Text

EDO Control of Rulemaking Package Re 10CFR50,70 & 73, Physical Protection Requirements for Nonpower Reactor Licensees Processing Formula Quantities of Ssnm. Continuation of Rulemaking Approved
	ML20206E964
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/22/1985
From:	Dircks W; NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	Jennifer Davis; NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
References
	NUDOCS 8606240056
	Download: ML20206E964 (120)
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e p45 JUL 2 21985 MEMORANDUM FOR: John G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards FROM: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING By memorandum of February 13,1984, " Control of NRC Rulemaking by Offices Reporting to the EDO," Offices were directed that effective April 1, 1984, (1) all offices under EDO purview must obtain my approval to begin and/or continue a specific rulemaking, (2) resources were not to be expended on rule-makings that have not been approved, and (3) RES would independently review rulemaking proposals fomarded for my approval and make reconnendations to me concerning whether or not and how to proceed with the rulemakings.

In accordance with my directive, the following proposal concerning rulemaking has been forwarded for my approval.

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Proposed rulemaking, entitled " Physical Protection Requirements for Nonpower Reactor Licensees Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material," (10 CFR Parts 50, 70 and 73) (Sponsored by NMSS - memorandum, a

Minogue to ED0 dated May 31,1985.)

My understanding is that this rulemaking will be modified to be consistent with the Commission's recent decision concerning the proposed rule to limit the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in research and test reactors (SECY 85 213 and related Chilk memorandum dated July 5, 1985).

I approve continuation of this rulemaking. The NRC Regulatory Agenda (NUREG-0936) should be modified to reflect the status of this rulemaking.

(Signed) William J.Dircks, William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations cc: V. Stello Distribution:

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fe T_l f j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20',% b , g Q.1)f.l ph) w, NAY 311985 MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM: Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT:

CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING: RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF ONGOING RULEMAKING BY NMSS Based on our independent review of the ongoing rulemaking, " Physical Protection Requirements for Non-power Reactor Licensees Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material," (10 CFR 50, 70, 73), RES recommends that st be continued. The basis for our recommendation follows.

When the Commission approved the physical protection requirements for fuel cycle facilities possessing formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) in July 1979, category I non-power reactors (NPR's) were exempted from these requirements (10 CFR 73.20, 73.45 and 73.46). Instead ths Commission specified a set of interim requirements and directed the staff to develop final physical protection requirements.

The subject rulemaking is needed to replace the current interim regulations for physical protection requirements at category I NPR's. The proposed final rule would upgrade requirements to provide protection against insiders and to arrange for response by local law enforcement in time of theft of a formula quantity of 7

SSNM. It does so by specifying the measures necessary to afford a level of physical protection compatible with the protection provided for formula quantities of SShM at fuel cycle facilities. Credit is given for specific facility and fuel design features which offer intrinsic protection against theft, i.e., the proposed new rule continues to give some safeguards credit for irradiated fuel whose radiation level is above 100 rem / hour at three feet, since this radiation level provides a certain deterenoe against theft.

The subject rulemaking uses a performance oriented regulatory approach which gives affected licensees flexibility in designing cost-effective measures to-take advantage of existing facility design features. Currently, a decision is pending by the Commission concerning what, if any, additional physical security safeguards will be required of category II NPR's. Since improvements necessary to safeguard category I NPR's are in addition to physical protection requirements for category II, further action on the subject rulemaking by NMSS is being deferred until the issue of category II NPR's is resolved by the Conmission.

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, g William J. Dircks 2 MAY 311985 Potentially, there could be 13 licensees affected by the proposed rule although no more than three are likely to be actually affected. These 13 licensees are made up of large companies, major universities, and Federal and state agencies.

Consequently, under the provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.

605(b)), this rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Not more than three facilities are expected to have to implement these new requirements at an estimated one time capital cost of

$1,100 to $5,100 and an annual operating cost increase of $300 to $7,900 per facility. A low operating cost normally corresponds to a high capital cost and vice versa.

The public will benefit from improved physical protection measures which will be implemented at the affected licensees. The impact on the NRC resulting from this rulemaking will be the resources needed to review new or amended physical protection plans when they are submitted by the licensees.

It should be noted that the proposed rule " Limiting the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Research and Test Reactors" which addresses issues raised by international policy objectives is not driven by domestic safeguards considerations and therefore, is not an alternative to the subject rulemaking.

The Director of NMSS recommends that this rulemaking continue.

The complete RES independent review package has been sent to OED0 (Attention OEDR0GR) and to the Director, NHSS.

Robert B. Minogue, irector Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research t

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, 1 IEMORANDLM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations j

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b. FROM: Robert B. Minogue. Director 3 g

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT:

CONTROL OF IRC RULEMAKING: RES INDEPEIDENT REVIEW '

0F ONG0ING RULEMAKING BY 19455 Based on our independent review of the ongoing rulemaking, " physical Protection

.J Requirements forNuclear Non-power Reactor Licensees

_ . Strategic Special Material," (10 CFR 50, 70,possessing)Fomula 73 , RES recommends Quantities that it of be continued. The basis for our recommendation follows.

4 i When the Commission approved the physical protection requirements for fuel cycle -

facilities possessing fomula quantities of strategic special nuclear material l .

(55191) in July 1979, category I non-power reactors (NPR's) mere exempted from j

r these receiraments (10 CFR 73.20, 73.45 and 73.46). Instead the Commission 1,'!Y specifiet a set of interim requirements and directed the staff to develop final physical protection requirements.

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!@- The subject rulemaking is needed to replace the current interim regulations for

d @ physical protection requirements at category I NPR's. The proposed final rule l V would upgrade requirements to provide protection against insiders and to arrange

! for response by local law enforcement in time of theft of a fomula quantity of l1 (s

$$NM. It does so by specifying the measures necessary to afford a level of physical protection compatible with the protection provided for fomula f'-

W. quantities of SSNM at fuel cycle facilities. Credit is given for specific 4' < facility and fuel design features which offer intrinsic protection against 2 theft, i.e., the proposed new rule continues to give some safeguards credit for s irradiated fuel whose radiation level is above 140 rum / hour at three feet, since this radiation level provides a certain deterence against theft.

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h. The subject rulemaking uses a performance oriented regulatory approach which ri l;. gives affected licensees flexibility in designing cost-effective measures to 3

7 take advantage of existing facility design features. Currently, a decision is pending by the Commission concerning what, if any, additional physical security l h'c safeguards will be required of category II NPR's. Since improvements necessary

h. to safeguard category I NPR's are in addition to physical protection requirements for category !!, further action on the subject rulemaking by NMSS >

}(- is being deferred until the issue of category !! NPR's is resolved by the

? Commission.

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[ potentially, there could be 13 licensees affected by the proposed rule although

( no more than three are likely to be actually affected. These 13 licensees are

? made up of large companies, major universities, and Federal and state agencies.

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p Conseq)uently, under the provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.605(b )

number of small entities. Not more than three facilities are expected to have x to implement these new requirements at an estimated one time capital cost of f $1.100 to $5,100 and an annual operating cost increase of $300 to $7,900 per i facility. A low operating cost moraally corresponds to a high capital cost and p vice versa.

4 The public will benefit from improved physical protection measures which will be

[ implemented at the affected licensees. The impact on the NRC resulting from jy this rulemaking will be the resources needed to review new or amended physical A

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protection plans when they are submitted by the licensees.

O It should be noted that the proposed rule " Limiting the Use of Highly Enriched

$ Uranium in Research and Test Reactors" which addresses issues raised by international policy objectives is not driven by domestic safeguards considerations and therefore, is not an alternative to the subject rulemaking.

The Director of MSS recannends that this rulemaking continue.

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TO: F. P. GILLESPIE, CHAIRMAN, RIRB FROM: W. M. Morrison, Member, RIRB TITLE OF RULEMAKING: Physical Protection Req. for Nonpower Reactor Licensees Possessing Formula Quantities of SSNM AGREE WITH RECOMENDATIONS IN RES RULEMAKING REVIEW PACKAGE

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MODIFY RECOMENDATIONS IN NOT PARTICIPATING.

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Please evaluate the . attached dra'ft independent review package and provide RAHRB with your voting sheet indicating your, position on the rulemaking.

Your response by c.o.b. MAY 2 0 1985 will assist in RES' making independent recomendations to the EDO in a timely manner.

Do esor use ehis eenn se a sutcono esseeeness, ens e e7 tis, sensenenese, merensis, assens FMlet. (feesng org. sym6el, Agency /reeg neem No.4 RAMRB staff enenesee.

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[ SUBJFCT: CONTROL OF IstC RULEMAKING: RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW

, .? 0F ONG0ING RULEMAKING BY NMSS pt ix h-

' 't Based on our independent review of the ongo1 rulemaking. " Physical Protection

l. Requirements for non-power Reactor Licensees ssessing Fomula Quantitles of 3 Strategic Special Nuclear Material." (10 CFR 50, 70. 73). RES recommends that it jf, he continued. The basis for our recommendation follows.

When the Commission approved the physical protection requirements for fuel cycle

[b: facilities possessing fomula quantities of strategic special nuclear material yl (55101) in July 1979 category I non-pouer reactors (NPR's) were exempted from

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'a l, physical protection requirements at category I NPR's. The propused final rule

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'y. for response by local law enforcement in time of theft of a fomula quantity of M, 55101. It does so by specifying the measures necessary to afford a level of j[1 physical protection compatible with the protection provided for fomula

e. quantities of $5NN at fuel cycle facilities. Credit is given for specific 0 facility and fuel design features which offer intrinsic protection against

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h'i c The subject rulemaking uses a perfomance oriented regulatory approach which gives affected licensees flexibility in designing cost-effective measures to S9 f- take advantage of existing facility design features. Currently, a decision is H pending by the Caumission concerning what. If any, additional physical security

, safeguards will be required of category II NPR's. Since improvements necessary i to safeguard category I NPR's are in addition to physical protection

k. requirements for category II, further action on the subject rulemaking by NMSS is being deferred until the issue of category II NPR's is resolved by the

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William J. Dircks 2 s

Potentially, there could be 13 licensees affectr.d by the proposed rule although no more than three are likely to be actually affected. These 13 licensees are made up of large companies, major universities, and Federal and state agencies.

Consequently, under the provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.

605(b)), this rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Not more than three facilities are expected to have to implement these new requirements at an estimated one time capital cost of

$1.100 to $5.100 and an annual operating cost increase of $300 to $7,900 per facility. A low operating cost normally corresponds to a high capital cost and vice versa.

The public will benefit from improved physical protection measures which will be implemented at the affected licensees. The impact on the NRC resulting from this rulemaking will be the resources needed to review new or amended physical protection plans when they ore submitted by the licensees.

It should be noted that the proposed rule " Limiting the Use of Highly Enriched

< Uranium in Research and Test Reactors" which addresses issues raised by international policy objectives is not driven by domestic safeguards

} considerations and therefore, is not an alternative to the subject rulemaking.

The Director of MSS recommiends that this rulemaking continue.

The c lete RES independent review pack % e has been sent to OEDO (Attention DEDROGR and to the Director, MSS.

. Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research DISTRIBUTION:

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Y M 2 61985 IGIORANDUM FOR: J. A. Norberg, Chief Human Factors and Safeguards Branch, DRA0 FROM: Frank P. Gillespie, Chairman i RES Independent Review Board

SUBJECT:

CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING: RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW

^

OF ONGOING RULEMAKING

~ Enclosed is a rulemaking review package received from a sponsoring office for RES independent review. (Enclosure 1)

A In accordance with procedures approved by the EDO on May 30, 1984, the rule-4 making review package is assigned to your branch for action. (Enclosure 2).

7 The EDO-approved procedures allow a total of 20 working days for completing the RES independent review. To assist RES in completing its independent review in a timely manner, please submit the draft independent review package for this specific rulemaking to RAMRB by 7 working days from the date of this memorandum.

~

Frank P. Gillespie, Chairman RES Independent Review Board

Enclosures:

1. Physical Protection Requirements for Non-power Reactor 1.icensees Possessing Fonnula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material (10 CFR 50, 70, 73)

2. Procedures for Conducting RES Independent Review of Rulemakings Distribution:

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MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM: John G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety

- and Safeguards

SUBJECT:

CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING - EDO QUARTERLY REVIEW In response to your memorandum of February 13, 1984, and in accordance with instructions provided in subsequent memoranda from the Office of Nuclear Regu-latory Research (NRR), the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) has reviewed the ongoing or proposed rulemaking activities listed in Attachment 1 to this memorandum. On the basis of our review, we recommend

- approval of continued activity on these rules, with the exception of "Certifi-cation of Industrial Radiographers" and " Shallow Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste". Staff efforts on these are now directed toward tenninating the two rulemaking activities. ' -

Also, as directed by your memorandum and the subsequent instructions from RES, we have prepared Review Packages for all of the listed rulemaking activities.

These are included as attachments to this memorandum, with copies forwarded to RES and the other reviewirig office . -

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J hn G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safegusrds t

Attachments:

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I f EVALUATION OF RULEMAKING

! , 1. The issue to be addressed.

When the Comission approved the set of final physical protection mquirements for fuel cycle facilities possessing formula quantities (five fonnula kilograms or more) of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM),

they exempted nonpower reactors from these requirements and, instead, specified a set of interim requirements. At that time the staff was directed to develop a set of pennanent physical protection requirements for this class of nonpower reactors.

2. The necessity and urgency of addressing this issue.

- This rulemaking is needed: 1) to replace the current interim regulations and establish permanent physical security requirements for nonpower reactor licensees who possess a nonexempt formula quantity of SSNM, 2) to provide protection against insiders, and 3) to arrange for a response by local law enforcement or other agencies in time to prevent a theft of a fonnula quantity. The rulemaking will satisfy the Commission's request t for a permanent rule in this area to replace the present interim rule.

l l 3. Alternatives to rulemaking.

l An alternative to rulemaking is to issue special license conditions when a nonpower reactor licensee possesses a fonnula quantity of SSNM which does not qualify for any exemption from physical protection requirements.

Doing this would in effect be regulating by license condition rather than, publicly amending the regulations and would not be responsive to the Comission's request for a pennanent rule.

4. How the issue will be addressed through rulemaking. -

l The staff is using a performance-oriented regulatory approach which would l give affected licensees flexibility in designing cost-effective measures for implementing the requirements of the final rule by allowing licensees to take advantage of existing facility design features. As discussed above, this rulemaking will: 1) replace the current interim regulations l

and establish permanent physical security requirements for nonpower reactor licensees who possess a nonexempt formula quantity of SSNM, 2) provide protection against insiders, and 3) require the licensee to arrange for a response by local law enforcement or other agencies in time to prevent a theft of a fonnula quantity.

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5. How the public, industry, and NRC will be affected.

. The public will benefit from improved physical protection measures which will be implemented at the affected licensees. Not more than three facilities are expected to have to implement these requirements at an estimated cost increase of $1,100 to $5,100 for improvements and $300 to

$7,900 for annual operating costs per facility. As a result nf this rulemaking, the NRC will be reviewing new or amended physical protection plans when they are submitted by the licensees.

6. NRC resources and scheduling needed for the rulemaking.

The currently budgeted NRC resources for finishing this rulemaking are 0.4

l. staff years. No final schedule will be set until the Comission takes

' action on the related question (SECY-84-216) of whether to make security improvements at Category Il nonpower reactors (those possessing 1 to 5 kilogramsofHEU).

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TITLE:

a Physical Protection Recuirements for Nonpower Reactor Licensees Possessing e Formula Guantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material CFR CITATION:

10 CFR 50; 10 CFR 70; 10 CFR 73 ABSTRACT:

When the Commission approved the set of final physical protection requirements for fuel cycle facilities possessing formula quantities (five formula kilograms or more) of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM), they exempted nonpower reactors from these requirements and, instead, specified a set of interim requirements. At that time the staff was directea to develop a set of permanent physical protection require-ments for this class of nonpower reactors. This rulemaking is needed:

1) to replace the current interim regulations anc establish permanent physical security requirements for nonpower reactor licensees who pcssess a nonexempt formula quantity of SSNM, 2) to provide protection against s

insiders, and 3) to arrange for a response by local law enforcement or other agencies in time to prevent a theft of a formula quantity. The i staff is using a performance-oriented regulatory approach which would y

give affected licensees flexibility in designing cost-effective measures for implementing the requirements of the final rule by allowing licensees to take advantage of existing facility design features. Not more than .

three facilities are expected to have to implement these requirements at an estimated cost increase of $1,100 to $5,100 for . improvements and $300 to $7,900 for annual operating costs per facility. Public comments on the new NPRM have been received and analyzed. Further action has been deferreo pending resolution of other related issues.

TIMETABLES:

Interim Final Rule 11/28/78 44 FR 68199 Previous NPRM 09/18/81 46 FR 46333 NPRM 07/27/83 I NPRM Comment Period Begin 07/27/83 48 FR 34056 2 Proposeo Rule Limited to Part 73 07/27/83 48 FR 34056 .

1 NPRM Comment Period End 11/28/83 hext Action Undetermined LEGAL AUTHORITY: .

42 USC 2071; 42 USC 2073; 42 USC 2133; 42 USC 2134; 42 USC 2152; 42 USC 2201; 42 USC 2232; 42 USC 2233; 42 USC 2236; 42 USC 2239; 42 USC 2273; 42 USC 5841; 42 USC 5842; 42 USC 5846 EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESS AND OTHER ENTITIES: No e e em . g e ee e e =

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!- TITLE: .

. Physical Protection Requirements for Nonpower Reactor Licensees g Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material AGENCY CONTACT:

Carl J. Withee Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards .

301 427-4768 6

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g Federal Register / Volses. No.145 / Wednesday, July 27, 1983 / Proposed Rules y .

A,4ssedias Desiposted Imr *

Branch.P- received win be ana*=inant in to CFR 73.80. 73.87(a) and Q*Ph GR Put 405 avellable for examination and copying ' 73.HF(d)., , , , . t ,

,r The Isuewing esunties are desipated for at the NRC Publicnar====t Room at Badgieand -

l 9typer crop Imawamos seder the previsions 1717 H Street NW., Washington. D.C.

sf 7 CFR 4es.t. 3E45. Also eveGable in the NRC Public On July 24. ters, ther%==l==laa I yg,,gg, Doceanent Room are copies of the approved a ran===adation that nonpower reactor (NPR) licensees lM j 7 l . Dame la Weebington. D.C., n May 25. tees, Regulatory Analysis which includes an

-r adad cost /beneSt discussion and 3y 7-stra

' ; formula c

tities of-ma enhg 5

! - . c* ef 6. ,ro ,osed= ~ a. e require.=.- d e. ne. Sdesmds

( ' 4 8 " *F-[ M O *P - pen puumeen esponsaanose coerrac'r: Upgrade Rule (10 CFR 73.20. 73.45, and Dr. C. J. Withee. Fast Facility Safeguards 73.46). At that time, the a==f== ion r l asked the staff to develop new physical r Desed:lely is, tees. IJoensing Branch Division of ,

Apprm% Gefoguards. OfBos of Nuclear Material tection requirements for NPR l

,e , 88""d li'" and Safeguards.U.S. Nuclear that would provide AhyeepManager - toryennmientan Washington. comparable protection against the theft ! l D.C. aussa, telephone (301) 427-4040. of SSNM. hee new requirements wm ' , l ,

l-Weomswussru=o-awm**==1 ' '

ename osaa newe.m suppMIAEIrfaRY eIpOnhaafl004 . to,take into account the unique considerations of facility i

"="""""= . - design features, and fuel type and form

, MIUCL. EAR REQULATORY

, To aidin endarstanding the at NPRs.In the interim NPR licensees l l ;400AndISSION tary Information. the Possessing a formula quantity of l T definitions and citations tb ======pt material would be subject to '

to CpR Part 73 the recently enacted Category H -

j Title to of the Code of Federal tions (10 CFR) are given.h requirements (to CFR 73.67(d)) as weII ,

- 9hysiced Protecdon Respdroments for -as the old Category I requirements (10 i 80enpower Reactor 1.icensees tions also appear in 10 CFR 73.2 ,

and in table form in10 CFR Part 110 C m 73.80). 3 posseeming Formuis Quensues of Under the laterim regulations. NPR 0 0 Strategic Special Nucesar Iseterial Appendix C. *

(1) Special nuclear material oflow licensees are permitted to reduce the . .

asancv: Nuclear Regulatory ,g.stagic "== (referred to as level of their physical protection . L cm==i== ion. Category In material) is: (a) More than measures to the extent that their fuel is l asmest Proposed rule. 15 grams but not more than 500 grams of irradiated sufBciently to quahiy for the g plutonium or urenhun-233; (b) more than . exemptions in 10 CFR 73.80 and

. suunant De Nuclear Regulatwy la grams but not more than 1000 grams 73.87(b)(1)(1). De exemptions rely on the ,

M Pa""ni== ion is proposing to amend its of uranium ass in uranium enriched to determat effect that exists when fuel physicaWecha mgula 30 percent or greater: (c) more than 1000 has an external radiation dose rate in %

nonPower reactor (NPR) censeesh, Bonsgrams fw butless than10.000 grams of excess of 100 rem per hour at 3 feet from t l

possessing femula quanudes d unranium-235 in uranium enriched to to any accessible point without intervening (

ctrategic special nuclear matenal percent or more but less than 20 percent: shielding. Presently, all NPR licensees (SSW) De proped amendments or (d)10.000 grams or more of uranium- who would have to implement the h '

have been prepared lansponse to a Category I protection requirements in to 9 235 in uranium enriched above natural E I

ca=*nf==faa mquest for the butless than to percent. Fixed site CFR 73.00 are keeping their fuel .

dev;lopment of these new physical snN4=ntly irradiated to be exempted to

Mcalproucumuimments fu P" nonexempt Category IH material are a lower level of protection requirements (

an:M'"9'I'"*"'** D*

to would mplace the interim contained in 10 CFR 73.67 (a) and (f).~ (i.e. some am ===mpted to Category,H .s aquirments which am carmntly in (2) Special nuclear material of and some to Category HI requirements).

force et these facilities. De result of moderate strategic significance (referred Also, under current regulations. {J em= to wiH be se most cook to as Category H material) is: (a) More physical protection measures only need ;

effeedve approach fw providing than 500 grams but less than 2000 grams be effective against external ;

assurance against se een d a famula of plutonima or uranium-233: (b) more adversaries.Thus, insiders are not i I

l quenay d SSW. whue taking into than 1000 grams but less than 5000 included as part of the adversary threat. 1 account se unique featums d se F pass of uranium-235 in uranium However, as provided in 10 CFR l

' I ty design, and fuel type and fwm at enriched to 20 percent or greater; or (c) 73.1(a)(2), insiders are part of the g s 10.000 grams or more of uranium-235 in adversary threat for fuel cycle facilities p sam Conunents must be received on or uranium enriched to 10 percent or possessing formula quantities of SSNM. 7 before November 28.1963. Comments greater but less than 20 percent. Fixed On August 12.1981, the Commission g received after this date will be site physical protection requirements for approved the publication of proposed d considered if it is practical to do so, but nonexampt Category H material are permanent physical protection casurance of consideration cannot be contained in CFR 73.67 (e) and (d).. requirements regarding Category I NPRs k given except as to comments received (3) A formula quantity (referred to as possessing nonexempt formula M on or before this date. .

Category I material) is: (a) 2.000 grams quantities of SSNM.Dese requirements j

=aa===* Comments or suggestions or more of plutonium or uranium-233 or were published in the Federal Register q' regirding the proposed amendments (b) 5.000 grams or more of uranium.235 on September 18.1981 (48 FR 46333) and .

siculd be sent to the Secretary of the - in uranium enriched to 20 percent or took into account the NPR facility and j Commission. U.S Nuclear Regulatory smeter. Current physical protection fuel design and eliminated some 1 l e.;

Commission. Washington. D.C. 20555 requirements for nonexempt Category I Safeguards Upgrade Rule requirements. "

Att:ntion: Docketing and Service material at nonpower reactore (NPR) are Rose proposed requirements and the ,

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Jederal Register / Vcl 48. No.145 / Wednesday, July 27. 1983 / Proposed Rul:s 34057 2

I sevised .J- -ta in this . syde indlities, while talang advantage text of several sections.nere is no e motice include the insider as part of a esmiber of specific facility and fuel further change in those previously t of the adversary threat. limit the design features that collectively offer proposed a==adments and thus they are

'- exemption which a CategoryINpR inherent protection against theft. .

act repeated in this notice. ,

ban ==e can receive to no lower than he exemptias level.100 rem Masponse h b Pubuc Comunents she level of Category H physical per hour at a front any accessible protection requirements, and replace the anrface without intervening shielding. is Twelve public comments were interim Category I requirements in 10 seasidered to be appropriate and has received which discussed spedfic GR 73AD. .

not been changed. De f'r=wni==fon staN provisions of the proposed rule. Eleven

%e September 13.1981 motice also has determined that it is appropriate to of these C TM"-d one on more aspects Eaeladad a statement of the staff's allow medit towards safeguards based of the proposed rule as being too l resolution of a number ofissues which upon radiation levels due to the '

restrictive or unnecessary. One had been raised earlier. In particular, deterrent quality of nuclear radiation commenter called for stricter the t'a=== ion presented its fInthngs and the adversaries' difBculty in requirements than those being ymywd

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that the axisting protection exemption accurately J L . LMgirradiation and supported a minority Commission

+ level of100 rem per hour at 3 feet from levels.De current exemption level, position which was included in the 1961 ety acosesible surface without r.ny which is internationally accepted, does notics.

kr.orvening shielding was appropriate, not, however, preclude the possibility of De most frequent comments were:(1) and thus, a new level was not proposed. a dedicated adversary, heedless of the ne requirernents as stated were too However, e====ats were specifically subsequent efects of the radiation prescriptive and did not allow for solidted on the 100 rem per hour level. =Pa==e. from successfully removing a consideration of site specific features:

(

c',=ammats on that issue ranged from formula quantity of SSNM from an NPR (2) the 100 rem per hour exemption level stating that the 100 rem per hour level fadlity before being physically may be difficult for some licensees to was higher than necessary to proposing bcapacitated by the radiation effects. maintain and could encourage some that the exemption levelbe raised all For this reason. it is considered prudent annecessary reactor operations just to the way to 2.000 rem per haur. While the to require that the minimum level of meet that level:(3) a phase-in period -

ea=-ts supported various exemption p_hysical protection provided for these should be allowed before full Category I levels, they did act give any significot m x facilities be the same as that for (Le when a formula quantity of SSNM new techairal information on the topic. Category H mate ial, regardless of the becomes nonexempt) requirements are After review of the comments, the staff enount of SSNM possessed which is necessary: (4) licensees irradiating determined that because the Prediated beyond the 100 rem per hour enough SSNM to over 100 rem per hour commenters supported a range of at 3 feet level -

.should only have to implement Category exemption levels and no significant new his apprqach is based on several HI (low strategic significance) physical technical information was provided. considerations. It is acknowledged that protection measures and sheuld be there was insufficient reason to justify a the existing exemption level.100 rem per exempted from both Category I and preposed change in the 100 rem per hour hour at 3 feet. is not an incapacitating Category H requirements: and (5) the level However since the Commission is dose rate, but serves as a deterrent to cost estimates for implementing the asking for comment on the revised theft. Also, staff believes that this dose proposed rule were too low.

proposed ==mariments, any technical rate will be a significant deterrent to the In respose to these comments, the information or comment on the processing of the material for use as a originally proposed amendments have appropriateness of the 100 rem per hour weapon particularly r=aa-aMag the been extensively revised as follows.

and the use of Category H physical email quantities of material present at First. the Category I physical protection

protection measures as a minimum level these reactors and the inherent dif5culty requirements were rewritten as of material safeguards is again solicited. In preprocessing the TRIGA and MTR performance capabilities. A description ne following discussion is provided as plate-type fuel used in NPRs. Finally, of how the licensee intends to background on this issue. this dose rate must be considered in implement the requirements will be h proposed amendments would view of the ALARA principles and the given in the physical security plan require NPR licensees possessing fact that higher dose rates would submitted for licensing review. Site formula quantities of strategic special . encourage reactor operation simply to specific features will be considered nuclear material to protect their material meet the regulatory exemption level. before licenses approvalis given.To aid at least at the level prescribed in to CFR his is against the ALARA prmciple in the public commenters in understanding 73.87(d) for Category H materialhis that reactors might operated at radiation the rule's intent, scope of application, requirement would apply regardless of levels higher than ameammary. and rationale, additional supporting wbat portion of the material ymi Verbal ca===nts have been received information is available for inspection in is irradiated to meet the 100 rem per that favor ahaa-ia the exemption the NRC Public Document Room.1717 H

, hour exemption.%e amendments also criterion to one which specifies a dose Street. NW, Washington. DC 20655.

require that additional physical reta per gram of contained uranium-235 Prescriptive security measures aremo protection measures, specified in a new lootope. Written comments on such a longer specified, thereby allowing the

paragraph.10 CPR 73.87(h) be provided criterion. including its basis and licensee greater flexibility in preperms l during periods when the amount.of justification, are also solicited. its plan.

l SSNM possessed having an external Several nonsubstantive clarifying and Second. given the inability of all but a dose rate not exceeding the 100 rem per conforming amendments to the currently very few insiders to know the expected hour criterion equsle or exceeds a effective Parts 50 and 70 were also dose rete from any irradiated fuel formula quantity.The additional proposed in the September 18.1981 element, the licensee will be allowed to measures are designed to provide the notice.nere was no public comment on average its irradiated fuel to meet the affected NPR facilities with a level of these amendments and they do not 100 rem per hour exemption as long as protection comparable to that provided modify current practices or applications no single fuel unit drops below 50 rem for formula quantities of SSNM st fuel of the regulations, but only clarify the per hour at 3 feet. This approach will

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1 34058 Federal Register / Vol. 48. No.145 / Wednesday, July 27. 1983 / Proposed Rules l reduce h need for a licensee to typically have 100-a00 gre.ms of U-2ss would most likely eccur only for short - t

"' sonduct reactor operations just to each. the theft of a formula quantity periods of time which are less than the

- entisfy the exemption criterion. would have to include a number of so.dayinterim phase-in period. For

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_Dird. the revised rule allows an sepetitive acts that require a long time to , those cases,it may not be necessary to interim period of 90 days after a licensee, complete.%us, there will be awpand the full capital costs as no longer meets b 200 rem per hour considerable opportunity for a response estimated. In fact, if labor intensive

- exemption level before it has to action to prevent the removal of a ures are usedin place of haplementfullCategoryli.d ats. formula quantity from the site. are during the short interim However, during b interim period . As a result of these factors, a number periods, the captial cost could be some compensatory physical protection of prescriptive Safeguards U de Rule avoided altogether.

measures are required which could be requirmnants can be re or b revised proposed amendments less coe*!y than b full Category I aliminated for protecting formula are the most cost. effective approach for measures. Dis interim period can be quantities at NPRs.Rese include the stovid'.ng assurance against theft of a permitted because, in raost cases, as reduction or elimination of uirements formula quantity while taking into arradiated fuel decaya '.,elow the too rem foe redundant and hardened account the unique features of the per hour everage value. It does so fairly stations, entrance searches for weapons facility design, and fuel type and form at slowly. . and evpla=ives, a second SNM exit nonpower ructors.

Fourth,if a licensee can show that for search.10 CFR Part 73 Appendix B Pdor to b pubucadon of b Enal o theft of a formula quantity it is Guard Training rigd. ats and efeedve ==av' Aments. b stag win.-

reasonable to expect that a thief would Aaa-adh C Contingency Plans, armed 0) Develop Henm guidance for b receive an absorbed dose of at least guards on site, and vault hardening. amendments to includ@) Acceptable 3000 rem, hn the lia name will only However, the rule requires I'

" have to satisfy Category HI physical protection t by both insiders d'd upon upp protection requirements. De 2000 rem and ex adversaries at security license a protection capabilities, and dose would be incapacitating within a capability levels comparable to the - do short period and would mean certain Safeguards Upgrade Rule. ,Q ,h des ain 8' (2) Update b prov.ous discussion tenad Cast /BeneSt Several benefits will be derived from (SECY 81-378) on the effectiveness an,d .

s Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standard that the irradiated fuel exemption implementing the proposed amendments achievability of the reliance on radiaton should be used to drop a facility only rather than keeping the status quo. First. Selds in confunction with the Category protection against insider theft of H physical protection measures; and one material protection cat and -

because of b saf ards ' cance. nuclear material will be included. %Is (3) Solicit comments from the State above 20%, the rule le not currently required.Decond. . . Department on: (a) Permitting Category of uranium enri HI protection when it can be shown that requires NPR licensus possessing a licensees are given more flexibility in selecting a set of physical protection , a thief would be likely to receive a dose formula quantity of SSNM to satisfy at measures which can take maximum of 2000 rem or smater, and (b) allowing l least Category H physical protection beneSt of any site specific design averaging of fuel elements in the core to l requirements when the 2000 rem i features that aid security functions, meet the 100 rem per hour exemption exemption cannot be met.

Fifta. given the extensive restructuring Finally, except under special conditions, criterion.

of the revised proposed rule the cost / licensees who possess a formula - - - - - - -

~ n.a.,,s , 3,,,===nt

benefit analysis was also extensively quantity, regardless of its irradiation revised.This analysis reflects updated exemption status, must at least satisfy %e application and reporting

' - ents for requirements contained in these figures Analysis and whichisisincluded in the Regulatory available for Category theH physicalprotection material. the rTrereducing proposed amendments have been inspection in the NRC Public Document the_ possibility of theft of such material. approved by the OfBee of Management Room.1717 H Street. NW., Washington, ne cost comparison estimates the and Budget: OMB approval No. 3150-DC 20555. lacrease between implementing the 0002.

DINeesoces from b Safeguards the measums Regulatory flavtWHty Cert 1Bcation g

en$

y Upgrade Rule requirements.%e Regulatory Analysis In accordance with the Regulatory As a result of the uniqueness of the - shows an estimated one time capital Flexibility Act of 1980. 5 U.S.C. 005(b).

facility design features and the type and cost of 31.100 to 35.100 and an operating the Commission hereby certifies that form of fuel at NpRs. It is not necessary cost during one year of $300 to 37.900 this rule will not,if promulgated. have a to requin physical protection measures per facility,if the proposed requirements significant economic impact on a as extensive as those specified for fuel are adopted. It should be noted that, substantial number of small entities.

fabrication facilities in the Safeguards within the range of cost estimates, a low This proposed rule would amend 10 CFR, Upgrade Rule. It is sufficient to require operating cost will normally match up Part 73 to require any nonpower reactor th:t the licensee detect an attempted with a high capital cost and vice versa. ' licensee authorized to possess a formula theft cnd arranse for a msponse force to While there an 14 current NpR quantity of strategic special nuclear prevent b theft of a formula quantity of licensees who possess formula material to submit amendments to its ESNM.This is acceptable in view of the quantities, no more than three licensees physical security plan.Dese plans tct that NPR fuel cannot be used are expected to have to implement the would include certain additional directly in a clandestine fission full Category I proposed requirements wurity precautions that would be expluive device without undergoing and this number could very well go to implemented when a sufficient amount reprocessing to recover the uranium, sero since dose rate averaging is .

of the licensee's irradiated fuel drops and this requins a large commitment of allowed. In addition. If any licensee is below the 100 rem per hour at 3 feet i

I resources. Also, because the SSNM is unable to keep its amount of nonexempt external radiation dose rate exemption l contained in fuel elements which fuel smaFer than a formula quantity, this level resulting in the licensee possessing

m Federal Register / Vcl. 48. No.145 / Wednesday. July 27. 1983 / Proposed Rules 84059 a larmula quantity of feel thatis not . ft.se ese loosed under sec.1sth, as Stat. Mt. 5.Section DM is amended as follows:

as anseded (c UAC saDi(b))Ii 73Ja a. Paragraphs (b) and (c) are revised: t self. protecting'he proposed 7s.34. 73.sk Fa.at 73.27,73.37. 73m. ms, b"la Nph (d). (10) and (11) are At this time t meanA= mats would require only 14 Res. 78JG. 73.88. 7587 are issued ander sec. sevised and a new (12)is added; and 181L es Stat. ese, as ==== dad (42 USC,

$ census to submit mvised secud c. A new paragraph (b)is added to 33D1(i)) and ll 73JD(cM1). 73J4(bX1h plans. and no more than three nonpower 73JNbXs). (hXe), and (hX4). 7s.zr(el and (b). read as foBows. i mactor Hoensees em upscted to 75J7(f). 75.40 (b) and (d). 73.40(gM6) and !

implement the additional security (hX2). 73JO(gM2). (3XtilXB) and th). $73M usesmee Ausd she andIrWenset mguiremente er Sie physical protection of measures.De amendments probebly 73Je(hX2), and (4KiliXB). 73.7th 73.71.75.72 speesel musener materies of moderste and would not affect any future licensees are issued under sec. seto. es stat. OsaM tow straegie sognensowe and W memuss since they would not likely build a assaded (4a UAC saDi(op.

aanpower reactw requiring a formula 2. In I n.a. paragraph (e) is revised to *. "*"'* " .

quantity d SSNM. . toad as follows and the flush paragraph (b) Exemptions. (2) A licensee.a De 14 licensees include two large which foHows (e)is amov.id. possession.use, or transportation of the companies (Union Carbide Corporation 973.s Esempaansetearuingumenes following materials is exempt from the and GA Technologies. Inc.), ten major universities (Georgia lastitute of and tende et speetal nur'mr maseries. ,

aquirements of this section: ,

Technology. University of Wisconsin.

* (1) Speci21 nuclear matedalin a Maseachusetts Institute of Technology. (e) Spedal nec'aer material at quantity not aWas 350 grams of University of Michigan, University of manpower reac'. ors. Any 14a=n==e subject uranium-235 uranium-233, plutonium,or to I ns(h) M not exempted from a combination thereof. possessed in any Virginia. Oregon State University.

$ $ n.70 ara n.72. and any licenew analytical, research, quality control.

Virginia Polytechnic lastitute. Texas AaM. University of Mh.souri at subject ta l 73M(e)is not exemptad metaHurgical, or electronic laboratory.

Columbia, and Washington State drum p 73.72 of this part. or University), the National Bureau of 3.:n i 73.40, paragraph (b)is reused (11) Sealed plutonium-beryllium Standards (NBS), and the Rhode Island to : sad as follows: neutron sources totaling 500 grams or Atomic Energy Commdssion.%e two less contained plutonium at any one site

! Inde phyeleameenceamemneral or contiguous sites, or corporetians and ten universities each ugueremene at anos seen.

emplot is excess of 500 employees and (iii) Plutonium with an botopic hav. annual sales or revenues in excess concentration exceedm2 80 percent in of St million for services they provide. (b) Each Hmn4 subject to the plutonium-238.

sW- tsofII U.30. 2 45, n 46. (2) A hmname, other than a nonpower NBS and the Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission an a Federal and 73.50, or 7334 shall prepare a safeguards reactar licensee who possesses a contingency plan in accordance with the formula quantity or more of strategic

state agency, respectively.None of these criteria set forth in Appendix C to this opcial nulm makrial,is mapt from affected licensees fall within b scope Part.De safeguards contingency plan the requirements of this section to b of the definition of "small entities" set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or shallinclude plans for dealing with extent that it pa==aas, uses, or l b Small Business Size Standards in threats, thdts, and radiological sabotage transports special nuclear material regulations issued by b Small Bu=ina, relating to nuclear facilities licensed under Part 50 or to the possession of which is not readily separable from Mministration at 13 CFR Partiti. other radioactive material and which

l. **

IJet of Subjeste h to CFR Part 73 Part 70 of chapt Each neee g og ", ,"*, ,

i Hazardous materials. transportation, subject to the requirements of this distance of 3 feet from any accessible Nuclear matenals. nuclear power plaats paragraph shall submit to the scrface without intervening shielding.

and reactors, Penalty. Reporting Commission for approval the first four (3) A nonpower reactor li:ensee who requirements. Security smasures. categories ofinformation contained in -

-- _ . faula queuty is mmpt .

the safeguards coa cy plan. (De from the additional requirements above For the reasons set out in the fm cakgwin o infonnadon, u Preamble and under the authority of the those for special nuclear material of

' paj*are moderate strategic significance to the Atomic Energy Act ol1964, as ==andad tf e Energy Reorganization Act of1974.

( I"^bP'

d. Ba exkat at it pa===s sMal nuc!w as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 563 notice is IJcensee Planni"8 Ba*** **d material which is not readily separable Responsibility Matrix. no fifth categmy from other radioactive material and 1 areby given that the NRC is proposing ofinformation. Procedums, does not to adopt the following ==andments to to which ha a kul ukrnal udiaHon

" ' dose rate in excess M100 mas per hw CFR Part a plan shal becom effe ive and be at a distana d3 fut fran any PART 73-4HYSICAI. PROTEC, TION OF followed (when approprir.te) by the ace at inkn@

PLANTS AND BRATERIAL 1.He authority citation for Part y3 la licensee 30 days after approval by. the Commi==ka.

[ (4) During an interim period of 90 days rev! sed to read as follows:

after a formula quantity of nonexempt Amibensy: Sece. sa. set, es Stat. eso, sea, es t 71ao Inomovedj , fuel is possessed by a nonpower reactor asundat. sw.147, os stat.7so (42 UAC licenses, approved compenastory

4. Secuan 73.00 is mmaed, measures may be substituted for those sors. 21s7. 2 aoth sec. act. es stat.1242. as sec.aos, es stat.taes (42 UAC . 'e,,i, approved on a permanent basis,

'h Y"'"I "F P'""' '"*"'Porete esattasoney . (5) Any nonpower roectorlicensee section 73.srtf) is also ineeed under sec.

~.

seet notel-

.E 1. es-:ss, se stat. 7es (42 UAC $ "P O,y",g',1, '" MMP"'" Possessing tefonmanon e qwr.d m i .rs.ss and w a formula quantity may Prot =ct its special nuclear material at the level of low strategic significance if For the purposee of sec. 223. es Stat. ess as c is peri re n.n i>. ,,,,e, ser .

-a-r -y pine. the expected total dose to any amended (42 UAC azrsk iI 73.21.71.3r(31.

O e

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y34000 Fodseal Regleter / W1. 48 No.145 / Wednesday, July 27, 1983 / Proposed Rules For tbs NacieerItagulatory rw-toa.

[ hidividual would be 2000 runs or greater Adadaistrator atleast 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months in advance of b thne the licensee expects sammet J.chilk. ~ g

, .daring the unauthorized removal of any

- Isrmula quantity from the licensee's that it will poseems a formula quantity of secreeary ofthe N=I= ton.

docility. -

=====p4 strategic special nuclear pu om m.ammi ra.u.a.aa ne

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(6) Alhaaae,other than a nonpower seaterial. enum eoes roso.es.a seector licenses who poseeeees a . . . . .

- Israula quantity or more of strategic ents fw special nuclear material who has monpower reactor haa== possessing CIVM. AERONAWCS BOARD quanddes of special nuclear material amnnula quantities of nonexampt ,

equivalent to special nuclear material of strategic special nuclear material. Es.:h M CPR Port E ,

moderah strategic signi$cance nonpower reactor 1Waa== who ,,

distributed ovw several 6MA'a== shan, Possesses, at any site or contiguous sites for each building which contair5 a sablect to control by the licanaee, a nuclear materialless formula quantity of -==pt strategic EarWfe; .hsouncou$on of Free or Rates

' Etityar of level of special special neclear material shall sneet b Outside um Zones of phzibsty; aselear material oflow strategic 18 of paragraphs (a) and (d) gatonsion of Comment Period d==*r==e=. protect b materialin that ==d-bddine at least at the lent of the lower of this secdon and.In addida shalb memocv- Qv 1 Aeronaudes Board. '

classincation physical security (1) Satisfy the requirements of actiose Extension of comment period.

l requirements. paragraph (a)(2) of this section against a (c) Each licensee who possesses, eses, single insider and a conspiracy between m,.h CAB is aw+-adaa b 4 kasiders, as well as an external

. transports, or delivers to a carrier for '

en===nt period for 1 month and adding

& . mensport. special nuclear material of adwreary, during any per6od when a g week reply comment period for its -

moderate strategic signincanes or 10 kg possession exceeds a formula quantity modce d proposed rulemaldng on

ee more of special nuclear material of of nonexampt material: justiacation of fares or retes outside the low stra e sign 18cance, anil each (2) Achiew the following capabilities mones of Esxibility.This action is taken licensee pa a==a-o a formula in order to meet the objectives of in response to requests by Pan Am and .

quantity of strategic special nuclear paragraph (h)(1) d this secdon. I.ACAC.

- material for use in the operation of a (I) Demet acom d unaubrized a r - W Se p h 1981

""P'*" "*C'"' personnel to strategic special nuclear geply annnnents by September is, material within controlled access areas insa.

(2) Within 30 days after the plan (s) situated within a protected area: r'ammants and other relevant submitted pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) (11) Detect unauthorized acevities and information received after this date will d $1s secdonis appmnd.haplement conditions within the protected area and be mesidered by the Board only to the extent practicable.

, 3

,,, [ eg"ge,,,, the controlled access areas:

maa=====* Twenty copia of cents who possesses a formula quantity of (til) Detect unauthorized mmoval a should be sent to Docket 41496, Qvil etrategic special nuclear material from strategic special nucieer material: (i) Aaronautics Board.1825 Connecticut Submit within 150 days after the the controlled access areas: and Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20428.

effective date of these amendments, a (iv) Provide for a response capability individuals may submit their views as sufficient to prevent the unauthorized l physical security plan or an amended consumrs without muldple :,

physical security plan describing how removalof aformuisquantityof strategic special nuclearinatorial from copies. Comets may eramined in the licensee will comply with the the praeanad area: and . Room 711.Qvil Aeronautics Board.1825 requirements of paragraph (h) of this Connecucut Annue, NW, Washington, section, any compensatory measures to (3) Test physical protect'fon devices D.C. as own as eey are aceind.

be used during a 90 day interim period. esed pursuant to the requirement of this con pusmenn esponseAT1ost CoefTACT; ochedulee ofimplementation, and section to assure their functional methods used for determining external performance during periods when they Joanne Petrie.OfBee of the General Counsel. Qvil Aeronautics Board,1825 redistion does rates ofirradiated reactor are required to be in use. r'annacticut Avenue.NW., Washington, ,

fool; and (11) implement the applicable e. In i 73.70 b introductory text and parts of the approved physical secur"Y paragraph (c) are revised to reed as D A 20422 N suppi.asserrAny esponeaAftosc In EDR-plan submitted pursuant to paragraph gagaws.

400,48 FR 24918 June 3,1963, the Board (c)(3)(i) of this section within 240 days i 173.79 Rosente proposed to amend its tariff rules to after the effective date of these amendments, or within 30 days after the Each licensee subject to provisions of mquire that U.S. and foreign air carriers l justify fans or rates that are outside the pt:,n is approved, whichever is later. II 73 2 73.25, 73.28, 73.27. 73.45, 73.46, sona of flexibility permitted by the l (d) Fixed Site Requirements for 73.35 or 73.87(b) shall keep the following Standard Foreign Rate LevelThis '

Special Nuclear Material of Moderate records. amendment.if adopted,would also Strategic Signiacance. , , , ,

* * * * - conform tariff filing procedums to the l (:) A register of visitors, vendors, and changes made by the International Air 1 (10) Search on a random basis other individuals not employed by the -

vehicles and packages leaving b licensee (as stated in il 73.46(d)(13) and Transportation Competition j Ac controlled access amas, foreign passenger fares, and a recent H 73.55(d)(6), or when the licensee is (11) Establish and maintain msponse Board policy statement permitting zones tt requimd to satisfy I 73.87(h)).

procedurve for dealing with thmets of * * * *

of flexibility for cargo rates in foreign air .j thefts or thefts of such materials, and Deted at Washington. DC. this 22nd day of transportation.%e proposal was made r.

(12) Notify the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional July tees. at the Board's initiative in order to f

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BACKGROUND INFORMATION .

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f November 16, 1982 SECY-82-456

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RULEMAKING ISSUE (Notation Vote)

For: The Commissioners .

From: M111am J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Subject:

PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREENTS FOR NONP0lER REACTOR Y

(NPR) LICENSEES POSSESSING FORMJLA QUANTITIES OF SSNM A

Purpose:

To obtain apprwal to publish for public connent, proposed

'- anendsents to 10 CFR Part 73. These amendments will establish

<+ physical protection requirements for nonpower reactor licensees who possess forsula quantities of strategic special nuclear j saterial .

'~

Category: Maj or policy issue.

Discussion: Background .

On July 24,1979, the Cossaission approved a reconnendation that nonpower reactor (NPR) licensees possesssing forsula quantities I of strategic special nuclear saterial (SSNM) be deferred from -

i

~

implenenting the requirements of the Safeguards Upgrade Rule (10 CFR 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46) . At that time the Commission asked the staff to develop new physical protection requirements for NPR licensees that would provide cosparable protection against the theft of SSNM. These new requirements were to take into account the unique safeguards considerations of facility design features and fuel type and form at NPRs. In the interim, the CONTACT: '

C . J . M thee , SGFF 427-4040 4

fp .. . . The Commissicners Commission stated that licensees possessing a fonnula quantity of

[

.; monexempt material would be subject to recently enacted Category :

,, II requirements (10 CFR 73.67(d)) as well as previously existing i requirements (10 CFR 73.60) for Category I material .

On August 12, 1981 in response to SECY-81-376, the Commission approved the publication of proposed physical protection require-ments regarding Category I NPRs (those possessing forsula quan-tities of SSNM). These requirements were published in the Federal Register on September 18,1981 (46 FR 46333) along with a minority opinion of Cosumissioners Gilinsky and Bradford and the '

separate views of Commissioner Bradford. These requirements took I into account the NPR facility and fuel design, eliminated some )

Safeguards Upgrade Rule requirements, and maintained the 100 res/hr exemption from physical protection requirements.

RESPONSE TO THE PUBLIC CODMENT Twelve public comments were received which discussed specific

provisions of the proposed rule. Eleven were from NPR operators who questioned one or more aspects of the proposed rule as being too restrictive or unnecessary. One commenter c,alled for stricter requirements than those being proposed and supported the minority Connaission position.

The most frequent comments were: (1) the requirements.as. stated

were too prescriptive and did not allow for consideration of site specific features, (2) the 100 rem / hour exemption level may be

'~ difficult for some licensees to maintain and could encourage unncessary reactor operations just to meet that level, (3) a phase in period should be allowed before full Category I requirements are necessary (i.e., when a fonsula quantity of SSNM becomes nonexempt), (4) licensees irradiating enough SSNM to over 100 res/ hour should only have to implement Category III physical

protection measures and should be exempt from both Category I and Category II requirements, and (5) the cost estimates'for imple-

. menting the proposed rule were too low. i In response to these comments, staff has extensively revised the

. September 18, 1981 proposed rule as follows. The Category I physical protection requirements were rewritten as performance capabilities. Also, prescriptive security measures are no longer specified, thereby allowing the licensee greater flexibility in preparing its plan. To aid the public commenters in understanding the rule s intent, scope of application, and rationale, the J additional information in Enclosure B will be made available with the proposed amendments. This 'nformation is expected to serve as the regulatory position in a Regulatory Guide to be published for comment at a later date. A final version of the Guide will be pubitsnad with the final rule.

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'p Second, given the inability of all but a very few insiders to know

, the expected dose rate from any. irradiated fuel element, the licensee will be allowed to average its irradiated fuel to meet

- the 100 res/ hour exemption as long as no single fuel unit drops below 50 rem / hour at 3 feet. This approach will reduce the need for a licensee to conduct reactor operations just to satisfy the exemption criterion.

Third, the revised rule allows an interim period of 90 days after a licensee no longer meets the 100 res/ hour exemption level before it has to implement full Category I requirements. However, during the interim period, some compensatory physical protection measures are required which could be less costly than the full Category I measures. This interim period can be permitted because, in most cases, as irradiated fuel decays below the 100 res/ hour average value, it does so fairly slowly.

Fourth, if a licensee can show that, for a theft of a formula -

. quantity, it is reasonable to expect that a thief would receive an absorbed dose of at least 2000 ram, then the licensee will only have to satisfy Category III physical protection requirements.

The 2000 rem dose would be incapacitating within a short period and would mean certain death. However, since the International

- Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standard is that the irradiated fuel exemption should be used to drop a facility only one material protection category and since uranium enriched above 20% could be more directly useable in a nuclear explosive device, the rule requires NPR licensees possessing a formula quantity of SSNM to

, satisfy at least Category II physical protection requirements when the 2000 rem exemption cannot be met.

Fifth, given the. extensive restructuring of the revised proposed rule, the cost / benefit analysis was also extensively revised. This analysis is included in Enclosure C and reflects updated figures.

Differences from the Safeguards Upgrade Rule

~

As a result of the uniqueness of the facility design features and the type and form of fuel at NPRs, it is not necessary to . require

- as extensive a set of physical protection measures as is included in the Safeguards Upgrade Rule. It is sufficient to require that the licensee detect an attempted theft and arrange for a response force to prevent the theft of a formula quantity of SSNM. This is acceptable in view of the fact that NPR fuel cannot be used in a clandestine fission explosive device without under-going reprocessing to recover the uranium and this requires a large commitment of resources. Also, because the SSNM is cor.tained in fuel elements which typically have 100-200 grams of U-235 each, the theft of a formula quantity would have to include a number of

- repetitive acts that require a long time to complete. Thus, there will be considerable opportunity for a response action to prevent the removal of a fomula quantity from the site. ,

-. ._- _ = _ _ = . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ . --

. s The Commissitners I t .. . .

I As a result of these factors, a number of prescriptive Safeguards :

Upgrade Rule requirements can be reduced or eliminated for pro- ,

tecting fomula quantities at NPRs. These include tre reduction i or the eliminationlof requirements for redundant and hardened

. alam stations, entrance searches for weapons and explosives, a second SNM exit search, Part 73 Appendix 8 Guard Training require-ments and Appendix C Contingency Plans. *amed guards on site, and t vault hardening.

However, the proposed rule requires protection against theft by both insiders and external adversaries at security capability levels comparable to the Safeguards Upgrade Rule.

Cost / Benefit Several benefits will be derived from implementing the proposed amendments rather than keeping the status quo. First, protection against insider theft of nuclear material will be included.

This is not currently required. Second, Ifcensees are given

, fj more flexibility in selecting a set of physical protection

measures which can take maximum benefit of any site specific

!; design features that aid security functions. Finally, except

,7 under special conditions, licensees who possess a formula quantity, 1- regardless of its irradiation exemption status, must at least satisfy the physical protection requirements for Category II material, thereby reducing the possibility of theft of such material.

The cost comparison estimates the cost increase between imple-l

~

menting the proposed amendments and the measures necessary to

! satisfy Category II requirements. The Regulatory Analysis (Enclo-sure C) shows an estimated one time capital cost of $1,100 to l $5,100.and an operating cost during one year of $300 to $7,900 per facility if the proposed requirements are adopted. It should be noted that, within the range of cost estimates, a low operating

. cost will nomally match up with a high capital cost and vice .

versa.

While there are 15 current NPR licensees who possess fomula quantities, no more than three licensees are expected to have to

. implement the full Category I proposed requirements and this number could very well no to zero since dose rate averaging is allowed. In addition, f any licensee is unable to keep its amount of nonexempt fuel smaller than a formula quantity, this -

would most likely occur only for short periods of time which are less than the 90-day interim phase-in period. For those cases, it may not be necessary to expend the full capital costs estimated above. In fact, ;f labor intensive procedures are used for these short periods in place of hardware, the capital cost could be avoided altogether.

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1 4 The C: audssioners L. ',

t conclusion: The revised p'roposed amendments are the most cost-effective

,6 approach for prwiding assurance against the theft of a forsula t quantity of SSNM, while taking into account the unique features of

+ the facility design, and fuel type and fore at nonpower reactors.

Recoseendation: That the Cosedssion:

1. Appree the revised proposed ' amendments and authorize pus 11 cation of Enclosure A in the Federal Register for public comment.

f 2. C etify, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Regulatory

? Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), 'that this rule, if prosul-gated, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial nusber of ssall entities. This Certification is included in the enclosed Federal Register notice.

3. Note:

4

.I* .

' a. That the appropriate Congressional Cosedttees will be I~ notif,ied of this Coeudssion action.

b l- b. That, in accordance with 10 CFR 51.5(d)(3), neither an emironmental ispact statement nor a negative declaration need be prepared since the proposed amendments art not significant from the standpoint of emironmental 1spect.

~

c. That the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business -

Adadnistration will be informed of the certification and l

the reasons for it as required by the Regulatory Flexibi-

! lity Act.

d. That a pubite announcement will be issued when the

~

amendments are filed with the Office of the Federal .

Register.

e. That copies of this notice will be distributed to affected licensees and other interested persons by the Office of Administration.

f. That DDE is developing lower enriched fuels which, it is our understanding, could he substituted for higher enriched fuels in existing nonpower reactors with minimal O

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- andifications.- Approval of the recommended regulatory l action should not be construed as foreclosing further l

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- future encouragement of NPR licensees to reduce their holdings of high enriched urani,ue once the lower enriched fuels become available.

3

/t1111am th.1~J. Dircks~ -

Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

i A - Federal Register Notice 8 - Draft Intent and Scope Guide C - Regulatory Analysis

! Consnissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly

! to the Office,of the Secretary by c.o.b. Friday, December 3, 1982.

Consnission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT Wednesday, November 24, 1982, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should

~

be apprised of when conunents may be expected. ,

DISTRIBUTION:

Conunissioners OGC OPE - .

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! OPA OIA REGIONAL OFFICES

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. ~10 CFR Part 73 ,

Safeguards Requim'ments for Nonpower Reactor Licensees

-- - Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

~

ACTION: Proposed Rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Consission is proposing to amend its physical protection regulations for nonpower reactor licensees possessing formula quan-

~' tities of strategic special nuclear seterial . The proposed amendnents have been prepared in response to a Cosalssion request for the development of these new physical protection requirements. These amendments would replace the interim I requirerents which are currently in force at these facilities. The ensult of these amendnents will be tht sost cost-effective appproach for providing assurance against the theft of a forsula quantity of SSNM, while taking into account the unique features of the facility design, and fuel type and form at'NPRs.

. Connents

~

DATES: Coments sust be received on or before

i received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, . ;

but assurance of consideration cannot be given except as to connents aceived on or before this date. .

ADDRESSES: Comments or suggestions regarding the proposed amendsents should be sent to the Secretary of the Connission, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission, Wshington,DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Senice Branch. Comnents received will be available for examination and copying at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, NW., Mshington , DC 20555.

" Insert date 120 days af ter publication in the Federal Register.

Enclosure A "w--~--- -

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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION C04 TACT: Dr. C. J. Withee, Fuel Facility Safeguards s

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Licensing Branch, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety

, and Safeguards, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, .

Telephone (301) 427-4040.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION l

l BACKGROUND On July 24, 1979, the Commission approved a recommendation that nonpower reactor I (NPR) Ifeensees possessing formula quantities of strategic special, nuclear material g

(SSNM) be deferred from implementing the requirements of the Safeguards Upgrade L Rule (10 CFR 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46). At that time the Commission asked the staff to develop new physical protection requirements for NPR licensees that i

would provide comparable protection against the theft of SSHM. These new re-quirements were to take into account the unique safeguards considerations of t

facility design features, and fuel type and form at NPRs. In the interim, the Commission stated that licensees possessing a formula quantity of nonexempt i

i material would be subject to recently enacted Category II requirements (10 CFR 73.67(d)) as well as previously existing requirements (10 CFR 73.60) for Category .

i l I material.

Under the interim requirements, some NPR licensees are pemitted to provide only minimal physical protection for their fuel if enough material is irradiated to a level which qualifies for exemption under 10 CFR 73.67(b)(1)(1). The exemption is based on the deterrent effect of an external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rem per hour at 3 feet from any accessible point without intervening shielding.

Also, under current requirements, physical protection measures only need be effective against external adversaries. Thus, insiders are not included Enclosure A l

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r I. as part of the design basis threat. However, as provided in.10 CFR Section 73.1(a)(2), insiders are part of the physical protection design basis threat for facilities possessing formula quaritities of SSNM.

On August 12,'the Commission approved the publication of proposed physical protection requirements regarding Category I NPRs (those possessing fomula j quantities of SSNM) . These requirements were published in the Federal Register on September 18,1981 (46 FR 46333) along with a minority opinion of Commis-sioners Gilinsky and Bradford and the separate views of Commissioner Bradford.

These requirements took into account the NPR facility and fuel design and elimi-nated some Safeguards Upgrade Rule requirements.

Those proposed amendments (46 FR 46333) also included a statement of the staff's l

resolution of a number of issues which had been raised earlier. In particular,

the Commission presented its finding that the existing protection exemption level j --

of 100 rem per hour at 3 feet from.any accessible surface without any intervening shielding was appropriate.

Several nonsubstantive clarifying and confoming amendments to the currently effective Parts 50 and 70 were also proposed in the September 18, 1981 notice.

1 There was no public comment on these amendments and they do not modify current practices or applications of the regulations, but only clarify the text of several sections. There is no further change in those previously pro-posed amendments and thus they are not repeated in this notice.

RESPONSE TO THE PUbLIC COMMENTS Twelve public crements were received which discussed specific provisions of the proposed rule. Eleven of these questioned one or more aspects of the Enclosure A e-__-

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o phsed rule as being too restrictive or unnecessary. One commenter called for stricter requirements than those being proposed and supported the minority Commission position which was included in the 1981 notice.

The most frequent comments were: (1) the requirements as stated were too pre-scriptive and did not allow for consideration of site specific features, (2) the 100 rem per hour exemption level may be difficult for some licensees to maintain and could encourage some unncessary reactor operations just t.o meet that level, (3) a phase-in period should be allowed before full Category I (i.e., when a formula quantit'y of SSNM becomes nonexampt) requirements are necessary, (4) licensees irradiating enough SSNM to over 100 rem per hour should only have to implement Category III (low strategic significance) physical protection measures and should be exempted from both Category I and Category II requirements, and (5) the cost estimates for implementing the proposed rule were too 'ow.

In response to these comments, the originally proposed amendments have been extensively revised as follows. First, the Category I physical protection requirements were rewritten as performance capabilities. A description of how the licensee intends to implement the requirements will be given in the physical security plan submitted for licensing review. Site specific features will be considered before license approval is given. To aid the public commenters in understanding the rule's intent, scope of application, and rationale, additional

~

supplementary infomation is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, NN., Washington, DC 20555. Prescriptive security meesures are no longer specified, thereby allowing the licensee greater flexibilitj in preparing its plan.

i I

Enclosure A l i

j} . ,

Second, given the inability of all but a very few insiders.to know the expected .

dose rate from any irradiated fuel element, the licensee will be allowed to average its irradiated fuel to meet the 100 rem per hour exemption as long as no single fuel unit drops below 50 rem per hour at 3 fee't. This approach will reduce the need for a licensee 'to conduct reactor operations just to satisfy the exemption criterion.

6 Third, the revised rule allows an interim period of 90 days after a licensee no longer meets the 100 rem per hour exemption level before it has to implement full Category I requirements. However, during the interim period some compensatory physical protection measures are required which could be less costly than the l full Category I measures. This interim period can be permitted because, in most cases, as irradiated fuel decays below the 100 rem per hour average value, it does so fairly slowly.

Fourth, if a licensee can show that for a theft of a formula quantity it is reasonable to expect that a thief would receive an absorbed dose of at least 2000 rem, then the licensee will only have to satisfy Category III physical protection requirements. The 2000 rem dose would be incapacitating within a short period ,

and would mean certain death. However, since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standard is that the irradiated fuel exemption should be used to drop a facility only one material protection category and since uranium enriched' above 20% could be more directly useable in a nuclear explosive c'tvice, the rule requires NPR licensees possessing a forsula quantity of SSNM to satisfy at least Category II physical protection requirements wl.an the 2000 rem exemption cannot he met.

l Enclosure A 1

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f Fifth, given the extensive restructuring of the revised proposed rule the sost/ benefit analysis was also extensively revised. This analysis reflects

' updated figures and is included in the Regulatory Analysis which is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, W., Yashington, DC 20555.

Differences from the Safeguards Upgrade Rule .

As a result of the uniqueness of the facility desiiin features and the type and form of fuel at NPRs, it is not necessary to require as extensive a set of It physical protection measures as are included in the Safeguards Upgrade Rule.

~ is sufficient to require that the licensee detect an attempted theft and arrange for a response force to prevent the theft of a fomula quantity of SSNM.

This is acceptr.ble in view of the fact that NPR fuel cannot be used directly in a clandestine fission explosive device without undergoing reprocessing to recover the uranium', and this requires a large commitment of resources. Also,

~

because the SSNM is contained in fuel elements which typically have 100-200 grams of U-235 each, the theft of a fomula quantity would have to include a number of

! repetitive acts that require a l'ong time to complete. Thus, there will be ,

considerable opportunity for a response action to prevent the removal of a formula quantity from the site.

As a result of these factors, a number of prescriptive Safeguards Upgrade Rule requirements can be reduced or eliminated for protecting fomula quantities at NPRs. These include the reduction or elimination of requirements for redundant and hardened alarm stations, entrance searches for weapons and explosives, a second SNM exit search, Part 73 Appendix B Guard Training requirements and

~

Appendix C Contingency Plans, armed guards on site, and vault hardening.

Enclosure A

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j 7 - ~Nowever, the propos d rulo requires protection against theft by both insidirs and I external adversaries at security gapability levels comparable to the. Safeguards

- Upgrade Rule.

Cost / Benefit Several benefits will be derived from implementing the proposed amendments rather l than keeping the status quo. First, protection against insider theft of nuclear material will be included. This is not currently required. Second, ifcensees are given more flexibility in selecting a set of physical protection meas res which can take maximum benefit of any site specific design features that aid security functions. Finally, except .under special conditions, licensees who ,

y possess a fonnula quantity, regardless of its irradiation exemption status, must

~

at least satisfy the physical protection requirements for Category II material, thereby reducing the possibility of theft of such material. ,

~

The cost ceciparison estimates the increase between implementing the proposed amendments and the measures necessary to satisfy ~tateg'ory II requiremen'ts.

The Regulatory Analysis shows an estimated one time capital cost of $1,100 to

,35,100 and an operating cost during one year of $300 to $7,900 per facility, i if the proposed requirements are adopted. It should be noted that, within the range of cost estimates, a low operating cost will normally match up with a high l

capital cost and vice versa.

While there are 15 current NPR licensees who possess formula quantities, no more than three licensees are expected to have to implement the full Category I proposed requirements and this number could very well 50 to zero since dose rate Enclosure A

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averaging is allowed. In addition, if any licensee is unable to keep its amount of nonexenpt fuel smaller than a formula quantity, this would sost likely occur '

7

. 'only for short periods of time which are less than the 90-day interim phase-in period. For those cases, it my not be necessary to expend the full capital costs as estimated. In fact, if labor intensive procedures are used in place of hardware during the short interim periods, the capital cost could be avoided al together.

The revised proposed amendments are the sost cost-effective approach for pro-viding assurance against theft of a formula quantity while taking into account the unique features of the facility design, and fuel type and form at nonpower l

reactors.

t PAPERIORK REDUCTION STATEMENT The application and reporting requirenants contained in these proposed anandsents have be'e n approved by the Office of Managenent and Budget; Ote approval No."

3150-0002.

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION l

In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U. S. C. 605(b), ,

the Consnission hereby certifies that this rule will not, if pronulgated, have a significant economic frpact on a substantial nunber of small entities. This proposed rule would anend 10 CFR Part 73 to require any nonpower reactor licen-see authorized to possess a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear seterial to submit anendments to its physical security plan. These plans would Enclosure A

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include certain additional security precautions that would be implemented when a

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sufficient amount of the licensee's irradiated fuel drops below the 100 rem per *

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. hour at 3 feet external radiation dose rate exemption level resulting in the licensee possessing a formula quantity of fuel that is not self-protecting.

At this time the proposed asentents would require only 15 licensees to submit revised security plans, and no more than three nonpower reactor licensees are expected to implement the additional security measures. The amendments probsbly would not affect any future licensees since they would not likely build a non-power reactor requiring a formula quantity of SSNM.

The 15 licensees include three large companies (Union Carbide Corporation, General Atomic Corporation - a-subsidiary of Gulf Corporation, and General Electric Corporation), ten major universities (Georgia Institute of Technology, University of Wisconsin, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of

~'

Michigan, University of Virginia, Oregon State University, Virginia Polytechnic 4

Institute, Texas A&M, University of Missouri at Columbia, and Washington State University), the National Bureau of Standards ( BS), and the Rhodo Island Atomic Energy Commission. The three corporations each employ in excess of 500 employees and have annual sales in excess of $1 million for services they previde. NBS and the Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission are a Federal and state agency, respectively.

None of these affected licensees fall within the scope of the definition of ,

"small entities" set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small Business size Standards in regulations issued by the Small Business Akinistration at 13 CFR Part 121.

l Enclosure A .

M

f- - , ,

y* .

f LIST OF SUBJECT TERMS IN 10 CFR PART 73

?

' Hazardous saterials-transportation, Nuclear saterials , Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Reporting requirenants, Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the Preanble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as ananded, and 5 U.S.C. 553, notice is hereby given that the NRC is proposing to adopt the .

following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73.

PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIAL i

, 1. The authority citation for Part 73 is revised to read as, follows:

'. AUTHORITY: Secs. 53,161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as anended, sec. 147,94 Stat.

- ,780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat.1242, as amended, sec. 204, 88 Stat.1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844) .

~

Section 73.37(f) is also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).

For the purposes of sec. 223,68 Stat. 958, as ananded (42 U.S.C. 2273); .

5573.37(g), 73.55 are issued under sec.161b, 68 Stat. 948, as ananded (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); 1173.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, 73.67 are issued under sec. 1611,68 Stat. 949, as ananded (42 U.S.C. 2201(1)); and it73.20(c)(1) ,73.24(b)(1),73.26(b)(3),

(h)(6),and(k)(4),73.27(a)and(b),73.37kf),73.40(b)and(d),73.46(g)(6) and (h)(2),73.50(g)(2), (3)(iii)(B) and (h), 73.55(h)(2), and (4)(iii)(B),

73.70, 73.71, 73.72 are issued under sec.161o,68 Stat. 950, as anended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).

Encicsure A

-m- ----.. - -----m - .w. m - - ,-- -- - - - - - - - - , - - - _ -

. ,,---+p---

y -

l V. - - .

. 11 _

h '- .

1 2. In 93.2, paragraph (x) is revised to read as follows:-

873.2 Definitions. .

(x) "Special nuclear saterial of moderate strategic significance" means:

(1) Less than a formula, quantity of strategic special nuclear material but more than 1000 grass of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isobe) or more than 500 grams of uranium-233 or plutonium or in a combined quantity of more than 1000 grams when cosputed by the equation, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2 (grass U-233 + grams plutonium) EeP}*

(2) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope) [ ], or (3) Formula cuantities of strategic special nuclear material possessed at nonpower reactors.

3. In 573.6, paragraph (e) is revised to read as follows:

573:6 Exemptions of certain quantities and kinds of special nuclear saterial.

1 (e) Special nuclear saterial at nonpower reactors. Any licenseeEs3 subject to 3[W.se5 73.67(h) is feni not exesoted from ss73.70 and 73.72, and any licensee [s3 subject to 173.67(e) 15 [en] not exespted from 173.72 of this part. .

4

~

Copparative text lliows changes between proposed rule and current regulations.

Underlined text shows additions and dashed through text in brackets shows deletions.

Enclosure A

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--,wy,-,em,,-m,_-.,-,,.,, am,-e,>_-, v.-,,,--,.-- - , - - -_v,__,.___.,-

,. __ __ )

[ 4. In 73.40, Paragraph (b) is mvised to read as follows:

873.40 Physical protection: General requiremnts at fixed sitss.

+ )

( * * * *

(b) Each licensee subject to the requiresents of sF3.20, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, o_r_73.55 [sor-90603 shall prepara a safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the criteria set forth in Appendix C to this part.

The safeguards contingency plan shall include plans for dealing with thmats, thefts, and radiological sabotage relating to nuclear facilities licensed under Part 50 or to tt.e possession of special nuclear saterial Ifcensed under Part 70 of this chapter. By-N;teaban.15L, LE23L,3 Each

$ licensee subject to the requirements of this paragraph G., ==a+ N I

nuclear-power-plant-Meansees,-Spos.whou-suhad.ttal. is.nat cegni.ced.un.tt.L March-23;-1979 5 3 shall submit to the Commission for approval the first four categories of inforation contained in the safeguards contingency plan.

(The first four categories of information, as set forth in Appendix C to this pa'rt, are Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, and Responsibility Matrix. The fifth category of information, frocedures, does not have to be submitted for approval .)1

, The plan shall becone effective and be followed (when appropriate) by the licensee h-enept-for-nulear-power-plants,3 30 days after approval by the Coastssion. [ee-400-days-after March 23.,1928,whicheuer is latet. ,

Te. ... eke. pc a plente-the-9 an-sha3E.becose-effeet4ve-30-days-aftes 4

app ruv si-Li L Cnarissitm.3

5. Sectiori 73.60 is removed.

Enclosure A

$* ' 6". Section 73.67 is revised as fallows- }

%* . a ;

{ a. Paragraphs (b) and (c) are revised, ~

b. In paragraph (d) ..(10) and (11) are revised and a new (12) is added; and t

c. A new paragraph (h) is added to read as follows. - ,

1 .

l 373.67 Licensee fixed site and in-transit requiresents for the physical protec': ion of special nuclear saterial of moderate and low strategic signi-ficance and of fornula quantities at nonpower reactors.

(b) Exemptions. (1) A licensee's possession , use, or transportation of the following sterials is exempt from the requimments of this section

- [te-de-extent-that-he-possesses,-uses-or-transports 3: (i) Special nuclear saterial in a quantity not exceeding 350 grams of uranium-235, uranium-233, plutonium, or a conbination thereof, possessed in any analytical, research, quality control, metallurgical, or electronic laboratory , [44th-44-met-read 41y-separable-from. ether-radteastiva ,,

aster 4a4-and-which-has-a-total-external-radiation,. dose-rats in-axcess of ,

3-feet-frem.4ay-access 4ble-surface-without intervening-shieldingJ or (ii)

~

Sealed plutonium-beryllium neutron sources. totalling 500 grass or less

' contained plutonium at any one site or contiguous sites, or (iii) Plutonium with an isotopic concentration exceeding 80 percent in plutonium-238.

(2) A licensee, other than a nonpower reactor licensee who possesses a fornula quantity or more of strategic special nuclear anterial , is exempt from the requirements of this section to the extent that it poss?sses, uses, or transports special nuclear saterial which is not readily separable from other radioactive saterial and which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without inter-vening shielding.

Enclosure A

-e . -- . . - _ _ - - _ _ _ - .

p_

p'. .

(3) A nonpower reactor licensee who possesses a formula quantity is exegt

?

8 from the additional requirenants above those for special nuclear

seterial of moderate strategic significance to the extent that it possesses special nuclear material which is not readily separable from other radioactive saterial and which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 reus per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding.

(4) During an interim period of 90 days after a formula quantity of nonexempt fuel is possessed by a nonpower reactor licensee, approved

~

comensatory measures any be substituted for those approved on a permanent basis.

(5) Any nonpower reactor licensee possessing a formula quantity say protect its special nuclear asterial at the level of low strategic significance

~

if the expected total dose to any individual would be 2000 rems or greater during the unauthorized removal of any formula quantity from the i licensee's facility.

U2M46) A licensee, other than a nonpower reactor licensee who possesses a formula quantity or more of strategic special nuclear saterial, who has quantities of special nuclear untarial equivalent to special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance distributed over several buildings Lan,y] shall, for each building which contains a quantity of special nuclear material less than or equal to a level of special nuclear saterial of low strategic significance, protect the saterial in that building at least at the level of [4mder.] the lower classifi-cation physical security requirements.

Enclosure A

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I 15 - .

I... .

E. . .

(c) Each licensee no possesses, uses , transports 2 or [whol delivers to a l carrier for transporta pecial s nuclear seterial of anderate strategic 7

l significance or 10 kg or som of special nuclear saterial of low strate-gic significance, and each licensee who possesses a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear seterial for use in the operation of a nonpower reactor, shall:

(1)

d=+a a ... ,

(2) Mthin E400.. days. .astas. .the. -". . .+.4v. . . . .

..'..........,;.*ha*a ==ruiments ffhrsh 21 1996)-or3 30 days after the plan (s) stheitted 'pur'sua'nt 'to ' paragraph' (c)(1) of this section is approved, Gwh44heves. h '-ty ,3 implement the approved security plan; or5<3 4

(3) For a nonpo- reactor licensee who possesses a formula quantity of strategic special ' nuclear material , (il submit by

a physical security plan or an asunded physical security' plan describing how the licensee will comply with the requirements of paragraph (h) of this section, any compensatory measures to be used during a 90-day l . .

' interim period, schedules of implementation, and sathods used for determining external radiation dose rates of irradiated reactor fuel; and (ii) implement the applicable parts of the approved physical security plan submitted pursuant to paragraph (c)(3)(1) of this section by ** ,

or within 30 days after this I

plan is a~pproved, whichever is later.

l

(Insert date 150 days after effective date of these asundments.)

- (Insert date 240 days after effective date of these amendsents.)

Enclosure A

v - .

y ., .

h* *

(d) Fixed Site Requirements fcr Special Nuclear Material of Moderate p Strategic Significance.* *

i (10)

Search on a random basis vehicles and pacliages leaving the con.-

trolled access areas [end3 .

(11) Establish and mintain response procedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of each saterials, and [s3 7

,- (12) Notify the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Comunission Regional Administrator at least 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months in advance of the time the licensee expects that it will possess a formula quantity of nonexempt strategic special nuclear saterial .

l} (h) Additional requirements for nonpower reactor licensees possessing formula quantities of nonexempt strategic special nuclear saterial.

j , Each nonpower reactor licensee who possesses, at any site or contiguous

~

sites subject to control by the licensee, a formula ~ quantity of nonexengt strategic special nuclear material shall meet the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (d) of this section and, in addition, shall:

(1) Satisfy the requirements of paragraph (a)(2) of this section against a single insider and a conspiracy between insiders, as well as an external adversary, during any period when possession exceeds a formula quantity of nonexenpt saterial; (2) Achieve the following c'apabilities in order to meet the oldactives of paragraph (h)(1) of this section:

(1) Detect access of unauthorized personnel to strategic special nuclear saterial within controlled access areas situated within a protected area; Enclosure A

. . . _ . . . _ _ . _ . =_ . . . . . . . . . __ . ._

C .

$~ * *.

17 -

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(ii) Detect unauthorized activities and conditions within'the

~

i ,

protected arwa and the controlled access areas:

(iii) Detect unauthorized removal of' strategic special nuclear unterial from the controlled access areas; and i* (iv) Provide for a response capability sufficient to prevent u the unauthorized removal o'f a forsula quantity of strate-gic special nuclear material from the protected area; and (3) Test physical protection devices used pursuant to the requirements l.

of this'section to assure their functional perforannce during periods when they are required to be in use.

7. In b73.70 the introductory text and paragraph (c) are revised to read as

~

j follows: .

s 73.70 -ftecords Each licensee sutdact to provisions of gg 73.20,73.25,73.26,73.27, 73.45, 73.46, 73.55, or [-,13.,603 73.67(h) shall keep the following records:

(c) A register of visitors, vendors, and other individuals not esployed

- by the licensee pursuant to n93.46(d)(10),73.55(d)(6), or [f-7&60]

by a licensee required to satisfy l 73.67(h). :.

~

day of 1982.

Dated at Eshington,DC this .

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Coussission.

Enclosure A

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3 ENCLOSURE B

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SPPLDENTARY INFORMATION b*~*

i Physical Protection Requirements for Nonpower Reactor Licensees Possessing Formula Quantities of SSNM -

t 7, 73.67(b)(2)

1. -Q: Besides the 20C0 rem exemption, why are nonpower reactor licensees possessing formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (Category I) not able to have physical protection requirements reduced note than one saterial category by using the 100 res/hr criterion?

i 4

A: Uranium enriched above 205 is more directly useable in a nuclear explo-sive device (i.e., does not necessarily need further enrichment) than 1

uranium not so enriched. Because of the high strategic significance of L

this type of material, we have maintained a close compatibility with the recommendation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in INFCIRC 225 except when the fuel is extrenely self-protecting. The IAEA says that the irradiated fuel exemption should be 'used to drop a facility l

l '

no more than one material protection category.

i

2. Q: Does each fuel element have to have at least a dose rate of 100 rem /hr at I 3 feet to qualify for the exemption?

i I

A. No. A licenste is allowed to apply an average value to the irradiated fuel it wishes to have qualified for the dose rate exemption. Material is exempted as long as (1) the weighted average (weighted by U-235 isotope weight) of all exempted material per C4A is at least 100 res/hr at three feet and (2) no single fuel unit has a dose rate of less than 50 rem /hr at 3 feet.

3. Q: Must direct radiation measurenant be used to show that fuel meets the 100 rem /hr exenption criterion?

Enclosure B

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p- . A: No. As long as a lic:n=ee can cstablish a technical basis and maintains 7

any necessary supporting data for determining th'e expected dose rate, alter-

[ .

natives to direct measurement are acceptable. 'Among the acceptable methods for detemining dose rates are:

a) Direct measurement of the external dose rate of the material in air at a distance of 3 feet without intervening shielding; b) Indirect measurement with appropriate correction factors applied for intervening shielding (e.g., water); or t

c) Predicted dose rate based upon the power history and core position of the fuel element.

1 .

l It is not necessary nor especially desirable that direct measurements in air be made, or that fuel be moved, solely for the purpose of measurement.

73.67(h)

4. Q: Must a licensee have equipment in place at all times in order to implement the additional Category I requirements of paragraph 73.67(h)?

i A: No. The requirement is that a licensee have an approved plan which f describes the measures the licensee will commit to taking if the licensee i

should possess a fomula quantity of. nonexempt fuel . This may include i interim measures to be employed during the 90-day initial period as well ;

as the pemanent measures to be employed if the 90-day period is exceeded. !

The licensee does not have to have equipment for these additional measures [

installed end in place until they are needed. ,

i A licensee should develop its plan in such a way that for an emergency, such '

i as equipment failure, there would be enough time to set up any necessary ;

}

interim protection measures before the point is reached where a fomula Enclosure B !

hntity is conexempt. Afbr this, the licensen will have 90 days to asssss the extent of tha emergency and set up any additio'nal equipment which has been

[ committed to on a permanent basis. t i

2 73.67(h)(1) ,

5. Q: Can you describe the design basis irisider threat?

A: Yes. The design basis insider threat is an individual , including an l esployee (in any position), and a conspiracy between individuals in sny position who say have: (a) access to and detailed knowledge of the facility or (b) items that could facilitate theft of special nuclear material (e.g. small tools, substitute seterial, false documents, etc.)

I' or both.

i

6. Q: that is the seaning of "early detection" in 73.67(a)(2) as mferenced by i

! this paragraph? ,

A: As mquired under 73.67(h)(2)(iv), a licensee must arrange for a response capability to prevent the unauthorized mmoval of a formula quantity from l

the protected area. In order t:o meet this requirement, a detection must .

I b'e "early" enough to permit a response which can satisfy the prevention requiresent. The length of time available for detection will depend on the speed of the arranged msponse and the expected length of time it would take to steal a formual quantity.

73.67(h)(2) -

7. Q: Is the heavy inpact of implementing a full set of additional security measures justified whem fuel should happen to slip just below the 100 rem /hr level to say 99 or 95 rem /hr, particularly when unscheduled equipment failure say have caused this? ,

F.nclosure B

v _ _

fIp A: Because we are allowing av; raging of fuel dose rates and alternative -

methods of determining the dose rate of fuel, there will be some uncer , '

,' tainty as to the exact radiation level . Also, in most cases, as fuel decays below the 100 rem /hr level, its decay rate is fairly gradual . For these reasons, a licensee will be allowed a period of up to 90 days before the full set of required security measures must be implemented. The licensee must still use measures that will accomplish the objectives described in paragraph 73.67(h)(1) during this period, but at a lower level of assurance than would be required for the long ters measures.

Interim measures will be approved on a site specific basis.

l

A-

} 8. Q: Why don't I receive credit for the difficulty of processing NPR fuel to i*

recover the uranium and for the reactor design features which make fuel difficult to steal?

6 l' A: Although studies show that reprocessing can be accomplished if sufficient i

resources are expended, it'is still a very difficult task. Credit is l given for general reactor design features and fuel reprocessing difficulty because an NPR licensee with a fomula quantity of nonexempt fuel is not required to implement the full Safeguards Upgrade Rule requirements (10 CFR 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46) . The following is a list of the reduction in full Category I physical pr'otection measures that is being made for NPRs because of their general fuel and. facility design features.

1. Eliminate redundant alam stations.

2. Eliminate hardening of alarm stations.

3. Eliminate entrance searches for weapons and explosives.

4. Eliminate a second SNM exit search.

5. Eliminate Part 73 Appendix 8 Guard Training requirements.

- Enclosure B

T * :*

ha t- 6. Eltinate requirements for traed guards. ,

7. Reduce Contingency Plan requirements.

t

8. Eliminate hardening for vaults.

9. Q: Why does the rule require three capabilities: (1) detecting unauthorized access into CAAs, (2) detecting unauthorized activities and conditions in

CAAs and pas and (3) detecting unauthorized removal of SSNM7 s

A: The objective is to detect attempts to remove SSNM as early'as possible.

In order to help achieve this with high assurance, a safeguards system which provides defense in depth is essential . In addition, the resulting redundanc;

~

and diversity of capabilities helps assure that the system is not vulnerable

' to common mode failures or any single adversary act, such as commercial power failures or the severing of non-tampersafed alann lines.

10. Q: What are examples of unauthorized activities and conditions 7 ,

A: Some examples of unauthorized activities are (a) failure to follow signi-ficant operating procedures, (b) someone being in a restricted area without proper authorization, or (c) moving fuel without prior approval.

Some examples of unauthorized conditions are (a) a door left unlocked when it should be secured, (b) monitoring equipment that is not energized when it should be, or (c) fuel handling equipment not being secured when required

11. Q: Does the protected area (PA) required'in 73.67(h)(2) have to be inclosed by barriers of the construction defined in 73.2(f)(1) and (2)?

A: No. As stated in 73.2(f)(3) "any other physical obstruction constructed in a manner and of material suitable for the purpose for which the obstruction is intended," is acceptable. Thus, while alternatives to the Enclosure B

Y,, '

] -. 6- - -

t - se ,

barriers described in 73.2(f)(1) and (2) are acceptable, they must have a

.I.

penetration resistance which is appropriate for the type and quantity of ,

f material being protected, and taking into account the other physical protection measures present.

73.67(h)(2)(1)

12. Q: Can material be used and stored in otiher than a controlled access area (CAA)?

A: Only the 350 grams of material, Pu/Be sources, and Pu-238 exempted under 73.67(b) can be used outside a CAA. As required under 73.67(h)(2)(1),

the Itcensee must be able to detect unauthorized access to SSNM other e ,

than that listed above. This can be assured only if the material is l_ always kept in controlled areas with physical babiers and some form of

- intrusion detection devices or procedures.

l .. 13. Q: What types of measures could be used to detect unauthorized access to a controlled access area (CAA) or a protected area (PA)?

A: The access detection system should include physical barriers to impede an adversary's entry into the area and allow time for detection to take place. For the detection system itself some options are:

1. Alarm switches on doors into the area which are backed up by some means of detecting attempted entry through the walls. Attempted wall entry could.be detected by (a) motion detectors inside the area which view the wall, or (b) periodic patrols to visually inspect the wall,

2. A motion detector inside an aren which can view fuel access areas, or

3. Individuals inside the CAA who could detect unauthorized access, such as, during normal operation hours.

Enc 1osure 8

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? It should be noted that many of the seasures listed Nre can also satisfy some of the other capability requirements. t 73.67(h)(2)(11) l

14. Q: mat measures could be used to detect unauthoriz'ed activities?

A': Again some measures may be able to satisfy several capabilties. Some means of detecting unauthorized activities are: . ._

1. mtion detectors which cover the interior space of the area,

2. ' Periodic patrols.

3. Appropriate use of CCTV's or observation windows which can survey the l important, parts of the area, or

4. Use of the two san rule inside the area.

' ~ '

73.67(h)(2)(iii)

15. Q: mat measures could be used to detect unauthorized removal of meterial?

+

A: Some measums for detecting attespts at unauthorized removal are: .

1. Motion detectors which view (a) the fuel, (b) fuel removal points such as a core plug, or (c) specialized tools, such as remote manipulators 1

i or cranes, which are necessary for fuel mmoval, i

2. A radiation' detector which is difficult to shield and has sufficient sen-sitivity to detect the removal of any (Nadiated fuel it is pro +ecting,

3. Alarming of the.special fuel mmoval tools mentioned above, or Enclosure B

z.

k:

E~ *. -

e i 4. Exit searches of packages, personnel, and vehicles leaving the CAA or PA to a level sufficier'it to detect the physical concealment of a fuel 8

- element of given size and dimension.

73.67(h)(2)(iv)

16. Q: What steps are necessary to provide for a response capability sufficient to prevent the unauthorized removal of a fonsula quantity?

A: The licensee should be able to have a combination of detection times and response times which would be less than the time it would take an adversary to remove a fonsula quantity of material . Thus, depending on the length of detection times expected for satisfying capabilities 73.67(h)(2)(1) -

(iii), the licensee will need to arrange for a response force with a sufficiently short deployment time. Simply stated, the licensee should assure that the total response time (detection plus security response) is

"~ less than the minimum time required for an adversary to remove a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material from the facility.

i I

17. Q: Does the response force have to be on-site and/or supplied by the licensee? *

. A: No. The licensee may choose to arrange with the local law enforcement agencies (LLEA) to provide the response force. In such a case, redundant or tamper indicating communications should be established for notifying the LLEA when a response is needed. .

73.67(h)(3) -

18. Q: Under 73.67(h)(3), when must the licensee test equipment for implementing the adoitional requirements of 73.67(h)? l

)

Enclosure 8 l l

Y -

~

g r .. .

L. .

A: When the equipment is needed for use, it should be tested. ~ A test shouldt .

[ ,

be made prior to a licedsee reaching the point where a formula quantity of nonexempt material is possessed. After that, periodic tests should be made at least every 7 days to assure that the equipment is still func-

. tioning at the necessary level .

O .

9 m

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0 Enclosure B I . . - - . . .- . . . . . .. .. . . .. .

._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ . . - . - _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ , . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . .

.2

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ENCLOSURE C O

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en e

E.. .

Regulatory Analysis -

l Physical Protection of Nonpower Reactors '

lh

Possessing Fcrsula' Quantities of SSNM (10 CFR Part 73)1 b

1,q Statement of Problem . ,

i~ dnder currently applicable regulations, nonpower reactor (NPR) Ifcensees possessing formula quantities of nonexespt strategic special nuclear anterial (SSNM) are i sutdect to requirements relating to the physical protection of special nuclear I

material of moderate strategic significance (10 CFR 73.67(d)) as well as interin j< additional requirements (10 CFR 73.60) in place of implementing the adre stringent l requirements of the Safeguards Upgrade Rule (10 CFR 73.45 and 46). These interim 1

! requirenants are in effect while the NRC staff determines the measures necessary I to afford this unterial with a level of physical protection cosparable to the j

i protection provided for formula quantities of SSNM at fuel cycle facilities, while at the same time giving credit for specific facility and fuel design i features that together offer intrinsic protection against theft. The new level of protection is to be commensurate with the threat posed to the public safety I' and health by theft of a formula quantity of this material .,while providing

/

protection actually needed at each specific site.

t i

l Potentially, there could be 15 licensees affected by the proposed amendments .

1 although no more than one to three are likely to be affected. These 15 Ifcen-sees are made up of large companies, large universities, and Federal and state 1

l egencies. Consequently, under the provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act I

(5 U.S.C. 605(b)), this rule would not have a significant economic inpact on a i

l substantial number of small entities.

l 1

l Copies of the Regulatory Analysis are being placed in the NRC Public Docunent 4 room,1717 H Street NW., Washington DC, where they will be available for public

, inspection and copying for a fee.

Enciosure C

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'* All liccnsees, with tha possib10 exc ption cf one, currently have plans on file ,

h -eddressing the Category 11 requirements which sandate that. licensees have a system which will provide early detection of theft of material of anderate strategic significance. Adapting and expanding plans already on file to include seasures for pmventing the theft of a forsula quantity of SSNM by an external adversary or insider (s) could be done to amet the requirements of the proposed rule. For most licensees, this can be acconplished by expanding precedures, with i

little emphasis on new capital equipment. Others say choose to install new l

cquipment because they anticipate a more frequent need to satisfy Category I mquirements (although it is unlikely that a licensee, baring unforseen energen-cies ,'would choose to possess a formula quantity of unirradiated fuel). By l7 I operating with fuel at an exempt level (>100 reWhour at 3 feet or 2000 rem dose

! to an adversary), NPR licensees can avoid ha'ving to isplement the proposed rule.

l-

! Obj ectives r

! The general goal of physical protection requirements at NPRs is to assure that the public health and safety will not be threatened due to the theft of a formula quantity of SSNM. The obj ectives are to detect an attempted theft of material ,

and protect against theft through appropriate response. Concurmntly, the aim is to not burden licensees with overly restric~tive seasures which might unneces-sarily inhibit their operation (e.g., researth, instructional, etc.). In seating i

the objectives, the new rule continues to give sose safeguards credit for fuel irradiated above 100 res/ hour since it provides a certain deterence against theft.

Alternatives -

Regulatory options considered for placing physical protection requirements on NPRs licensees possessing formula quantities of nonexengt strategic special 4

Enclosure C l

l

iJ nuclear material ranged from allowing the opportunity for no requiresents .

based on fuel exemption, up to requiring implementation of all of the Safeguards ,

,. Upgrade Rule measures. .

l After this consideration, staff developed recoseended as[endments which (1) protect I

against insider theft of nuclear material, (2) give the lict:nsees much greater flexibilii;y in selecting a set of physical protection measures, and (3) take maximum benefit of any NPR and fuel design features that provide intrinsic safeguards, which help achieve protection levels cosparable to the Safeguards Upgrade Rule. These amendments are provided as an alternative to maintaining the status quo. Thus, the two alternatives can be stated as follows:

~

Status quo.

1)

2) Implesent the mvised proposed amendments to protect against theft by the l

insider, conspiracy between insiders, and the external adversary.

t W . .

The current regulations are given in 10 CFR 73.60 and 73.67(d). The recommended i

reform amendments can be sunnarized as containing the following requiresants:

I o Detek:t access of unauthorized personnel to strategic special nuclear material within the protected area and the controlled access areas; i

o Detect unauthorized activities and conditions within the protected

. area and the controlled access areas; .

l "o Detect unauthorized mmoval of strategic special nuclear saterial I

from the controlled access areas; and 1

o Provide for a response capability sufficient to prevent the unauthorized removal of a fornula quantity of strategic special nuclear material.

l 1

Enclosure C

!. *8 *

< , {O e 'Iri addition, because of th3 design features cnd fuel type and form at Categcry I

[ .

NPRs , changes from the Safeguards Upgrade Rule requirements (i .e.,10 CFR 73.45 and 73.46) were possible. These include elimination of redundant and hardened ilarm stations, entrance searches for weapons and explosives, a second SSNM exit search, Part 73 Appendix B Guarti Training requirements, armed guards on site, and vault hardening.

! l i Cost / Benefit . _

i To give the estimated costs a proper perspective, they must be weighed against the f benefits 'which will result from adopting the revised proposed amendnents instead of keeping the status quo. These benefits are listed first and art as follows:

l 1) protection against theft by insiders and a collusion of insiders will be added to the protection already given against theft by external adversaries,2)' by 1

replacing the prescriptive requirements of 73.60 with performance capability requirements, the licensee is given such greater flexibility in selecting cost-effective physical protection measurescwhich make optinum use of arty inherent i

f site specific features,3) the conbination of physical protection requirements

! and unique features of NPR fuel and facility design provides a level of protec-tion conparable to that of the Safeguards Upgrade Rule, and 4) except for cases when the fuel is extremely self-protecting, all NPR licensees possessing a

formula quantity must protect it at least to the level required for Category II f material (moderate strategic significance), thereby reducing the likelihood of a theft of a formula quantity of SSNM. -

Ther* are currently 15 NPR licensees who po'ssess formula quantities of SSNM and f

l thus could potentially be subj ect to the proposed Category I requirements, if i they are unable to keep their amount of nonexenpt fuel below a formula quantity.

Mth current levels of operations, it is conservatively estimated that no more l

! than one to three of these 15 would ever have a fornula quantity of nonexenpt Enclosure C

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s s y

'I': fuel and then only for short pericds of time. This number.could vary well go to zero when licensees are allowed to average the dose rate of all fuel qualifying

?

for the self-protecting exemption. -

l 1

In developing the cost figures, a typical set of physical protection measures was ;

established which were representative of an average current NPR licensee covered by this rulemaking action. Because the great majority of current ifcensees maintain an exemption from Category I requirements and have NRC apprcWed or have submitted plans at the Category II level, the typical set of physical protection measures will only satisfy Category II requirements. Two sets of physical protection measures were drawn up which could satisfy the Category I requirements contained in the revised proposed amendments. The sets included measures for both irradiated and unirradiated fuel. One set was capital equipment inten-sive and one set was personnel intensive.

- The estimated additional cost per facility for implementing the revised proposed amendments above the requirements of Category II are given in Table 1. .

Table 1 .

Estimated Additonal Cost Per Facility l

to Implement the Revised Proposed Amendments l

Type of One T!me Capital Operating Measures Employed Equipmer. Expenditure Cost During One Year Personnel Intensive $1,100 - $1,400 ,

$5,300 - $7,900 l

Capital Equipment -

$2,500 - $5,100 $300 - $1,000 Intensive -

i Enclosure C

, s.. :,b .3 s -

w p- It is not necessary, and highly unlikely, that a licensee would cho:se to i r- ,cse equipment and' operating procedures which both fall at the high cost and of ,

their respective ranges. -

1 i

i It should be remembered that no more than three licensees are expected to have to implement the full Category I proposed requirements and that this number could very well go to zero. In addition, if any licensee is unable to keep its amount

' ~

' cf nonexempt fuel smaller than a formula quantity, this would most likely occur i

only for short periods of time which would be less than the.90 day interim period.

For those cases, it would not be necessary to expend the full capital costs

! v, estistated above. In fact, if labor intensive procedures are used for these short periods instead of hardware, the capital cost might be avoided altogether.

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- - - - Decembe'r 21, 1983 CHAIRMAN MEMORANDUM FOR: C'ommissione'r Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts ~

Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal FROM: Nunzio J. Palladino

SUBJECT:

HIGH ENRICHED URANIUM AT RESEARCH REACTORS After considering the December 19, 1983 meeting on converting from high enriched uranium to low enriched uranium at research reactors, I have the following thoughts.

1. If a security problem is the root motivation for

'- converting, then.I think we cannpt wait for the many

. years it could take to make the changes from.HEU to LEU. Rather, we must solve any security problem quickly. -

"If instead a perception problem with other nations is

~

2.

.the motivating factor, then I'think'we should proceed judiciously, taking into account the many issues that were discussed at our meeting and that may arise in -

future meetings. .

In the interests of moving expeditiously to closure on -

Item 1, and as background for our classified meeting on .

January 27, 1984, I would like the staff's assessment of the adequacy of security at..research reactors, along with ,

recommendations for upgrade if' deemed necessary. The extent to which the pending upgrade rule would affect the .

adequacy of security should also be addressed. By copy of this memorandum the staff is requested to provide the Commission with an assessment of. security and any recommendations by January 23, 1984. ,

With respect to Item 2,.I suggest that we await the results of our second meeting on January 27 covering the 9

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! - international implications before giving guidance to the staff concerning next steps on a proposed r'ule er any other !

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladinol ,

Comissioner Gilinsky

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Commissioner Roberts -

Commissioner Asselstine .

Commissioner .

Bernthal. .

FROM: William J.'Dircks. Executive- *

, Director for Operations .

SUBJECT:

HIGH ENRICHED URANIUM AT NONPOWER REACTORS -

.- r -

Th3 purpose of this memorandum is to respond to Chairman Palladino's Decenber 21, 1983 request to staff to provide background information for the Comission's January 27, 1984 meeting on security at nonpower reactors and the Cocnission's - -

policy on converting from high enriched to low enriched uranium at nonpower .

reactors. As the Chairman indicated in his memorandum, conversion to lower enrichments would be a long term solution to the problem of protecting nonpower T reactor fuel against theft. In the interim, the Commission must ass'ure that .

it maintains security requirements which protect the public health and safety with an adequate degres.of conservatism. The Decipiber 21, 1983 memorandum

from^the Chairman requested: ,

_ 1. Staff'Is assessment of t!)e adequacy of security at research reactors.

2. Recommendations for upgrading security, if deemed nece'ssary. ,

3. Extent to which the pending upgrade rule would affect the adequacy of security. .

Security reituirements at nonpower reactors are bounded by Section 104 of the Atomic Energy Act which states, "The Commission is directed to impos.e only such cinimum abount of regulation of the licensee as the Comission finds will permit

! - the Comission to fulfill its obligations un' der the act to promote the con:::en defense and sei:Grity and to protect the health and safety of the public and -

will permit the cofiduct 'of widespread and diverse research and development."

Staff believes that the security improvements the Commission has pursued during the last several years have represented a reasoned, balanced approach consistent with Section 104 of the Atomic Ene'rgy Act. However, sta'ff also believes that as long as high enriched uranium exists at nonpower reactors in significant quantities," some residual risk of malevolent use exists.

CONTACT: R. J. Dube '

42-74040

, Enclosure B

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i. , Security requiremeIr.ts are placed en Jicensees according to the quantity of

& material p:ssessed--Category II quantities of fuel .(less than 5 formula kilo ' -

grams) and Category I quantities (5 formula' kilograms or more)--with the addi-4 . tional provision that.Qtegory I material which has been irradiated to a level of 100 res/ hour at -3 feet is protected according to the security requirements :

for Category II quantities. This is consistent with IAEA. guidelines. The 100 rem / hour radiation level,-although not an '. incapacitating level, is con-sidered to be a deterrent. it should be recognized that there is a risk of some dedicated individual (s) ignoring this deterrent and obtaining in a However,'

single theft sufficient material to fashion an ex;ilosive device.

In providing protection, it is recognized that nonpower reactors will have on hand quantities of unirradiated fuel-(currently possession is 'below Category I protection for the

.

quantities) in addition to irradiated fuel of Category I.

1rradiated fuel is.provided.by,1icensees by using the 100 rem / hour radiation

level. Hence, currently the protection in place is that required for Category ~

II quantities. '

Category II Duantities (See Enclosure 1) .

R'ecognizing the 100 rem / hour level, the primary security issue with Category II ' '

materials is establishing the appropriate level of security for unirradiated '

fuel in quantities less than 5 formula kilograms. Current requirements were '

published in July,1979, and were designed to provide proi!ection against theft at a level consistent with IAEA pidelines. Security plans submitted in accordance with these rules prov.de for early detection of an external adver-sary and notification of local 1aw enforcement authorities for their response.

The mechanisms for early detection are not designed to protect against an

> insider and are site-specific," varying in their degree of sephistication and in their vulnerability to a highly trained external adversary. The security measures in place for Category II quantities are sum.narized in Enclosure 2. .

Staff's position has been that these measures have provided an adequate degree of security, c.onsidering the additional conservatism resulting from the other factors listed above. Important elements in this conclusion are staff's under-standing that theft of multiple Category II quantities would be required to '

accumulate ' sufficient material to construct a nuclear explosive devi.ce and the '

' likelihood of a successful multiple theft was low. ,

Coordinated theft attempts occurring simultaneously or within a short period of time possibly could defeat NRC's early detection strategy. In view of recent -

events overseas which suggest successful conspira.cies can be accomplished and in view of the Administration's recent prudent actions of increased protection '

at certain domestic government facilities, staff believes that it would be prudent to consider additional measures which would increase the conservatism associated with the protection now provided for Category II . quantities. The pending. upgrade rule would not affect the existing requirements for Category II quantities.

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Enclosure,B

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4 Hessures that would improve the security' posture at nonpower reactors any be '

divided into two classes: those that can be implemented in the near-term ,

through rule revisions or voluntary actioni on the part.of licensees--the short-term solution--and the long-term solution, conystsion to lower

^ -

i enrichments. . .

Short-Term Solution . .

Fer Category II facilities,. based on the preceedin'g discussions, staff recom- ,

sends the following alternative requ,irements be analyzed for~ improving security: .

1. Reduce it.oldings,of Fresh HEU Fuel at Nonpower Reactors .$.

2. Tamper-proof Detection Systems and Provide Line-Supervision

3. Assure Presence of Two-Persons During Access to Material ,

4 Improve Cosaunications capability , ,

5. Provide Access Barriers over Ge Reactor Core . .

2 For Category I quantities, when protection is prgy.ided at the Category II level due to the 100 rem / hour deterrent, as noted above, the staff recomends that, as an additional interim requirement, consideration be given to requirin'g, (1) licensee demonstration of how they.will assure that the radiation level for

--- Category I quantities will not be allowed to drop below 100 rem / hour at 3 feet

, 'cr (2) submittal for. review and approval the specific measures ths licensee would apply to meet the requirements of 173.60 should the licensee po sess .

Category I quantities that do not meet the 100 rem / hour level.

These improvenients could be accomplished by rulemaking or by voluntary action on the part of licensees. Due to current resource limitations in the Division of Safeguards, should the Comission decide to proceed in this direc- .

l tion, work on the Category I updgrade rule would be suspended. The staff' -

believes.this is appropriate prioritization of these efferts. ,

Long-Te*rm Solu' tion , , .

Given the unacceptable consequences of 'sdccessful~ theft and construction of a nuclear explosive device, staff believes that implementation of the Commission's policy statement of August 24, 1982, on conversion of nonpower reactors fr.om high enriched to lower enriched fuels would reduce the residual a

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Enclosure B

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ategory II Oront1 tim. water syswy,-9nyaise t securuy as nonpower vs.uvro _._ _

3.... .. '

p(regardless of type and qdantity ofielj was' provid2d only to protect against u

' industrial sabotage. ' Those security measures providad'some indirect pro'tection t

against theft, mainly against an unorganized . unsophisticated adversary. There 1were no physical security requirements for Category II quantities of special ,

nuclear material at other types of facilities, e.g.' at low-enriched uranium ,

fuel fabricators. In February,1977, staff'recomended to the Comission

.(SECY-77-79) that security for Category 11 materials be provided at a level . ~

. . .v .

consistent with' IAEA guidelines in INFCIRC/225. The proposed approach upg"raded the level of physical protection at nonpower reactors, in addition to intro-ducing totally new requirements for protecting Category II materials at other .

[ f acilities. The Commission approved the general approach of the staff in June. .

~ *

, 1977(SECY-77-798). *,

A proposed rul,e was forwarded to t.he Commission in March,1978 (SECY-78-142),

- ~ari approved for publi,ation c in'May,1978. After -review of public coments, a

~

~.

final rule was forwarded to the Comission in January,1979 (SECY-79-38).

5taff's recomended final rule was generally consistent with INFCIRC/225 and included the following requirements: _

- 1. Detect and assess unauthorized access to or activities within a contro11e'd i access area containing'the special nuclear material;

2. Detect and assess unauthorized ' removal of special nuclear material; l 3. Assure. proper p.1,acement and, transfer of custody of special nuclear ,

meterial; and .

4. Respend to indications of an unauthorized removal of special nuclear material and then notify the appropriate response forces of its removal in

~

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' - order to facilitate its recovery.

. Enclosure 1 of Enclosure B

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ma vayw p.yw-ww was cxpressed as to whether the physical protection requirements actually were . .

~

, needed at Category 1.n::ri-power reactor facilities, given the unique type sad form Iofthefuel. In" addition, coments focused on the imp'act that the Upgrade Rule t ~

x would have on nonpower reactors. .

L ,

The Commission decided not to require nonpower reactors to meet the requirements of the upgrade rule. As an interim seas'ure, non-power reactors ,were required to meet the theft protection measures provided by the regulations covering Category .

.. e .

II quantities of special nuclear material. Those non-power reactor facilities po'ssessing Category I quantities not meeting the 100 rem / hour exemption criterion

-were required also to meet the provisions of fl73.60. The additional measures ,

required by 373.60, outlined in Enclosure 3, are designed to give some protec-y t. ion against theft of material by an insider. A particular weakness of these interim requirements is that licensees are not required to submit security

.J a,ns describi'ng the additional measures they would implement to meet the 1 , .

requirements of 573.60 for NRC licensing approval.

When the Comis. s ion approved the interim requirements for Category I quantities at nonpower reactors, it directed staff to develop final requirements which '

would provide protection against theft comparable to the physical protection, Upgrade Rule, considering the unique type and form of the fuel. A proposed rule to this and was published in September,1981. In response to extensive public comments, a revised proposed rule was forwarded to the Commission in Hovember, -

1982. The Commission approved the proposed rule subjec,t to several staff follow-on actions r'ecommended by OPE. However: .

Chairman palladino would have preferred that .the following change:

The statement that a licensee will now be allowed to average its irradiated fuel in meeting the 100 rem / hour exemption so long as no fuel unit drops below 50 rem / hour at 3 feet should be explicitly shown in the rule as well as in the supplementary information.

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- ' ' Enclosure I of Enclosure B hiamm---_._m_ . _

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CURRENT REQUIREMENTS FOR ,

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CATEGORY 'II* (10 CFR .73.67(d)) . t

1. Store and use material only in a lighted controlled access area (CAA). .

2. Monitor the CAA with an katrusion a,lara (door switches acceptable) or procedures. . .

~

3. Conduct screen [ng (student credeniials acceptable) prior to granting unescorted acce.gs.to the material. .

4. Limit CAA access to authorized persons or escorted visitors.

5. Use a badging system and limit access to the controlled access area .

to persons who require such access in their duties. .

- 6. Provide at least one around-the-clock unarmed watchman to respond to .

security incidents or emergencies. ,

5 I 7. Provide a communication capability (telephone acceptable) between the watchman and a. response force (police acceptable). .

rando:n basis vehicles and packages leaving the CAA.

8. (visitors

' ,. ' Search'on on a. ly). -

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9. Establish response procedures. ,

Note that protection is provided only against an external adversary. , _

*Less tnan 5 formula kilograms of high. enriched uranium and all fuel irradiaked to 100 re'm/ hour at n9npower. reactors.

Enclosure 2 of Enclosure B l . .

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. . . r '- . Fiebruary 23, 1984 FFCE SP THE , ,

eSCRETARY 8

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ME.CRANDUM% FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director .for Operat

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D FROM: Samuel J. Chilk Secretary for the Comission

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SUBJECT:

DEVELOPMENT OF A PROPOSED rut E'O' THE USE OF HEU AND STEPSTOIMPROVE'SECURITYMEM5 urb The Comission was briefed on current physical security measures at domestic .

.;, nenpower reactors and en the potential for conversion of these reactors frcm high enriched uranium to low enriched uranium fuel in meetings held on December 19, 1983, January 27 and February 6,1984 As a result of these briefings the Corcaission requests that the staff orecare exceditiously (by

. Merch 20. 198 0 fo- Comission consideration a croceseo ru te on Ine use e7

'HEU, and a clan and schedule for develooment of staos to improve security censures at cecestic nonoower reactors usine HEU fuel.

f3 A. Proposed Rule on HEU at' Domestic Research Reactor's The proposed rule should contain the following provisions:

1. No new nonpewer reactors would be licensed for.use of HEU fuel unless the applicant shows the unioue purposes of the project

. cannot be achieved without using HEU fuel. -

'2 Existing nenpower reactors would be required to convert to LEU fuel if it is technically fe'asible for them to do so.

Reactors that refuel would be required to replace such fuel with low enrichment fuel as the-replacement fuel bec:ces available. The schedule of such replacements would be devel-oped by the Director, NRR, who will coordinate such actions

. with DOE. If a suitable replacement fuel is not expected to

'be available within the everall schedule of DOE'.s RERTR program, the rule should provide for replacement of HEU fuel with fuel of enrichment as close to 20 percent as practical.

For reactor's that would not otherwise expect to require the acquisition of new fuel during the term of their license, a schedule should be develcped by the Director, NRR, to. provide for as prompt conversion to LEU as is reasonable.

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. J Sche 5U1es for: conversion should take into acccunt such factors i

<* . as: scheduling of shipping casks, replace =ent fuel fabrica-tion, financial support, and, reactor usage.. These schedules -

should be coordinated with" DOE. .., ,

h Exemptions from this rule would be based.on a determination that the particular reactor serves a unique purpose. Unique purpose should account for such characteristics as neutron flux levels and energy spectrum specifically designed to facilitate research on

- irradiations not perfomed elsewhere .16 the U.S. The. Director, NRR would determine whether. a reactor has a unique purpose.

Comissioner Gilin' sky would prefer that the Connission itself make this determination.

4. In order to minimize cgsts to licensees of obtaining pemission to l use low enriched uranium, consideration will' be given to including

. in the rule provisions which would permit existing licensees *

' automatically to convert their facilities to LEU if prescribed conditions are met. These conditions should assure that present r safety margins are not significantly reduced. To this and the '

staff shculd act promptly to develop.the technical basis needed to support generic findings which would perinit conversion to LEU.

5. The rulemaking should request comments on the question of how much

'- the issue of economic feasibility should inf.luence the conversien

. of facilities to LEU. ,

6. This rulemaking is based upon Congress funding DOE to provide the j appreciably lower enrichment and LEU fuel .for university . reactors.

Procesed Steos to Imorove Physical Protection at Des stic Research

> g gg B.

i Reactors . .

The proposed steps should consider, for the period preceding the comple-tion of conversion to LEU fuel, alternative strengthened security measures at licensed NPRs, including any available estimates of the be.nefits and ic: pacts of the following possible improvements:

1. Aucmented Minimal Protection for Both Catecory I and II Facilities

. Reduce holdings of fresh HEU fuel at nonpower reactors

. Provide tamper-proof detection systems and line-supervisien

. Assure presence of two-persons during access to material l'

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. . . Improve ccr.Tunications capability

. Previde access barriers over;the reacter core.

2. Additienal Protection for Cateoory I Facilities

. Require submittal for NRC review and approv.al of the specific measures that the licensee. would apply to meet the require-ments of 10 CFR 573.60; and

. Require licensees who, under the 150 rem / hour at 3 feet exemption, meet only Category II requirements to demonstrate how they detemine that radiation levels are maintained above the level stipulated in the exemption; and

. Recuire licensees to notify the NRC at least 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months before .

they expect a change in requirement category.

3. Transoortation -

The staff should reccmmend options for strengthening present Category II HEU transportaticn safeguards recuirements for c:nsis-tency with upgraded protection at nonpower reactors.

The staff should'reocrt back to the Cecaiss. ion by March 30, 1984_with

! reccc.encations en (1) wnten of the aoove improvements or otners should

' be implemented, (2) when they should be in place, and (3) the method of implementing them (e.g., license condition, rulemaking). The coal ,

should be assurance that upgrades needed to strengthen security will be

~

put in place expeditiously, but with due consideration given to relevant safety considerations.

Work on the final rule for theft at Category I nonpower reactors (the

. permanent rule replacement to 10 CFR 573.60) shall be deferred, but should include a reexam,ination of the technical basis for the present irradiation exemption and whether irradiation provides a sufficiently effective inherent safeguards protection for fonnula quantities cf SNM to justify the significantly 1cwer level of physical protecticn associ-ated with, Category II.

I'"'"***i "

l .SfAU~ In developing the proposed rule and steps (A and B above) the staff should provide answers to the following cuestions: (1)whetherthe conversion to LEU fuel can be done strictly by rule, without license I

if amendments, license amendments or whether license amendments are required, v:hether and under will be required; what circumst(2) 'acces 1

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heariniis wculd'need to"be held on these amendments; and (3) whether a r.egative dsclaration, environinental assessment, or environmental impact

- statement is required for either the ryle or, if,* required, the license

. amendments. .

cc: H. Plaine J. Zerbe .

C. Kamerer -

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g RULEMAKING ISSUE (Notation Vote)

May 25, 1984 SECY-84-216 For: The Comissioners

' From: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

~ *

Subject:

Security Measures at Nonpower Reactors

Purpose:

To supply a plan and schedule to increase security measures at

. nonpower reactors (NPRs) that use high enriched uranium (HEU) fuel.

Category: Major policy issue. -

l Discussion: This paper replies to the second part (item- B) of the Commission's

- staff requirements samorandum issued by the Secretary on February 23, 1984. That part requested a plan and a schedule for _ . _ ,

development of steps in increase security measures at NPRs that'use l HEU fuel. In addition, staff was asked to consider similar improve-ments for material in transit. A reply to the first part of the requirements memorandum, which requested that sta.ff prepare a

. proposed rule on conversion of high enriched uranium NPR fuel to low enriched uranium (LEU), is being forwarded separately.

Background .

At the December 19,1983 Comission meeting on the conversion of ,

about 30 nonpower reactors from HEU fuel, a question was raised as to whether the Commission's. motivation for seeking conversion was primarily based on international considerations or whether it was also based on domestic safeguards considerations. As a consequence of l

CONTACT:

R. J. Dube, SGFF 427-4040 l

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that q.uestion in a memorandum dated December 21, 1983 (Enclosure A),

--the Chairman r,equested staff's assessment of the adequacy of security at nonpower reactors, and its recommendations for any .

-upgrades deemed necessary. At that time, staff was working on a )

. ' final security rule for the 13 NPRs possessing five kilograms or !

l more of U-235,in HEU (Category I MPR rule). The Chairman's December 21 memorandum also requested information on the extent

<to which that pending rule would affect the adequacy of security.

In a memorandum dated January 25,1984 (Enclosure B), staff in-formed the Commission that:

a. The security improvements the Connission has pursued during the '

last several years have represented a reasoned, salanced approach consistent with Section 104 of the Atomic Energy Act. b ever, staff also believes that as long as high enriched uranium exists at nonpower reactors in significant quantities, some residual risk of malevolent use exists. l

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. b. Of the approximately 30 reactors which possess HEU, most are '

implementing Category II safeguards requirements because they either possess between 1 and 5 kg of U-235 (Category 11

' tities) or possess 5 kg or more (Category I quantities) quan-but maintain enough of their fuel irradiated to at least 100 rem /hr at 3 feet to be exempt from Category I requirements.

4

c. Category 11 requirements provide for early detection of an external adversary and . notification of local law enforcement authorities. Their response does not necessarily have 3

to be timely enough to prevent a theft. The basis for staff's position that these measures provide an adequate degree of security were: (1) theft of multiple Category II quantities would be required to accumulate sufficient material to construct a nuclear explosive device, and (ii) the like11-

- hood of a successful multiple theft was low. -

d. Currently available information contains no indication of a specific threat aimed at a domestic nuclear facility. However, recent acts by international terrorists have shown that a ,

. significant adversary capability can materialize without sufficient warning from the intelligence community. These recent acts in other countries have also exhibited a signifi-cant increase in sophistication, coordination, and willingness to commit violence. Therefore, it may be prudent to consider additional, domestic, security measures to increasei the conservatism associated with the protection now provided for Category II quantities.

e. The Category I MPR rule that was in preparation in December, 1983, would affect only one to three of the 30 HEU licensees, since only 13 have Category I quantities and most of these follow Category II requirements because of the 100 rem /hr exemption.

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.. -~7 Implementation of items b through e would increase conservatism by )

.? contributing to the following capabilities: 1) impeding removal 1

- .of fuel from reactors having a core in an open pool (item e), 2) protecting against theft by an insider (item c), and 3) upgrading the ability to detect an attempted theft end to alert' the LLEA.

. The Commission's February 23 staff requirements memorandum also requested recommendations on any other improvements which should be implemented. In response to.the Commission's direction, three other improvements have been identified that would contri-bute to the conservatism. in addition to items a through e above.

These additional improvements are:

f. Detect both unauthorized penetration through barriers into, as well as unauthorized activities within, the controlled access area.

g. Detect attempts to prevent the assessment of an alarm, for example, by use of a duress alarm by the assessor.

h. Arrange with the local law enforcement agency (LLEA) to supply at least one armed response person when called upon.

Enclosure D contains a discussion of items a through e, the additional measures (items f, g and h), acceptable alternatives

~~

. where applicable and available, and the limited cost information-presently available (more complete cost information will be .

developed from discussions with the licensees and comments re-ceived on the proposed rule).

Additional Protection for Category 1 Facilities.

. The Commission's February 23 staff requirements memorandum re- -

quested recommendations on which of the following improvements, or others, should be implemented:-

a. Require submittal for NRC review and approval of the specific ,

measures that the licensee would apply to meet the requirements of 10 CFR $73.60;

b. Require licensees who, under the 100 rem / hour at 3 feet exemp-l tion, meat only Category II requirements to demonstrate how they determine that radiation levels are maintained above the level stipulated in the exemption; and

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'l" #The Commissionsrs .r. ,

- - - -. . .Th(total approximate impact to licensees (University reactors)

- for shipments made under option 2 is $57.600 per year for the 8 o- -- 4edicated transports. -Costs for the other provisions are not available at.this time. ,,

3. -tipgrade the physical security requirements as outI1aed in option 2 only for shipments of 3 kg to 4.g9 kg of HEU.

Under this option, fixed site Category II facilities would be limited to 2 kg or less of fresh HEU fuel on site unless a special need can be demonstrated (special cases will be ,

. Aandled on a site specific basis). With this limitation, only 1 theft of shipments of 3 kg or uore could result in a 5 kg loss if there were a simultaneous theft of fresh HEU fuel stored at ,

j any one Category 11 site. Thus, shipments of 3 kg or more l would receive the higher level of protection of option 2. At '

the same time, for those shipments where the simultaneous

. thefts would result in less than a composite 5 kg loss, the current level of Category II protection would . continue to be .

'> provided. Asswaing that, for option 3, large shipments would

? be broken up into more, smaller shipments, the estimated 2 impact of this option would be to increase the number of t shipments per year to University reactors (mostly University

, of Missouri) by 3 to 4 at an approximate total cost of a $1,600 per year. ,

~

Option 3 results in minimal cost impact while providing a

- higher degree of protection against the simultaneous combined theft of more than 5 kg of HEU fresh fuel from a Category II site and a Category II shipment. Upon Counission decision, the staff would pursue this upgrading parallel with the fixed site physical security upgrade.

Method of Implementing the Recomended Improvements .

1 In its February 23 staff requirements memorandum, the Commission requested recommendations on how to accompitsh the improvements l with the goal of implementing the upgrades on an expedited basis. Alternative methods specifically identified were license .

. .-conditions and rulenMng. .There are three variations on license conditions: voluntary li cehsee abdifications of their security plans, an immediately effective order under 10 CFR 2.204, and a regular order for modification of license under 10 CFR 2.204. The

fo' 10 wing discussion and recommendation reflects the Comission's expressed desire to proceed expeditiously.

Alternative 1: Voluntary security plan modification. Informal discussions with a small sampling of licensees indicate a willing-ness to voluntarily modify plans on a site-by-site basis, particu-larly if a good set of criteria were available. If this action is approved, criteria could be developed in three weeks. With three teams of two headquarters personnel each (1 security and 1 reactor safety), supplemented by one inspector, six to eight J

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,! .e g - tiniform application if a hearing is not held.

t y - Does not depend on voluntary cooperation. ,

- Less manpower intensive, if hearings are not requested.

CON - It would be difficult to take into consideration site specific characteristics.

- Several requests for hearings would significantly delay implementation, and place a heavy strain on staff resources.

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. - Licenses a~ay become" inconsistent with the regulations.

- Contrary'to agency practice of effecting generic modifications by rulemaking.

Alternative 4: Expedited rulemaking. Enclosure F shows a schedule which would reduce to 47 weeks the normal 2-3 year period required for development of a proposed and final rule. The expedited schedule racognizes that a draft rule for augmented protection for both Category I and II facilities who are currently subject to Category II requirements has already been prepared and circulated for staff review. Revised licensee security plans would be submitted within a month after a final rule is published and i approved within 2 to 5 weeks after submittal. This expedited

- - schedule can be accomplished by creating a task force to develop the rule and by the following deviations from normal regulatory process.

1. There will be no review by the Deptrtment of State or the CRGR during both the proposed and final rule stages; l

l 2. The Regulatory Analysis will be prepared for'the final rule only, will use impact and cost data obtained during the rule's ,

public comment period, and will not be reviewed by the CAG;

3. Acceptance Criteria for license review will not be ready until the final rule development stage; ,

I

4. Staff concurrence will .be by ELD, IE, MSS, NRR and RES only; and S. The OM8 clearance package will be prepared and receive staff review at the same time that the Commission considers the proposed rule.

' PRO - Uniform application.

- Does not depend on voluntary cooperation.

- Staff review of proposed licensee plans facilitates incor-l poration of site specific considerations.

- Provides for an expedited rulemaking schedule.

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Implementation Program _

Implementation Time ,

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'" Voluntary" improvements 5 - 13 weeks Category II/I mie 53 .56 weeks Category I rule . ,.30 - 33 weeks In order to increase the security at nonpower reactors, the Commission could:

1. Direct the following to satisfy its desire for expeditious changes in security: .

. a. The improvements (items a through h) for both Category I ,

t and Category II facilities which are subject to Category i II requirements.

9 b. The additional requirements (items 1 and 2) for Category I facilities.

c. The third option for transportation.

d. The multi-dimensional expedited implementation approach discussed on pages 9 and 10. . -

2. Note:

l l a. The upgrade discussed in this paper are backfit. In view of the Comission's request for these items to be supplied

, on an expedited schedule the staff has not subjected them -

! to nonna11y required reviews by the CRER and the ACRS.

b. The staff resources to proceed have not been budgeted but must come from redirection of resources. NMSS resources .

have been made available by suspending work on modification to the Category-I rule. Additional NMSS staff redirection will be necessary to proceed further.

I c. This effort results in increased conservatism on a l priority basis as desired by the Comission during the l several year period for licensees to convert to lower enriched fuel should the Comission desire to proceed with the rule on enrichment conversion.

d. The staff is not aware of available factual information of a specific threat aimed at a domestic nuclear facility.

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,I' 'This paper is tentatively scheduled for discussion at an Open

- Meeting on Thursday, May 31, 1984. If a Commission decision on how to proceed with the proposed rule is not made at that time, Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the secretary ASAP thereafter. I Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners ASAP, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may.be expected.

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.. . . e MEMORANDUM FOR: C'ommissione'r Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts -

Commissioner Asselstine ay. Commissioner Bernthal . -

FROM: -

Nunzio J. Palladino

SUBJECT:

HIGH ENRICHED URANIUM AT RESEARCH REACTORS

.. After considering the December 19, 1983 meeting on converting from high enriched uranium to low enriched -

uranium at research reactors I have the following

/. thoughts. .

1. If a security problem is the rSot motivation for converting,-then.I' think we canny.t wait for the many

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years it could take to make the changes from.HEU to LEU. Rather, we must solve any security, problem '

quickly. -

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If instead a perception problem with'other nations is 2.

.the motivating factor, then I think'we should proceed judiciously, taking into account the many issues that

! were discussed at our meeting and that may arise in .

, future meetings. .

In the interests of moving expeditiously to closure on

Item 1l and as background for our classified meeting on .,

January 2.7, 1984, I would like the staff's assessment of the adequacy of security at zesearch reactors, along with ,

recommendations for upgrade if deemed necessary. The extent to which the pending upgrade rule would affect the .

adequacy of security should also be addressed. By copy of this memorandum the staff is requested to provide the Commission with an assessment of. security and any recommendations by January- 23, 1984.

With respect to Item 2,.I suggest that we await the results of our second meeting on January 27 covering the l -

Enclosure A 9

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman palladino - -

Consiissioner Gilinsky .

Cocunissioner Roberts - ,

. Commissioner Asselstine ,

l Commissioner 8ernthal. ,

FROM: liilliam J. Dircks Executive-Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

HIGH ENRICHED URANIUM AT.-NONPOWER REACTOR 3 Th2 purpose of this memorandum is to respond to Chairman Palladino's December 21, 1983 request to staff to provide background infor: nation for the Coenission's .

January 27, 1984 meeting on security at nonpower re:ctors and the Commission's - -

policy on. converting from high enriched to' low enriched uranium at nonpower

reactors. As the Chairman indicated in his memorandum, conversion to lower k

enrichments would be a long term solution to the problem of protecting nonpower reactor fuel against theft. In the interim, the Commission must ass'ure that it maintains security requirements which. protect the public health and safety with an adequate degres.of conservatism. The Decimber 21,1983 memorandum -

from the Chairman requested: ,

1. Staff's assessment of t!)e adequacy of security at research reactors.

2. Recommendations for upgr'ading security, if deemed necessary. -

3. Extent to which the pending upgrade rule would affect the adequacy of security. ,

Security requirements at nonpower reactors are bounded by Section 104 of the Atomic Energy Act which states, "The Commission is directed to impos,e only such cinimum ainount of regulation of the licensee as the Commission finds will permit

- the Commission to fulfill its obligations un' der the act to promote the cor. con defense and sei:ority and to protect the health and safety of the public and -

will permit the- co.nduct of widespread and . diverse research and development."

Staff believes that the security improvimints the: Commission has pursued during the last several years have represented a reasoned, balanced approach consistent l with Section 104 of the Atomic Ene'rgy Act. However, sta'ff also believes that

as long as high enriched uranium exists at nonpower reactors in signiffrant quantities,' some residual risk of malevolent use exists.

C0!! TACT: R. J. Dube '

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IV. Security requireme.nts are placed on jicensees according to the quantity of F .satGrial p::ssessed--Category II quantities of fuel (less than 5 formula kilo ' -

7 grams) and Category I quantities (5 formula . kilograms or more)--with the addi-e :I material-which has been irradiated to's level

itional of 100provision rem /houVthat.

at'3Category?otected feet is p according to the security requirements t for Category II quantities. This is consistent with IAEA guidelines. The

100 rem / hour radiation level, although not an '. incapacitating level, is con-sidered to be a deterrent. .However, it should be recogni. zed that there is a risk of some dedicated individual (s)* ignoring this deterrent and obtaining in a

! single theft sufficient material to fashion an explosive device.

In providing protection, it is recognized that nonpower reactors will have on hand quantities of unirradiated fuel-(currently possession is 'below Category I

quantities) in addition to irradiated fuel of Category I. Protection for the 1rradiated fuel is.provided.by. licensees by using the 100 rem / hour radiation *

, level. Hence,' currently the protection in place is that required for Category l

II quantities. l Cateoory II Quantities (See Enclosure 1) .

Recognizing the 100 rem / hour level, the primary security issue with Category I.I materials is establishing the appropriate level of security for unirradiated fuel in quantities less than 5 formula kilograms. Current requirements were ,'

1 published in July,1979, and were designed to provide pro 1lection against theft i

at a level consistent with IAEA guidelines. Security plans submitted in accordance with these rules provide for early detection of an exte'rnal adver-

- sary and notification of local 1aw enforcement authorities for their response.

The mechanis:ss for early detection' are not designed to protect against an

" insider and are site-specific," varying in their degree of sophistication and in

.their vulnerability to a highly trained external adversary. 'The security measures in place for Category II quantities are summarized in Enclosure 2. .

Staff's position -has been that these measures have provided an adequate degree of security, considering the additional conservatism resulting from the other factors listed above. Important elements in this conclusion are staff's under-

~

standing that theft of multiple Category II quantities would be required to ,

accumulate sufficient material to construct a nuclear explosive device and the '

likelihood of a successful multiple theft was low. .

Coordinated theft attempts occurring simultilneously or within a short period of time possibly could defeat NRC's early detection strategy. In view of recent .

events overseas which suggest successfu.1.. conspiracies can be accomplished and in view of the Administration's recent prudent actions of increased protection ~

at certain domestic government facilities, staff believes that it would be prudent to consider additional measures which would increase the conservatism ,

associated with the protection now provided for Category II . quantities. The pendinr, .u,pgrade rule would not affect the existing requirements for Category II

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quantities.

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t Measures that would improva the security' posture 'at nonpower reactors may be '

! divided into two classel:"those'that can be -implemented in the near-term ,

- through rule revisions or voluntary.actioni on the part.of licensees--the

' short-term solution--and the 1cag-term solution, conversion * -

to lower enrichments. , ,

Short-Terin Solution For Category II facilities,. based on the preceedin'g discussions, staff recom-mends the following alternative requ,irements be analyzed for' improving security:

.- 1. Reduce goldings,of Fresh HEU Fuel at Nonpower Reactors ..

2. Tamper-Proof Detection Systems and Provide Line-Supervision l 3. Assure Presence of Two-Persons During Access to Material .

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4. , Improve Conrnunications Capability , _

5. Provide Access Barriers over the Reactor Core -

1 .

i For Category I quantities, when protection is prgv.ided at the Category II level

,! due to the 100 rem / hour deterrent, as noted above, the staff recomends that,

<? as an additional interim requirement, consideration be given to requirin'g, (1) licensee' demonstration of how they will assure that the radiation level for

. . Category I quantities will not be allowed to drop below.100 rem / hour at 3 feet

'cr (2) submittal for. review and approval the specific measures the licensee would apply to meet the requirements of 173.'60 should the licensee possess._, ,

Category I quantities that do not meet the 100 rem / hour level.

These improvenients could be accomplished by rulemaking or by voluntary action on the part of licensees. Due to current resource limitations in the Division of Safeguards, should the Commission decide to proceed in this direc- .

tion, work on the Category I updgrade rule would be suspended. The staff -

believes.this is appropriate prioritization of these efforts. ,

Long-Te'rm So1Nion, .

Given the unacceptable consequences of successful- theft and construction of a nuclear explosive device, staff believes that implementation of the .

l Conrnission's policy statement of August 24, 1982, on conversion of nonpower reactors from high enriched to lower enriched fuels would reduce the residual

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?&ategory II Quantities. Prior to 1979;; physical security at nonpower' reactors C. . . ...j-

E(regardless of type and qitantity of fuel) was' provided only to protect against

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industrial sabotape. Those securith measures provided'some indirect protection

- . g ragainst theft, mainly against an unorganized . unsophisticated adversary. There ,

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wers no physical security requirements for Category II quarttities of special ,

nuclear material at other types of facilities; e.g." at low-enriched uranium ,

fuel fabricators. In February,1977, staff recomended to the' . Commission

.(SECY-77-79) that security <

for Category II materials be provided at a leve,1 consistent with'IAEA guidelines in INFCIRC/225. The proposed approach upg*raded the level of physical protection at nonpower reactors, in addition to intro-ducing totally new requirements for protecting Category II materials at other .

f facilities. The Cournission approved the general approach of the staff in June,

!' Ig77 (SECY-77-798).

A proposed rul.e was forwarded to t.he Commission in March,1978 (SICY-78-142),

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dad approved for publication in May,1978. After review of public comments, a .

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I final rule was forwarded to the Commission in January, Ig79 (SECY-79-38).

Staff's recommended final rule was generally consistent with INFCIRC/225 and included the,following requirements: .

- 1. Detect and assess unauthorized access to or activities within a contro11e'd access area containing'the special nuclear material;

2. Detect and assess unauthorized ' removal of special nuclear material;

! 3. Assure. proper p.1,acement and, transfer of custody of special nuclear ,

material; and .

4. Respond to . indications of an unauthorized removal of special nuclear matWrial and then notify the appropriate response forces of its removal in

- order to facilitate its recovery.

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fualy During tha public comment peg'oa - .-

on Ina proposerupgraut rure7 concern-

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, , s expressed as to whether th2 pitysical protection requirements actually were . .

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Eneeded at Category I .non-power .. . .

reactor. facilities, given the unique type and form

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r ef the fuel. In7 addition,,ccaments focused on the . impact that the Upgrade Rule woS1d have on nonpower reactors. .- .. ,

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' The Commission decided not to require nonpower reactors to meet the requirements of the upgrade rule. As an interim measure,*non-power reactors were required to j seet the theft protection measures provided by the regulations covering Category -

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11 quantities o'f special nuclear material. Those non-power reactor facilities .

+ po'ssessing Catego'ry I quantities not meeting the 100 rem / hour exemption criterion

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5 were required also to meet the provisions of 473.60. The additional measures i

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required by 173.60, outlined in Enclosure 3, are designed to give some protec-g

tion against theft of material by an insider. A particular weakness of these

interim requirements is that licensees are not required to submit security ,

. plans describi'ng the additional measures they would implement to meet the requirements of 573.60 for NRC licensing approval. . .

(

l When the Connis.sion approved the interim requirements for Category I quantities l

at nonpower ' reactors, it directed staff to develop final requirements which .

would provide protection against theft comparable to the Physical Pr$tection, .

~

Upgrade Rule, considering the unique type and form of the fuel. A proposed rule to this and was published in September -1981. . In response to extensive public comments, a revised proposed rule was forwarded to the Commission in November. -

1982. The Commission appro~ved the proposed rule subject to several staff ,

follow-on actions recommended by OPE. However: .

ChairmanPalladinowouidhavepreferredthat.hefollowingchange: t The statement that a licensee will now be allowed to average its irradiated fuel in meeting the 100 rem / hour exemption so long as no fuel unit drops below 50 rem / hour at 3 feet should be explicitly shown in the rule as well as in the supplementary information.

Enclosure 1 of Enclosure B

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. ESTE'GDRY 'II* -(10 CFR .73.67(d)) . ,

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1. Store and use material only in a lighted controlled achss area (CAA). )

2. Monitor the CAA with an " intrusion a.larm (d.oor switches acceptable) or procedures. . .

3. Conduct screening (student credentials acceptable) prior to granting,

l vnescorted accen.to the material.

4. Limit CAA access to authorized persons or escorted visitors. .

5. Use a badging system and limit access to the controlled access area .

to persons who require such access in their duties. .

" 6. Provide at least one around-the-clock unarmed watchman to respond to" .

security incidents or emergencies.

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. 7. Provide a communication capability (telephone acceptable) between the t watchman and a. response force (police acceptable). .

8. ' Search'on 2, random basis vehicles, and packages leaving the CAA.

- - - . (visitors only).

! 9. Establish response procedures. .

Note that protection is provided only against an external adversary.

' *Less tnan 5 formula kilograms of high. enriched uranium and all fuel irradiated to 100 rem / hour at nonpower, reactors.

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Enclosure 2 of Enclosure B .

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Physical Protection Requirements for Category III Quantities of Special Nuclear Material ,

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. ..- (73.67(f)) at Fixed Sites (1) Store or use special nuclear material only in an area which is demarcated and to which access is controlled (con-trolled access area),

(2) Monitor the controlled access area to detect unauthorized .

penetrations or activities, (3) Have someone available to respond to all unauthorized penetration 5into,oractivitieswithin,the.controlledaccess area, and (4) Have response procedures for thefts and threats of theft ,

. of special nuclear material.

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P' 9EASURES FOR IMPROVING SECURITY AT NPR LICENSEES k.- -POSSESSING HEU AfW SUBJECTJTO CATEGORY II REQUIREMENTS .

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F 'The measures. listed tw1ow are the security improvements to be made by MPR g 11'censees who possess HEU materid1 and who-ere subject to Category 11 physical

{ ,

protection requirements. After e statement of each measure, there is a discus'-

sion of it, a statement of the general objective, a presentation of alterna-tives where possible, and to the extent available, a discussion of any cost or l 1mpact estimates. The first five measures are those included in the SECY's

~

memo of February 23, 1984.

1. Reduce holdings of fresh HEU fuel.

Under this measure the licensee would reduce its fresh HEU fuel holdings ,

as low as reason' ably necessary to maintain a normal operating schedule.

Licensees would normally be allowed to have more than 2 kg only for a short period of time following receipt of a fresh fuel shipment. Lower holdings will substantially reduce the likelihood that a malevolent group could accumulate a significant quantity of fresh,HEU through simultaneous thefts at multiple facilities. The current cost of a shipment of fuel is estimated at $400 and it is expected that DOE would agree to accept and store.the fuel for the licensee. -

2. Provide tamper-indicating detection systems and line-supervision. ,

Under .this measure licensees would put tamper-alarms on their intrusion -

detection systems and on the lines carrying the detection signal to an alarm station. This measure will provide an early indication that someone is attempting to n:utralize the detection system, which may be the initial step in a theft attempt. This early warning will give more time to make a response which can prevent a successful theft. Many but not all of the licensees already have supervised signal lines.

Enclosure D 9

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- insider adversary. One licensee has already insta11cd such a barrier and has ;

1

-estimated-its. coit at $10,000 to $12,000.1.This may not be a representative t

estimate for other facilities because of possible variation in the'naterials -

to be used, the size of the pool to be covered, the possible incorporation of useful design features that may already exist, and the fact that this one licensee had s'ome specially difficult design considerations. As a result of

. the possible high cost-associated with a core barrier, alternative means of impeding the removal of fuel will also be considered. Some'of these alterna-

tives are: a) locking fuel handling tools where a specially designed tool is needed that is difficult to duplicate, b) locking a crkne that is needed to remove a core cover, c) controlling access to special tools used to lock the

fuel elements into the core grid plate, and d) reliance on design features already in place sucfi as enclosed tanks or concrete plug's over the core.

- - In addition to the measures identified in the SECY's memo, the following .

l measures will also be subject to implementation ~ in the voluntary program .

and rulemaking. -

6. Detect both unauthorized entry into, and activities within, the contr611ed- .

access area.

The current Category II rule only requires that unauthorized entry or activities be detected. Under this beasure the licensee should be able to detect both such events. This will provide a defense in depth and give the opportunity to detect a theft attempt as early as possible. This will pro'v'ide a good chance that a response can be initiated which will stop the theft. In a small room a licensee may be able to use a single motion detector that will sense entry into the room as well as activities in the rec =. In a large room a licensee could use door and window alarms for entry detectica l

along with a cotion detector over the fuel to sense an attempt to access the fuel.

l Enclosure D m-- -

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Analysis of Options for Transportation of 7

t Categsry II Quantities of Material Option 1. Make no etiange in the physical security requirements. t

- This option is based on the fact that multiple thefts of more than 5 kg of HEU in transit are precluded under present regulations since no more than 4.99 kg of HEU is permitted to be on the road at any one time. Shipment schedules are controlled and approved at NRC headquarters. This option, which has tne least cost impact of the three, does not, however, prevent the multiple theft of Category II quantities of HEU if one took place at a fixed site and, at the same time, another took place during a shipment.

_ Option 2. . Upgrade transportation physical security requirements by adding measures ,

in conjunction with the fixed site security improvements.

The upgrades to the present 573.67(e) in transit requirements for phsyical protection of Category II HEU are:

o require' dedicated transports with a driver and an escort o require seals on containers and locks and seals on the cargo compartment o require in transit communications capable of requesting assistance from local law enforcement agencies (LLEA).

A preliminary analysis indicates that thest additional requirements would cost about 10 times the currently required signature service. A typical trip costs approximately $300 to $400 for signature service and $3,000 to $4,000 for dedicated truck with driver and escort, improved communications, and tamper-proofing.

A survey of 1983 Category II shipments discloses that there were approximately 33.' Exclusive-use vehicles were used in 17 of these shipments, all of which were export shipments to Japan and import shipments from Canada. Comercial carriers Enclosure E 9 ---

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t; f Accelerated Rulemaking Schedule 4-

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l Estimated Time to Complete

Prepare Draft Rule and obtain Staff Comments Completed for Category II rule (3 weeks)

ACRS Review and Prepare Commission Paper and Federal Register Notice 8 weeks _

Revise Rule and Related Documents 3 weeks Obtain ADM Review and Revise I week Staff Concurrence 1 week 2 weeks f Proposed Rule to Comission .

Commission Review of Proposed Rule (currently prepare and staff OMB Clearance Package) 4 weeks

d-

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Publish Proposed Rule 2 weeks Public Comment Period 4 weeks Revise Rule Package.and License Acceptance .

Criteria and Prepare Regulatory Analysis .- 3 weeks -

ACRS Review 8 weeks Revise Rule 2 weeks Staff Cone'urrence on Final Rule I week Final Rule tQ the Commission 2 weeks Commission Review 4 weeks ,

Publish Final Rule 2 weeks Licensees Submit Plans 4 weeks Plan Approval 2-5 weeks

This schedule will start when approved by the Comission.

Enclosure F

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

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.. APR 18 E34 :

8 1 -

9 HEMORANDUM FOR: Harol'd R. Denton, Director - -

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation I FROM: Darrell G. Eisenhut; Director Division of Licensing ~ - ,

SUBJECT:

COMMISSION PAPER ON IMPROVED PHYSICAL SECURITY

,. AT NON-POWER REACTORS .

+ .

y A February 23,' 1984. memo fron Chilk to Dircks directed the staff to prepare- a proposed rule on the use of HEU, and a plan to improve security measures at

non-power reactors using HEU fuel until such time as they can convert to LEU fuel. RES has prepared a proposed rule addressing the use of HEU, which we

, have concurred in. A Commission briefing is scheduled for April 27. KMSS also prepared a proposed rule to implement impro'ved security measures, which we enneurred in several weeks ago. However, in the interim, they revised 5 .' their approach completely in a. proposed Comissien paper delivered to us in

.- ;,: the evening on April 16 with' requested concurrence.by 3 PM April 17. The ~

' . ' , " paper is enclosed. . , ,

l

. The proposed NMSS apprcach includes a combination of activities using task-I forces composed of HMSS, NRR, IE, RES, ELD, ADM and regional staff. One task force would concurrently develop two rules on an expedited rulemaking schedule of 30 weeks, which would exclude ACRS and CRGP. review and use several other -

shortcuts. One rule would augment security at facilities subject to Category 11 requirerents and the second et facilities subject to Category I requirements.

Simultanecusly, a.second task force consisting of three teams would visit all.

31 FEU reactor sites over a period of about 5 weeks, seeking voluntary security i plan redification by the licensees. The staff would consider issuino 2.204- .

type orders to licensees who failed to. cooperate in the voluntary effort. A 4

third ' task force would review and approve the revised security plans submitted by the licensees. A Comissien briefing on the tr.SS paper which presents this '

proposec approach is scheduled for May 2.

We cannot recorrend HRR concurrence in the WSS proposal for a number of reasons which we discussed with Bob Eurnett on April 17. He understands our reservations but says that this paper reflects John Davis' interpretation of what the Com-mission wants. Our recor:. ended non-concurrence is based en the following reasons:

1) The approach is not responsive to the Chi 1k memo.of February 23, ISS' which directer' the staff to consider alternative measures, ircluding available estimatas of the t'enefits and irpacts of five specifiec i: ;revements. (A cery of the February 23, IF54 Chilk memo is included as the last enc 1csure to the proposed Co=ission paper).

i Enclosure G -

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2) The proposal prescribes very severe actions but has not identified any real problem which warrants such actions. .

3) The paper presents four implementation alternatives,"none of which '

is " ideal," and then recomends an approach which cecibines three of these four "non-ideal" alternatives.

4) Implemeritation.of the proposed plan would require substahtial staff resources which we cannot support. k'e estimate that NRR would have to comit about six senior-level staff for at least 6-9 months. .

5) The proposed schedules are unrealistically short.

5) The " voluntary" aspects of the plan appear to have serious potential .

backfit implications.

Iri simcary, we do not agree philosophically with the N!iSS proposed approach,'

nor do we have the resources to support it. We recorrrnend instead that the staff utilize the standard rulemaking process, which was originally. proposed by 17.55 and in which we previously concurred, to achiev'e the desired improve-cent of security measures at.non-power reactors using HEU.

We ,are available to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.

/. ,

Darrel . 1senhut, Director -

Divisjn f Licensing Enciosure. .

l As stated ,

l Enclosure G

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~T0: SAMUEL J. CHILx, SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION g6-FRON: CHAIRMAN PALLADINO bl

SUBJECT:

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DISAPPROVED ABSTAIN ' .

2 APPROVED lfNOTPARTICIPATING REQUEST DISCUSSION r

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COMENTS:

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' y-Subject to the attached comments. .

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SibNAIURL S /.r/t v DAlb SECRETARIAT NOTE: PLEASE ALSO RESPOND TO AND/OR COMMENT ON OGC MEMORANDUM IF ONE HAS SEEN ISSUED ON THIS PAPER.

O. A A A P 44 8 95 44 MM

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CHAIRMAN PALLADIN0'S COMMENTS

- ON SECY-84-216 .

1. I agree to consider proposed and final rules suggested by staff on p.9 with the understanding that:

a) the proposed rule will upgrade facilities subject to Category II requirements identified as items a-h on

- pp.3-4.

b) the proposed rule will also upgrade transportation requirements for shipments of fuel containing 3-4.99kg .

. with the elements under ite,m 2 on the bottom of p.5. .',.

. ;. . . 4 :. . . :. . .w .

c) the f'inal rule for Category I facilities will -

contain the elements listed as items (1) and (2) in the first paragraph of p.5.

r

2. I would prefer that the rules be developed at a reasonable pace without skipping important steps or points of coordination within the staff and accomplished within the

~

staff resources now projected to be available for the task.

In particular I believe that the staff should be given

' sufficient time to formulate the ful.1 justification and --

basis for proceeding with these rules. ,

3. I would ag.ree to directing the staff to seek information from licensees relative to the capability and necessity to implement the proposed rule. This would not seek " voluntary '

cooperation", but rather submittal of specific information. -

This should be done before the proposed rule is issued in order to aid the Commission's decision to issue the proposed

. rule.

8 9 9 9

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. RESPONSE SHER ,

TO: SAMUEdI.CH!dK,SECRETARYOFTHECOMMIS$10N

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SUBJECT:

srcy-s4-21s - szcoazrr azxsoars xx waarowra azxereas APPROVED

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~ DISAPPROVED ABSTAIN ~

I NOT PARTICIPATING"' REQUEST DISCUSSION COMMENTS:

I agree with the two track rulemaking propos~ed,in alternative four.

I, disagree with the proposed " voluntary" implementation effort. It seems to me premature to go ahead with this part of alternative four. .

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SECRETARIAT NOTE: RLEASE.ALSO. RESPOND T0.AND/OR COMMENT ON OGC/0PE

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. TO: SAMUEL-J. 'CsII.x! Sid'RETARY OF THE COMMISSION

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FROM: COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL

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SUBJECT:

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- APPROVED / DISAPPROVED ABSTAIN -

'NOT PARTICIPATING REQUEST DISCUSSION" -

. COMMENTS:

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s y SUBJECT? SECY-84-216 - SECURITY MEASURES AT NONPOWER REACTORS b

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' NOT PARTICIPATING........V... -

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MEMORANDUM IF ONE HAS BEEN ISSUED ON THIS PAPER.

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7 RES TASK LEADER EVALUATION AND RECOPNENDATION

5 l 7 ,

[ RES STAFF REVIEW SUW!ARY t

1. Review of the completeness of the Rulemaking Review Package.

a. The NRC Regulatory Agenda entry has been updated to reflect the current status of the rule.

b. The rulemaking package as it was published as a proposed rule in the Federal Register is complete except for the negative declaration for the Environmental Protection Statement. A regulatory guide which is to be included in the final package was not provided.

c. The Office Director's recomendations to the EDO concerning whether and how to continue with the rulemaking are not included. However a recommendation for the approval of continued activity on this rule 7

was stated in the cover letter dated March 14, 1985 from NMSS to the EDO.

,i

d. The sponsoring office's review, i.e., Evaluation of Rulemaking, is

complete except for explaining why the rulemaking is currently on hold.

e. The review included a copy of the Commission Paper, Federal Register Notice, Supplementary Cost / Benefit Analysis , )Infomation, and additionalRegulatory background Analysis information (including on a security measures at nonpower reactors.

2. Results of Review by the RES Task Leader.

a. The sponsoring offices Rulemaking Review Package clearly addresses the issues of the intended rulemaking, that is upgrading the physical security protection requirements at NPR's possessing fomula

, quantities of SSNM. The rulemaking will:

o replace the current interim regulations for physical security, o provide protection against insiders, and o arrange for a response by local law enforcement or other agencies in time to prevent the diversion of a formula quantity of SSNM.

b. With regard to the necessity and urgency of the ongoing rulemaking, although the necessity is made clear, the urgency is not discussed.

Presently the rule is in abeyance pending a Comission decision on what if any, additional physical security safeguards will be required of category II NPR's. Since the improvements necessary to safeguard category I NDR's are in addition to the physical protection requirements for NPR's posessing material of moderate quantity, further action on the subject rulemaking by NMSS has been deferred until the issue of category II NPR's is resolved by the Commission.

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+ c. The alternative to rulemaking discussed in the Evaluation appears to be adequate.

d. The resources needed by the licensees including the costs i were carefully evaluated in the Regulatory Analysis provided. No i more than three facilities are expected to have to implement these requirements at an estimated one time capital cost of $1,100 to

$5,100 and an annual operating cost increase of $300 to $7,900.

.. Within the range of the cost estimates, a low operating cost nomally s matches a high capital cost and vice versa.

e. The NRC's resources needed for this rulemaking are estimated at 0.4 y staff years. The final schedule will be determined after the 1 Consission takes action on the related question of physical j protection of category II NPR's.

y

3. General Comments and Reconnendation.

F

( o The need for this rulemaking to continue has been e established. The rulemaking is consistent with applicable E Policy and Planning Guidance.

o RES recommends that the rulemaking be continued as

expeditiously as possible as soon as the Comission comes to a decision on category II non-power reactor physical security requirements.

l

~~

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ML20206E964

Contents

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=====p4 strategic special nuclear pu om m.ammi ra.u.a.aa ne

Subject:

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Enclosure:

SUMMARY

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