ML20206E837
| ML20206E837 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/16/1985 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Jennifer Davis NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8606240020 | |
| Download: ML20206E837 (41) | |
Text
,
b OCT I 81985 i
MEMORANDUM FOR: John G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 4 FROM: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING i
By memorandum of February 13, 1984, " Control of NRC Rulemaking by Offices
! Reporting to the EDO," Offices were directed that effective April 1,1984, (1) all offices under EDO purview must obtain my approval to begin and/or
< continue a specific rulemaking, (2) resources were not to be expended on rule-makings that have not been approved, and (3) RES would independently review rulemaking proposals forwarded for my approval and make recommendations to me concerning whether or not and how to proceed with the rulemakings.
4 In accordance with my directive, the following proposal concerning rulemaking has been forwarded for my approval, i
Proposed revision of 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 concerning access authorization at nuclear power plants. (Sponsored by NMSS - memorandum, Minogue to E00 dated September 20,1985.)
l I approve continuation of this rulemaking. The NRC Regulatory Agenda (NUREG-0936) should be modified to reflect the status of this rulemaking.
4 %gnsd)Y2licI.Dhl4 I
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations i cc: V. Stello Distribution: ,:JHSniezek J. Roe WJDircks H. Denton VStello WSchwink i J. Taylor JPhilips JHenry R. Minogue EDO rf Central File i P. Norry DEDROGR cf f
1 8606240020 851016 I EDO RM 50 PDR i
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE . Revised by A0/ED0 10/8 and DEDROGR 10/15 ru
- DEDROGR :EDO #M : : :
0FC :*ROGR/5 :*ROGR/D
.....:..__...___..:.____.......:... _.......:.... 4 ...:.........___:.......__
NAME :WSchwink :JSniezek :VStello :WDircks :
DATE :10/4/85 :10/4/85 :10/7/85 :10/l(/85 : :
f - - - ,
D
- %g UNITED STATES
& (,2 aynk., [4 y'. 4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON j WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 W
- =
k+***/ SEP 3 01985 MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM: Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
SUBJECT:
CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING: RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW 0F ONGOING RULEMAKING SPONSORED BY NMSS Based on our independent review of ongoing rulemaking, " Access Authorization Program" (10 CFR Parts 50 and 73), sponsored by NMSS, RES recommends that this rulemaking effort should continue.
This proposed rule is a part of the Insider Rule Package, along with the Search Requirements Rule and Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants. All 3 proposed Rules were published together on August 1, 1984 for public comment because of their marked interrelationship.
The public coment period has ended as of March 7,1985 and the staff is currently analyzing the comments. The basis for our recommendation to continue this segment of the rulemaking is as follows.
The proposed rule establishes a personnel screening program that addresses four aspects of protection against an insider threat to nuclear power plant safety:
(1)backgroundinvesti observation; and, (4) support gations;measures.
(2) psychological Background assessment; (3) behavioral investigations would filter out those personnel with a record of questionable integrity or trustworthiness.
The psyctological assessment would flag tendencies not identified in background investigations such as a persods reliability and emotional stability so that persons psychologically unsuited for nuclear power plant operations could be filtered out. The behavioral observation program would detect changes in an individuals behavior pattern which could indicate a potential for comitting acts detrimental to public health and safety. The support measures would assure review of procedures, handle grandfathering, protect information, provide guidance, and address treatment of temporary workers. The proposed rule is not intended to protect against the dedicated saboteur but rather to protect against the untrustworthy or disgruntled or disoriented employee that because of their plant knowledge and access to vital safety equipment could perform an act(s) inside the plant that jeopardize public health and safety.
r William J. Dircks 2 The value of background investigations is well recognized both within and outside the nuclear industry. As for psychological testing, it too is being used by the nuclear power industry as well as many government agencies (e.g.,
NAS, CIA, FHA, Coast Guard, Los Angeles Police Department, and Maryland State Police, etc.) and other industries (e.g., AT&T, and Commercial Security Firms, etc). The final rule concurrence package has been reviewed and RES concurrence has been provided to NMSS.
Industry-run screening programs are currently in place; however, the staff notes the lack of standardization which presently exists throughout the industry in the current programs. The industry standard being used, ANSI 3.3, Security for Nuclear Power Plants, is not explicit enough and is not required to be used by all NPP licensees. Standardization of such programs through regulation allows for reciprocity in granting access authorization to a contractor, manufacturer, or vendor, based on screening conducted by another licensee, and would provide a method of accomodating temporary workers during major outag:.s icr refueling.
In addition, the fairness and effectiveness of a standardized program is reasonably assured by a mandated review procedure which ensures that an individual has the fullest opportunity to respond to and refute information that leads to a denial or revocation of an unescorted access authorization, and that the individual is protected from abuses of power and errors in judgment or interpretation on the part of licensee personnel. Furthermore, the important issues of an individual's privacy and safeguarding of confidential information are adequately addressed in the rule and its supporting regulatory guide.
Incidents involving insiders committing deliberate acts directed against plant equipment in vital areas of operating reactors exist. The NRC's Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) continuously cites incidents caused by screened personnel at reactor facilities. During the period of January - December 1984, there were 111 reported safeguards-related events, 43 of which involved an insider. Some examples of past events are as follows:
o January 3, 1984, Hatch. Three bomb threats were received during one day. After investigating the related threats, two contractor employees were fired for suspicion of making bomb threats. Subse-quently, one of the contracter persons was arrested on a felony charge of issuing a nuisance alarm, o June 30, 1982, Limerick. Smoke in the 239' elevation of the Control Building was traced to a fire in two non-safety-related cable trays located near the switch gear room. After the fire was put out, it was discovered that the cables were cut as well as burned, and the fire was determined to be a malevolent act.
- ,. r William J. Dircks 3 i
i i.
o June 5, 1981, Beaver Valley. On a routine operator tour, 3 Auxiliary
- Feedwater Pumps' manual suction isolation valves were found unchained
' and unlocked. The next day, a manual valve in the High Head Safety Injection Pumps' common suction line was found shut during a routine '
operator tour. The chains and locks that normally secure all of these valves were not found. Although these events did not result in any adverse effects on the health of the public or licensee personnel, i they did represent a major degradation of essential safety-related j equipment designed to mitigate the consequences of a major occurrence such as LOCA. Upon investigation, it was determined that the intent l- of the probable insider was to harass and embarrass the licensee.
These, and many other incidents found to be committed by screened personnel at-reactor facilities, indicate that the industry-run programs are not as effective as they were intended to be.
The Nuclear Utility Management'and Human Resource Committee (NUMARC) followed up
! their letter of public comment on the Safeguards Insider Rule dated March 7, 1985, with a presentation of their views to the Commission on
! March 20, 1985. NUMARC recommended that the proposed Access Authorization Rule be withdrawn and replaced by the issuance of a policy statement with an industry organization exercising oversight of the program. At Commission direction, the staff has been working with NUMARC personnel in an effort to develop criteria for use in the event the Commission were to approve an alternative of this nature to replace the proposed Access Authorization Rule. These criteria are presently in the developmental stage, with one or two areas still in need of l refinement. A principal area of staff concern relates to how NUMARC proposes to
! assure compliance with approved standards by member utilities. This remains to g be clarified.
- We agree with the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards' l recommendation against adoption of the NUMARC proposal and are in favor of
, publishing the rule in final form. This position is taken in the interest of
- assuring that 1) the privacy rights of individuals will 'e v protected; 2) a standardized program with appropriate oversight is implemented throughout the
- industry; 3) consideration of union views as expressed during a Consnission
- meeting on this subject on December 1,1983 will be taken; 4) for consistency, an access authorization program should remain as a regulatory requirement with direct NRC oversight as is the case with all other phases of the NRC security j program (physical protection, guard training, and contingency plans) and 5) a mechanism exists to assure prompt and effective remedial action to correct
- security program deficiencies.
i k
u 1
i
! . .-, - . - . - _ - - - _ . . - ,.-..-.- _ =
a . .
William J. Dircks 4 Comenters on the proposed rule expressed the belief that the access authorization program was redundant with the " Fitness for Duty" program. It is acknowledged that some overlap between the two programs may exist; however, the
" Fitness for Duty" program is primarily directed at individuals reporting for work under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances. These individuals should be denied access to their work place, usually for a temporary period of time. A continual behavioral observation program, as a component of the overall access authorization program, is designed to note changes in behavior patterns of a broader scope than that encompassed in the " Fitness for Duty" program.
Alternatives to rulemaking were investigated that included: 1)endorsingan ANSI standard through a regulatory guide, 2) the use of staff position papers, and 3) implementing license conditions. These alternatives were rejected because some would not produce an industry standardized program while others lacked regulatory authority.
The net increase cost per applicant and licensee in implementing the proposed requirements is estimated to be $155K initially and $348K per annum thereafter.
However, the staff believes that the net increase costs associated with these requirements for many licensees will be much less because they are presently already using similar safeguards programs (ANSI 18.17). The initial cost to the NRC due to estimated time in reviewing proposed Access Authorization Plans and enforcement activities is $510K with an estimated annual cost of $211K thereafter.
The benefit that would be derived from the Insider Rule package as a whole would be to improve the practicality and effectiveness of measures to protect against the insider threat at power reactor facilities while enhancing plant safety.
The Access Authorization portion of the Insider Rule package specifically addresses establishing a personnel screening program for increased assurance of the trustworthiness and emotional suitability of those individuals having access to protected and vital areas of a nuclear power plant.
The Director of HMSS recommended continuation of this rulemaking.
The com lete RES independent review package has been sent to OED0 (Attention:
DEDR0GR and to the Director, NMSS.
cIdNb Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Enclosure:
RES Staff Review ,
Sumary Sheet
n+' '
n , ^ ^ '
--w m,~,y,';nn,.c ,,, ,
. .g_g
..nn<; y
,.C + , ' % :: , [ * ;
k'* ,
y SN ~1M) :?qj -
y, + ' $ k' '
._[ ,1 )
1 g
y..,.- g
.+ - .
. . .. . . g o, w,y
~'
~~
n?.
+.
& &. g.
, .e ,
_y y
, ' ~3s . . }m}; , ['.,y .
_va , .
.'{i ., . -
f ~, 1 _
w p v.s
-suw.www, . .. ..
.w ,. - -
q;
.{} r}.,q.-
. x, u 4 .
L,*y.
?;
_.Q:
> , );4 ff _
f,u.;f, :., g_ . =. -
- a cr-
. - u u 73, m ;.. :. ,n - 3 y :.4 I
f? .~ s e a.M w x ,<
, . ,t ,- ,
.y
~
g_ y . .
c :~ "- ic : tr 1: s C .n. ., .g',
-, x w .. .. m.
o..w ,-
v .
m oc um. Jj p;
p :,, h 3
m + se am s w r __ _ - -
a 2 b '
per es. semen Russe Asser - . J ;j he A.au.e.d k- m =r n., ins -
- e. m a
.o n -+ w ,,,,,,,,,s- -
fcfa misser f f -_ -
p ammme
<,~r
-x , m-' <
C
_ , = .
V:
7 i cc j . < ,.
'. . d i h '.r
- ,' D .U D' i, 4-. -g g ME gg y ei.%s 9n2c. q.,
?' .
, m..g fc .
' ,.&!Q&r&MW. ' . . ' ' ']a Y w sq. m t _
{h 4 4z,t eggo 7 y g 4,s WWQ .:g cs.ges y .. m# .
p gj v . . . .
p yegw o wi :44g4$.. .sph -
s w , _v- ;.
, t' - -
g x a g,.
3
- y . . t s, %:g.a .
o v
i y r >%
o ^
"}'* .,_l so mer en.s , a e mm. . nemo.ne w - en m-0_ .I I' . 4 - ~ -
t Y*
? ,[ ,
1 ' ===
um a cm a -
u,
~e m..L.m-
O I
u nireo stares L y.f* "%,8'g , NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 3 j 1 , i
\ ..... / SD 101985 MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM: Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
SUBJECT:
CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING: RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW 0F ONG0ING RULEMAKING SPONSORED BY NMSS Based on our independent review of ongoing rulemaking, " Access Authorization Program" (10 CFR Parts 50 and 73), sponsored by NMSS, RES recomends that this rulemaking effort should continue.
This proposed rule is a part of the Insider Rule Package, along with the Search Requirements Rule and Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants. All 3 proposed Rules were published together on August 1,1984 for public coment because of their marked interrelationship.
The public coment period has ended as of March 7,1985 and the staff is currently analyzing the coments. The basis for our recomendation to continue this segment of the rulemaking is as follows.
The proposed rule establishes a personnel screening program that addresses four aspects of protection against an insider threat to nuclear power plant safety:
(1)backgroundinvesti observation; and, (4) support gations;measures.
(2) psychological Background assessment; (3) behavioral investigations would filter out those personnel with a record of questionable integrity or trustworthiness.
The psychological assessment would flag tendencies not identified in background i investigations such as a persorf s reliability and emotional stability so that persons psychologically unsuited for nuclear power plant operations could be filtered out. The behavioral observation program would detect changes in an individuals behavior pattern which could indicate a potential for comitting acts detrimental to public health and safety. The support measures would assure review of procedures, handle grandfathering, protect information, provide guidance, and address treatment of temporary workers. The proposed rule is not intended to protect against the dedicated saboteur but rather to protect against the untrustworthy or disgruntled or disoriented employee that because of their plant knowledge and access to vital safety equipment could perform an act(s) inside the plant that jeopardize public health and safety.
i l
William J. Dircks 2 The value of background investigations is well recognized both within and outside the nuclear industry. As for psychological testing, it too is being used by the nuclear power industry as well as many government agencies (e.g.,
NAS, CIA, FHA, Coast Guard, Los Angeles Police Department, and Maryland State Police, etc.) and other industries (e.g., AT&T, and Comercial Security Finns, etc). The final rule concurrence package has been reviewed and RES concurrence has been provided to NMSS.
Industry-run screening programs are currently in place; however, the staff notes the lack of standardization which presently exists throughout the industry in the current programs. The industry standard being used, ANSI 3.3, Security for Nuclear Power Plants, is not explicit enough and is not required to be used by all NPP licensees. Standardization of such programs through regulation allows for reciprocity in granting access authorization to a contractor, manufacturer, or vendor, based on screening conducted by another licensee, and would provide a method of accomodating temporary workers during major outages for refueling.
In addition, the fairness and effectiveness of a standardized program is reasonably assured by a mandated review procedure which ensures that an individual has the fullest opportunity to respond to and refute information that leads to a denial or revocation of an unescorted access authorization, and that the individual is protected from abuses of power and errors in judgment or interpretation on the part of licensee personnel. Furthermore, the important issues of an individual's privacy and safeguarding of confidential information are adequately addressed in the rule and its supporting regulatory guide.
Incidents involving insiders committing deliberate acts directed against plant equipment in vital areas of operating reactors exist. The NRC's Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) continuously cites incidents caused by screened personnel at reactor facilities. During the period of January - December 1984, there were 111 reported safeguards-related events, 43 of which involved an insider. Some examples of past events are as follows:
o January 3, 1984, Hatch. Three bomb threats were received during one day. After investigating the related threats, two contractor employees were fired for suspicion of making bomb threats. Subse-quently, one of the contractor persons was arrested on a felony charge of issuing a nuisance alarm.
o June 30, 1982, Limerick. Smoke in the 239' elevation of the Control Building was traced to a f) e in two non-safety-related cable trays located near the switch gear room. After the fire was put out, it was discovered that the cables were cut as well as burned, and the fire was determined to be a malevolent act.
l
, William J. Dircks 3 l
o June 5, 1981. Beaver Valley. On a routine operator tour 3 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps' manual suction isolation valves were found unchained I and unlocked. The next day, a manual valve in the High Head Safety :
Injection Pumps' comon suction line was found shut during a routine operator tour. The chains and locks that normally secure all of these ;
valves were not found. Although these events did not result in any adverse effects on the health of the public or licensee personnel, ;
i they did represent a major degradation of essential safety-related l
' equipment designed to mitigate the consequences of a major occurrence such as LOCA. Upon investigation, it was determined that the intent '
of the probable insider was to harass and embarrass the licensee. I i
i These, and many other incidents found to be comitted by screened personnel at i reactor facilities, indicate that the industry-run programs are not as '
effective as they were intended to be.
4 i The Nuclear Utility Management and Human Resource Comittee (NUMARC) followed up their letter of public coment on the Safeguards Insider Rule dated March 7,1985, with a presentation of their views to the Commission on 4 March 20, 1985. NUMARC recomended that the proposed Access Authorization Rule l be withdrawn and replaced by the issuance of a policy statement with an industry i i' organization exercising oversight of the program. At Comission direction, the staff has been working with NUMARC personnel in an effort to develop criteria
- for use in the event the Commission were to approve an alternative of this
- nature to replace the proposed Access Authorization Rule. These criteria are i presently in the developmental stage, with one or two areas still in need of refinement. A principal area of staff concern relates to how NUMARC proposes to assure compliance with approved standards by member utilities. This remains to be clarified. ,
We agree with the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards' recomendation against adoption of the NUMARC proposal and arein favor of publishing the rule in final form. This position is taken in the interest of assuring that 1) the privacy rights of individuals will be protected; 2) a j standardized program with appropriate oversight is implemented throughout the industry; 3) consideration of union views as expressed during a Comission meeting on this subject on December 1,1983 will be taken; 4) for consistency, an access authorization program should remain as a regulatory requirement with direct NRC oversight as is the case with all other phases of the NRC security program (physical protection, guard training, and contingency plans) and 5) a mechanism exists to assure prompt and effective remedial action to correct l security program deficiencies.
l l
i l
m .
~. .. - . w _. .
g i
\
William J. Dircks 4 Commenters on the proposed rule expressed the belief that the access authorization program was redundant with the " Fitness for Duty" program. It is acknowledged that some overlap between the two programs may exist; however, the
" Fitness for Duty" program is primarily directed at individuals reporting for work under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances. These individuals should be denied access to their work place, usually for a temporary period of time. A continual behayloral observation program, as a component of the overall access authorization program, is designed to note changes in behavior patterns of a broader scope than that encompassed in the " Fitness for Duty" program.
Alternatives to rulemaking were investigated that included: 1)endorsingan ANSI standard through a regulatory guide, 2) the use of staff position papers, and 3) implementing license conditions. These alternatives wert rejected because some would not produce an industry standardized program while others lacked regulatory authority.
l The net increase cost per applicant and licensee in implementing the proposed requirements is estimated to be $155K initially and $348K per annus thereafter.
However, the staff believes that the net increase costs associated with these
.. requirements for many licensees will be much less because they are presently already using similar safeguards programs (ANSI 18.17). The initial cost to the NRC due to estimated time in reviewing proposed Access Authorization plans and l enforcement activities is $510K with an estimated annual cost of $211K l
thereafter.
The benefit that would be derived from the Insider Rule package as a whole would be to improve the practicality and effectiveness of measures to protect against the insider threat at power reactor facilitter, while enhancing plant safety.
The Access Authorization portion of the Insider Rule package specifically ;
addresses establishing a personnel screening program for increased assurance of '
the trustworthiness and emotional suitability of those individuals having access to protected and vital areas of a nuclear power plant.
The Director of IMSS recommended continuation of this rulemaking.
The c lete RES independent review package has been sent to OEDO (Attention:
DEDROGR and to the Director, IMSS.
Originni signed by:
MhMEERE l Robert B. Minogue, Director
- Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Enclosure:
RES Staff Review DISTRIBUTION:
Summary Sheet Circ JNorberg Chron PTing RMinogue KJamgochian 1
Dross KJamgochian i j FGillespie HFSGB R/F m nr r
-> . . . . .fi 0,,,,,, ,,,SGB,@0,,,, ,,,, D/,DM,0,:R,y , ,,,, ,Q @, , , , , p, ,,,,,, ,, ,,.....
! =~W . ....".*991GB.!.DRA
. chi'". ! c PT g rg M t,,,,,, ,,,, ,,Gi l.l esp,1,s ,,,,D,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
- > .... W /.e.s... . .......al.#tas . . . . .es/.as. .... . . . . a/. . . . /.8 . . kas.... . 7s/.9/ ss. ...
. . . . 8/
,, ,,,,M,,n l n:c rec m oo..o Nac" " OFFICIAL RECORD COPY i
AUG s 0 g5 RES INDEPENDEt3 f.. _
VOTING SM; F. P. GILLESPIE, CHAIRMAN, RIRB G. A. Arlotto, Member, RIRB
- IfIE OF RULEMAKING: r r_e_a u _ v K Q C \c ce ca. bb 50 wD3 r . --7 REQUEST
' RF' Q A REE WITH RECOMENDATIONS I RES RULEMAKING REVIEW -
I
..-r-PACKAGE MODIFY RECOMENDATIONS IN .
l RES RULEMAKING REVIEW ,
PACKAGE AS INDICATED BELOW --
1ENTS AND SUGGESTIONS:
1 i
l
-- u
{
\ /
b b
l l
1
F.[5 INDEPENDE!.1 5.i'. LEV BOARD VOTINC SFtti TO: F. P. GILLESPIE, CHAIRMAN, RIRB FROM: W. M. Morrison, Member, RIRB TITLE OF RULEMAKING: Access Authorization Program (10 CFR Parts 50 and 73)
AGREE WITH RECOMMENDATIONS REQUEST RIRB IN RES RULEMAXING REVIEW. MEETING. .
PACKAGE MODIFY RECOMMENDATIONS IN NOT PARTICIPATING.
X RES RULEMAKING REVIEW PACKAGE AS INDICATED BELOW COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS:
I agree that this rulemaking should be continued, particularly at the comment resolution stage, because the issue it addresses needs to be resolved and the proposed rulemaking is an appropriate method to do so.
I have a problem with the draft Minogue to Dircks memorandum because of the following:
- a. It is too long, going into detail not appropriate for a memorandum of this type. Much of the information seems to be taken from the Comission Staff Paper,
- b. The RIRB is being asked by its ballot action to concur with the draft Minogue to Dircks memorandum, which makes detailed recomendation, '
without having the benefit of input received by coments on the proposed rulemaking. In addition,the draft memorandum says that we agree that the NUMARC proposal should not be adopted. It is not clear to me how RIRB can agree, or disagree, with this position when, per the memorandum, the staff is still working with NUMARC personnel to clarify staff concerns relating to the their proposal.
In the event that it is decided to go forward with the present draft Minogue to Dircks memorandum, editorial coments are provided on the ,
attached markup. jjf g m W. M. MORRISON MEM ER, RIRB September 10, 1985 DATE
f
\
RES INDEPENDEt;1 5,I \ IEW VOTING SHEET n- ; -
GILLESPIE, CHAIRMAN, RIRB Goller, Member, RIRB
,s_-
. ' h.' of RULEMAKING:
{\ w A s hy,h L G,T ( go ua g659 %g 33]
4 GREE WITH RECOPMENDATIONS
$ , b9f, . 'b '
-~~{ IN RES RULEMAKING REVIEW PACKAGE
, MODIFY RECOMMENDATIONS IN { NOT FAPiJr i i, RES RULEMAKING REVIEW .
PACKAGE AS INDICATED BELOW L AND SUGGESTIONS:
i m
m - ._
m.;
R I
- 1
( _ .. -- . .
I este
! ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLP
' 14k (Nemo, eSco symbed room awnber, hdtash Date tusens, Agency /reen ,
3.
W. M. Morrison, Member, RIRR ~ - - %
f g K. R. Goller, Member, RIRB g d. A. Arlotto, Member, RIRB -
4 6 -
y neuen FBe NoteandRetwn
- 2_r rerem.,ense -
Fw esmersemen no T:;__^_ f For Correction Prepare Raph Circulate For Your information See tee t _- - ^ -
toweetigste Signature P: c.. J": . - Asetik g3eAngs .
We are at step III.C.2, "RIRS deliberations " of.the RES independent review procedures for the attached specific ongoing rulemaking sponsored by Please evaluate the . attached dra'ft independent review package and provide RA!!RB with your voting sheet indicating your position on the rulemaking.
Your response by c.o.b. ,b / O will assist in RES' making' independent recomendations to the EDO in a timely manner.
90 000T use this form as a RECORD of . _ J:. eeneurrences, *M elesreness, and simier emetens FRott. (Nem arg. gmael, Agency /PeaQ Room Ms.-41ds.
[
i RAMRB staff pnene no.
i l t 443-7885
~sess.nas 41 (new. 7-m l t., -t -
. e.g. ,,,, e . ....... ....,
t
_.,___,____._.-.__,_.y- - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - , _ , . , , , , , _ _ _ , _ _ _ . . _ _ _ - _ _ . , _ _ . , _ _ _ , _ - , . _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ _ _ __
a .
RES STAFF REVIEW
SUMMARY
SHEET
- 1. Review of the completeness of the Rulemaking Review Package:
- a. The NRC Regulatory Agenda entry has been updated to reflect the most current status of the rule. :
- b. The rulemaking package as it was published in the Federal Register as ,
a proposed rule (49 FR 30726, 8/1/84) is complete.
t
- c. The sponsoring office Director's recommendation to the EDO concerning continuation with the proposed rulemaking is included.
- d. The results of the sponsoring office review (Evaluation for Rulemaking) is complete and included.
- e. A copy of the Commission paper and regulatory analysis (value/ impact statement) were complete and included in the package. Not included was the CRGR package. However, since the rule has already been published in proposed form, the CRGR had previously reviewed the package and their recommendations were addressed in the Commission paper.
- f. No summary sheets, forms, or other documentation were requested by OEDO or "others" to assist in their review of the rulemaking.
Therefore, no such items were included in the review package.
l
a . - . _ . - -
q --- . - - -
. 2
, 2. Results of Review by the RES Task Leader:
- a. The proposed rule package clearly addresses the problems to be clarifjed. .
- b. The necessity and urgency of the proposed rulemaking are reasonable as presented in the package. The proposed rule is needed to establish a personnel screening and behavioral observation program for individuals requiring unescorted reactor facility access, thus providing increased assurance of the trustworthiness and emotional stability of a reactor site population. The proposed rule is an integral part of the Insider Rule Package which was published for public coment on August 1,1984. ,
- c. The alternatives to rulemaking stated in the rule package appear to be reasonable.
- d. The following issues are addressed through this rulemaking and appear to be sound: A personnel screening program for licensee employees and 1 contractor personnel to include 1) background investigations to look for past behavior that would indicate that the individual is unreliable or untrustworthy, 2) a psychological assessment requirement
! consisting of written personality tests and a clinical interview by a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist for those whose test results are inconclusive or indicate abnonnal personality traits, and 3) a continual behavioral observation program designed to detect changes in an individual's behavior pattern which indicates a potential for comitting acts detrimental to the public health and safety, and 4) support measures such as review procedures, grandfathering, protection of information, guidance, and treatment of temporary workers.
- e. The value/ impact analysis contained in the proposed rule package adequately addressed the impact to the public, industry, and NRC, including benefits and costs.
- f. The NRC resources and scheduling needed for this proposed rulemaking were analyzed and judged to be reasonable.
3
- 3. General Coments and Recomendations:
- a. The subject actions are intended to establish a personnel screening and behavioral observation program for individuals requiring ,
ur. escorted reactor facility access, thus providing increased assurance of the trustworthiness and emotional stability of a reactor site population. Benefits to the NRC result from the use of a codified program that assures that a uniform approach, meeting minimum requirements, will be applied in screening reactor personnel.
- b. It is recommended that this proposed rulemaking should proceed. The staff is currently analyzing public comments received on the proposed regulation, and any modifications to this rule would be a result of incorporating needed changes.
l l
l s
i I
("
- .*
- e
, % j c m., ,. . . . . . . . . . . . - .. as.. ,. o .s . o . 66:. w - 2 . %. . . t . ,- D . - -
)
..** M M,44*.*
. ."
- b ". - - ' ^ ^ .w - * .w F
OFFICE REVIEW PACKAGE RECEIVED FROM NHSS
- e I
N f e- }
~
me.
8
! UNITE D STATES -
3 .
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,' . wasumotow. o. c. zosas ,
O 5 5 15 MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM: John G. Davis. Director '
. Offi f Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
SUBJECT:
. TEP.LY RULEMAKING REVIEW -- ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM The enclosed review package is provided to you for use when reviewing the rulemaking for the proposed " Access Authorization Program." The content of this rulemaking has been reviewed by the Comission and approved for publication for public coment as part of the Insider '
Safeguards Rules package. (The coment period ended March 7,1985.) -
~~
The staff continues to support the Insider Safeguards Rules. including the proposed " Access Authorization Program." When all public coments have been analyzed, the final rule will be drafted and forwarded to the Comission for action.
l ' John G. Davis. Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and-Safeguards
Enclosure:
EDO-Directed Review Pkg
..' . _
- e.- - - ^ a*= ** - - - ' " ^ -._
^. N
. . m.e. .4.
. i. .
e e
h h h HMSS TASK LEADER EVALUATION
, . . ~ -
L:.-..<.-
-. . s..e ~. s a l y w w & = k~ a. . 4...W %.
4 .
FINDINGS OF 0FFICE REVIEW -
'. PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM ,
A. The issue to be addressed; problem to be corrected.
Study has indicated that disortanted/ disgruntled employees at nuclear reactors are of primary safeguards concern because of their inside position. The goal-oriented, technically sophisticated, disoriented /
disgruntled employee, particularly the psychotic, is difficult to protect against. This proposed rule would establish a personnel -
screening program for individuals requiring unescorted reactor facility access, thus providing increased assurance of the trustworthiness and emotional stability of a reactor site population.
B. Tne necessity and urgency of addressing the problem.
Knile the Commission has stated that at present it is satis ~fied with the level of safeguards in place at reactors, it approved publication of the proposed rule for public coment (49 FR 30726) as one means of further assuring protection of public health and safety. The public coment period concluded March 7,1985 and coninents received are now :
under analysis.
l
~
C. Alternativestorulemaking.
Alternatives to rulemaking were investigated that included: 1) endorsing an AN U standard thenunh a renulatnry_guido; 2) the pen _gf etaff nneitjan papers, and 3) implementation of licensing conditions. These alternatives were rejected because some would not produce an industry standardized program while others lack regulatory authority.
D. How the issue will be addressed through rulemaking.
. 'The proposed regulation will protect against the " insider" threat at reactors through the use of three components: 1) a background investigation to detemine past history, 2) a psychological assessment to determine current emotional stability and 3) a continual behavioral observation program to detect behavioral changes in an individual once granted unescorted access. ,
E. How the public, industry, and NRC will be affected by the rulemaking.
Primary benefit to the public and licensees is an increased assurance of '
~
the trustworthiness and emotional suitability of individuah working in a .
nuclear reactor environment. Benefits to the NRC result from the use of .
a codefied program that assures that a unifom approach, meeting minimum 2 requirements, will be applied in screening reactor personnel. The net -
increase cost per applicant and licensee in implementing this requirement
,is estimated to be $155K initially and $348K per annum thereafter. The net increase initial cost to the NRC due. to estimated time in reviewing proposed Access Authorization Plans and enforcement activities is $510K with an estimated . annual cost impact of $211K.
- - e .
t . .
Access Authorization Program .
F. Schedule NPRM: 0/01/84 NPRM Coment Period End: 03/07/85 Finai Action: 09/85 ,
9 9
- e e
O 9
9 0
O e
e 9
i .
e o
e e
G e
e
t'
.. , s ...
. - . . _ . . ..; .l . .
'. % . . - . . , . . . . . . . . . . , u e
e RULEMAKING AS CURRENTLY PROPOSED (TEXT OF FINAL RULE NOT YET DEVELOPED; COP 94ENTS RECEIVED NOW UNDER ANALYSIS)
g,-. . ;--.... L,. . 4,w .;.f. . y .m .; , . .
]
\
l TITLE .
Access Authorization Program (part of Insider Safeguards Rules)
CFR CITATION:
10 CFR Part 50; 10 CFR Part 73 ABSTRACT:' l Study has indicated that disoriented / disgruntled employees at nuclear reactors I are of primary safeguards concern because of their inside position. The goal-oriented, technically sophisticated, disoriented / disgruntled employee, parti -
cularly the psychotic, is difficult to protect against. The proposed rule would establish a personnel screening program for individuals requiring unescorted reactor facility access, thus providing increased assurance of the trustworthiness and emotional stability of a reacto. site population. While the Commission has stated that at present it is satisfied with the level of safeguards in place at reactors, it approved publication of the proposed rule for public coment (49 FR 30726) as one means of further assuring protection of public health and safety. The public coment period concluded March 7,1985 and coments received are now under analysis. Alternatives to rulemaking were investigated that included: 1) endorsing an ANSI standard through 4 regulatory guide, 2) the use of staff position papers, and 3) implementing license conditions. These alternatives were rejected because some would not produce an industry standardized program while others lack regulatory authority. The proposed regulation will protect against the " insider" threat at reactors through the use of three components: 1) a back-ground investigation to determine past history, 2) a psychological assessment to u determine current emotional stability and 3) a continual behavioral observation i program to detect behavioral changes in an individual once granted unesc'crted access.
Primary benefit to the public and licensees is an increased assurance of the trustworthiness and emotional suitability of individuals working in a nuclear reactor environment. Benefits to the NRC result from the use of a codified program that assures that a uniform approach, meeting minimum requirements, will be applied in screening reactor personnel. The~ net increase cost per applicant and licensee in' implementing this requirement is estimated to be $155K initially and $348K per annum thereafter. The net increase initial cost to the NRC due to estimated time in reviewing proposed Access Authorization Plans and enforcement activities is
$510K with an estimated annual cost impact of $211K.
TIMETABLE:
NPRM: 08/01/84
.NPRM Coment Period End: 03/07/85 Final Action: 09/85 ,
LEGAL AUTHORITY l 42 USC 2201; 42 USC 5841 l EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESS AND OTHER ENTITIES: No ,
i AGENCY CONTACT: 0 Priscilla A. Dwyer 0ffice gf Nucleagateri{ Safety aQSafeauards
c
. .. .. . . , . s. s.-->=-
_l___,_._.---
- a. .. -
y---_p.,-
- s .
i
- July 29, 1983 " '
,s ". . .
' ; SECT-83-311
-s.i : ,
' ,2 :: :M .'. . ; .5 f,or: The Commissioners fede: William J. Otrcks -
~
s -
Executive Director for Cperations Subiect: PROPOSED INSIDER SAFEGUARDS RULES Purcose:
To present for Cosaission consideration, three related rulemaking actions concerning revised requirements for safeguarding pow;r
" reactors. One of the rulemaking actions, the Access ~
' Authorization Rule, was prepared in response to Commission direction in a memorandum to the Acting EDO from the Secretary dated June 30, 1980.
i Discussion: This paper covers proposed rules in three areas related to safe-guards requirements for power reactors. These are: .
g o Access Authorization Rule (Screening Requirements) a c.wh e-. .e. m - _ .. . m . s. n._
v
-,,,,,m, ..awy .
o r Miscellaneous Safeguards-Related Amendments (Access Controls, Vital Area Designation, etc.) .
This rule package was studied by a multi-office Safety / Safeguards Committee which was formed in response to the Chairman's request -
of August 16, 1982. The Committaa had the overall task of study- .
e o
ing power reactor safeguards requirsments and practices to datar-e mine whether actual or potential conflicts exist with plant safety objectives. The Committae's recommendations have been ac-n==ntiated in this package.
Contacts:
T. R. Allen or .
H. S. 81umenthal, SGPR -
42-74010 K. Z. Jangochian or W. C. Floyd, RES 44-35976 ..,. . ae..- %- - ! i
e l
- 3. -
i - - "~
__ ...s......--- -
- ^-
~
e, e -
The Commissioners 2
.j -
.i ' .
,! *~
} Access Authori ation Rule J
This proposed rule would establish a personnel screening program q for licensee employees and contractor personnel.
j j to provide increased assurance of trustworthiness. It is designed are provided in Enclosure A. Key elements of the program Further details are:
Ll e Background Investigations to look for past behavior that o would indicate that the individual is unrettable or untrustworthy..
o L! - A Continual Behavioral Observation Progras designed to detect
!, changes in an individual's behavior pattern which indicates a potential for committing acts detrimental to the public health 3 ' and safety. (On June 24, 1982, the Commission approved
. publishing for public comment a complementary rule concern-ing " fitness for duty." That program will also depend on -
behavioral observation.)
o Support seasures such as review procedures, grandfathering,
- protection of information, guidance, and treatment of temporary workers.
l- A Hearing Board established in 1978 to examine the issue et 'l access authorization later recommended that the Commission include i psychological programs. assessment as a component of personnel screefing In developing this rulet h a n e. + % staff hf0. 11 ,
7 sougnT. T.no opinions of various authorities concerning the value of psychological assessment for precicting behavior inimical to
~
the public health and safety. Because of the wide variety of opinions expressed, the staff proposes to solicit further public comment on this issue in the Supplementary Information accompany -
ing the rule rather than proposing specific requirements at this time." .
Search Recuirements Rule This amendment would clarify the role of pat-down searches as a safeguards asasure to be used only for suspicion or malfunction of search equipment and would complete outstanding action on industry petitions which have been pending since 1977. Although this rule has been previously published as a proposed rule in
. 1980, it appears appropriate to republish it (along with the i other related rules) for a second round of public comment in '
light of the Safety / Safeguards Committee's findings that most
. "The office of Policy Evaluation advises that the NRC contractor who provided the study on the behavioral observation program states a revised program would be '
necessary if psychological assessment is not required. The staff plans to consider this position along with public co==ents when received. -
I
+
L :
g
- - n
(
[_ _ . _ _ __ __ . L- m . *S* ^ i _*. E - > L_A , _ .C - - . .. ,
., e.
The Commissioners .
3 3 .
1 i licenbeshavesuccessfullyadjustedto100".equipmentsearche and believe that changing to random sea,rches would be disruptive. ,
]
1 Miscellaneous Safecuerds-Related Amendments 4
These proposed Key features are: changes are discussed in detail in Enclosure C.
a 1 *
, o .
This would result in a reduction in the number o .
areas at most'sitas by grouping and protecting selected *
, Items of vital equipment in fewer vital areas. *
" would be enhanced through fewer access control points. Safety o
Improved provisions for vital equi during both routine and emergency conditions.ont accass
- control .
- o
...i Provision for licensees to have the authority to suspend safeguards measures to facilitate response to emergency i conditions. ;i 3
o Revised changes. critaria for detarsining the need for lock and key !I i
Locks and keys would be changed annually, upon suspicion ,of compromise, or wtjen an individual tarsinatas .ii egioyment under unfavorable circumsta,nces. i
- I, ,
i CRGR Recommendation - * . -
i The CRGR has recosutended publication of the proposed rule; how i it believes that public commen should be sought on the use of a government-operated clearance program similar to that prescribed y in 10 CFR proposed Part 11 for "Q"screening industry-administered clearances as an alternative to the program.
The CRGR suggested that government clearances would provide increased l
. assurance of trustworthiness, thereby permitting a reduction in . i access controls and other security measures. [
The issue tif an industry operated program versus a government-
! operated program was previously consicerad by a Hearing Board i convened at the Commission's direction and in detail by the Commission itself. .The Hearing Board recommended a private
- sector program such as proposed in the attachment. ,
The Ccomission recognized that controversy existed concerning its authority under ^
section 161(1)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act to require government clearances for individuals working at power reactors (CLI-80-37), I 12 NRC 528, 536, footnote 18 (1980). While the staff believed that such authority existad, the Office of General Counsel advised that the better legal view was that section 161(1)(2) could not I be read broadly enough to consider the sabotage of light water reactors as constituting a threat to the national security, l
. . . . .-..--.: . ~ -a . . . - . . . . - . - _ - . .
x =. . .:v. w
)
v o- . .
2 . . .
e .
The Commissioners 4 '
e thereby not permitting the use of a government-administered .
clearance program (OGC legal opinion, September 11, Ig7g). It may be that the Commission will wish to' reconsider this issue at this time.
Value/Isoact .
3 This rulemaking package is designed to improve the practicality and effectiveness of measures to protect against the insider threat at power reactor facilities while enhancing plant safety.
3 The staff believes that costs. associated with these changes can
- be minimized because many reactor licensees are either presently using similar safeguards programs (e.g., personnel background screening under AN3118.17) or can accommodate the proposed ,
a amendments (e.g., re-configuration of the interior layout of ,
their plants to protect vital safety equipment under the " vital 1sland" approach) without undue expense. ."
^
a
- The enclosures indicate that costs to the Itcensee of these amend-ments will be approximately 31.7M per site on an initial basis
- with annual maintenance cost of $300K. It will initially cost l
new plants, which receive their operating license after the effec-tive date of this rule, approximately $603K to screen their .
i employees'with the same annual maintenance cost as existing plants. These expenditures are partially offset by cost savings
' associated with licensees estabitshing a reciprocity program for personnel sc_reerting_And rarfurarf hay-and-4eck-eentrol . 41. _..u.
5a reductions are estimated to reduce the cost to each site by approximately $200K per year. Costs to the NRC are estimated at
- c 5760K in staff time initially with annual maintenance approximat-ing 5170K. It is anticipated that no occupational radiation
- i. exposure will be associated with taplementation of this proposed rule package. -
l W relationshis As previously stated, these proposed rule changes are presented together because of their marked interrelationship. Any major i
changes to the principal components of the proposed access
' authorization program could tapact the proposal to relax require-ments for lock and key controls and other current requirements. .-
f Recomendations: That the Commission: ,
- 1. Aooreve the amendments as set forth in Enclosures A, 8, and C for pubitcation as proposed rules in the Federal Register, with a go-day pubite comment period. .
4
\
i
9 . . . . - - a-. -- -- . - . - - -... .. - -
_y e
)
The Commissionars , 5 2.
I'n order to satisfy the requirements of the Regulatory *
.. . Flaxibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b),. certify that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entitles. This certification is included !
in the A, sures enclosed Federal Register notices contained in Enclo-8, and C.
, 3.* Note: -
a.
. That the staff will revise the supplemental informa. tion '
of the Access Authorization Rule as necessary and
- l appropriate to reflect any of the Commission's instruc-tions pertaining to the question of a government run .
clearance program for power reactors resulting from the Commission's review of this proposal. .
D.
- That the value/ impact statements which appear as attach- .
ments to Enclosures A, 8, and C will be placed in the i NRC Public Document Room. '
- c. That draft guidance saterials for the enclosed rule- I making actions will be made publicly available concur- i' rently with publication of these amendments (Attach- - '
- ment'2 to Enclosures A and c). . -
- . Lt. , in accor6 Fce with 10 CFR 51.5(o)(3), neither t l environmental impact statements nor negative declara- '
tions need'be prepared since the proposed amendments are not significant frca the standpoint of environ- ,
mental impact. i l
- e. :
That these amendments contain information collection- l and reporting requirements that are subject to review . ;
by the Office of Management and Budget. Upon Commis-sion affirmation, formal request for GMB review and
- l clearance will be initiated. OMB review may take 50-90 days from the date of publication in the Federal
' Register. If approval is denied by OM8, the Commis-sion will be notified. ,
f.
That appropriate Congressional Cos:mittees will be
- a advised of these actions (see drafts provided as attach- !
ments to Enclosures A, 8, and C). .
i
- g. That pubite announcements will be issued (see drafts ;}
provided as attachments to Enclosures A, 8, and C.). Jj
- h. That copies of the Federal Register notices will be distributed by ADM:TIOC to all affected licensees and other interested persons.
-e
\'~*_,'*~'*~
- . . .. . - . ~ - - - - - ~ ~ ~ - - - -*
C.,,, __ + .
.~~.
The Commissioners , E .
~ .
1.
That the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Sea 11
- ^ Business Administration will be informed of the certification and the reasons for it as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
Scheduline:
The. staff requests scheduling at an early policy session.
- ~
- W D *
~
Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
A - Access Authorization Rule 3 - Search Requirements Rule ~
i
' C -:Miscellaneous Related Amendments to the Office of the Secretary by c.c.b. Aucust Friday,Commaissione 26, 1983.
Comunission to the cometissioners staff Office NLT comunents, Friday, August if any, should be submitted . ,
nation copy to the Office of the secretary.19, 1983, with an infor-If the w ef
' such a __ nature _that-it moires adalu.onal time for analytical review and ofcomment, the Casunissioners and the secretariat should k l be apprised when comunents may be expected. r DISTRIBUTImt:
Coennissioners -
CGC .
QPE -
OIA opA EEGICBAL OFFICES . '
EDO ELD -
ACES ASLBP .
ASL&P
- e
=+
- . e. % *. .. .ma .. . . * * *.**
4 -
)
e e
9 e i.
e e.o 7
b s
- ) o." e 5
5 O as
- s
- e t
4 g .
t .,
i
. t
/ . .' o .
. o 5*
ENCLOS'JRE A ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE .
9 k
O e
-e
y -_ . -
p
= =_ = .-
4 9 ACCESS AUTHORI2ATION RULE BACXGROUND
/
In March 1977 the staff proposed a rule requ1Mng an access authorization r program for individuals having unescorted access to or control over special nuclear antarial. The Commission referred the matter to a Hearing Board which recommended rule development incorporating standards more specific than those
! contained in ANSI N18.17, the industrial standard for security of power plants.
j The Hearing Board's recommendation forms the basis for this proposed rule (Attachment 1).
The proposed program would be administered by industry. It is designed to reduce the possibility of malevolent acts endangering the public health and safety.
4
- SCOPE OF PROGRAM
- Sackcround Investioations - These are designed to determine an individual's -
o trustwortniness througn inquiries into his past history. It requires, as a minis m , that the licensee investigate an individual's past employment, educa-tion, charactar, vidual's identity.militan, credit, and cMainal history" and veMfy the indi-5 year period. It is also recommended that investigations cover the past 1
Continual Sahavioral Observation - This feature would provide increased assur- -
ance that personnel remain trustworthy and reliable. Licensee and contractor supervisors would be specially trdad 'a eM er.;;n i . ;,.i..w ier pav.arns
=nicn coula lead to acts detMeental to the pubife health and safety.
RELATED FEAT 1JRES Protected Areas vs. Vital _ Areas (Vital Islands) - Licensees indicate that most personnel grantaa access to protectec areas also require access to vital areas, or islands. Therefore, the staff has proposed the same screening requirements "
for unesesrted access to protected areas and vital islands. -
"Several options are being considered ta help licensees obtain criminal history information. The staff is developing draft legislation that would provide for the direct transfer of criminal history information from the FBI to Ifconsees.
Failing passage of this or similar legislation, the NRC Division of Security could receive input on the existanca of cMainal history information at the .
FBI, notifying licensees when no record exists. Wen a record does exist, the "
licensee could be advised through guidance to obtain additional background data on the incividual through stata agencies, additional reference checks, etc. If the Division of Security handles criminal history checks in this fasnion, addi-tional staff resources amounting to s.6 man years per year would be required.
! 06/16/83 1 Enclosure A r
- t. * '
. . ..m. m
= .,,
- .e-.i.
m=--- w w~* "~~ *~-~'~~-". '"' *** **
.. s EllE_Al$1 ' .
Draft guidince (Attacheent 2) has been developed for issuance for public caement concurrent with the publication of the proposed rule.
Attachments' I 1 - Feders) Recister Motica I 2 - Draft Guisance 3 - Value Impact Statement 4 - Draft Pelic Announcament 5 - Draft Congressional Latter 6 - Supporting Statement for Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements ,
l
- I l .
t 06/15/83 3 Enclosure A
-, -,w-
4
. o ,
so73s Federal Register / Vol. 49. No.149 / Wednesday. Aug.tst 1.19N / Proposed Ru NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSCN the Commission may be examined and copied for a fee la the Co=missica's
. 10 CFR parts 50 and 73 Public DocumentDC. Room at 1717 H Street NW., Washington.
- Accesa Authortaation Prograrn ~
'O" 'U"T"88 808"'T'0" C0"fACTt Ac oscy: Nuclear Regulatory ' Tom R. Allen. Chief. Regulatory Cocunisalon. Activities Section. or Henry S.
ACTioet Proposed rule. Blumenthal III. Division of Safeguards.
OfEce of Nudear MaterialSafety and suessaARY:The Nuclear Regulatory Safeguards. US Nudear Regulatory
&=mbsion (NRC)is propoeng Commission. Washington DC20555.
amendments to its agulations which telephone (302) 427-4010: or for would re nire an access authorization information of a legal nature. Robert I.
program orindividuals seeking Fonner. 05ce of the Executive Legal maescorted access to protected areas Director. US Nucleat Regulatory and vitalislands at nuclear power Commission. Washington, DC 20555, plants. Nse amendments represent the telephone (301) 4s2-4002.
culminadon of several years of supet.ansDf7ARY BspoRt4ATlcst development which included publication of an earlier proposed rule: public Background hearings: the establishment and recommendations'of a He Board. NRC published propo(sed amend:nent which received additional o and to its regulations which would establish written communications regardag the an access authorization program for proposed rule: and the establishment and recommendations of the NRC ladividuals who have unescorted access to or control over special nuclear Safety / Safeguards Review Committee.
Adoption of the proposed amendments, material. Written comments were invited and received. On December 28, which will affect all nuclear power plant 1977 (42 FR 64703), the Commission ba-es, will result in increased issued a notice of public hearing on the assurance of the trustworthiness of propcsed regulations and subsequently licensee em personnel, ployees and contractor established a Hearing Board to gather additional testimony. A final rule, based oAtum The comment period expires upon recommendations of the Hearing Friday. De<==h- 7.19s4. r'a--ts Board regardmg only fuel cyclefactlitias W-deheHbie t W 4 be und transportation, was published in to considered ifit is practical to do so, but CFR Parts II,50. and 70 on November assurance of consideration cannot be 21.1980 (45 FR 75968). .
given except as to comments received on or before this data. As a result ofinformation gathered at the public hearing andits own
""* Interested persons are examination of the 1977 prcposed access invited to submit written comments and authorization program, the Hearing suggestions on the proposed rule and/or Board made recommendations in its
- the supporting value/ impact analysis to April 1979 report to the Commission, the Secretary of the Commission. UA Nuclear Regu! story Commtssion, concerning future personnel sc eening requirements applicable to nuclear Washington.DC20655 Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch, power reactors (" Authority for Access to or Centrol Over SpecialNuclear Comments may also be delivered to Material"(RM50 7). Copies may be Room 1121.1717 H Street NW obtained from the Secretary of the Washington DC.between 4:15 a.m. and Commission. US Nuclear Regulatory 5:00 p.m. Single copies of the value/ Commission. Washington. DC 20655).
Impact analysis may be obtained on request from Kristina Z. Jamgochian, The Board's recom:nendations are summarized as follows:
Human Factors and Safeguards Branch.
Division of Risk Analysis and 1.That the Commission determine. If Operations. OfBee of Nuclear it adopts a full. field background Regulatory Research. US Nuclear investigation program, whether it is required bylaw to use 0 CFR Part to Regulatory Commission. Washington.
DC 20555 telephone (3c1) 443-7as7 Department of Energy derogatory-Single copies of draft guidance material Information cnteria. Further legal may be obtained from U1 Nuclear analysis resulted in the conclusion that Regulatory CWaion. Washington. the NRC has statutory authonty to establish different enteria from these DC 20555. Attention: Director. Division used by the Department of Energy for of Technical lnformation and Document access authcrization (see Comnussion Control. Copies of the value/ impact analysis and of comments received by Decision C1J-oo-37.12 NRC 528. 535 fn is (1980]).
= . - - .-
- ^
_ w .,as -. . . . a L' - . ~ ~ . ~ R- g
- %.?
..w-Federal Resister / Vol 49. No.149 / Wednesday. August 1.1964 / Proposed Rules 30727 a.ht the derogatory information stated that the record of b decision for time period is consistent with erit;ris contained in to CFR 10.11(b);6). , this proposed rule willinchide the Department of Defense requirements.
-(b)(8) and (b)(9) not be adopted in their Hearing Board s repsrt as it related to present form. De second or subsequent licensee will power reactors and the record compiled be regmrod to secum from the original
- 3. mt any future access - in the hearing on which the Board relied catherization rule for nuclear power licensee a photogroph of the individual forits recommendation on nuclear along with certi$ cation that the seact:rs not utilise the securtly power reactor access authorization.
background investigation system. Indindual has been screened and Consistent with the Hearing Board cunently holds a valid unescorted criteria, or staNs now existing at the recommendations and its opinion. the Department of Defense or the Co==inaion is proposing to amend to access authorization in accordance with Department of Energy. the requirements of the proposed rule.
CFR Parts 50 and 73 to establish new Temporary employees like permanent 4.ht personnel screening to ensure employee suitability and requirements for an access authorization employees will be subject to the program for those individuals requiring behavioral observation program. In trustworthiness at suc: ear power plants unescorted access to protected areas
, be done by the private sector. and vital talands at nuclear power those cases where an unescorted access '
, 5 bt the NRClasse a rule,in lieu of plants and to make minor conforming authorization is not obtained or granted.
t seeking a revised American National the licensee is requimd to escort the amendments not previously made. It is individual as provided in I 73.55.
Standards Institute Standard N14.17 anticipeted that no occupational
'1ndustnal Security for Nuclear Power exposure willbe associated with DGring cold shutdown or refueling Plants" (ANSI N18.17), to set speciSc operations, h licensee would not be
' haplementation of this proposed rule. required to meet the access standards for the conduct of screening h licensee will be required to submit programs by licensees and prescribe the authorization requirements of the for Commission approval an Access - proposed rule forindividuals if:
minimum components of an hvestigation - Authorization Plan describing how the requirements of this rule will be met. (1) De requirements of 173.55 remain s.nat the C consider conducting ggo,c Rese proposed mquirements will National Agency Qiecia (NACs)on all consist of three major industry-run (2) Prict to start up, a thorough visual cpplicants on a reimbursable basis. inspection of the afected protected 7.nat a lheurs screening rule contain: components: background logical assessmentinvestigation.
and continual areas and vital talands is made by (2) A requirement for abackground havioral observation programs licensee personnel who normally work investigation of the personal and in those amas to identify signs of employment history of the applicant. - Temporary Workers tamperms or aabotage: and including any criminalhistory I83 Armyn.te safety start.up hformanoer no Commission recosmses that temporary workers represent a unique procedures are followed to assure that (b) A requirement ler a psychological problem in regard to granting and then alloperetirg and safety systems ase screening program, wisch should functioning normaHy.
transfumns to other sites their helnde as a minimeme a written unescorted access authorization.h De Commission believes that this psychological test, an hterview by a proposed rule speciSes how procedure wiD provide adequate pophologist with ariy manufacturern, ennerartan= ar
^
W ~vFpossible equipment suppliers may obtain
."" " a= =4ha N eed safety and be cost.eNective for emotionalproblems and a system for unescorted access authorization. licensees.
continued observation by supervisors: -
Specifically, the licensee may prepan De proposed rule also addressas (c) A requirement for an appeal and include a generic plan in the Access procedure,which could be through an individuals who have received their Anthorization Program Plan which i bdustry management system or to a unescorted access authorization to contractors.manufactuars orsuppliers protected areas and vital islands prior to
! central NRC office: and would use to screen and observe their the efective date of this rule.Rese (d) A requirement for protecting employees. De licensee would still be information and personalpervacy by individuals are Act required to undergo responsible for granting. denying, or either a beckground investigetion or i
prescribing spec Sc privacy revoking the eccess authorization to psychological assessment, but are i requirements for allpeyA91 6.e individuals based on results of the subject to the believiorn] observation
! Personal. or derogatory information in contractors'. manufacturers', or requirements.
I an individual's Sle. suppliers' findings or observations. In l pg,,,,g p ,A addition. the licensee would be Background lavendgedon i responsible for auditing all licensee-On June 24.1980.these De proposed background secommendations were accepted by the acceoted contractor manufacturer or investigation regarements establish supplier administered programs to minimum areas of background i Commuasion and have provided the basis for this proposed personnel determine compatibility with the investigation which are designed to requirements of this rule. Alternatively. provide a basis for determining an
. Access Authorization Raia.no the licensee may scnen and grant l Comunission has also lessed a Anal individual's trustworthiness and anescorted access authorization to aliability. His program would be opinion in the rulemaidas proceeding i NRC 528 (1980)), adopting the major contractors (12 employees of manufacturers, industry admmistered. A Regulstory
- or suppliers directly. Once Cuide is also being published for public recomunandations of the Hearms Board an employee is granted unescorted comment which proddes guidance on I with respect to nuclear power reactors. access authorization by a licensee, a
' with a specinc prohibition. bowever. the scope of the background second or subsequent licensee may then investigation criteria that can be used i cgainst the promulgation of a rule that grant unescorted access authorization to by the licensee to determine an
' would infrmge upon ancindividual's right this same individual provided that the - individual's history of trustworthiness cf free speech. association. and privacy individual's employment under the and reliability. nis guidance closely l protected by the First Amendment to the Access Authorization Plan has not been parallels the proposed ANSINis.17 i Conettution.nar ' ""r also interrupted for more than 365 days. nis standard. dated December 1980.
. _ . 4 A.,. . . . . -
- 3072s Federal Register / Vol. 49. No.149 / Wednesday. August 1.1984 / Proposed Rules I
, For inquiry into an individual's true arising later that may have a bearing on determination whether referral of b identity, military history, educational their scruned status (e g a subsequent individual to competent medical
, history, and character, the Commission conviction). authorities with suspension of the considers that the retrospective period
- individual's unescorted access of examination should be sufficient to y,ygggge,g %,,,,, -
authorization is warranted. lf a assure that the investigation is adequate~
D* prop 08ed Psychological supervisor helleves that an individual's -
for C;aking the necessary assessment requirement consists of two actions rep esent an imminent potential det:rminations. ANSIN18.17 basic components:(1) Written danger to the public health and safety, di5erentiates between the retrospective personali tests, and (2) a clinical the supervisor has the authority to -
background investigative time period interview y a qualified psychologist or immediately suspend the individual's required for a protected area Psychiatrist for individuals whose unescorted access authorization on a i cuthorization and for a vital area Persona"lity test results are elbr temporary basis and then refer the l authorization. A two-year retrospective inconclusive orindicate abnormal individual to the licensee management l background investigation of previous Pesonality traits. This is consistent with official responsible for the access empl:yment, education. credit. and the acommendations of the Hearica authorization program: and I criminal history is recommended for a Board 3.ne decision by the licensee tected area authorisation while a Personality tests are frequently used management on whether to suspend an ve-year retrospective investigation of in employment settings in order to
- Provide information regardmg an individd's unescorted access these same types of histories is . ubrizadon 2 ads power plut recommended for a vital area individual e ps chological and interpersonal aracteristics. Clinical protected areas and vitalislands. He cabrisadon.N Comminion is proposed Regulatory Guide suppcrting recommending in supporting guidanca, laterv ews serve as a means of profes}sionally evalua the results of &is rdemahng actbn dearly indicata i for both protected and vital area (vital that this decision may be revised after a taland) authorizadon a five-year the personality tests, se ering further inf rmation on an individual a consultation between the licensee and a retrospective time frame for establishing qualified medical person.
emp!:yment. credit. educational, and - a behjo g abg,and
,g boe De proposed Regulatory Guide criminal histwinEs, approach is recommends and provides guidance for
(
based en the Commiss3on's belief that behavior.The proposed rule requires the trauung of supervisors to detect l them would be no signdicant difference ht & dWW hdm' who mquired,be done by a qu lified and if certain behavioral changes in an la maource impact to the Bcensa individual which could possibly lead to l betwun se two pmgrams. N applicable. state-licensed psychologist or psychiatrist. The use of a qualified actions detrimental to the public health Comunission has determined. based on and safety.His guide also recommends infamalindustry input. &at &e fusional will hel that majority oflicensa employees require
[ividualis not subfe t an arbitrary that the licensee establish procedures for makin individuals aware of the access to both the protected areas and vitalislands of the site. Public Cantinual comments ,and capricious decision Behavioral Observation continualby a supervisor.
havioral observation
- ==== program and,the decisioin-==hng l- gnhiaJanvisionata-rR'="y m., _- .avr om. e un solicited. Because human behavior is dynamic, individual's suitability for maintaining -
h proposed regulation includes a continual behavioral observation unescorted access to protected areas*
inform: tion evaluation criteria. Noe program is proposed. As recommended and vitalislands.
criteria have been developed to serve as by the Heanns Board and an NRC o medantam for the evaluation of Review Procedure study. BehavioralReliability collected background history for the Nuclear Industy." NUREG CR- De Hearing Board recommended that infonnation and are based primarily on atr76, this program is needed to detect the rule include an appeal procedure an individual's direct actions rather than changes in anindividual which may through either an industry management the individual's ideas beliefs, reading occur and be manifested as behavioral system or a central NRC office. A habita, or socal. educational or political changes in job performance. review of sample labor. management assochtions. hse criteria. however. do competence, or judgment capabilities. collective bargaining agreements not ude interviews with the De ca==ission believes the existence covering workers in nuclear power indi dual seeking access euthorization of a continual behavioral observation plants has demonstrated that the that could elicit information concerning program would also help deter screened grievance procedures contained therein intenti:ns, attitudes and beliefs to ladividuals fra engaging in acts of provide an adequate mechanism for exphin or mitigate derogatory sabotage.De proposed continual review of access authorization denials information that may have been behavioral observation program consists or revocations. De usual grievance
, devdoped by the background of two basic elements.These elements procedure includes notice and an investigation. Each criterion contains are: evidentiary hearing before a neutral direct safeguards implications which 1.De detection by an individual's arbitrator with full exploration of fac*.:al could. if discovered in the individual's immediate supervisor of those issues.The Commission believes such background, cause that ladividual to be behavioral patterns which may lead to procedures at least meet the minireal -
consid: red a potential risk to the public acts detrimental to the public besith and requirements of procedural due process health and safetyif authonzed safety in a nuclear power plant and may be used in review of access unescorted access to a nuclear power operating environment. After detecting authorization denials or revocations. As re:ctor's protected areas and vital such behavior patterns. the individual's an attemative, however, and for cases islands. Under the proposed immediate supervisor will refer tha where an employee is not covered by a requirements. licensees will also be individual to the individual responsible collective bargaining agreement ar l; responsible for ensunns that individuals for administration of the licensee's where the collective bargaining panted access to protected areas and access authorization program. This agreement's grievance procedure is ,
- wital blands report any information perscn will make an impartial inadequate, the licensee sha!! prev
- .oe a
,I . .
I! ._
~ _
. . . _ _ _ m. . .a n. = ' Y-^L-=~^
- = " ' ~ " " " '
_ . ~ . .
4
_n Federal Register / Vol. 40. No.149 / Wednesday. August 1.1964 / Proposed Rules '
30729 revi:w procedure that provides notice Conforadng Amendaments end a fair evidentiary bearms ne ladividuals worldngin the nuclear Office of the Executive I.egal Director he Commission has included in this industry on the need for, and will participa te in examming the revi rulemaking action revisions to lo CFR appropnatenm d. thm aspects d the procedures submitted in the !!censee,ew a 50.34(d).ne amendeJ language pecposed rule would be particularly Accan Aueorizabon Program Man. removes the terminology " industrial useful.
Such review procedures are not sabotage" and substitutei the term ~
o mdiologicd ubou rammt..ta ., Roberts' Separate View int:nded to reempt any Federal or State proce ures for the review of necmary becauw industrial "p"'This chup is ubotage- Ido not approve the psychological aWgauons ddiscnnuna6m in is not de$ned in 10 CFR Part 73. asusnnent and behavioral observation
]h ud up ca. mla.g ion. He Commissbn has also included in this rulemaking action revisions to to CFR 30.54(p).The amesded language elements of the proposed rule.
r===ta- Gihasky's Separate VieG Protection oflafama6am allows licansees to propose changes, on I am worried that this rule will *.ao De Hearing Board recommended that a non.fw basis, to guard training and '*tasily lend itself to abuse. I have the rule contain regarements for cation plans that do not decrease attached the suggested stasguidelines protecting information and personal [efectivenm of these plans. for shut supemson to IUustrate my priv:cy for all recorded psychological, personal or derogatory information on e- i..taa Statament on Proposed ** $ ,
co, an Rula d SI demoralization of nuclear plant stafs at mainta[i p,, An extensive record has been a time when there is a great need to abould be given.He Congress of the developed on the psychological retain experienced personnel.
United States stated in the Privacy Act assessment and behavioral observation
' Cf1974 that the t of privacy is a elements of this proposed rule. In 177 Drdt Resuhey e " "' "-d Fumat personal and ental right the Ccamission established a Hearing and contents Guide for Accan Authertaanoe protected by the Constitution of the plan for heteerPewer Plants Board to obtaininformation from the United States. While the Privacy Act public on these and other aspects of Appundia P *~ "
- a Guide To does not apply to personal information access authoriaatiort In 1979 that Board %,,g,,g,g c"hape .
hipt by private parties the public policy recommended, among other things Tha may b & supe it ressesleeds the Con: mission to requarms a psychological screening ,
)
ude that information of a sensitive program and a system for continued - g,, ,g g ;, , gggg,g natum in personal records, resulung observation of employees. The ,,pg y,, ,g ,, ,,g,,,,g % g,,, -
from the application of this rule, abould "==i== ion. on June 24.1900, accepted mus: work pe:formance, socid intereenoaa.
be handled with dancretion and the recommendations of that Board. his and penood heal &,
diaeernisated to persons, other than the proposed rulela the rean!t of that Work performance individualinvolved. or his "^"'"'"!on decision. Finally, in a Employee's on.theiob behavior and work .
representative, onlyif they have a- General Accounting Office (GAO) ha,Wts ea! Qy impact on ebency and lesitimata "nand to i= A ad=Inistering the access authorization
- "~**manled "CG ,
1.ms ne inliiMuare wdrk paury or -
Improvements Needed in Physical
, program.Because it is impossible to Security at Nuclear powerplants" par tiry chanpd' '
identify in advance who in a licensee's (GAO/RCED-43-141. July 13.1983); the -crestjy chang,d speed of working org:nization will need access to this -changed level or work involvement -
GAO stated: **There is strong support 2. We the employee made more mistaAss personal information. the rule is drafted among licensees for personal screening in general terms, stating the principle to er bad /vatmessi programs thatinclude background -me numerous accidents be applied rather than detailing investigations, psychological testing. --hughs os enon or mpnmands ures. it is anticipated that ees will develop procedures to and benavioral observation to assess the reliability and trustworthiness of
,","j'* eens adf fw mimku provide an appropriate level of privacy their amployees." The GAO report went 3. me the employee's eP protection for the had% storage and on to state:"he proposed access -Has trooble arnvmg at 'fic;encylesaned?
deesions destruction of personalinformation. authorization rule appears to be --often fails to amet deadlines The Commission believes that the - Needs repeated directions for usy tasks adequate for upgrading the a. Does the individual have more ddBeulty proposed. Access Authorization Rule is trustworthiness of riant employees."(It concenostuig?
consistent with the recommendations of is clear in this GAO report that the -Forgets important or obvious sings the Hearing Board for establishing an proposed rule being commented upon --Acts wuboot stuninas cecess N18,17. sethorization rule based on AN51 included reqnirements for background
-De Investigations and continual behavioral mamsfoo
, ; m
-Repats amme acn[a per and per Edated Actions Aimed a observations: it is not clear whether bEvidualFimam fee Dury% GAO was commenting on requiring io6' as How much is the worser obsentfrom the la a complementary action. the psychological testing.
-4. Iste or absent especially Monday or Commission. on August 5.1982. The Commission is not persuaded at Fnday this time that the psychological -Often takes o5 half days published for public comment additional assessment and behavioral observation --haves work wieout notice m:ssures aimed at assunna individual elements are appropriste requirements Walsmes anww. neonis fitness for duty at nuclear power plants for this agenc/ to adopt. However, given -Taku a los of sick tean (47 FR 33e80). The fitness for duty the extensive record leading to this -Civte imp'obable excuses for absences program would employ sunilar proposal. It believes that it is "
techniques (e.g behavioral _ ,'r d e pb" appropriate to expand further the record c observation) and is being made the and to obtain critical public comments - -Takes excessaniy ions lunches and bmaks eubject of a separate rulemaking action. -Avoids a part of the plant because of fear on these elements. Corr.ments from -Gets sick whale at werk i
. ~ , .
.I 7=,.c..w.
- --- ...a 4.,.rs.,a .< , ,
o.am au. ; . . . *s
. .. t . . . . l 30
- Federal Register / Vol. 49. No.149 / Wednesdc.y. August 1.1964 / Proposed Rules ,
l Does the employee adhere to company -Bragelemaggerates -Puffy fece
-Acts naive er lanocent --Dil5culty hearing
@le er damages property -Ues e,mye you nonced any changes in the sa '
ladividuars body or lun6sP asegards mies -8 bowse 5
~Borrowneoney -shaky hands ads the nales .
Have you noticed the individual y.Have you aooced any changes la time -
employee's speech behovsor?
-NailEmns
~ Weight lose/gela .
pains overooucous? -
.-Cold. sweary hands ,
eerrorc*s to sormal conditione
-Talks slower / faster
- weses or diasppeare la en emergency -Talks moreflese -Twitching
, everly concerned about details / accuracy -Stammers -Sweeting, especially nonseasonal
==Al-k=* work too much & Has the esoployee's speech conten: 9. Has the employee had any *
- Has the employee become overseolous? eenged? goerrointestinot changes?
h takes h maks ,-Juipe from topic to espic _g. .f,,miga, ames O work early -Talks about hopeless future -8tomach schesIgu leap around after ektft J.n- - -M with emode. dinaster's. --Frequent tripe to the restoon
, --E.ncewive ese of antacids, caffee/tes or I elesteers Ier escaesive amounts of doetmetion '
eartime
- 4. ; - =;ed with one topic seu Equids. aspina, cigarenes hedenly meseds work espectatkas --Never thats about family /intmoets a Don te employee have any 3 Does Ibn employee engage la a lot of S.Does the employee have more omrifieroscular diHicainu?
comploise abouc oi,,io,,frg,,,,
t.ammeurt -
mvm =ckhmly -physical allamm --arathingirregulviues
-seck pain /musch ech" n.mve m nonced any danses in ee pue egepuest carelmaly on or off the Ning towsmY/lYeft shows pow ) dgment in dangerous
-Has stopped complaining
$7"dDj.$
Dialludutwisel gutivities
- l*' -F*"il /*'**7? 8"blems -rain behefe (delusions) '
)L Has the individuare cooperation with , -Lack of privileges h a m a lide n
.worsarechanged? -Filling out required forms Refuses ta abare equipment or information parecealWalth Questions for Specific Public Coinment .
Refuses ts take directions . Imployee's physicial and emotional stat" *the Comnussion is particularly Refuses ta eccept heir ' rom 69 the ect wer she o' interested in recei' ring public response ,
snallaurecenas
,,,e e.d ,m.3,,ofem ,io ,ee., ,,e,ves-d,emoo ,ip.et,
=
- fa -i e - coc-=ias the propowd mtutmnents.
talenship wie work tenometa that may -Headaches LTo what extent are the proposals spect sa team ,-.'-._ ---- -8tarties easily
--Cnes easily .
containedin the proposed access i
t Does the employee appear Jess socio6Je authorization rules already in place in sea beforet -8haky esiae E Does the individual use alcoholar dup the commercial power reactor industry?
aseisted/ withdrawn
.abaDow b =daht= d#srently To what extent are psychological
. amass and take to seN . --Drtahs too see asansment and behavioral reliability aafuese social oestacts' - Alcoholonbreath amer === already used by the nuclear
.ygggg,pEdgm W - -- i 26 = ; ~
-Culpe detaka, wreaally the Brelow 'ndustry i as part of employee screening -
Peer eye esatact programs?
-Lacks a esase of humor -Encourages othere to use
-Oeerfy suspicious of othere -Frequently "en the wagon" 2.What purposes are being served by
- 3. Has the individual had unusual ilhiesst the use of psychological assessment 1 2. Has the individual become too sacsoble? amounts of dental /M
> Talks too much with other employees . --Claims procedures in the nuclear industry? Is g id" ann wunons -si w rawwy utnen Preoccupied with doeth or suddenly ~
Psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns.
anappropnate sexual behavior radiological sabotage concerns, or both,.
Lylashoe money
- relipous
-ignores own 11lnese 3.What are the particular concerns S. Are there changes la the employee's 4.Has the ladivutual's energy Jewel about ininngements on civil liberties lheime of ArendrF chenytt associated with each of the components
-t +ny for breaks / lunch or
-Yawning of the proposed acc.ess authorization i teasponatos - Fatigue
-Only these younger or easily domunated rule? The Commission is aIso interested Leopamm at of Enends just kr dnahms w - R utk u eese in specific comments regarding the gamb%g -Fidgetag contribution of the specific provisions of
- 4. Are there danges in the way other S. Are yes aware of any charises in daily livisig routine 11a word sostane? the proposed rule in decreasing the risk verdere react to him/herf of sabotage and whether they have been orcvead --Steep dif5culties anyy with -Change la after-work hobbies acevin" adequately demonstrated to outweigh
-.geesme ==d==e=ading Change in amount-pattern of esting the ininngements on individual privacy
- d ' ' about Ripdly follows same pottern without oad with b inidadvu.
-Metnest reessa 4.What evidence does or does not
--Play praaks on & Have you nonced any changa in the Individualgeneinloppeorance? support the use of objective diagnosh,c
- Joke thout .
-Appears better/more poorly yoomed tests such as the hDdPI as screerung E Does the employee abow more angerf tools when specifically used only to
-.ampenent
-Walks differently (elower, stumbles)
-OverreecSon to real or imeoned enticism -Change la postur* Nitiate overall clinical assessments?
- y. Have you aooced any fociol changeef sat evidence does or does not support
-arritable
?.T -t*6ve -Blushing or palmu the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatnst as ou ts Dry th (frequently swauowtag/ lip a considerat2on in determining whether C5 Does the adividual monipulate othere? wornas) or not an individual should be granted amidsuphow=epoets . _ Dilated pupils
- ~ ~ . . . -
4- :
~
_ e .
. . .~ 2 :' --
Federal Register / Vol es. No.149 / Wednesday. August 1.1964 / Proposed Rules 30731 unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactoref for clearance of the information the Energy Reorganization Act of1974.
- 8. What speciBc characteristics are collection requirements that may be j appropriate under the Paperwork as amended. and 5 USC. 553. notice is :
ident18ed by a chnicalpsycholopeal hereby given that adoption of the '
assessment that relate Riisetly or Reduction Act (44 USC. 3801 et se following amendments to 10 CFR Parts Indirectly to reducing the risk of no SF-43. " Request for Clearance.q.). '
Supporting Statement. and related 30 and 73 la contemplated.
- radiological sabotage? What percentage .
l of false positives and false negatives documentation submitted to OMB wiu - PART 50-DOMESTIC UCENSING (Type Iand Type H errors)can be be placedin the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW., PRODUCTION AND UTIUZATION expected from mains the NRC proposed PACluTIES psychological assessment procedure? Washington. DC 20555. %e material wiD Are more effecdve procedures available be available for inspection or copying. 1. ne authority citation for Part 30 is and practicalf . _ . .
, MaidhiHey Card 8 cation revised to read as foUows:
avtan theuse of psychological P r,. Sees.1n 104.181. tn la sa In accordance with the Regulatory im as stat. ma, s 7. su ass. es4. ess, ses, as assessmentla the commerdalnuclear Flexibility Act of1980. 5 UAC. 806(b).
todustry be justi8ed solely on the basis amended, sec. zu,as Stat.12M as amended the Commission hereby certiBes that of reducing the risk of radiological these proposed regulations will not, if . , 223a. (42 U.s.c 2133. 2134. 22o1. 2232. 2233. 223s.
esbotage? Is there any evidence which 22s2); secs. 2o1. 2o2. 206. as. Stat.
proemigated, have a signiScant. 1242. 22n saa as amended (42 UAc seet, would help quantify the extent, if any, of acaaa=ie impact on a substantial risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, investigations, number of small entities. Dese proposed regulstions afect electric 88",,38"k g , , g y ,g,, [
""I*** D** Pubi s-est. sec. ta s2 Stat. sest (42 UAc sest). -
, and behavioral bility programs.
stilities that are dominant in their Secdons anR so.91 and so.82 also issued
' y. Can the use a(psychological under Puba gr-41s. es Stat. 2Drs (42 UAc respective service areas and that own assessment in the commercial nuclear and operate nuclear power plants. %ese 223s1. Section sarniso issued under sec.
industry be justi8ed on the basis of 122. es Stat. ese (42 UAc 21521. Secuens i
' addressing both 8tness for duty and utilities do not fall within the defintion "" "81 also ismd ander me. su a stat.
radiologicalsabotage concerns? of small businesses set forth in Section 3 ase (a UAc 21521. Sections " m. m
- a. To what extent is the use of of the Small Business Act.15 USC. 832. Issued under sec.1K es Stat. s54. es ologicalassessment related to a or within the Smau Business Size amended (42 UAC 2234L Seenons satco.
" i *e a vioralreliability program? Would Standards set forth in to CFR Part 121. g'u U 223sl a se s Dese proposed regulations will affect the proposed behavioral reliability some nuclear powerindustry For die purposes of en 223. as Sut me as program be effecove without preemployment psychological sentrectors and vendore all of which are amended (42 UAC 2rsi. II so.to(el. (bl.
! large concerns which service the and (c). san saa snes so.ss. and saantal assessment? What risks wodid industry. are issued under sec. selb. es stat. su as remainif both cal assessment amended (42 UAC 2an(bil: Si sato(b)and and a beha reBa ty program . agulatory Analysis tel and 3c34 are issued under sec. sett as were,,not part o.f a scre.e.ning program.
u stat. see. as amended (42 UAc. Isot(fil: and g _ .- - - ,-i - _he 1netincrease
_ - .m laitial cost.to the .i.l sass (et sase(bt sara sa7s. sarz, and g-
" P "' Je are lessed undersecdoto-en set-sen as amended (42 UAC 22D1(c1).
G What klads ofindividuals have Authorisation Plans is 8510K with an been " screened out" of nuclear industry estimated annual cost impact of $211K. 2. In i 50.34. paragraph (d) is revised by the use of psycholo and para by the use of had=.-.gical assessment. The netincmase cost per applicant d investigations, foUows: graph (b)is added. to read as and licensee inimplementing these or by the use of baliavioral reliability requirements is estimated to be 3155K g so.34 canene of appsconone;seehneses programat
! 10. What ====p1== if any. exist of initially and 334aK per year thereafter. It 8"""*888-is estimated that it will initially cost * * * *
- Annagement abuses of sesening new plants, which receive their procedures.:s :.diripsychologica] (d) Sofeguartfs contingencyplon. Each assessment backgroundinvestigations 7this rule, approximately 3770K application toteting beense for a license to operate after a the efective dat and behavioral reliability programa? screen their employus with the sa'me production or utilization facility that it.How do employees and employee shall be subject to il 73.50. 73.55, or annual maint=== ara cost as existing -
73.80 of this chapter shallinclude a organisations feelabout past and plants present use of acreemos programa? How licenses safeguards contingency plan in do they feel about the proposed access Ust of Subjects accordance with the criteria set forth in authorizados rolest Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73.De
- CPN Mart 30
. safeguards contingency plan shall j;;;ll;;;;;;-t iweeCa omai s
^=i/a n.' cin -d"*de,naen'='a'g", erd"~ ,.
lldfi fef,'d M"i #' ' set * *"*.
fuel er power ts and reactors, De NRC has determined that the defined in Part 73 of this chapter.
proposed rule is the Penalty. Radiation protection. Reactor relating to the special nuclear material ofaction descibedin categori exclusion to siting critaria. Reporting requirements. and nuclear facilities licensed under tb CFR 51.22(c)(3);7berefore neither an 20 CFR M chapter and in the appbcant's environmental impact statement nor an possession and control. Each application Hazardous materials. transportation.
environment assessment has been ror such a license shall include the Erst prepared for this proposed rule. Nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants four categories ofinformation contained and reactors. Penalty. Reporting in the applicant's safeguards p ~ Badestion Statement
~ mluiminents. Securhy measums. conungency plan @e Amt four i The proposed rule has been submitted For the reasons set outin the categories ofinformation. as set forth m preamble and under the authority of the Appendix C to 10 CF"4 Part 73, are to the OfBce of"- 1 -st and Budget Atomic Energy Act of1964. as amended.
Background. Generic Planmng Base.
i
3 i i. .: ....-.m.,.. ..-
..g--- .
- ~If1 ,,."?""~*"9
, 30732 Federal Regist:r / Vel. 49. No. Se / Wednesday. August 1.1964 / Propos:d Rules
- Ucensee Planning Base. and of Nuclear Matarial Safety and n es, n.so, nas. ns am leeved under sec.
Responsibuity Matrix.& Sfth category Safeguards (for enrichment and tatt es stei. see. as amended (c U.s c of information. Procedures. does not reprocessing facilities) or the Director of am Olk and il n.a.(cNil n.24@Xt).
have to be submitted for approval.)' Nucleat Reactor Regulstion (for nuclear " "*H3I-@H81 **d SM*I " I*I*"d Al-reactors). U.S. Nuclear Regulato MJrtt). n.colb) and (d) n.ea(s)(s) and (h)(2).
(b) Access AutAonsotion Plan. Each application for a license to operate a auc!:ar power reactor pursuant to Commission. Washington. DC with a copy to the appropriate NRC
[hTk $h*
sec. toso. en Stat too. as amended 1e2 U.S C -
Regional Ofice specified in Appendix A anot(oll.
I 50.22 af this chapter shallinclude an of Part n of this chapter. a report Access Authorization Plan.De Access contammg a description of each change ti na.ne.nac. nse. nas.nso and Authortsation Plan is to provide details within two months after the change is ^8'*"88** ** 8' *"8 C IA"*"8883 for meeting the .wi.d.- -ts of I n.56 made. Prior to the safeguards 5. Remove the authority citation of this chapter.The Access contingency plan being put into efect. following Il 73.2. 73.4. n.40, n.50. 73.55.
Althoriantion Plan shad describe in thelicensee shall have: 73J0. Appendices. A. B and C.
detail the program used for: performag (1) All safeguards capabilities a be investigation and e. In i 73.55..the introductory text of ed in une safeguards contingency paragraph (d)is revised and peregraph ps , cal assessment on an available and funcnonal: (i)is added to read as fouows:
Indi procedures estabhshed for (ii) Detailed procedures developed (S continualbehavioralobservation according to Appendix C to Part n i n.as needroments hr phreisiet program, grievance review procedures, evallable at the ucensee's site: and PN88888" *t 888"**d acewmes in nucceer protection of infocmation, procedures to (iii) All appropriate personnel trained Pwoosec ors egeenet resological De used with mgant to temporary and to respond to safeguards incidents as setotmee.
transient workers, andahe other outlined in the plan and specified in the requirements of I n.5s of this chapter. detailed Pmcadures. (d) Access Requirementa In addition (4)N licensee shallprovide for the to the requirements of I 73.56 of this
.I8E38 IA"*"888I development. revision, implementstion. Part 3.In i 5034 para eo re:d ce follows: graph (p)is mvised and maintenance of his safeguards * * * *
- contingency lan. To this end, the licensee (i) Durms cold shutdown or refueling I sa.54 censuono et scenese, provide for the myiew at operations, u specified in the facility s
. . . . . least every 12 months of the safeguards technical specifications as mquired in to (p)(1)N Ucensee shad prepare and contingency plan byindividuals CFR 30.36 the licensee has the opdon maintain safeguards coa independant of both secunty program under i n.se(e)(3) of this Part to grant procedares in accordann% e wie plan management and personnel who have temporary unescorted access Appendix C of10 Cf1 Pert n for- direct responsibility for implementation 8f es 8ecurity pmgran b mview authorizations to unscreened individuals efecdag the actions and decisions provided that:
contamed in the Responsdnlity Matrix shau include a review and audit of (1) Applicable requirements of this of tha safeguards conungency plan.N safeguards contingency proced practices, an andit of the secun,ures and secdon are foDowed: .
hcensee may make no change which ty m p,to, to ...n.on . u ma
~~"* "-mafnunance a. 9
.O L .. se eHect!Veness or a P'-
inspection of all afected protected _
~
security plan. guard trainmg and progran and a tut of the safeguards quali5 cation plan or access systems along with commitments areas and vital islands is conducted by licensee personnel who normally work cuthsriza tion plan, prepared pursuant to established for response by local Inw in these areas to identify any signs of 8 50.34(c). 50.34(f) or Part n of this enforcement authontms.Re moults of tampering or sabotage; and ch:pter, or of the first four categories of es mylew and audit along wie inf:rmation (Background. Generic *nenendations for improvements. (3) Appropriate safety start-up shall be procedures are followed to assure that planning Base: Licensee Plannin . Base, Responsibility Matrix) con licensee,a documented. corporate and plant reported to the su operating and safety systems are in a functioning normaDy.
heansa safeguards conungency plan mana ment and kept avadable at the prepared pursuant to I 50.54(d) or Part plant winspection fa a period of two 7. A new I 73.56 is adde. d to read as g,g3,,,,~
73, as cppticable, withoot prior approval F*-
of the Commission. A licensa desiring *
- I 73.58 personnet asemos authertuoson D maka such a change shah submit an 'ogdromenta er nuaieer pamw plants.
applie=*ian for an amendment to his PART 73--PHYSICtAL pRQTECTION heense persaant to I 50.90. OF PLANTS AND MATEftlALS (a) Generol. (1) Ea .h licensee who is (2)h Deensa may make changes to authonzed on (date that a !!nal rule is plans mfmacedin paragraph (pM1) of 4. h authority citation for Part 73 is published in the l'oderal Register to this section without prior Commission revised to roed as follows: operate a nuclear power reactor under
- alif ,m- ..
Part 50150.22 of this chapter shall g%, se eguar&e chansaofdo ds efechvenem thenot plan.demam
,, ,,,,gg 7,i,,f,[7,"o'(42USC comply with the n tuirements of this (3)m licensa shall maintain son. 21er. zan h sec. 201. as Stat. us2. as section. The licensee shall submit by amended. sec. 204, as Stat.124s (42 Usc [120 day: after this efective rule is records cf changes to the plans made sa41. ss441 published in the Federal Register as without prior Comaussion approval for a sectica nsrif) is also issued under sec.
period cf two years froen the date of the - act. Feb. L SD-2ss. 94 Stat. 7ss (42 USC Access Authorization Plan describing chaise, and shall furnish to the Director seet ant 4 how the licensee will comply with all of For the purposes of sec. 223. as Stat. esa, as tlw requirements of this section. By [360
"' ff rul blish
,o , mg are und a 1st se a in the F Re s er or 1 days after C to Part "3 eensib the sequirement for e as amended (42 USC 2201(b]h il 72.2o.
emmenssacy plan, the Access Authorization Plan has been nJ4. n.25. n.2s. n.zr n.37. n 40. n.43, approved by the Comnussion, whichever
- , - . _ - - - . - _ _ . - . , _ - , _ - ,,,_r,-,_,,--_._.-- , - - - - ,. - , - - -
. , '. e t
. . .l
~ \
Federal Register / Vol. 49. No.149 / Wednesday. August 1.1964 / Proposed Rules 30733 l 1 I is let:r. the licensee shan comply srith program shad consist of written and Control Act of1970, pub.l 91-513.
the requirements of this section and personality tests and, if needed. clialcal 31 U.Sn 301 et seq.] without a with its plan.
Intarviews designed to provide prescription or has been without (2) Each applicant for slicense to personality protues and to assess adequate evidence of rehabilitation:
operate a nuclear power reactor psychological abnormalities. De (vi)Is a user of alcohol habitually and pursuant to I 3o22 of this chapter. continual behaviors! observation to excesa, or has been so la the past .
whae application was subtditted prior program shallbe designed to detect without adequate evidence of to [date that a final rule is published in certain individual behavior or rehabilitation: or b Federal Register), shall submit by behavioral changes within the context of (vil) Has engaged in any other 120 days after a final rule is published the job environment which. Ifleft conduct. or is subject to any other
- a the Feders! Registarl en Access undetected. could lead to acts inimical circumstanca, which furnishes reason tc Anthorizadon Plan describing how the to the public health and safety or could believe that the ladividual may act in a ;
cypticant plans to comply with the present a danger tolife or prope . His manner contrary to the protection of I requirements of this section. By.[3eo behavioral obearvation program health and =ini=l*= tion of danger to life '
days after a final rule is published in the include a supervisor training program and property.
Federal , or on the date of and. if needed, a new psychological 3 (4) No person may cite this section as' receipt of opers license, assessment. Individuals who have authority for the denla!. revocation. or whichever is later. the shaB received an unescorted access suspension of an access authorisation comply with the gA _sts of this authorization to protected areas and based upon information derived from a section and with its r *-=l== ion vitalislands prior to the e5ective date of background investigation when the cyproved plan. these amendmants are exempt from (3) Each applicant for alicensee to basis for the denla!. revocation. or having to meet the requirements of. euspension is other than application of a I operate a nuclear power reactor graph (c) of this section for a pursuant to ll 30.21(b) and 5022 of this criterion listed in paragraph (b)(3) of this dinvestigation and paragraph section.
chapter, whose application la submitted (d) o this section for psychological after [date a final rule is published in the assessment. (c) Backgrounditwestigotien. He Federal Register), shad include in its licensee shall conduct. or make (2) Dis section does not authorize arrsagements for, background cpplication an Access Authorization any activity by the licensee or any other plan describing how the applicant plans person that would infnnge upon the investigttions that provide assurance ta meet the requirements of this section. rights of any individual under the First est indviduals mking unucormd De cpplicant shad comply with the Amendment to the Constitution of the access to 'rotected amas and vital '
seguirements of this section and with its United States, nor any activity that islands at nuclear power reactors are f*- = h a plan upon receipt would discriminate among innm, duals reliable. trustwonby, and would act in a et an operating on the basis of race, a on.nat amaner that would rotect health and -
(4) Licensees may include in their origin. sex, or age. Any enial, ,ional miniml** danger to fife and property. As -
Ancmas Authorization plan a senanc revocation or suspension of access a nunimum. thia background plan ta be used by aD 18e=a= authorization resulting from information lamnganon must verify an individual's Ior
-manufacerers.* sepphers aa fromW W true identity, employment history.
educationaWomn.cmdt hismn.
and obserymg their and for which this section is cited as emp e licensee shall be authority shall be based solely upon crinunal histon. mean me,and b for ting, ying. or a heation of the critena enumerated dm cen m g .
authorization to these individuals based (3)la making a determmation under unescorted access under these on results of the contractors'. this section for the denial, revocation or ans aport promptly W 6e manufacturers'. or suppliers' Endings or suspension of access authorization f'cenm any subsequent occurnace w i
observations. based upon data derived from a circumstance (conviction.
(b)Genern/pe#ca aobjective background lavestigation. the licensees hospitalization. etc.) that may have a endieguurmerus. (1)he licensee shall shall consider whether the individuah bearing on such individual s conti.nued establish and maintain an access (i) Has committed or attempted to access authwization.
cnthonzation program which has as it commit. or aided. or abetted another (d) Psychologica1 Assessment. De objective preventing unescorted access who committed or attempted to commit. licensee shall establish and maintain a to protected areas and vitalislands to any act of sabotage or other unlawful psychological assessment program to be those individuals whose history, destruction of property; administered to all ledividuals prior to ogical profile orex in (ii) Has deliberstely omitted granting them unesecrted access to viaral patterns indicate in potential material information or falsified his protected areas and vitalislands.De for committing acts that are inimical to employment or alte access application: requiremetas of this paragraph supplant the public health and safety or prevent a (iii)Has or has had any illness of a the requirements of Appendix B danger to life or property.ne sature which. la the opinion of a paragraph I.B.2.b. of this part for nuclear unescorted access authonzation quahfied and. If applicable, state. power reactor security personnel. His program shall consist of a background licensed psychologist. or psychistnst. or program. as a muumum, shall consist of-Invest!3ation program. a psychological medical doctor, may cause significant (1) Written personality tests which cssessreent program, and a continual defect in the judgment or reliability of have been designed to furnish an behavioral observation program. ne the individuah objective evaluation of some of the background investigation program shall (iv)Has been convicted of any felony major personality traits which influence be designed to identify past actions that or series oflesser ofenses indicating individual and interpersonal behavior.
would be predictive of an individual's habitual cruninal tendencies: Results of the personality tests shall be future reliability within a protected area (v)is a habitual user of a controlled evaluated by a qualified and. if er vitalialand of a nuclear power substance (as defined and listed in the applicable. state-licensed psychologist reactor.The psychological assessment Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention or psychiatrist. He tests chosen shall
~- -
I ,-
- g. _L._ ._ - + ~ - - - m.u .
3373d Federal Register / Vol. 49. No.149 / Wednesday. August 1.1964 / ProPored Rules have predstermined evaluation scales access authorization granted an revocation of access authorization is a erbich an statistically proven to have a Etnployee of a manufactumr. contractor, grievable action under the contract.
bish desres of reliability, shad have or equipment supplier by another been proven to be valid. shall sfeet the (b) Prosection ollaformation. (1) Each hcansw. or a previous employee of licensee, contractor, or supplier who -
criteria ef paragraph (d)(2) of 2 anohr licensee. if 6 individual's coUects personal information.on an section, and shall comply with the employment in licensed nuclear power
- empl yse selection procedure guidelines employee for the purpose of complying reactors has not been interrupted for a with this section shall estabhsh and kn d:senbed in "Un form Guidelines on continuous period of more than sas days Employee Selection Procedures (1978)." maintain a system og g;u and and if the orismal grantinglicensee
'43 FR 3a295 (August 25.1978),29 CR procedures for the protection of the eends to the gaining licensee a Part teo7. photograph of the individual and a Personalinfenshon.
(2) Clinical interviews for ladividuals written veriScation of the todividual's (2) h licenm. contractw. or
- whose personality tests results an enescorted access authorization along supplier shall not disclose the personal
,laconclusive or indicate abnormal with a statement which indicates its information coUected and maintained to Personality traits.These interviews shall carnnt validity. For individuals whose Persons other than b subject to cdnunistered and conducted by a employment in licensed nuclear power . Individual. or his representative or to guah8ed and. If applicable. state. reactors has bun interrupted for a , those who have a need to have access to Deensed psychologist or psychiatrist- continuous period of more than 385 the information in performing assigned tests and laterview shall be days, the individual's activities must be duties in the process of granting or
@ designed ta evaluate (0 an individual's
, investigated accord ng to the applicable denying access to protected areas and current behav$ oral reliability,looking for requirements of paragraph (c) of this vitalislands.
, traits which would indicate that the section and a new psychological individual possesses a strong potential (3)h licensee shall have access to assessment made scenrding to the and periodically audit contractor
' ' requireme ts of paragraph (d) of this records to ensure that the requirements bc d uf pro co ed
'
- a g g , c3, ,
, environs:nt. could develop into a high licensee shall grant unescorted access Pmen Man. ,
potential for committing acts *"e (4)h licensee shall make available ed -
- d ldetrumental to the public health, safety. ,gtal ands further Slee or documents relied upon by the P investigation by the licensee with regard beensee, including records of audits .
y 'operty.
1*e'sts and.Based if nuded,on ee rm!ts d the clinicalinteniew, due on de contractw's scraning l
e' *tri81 or psychologist shad to the requirements of this section to an employees of the Commission who have program, fa exanunahn by an NRC in *Tidag to appropriate seniw been certiSed by the NRC to have met inspector to allow the NRC to determine management, a se Bcensu's compliance in the intent of the requinments of this recommendation as to the4ndividual's section. implementing its approved plan.
behavioral suitability for unescorted 'M l'"*"***"""'*"b*~'***
'%esing soldenadowsm%
@dset2ar er ' t oper'stions, as specBed in the facility's technical specifications, as required in au'thorization Ele of an individual for three years after termination of the (2) ContinualBe oviornl Obsevotion l Program. (1) h licensee shall establish to CFR 50.36, the licensu has the option unescwted access authorizatin fw ,
and maintain a continual behavioral to grant a temporary unescorted access protected areas and vitalislands.
- observctirn program for individuals authorization to an unscreened 4. Appendix B of Part 73 is amended
- which is designed to have supervisors individualif
- by revising paragraph I.B.2.c. to read as l detect changes in an individual's on.the. (0 h mquirments of I 73.55 of this gotiow,:
pb perf rmance. judgment. level, ce chapter are followed: and
- eehsvior and, after detecting a pattern (ii) He afected individual is subject APPENDEX 5-GENERAL CRITERIA pOft of cbnormal behavior, refer the to the continual behavioral obsenation SECURITY PERSONNEL ladividual to senior licensee mquirements of paragraph (e) of this * * * * * -
mmgement to make an initial decision section. L Employment suitability and qualiEcation.
on whsth:r to maintain or temporarily (3) Aeriew Procedures. %e licensee's suspend the individual's unescorted plan submitted pursuant to I 73.36(a) Es Physical and mental qualificanon. * * *
! access cathorization to protected areas this of chapter must include a procedure z. Mental quahtication. * *
- and vitalislands. In the case where the for the review of a denial or revocation c. The licensee shau anonse for contmued
- individual's behavioral actions under this section of an access observation of secunty personnel and for represent an imminant danger to the authorization of an amployee of the appropnate corrective measures by Public bedth and safety, the individual's licensee, contractor, or supplier that has responsible supervisors for indications of
, supervtaor shall immediately suspend an adverse effect on the individual's emotional instability of individuals in the the individual's unescorted access employment.The procedure must course of performins suisned secu try job cuth:rization on a temporary basis and provide notice and an opportunity for a duties. !dentification of emotionalinstability then refer the individual to senior fair evidentiary heanns and be by responsible supervisors must be subject to
, licensee management.
consonant with fundamental principles venf! cation by a licensed. tramed person.
(2) h requiremeets of paragraphs (d) of due process.h grievance review This paragraph does not s; ply to secur:ty
, and (e) of this section supplant the procedure contained in the collective personnel at nuclear power reactors bcensed requirem:nts of Appendix B paragraph bargaining agreement covering the ender to CMt Part 50. These licenwn shau
' LB.2.c. of this part for nuclear power bargaining unit of which the employee is consult I rsJs(e).
- reactor secunty personnel a member will normally meet this * * * *
- l (f) Non-licensee Employees. (1)h requirement, and may be used for this Deted at Wuhington. DC tha Zrth day of bconsee may accept an unescorted purpose whether or not the denial or July.1cse.
- _ _ _ _ _ - . - - - - _ . .- . - .