) Component Verification and System Validation Guideline. 9.6 ALO-1019 Simulator Evaluation of the Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group (BWROC) Graphics Display System (GDS). 9.7 NSAC/39 Verification and Validation for Safety Parameter Display Systema. 9.8 NSAC/61 Verification and Validation of the Yankee Plant Safety Parameter Display System. 10. FIGURES 10.1 Figure 1: DCRDR Validation Review Process to Resolve Control Room Design and SPDS HEOs.

11. ATTACHMENTS 11.1 Attachment 1:

Simulator Scenario Form 11.2 Attachment 2: Review Team Evaluation Checklist 11.3 Attachment 3: Operating Crew Evaluation Checklist 11.4 Attachment 4: Scenario Evaluation Summary O 1 j --,-----n- ,,n----, ._,-..,n. -.-,--g ,,-n-----,-

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Page: 8 Rev.: 2 O Simulator Scenario Form 6 PEI - Revision: i

Title:

l Date: j

Purpose:

Scenario

Description:

1 O Initial Plant Conditions: Simulator Sequence (to be completed by the simulator supervisor): TIE HR: MIN:SEC EVENT / REMARKS / COMMENT h t J i 1 ( O i i ~.., _. -. _ -...,, _. -.. _ _ _... _., _ _ _

Paes 9 Rev.: 2 O Scenario No. Attachesnt 2 Crew No. Review Tasa Evaluation Checklist i A. Control Room Evaluation 1. Did you observe operators uniking to the incorrect area of the control roon on the first try? If so, please explain. 2. Did you observe operators looking at an incorrect display or 4 looking in the wrong direction or area on the first try? If so, please explain. 3. Did you observe operators having difficulty locating a partico-lar control or reaching for an incorrect control on the first try? If so, please explain. 4. Did you observe operators setting a control on an incorrect value or moving it in the wrong direction on the first try? i If so, please explain. 5. Did you observe operators failias to observe a key signal? If so, please explain. 1 O

pages 10 Rev.: 2 Attachesnt 2 (Cont.) 6. DM you observe operators having to convert displayed values to operational process units? If so, please explain. i 7. Did you observe operators opening the door of a recorder in order to read a parametric value? If so, please explain. 8. Did you observe operators having particular dif ficulty with any particular panel or task? If so, please explain. O 9. Did you observe operators needing or desiring more controls or displays to respond to this situation? If so, please explain? 10. Did you observe operators having dif ficulties reading some displays or reaching / operating some controls? If so, please

explain, i

l 11. Did you observe operators having difficulty locating and operating l emergency controls? If so, please explain. O

Page 11 Rev.: 2 (Cont.) 12. Did you observe any situations where an energency control could have been inadvertently activated? If so, please saplain. i f 13. Did you observe operator (s) having difficulty interpreting or responding to the information presented on the annunciator system? If so, please explain.

14. Did you observe operators misinterpreting any information or drawing erroneous conclusions from controls and instrumentation?

If so, please explain. O 1

15. Did you observe any congestion problesis during this exercise?

If so, please explain.

16. Did you observe any uncertataty among the operators as to their area of responsibility?

If so, please explain.

17. Did you observe any uncertaint} among operators as to the lines of authority? If so, please explain.

O

Page 12 Rev.: 2 Attachesnt 2 (Cont.) 18. DM you observe any probises in essenting tasks that require more than one operator to perform? If so, please explain. 6 19. Did you observe any problems in terms of insufficient work space or an inadequate number of operating tools (e.g., procedures, reference asterials, telephones, etc.) to support the response to this scenario? If so, please explain. l 20. Did you observe any verbal instructions between operators having to be repeated? If so, please explain. O 21. Did you observe any verbal instructions between operators not being carried out? If so, please explain. J 22. Did you observe any problems with operators communicating an insuf ficient enount of information to support the coordination of the activities of the entire crew? If so, please esplain. A 23. Did you aske any other observations about the usefulness and adequacy of the control room and instrumentation in enabling the trained operating crew to respond correctly to this O scenario? Plasse describe.

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Page: 13 Rev.: 2 (Cont.) 5. Plant Emeranacy Instruction (PRI) twaluation 1. Did you observe operators selecting the wrong procedure? If so, please explain, s 2. Did you observe operators selecting too many procedures? If so, please explain. 3. Did you observe operators taking an excessive amount of time to read procedures? If so, please explain. O 4 4. Did you observe operators re-reading procedures? If so, please explain. 5. Did you observe operators misunderstanding or having dif ficulties interpreting procedures. If so, please explain. 2 i 6. Did you observe operators not using procedures, when they were available to support a particular operation? If so, please en h h. O

Page 14 Rev.: 2 Attachesnt 2 (Cont.) 7. Did you observe operators having dif ficulty locating key infor-estion in the procedures? If so, please explain. 6 8. Did you observe operators having dif ficulty interpreting infor-nation in charts, graphs, etc. in the procedures? If so, explain. 9. Did you observe operators performing procedural steps out of sequence? If so, please explain. O 10. Did you observe operators neglecting to perform actiocu or steps detailed in the procedures? If so, please explain. 11. Did you observe the operators having difficulty obtaining the necessary information specified in the procedures from the installed plant instruentation? If so, plasse explain. 12. Did you observe the operators using inforestion or equipment not specified in the procedures to accomplish a task? If so, please explain. O l -,,,----,--,,,,,,---,.,,,,e n,,,a.,,r, -,,,-,..._.a ,n ,.------,,,-----....._-e_,--,.----.,n a,,,-.,, ,,-,,,--n .,,,,, - - -, -., ~ -,. +w

Pages 15 Rev.: 2 Attachesnt 2 (Cont.) 13. Did you observe operators having dif ficulty in using the procedures in the control room? If so, please explain. i 6 14 Did you observe operators having dif ficulty moving f rom one procedure to another, as operational conditions required? If so, please explain.

15. Did you observe operators having dif f fi aty using procedures concurrently?

If so, please explaf.. O

16. Did you make any other observations about the usefulness and adequacy of the FEIs in enabling the trained operating crew to respond correctly to this scenario? Please describe.

C. SPDS Evaluation 1. Did you observe operators having difficulty accessing or reading the system when stationed at the controls? If so, please explain. O

Page 17 Rev.: 2 (Cont.) l 8. DM you observe any situations where you thou;At SPD6 was of particular value to the operators in responding to this scenario? If so, please explain. a i 9. Did you observe any situations where you thought SPDS hindered the operators in responding to this scenario? If so, please explain. 10. Did you aske any other observations about the usefulness and adequacy of the SPDS in enabling the trained operating crew to respond correctly to this acenario? Please describe. O

Page 18 Rev.: 2 I Scenario No. Crew No. Operatina crew Evaluation Checklist A. Control Room Evaluation l 1. What problems arose due to the physical layout of the control room (panel locations, storage space, work space, etc.)? t 2. Identify any problems with locating or operating components due to inadequate labeling, location, etc. O 3. Identify any components that were confusing or hard to read or operate due to design or location. I O

Pago 19 Rev.: 2 Attachesnt 3 (Cont.) 4. Could you obtain the ascessary information specified in the procedures from the installed plant instrumentatioat Identify any problem areas, a 6 5. Is there a particular panel which you consider more difficult or confusing to operate than the others? O 6. Does the control room lack any controls or displays needed in your response to this situation? ( o l o 's a ., _ _ -, ~...

Page 20 Rev.: 2 O (Cont.) 7. nov effective do you consider the annunciator system to be in conveying important information to yout i i F 1 8. List any problems locating or using procedures, instructions or reference material. O i 9. Identify any problems with coerunication systems. 1!O e a- ,,~,,---,n,n._,,, ,,,.-,..-,rw_-.,.,,v,- ,_,,,-,___,,-,__n-a_-_,n nn.v..

d 3 i Page: 21 see.: 2 q. ^ Attscheent 3 (Cost.) 10. Identify any problems you encometerodiin responding to this situation sich could have been averted through 'loproved control roast desip. s a ,1 3 ' / N s B. Plant Emergency Instruction (PEI) Evaluation 1. Identify.,'say instances where the PEI did not. supply suf ficient informatdos to complete a given task. O s N 2. Are the alternatives adequately described at each decision Point? f 1 l t -..,. - - - - - + _, -, -, -. - .______.-,,,,y,_ y _,_

Page 22 Rev.: 2 O Attachemat 3 (Cont.) 3. Are the labeling, abbreviatiosa, and location information as provided in the FEI suf ficient to enable the operator to find the needed equipment? i 6 4. Is the FE1 missing information needed to annage the emergency condition? O 5. Are the contingency actions maf ficient to addresa the symptoma? f i r

Peso 23 Rev.: 2 O (Cont.) 6. Are the titles and numbers 6 efficiently descriptive to enable the operator to find referenced nd branched instructions? i 7. Is the PEI easy to read? O 8. Were tables and charts easy to read with accuracy? Cite any 4 problems. i l 9. Are the figures and tables easy to read with accuracy? O f ,.r- -n-,_

i Paget 24 Rev.: 2 O (Cont.) 10. Can the values on figures and charts be easily determined? 6 4 l l 11. Are CAETION and NOTE statements readily understandable? O 12. Are the FEI steps readily understandable? l 13. Can the actions specified in t! c instruction be performed in the designated sequence? i O l

Fage 25 Rw. 2 , (Coat.) 14. Are there alternate success paths that are not included in the PRIst i 6 15. Can the information from the plant instrumentation be obtained as specified by the PEI? O 1 i 16. Are the plant symptoms specified by the FEI adequate to enable the operator to select the applicable PEI? l i l j l l O i

Page 26 Rev.: 2 O Attachesat 3 (Cost.) 17. Are the MI entry conditions appropriate for the plant symptoms displayed to the operator? s 18. Is infomation or equipment not specified in the MI required to accomplish the task?

O 19.

Do the plant responses agree with the MI hasia? 20. Are the instrument readings and tolerances stated in the MI consistent with the instrument values displayed on the instru-j asats? O

Page 27 Rev.: 2 O (Cont.) 21. Is the PRI physically compatible with the work situation (too bulky to hold, binding would not allow them to lay flat in work space, no place to lay the PEIs down to use)? s t 22. If time intervals are specified, can the action steps be per-formed on the plant withis or at the designated time inter-vals? O 23. Can the action steps be performed by the operating shif t? I l l l O

Page 28 Rev.: 2 (Cost.) O 24. If specific actionn are assigned to indivMeal shif t perosanel, does the FEI adequately aM in the coordination of actions among shif t personnel where necessary? t 25. Can the operating shif t follow the designated action step sequences? I I l O I f i 26. Can the particular steps or sets of steps be readily located I when required? O

A = _ Rev. 2 Attachenst 3 (Cont.) O 27. Can the exit point be returned to without omitting steps uben regaired? 1 6 i 28. Can instruction branches be entered at the correct point? O 29. Are FEI exit points specified adequately? i l l l l 30. Identify any problems you encountered responding to this situation which could have been averted through improvements to the FEI. O

Page 30 Rev.: 2 (Cont.) 31. List any specific recommendations for improvement to the FBI. i t C. SPDS Review (To be completed only if SPDS was available.) 1. Did you encounter any dif ficulty operating the system? Cite specific problems. O 2. Plasse comment on the amount of information available. (Any l information that was not available that should be, too inch redundant information, etc.). i O

Pages 31 Eme. 2 Attachasat 3 (Cost.) O 3. Were there any problems understanding the infarestion pre-seated? Cite specific instances. a 4. Were there any problems with the way inforestion uns organised? O 5. Could you access inforwation as quickly as you needed it? Cite any delays. 6. Were there any inconsistencies between SPDS and the control panels regarding color codes, abbreviations, acronyms, equip-ment terminology and symbology? O

Page: 32 Rev.: 2 Attachasst 3 (Cont.) 6. Were you able to use all inforestion as it une presented? Identify cases dare conversion or interpolation uns required. s 7. How mach did you use the SPDS in responding to this situation? Identify those areas in dich it was the most helpful. O 8. Identify any problems you encountered in responding to this situation sich could have been averted through improvements to the SPDS. i O ?

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Paget 33 Rev.: 2

O Scenario twelustion Summary Scenario No.

i Crew No. Significant Human Engineerina Observations and Discrepancies i e l l l j l l t OPSMISI/A/skh l

4.2.1 NOV 1985 EXERCISE SCDERIOS OO Number Title 1 Small Imak in Drywell 2 Small Increasing toCA in Drywell, Ioss of ALL Injection systems 3 Small Break IDCA in Drywell, Loss of High Pressure Make-up, Ioss of Drywell Cooling, Loss of RPV Level Indication 4 Small Break IDCA in Drywell, Failure of Four Rods to Insert, Loss of High Pressure Make-up, Loss of Drywell cooling, Ioss of RPV Imvel Indication 5 Startup in Progress, Inadvertent HPCS Initiation, Power Transient with Fuel Damage, MSIV Hi Red Iso-lation, Small Leak in Drywell, RCIC Initiation and Steam Line Break, Rad Release Out of Con-O Tainment. 6 MSIV Isolation with Stuck Open SRV, Failure to Scram (ARI ok) 7 SRVs Stuck Open, Failure to Scram 8 SRVs Stuck Open, Failure to Scram, Crack in LPCI-B Injection Line, Containment Pressurization, Flooding Required llO 1 l l l l t

SCENARIO: I SMALL LEAK IN DRVELL O PEIs EVALUATED: 1 (RPV CONTROL) 2 (SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE) 3 (DRYWELL TDPERATLNIE) 4 (CONTAlpeENT TBFERATURE) 5 (DRYWELL PRESSURE) s 6 (SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL' s INITIAL CONDITIONS: 100 PERCENT POWER, BEGINr41NG OF CYCLE RCIC out of service while replacing turbine exhaust rupture disks (Simulator malfunction 511 - RCIC turbine trip - is active). NCC Pump C is out of service (Simulator Malfunction 655) a TIME EVENT - REMARKS - EVALUATOR COMMENT 0000 EVENT: A small recirc system suction pipe crack occurs, causing a buildup in drywell pressure and temperature (Simulator malfunction 704). Reactor scrams on high drywell pressure unless operator shuts down the reactor before hand. REMARKS: Operator should anticipate the reactor scram 3 and manually scram the reactor. Operator should recognize leakage as pressure boundary leakage, which is an Unusual Event per EPI-A1 (Emergency Action Level s). Operator should enter PEI-3 (Drywell Temperature Control) and PEI-5 (Drywell Pressure Conteo1). COMMENTS: i 0004 EVENT: LOCA initiation signals and LOCA isolation signals on high drywell pressure occur. NCC and instrument air to the drywell and containment are lost. All divisions of ECCS initiate, with hPCS injecting into the vessel. REMARKS: Operator enters PE!-1 power, level, and O, pressure control sections. Pressure will still be ) controlled by the Steam Bypass System, and Feedwater through the Motor Feed Pump will still be available in i

excess of leakage from vessel. Operator's main concern will be with controlling the rising temperatures in the f containment and drywell, as well as drywell pressure. The automatic injection of WCS is an unusual Event per EPI-A1. Operator may estimate leakage in excess of 50 gpe (from inf ormation f ound on Leakage Detection System panel P642), in which case an Alert thould be called per EPI-A1. COMMENT: i = e' 0010 EVENT: Drywell temperature and pressure continue to rise. Containment temperature begins to rise slowly due to loss of Containment Vessel Cooling. REMARKS: Operator uses PEI-3 and PEI-5 to restore Drywell Cooling System operation. This will require bypassing the stub bus LOCA trips, re-energizing XH11 and/or XH-12 stub busses, and restarting NCC pump A and/or B (Pump C is out of service). Additionally, the NCC LOCA isolation signals will have to be bypassed. COMMENTS: d. EVENT: RPV pressur., and temperature remain f airly 0015 const ar.t. controlling through Bypass Valves. Drywell temperature and pressure continue to rise (Drywell Temperature is still less than 212 F). REMARKS: Operator should consider use of backup hydrogen purge line to the Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System to bleed off drywell pressure. This method becomes un-available if drywell temperature exceeds 212 F. Containment temperature tu not being controlled, due O. to loss of Containment Chill Water System because of i Balance of Plant Isolation which cannot be reset as long as drywell pressure is above 1.68 psig.

i 1 COMMENTS: O i i 0025 EVENT: Drywell temperature increases above 212 F. (Increase simulator malfunction 704 if necessary). REMARKS: Operator must observe drywell temperature i limitation of 330 F. If temperature cannot be maintained below this point, then emergency depressurization is required. COMMENT: 1 O 4 0030 EVENT: Drywell temperature continues increase toward 330 F (Increase simulator malfunction 704). Supp,ression Pool level will increase prat 19.5 feet. Suppression Pool temperature is increasing, but is still below 95 F. REMARKS: Operator will notice need for increasing amounts of make up water, which may be coming from the motor feed pump or >FCS. If operator decides to emergency depressuriae, operator shoutd depressuriae using the Steam Bypass Valves to the main condenser. Operator will enter PEI-6 (Suppression Pool Level Control), but will not be able to use Suppression Pool Cleanup System to lower level due to SPCU LOCA isolation signals. Operator may enter PEI-2 (Suppression Pool Temperature Control) and divert a loop of RPGt to the Suppression Pool Cooling Mode of operation if 10 minutes have elapsed since the RHR LO7.A initiation signal has occurred. COMMENT 3 O l t ~

0035 EVENT: Manual depressurization in progress. 1 REMARA?: Chring depressurization process, vessel temperaturer ' wi l l decrease rapidly. As heat input to the i 6 drywell decreases, the restored dryssell cooling system will begin to lower drywell temperature and pressure. COMMENTS: -O 1 O 0040 EVENT: END OF SCENARIO REMARKS: Scenario my be terminated at any point af ter the vessel has been depressurized. t COMMENTS: O>

SCENARIO: 2 SMALL INCREASING LOCA IN DRYWELL, i LOSS OF ALL INJECTION SYSTEMS. O v PEls EVALUATED: 1 (Rf%' CONTROL) 1 ATT. 1 (LEVEL RESTORATION) 1 ATT. 2- (EPER6ENCY DEPRESSURIZATION) 1 ATT. 3 (STEAM COOLING) 2 (SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE) 3 (DRYWELL TEMPERATURE) 4 (CONTAINMENT TEPPERATURE) 5 (DRYWELL PRESSURE) 6 (SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL) INITIAL CONDITIONS: 100 PERCENT POWER, BOC (IC-12), MOTOR FEED PUMP FLOW CONTROL VALVE SIGNAL FAILURE PRESENT (MF 606) HPCS OUT OF SERVICE FOR BREAKER REPAIR. (MF 517) NUCLEAR CLO!!ED COOLING PUMP C OUT OF SERVICE (MF 655) e TIME EVENT - REMARKS - EVALUATOR COMMENT 0000 EVENT: A small crack developes in a recirc loop suction line (MF 704). Drywell pressure begins to increase. REMARKS: Operator will diagnose problem from drywell pressure high and drywell cooler drain flow high alarms. Operator should plan for f ast reactor shutdown as drywell pressure approaches the scram setpoint 6f 1.68. psig. COMMENTS: t 0005 EVENT: Drywell pressure reaches 1.68 psig. Reactor scrams if not already shutdown by operator. All ECCS receive start signals but LPCS does not start (MF 518), HPCS is out of service. Stub busses XH-11, XH-12 trip causing a loss of CRDH and NCC pumps A and B. Balance O) of Plant and RM( LOCA isolations take place. Drywe!! temperature is high. Probable trip of feedpumps occurs on high RPV water level.

1 REMARKS: Operator should enter PEI-1 (power, pressure, and level control), PEI-3, PEI-4, and PEI-5. Since there is no immediate problem with water level, the operator will place highest priority on the restoration of NCC and air supply to containment and drywell. Any attempts to restore CRDH will be prevented for this scenario by a spurious pump trip (MF 497 and 499). Operator should evaluate leakage and determine that s leakage is greater than 50 gpe, requiring the declaration of a ALERT per EPI-Al (Emergency Action i Levels). COMMENTS: 0010 EVENT: Water level begins to decrease as leak gets larger. Suppression Pool temperature and level are both increasing. REMARKS: Operator should restore turbine feedwater pumps to make up water to the RPV, or use motor feadpump with a plant operator controlling the flow control valves with the manual handwheels as directed by the control room. If operator has initiated RCIC to provide makeup, this will trip the turbine feedpumps. @ erator, should give consideration to lowering reactor pressure by using the Bypass Valves to blowdown to the Main Condenser. Operator should take steps to ensure that condenser vacuum is maintained. Operator should continue to attempt to control the degrading conditions of the containment systems with PEI-2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. l Operator will not be able to lower suppression pool level due to the LOCA isolation of the Suppression Pool Cleanup system. Operator may decide to override the automatic dump of the Suppression Pool Makeup system which will occur 30 minutes after the high drywell pressure cen Ation occurred. COMMENTS: O

l O i 0015 EVENT: Reactor Feed Booster Pumps trip on spurious hot surge tank low level (MF 841 and 601), causing a loss of feedpump operation. 1 REMARKS: Water level will drop at a moderate rate. Operator will start RCIC system to provide make up to the vessel. a i COMMENTS: 0018 EVENT: After several minutes of use, the RCIC flow controller f ails low (MF 510) and prevents further injection in to the RPV. REMARKS: Operator should enter PEI-1 Att. 1 for level () restoration. Since only low pressure injection systems are available, the operator should anticipate the need f or emergency depressurization and proceed to rapidly depressurize using the Bypass Valves to the Main Condenser. COMMENT: 0025 EVENT: A ground fault on emergency bus EH-12 (MF 676) results in a loss of division 2 ECCS (RHR-B, RHR-C). REMARKS: The operator is left with only one injection system (RHR-A), which is adequate for the operator to proceed with depressurization. If water level has reacned 16.5 inches by this point, the MSIVs will isolate. Emergency Depressurization using the SRVs per O) PEI-1 Att. 2 will be required. COMMENT:

O l 0030 EVENT: RHR-A pump trips (MF 514). Any attempts to use SLC as an injection system fail as both SLC systems are found not to be operable (MF 853 and 854). REMARKS: Operator will likely call a Site Area Emergency per EPI-A1 based on loss of vessel make up capability. Operator will attempt to line up alternate injection systems while proceeding to PEI-1 Att. 3 (Steam Cooling). COMMENTS: O 1 0035 EVENT: Maintenance informs control room that LPCS is available for injection (remove MF 518). ( REMARKS: Operator will commence injection with LPCS. Water level will begin to increase. Operator will exit PEI-1 Att.1 and return to the level control portion of PEl-1. COMMEN'TS: 0040 EVEP;T: Recarc loop suction line totally ruptures, leak increases resulting in decreasing water level. ) REMARK: Operator re-enters PEI-1 Att. 1. and verifies LPCS flow rate greater than 6250 and RPV pressure less

~ 1 than 330 peig. If operator had managed to line up any l injection sources external to containment, then these systems would be stopped. COMPENT: ~ i 0045 EVENT: Maintenance informs control room that RHR-A is available (remove MF 514), that HPCS is available (remove PF 517), and that the reactor feed booster pumps are available (remove PF 041). REMARKS: Operator will inject with HPCS and/or RHR-A, but not with RFBPs, since the RFBPs are sources of make up external t'o containment. COMMENTS: O ( EVENT: Water level has increased to above 16.5 inches. 0055 REMARKS: Operator exits to PEI-1 level control section. Operator continues to pursue solutions for drywell temperature and pressure control. Operator should line up RHR-A to Suppressico Pool rooling per PEI-2. COMMENTS: O i 0100 EVENT: END OF SCENARIO

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i SCENARIO: 3 SMALL BREAK LOCA IN DRYWELL. LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE MAKE-UP, LOSS OF DRYWELL COOLING. LOSS OF RPV LEVEL INDICATION. PEIs EVALUATED: 1 (RPV CONTROL) 1 ATT. 1 (LEVEL RESTORATION) 1 ATT. 2 (RPV DEPRESSURIZATION) 1 ATT. 4 (RPV FLOODING) 2 (SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE CONTROL) 3 (DRYWELL TEMPERATURE CONTROL) 5 (CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CONTROL). 6 (SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL CONTROL) INITIAL CONDITIONS: 100 PERCENT POWER, BOC (IC-12), HPCS OUT OF SERVICE FOR BREAKER REPAIR (MF 517) TIME EVENT - REMARKS - EVALUATOR COMMENT 0000 EVENT: Instructor inserts Rectre Loop Crack (MF 704). A Drywell Cooler Drain Flow High alarm is received on P601. A moderate rate of increase in drywell pressure is observed. REMARKS: Operator will diagnose the existence of a leak. In the absence of other indicators, he should assume that the leakage is pressure boundary leakage and declare an unusual Event per EPI-A1 (Emergency Action Levels). Operator should take actions to shut down that reactor as drywell pressure approaches the scram point of 1.68 psig. COP 9ENT: } l 0004 EVENT: Reactor is scrammed by high drywell pressure or by operator action. Main Turbine trips on reverse power. High drywell pressure causes initiation of I Division 1, 2, and 3 ECCS (but >PCS is out of service). Suppression Pool Nakeup System dump timer (30 minute) begins counting. Suppression Pool High alarm may be received as drywell pressure pushes down on weir wa!!

surface. Dryesell floor drain sumps indicate greater O than 50 gpa leakage. A Balance of Plant Isolation also occurs on High Drywell Pressure. The stub busses XH-11 and XH-12 trip when Division 1 and 2 ECCS activate, causing a loss of Nuclear Closed Cooling supply to the drywell

• coolers, and a loss of air supply to the

, containment and drywell. Control rod hydraulic pumps, also supplied from the stub busses, are lost. REMARKS: High drywell pressure requires entry into PEI-1. Operator will ensure that all rods have inserted past notch 02, that RPV pressure is being controlled below 1033 poig by the Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System, and that RPV water level is under manual control l using the f eedwater system. Operator may begin 100 F/HR cooldown and depressurization using the Bypass Valves in order to reduce the leak rate. High drywell pressure requires entry into PEI-5. Operator will attempt to restore drywell cooling per PEI-5. High drywell temperature requires entry into PEI-3,.which will also direct restoration of drywell cooling. Operator should select one stub bus for re-energiration from its associated ECCS divisional bus, after ensuring that ECCS from that division are not required for maintenance of adequate core cooling. Operator may use authority of PAP-0205 (Overriding Safety Systems) to prevent automatic SPMU pool dump. Operator should declare an Alert per EPI-Al when floor drain sumps in drywell and contaiment indicated greater than 50 gpm of leakage. l COPW1ENT: l t l 0010 EVENT: Operator is unable to open inboard NCC isolation valves (Instructor fails to bypass LOCA isolation signal when requested by operator). REMARK: Sustained loss of drywell cooling will cause continued drywell heatup. Isolation valves are not accessible 4or local operation. Containment pressure will begin to rise slowly as drywell pressure rises. Operator will use PE!-5 to control both containa.rnt and O drywell pressure, observing the requirement to use containment spray if containment pressure approaches the Pressure Suppression Limit. COMMENT:

e _ O 4 T / i ll 0015 EVENT: Failure of Hot Surge Tank level interlock (MF 841) causes a tejp'of 'any turbine f eedpump that is operating. Motor feedpump, if operating, cavitates and trips 30 seconds later (MF 601). REMARKS: Operator will investigate loss of feedsystem. Operator'Will notice slow decrease in RPV water level. Operator may halt cooldown until makeup water can be supplied'to the vessel at high pressure. Reactor Core 1 1 solation Cooling (RCIC) will be started for this purpose. COMMENT: i i / O ,l f / R 0018 EVENT: RCIC flow control system malfunctions (r# 510). and does not allow RCIC pump.to deliver water to the RPV. REMARKS: Operator will pursue two options - continue to depressuriae with typass Valves until Low Pressure Core Spray injects at aprroximately 450 poig, or enter

. in preparation for possible emergency

[ depressurihation so low pressure make up systees can inject. COMMENTS: 9 1

0025 EVENT: Size of leak increases (Instructor increases MF ( 704). REMARKS: Operator observes quickly decreasing water level, but RPV pressure drops much more slowly. This will indicate definite need to enter PE!-1. attachment 1. Until RPV level 1 (16.5 inches) is reached, operator will use maximum Bypass Valve capacity to direct steam i flow to the main condenser, as allowed in PE!-1 pressure control section. COMMENT: 4 i 0030 EVEN1: RPV level 1 is reached, resulting in MSIV isolation and slow repressurization of RPV. l REMARKS: Operator is required to enter Emergency Depressurization (PE!-1, Att. 2) to continue depressurization. This will require eight ADS SRVs to be opened by the operator. Low pressure ECCS will inject. COrWENT: l 0035 EVENT: RPV water level begins to increase after dropping below top of active fuel. Suppression pool temperature increases as result of emergency depressurization. Pool level may be either high (as a result of depressurt ration or automatic pool dump) or low (as a result of ECCS drawdown). REMARKS: Operator will leave attachment 1 and begin return to normal water l eve =1 range of 183 to 210 inches, while SRVs remain open to continue depressurization. ) Operator must enter PEI-2 to control suppression pool temperature if 95 F is reached. Operator must enter l PE!-6 to control suppression pool level if level is out

/ of band. CDPWENT /- I 6 e 0040 EVENT: Drywell temperature has increased to approximately 270 F. RPV pressure has decreased to zero. Water level indications become erratic (Instructor must. verbally present this indication , problem to the operator).

• The possibility of RPV water level REMARKS:

instrumentation ref erence leg flashing becomes a concern. The ope-ator will enter attachment 4 (RPV flooding). This will require injecting to the vessel until RPV pressure is 130 psig above containment pressure. Injection continues until drywell temperature is reduced below 212 F. COMMENT:- ( / 0055 EVENT: NCC inboard isolation valves are returned to service and may be opened. REMARKS: Operator should immediately restore drywell cooling per PEI-3 and/or PEI-5. COMMENT: l e

0100 EVENT: Drywell temperature decrease below 212 F. REMARKS: Operator terminates injection for the time allowed by the Maximum Core Uncovery Time Limit in Att. 4 to observe developement of on-scale RPV level ~ indication (on Shutdown Range). COMMENT: i 0110 EVENT: On-scale indication observed. REMARKS: Level indication will allow the operator to exit PEI-1. Operator continues to use PEI-3 and PEI-5 to reduce drywell temperature and pewssure. Operator uses PEI-2 to reduce suppression pool temperature and PEI-6 to reduce suppression pool level. COMMENT: 0115 EVENT: End of scenario. COPWENT: I O

i SCENARIO: 4 SMALL SREAK LOCA IN DRYWELL, FAIL (ate OF FOUR RGMB TO INSERT, LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE MAKE-UP, LOSS OF DRYWELL COOLING, LOSS OF RPV LEVEL INDICATION. i PEIs EVALUATED: 1 (RPV CONTROL) 1 ATT. 2 (RPV DEPRESSURIZATION) 1 ATT. 4 (RPV FLOODING) 1 ATT. 5 (POWER CONTROL WITH LEVEL) 2 (SLPPRESSION POOL TEf9ERATimE CONTROL) 3 (DRYWELL TEFFERATURE CONTROL) 5 (CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CONTROL) 6 (SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL CONTROL) INITIkL CONDITIONS: 100 PERCENT POWER, BOC (IC-12), HPCS OUT OF SERVICE FOR BREAKER REPAIR (MF 517) TIPE EVENT - REMARKS - EVALUATOR COMMENT I l 0000 EVENT: Instructor inserts Recire Loop Crack (MF 704). O A Drywell Cooler Drain Flow High alarm is received on P601. A moderate rate of increase in drywel'1 pressure is observed. REMARKS: Operator will diagnose the extstence of a. leak. In the absence of other indicators, he should ~ assume that the leakage is pressure boundary leakage'and declare an unusual Event per EPI-A1 (Emergency #ction -. I Levels). Operator should take actions to shut down the reactor as drywell pressure approaches the scram point of 1.69 psig. CGTENT: l l l l 0005 EVENT: Reactor is scrammed by high drywell pressure or by operator action. Four Control Rods do not insert (MF 424, 426, 427, 428). Main Turbine trips on reverse poseer. High drywell pressure causes initiation of Division 1, 2, and 3 ECCS (but HPCS is out of service). LPCS fails to start (PF 519). Suppression Pool Makeup

L System dump timer (30 minute) begins counting. Suppression Pool Level High alare may be received as drywell pressure pushes down on weir well surf ace. Drywell floor drain sumps indicate greater than 50 gpa leakage. A Balance of Plant Isolation also occurs on High Drywell Pressure. The stub busses XH-11 and XH-12 trip when Division 1 and 2 ECCS activate, causing a loss of Nuclear Closed Cooling supply to the drywell coolers, l and a loss of idir supply to the containment and drywell. Control rod hyc3raulic pumps, also supplied from the stub busses, are lost. REMArtKS: High drywell pressure requires entry into PEI-1. Operator will observe that four rods have NOT inserted past notch 02, that RPV pressure is being controlled below 1033 psig by the Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System, and that RPV water level is under manual control using the feedwater system. Operator should notice upon entry into level control section of PEI-1 that LPCS has failed to start. Operator will then exit level control and enter Att. 5 to control water level at 183 to 218 inches. Operator will use PEl-1 power control section to attempt further methods of inserting stuck rods. Operator may begin 100 i F/lft cooldown and depressurization using the Bypass Valves in order to reduce the leak rate. High drywell pressure requires entry into PEI-5. Operator will attempt to restore drywell cooling per PEI-5. High drywell temperature requires entry into PEI-3, which will also direct restoration of drywell cooling. Operator should select one stub bus for re-energization f rom its associated ECCS divisional bus, af ter ensuring that ECCS from that division are not required for maintenance of adequate core cooling. NCC, CRD,' and contalment air should be restored per PEI-1. Operator may use authority of PAP-0205 (Overriding Safety Systems) to prevent automatic SPMU pool dump. Operator should declare an Alert per EPI-A1 when floor drain sumps in drywell and containment indicate greater than l 50 gpa of leakage. COMMENT: 0010 EVENT: Operator is unable to open inboard NCC isolation valves (Instructor fails to bypass LOCA isolation signal l when requested by operator).

REMARK Sustained loss of drywell cooling will cause continued drywell heatup. Isolation valves are not accessible for local operation. Containment pressure will begin to rise slowly as drywell pressure rises,. Operator will use PEI-5 to control both containment and drywell pressure, % serving the requirement to use containment spray if containment pressure approaches the Pressure Suppression Limit. COMMENT: EVENT: Failure of Hot Surge Tank level interlock (MF 0015 841) causes a trip of any turbine feedpump that is operating. Note feedpump, if operating, cavitates and trips 30 seconds later (PF 601). REMARKS: Operator will investigate loss of feedsystem. Operator will notice slow decrease in RPV water level. O oa r * - v 8 > = t a - ati i a*r-supplied to the vessel at high pressure. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) will be started for this purpose. COMMENT: l 0019 EVENT: RCIC flow control system malfunctions (MF 510) and does not allow RCIC pump to deliver water to the RPV. REMARKS: Operator will proceed to attempt to maintain level above 16.5 inches per PEI-1 Att. 5 using systems that inject outside the core shroud. Except for CRDH flow to vessel, all such means are unavailable. COMMENTS:

O 0020 EVENT: Size of leak increases (Instructor increases MF 704). REMARKS: Operator observes quickly decreasing water level. It should be apparent to the operator that he is not able to maintain level above 16.5 inches. Att. 5 l requires the operator to override the injection valves l shut on all ECCS, along with concurrent emergency I depressurization. COMMENT: O 0025 EVENT: Eight ADS SRVs are opened by operator. RPV level 1 is reached, resulting in MSIV isolation. REMARKS: Operator uses Att. 2 to emergency l depressurize. Operator allows depressurization until l the Minusua Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure for eight l open SRVs is reached (90 psig). COlWIENT: 0030 EVENT: RPV pressure drops below 90 psig. RPV level is below top of active fuel. 1 REMARKS: Operator is directed by Att. 5 to commence injection at this pressure using Motor Feedpump or i-

l Feedwater Booster Pumps (neither aro cvoilable) or CRDH (which is not suf ficient). Operator is then directed to bypass the Shutdown Cooling Isolation signal to the RHR A/B Shutdown Cooling Return to Feedheader Valve E12-F053A/B and to start the associated R>Wt pump. This will allow the operat*ar to throttle makeup to the vessel, and to direct that makeup outside the core shroud. COMMENT: 4 4 0035 EVENT: RPV water level begins to increase af ter dropping below top of active fuel. Suppression pool temperature increases as result of emergency depressurization. Pool level may be either high (as a result of depressurization or automatic pool dump) or low (as a result of ECCS drawdown). 4 REMARKS: Operator will follow attachment 5 and begin return to a water level range of 16.5 to 30 inches, while SRVs remain open to continue depressurization. Operator must maintain this level until all control rods are inserted. Operator must enter PEI-2 to control i suppression pool temperature if 95 F is reached. Operator must enter PEI-6 to control suppression pool level if level is out of band. COMMENT: t I 0040 EVENTS Drywell temperature has increased to j approximately 270 F. RPV pressure has decreased to i zero. Water level indications become erratic l (Instructor must verbally present this indication problem to the operator). I ' REMARKS: The possibility of RPV water level O instrumentation reference leg flashing becomes a concern. The operator will exit Att. 5 and enter j

_. (RPV Flooding). Thio will requiro the identical injection lineup as was being used in Att. 5, except that injection must continue to the vessel to maintain RPV pressure just above the Minimum Alternate RPV Flood Pressure of 90 psig. This must be maintained s until all control rods are inserted. COMMENT: 6 6 0050 EVENT: Operator is informed that all rods have inserted, if not already inserted by operator at this point. REMARKS: Operator will proceed per Attacheent 4 to increase injection, using normal ECCS flow paths, until RPV pressure is 130 psig above containment pressure. Injection continues until drywell temperature is reduced below 212 F. COMMENT: I 0100 EVENT' NCC inboard isolation valves are returned to service and may be opened. REMARKS: Operator should immediately restore drywell cooling per PEI-3 and/or PEI-5. COMMENT:

O l

m

0110 EVENTS Drywell temperature decrease below 212 F. REMARKS: Operator terminates injection for the ties O. allowed by the Maximum Core Uncovery Time Limit in Att. 4 to observe developement of on-scale RPV level indication (on Shutdown Range). COPMENT: 4 4 l 0115 EVENT: On-scale indication observed. REMARKS: Level indication will allow the operator to exit PEI-1. Operator continues to use PE!-3 and PEI-5 to reduce drywell temperature and pressure. Operator uses PEI-2 to reduce suppression pool temperature and PEI-6 to reduce suppression pool level. COMMENT: O ( 0120 EVENT: End of scenario. COPMEh7: O c.

k. i SCENARIOS 5 STARTUP IN PROGRESS, -O raa=v=a'==r c= >=>riariaa POWER TRAM IENT WITH FUEL DAMAGE PWIV HI RAD IS(LATION ~ SMALL LEAK IN ORYW LL RCIC INITIATION / STEAM LIE SREAK RAD RELEASE OUT OF CONTAIPPENT s PEIs EVALUATED: 1 (RPY CONTR(M ) i 3 (DRYWELL TEPPERATURE) 5 (DRYELL PRFefusE) 7 (RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE) INITIAL CONDITIONS: REACTOR STARTUP IN PROGRESS RPV PRESSURE = 920 PSIG REACTOR P0tER= 1 PERCENT BEGIpedING OF CYCLE (IC-7) MOTOR FEED PurP OOC (M 601) TIME EVENT - REMARKS - EVALUATOR C0f91ENT 0000 EVENT: While reactor poseer is in the intermediate range, FPCS inadvertently initiates (M S48) and injects into the, O vessel, causing a rapid poseer rise and reactor scram (M l 569) on IRM high flux trips. >PCS pump then trips on overcurrent (M 517). j REMARKS: >PCS injection is an unusual Event per EPI-A1 (Emergency Action Levels). Operator should investigate tPCS actuation and subsequent trip, echile carryihg out. the actions of DNI-C71 for a reactor scram. COMMENTS: 0003 EVENT: MSIVs isolate on Steam Line High Radiation (M 566). Subsequently, a small break occurs in the dryteell (M 704), causing dryteell temperature and pressure to increase. j REMARKSs Operator has lost all high pressure RPV make-up capacity except for RCIC, eshich he should anticipate manually initiating to provide make-up. Operator enters l

.Sm m v. =, n v-y ~w qws 3 Op

v S,, cpk ( - MPEI--1',because of PEIV isolation, ~PEI-3 because of Ldrywe e

5:

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=1 5 < arv pressure increase. COfGENTSs 6 6 0005 EVENT: Operator initiates RCIC. Within five minutes several annunciators- (M 1007, 1245, 1256, 1190) are recieved on P601 and P680 indicating a steam line crack in the steam tunnel. Additional annunciators (M 1574, 1573, 1568) are received indicating a radiological release problem in the tunnel and turbane building. a REMARKS: Operator will enter ONI-N11 for steam line break outside containment, and ONI-D17 for rad alarms (though no guidence is given for this situation). Operator should consider entry into PEI-7 for rad relead control, which implys Alert level conditions exist per EPI-A1. Operator will associate alarms with RCIC operation and may choose to isolate RCIC. If isolated, operator will be informed that Inboard Isolation Valve l E51-F063 failed to shut (Release still in progress). C0ffENT: 0010 EVENT: Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust System is l exhausting to outside of. plant (non-fil tered). Operator is inf ormed that radiation levels at the site boundary i east of the turbine building are 13 mr/hr and increasing l (measurement taken by team sent out by control room or b' t l a team that "Just happened" to be practicing in the areal for the upcoming E-P1,an Exercise). REMARK 8s Operator may consider Emergency Depressurization to stop release, although he is still far away from General Emergency levels which require thi l

action. Operator continues to corstrol drywell related PEIs, while level decreases slowly. The lack of >F makeup may also cause the operator to consider Emergency l Depressurization (at 16.5 inches) or slow depressurization through SRVs to allow LPCS to inject. 1 Operator may also consider securing the Turbine Building Exhaust System, though release would still continue in an unmonitored manner through turbine building leakage if i 5 this option is used. COMMENTS: 0025 EVENT: Operator is informed that E51-F063 has shut after technician troubleshot the valve's MCC. Release rates fall. Motor feed pump becomes available. REMARKS: Operator continues to control RPV and ^ containment, while monitoring rad levels in turbine building. COMMENTS: 0030 EVENT: END OF DRILL. COMMEP4Ts ~ O

SCENNtIGs 6 MIV ISOLATI(N4 UITH GTUCK (PEN SRV, FAILL5tE TO SCRAM (ARI (30 ' O PEIs EVALUATED: 1 (RPV CONTR(L) 2 (SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE) 6 (SLPPfESSIENG PO(L LEVEL) INITIAL CONDITIONS: 100 PERCENT PONER, SEGINNING OF CYCLE (Simulator Malfunction 707 - Failure to Scram - is active) TIPE EVENT - REMARKS - EVALUATWt COMMENT 0000 EVENT: A rupture of a weld on the intermediat$ pressure condenser occurs, resulting in decreasing condenser (Simulator malfunction number 717 is inserted). vacuum. REMARKS: Operator enters ONI-N62, starting an additional cire water pump, checking SJAE parameters, reducing reactor power by reducing reactor recirc flow. COMMENTS: i O 9 l J ) 0003 EVENT: Vacuum continues to decrease in spite of operator actions above. (Simulator malfunction 717 is increased) REMARKS: Operator should trip the main turbine if vacuum is less than 25 inhg when power is reduced beloos 35 percent. The following actions will occur as vacuum l rapidly decreases: Main turbine trips at 22 inhg, Feed Pump turbines trip at 17 inhg, MSIVs isolate at 9 inhg. l COMMENTS:

o 1

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N 7 0007 EVENT: MSIVs isolate as vacuum reaches 9 inhg. (Simulatw malf unction 717 is increased). Fw some non-apparent reason, almost all scram pilot valves do not open, reactor does not scram. REMARKS: Operatw should recognize that scram has not occured and enter PEI-1 for poseer, pressure, and level control. Operator should attempt manual scram and place Mode switch in " shutdown." ALERT should be declared per EPI-A1 (Emergency Action Levels), because of failure to scram. COMMENTS: i a 0008 EVENT: Reactor pressure increases rapidly, and with it reactor power. Several SRVs open to relieve pressure. Level decreases due to loss of reactor feed pump turbines. REMARKS: Operator should continue PEI-1 power control section and attempt a manual Alternate Rod Insert (ARI) using the Redundant Reactivity Control System. Operator should cycle SRVs per PEI-1 pressure control section to keep pressure below 1033 psig. Operator should bee Motor Driven Feed Pump, HPCS, and/or RCIC per PEI-1 level control section to control level 183 to 218 inches. COMMENTS: 0008 EVENT: ARI i s successfull in causing full reactor scram. However, one SRV has mechanically stuck near full open. (Simulator malfunction 0521 B21-F051D). Suppression r>ool Temperature rises toward 95 F. O REMARKSs Operator will not be able to tell that this i J

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WtV 10 ctuck open until rcactor pressuro follo beloos the low lose setpoint of 926 peig and StV f ails to shut. Operator should enter DNI-821-1 (Stuck open StV), eehich will direct his entry into PEI-2 (Suppression Pool O Temperature Control), if it has not already been entered due to high suppression pool temperature. This will direct him to line up at least one loop of RHR-Suppression Pool Cooling per 901-E12. Failure of an ~* SRV to shut is an LDENRJAL EVENT per EPI-A1. l COMMENTS: l 4 i t 0015 EVENT: Reactor pressure decreases, suppression pool temperature increases, suppression pool level increases due to stuck open SRV. i i REMARKS: Operator should monitor suppression pool temperature verses reactor pressure limitations as given by the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) curve from PEI-2. If necessary, the operator should use additional methods to lower RPV pressure to remain below the HCTL i per PEI-1 pressure control (using RCIC, R>5t Steam Condensing, opening additional SRVs, etc.), or an additional loop of suppression pool cooling should be lined up to keep below the HCTL. Emergency depressurization will be required if HCTL can not be met. Additionally, operator should attempt to lower suppression pool level beloos 18.5 feet by entry into PEI-6 (Suppression Pool Level Control). This will require use of the Suppression Pool Cleanup System to j reject osater to radesaste. Operator must also observe Suppression Pool Load Limit (SPLL) curve of PEI-6. If unable to maintain level belose SPLL, emergency i depressurization oeill be required. l l COMMENTS: l I I l ' O

0030 EVENT: Reactor pressuro decreceew ct such a rcto thct the HCTL is not exceeded, although suppression pool temperature continues to increase. REMARKS: When directed by PEI-1,.the operator teill exit to ONI-C71 (Reactor Scram) f or f oll ose-up acti ons. As pressure decreases toesard 135 psig, preparations should be made to place a loop of R>m into Shutdown Cooling Mode per SOI-E12. Operator may allo be following 10I-6 (Cooldown, Main Condenser Not Available) as a guide for the shutdown of balance of plant. Appropriate emergency plan notifications with updates should be ongoing per EPI-A2 (Unusual Event), EPI-A3 (Alert), EPI-A10 (Recovery), and EPI-B1 (Emergency Notification System). COMMENTS: 0040 EVENT: END OF SCENARIO REMARKS: Scenario may be terminated at any point af ter reactor pressure has decreased to 700 psig and PEI-2 and PEI-6 have been entered. CortENTS: O I l

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SCENARIO: 7 SRVS STUCK OPEN, FAILLNtE TO SCRAM O PEIs EVALUATED: 1 (RPV CONTROL) 1 ATT. 5 (POWER CONTROL MITH LEVEL) 2 (SLPPftESSION POm. TEPPERATtNtE) 6 (SLPPftESSION POOL LEVEL) INITIAL CONDITIONS: 100 PERCENT POWER, BEGINNING OF CYCLE TIPE EVENT - REMARKS - EVALUATOR COMMENTS 0000 EVENT: Two SRVs open spuriously due to instrument technician error (Simulator malfunction 519, 522). REMARKS: Operator enters ONI-B21-1 (Inadvertent SRV opening). COrmENT: O 0005 EVENT: Operator unable to shut SRVs (apparent mechanical bind). REMARKS: Operator lines up both loops of RHR shutdown cooling per SOI-E12-1, as directed by ONI-B21-1. l COMMENT: l l l \\ 0006 EVENT: Suppression Pool temperature approaches 95 F. REMARKS: Operator enters PEI-2 (Suppression Pool l Temperature Control), declares Unusual Event per EPI-A1 l (Emergency Action Levels). Attempts fast shutdown per ONI-921-1 (or PEI-2).

COrmENT: O i S 0008 EVENT: No rod motion occurs when reactor is manually scrammed (Simulator malfunction 707). REMARKS: Operator simultaneously enters PEI-1 sections for POWER, PRESSURE, LEVEL control. Attempts RRCS ARI per PEI-1. COMMENT: O 0009 EVENT: ARI fails to cause rod motion (Simulator Malfunction 856). ( REMARKS: Operator dec1 ares Site Arsa Emergency per EPI-A1. Continues PEI-1 POWER, PRESSURE control. Enters PEI-1 Attachment 5 (Power control using level). Recirc Pumps are tripped and main generator is left on line as heat sink. Operator attempts repeated resets of scru and ARI folloesed by manual scram and ARI. COMMENT: 0010 EVENT: Supression pool high level alarm obtained. REMARKS: Operator may anticipate need to enter PEI-6

(Suppression Pool Level Control) and attempt to lower water level using the SPCU system. l COMMENT: i 0011 EVENT: Scram signal will not reset (Simulator malfunction 707). REMARKS: Operator will bypass RC8cIS low power setpoint, drive rods in. Operator controls water level 183 to 218 inches. cot 9ENT: 4 O l 0015 EVENT: Suppression pool temperature approches l'10 F. .,On Suppression pool high level, RCIC and W CB suction lineup shifts to suppression pool. REMARKS: Per PEI-1 POWER control, operator initiates SLC system A and B, and overrides automatic ADS. Per PEI-1 Att. 5 operator begins to terminate f eed to the vessel to looser level and reactor poseer. Operator bypasses the LOCA t trip of the XH-11 and/or XH-12. Operator manually initiates all ECCS and overrides each injection valve shut, and bypasses the MSIV low level isolation trip. On RHR initiation, SPCU being used f or suppression pool level control will isolate, and containment air supply will isolate, removing the capability to use the CRDH system to insert rods; Rtft re-aligns f or LPCI mode. Operator will i have to manually re-align RHR for suppression pool i cooling, noting that it will be 10 minutes bef ere the RHR heat exchanger bypass valves may be shut. Operator should refer frequently to suppression pool heat capacity and load limits of PEI-2 and PEI-6. Operator must attempt to O keep generator on-line until power is below the capability of the Steam Bypass System, or otherwise a pressure

transient will occur. Should a pressure transient occur, the operator must utilize additional SRVs per PEI-1 PRESSLNtE control to keep pressure below 1033 psig. If O pressure reaches the RRCS high pressure trip point of 1003 psig, a feedwater system runback will occur 25 seconds i later. CN 6 6 1 0020 EVENT: None. REMARKS: Notifications and f acility activiations per EPI-A3 (Alert) and EPI-B2 (Emergency Notification System) should be in progress. COP 9ENT: l ' O ( i 0030 EVENT: Power level decreases to beloos the capacity of the Motor Feed Pump, due to actions of SLC, rod insertion through RCa:IS, and lowering water level. Reactor pressure decreases due to action of open SRVs and the EHC/ Steam 4 Bypass Pressure control system. REMARKS: Operator must note that the main turbine, acting as the heat sink, will trip on reverse power when reactor poseer is still about 12 percent, due to the steam that is bypassed through the SRVs. The operator should take actions to manually secure the Main Turbine as generator i megawatts decrease below 90 MWe. This will cause a pressure transient until Bypass Valves settle out. COMMENT: i

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OG 0035 EVENT: Reactor power approaches the APRM downscale setpoints RPV water level approaches Level 2. R6 actor pressure decreases rapidly when power level drops below that necessary to make up heat losses through the stuck open SRVs. REMARKS: Operator must note carefully the consequences of reaching Level 2, which causes a BuP isolation and RCIC initiation. RCIC initiation will cause a trip of the Main Turbine (if not already tripped) and the Reactor Feed Pump Turbines. COMMENT: i O 0040 EVENT: Stuck open SRVs shut (Remove simulator malfunctions 519, 522). REMARKS: Operator will observe maximum cooldowrf rate of 100 F/Wt and control pressure per PEI-1 PRESSLNtE control. COMMENT: r 0040 EVENT: Power level decreases below APRM downscale setpoint. REMARKS: Per PEI-1 Att. 5, water level should be maintained at this level using the feed system (alternate makeup systems may be used). O COMMENT:

O -e a 0045 EVENT: All rods insert automatically (Remove simulator malfunction 707) REMARKS: Operator exits attachment 5 and enters the level control section of PEl-1. Water level is restored to 183 to 218 inches. Per PEI-1 PRESSURE control, operator continues normal cooldown using Bypass Valves and RHR Shutdown Cooling (when pressure drops below 135 psig). Maximum allowed cooldown rate is 100 F/HR. Operator exits PEI-1 and enters ON1-C71-1 (Reactor Scram). Operator may reset RHR LPCI initiation signals and restore SPCU and containment air. Also, any BOP isolation that has occured should be reset. As much suppression pool cooling as possible should be placed in operation, and operator should attempt to restore proper suppression pool level using the SPCU system. COMMENT: n. d 0055 EVENT: Suppression pool temperature and level under operator control below heat capacity and load limit. REMARKS: Operator continues use of PEI-2 and PEI-6 until suppression pool conditions return to normal. Reactor plant is being controlled through supplemental actions of ONI-C71-1. Emergency plan restoration and notifications occur per EPI-A10 (Recovery). COMMENT: O 1

O 0100 EVENT: END OF DRILL. REMARKS: None. COMMENT: i 6 1 1 O ) f 1 1 O

s SCENARIO: 8 STUCK OPEN NtVS, FAIL TO SCRAM CRACK IN LPCI-B INJECTION LIFE CONTAI 6 PRESSURIZATION FLOODINE REQUIRED PEls EVALUTED: 1 (RPV ' DlONTR(L) 6 1 ATT. 2 (DEPRESSURIZATION) 5 1 ATT. 4 (WY FLOG)ING) 1 ATT. 5 (LEVEL / POWER CONTROL) 2 (SWPRESSICD4 PO(L TEF. ) 3 (DRYtELL TENERATURE) 4 (DRYtELL TE)TERATL#tE) 5 (DRYWELL/ CONTAINMENT PRESSLNE) ~ - ~ - ' ~ ~ ~ " ~ INITIAL CONDITIONS: 100 PERCENT POWER, BOC Rtst-B OOS BECAUSE F041B INDICATES INTERMEDIATE POSITION, F042B AND PUMP TAGGED OUT. NDT SCHEDULED FOR ACCESSIBLE PIPING / WELDS UPSTREAM F042B (M 515). SFMG EfMO. t*43f. (S-TRAW) out op seit## W, E. Rat odt eS SEttvet4 TIPE EVENT - REMARKS - EVALUATOR COMPENTS 0000 EVENT: Teso SRVs receive spurious energization of their "A" solenoide and open (M 536, 527). REMARKS: Operator enters ONI-921-1 (SRV stuck doen).. COMMENT: i l 0003 EVFNT: Operator pulls fuses f or SRVs. Solenoids de -energi z e, one SRV snuts (remove M 536) but other SRV rremains mechanically stuck open. i REMARKS: Oper ator lines up RHR-A suppression pool cooling, anticipates entry into PEI-2, declares Unusual Event per EP3-A1. COMMENTS:

o i i i 0005 EVENT: Suppression pool temperature exceeds 90 F. REMARKS: Requires entry into PEI-2. Operator will conduct f ast shutdoesn bef ore pool temperature reaches 110 F. COMMENTS: 1 0007 EVENT: No rod motion occurs when reactor is manually scrammed (M 707) or when RRCS-Alternate Rod Insert is attempted (M 956). REMARKSs Operator declares an ALERT per EPI-A1. ) Operator enters PEI-1 and Attachment 5. Reactor recirc pumps are stopped. SLC is initiated before 110 d, and power control by lowering water level is begun. Rods are 1 manually driven in. As soon as operator initiates and overrides injection systems per attachment 5, operator will begin to recover NCC, CRDH, and Instrument Air lost as a result of the Division 1 and 2 ECCS initiation. I This me be accomplished through PEI-1, 3, 4, and/or 5. P50 iW 6 esesavee.4 vs%t6r$ FAft q gMaj. Cor9ENTS: 0013 EVENT: Report of steam formation in vicinity of E12-FO42B is made by HP Technician who observed condition as he evacuated containment, having been conducting a rad survey in vicinity. Containment pressure begins to rise, i -,,r-- r-..,,,.-- e - -.~.----- - - - - - -. -, - -. - - - - -

i O dryssell vacuum breakers open, and drywell pressure begins to increase (M 704, 1073, 1120, 1075, 1121, 1575/3 min, cover erroneous indication) REMARKS (The events above are simulated by the instructor, using data sheets showing parameter values to be used by the plant operator.) Drywell pressure will follow containment pressure due to drywell vaccum breaker system. men dryssell pressure reaches 1.68 psig, the ECCS initiations and isolations will take place, including the dryssell vacuum breaker system isolation. Drywell pressure increase will then increase only slowly in response to containment pressure increase. This increasing differential pressure will cause the suppression pool level to drop as it is forced into the drywell. Operator continues to combat f ailure to scram and SRV problems, while anticipating PEl-5 entry. COMMENT: i t i ! O 9tMt EVENT: Suppression Pool Low-Low level reached, SPMU O*M dumps (M 879). Containment High Temperature Alarms occur at 110 F (M 1081, 1115) Af f enig oo gg, REMARKS: 'Drywell is still sealed f rom containment by the i level in the suppression pool, and increases slowly until the level of the suppresion pool reached top row of vents (requires about 4.5 paid between Containment and Drywell i after SPMU Dump for the vents to be reached). COMMENTS: 0025 EVENT: Pramary containment pressure continues to rise toward the Pressure Suppression Limit of PE!-5. Aver age Contatnment Temperature as 156 F and on l y sl owl y rasang.

O REMARMS Operator will consider initiatir*g Containment Spray Mode of fDWt-A, which must be accomplished before reaching the limit. Operator will also be following PEI-4, monitoring containment temperature (Limit is 185 F). f' j'.. COMMENT: 0030 EVENT: Operator initiates containment spray, with only minimal ef fect on containment pressure. Top row of vents are reached as Suppression Pool level drops from effects e of high containment pressure and the initiation of e containment spray. i REMARKS: Drywell preissure will begin to follow O containment pressure, minus 4.5 psi as pressure equalizes through vents. Suppression' pool level will stop dropping. COMMENTS: ( e 0033 EVENT: Containment pressure continues to increase beyond Pressure Suppression Pressure limi t of PEI-5. REMARMS: Emergency depressurization is required. Operator performs depressurization after.gumping to portion of attachment 5 that terminates all injection except SLC and CRD (step 7). o COMMENTS: I O i

O 0040 EVENT: Eight ADS SRVs are opened by operator. REMARKS: Pressure will be alloo$d to decrease until the minimum alternate RPV flooding pressure for eight open i 5 SRVs is reached (90 psig), at which time the operator will recommence injection using the feed system to maintain esator level 16.5 to 30 inches. COMMENTS: i 0045 EVENT: All rods that are out scram in (remove M 707, 856). 4 REMARKS: Operator exits attachment 5 and returns to PEI-1 level control. He will feed quickly using the feed system to maintain water level 183 to 218 inches. COPWENT: N EVENT: Containment pressure has continued to increase, OOSO but at a slower rate. The Containment Design Pressure Limit of PEI-5 has been reached. REMARKS: RPV Flooding (Attachment 4) is required (Note: Operators still have reliable RPV level indication). Operators will inject using available systems to maintain 1evel above 400 inches until containment pressure can be maintained below the Containment Design Pressure Lamit. COMMENTS: .a .,_. - - - - -.., -. _ _.,_r......_ r.w.,,,_,,,,.....,y_-,.,... _-_._......___y_

4M9 EVENTS Containment pressure begins rapid decrease. @l80 i REMARKS: will be exited after containment pressure is reduced below the Design Pressure Limit. l Before containment pressure drops below zero, containment spray will be terminated. cot 9 TENT: O 0120 EVENT: Drywell pressure decreases as leakage between containment and dryssell is reduced. Containment and dryssell parataeters approach normal. REMARKS: Operator exits PEI-1 and enters (24I-C71 (reactor scram) and 101-13 (Cooldoesn af ter Baron Injection). Operator continues execution of containment related PEIs, including the restoration of Suppression Pool Temperature and Level. COMMENTS: l j 0130 EVENT: END OF SCENARIO. O COMMENT: e ..._.m-, ..,--m ,-..__-,._,,o_m.,

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4.2.2 JAN 1986 EXEltCISE SCENMLIOS O Number Title 1 MSIV Isolation, Itods out, IDCA Low vacuusa Main Steam Line Isolation, 2 SRV Failure, IDCA O O 1

S Furr Pr_AMT==acEMCY TMSTRUCTION VALYDATION SPNADIO CREN NUMBER: DATE: EVALUATOR: SCENARIO:

1. 1 (1/86) - MSIV ISOLATION, 20DS OUT, LOCA PRIs nnCISED:

RPV Control (B13) Emergency Depressurisation (B13 Att. 1) RPV Flooding (B13 Att. 4) Power / Level Control (B13 Att. 5) Containment Temperature Control (D23-1) Drywell/ Containment Pressure Control (D23-2) Drywell Temperature Control (D23-3) Sbppression Pool Temperature (E12) Suppression Pool Level (G42) INITIAL CONDITIONS: Full power, BOC; HPCS pump out of commission due to breaker repair since 0800 (N517), expected available in four hours; NCC pump C tripped on overourrent last shift, maintenance investigating; I&C SVI on MSL rad monitors in progress. TIME EVENT /= " w R/EVALnAfQR n'" _'-=T5 0000 EVENT: A motor feed pump flow control valve control signal loss alarm occurs (M606). i REMARKS: Operator has lost control of the NFP FCVs from P680, and the FCVs fails as are. MFP was not in service. Operator should refer to ONI-C34 and have I&C investigate problem. r CORRENTS: 0004 EVENT: I&C Tech errors cause a spurious MSIV isolation and scram (M849). Several rods do not fully insert (M421-7). REMARKS: A rapid loss of RPV water level occurs due to loss of the turbine feedpumps. MFP provides only a small amount of makeup through the failed FCVs. l O Operator enters PEI-B13 because of MSL isolation, high l RPV pressure, and low water level. Operator will enter l l 1 --

. of PEI-B13 for water level control with O roa aos <=>>x i s t a. -aica air ets ta t oaix < a. RCIC, or CRDH be used for injection. GBAIENTS: 0006 EVENT: RPV water level drops below Level 2 (130 inohes). RCIC initiates, Balance of Plant isolations occur. REbiARKS: Operator will verify that RCIC is operating properly. Operator will use SRVs to control pressure below 1033 psig, while investigating reason for MSL isolation. 000ARENTS: O_ I 0010 EVENT: Suppression Pool temperature and level rise as a result of SRV openings. I&C Tech reports the error to - Unit Eupervisor which caused spurious MSL isolation from MSL radiation nonitors. '- ~. EERIARKS: Operator may make early entry to PEI-E12 for suppression pool temperature control (required when temperature reaches 90 degrees) by placing at least one loop of RHR suppression pool cooling in operation. Upon determination of cause of MSL isolation, operator should take steps to restore vacuum, if it is low, and open MSIVs to enable pressure control to be resumed using the steam bypass valves to the main condenser. COMMENTS: O d =.n.,. w% g,-,y-.

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O using RCIC. Pressure control may be on the bypass valves. EEMdWKS: Operator should make efforts per PEI-B13 section 3.1 to insert rods using the CRD system. Only two rods will be movable (Remove M424-5). Soram signals -may be reset when RPV water level is above 178 inches. If desired, operator may restore turbine driven feed pumps to operation when RPV level returns above the RCIC automatic initiation point of 130 inches and the RCIC initiation signal is manually reset. Any operator attempt to manually control the motor feedpump FCVs locally will fail due to mechanically stuck valves. 000 AGENTS: i i 0025 EVENT: A small break IDCA occurs in the drywell from a small crack in a reactor recirculation loop (M704). 1 Drywell pressure and tempiera*ure begins to increase. EIM M S: Operator should continue to use PEI-B13, with concerns directed toward the newly developed leak. rCperator should take steps to maximise-drywell cooling tc' slow drywell pressure rise. Shift t Supervisor should direct investigation of Drywell equipment and floor drain sump fill rates at the leakage detection panels to determine magnitude of the leak, and declare an Unusual Event per EPI-Al (Emergency Action Levels) for pressure boundary leakage. CORAENTS: l f O - - -,, -.. - ~. _,. -,_. _,_, _ _ _,_ _ _ _ _

0030 EVENT: Drywell pressure reaches 1.68 peig. Automatic O isoiatie s er acC soa 1 strume t air to ta ooat i meet occur as Division 1 and 2 ECCS initiate. All low pressure ECCS start as expected. Any RHR system aligned for suppression pool cooling realign for LPCI mode. Stub busses XH-11 and XH-12 trip, doenergising all available NCC and CRD pumps. EEM& BKS: Operator enters PEI-D23-2 for drywell pressure control, including restoration of a stub bus for a ECCS division that is not providing makeup to the vessel, restarting NCC and CRD, and restoring NCC and instrument air to the containment and drywell. Operator should be using RCIC or Feedwater to maintain RPV water level, so any stub bus may be chosen for reenergisation. Operator will also enter PEl-D23-3 for drywell temperature control when temperature reaches 135 degrees, and PEI-D23-1 for containment temperature control when t' temperature reaches 90 degrees. If operator diagosos leak rate to be in excess of 50 gym, the Shift Supervisor should declare an Alert per EPI-A1. CDMIENTS: O ~ t 1 OOM EVENT: A failure of the Ho Surge Tank low level swi.tch - l occurs, causing a trip of all. reactor feed booster pumps and feed pumps (H841, 601). REMARKS: RPV water level-begins to decrease slowly as -operator uses RCIC to provide maximum makeup. Operator l should diagnose the inability to maintain water level above sero inches and proceed to steps in PEI-B13 which require emergency depressurisation and the override of all ECCS injection valves to the shut position. This will prevent uncontrolled injection within core shroud when rods are still stuck out of the i core. COMtENTS: O w --m-g-w re--wye _,w- ---y--o,-we---,,_y,_,amm _--_sm, w ppy.y -gg- .mrwp-w w-w--

O 0050 EVEMT: Emergency Depressurisation in progress. J REMARES: Operator will terminate all injeotion into vessel in order to assure no power and pressure transients occur during depressurisation. Operator will i depressurise using eight ADS SRVs until the minimum alternate RPV reflood pressure of 90 psig is reached. Operator should make preparations for using RHR loop A or B to inject when this pressure is reached. This will require the bypassing of the shutdown cooling interlocks to the RHR return to feedwater valves E12-F053A/B in order to diroot injection into RPV downoomer annulus. Operator should choose a division of RHR whose Stub Bus is not energised, or should deenergine the stub bus 1 prior to using the ICCS for makeup. 00MIEllTS: i O I 0100 EVERT: Injection from RHR in progress. Vessel level may be.below the bottom of the-Fuel Zone level t instruments before injection begins to recover. water Suppression pool to'perature may have reached level. a the boron injection temperature limit of 133 degrees due ~ to'depressurization. f REMARES:- If water level dropped below -150 inches on the fuel sone'i'struments, then the operator should n i declare that RPV level cannot be determined, and enter ' (RPV flooding). This will lead to nearly identical actions as Attachment 5 was requiring. When water level returns to indicating range and is consistent, and if drywell temperature has not exceeded the saturation temperature corresponding to present j then the operator may determine that reactor pressure, RPV water level indication has been restored. This will l l place the operator back in Attachment 5. If Suppression Pool temperature has reached 133 degrees and the i operators have not been informed the reactor engineering has determined that the reactor is shutdown, then O Standby Liquid Control should be initiated. If drywell l pressure is above 1.68 psig when water level is below l l I

(O 18.25 inches, the Shift Supervisor may declare a Site Area Emergency per EPI-Al based on a technicality of that proceedure under loss of makeup systems. CORAENTS: 0110 EVENT: RPV water level is rising with consistent readings between instruments. REMARKS: Operator will restore water level to above sero inches with RHR. CDhetENTS: (O ~ 0115 avnNT: Operator is informed that all rods hava suddenly leserted (Unable to simulate this, operator will be handed a messinge to this effect). REMARKS: Operator may leave Attachuent 5, terminate baron injection if it had been initiated, and return to. main body of PEI-B13 to restore water level 185 to 215 inches, at which point PEI-B13 may be exited for the Off Normal Instructions to further control the plant. Operator will continue in other PEIs as necessary to restore containment, drywell, and suppression pool paramenters. COMMENTS: lO l

e 1 ( 0120 EVENT: END OF SCENARIO. t OVERALL COBOUDfTSs i b O L i e r, 8Dp e 8% l O I l l

MEPP Pt "T M YE=->CTIoRI VALYBATIObl SPWA*IO CREN IRBSER: DATE: EVAIAATOR: SGNARIO:

1. 2 (1/88) - LOes VACUUN NSL ISOLATION, SRV FAILURE, LOCA

6 PEIs EXERCISED

RPV Control (B13) Emergency Depressurisation (B13 Att. 1) Level Roetoration (B13 Att. 3) RPV Flooding (B13 Att. 4) Containment Temperature Control (D23-1) Drywell/ Containment Pressure Control (D23-2) Drywell Temperature Control (D23-3) Suppression Pool Temperature (E12) Suppression Pool Level (G42) INITIAL CONDITIONS: Full power, BOC; HPCS pump out of commission l for breaker repair since 1100 (N517); NCC pump C tripped on overourrent last shift, maintenance investigating; Ciro Water pump C protective relay calibration in progress, pump tagged out. TM m1-1/""'"#MAfRAffar C-1n 00:01 E M T: A motor feed pump flow control valve control O sin 2 toss 1 r ecours <aaoa>- E M M S: Operator has lost control of the NFP FCVs from, P880, and the FCVs fail as are. MFP was not in service. Operator should refer to ONI-C34 and have Iaic j investigate problem. Any attempt to open the FCVs locally will fall when the operator finds the smallest FCV to already be full open and the large FCV to be mechanically stuck shut. If desired, the small FCV may be open or shut as desired. 3 GMAENTS: i e i ) 00:04 B3f: A complete loss of division 1 DC bus EDIA occurs (N701). ' O

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The loss of this hus wili riace ali division 1 ECCS and the division 1 diesel generator out of service. RCIC will be out of service. SRV "A" solenoids and logic will lose power supply. Operator should refer to

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a 2 tri r. a refer to ONI-R42-1 (Loss of EDIA). GRAMITS: i 00:09 M: Ciro Mater Pump A trips on inverse-time i overourrent (N582). Vacuum begins to drop, though not drastically. i REMARKS: Operator should refer to ONI-N62 for loss of vacuum and begin power reduction to attempt to maintain vacuum with one ciro water pump. An automatic i roolroulation system flow control valve runback may occur as vacuum drops. CORAIENTS: O i 00:10 EVENT: Ciro Mater pump B trips (M583) on instantaneous overourrent due to pump cavitation. Veouum drops suddenly resulting in a trip of the main turbine and the i reactor feedpump turbines, a scram, and a MSL isolation. One outboard MSIV fails to shut (N698). EEMMg: Operator should enter PEI-B13 based on the NSL isolation. In the first few moments of this transient, l the possibility exits'that the feedpump level 8 trip will seal-in before level drops as a result of loss of j high presure makeup to the vessel. The operator should j take action to restore the motor driven feed pump to operation, even though only reduced flow will be available through the stuck FCVs. This will be the only l source of high pressure makeup available. Level will Q trend down slowly until some feed is restored, due to SRY cycling. Operators should note the failure of the MSIV to shut and attempt to shut it manually. J l

_ _ ~.. - _ - O 00:11 M: Upon the first attempt of the pressure relief logic to oyole the SRVs using the "B" solenoids, the combined power feeder to the "B" solenoids from ED1806 fails when a fuse blows. " ADS B OUT OF SERVICE" annunciator is received (M1252) on P601.. Pressure rises to the safety setpoint of 1165 pelg, at which point eight SRVs cycle. M: Operators should recognise the loss of the normal relief function of the SRVs, which will make it impossible to control remotor pressure below 1033 peig I as specified by PEI-B13. Control of SRVs at the remote l shutdown panel will likewise not be available because of the loss of EDIA bus. Operator should begin the use of O

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r 2 i'i a 5 >=1-=2= using RNCU and RER steam condensing. Operator should investigate possibility of regaining a ciro water pump 4 to restore the main condenser vacuum idiioh will allow the opening of MSIVs, the use of the steam bypass valves, and the use of feed pump turbines to p'rovide - feed. m: i 00:14 M: Suppression Pool temperature and level rise as a i result of SRV openings. M: Operator may make early entry to PEI-E12 for suppression pool temperature control (required when tosperature reaches 90 degrees) by placing RHR B in O a u i ei 2ian a. m: i

O aa'=5 mr=r: Pr = i i== airi d steam condensing line up, and RNCU; or through restored main condenser. RPV water level trending up towards normal range. Operators have replaced fuse to "B" solenoids and thua partially restored the relief i function to the SRVs (reoove M1252, page FX). EEM&EES: Mben pressure control has been restored using the bypass valves to the main condenser, operators may diroot energies toward restoring EDIA. Because the "A" l solenoids have no power, any manual cycling of SRVs must take place at P631. Operator may declare that he has exited PEI-B13. GBAEMTE: l i i i 1 ! n 00:')0 EYEI: A small break LOCA occurs in the drywell from a kJ small crack in a reactor recirculation loop (M704). 4 Drywell pressure and temperature begins to increase. I l EEM&BES: Operator should return to PEI-B13, with l ooncern directed to the newly developed leak. Operator should take steps to maximise drywell cooling 'to slow pressure rise. Operator may use authority of P5I-B13 to i lower pressure while observing a 100 degree per hour l cooldown rate limit, in order to minimise the leak rate. Shift Supervisor should direct investigation of drywell l equipment and floor drain sump fill rates at the leakage detection panels to determine the magnitude of the leak, i and declare an Onusual Event per EPI-Al (Emergency Action Levels) for pressure boundary leakage. i l M: } l 1 l l

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OV 00:33 EVENT: Drywell pressure reaches 1.68 psig. Automatic isolations of NCC and instrument air to the containment and drywell occur as Division 2 ECCS initiates (Div. 1 is out of service from loss of ED1A). RHR B realigns for LPCI mode. Stub bus XH12 trips deenergizing NCC B. REMARKS: Operator enters PEI-D23-2 for drywell pressure control, including the restoration of NCC to the drywell. Level may be maintained using the feed system. If RHR B or C is chosen for injection, operators must de-energize the XH12 if they had reenergised it. Operator wil also enter PEI-D23-3 for drywell temperature control when temperature reaches 135 degrees, and PEI-D23-1 for containment temperature control when temperature reaches 90 degrees. If operator diagoses leak rate to be in excess of 50 gpm, the Shift Supervisor should declare an alert per EPI-Al. 00 AMENTS: O 00:38 EVENT: Operator is unable to unisolate Div. 2 (Inboard) NCC isolation valves due to failure of LOCA bypass circuits. REMARKS: Operators should recognize the implications of a continued drywell heatup on vessel water level instrumentation and refer occasionally to the level instrumentation temperature limits in the PEIs. Investigation of bypass problem should be started. CONNENTS: O 00:40 EVENT: A failure of the Hot Surge Tank low level switch occurs, causing a trip of al reactor feed booster pumps and feed pumps (M841, 601).

EIM&BES: RPV water level begins to decrease because of the loss of high pressure injection. Operator will eventually diagose the inability to maintain water level above sero inches and proceed to PEI-B13 Attachment 3 for level restoration. Operator may try to lower reactor pressure to the point where LPCI-B or C can inject without emergency depressurization. However, the leak rate will be such that level drops faster that pressure. Upon determining thtt emergency depressurisation will become necessary, the operator should rapidly depressurine to the main condenser if it is available until the MSL isolates at 16.5 inches. Emergency depressurization per PEI-B13 Attachment 1 should take place when sero inches is reached to allow LPCI injection to take place. 00bMENTS: O 00:50 EVENT: Emergency Depressurization in progress. BEM&BES: Since the "A" solenoids for the SRVs are not powered, the opening of the eight SRVs for this function will have to be done by initiating ADS logic, or by opening the SRVs from P631. CDBMENTS: 1 00iS3 EVENT: LPCI B and C inject into the vessel as pressure drops. Water level drops into the fuel zone before beginning to rise. (]) REMARKS: If water level drops below 18.25 inches while drywell pressure is above 1.68 psig, the Shift Supervisor may declare a Site Area Emergency per EPI-A1. I If water level drops below -150 inches or i f the d rywel l

N _) temperature is above the temperature corresponding to RPV saturation pressure as shown in the level instrumentation temperature' limit curves, then water level indication is suspect and RPV flooding per PEI-B13 is required. This will require the operators to continue flooding the vessel until level indications are consistent. If reference leg flashing is suspected then flooding will continue until an RPV i pressure 112 psid above containment pressure is reached for a specified amount of time and drywell temperature control is restored. At this point injection would be terminated for the maximum core uncovery time limit to await the return of on scale indication. CORAENTS: O 01: 00 EVENT: Maintenance reports the fix to the hot surge tank low level trip and to the NCC inboard valve bypass circuit. REMMIKS: Operators should use the feed booster pumps to help reflood and pressurize the vessel. NCC should be restored to the drywell. COleENTS: 01:10 EVENT: Drywell temperature and pressure are dropping rapidly. RPV pressure has been held at the appropriate point. REMMtKS: Operator should take steps per RPV flood procedure to verify restoration of water level. Upon doing so, operator may leave RPV flooding and return to () the main body of PEI-B13. When normal water level is restored, PEI-B13 may be exited. Operator will have to restore proper suppression pool temperature and level.

O - = = 01:15 EVENT: END OF SCENARIO OVERALL COMMENTS: O 4, e O \\

4.2.3 MMt 1986 EXERCISE SCENMtIO6 O Number Title 1 MSIV Isolation, mods out, IDCh 2 Small Break IOCA in Drywell, Failure of Four Rods to Insert, ! ass of Hi Pressure Make-up, ! ass of RPV Level Indication. O O

P&"P PLAMT w ENCY IMSTRUCTION VALIDATION S N ADIO CREN NUMBER: DATE: EVALUATOR: SCENARIO:

1. 1 (1/86) - MSIV ISOLATION, RODS OUT, LOCA PEle EXERCISED:

RPV Control (813) Emergency Depressurisation (B13 Att. 1) RPV Flooding (B13 Att. 4) Power / Level Control (B13 Att. 5) Containment Temperature Control (D23-1) Drywell/ Containment Pressure Control (D23-2) Drywell Temperature Control (D23-3) Suppression Pool Temperature (E12) Suppression Pool Level (042) INITIAL OONDITIONS: Full power, BOC; HPCS pump out of commission due to breaker repair since 0600 (N517), expected available in four hours; NCC pump C tripped on overourrent last shift, maintenance investigating; I&C SVI on MSL red monitors in progress. M EVENT /nmaaDrg/gyAIJtATOR (nmemTS 0000 EVENT: A motor feed pump flow control valve control signal loss alarm occurs (N606). REM &BES: Operator has lost control of the NFP FCVs from P680, and the FCVs fails as are. MFP was not in service. Operator should refer to ONI-C34 and have I&C investigate problem. C0bedENTS: 0004 gyENT: I&C Tech errors cause a spurious MSIV isolation l and scram (M849). Several rods do not fully insert (M421-7). EEHARLS: A rapid loss of RPV water level occurs due to loss of the turbine feedpumps. MFP provides only a O small amount of makeup through the failed FCVs. Operator enters PEI-B13 because of MSL isolation, high RPV pressure, and low water level. Operator will enter \\

O of PEI-B13 for water level control with (V rode not fully inserted, which directs that only feed, RCIC, or CRDH be used for injection. GEmmlTS: i 0006 EVENT: RPV water level drops below Level 2 (130 inohes). RCIC initiates, Balance of Plant isolations occur. REMARKS: Operator will verify that RCIC is operating properly. Operator will use SRVs to control pressure below 1033 psig, while investigating reason for MSL isolation. 00tedENTS: 0010 EVENT: Suppression Pool toeperature and level rise as a result of SRV openings. I&C Tech reports the error to Unit Supervisor which caused spurious MSL isolation from NSL radiation monitors. ~ EEMARKS: Operator may make early entry to PEI-E12 for suppression pool toeperature control (required when temperature reaches 90 degrees) by placing at least one loop of RHR suppression pool cooling in operation. Upon determination of cause of NSL isolation, operator should take steps to restore vacuum, if it is low, and open MSIVs to enable pressure control to be resumed using the steam bypass valves to the main condenser. .CQtest[Ti}: O

( 0020 EVENT: RPV water level trends toward normal water level using RCIC. Pressure control may be on the bypass valves. EIM& BKS: Operator should make efforts per PEI-B13 section 3.1 to insert rods using the CRD system. Only two' rods will be movable (Remove M424-5). Soram signals may be reset when RPV water level is above 178 inches. If desired, operator may restore turbine driven feed pumps to operation when RPV level returns above the RCIC automatio initiation point of 130 inches and the RCIC initiation signal is manually reset. Any operator attempt to manually control the motor feedpump FCVs locally will fail due to neobanically stuck veilves. .GMEHIli: ~ O 0025 EVENT: A small break 14CA occurs in the drywell froe a small crack in a reactor reoirculation loop (M704). Drywell pressure and tempierature begins to increase. REMARKS: Operator should continue to use PII-813, with conoarns directed toward the newly developed leak. - Operator should take steps to maximise drywell cooling tc ' slow drywell pressure rise. Shift Supervisor should direct investigation of Drywell equipeent and floor drain sump fill rates at the leakage detection panels to determine magnitude of the leak, and declare an Unusual Event per EPI-Al (Emergency Action Levels) for pressure boundary leakage. C0tedENTS: O 1

0030 EXENI: Drywell pressure reaches 1,38 peig. Automatic ( isolations of NCC and Instrument Air to the containment occur as Division 1 and 2 ECCS initiate. All low pressure ECCS start as expected. Any SHR system aligned for suppression pool cooling realign for LPCI mode. Stub busses XH-11 and XH-12 trip, doenergising all available NCC and CRD pumps, i EMAES: Operator enters PEI-D23-2 for drywell pressure control, including restoration of a stub bus for a ECCS division that is not providing makeup to the vessel, restarting NCC and CRD, and restoring NCC end instrument air to the containment and drywell. Operator should be using RCIC or Feedwater to maintain RPV water level, so i any stub bus may be chosen for reenergisation. Operator will also enter PEI-D23-3 for drywell temperature r control when temperature reaches 135 degrees, and PEI-D23-1 for containment temperature control when temperature reaches 90 degrees. If operator diagosos leak rate to be in excess of 50 gym, the Shift Supervisor should declare an Alert per EPI-A1. 00balENTS: t l 4 l 1 00W EIMI: A failure of the Ho Surge Tank low level switch - ocours, causing a trip of all reactor feed booster pumps 4 and feed pumps (M841, 601). l EEM&BES: RPV water level begins to decrease slowly as operator uses RCIC to provide maximum makeup. Operator should diagnose the inability to maintain water level l above sero inches and proceed to steps in PEI-B13 which require emergency depressurisation l l and the override of all ECCS injection valves to the i i shut position. This will prevent uncontrolled injection within core shroud when rods are still stuck out of the core. S O l l0 i i

] 0050 M: Emergency Depressurisation in progress. REMARES: Operator will terminate all injection into vessel in order to assure no power and pressure transients occur during depressurisation. Operator will depressurise using eight ADS SRVs until the minimum alternate RPV reflood pressure of 90 psig is reached. Operator should make preparations for using RHR loop A or B to inject when this pressure is reached. This will require the bypassing of the shutdown cooling interlocks to the RHR return to feedwater valves E12-F053A/B in order to direct injection into RPV downoomer annulus. Operator should choose a division of RHR whose Stub Bus is not energised, or should deenergine the stub bus prior to using the ECCS for makeup. l C0hmENTS: 0100 EMI: Injection from EHR in progress. Vessel level may be.below the bottom of the-Fuel Zone level t instruments before injection begins to recover. water I 1evel. Suppression pool to'aperature may have reached the boron injection temperature limit of 133 degrees due to'depressurisation. ~ Emmg:. It water level dropped below -150 inches on the fuel sons' instruments, then the operator should declare that RPY level cannot be determined, and enter (RPV flooding). This will lead to nearly L identical actions as Attaohnent 5 was requiring. When l water level returns to indicating range and is consistent, and if drywell temperature has not exceeded the saturation temperature corresponding to present reactor pressure, then the operator may determine that RPY water level indication has been restored. This will place the operator back in Attachment 5. If Suppression l Pool temperature has reached 133 degrees and the operators have not been informed the reactor engineering has determined that the reactor is shutdown, then i Standby Liquid Control should be initiated. If drywell pressure is above 1.68 psig when water level is below I

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• a s8irts ier

>aeir sit-Area Emergency per EPI-Al based on a technicality of that proceedure under loss of makeup systems. GMAENTS: i r 0110 EVENT: RPV water level is rising with consistent readings between instruments. BEM& BKS: Operator will restore water level to above sero inches with RHR. 00AAENTS: ( 0115 EvauT: Operator is informed that all rods have suddenly inserted (Unable to simulate this, operator will be handed a mess' age to this effect). REMARKS: Operator may leave Attachment 5, terminate boron injection if it had been initiated, and return to. main body of PEI-B13 to restore water level 185 to 215 inches, at which point PEI-B13 may be exited for the Off Normal Instructions to further control the plant. Operator will continue in other PEIs as necessary to restore containment, drywell, and suppression pool paramenters. CDtBENTS: O

O e 8 ( 0120 EVENT: END OF SCENARIO. OVERALL COBOOtTS: 1 * ~, r O ~ t ~' f a. $Q e S S4 O

SCENAftIOs 2 WWLL SMAK LOCA IN BRVtELL, i PRILLNE (F PER5t NEIS TO IM, g LOSS OF HIGH PRESEURE fWuS-4F, .O LOSS W DRVtELL IIMLINE, LOSS OF RPV LEVEL IISICATION. PEls EviLuATEDs 1 (fry CNNfffEL) 1 ATT. 2 (IFY DEPIESOLNtIZATION) 1 ATT. 4 (frV PLEMNIDS) 1 ATT. 5 (POWER (MNff1tOL NITH tEVEL) 2 (SWPMSSION POEL TEWERATWE i CONTROL) 3 (DRytELL TEWERATINE CONTROL) 5 (CONTAIDGENT PIEEEEE CONTR(L) 6 (SUPPRESSION Polk LEVEL CONTROL) INITIAL CONDITIONS: 100 PERCENT P0bER, SOC (IC-12), WCS OUT (F SERVICE FOR BREAKER REPAIR (W 517) r-TIPE EVENT - REMARKS - EVALUATCNt CorW9ENT l 0000 EVENT: Instructor inserts Recire Loop Crack (W 704). A Dryteell Cooler Drain Flow High alare is received on P601. A moderate rate of increase in drywell pressure O is observed. REMARKS: Operator will diagnose the existence of a. leak. In the absence of other indicators. he should assume that the leakage is pressure boundary leakage'and declare an unusual Event per EPI-A1 (Emergency dit: tion Levels). Oper-ator should take actions to shut dosen the reactor as alryssell pressure approaches the scras point-of 1.68 psig. C(NWENT: l l t ooos; EVENTS Reactor is screened by high dryssell pressure or by operator action. Four Control Rods do not insert (W-424, 426, 427, 428). Main Turbine trips on reverse poseer. High dryteell pressure causes initiation of j ,O Division 1, 2, and 3 ECCS (but WCS is out of service). LPCS fails to start (W 518). Suppression Poot Makeup I l

1 l Cystem dump timer (30 cinuto) togina counting. Suppression Pool Level High alarm may be received as drywell pressure pushes down on osuir wall surf acs. Drywell floor drain sumps indicate greater than 50 gpe I leakage. A Balance of Plant Isolation also occurs on High Drywell Pressure. The stub busses XH-11 and XH-12 trip when Division 1 and 2 ECCS activate, causing a loss of Nuclear Closed Cooling supply to the dryteell coolers, l and a loss of ifir supply to the containment and drywell. Control rod hydraulic pumps, also supplied from the j stub busses, are lost. l REMARKS: High drywell pressure requires entry into PEl-1. Operator will observe that four rods have NOT inserted past notch 02, that RPV pressure is being controlled below 1033 psig by the Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System, and that RPV water level is under manual control using the f eedwater system. Operator should notice upon entry into level control section of PEI-1 that LPCS has f ailed to start. Operator will then exit level control and enter Att. 5 to control water level at 103 to 218 inches. Operator will use PEI-1 power control section to attempt further methods of inserting stuck rods. Operator may begin 100 F/Wt cooldown and depressurization using the Bypass Valves in order to reduce the leak rate. High drywell pressure requires entry into PEI-5. Operator will attempt to restore drywell cooling per PEI-5. High drywell temperature requires entry into PEI-3, which will also direct restoration of drywell cooling. Operator should select one stub bus for re-energization from its associated ECCS divisional bus, after ensuring that ECCS from that division are not required for maintenance of adequate core cooling. NCC, CRD,' and contalment air should be restored per PEI-1. Operator may use authority of PAP-0205 (Overriding Safety ~ Systems) to prevent automatic SPMU pool dump. Operator should declare an Alert per EPI-A1 when floor drain sumps,in drywell and containment indicate greater than 50 gpa of leakage. COMMENT: 0010 EVENT: Operator is unable to open inboard NCC isolation valves (Instructor f ails to bypass LOCA isolation signal when requested by operator).

REMARKS Sustained loss of drywell cooling will cause continued drywell heatup. Isolation valves are not accessible for local operation. Containment praiseure will begin to rise slowly as drywell pressure rises,. Operator will use PEI-5 to control both containment.and drywell pressure, observing the requirement to use containment spray if containment pressure approaches the Pressure Suppression Limit. COPMENT: 6 4 i i EVENT: Failure of Hot Surge Tank level interlock (MF 0015 841) causes a trip of any turbine feedpump that is operating. Motor feedpump, if operating, cavitstes and trips 30 seconds later (PF 601). REMARKS: Operator will investigate loss of feedsystem. Operator will notice slow decrease in RPV water level. Operator may halt cooldown until eakeup water can be 3 supplied to the vessel at high pressure. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) will be started for this purpose. COMMENT: i 1 0019 EVENT: RCIC flow control systee malfunctions (MF 510) and does not allow RCIC pump to deliver water to the RPV. REMARKS: Operator will proceed to attempt ito maintain leve) above 16.5 inches per PEI-1 Att. 5 esing systees that inject outside the core shroud. Except for CRDH flow to vessel, all such means are unavailable. O coaaca's-

O 0020 EVENT: Size of leak increases (Instructw increases IF 704). i REMARKS: Operatw observes quickly decreasing water level. It should be apparent to the operator that he is not able to maintain level above 16.5 inches. Att. 5 requires the operator to override the injection valves shut on all ECCS, along with concurrent emergency depressurization. COMMENT: i 0 0025 EVENT: Eight ADS SRVs are opened by operator. RPV level 1 is reached, resulting in MSIV isolation. REMARKS: Operator uses Att. 2 to emergency l depressurize. Operate allows depressurization until the Minu=n= Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure for eight open SRVs is reached (90 psig). COMMENT: 0030 EVENT: RPV pressure drops below 90 psig. RPV level is below top of active fuel. REMARKSs Operatw is directed by Att. 5 to commence injection at this pressure using Mot w Feedpump w

i Feesheater Booster Pump 3 (neither aro cynilabic) er CRDH (which is not sufficient). Operator is then directed to bypass the Snatdown Costing Isolation signal to the R>Wt A/S Bustdoesn Cooling Return to Feedheader Valve E124053A/B and to start the associated ID5t pump. This will alloes the operat*ar to throttle makeup to the vessel, and to direct that makeup outside the core shroud. COrWENT: i i t 0035 EVENT: RPV water level begins to increase after dropping beloos top of active fuel. Suppression pool temperature increases as result of emergency depressurization. Pool level may be either high (as a result of depressurization or automatic pool dump) or lose (as a result of ECCS drade=an). REMARKS: Operator will folloes attachment 5 and begin return to a water level range of 16.5 to 30 inches, i while SRVs remain open to continue depressurization. O Operator must maintain this level until all control rods are inserted. Operator must enter PEI-2 to control suppression pool temperature if 95 F is reached. Operator must enter PEI-6 to control suppression, pool level if level is out of band. COMMENT: l l 0040 EVENTS Drywell temperature has increased to approximately 270 F. RPV pressure has decreased to zero. Water level indications become erratic (Instructor must verbally present this indication problem to the operator). REMARKS: The possibility of RPV water level instrumentation reference leg flashing becomes a concern. The operator will exit Att. 5 and enter

Attachment O (PPV Flooding). Thio will requiro the identical injection lineup as was being used in Att. 5 except that injection must continue to the vessel to maintain RPV pressure just above the Minimus Alternate O RPV Flood Pressure of 90 psig. This must be maintained until all control rods are inserted. COMPENT: L 0050 EVENT: Operator is informed that all rods have inserted, if not already inverted by operator at this point. REMARKS: Operator will proceed per Attachment 4 to i increase injection, using normal ECCS flow paths, until RPV pressure is 130 psig above containment pressure. Injection continues until drywell temperature is reduced below 212 F. O c """" l 0100 EVENT: NCC inboard isolation valves are returned to service 'and may be opened. REMARKS: Operator should immediately restore drywell cooling per PEI-3 and/or PEI-5. COMMENT: 1 0

0110 EVENTS Dryssell temperature decrease below 212 F. REMAR9GBs Operator terminates injection for the time O-alloesed by the Maxieue Core uncovery Time Limit in Att. 4 to observe developement of on-scale RPV level indication (on m utdown Range). CG9ENTs ~* i 0115 EVENT: On-scale indication observed. REMARKS: Level indication will allow the operator to exit PEI-1. Operator continues to use PEI-3 and PEI-5 to reduce drywell temperature and pressure. Operator uses PEI-2 to reduce suppression pool temperature and PEI-6 to reduce suppression pool level. COMMENT: O 0120 EVENT: End of scenario. COPTENT: l l O \\.. -.,.,.... - - _ _ _ -.. _.

4.3.1 PEI NNel:S REFERENCED TO VALIDATION EXERCISE & REV [] PEI NAME VALIDATICN EXERCISE Revision (and Draft) Level NOV 1985 JAN 1986 MAR 1986 1 (4) 0 1 (1) PEI TITLE Reactor Pressure Vessel Cont 1 B13 B13 2 E12 Suppression Pool Temp Cont 3 D23-3 Drywell Temperature Cont Containment 7teperature Cont 4 D23-1 Containment Pressure cont 5 D23-2 6 G42 Suppression Pool Level Cont Radiation Release Cont 7 D17 l 4 lO L +

4.3.2 DISCREPANCY RESOLITf10N SLMUULY I. EXERCISE DISCREPANCIES VALIDATION COMMENT RESOLITf1CN EXERCISE TYPE CATEGORY 'IUIAL D E L N Mar 86 Format 1 Technical 3 Training 1 5 Jan 86 Format 5 Technical 1 2 4 Training 2 1 15 TRAINING Format 1 & REVI N Technical 10 12 23 Nov 85 Format 2 7 2 4 Technical 5 10 12 Training 4 4 1 51 Manning SUM 'IUrAL 94 II. 'IUIAL DISCREPANCY OVERVIN RESOLUTION CA'IEGORY 'IUIRL COffENr TYPE D E L N i Format 2 14 2 4 22 23 i Technical 16 27 16 59 63 Training 6 6 12 13 1 1 1 Manning 'IUIAL 24 47 2 21 94 26 50 2 22 100

"~"* -W aa__. 4.3.3 MAR 1986 EXERCISES ? A

I t

l i f F l I l l l I e w*-- w---mm_,,-

PGP Paget 50 Rev.: 1 Att~ hment 3 (Cort.) l 7 PEI Validation Plan ) ( > Attachsent 4 ,f-~3 () Discrepancy Sheet: Number 4 PEI-B13 Revision: Rev 1. Draft 1 Step Number: N/A Discrepancy: The March 14, 1986 PEI validation crmTents and discrernncies are attached. he Date:j Pf Ob Evaluator: / Resolution: m, (O The richt band column of the attached 1ist identifles the resolution for each of the ccrments. b. Date: 3 pr96 Supervisor: / Approved: S NO (circle one) Operations Section /w jf General Supervisor: Z g rP Date: 4--(-66 / Resolution 4[/)T@b Date: incorporated By: f

1 p PEI VALIDATION EXERCISE CCffG!NTS: MAR 1986 L V he following is a compilation by resolution category of all the comments generated regarding the PEI-B13 Revision 1 Draft 1, evaluated with scenarios during the March 14, 1986 PEI Validation Exercise. All PEI resolutions regarding improvements in text will be implemented in Rev 1. %e center column I indicates comment type: "F" for format, "T" for technical, and "1R" for training. COMMENT CAT RESOLUIION j ENHANCEMENT 1. PEI-B13 Att 4 step 3.a. NOTE for F Notes can be placed before or HPCS/MFP L8 Trip Bypass should after the applicable step. %e be placed before this step. Note is best placed near the list of systems. To provide a better identification between the Note and the referenced systems superscript notations were added. 2. PEI-B13 Att 5 step 7.c. NOTE. T he referenced NOTE was deleted More guidance on the initial and the injection restoration restoration actions could be step clarified. We clarification added to the NOTE. We initial states that if the RPV level is restoration flow calculated could below BAF a prompt injection be higher than the depressurization increase is required to restore leak rate. Direction is needed to the level just on the fuel zone restore the level pronptly to on range using available systems scale fuel zone indication. which inject outside the shroud, and then above the BAF control injection to slowly increase RPV level. Wis resolution was also incorporated into the January 1986 resolution of comument 3. 3. PEI-B13 Att 5 step 7.c. NOTE. T he resolution to comunent #2 is his note should be referenced to also adequate to address this the contingency step 7.c. Consider conenent, since the clarified moving NOTE before 7.c. injection restoration step accomplishes what this NOTE in-tended. We NOTE was deleted. O

4. PEI-B13 Att 5 step 9. We level T A step was added before the level restoration task should direct that restoration step in Att 4 and 5 at least 2 low pressure injection stating " Align for injection at systema; be operating and aligned least injection systems in the for injection prior to the RPV priority listed with the injection injection step. valve closed." his step is similar to the Att 3 RPV Level Restoration strategy in step 1. 5. PEI-B13 Att 5 step 9. Injection 'IR he following items were flow was commenced at 140 psig emphasized. 1) te core is prior to the RPV pressure decreasing adequately cooled above the to the Minimum Alternate RPV MARFP pressure corresponding Flooding Pressure (MARFP) of 90 to the number of open SRVs. psig.

2) Once the RPV pressure drops below the MARFP the rate of depressurization is small and RPV injection is more easily controlled.

O i O 1 .-,,----_.,.r_ .m_ .w.. m,y --_-.--.-,,y

e 4 -,_m = -o 4 A---. --nmn = m = - - 4.3.4 JAN 1986 EXERCISES i t a b h r i 0 t ( I I i

m... _. _.. _ _ _. _., _. _.. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _

m

Pages 50 Rev.: 1 (Coit.) PE1 Valid; tion Pica } Discrepancy Sheet: Number 3 PEI-B13,D17,D23-1,D23-2,D23-3,E12,G42 Revision: 0 Step Number: N/A Discrepancy: The January 13-17, 1986 PEI validation ceriteren cr.d diFerecanciec are attached. 3 APr96 h. Date: Evaluator: / Resolution: The richt hand column of the attached list identifies the remiuMon for each of the emments. Date: '3 M/8r 94 h. Supervisor: Approved: NO (circle one) Operations Section / A fJ General Supervisor: I_ M g I-Date: 1 f-p4, / Resolution Incorporated By: h. Date: 'l/ pf8b j O L

PEI VALIDATION EXERCISE COMMENTS: JAN 1986 he following is a compilation by resolution category of all the comments generated regarding the MPL number designated Plant Emergency Instructions, Revision 0, evaluated with scenarios during the January 13-17, 1986 PEI validation Exercise. %e center column indicates the comment type: "F" for format, "T" for technical, and "TR" for training. All PEI resolutions regarding improvements in text will be inplemented in Rev 1. i 1 COPMENT CAT RESOLUTION DISCREPANCY

1. PEI-B13 Att 4 steps 7.11. With T Consolidate in Attachments 4&5 rods out injection after termina-all steps related to injection was slow. Uncertainty was noted restoration onto one page and regarding the use of the second into one step as in the PSIG to RHR loop. A timely implementation concisely format the instruction, of the other available injection allow flexibility, and promote a systems is required to avoid ex-timely execution. mis change cessive core uncovery times.

clearly states that both RHR loops can be used to increase O a v ias ctioa-Also the consolidation of the preceding injection termination step onto one page from three wees done to enhance usability during this level control transition. Sese two consolidations were accomplished by the use of an alternate format which presents only the instruction steps, rather than both instruction and con-tingency steps. i O

To minimize the restoration time to the top of the TAF in Attach-(f-) ment 5 the restoration step will be clarified. We clarification will state that if the RPV level.is below BAF a pra pt in-jection increase is required to restore the level just on the fuel zone range using available systems which inject outside the shroud, and then when level is above the BAF control injection to slowly increase RPV level.

2. PEI-B13 Att 4 steps 7 & 8.

TR All control room crews were trained The STA did not feel core in-to the revised injection tegrity was challenged despite the restoration steps. Emphasis will length of time the level was be placed on the distinction below the bottom of the fuel. between the directive to " slowly his possibly delayed restoration increase injection" and the im-of RPV level. Also " slowly plied directive to restore RPV inject" needs to be defined level as soon as practicable. better.

3. PEI-B13 Att 5 steps 8 & 9.

'IR Emphasized the P680 SO aust Neutron monitoring was used late observe the neutron monitoring as indicating that level had been instrumentation during the restored " slowly". the training of the revised Att 4 & 5 injection restoration steps. D51ANCDENT

4. Minor comments noted were the F As shown.

following: a. Would like titles of PEIs on Included in all the PEIs each page. except PEI-B13. he title was added under the page identification on all the i the arabic numbered pages except the entry condition Page. b. PEI-B13. Readability could CAUTICH has been reworded. be improved: would like im-Turbine shutdown is similar to provements at 3.1 in the the IOI turbine shutdown and is turbine shutdown and 5.1 satisfactory. CAUTION on the stub bus operation, c. PEI-B13. Pages 78 & 79 are Direct the Admin unit to verify reversed. copying correctness. 1

d. PEI-D23-2 rigure 1 Press he figure was revised. Suppression Press needs I] tick mark. e. PEI-D23-l&2 step 5.2.1.c Revised as indicated. Electrical division for P50-F060 is not included.

5. Reccamend 2 books for PEIs.

F Two one inch binder volumes will / replace the single three inch volume. Se RPV Control PEI will be in the first volume and the Containment Control PEIs in the second volume.

6. Questioned whether information F he PEIs will be divided into was always easily located.

two volumes and provided with an improved tabbing arrangement. 7. Provide three copies for PEI-B13. F PAP-0501 Rev 2 'IC-002 added an updated controlled PEI volume for the STA. his increased the control room PEI volumes to three.

8. Storage pockets are needed for F PEI location aid divider storage the PEI location aid page are provided for the control room

dividers, and sismilator PEI volumes.

9. PEI-B13. Need criteria to select T he selection criteria: shutoff Alternate Injection Subsystems shutoff head pressure and maximum (AIS); either add to list or section flow will be added to all the 5.0.

Section 5 AIS introductory NCRTs describing the lineup and details of operation.

10. PEI-B13 Att 4 step 4.

Difficulty T Added "and energised". was noted with the interpretation of "RPV level instrumentation available" statement in RPV Flooding. Add "and energized" for clarification.

11. Properly define and train to

'IR his PEI operating term explained " maintain". in the PEI training tapes will be added to the PEI Preparation instruction OAP-0507 in the Use of Operating Terms section. his definition was emphasized in training. O

NCTI A DISCREPANCY

12. PEI-B13. Need to be able to T To determine the reactor can be declare the reactor can be main-maintained shutdown at cold tained shutdown in order to exit depressurized conditions is the from the sections directing control responsibility of PPTD Reactor with rods out.

Engineering or NED Puels.

13. PEI-B13 step 3.1.4. Should SLC be T SLC initiation in step 3.1.4 "If injected with extremely low RPV the reactor cannot be shutdown level?

before the Suppression Pool temperature reaches the Boron Initiation Tenperature" is appro-priate at any RPV water level.

14. PEI-B13 Att 5 step 6.

We T Use of RCIC aust be tengered by initiation of RCIC at just above knowledge of its isolation set-the isolation pressure setpoint of point. With less than 8 SRVs 90 psig was questioned. open, the use of RCIC is viable option.

15. PEI-B13 3.3 A NOTE was requested T We three PEI-B13 sections to to refer to the 3.2, Reactor control reactor power, pressure Pressure Control left hand page and level are executed con-option to use the Bypass valves to currently. To add a pressure depressurize when Eng RPV Depress control NOTE in the level control f]

is anticipated. section is not consistent with the format of Reactor Pressure Vessel Control, PEI-B13. l l l i \\O i k i

a e 4.3.5 TRAINING & REVI N i t ( l l l l l i / l l

L2] Pages 50 Rev. 1 (Cont.) PE1 Validation Plan / i \\s' [} Discrepancy Sheet: Number 2 v PEl-B13,D17,D23-1,D23-2,D23-3,E12,G42 Revision: 0 Step Number: N/A s Discrepancy: The cminents cenerated durina the training and review of the MPI. r.trher desianated PETS Rev 0 are attached. This doctamntation of PEI turnents outside the simulator evaluation is rct recn11 red by the PEI validation plan, but is subnitted for conpleteness to identify alI comnents and revision iter.s which occurred durino the validation. h-Date: 'l PF Ob Evaluator: / Resolution: C)h All exrments have resolutions identified on the right coltunn which wi1i ( be incorporated by Rev 1. 3[prBb b-Date: Supervisor: Approved: YES NO (circle one) Operations Section /affg~ Date: <;r-g6 General Supervisor: 7 / f M Jo / Resolution Incorporated By: h. Date: N /) FOG / 8 1 l

\\.y/ PEI TRAINING C09ENTS 7v % e following is a list of comments generated by review and training to the MPL number designated Plant Emergency Instructions Rev 0 as recorded by W.J. Colvin. An explanation of the resolution is included in the right hand column. We center colunn indicates the ccament type: "r" for format, and "T" for technical. CO!9ENT CAT RESOLITIION DEFICIENCY

1. PEI-B13 step 3.1.5.a.

Verify all T Initially corrected by PEI-B13 scram valves open. K-001.

2. PEI-313 step 3.1.10 and 3.2.6.

T Corrected as indicated. WI-C71 is entered from step 16 not 15.

3. PEI-B13 ?.2 left hand page.

T Corrected as indicated. f MSIV Irol Lo Level Bypass never opens the MSIVs. h;m

4. PEI-B13 Att 3 step 12. LPCS does T Corrected as indicated.

not take a suction from outside the containment.

5. PEI-B13 Att 4 step 5.e and Att T Corrected to " Terminate injection 5 step 3.e & 7.e.

Wis action from the feedwater and RCIC to will not necessarily terminate allow operator flexibility. injection from the EW system.

6. PEI-B13 Att 5 step 6 Needs to be T Revised step 6.b to 6.c and modified to prevent automatic added the action to place ADS initiation of ADS when RPV level A and B IDGIC INHIBIT keylock drops below the ADS initiation switches to INHIBIT IN 6.b.

setpoint.

7. PEI-B13, D23-1, D23-2, step 5.1.1 T Reworded-changed If to Before CAITrIm should be more explicit, and deleted "then"; corrected also correct typo "witht".

typo.

8. PEI-B13 step 5.1.8.

CAtTrION should T Corrected as indicated. be the same as CAttrION in 5.1.

9. PEI-B13 step 5.4.1. Typo, 1F24 T Corrected as indicated.

should be 1R24.

8

,~ l v

10. PEI-D23-2 6.0 Figures. NDAS T New figures provided revise the

,r 3 determined these figures should limits and show separate () be revised to show the changes to figures for each instrument the various limits when the con-

channel, tainment pressure is varied and the lower pressure tap is covered by suppression pool level. Also the figure should be more explicit about what pressure channel instrument is required, with two figures, 2a, and 2b, one for each channel.

ENHANCEMENT

11. Minor coments noted were the F As shown.

following: a. PEI-B13, D23-1, D23-2, Revised as indicated. D23-3, E12 and G42. Remove the numbers in the Figure and Attachment section listings since they don't appear on the actual figure. /O ( ) b. PEI-B13 Margin established for Revised to maintain consistent Alt Inj Sys is inconsistent margins. (eg pgs 50, 52, & 54). c. PEI-B13 vertical lines for some Revised as indicated. If While Executing boxes have been omitted. d. PEI-B13 Put step 3.0.3 in two Revised as indicated. column format. e. PEI-B13 Insert INTENTICNALLY Revised as indicated. BLANKS as necessary for proper tabbing, before section 3.1. f. PEI-B13 Inconsistent use of Made consistent by replacement " return" (3.1.7) with " proceed". with " proceed". g. PEI-B13 Typo, section 3.2.3, Revised as indicated. " Steam Condensing Mode of RHR". h. PEI-B13 3.2.4, Logic terms "or Revised as indicated. & and" are not underlined. 8 1. PEI-B13 Att 1. Delete extra Revised as indicated. "than" from step 2. l 1

(-

j. PEI-B13 Att 3 If While Exe-Revised as indicated.

a cuting statement pg. 42 Typo () " monitor conditions". k. PEI-B13 Att 4 step 2 Should read Revised as indicated. "the motor feed pump". 1. PEI-B13 Att 4 step 3.1 112 psig Revised to 120 psig, should be Human Factored (also steps 3.b & 4). m. PEI-B13 Att 4 step 3.1 Note Revised as indicated. should appear before the list. n. PEI-B13 No page references All section 5.0 instructions for section 5.0. will be provided with appro-priate tab labels for control room and simulator usage. o. PEI-B13 Deleted PEI-B13 from Revised as indicated. section 5.1 title since all RHR Bypass sections are worded identically. p. PEI-B13 5.1.8.a(b) CAIRICH Revised as indicated (also in should be capitalized. 5.1.2 and 5.1.3). q. PEI-D23-2 Correct the margin Revised as indicated. for the contingency step. r. PEI-D23-2 3.0.9 "on operation" Changed to "during operation". should be clarified. s. PEI-D23-2 3.0.11 Delete extra Revised as indicated. " Figure". l t. PEI-D23-3 3.0.1. Add "3.0.1 Revised as indicated. I None" to the contingency side, u. PEI-E12 step 3.0.2. Directing Step was revised to direct the closure of stuck open SRVs continuing in the step. should be executed concurrently l with the remaining instruction. l But should not provide a text l exit step since the main in-struction should address the exit condition. I

12. PEI-B13, D23-1, D23-3 section 3.3.

T Changed instruments, limits, and l RPV level CAIRION seems awkward ranges to singular nouns to make l since one range would be in use at CAIRION more specific, a time; perhaps the CAIRION should be more specific.

13. PEI-B13 Att 4 step 4.a.

How is T Revised. IAvel should be lowered '3 level to be lowered? with RNCU dump to RW or the (V condenser.

14. PEI-B13, D23-1, D23-2, D23-3 step T Added "If appropriate to energize 5.1.2(3). Does this mean that all NCC Pump A/B, and" to 5.1.2 and 3 NCC pumps should be started?

respectively.

15. PEI-B13 step 5.1.8.a(b).

If the T Added "and if the stub bus is pump cannot be started, this step not powering NCC PUMP A(B)" and implies that it is okay to leave delete " consider". the XH11(12) LOCA BYPASS in BYPASS.

16. PEI-B13 section 5.3.

HPCS/MFP L8 T Corrected with CAIJrICN. Bypass is only used in association with Att 4; when Att 4 is exited, this bypass should be terminated.

17. PEI-B13 sections 5.4 & 5.5.

Are T Added "both" before " wires", wires or just a single wire being removed here?

18. PEI-B13 section 5.6.

Local CRD T Revised as indicated. valves are in the IB not in the FHB. p

19. PEI-B13 step 5.6.1.a.

'Ihe bottom T Changed "is" to "can be ve-ified"; 'y) line here is: is there a CRD pump deleted "or the PEI Bypass of RHR running? IOCA has been completed in section 5.1."

20. PEI-D23-1 3.0.6 If While Executing T Revised to 1.5 psig.

step. Human Factor 1.68 psig containment pressure.

21. PEI-D23-2 steps 3.0.4, 3.0.8, &

T Revised containment exit pressure 3.0.16. Exit steps assume the to 2.0 psig. DW vacuum check valve opening pressure is 0.8 psid. 'Ihe correct value is 0.2 psid.

22. PEI-D23-2 step 3.0.9.

Is there T Deleted the reference to Post a chemistry instruction that will Accident Sampling System since make this happen? the radiation sensitivity of this system is too high to be useful.

23. PEI-D23-2 section 5.4.

Note and T Deleted "or through the open Inner steps do not seem to agree. Door and out to the Intermediate Building atmosphere through the Outer Door Seal." r l l

,A-m- m-. = m e e. -.%4 ..a _am. A,-t A..Ma_Am_. .s ,A-44 4 A s_,_ 3 .-..,3__m_aaw a-A __.,aa b 1 t 4.3.6 NOV 1985 EXERCISES l .1 I t i I i 9 I i f i l 1 i e i i I 1 f .I 1 I s .I i l l i -,~ ~ ~ - - -. - - - -.,,. -. - - - --,------ - - - -- - - - - - -. -,--,n__--__-,,

ill) Paget 50 Rev. 1 Att~hment 3 (Co t.) PEl Validation Plan g Discrepancy Sheet: No:nber 1 PEl-1,2,3. 4. 5. 6.7 Revision: Rev.1, Draf t 4 Step Number: N/A Discrepancy: The November 11-14, 1985 PEI validation ccrments and discrepancies are attached. [M. Date: ? />f 84 Evaluator: / Resolution: The richt hand column of the attached list identifies the resolution for each of the errrnents. Since the PETS were retitled fran sequential nturber suffices to MPL number suffices, the PEI resolutions may pertain to Rev 0 or Rev 1. b-Date: 3 Apr B(o Supervisor: Approved: NO (circle one) Operations Section ,/, Date: 4 -.4 - A /,, General Supervisor: v Resolution Incorporated By: h* Date: 4 $pf b /

8 PEI VALIDATION EXERCISE COMMENTS: Nov 1985 h e following is a compilation by resolution category of all consnents generated regarding the numerically sequenced Plant Emergency Instructions, Rev 1, Draft 4 evaluated with scenarios during the November 11-14, 1985 PEI validation Exercise. We center column indicates the comment type: "F" for

format, "M" for manning, "T" for technical, and "TR" for training.

/

COMMENT CAT RESOLUTICN DEFICIENCY

1. Pressure Suppression Pressure has F Figure was revised in Rev 0.

ambiguous scale.

2. Procedures needs streamlining.

F PEI-B13 Rev 1 streamlines injection termination and level restoration in attachments 4 and 5. All other portions of.the PEIs were verified to be adequate by the completion of the validation process. 8

3. PEI-1,-3,-4,&-5.

Improve the T A CAUTION statement regarding stub CAUTION regarding the reenergization bus closure and reshedding was of the stub buses to ensure no pumps added to all appropriate steps in are supplying adequate core cooling Rev 0. (ACC). Also ensure the stub buses are reshed if ACC is being main-tained.

4. PEI-l Att 4 & 5 Words need to be T In Rev 1 an initial step was added to allow injection systems added to Att 5 to align the by-be lined up before the reactor passes for at least two of the is depressurized, injection systems which utilize bypasses to properly prepare for level restoration after,depres-surization. 21s improrement also effects Att 4 concerning the rods out even where these injection systems with bypasses are also utilized since the entry into Att 4 for this event is from Att 5.

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5. PEI-Sa step 3.0.14 After Flooding T A test exit step was added here in O

the step locks you into maintaining Rev 0. less than Omfr PRESS LIMIT without testing exit.

6. PEI-6 Needs improved exit for HI T Added contingency exit step in level.

Rev 0.

7. PEI-6 Crew failed to interpret Heat T An explanation detailing the Capacity muperature Limit curve figure usage was added in Rev 0.

when Supt P1 level was below 14 ft. Further clarification was added in Rev 1.

8. Step by step execution of the PEIs 'IR Proficiency training was needs to be demonstrated during provided for all members of the simlator training and all crew crew prior to the second exercise.

===hars performance verified by an instructor.

9. PEI-l Att 1. contingency step 8 TR 'Ihe intention is to proceed with could not find a limit of when Alternate Injection and to enter to stop trying Alt Inj paths and the next "when" step when the proceed to step 9 where the 16.5" condition is satisfied. Training is mentioned and the steam cooling on the PEI format eliminated is required, this confusion before the second validation exercise.

O 1o. E1-1 Att 4 crew did not wait for x rrainieorierte ecend the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding exercise improved instruction Pressure (90 psig, w/8 SRVs) before execution. commencing FW injection Actually started at around 130 psig, but appeared to disregard altogether, i.e. did not check pressure.

11. PEI-l When is left hand page side TR Per the format, when the If While of step 14 or 15 in Att 4 used Executing conditional statement instead of performing step 14 or 157 is met, it is executed. PEI proficiency training prior to the second exercise provided additional instruction.

ENHANCEMENT

12. PEIs are too bulky and should be F

Two one inch binder volumes will in two volumes. replace the single three inch volume. The RPV Control PEI will be in the first volume and the Containment Control PEIs in the the second volume.

13. Review providing up to four copies F PAP-0501 Rev 2 'IC-002 added an of the PEIs in the Control Room, updated controlled PEI volume for the STA. his increases the Control Room PEI volumes to three and is adequate.

14. Dividers are ineffective if F he new storage pockets for the procedures are to be carried.

PEI location aid page dividers will prevent the spare dividers from spilling out. i

15. Need tabs with word descriptions F In Rev 0 tabs with titles were of the section. Label or tab provided for all section

figures, instructions and attachments.

In Rev 1 tabs with section numbers are provided for all section 5 special operations. In Rev 0 miniatures of all figures have been placed on the applicable left page. Wis improvement is more suitable than tabbing all the section figures.

16. Tables are too small. Lines F Some figures were identified on the graphs too thick. Graphs as having small titles and were could be larger, must utilize revised in Rev 0.

In Rev 0 1/4 of the page. figures needing improvement were redrawn. l l

17. PEI-1 Att 4 & 5 Make inhibiting F Incorporated in Rev 1.

of injection systems a Special Operation.

18. PEI-7 When the background rad F he Radiation Level Alert entry levels are known, they should be condition was deleted in Rev 0 listed so that 1000x Normal is which references 1000 times defined.

normal levels.

19. A TSAT/PSAT graph from pg. 100-111 T We RPV Saturation curve was added would help in evaluating C/D rate.

in Rev 0 in the Figures section.

20. PEI-1 Max Core Uncovery Time curve T Corrected in Rev 0.

could use horizontal lines on the left side.

21. PEI-1 3.1 Is the BIIT curve T Corrected in Rev 0 to 110 F.

horizontal at 108 F or 110 F?

22. PEI-1 3.1 Should be able to drive T Wis option has been added to rods in parallel with draining Rev 0 by adding and If While the SUV after a failure to scram.

Executing step before steps 3.1.7 and 3.1.9. 0

23. PEI-1 Att 4 step 15, "If water T Changed to "available and ener-level indication was available,"

gized" in Rev 0, was confusing to the US; should clarify.

24. PEI-l Att 5 Basically forces T With a IOCA Att 5 directs a failed fuel since time required depressurization only if RPV for action causes a below Fuel level cannot be maintained above Zone level excursion.

O in. To reduce the time re-quired for level restoration the following changes will be made in Rev 1: 1) Add initial step to Att 5 to prepare at least two systems listed which utilize bypasses for injection after depressurization. his preparation step will align bypass switches and place jumpers.

2) Streamline the termination and restoration steps by rewriting each task into one step formatted.

25. PEI-l Att 5 step 5. Had trouble T RPV level is lowered in the Power maintaining level at the point to Control Using Level Att, until the which it was lowered. PEI should the Reactor power is <4%, or RPV provide a means of rejecting in-level decreases to L1, or all SRVs ventory.

remain closed and drywell pressure 8 remains <1.68 psig. De PEI provides steaming as the means of rejecting inventory. In Rev 0 the " termination" and " maintain" steps allow the level to be properly controlled at the appropriate level.

26. PEI-5 step 5.1.6 Not clear that T Clarified in Rev 0.

PS2 is required for P50 operation.

27. PEI-6 Information for use of T Each figure has an explanation Supr Pl Load Limit is difficult describing its use. Additional to obtain. Guidance could be given information was added to this for situations where Supr P1 level figure in Rev 0.

is below family of curves. j l

28. PEI-7 Entry conditions are too T Entry conditions to PEI-7 are lengthy. Suggest deleting un-directly from the appropriate necessary entry conditions not EPI-Al step. However, those related to offsite release rate.

conditions not directly related to an off site release were deleted i l in Rev 0. 0 I

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29. %e PEIs are not necessarily TR Training and a proficiency difficult. We only real fix is evaluation were conducted prior meaningful training on them.

to the second exercise. Euphasis needs to be placed on:

1) using the special operations section, 2) using cooldown rate SVI, 3) determining when cooldown rate can be exceeded, 4) logic term definition.

30. PEI-1 Need an interpretation of TR ne reactor is shutdown means the the Reactor is Shutdown.

reactor is subcritical. his was emphasized in training before the second validation exercise.

31. PEI-1 steps 3.1.5 to 9.

TR Familiarity was gained during After inhibiting injection systems proficiency training prior to with rods out, had difficulty the second exercise. finding steps which inject SLC.

32. PEI-l Awkward shift frcxn Att 5 to TR PEI-l is written per Guideline.

Att 4 for Flooding. Familiarity will improve execution. All crews were evaluated for pro-ficiency prior to the second validation exercise. L LATER - POSSIBLE ENHANCEMENT l DEFERRED FOR EUR'HIER REVIEW

33. Need only one Special Ops section F

he present Special Operations for all the PEIs. format was verified to function adequately during the second exercise. However, providing all the PEI Special Operations I section instructions in a separate PEI instruction contained in a third volume would enhance usability. But this change could effect the crew's implementation of the PEIs. To avoid a training l discontinuity at this time, this enhancement will be deferred until Rev 2 for incorporation. At that time changes due to Rev 4 of the EPG will be included and simulator training will be conducted. l 8

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34. Flow chart would be a helpful F A flow chart will be evaluated alternative.

when the next revision of the PEIs to the EPG Rev 4 is prepared. We present prose instructions have been verified to be adequate. 21s alternate method of presentation would be an enhancement. NCfr A DISCREPANCY

35. Make when/then statements more F he current underlining of logic emphatic. Were are too many steps terms as required by OAP-0507 with overlapping pages; i.e., one provides the necessary emphasis, entry for steps 1 to 13, another te left hand pg. is designed to for 2 to 5.

Recommend splitting minimize information to be memor-PEI-l into AWS and non-AWS ized. %e recommendation to events. split the A W S and non-AWS events offers no clear advantage.

36. It is confusing to have a con-F All these conditional statements tingency to the right of the action are required in the PEIs by the and an If While Executing step on PSIG. %ese steps are conditional; the left. Emergency RPV Depress performed regardless of steps on required usually ends up on the on right page. All Control Room l

left; easy to miss. crews have demonstrated pro-ficiency using the PEIs during requal training prior to the second exercise. l l

37. PEI-l Simplify words, e.g.

F Wese words are standard and Mininum Alternate RPV Flooding derived from the appropriate PEI Pressure are awkward and doesn't attachment adequate core cooling make sense. Perhaps moving model. We use of CAUTICNs on the 3.2 CAurION to be associated the left hand page is inconsis-with the IF WHILE EXECUTING step tent with the PEI format. directing the opening of the turbine bypass valves would be appropriate.

38. PEI-7 and CNI-Nil could provide F PEI-7 provided the information additional information on potential required by the PS'IG. PEI-7 E31 information. PEI-7 should was not required to reference reference (NI-Nil.

CNI-Nil.

39. Iocation of non-control room T PEI local task verification items (e.g. fuses to be re-indicated all items are moved) is inadequate.

in Rev. O.

40. No way to recover NC to DN when T Wis was simulated to drive the bypass switches fail.

scenario. In reality, the I&C technician could have repaired the l

failure, 8

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41. ESW & ECC are needed when operating T PEIs are written assuming the RHR.

operators will reference the SOIs as necessary. We DCRDR PEI task analysis verified all SOI references.

42. PEI-1,-3,&-4.

If ERIS is inop, T Inferred from Cntat & DW temps. how are reference leg tenperatures determined in the control room?

43. PEI-l Could use note to direct T Normal connunication between the P601 & P680 to coordinate feed to P601 and P680 operators is the vessel.

sufficient to provide the necessary coordination.

44. PEI-l Att 1 Cannot line up Alt T his is dependent on the casualty.

Inj fast enough to prevent level 1 If all normal injection systems where Steam Cooling is required, are failed, this is expected and was used to drive the scenario.

45. PEI-l Att 1 step 8. Need to be T Steam Cooling is a last resort directed to Steam Cooling faster.

time buying evolution; therefore, it should only be entered after all other possibilitias have been ex-hausted, and level cannot be maintained. l

46. PEI-l Some confusion in going T Att 4 is exited when the exit from Att 4 to Att 5; what happens conditions are met. Additional if 3.1 step 9 doesn't work?

training provided further fam-iliarity with the attachments. If the rods cannot be driven, continue as appropriate.

47. PEI-l Att 5 (and 4) step 7 Require-T Injection termination in these meats to terminate injection is too attachments is intended to be drastic in wording-should lower abrupt, to proceed with the Emg water level in a more controlled RPV Depressurization and then a subsequent restoration of level.

manner. i j

48. Procedure should allow one bundle T We reactivity of a core not fully to be destroyed (rod greater than shutdown is difficult to assess

02) if the SRMs are onscale.

from the control panel. We Att should have been able to inject 5 power control actions are ap-with LPCS at 480 psig and 85" propriately conservative. rather than securing inside the %e inside the shroud injection shroud systems and taking time systems are used as the last to go to LPCI and FW. priority and only after depress-urization to minimize positive reactivity effects from cold water directly on the core. l 0

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49. PEI-5 Perhaps Pressure Suppression T PEI-5 referenced this figure at Pressure should be looked at upon the appropriate step as required G

entering? by the PSIG.

50. PEI-6 Lacks Cntat Flood options T Containment Flood options will be (i.e. overriding HPCS & RCIC developed in a new PEI-B13 Att suction vlvs, ESW to RHR B in Rev 2 when EPG Rev 4 is in-Flood) corporated. We probability of this accident is outside the scope of the FSAR.

51. Could use another SO.

M Although occasional situations occurred when another 50 would have been helpful. We scenarios verified the present crew manning was adequate to implement the PEIs tasks as well as other tasks within the required time.

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