ML20206E632
| ML20206E632 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/26/1984 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Jennifer Davis NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8606230471 | |
| Download: ML20206E632 (37) | |
Text
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NOV 2 61984 MEMORANDUM FOR:
John G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards FROM:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
CONTROL 0F NRC RULEMAKING By memorandum of February 13, 1984, " Control of NRC Rulemaking by Offices Reporting to the EDO," Offices were directed that effective April 1, 1984, (1) all offices under ED0 purview must obtain my approval to begin and/or continue a specific rulemaking, (2) resources were not to be expended on rule-makings that have not been approved, and (3) RES would independently review rulemaking proposals forwarded for my approval and make recommendations to me concerning whether or not and how to proceed with the rulemakings.
In accordance with my directive, the following proposal concerning rulemaking has been fomarded for my approval along with recommendations from RES con-cerning the proposal:
Proposed revision of 10 CFR Part 73, Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Facilities concerning Sabotage of Independent Spent Fuel Installations.
(Sponsored by NMSS - memorandum, Minogue to ED0 dated November 2, 1984.)
Continuation of this rulemaking is approved. The NRC Regulatory Agenda (NUREG-0936) should be modified to reflect the status of the proposal.
(Signed) Jack W. Roe William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations J. Roe H. R. Denton R. C. DeYoung R. B. Minogue P. G. Norry I
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[bd.W WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 NOV 2 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM:
Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
SUBJECT:
CONTROL 0F NRC RULEMAKING: RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW 0F ONG0ING RULEMAKING SPONSORED BY NMSS Based on our independent review of ongoing rulemaking, " Physical Protection Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations" sponsored by NMSS, RES agrees with the recommendation of the Director, NMSS, that this rulemaking effort should continue.
1 1
The basis for our recomendation is as follows:
Under 10 CFR Part 72, an applicant for a license for the storage of spent fuel in an ISFSI must establish a physical security plan that demonstrates how the applicant plans to comply with the applicable requirements in 10 CFR Part 73 and, in the design for physical protection, must show the site layout and ISFSI l
design features provided to protect the ISFSI from sabotage.
In 10 CFR 73.50, the requirements for physical protection of licensed activi-ties include a specification that the licensee must establish a security orga-nization, including guards, to protect his facility against radiological sabo-tage and the special nuclear material in his possession against theft.
These requirements were not developed with ISFSIs specifically in mind and it appears they may not be appropriate for these facilities.
The purpose of this rulemaking effort is to establish new requirements which are suited to the nature of ISFSIs, their location and the nature of the threat and are commensurate with the consequences which could result from an attack.
NMSS plans to develop performance requirements to allow applicants and licensees the flexibility of using the most cost-effective measures for the physical protection of ISFSIs against sabotage attack.
Early promulgation of these new requirements would provide timely guidance to i
i the industry in the design, construction and operation of ISFSIs.
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-William J. Dircks NOV 2 1984 The com lete RES independent review package has been sent to CED0 (Attention:
DEDR0GR and to the Director, NMSS.
Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW PACKAGE
Distribution :
RAMRB r/f FGillespie i
Circ /chron RES Central Files R-2914 Subj File JHenry JMalaro GArlotto 4
KGoller 0Bassett HEMORANDUM FOR:
Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research FROM:
Frank P. Gillespie, Chaiman RES Independent Review Board
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF RIRB del.IBERATIONS FOR ONG0ING RULEMAKING SPONSORED BY NMSS The rulemaking review package received June 1, 1984 (Mail Control RES-8412300),
states:
...the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards has reviewed the ongoing rulemaking activities listed below. On the basis of our review, we recosmiend the approval of continued activity on these rules."
REVIEWED BY NMSS FOR EDO INITIAL REVIEW D. " Physical Protection Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations" i
Enclosed is the draft independent review package as prepared by responsible RES staff and considered by the RES Independent Review Board.
I l
Also enclosed are the voting sheets of the RIRB members that reflect their i
deliberations. One RIRB member considers it borderline as to whether this activity requires RES independent review at this time. As noted in the i
1
" abstract", the activity is an ongoing assessment to decide whether the exist-ing regulations should be changed. The RIRB member agrees that this ongoing j
assessment should continue.
1 The RIRB recomendation-is that the NRC should proceed with this rulemaking.
l Frank P. Gillespie, Chairman RES Independent Review Board
Enclosures:
1.
Draft independent review
-package for " Physical Protection Requirements for ISFSIs" 2.
VotingSheetsofRIRBMeirkers
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RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD VOTING SHEET TO:
ROBERT M. BERNER0, CHAIRMAN, RIRB FROM: 0. E. Bassett, Member, RIRB TITLE OF RULEMAKING: " Physical Protection Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations."
AGREE WITH DRAFT RES REQUEST RIRB INDEPENDENT RECOMMENDATIONS MEETING.
IN DRAFT INDEPENDENT REVIEW PACKAGE.
MODIFY DRAFT RES NOT PARTICIPATING.
X INDEPENDENT RECOMMENDATIONS AS INDICATED BELOW.
COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS:
I consider it boarderline as to whether this activity requires RES independent review at this time. As noted in the " abstract," the activity is an ongoing assessment to decide whether the existing regulations should be changed.
I agree that this ongoing assessment should continue.
Paragraph 3 of the independent RES evaluation entitled " Alternative to Rulemaking" should be changed by interchanging the second and third sentence. As now written it can be implied that the NRC Policy and Planning Guidance dictates that rulemaking should be utilized instead of regulatory guides when numerous licensees are affected.
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MEMBER, RIRB 74hv DATE l
e RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD V0 TING SHEET T0:
ROBERT M. BERNER0, CHAIRMAN, RIRB FROM:
TITLE OF RULEMAKING:
" Physical Protection Requirements for IFSIs" AGREE WITH DRAFT RES REQUEST RIRB X
iNDEeENDENT RECOMMENDATIONS MEtriNG.
IN DRAFT INDEPENDENT REVIEW PACKAGE.
MODIFY DRAFT RES NOT PARTICIPATING.
INDEPENDENT RECOMMENDATIONS AS INDICATED BELOW.
COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS:
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8 MEPEER, RIRB lh4 SY DATE
RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD VOTING SHEET T0:
RIRB FROM:
TITLE OF RULEMAKING:
" Physical Protection Requirements for IFSIs" AGREE WITH DRAFT RES REQUEST RIRB INDEPENDENT RECOMMENDATIONS MEETING.
IN DRAFT INDEPENDENT REVIEW PACKAGE.
MODIFY DRAFT RES NOT PARTICIPATING.
INDEPENDENT RECOMMENDATIONS AS INDICATED BELOW.
COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS:
h MEMBER, RIRB 7 - E l - d '/
DATE
i.y RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD V0 TING SHEET T0:
ROBERT M. BERNER0, CHAIRMAN, RIRB FROM:
TITLE OF RULEMAKING:
" Physical Protection Requirements for IFSIs" AGREE WITH DRAFT RES REQUEST RIRB G
INDEPENDENT RECOMMENDATIONS MEETING.
IN DRAFT INDEPENDENT REVIEW PACKAGE.
MODIFY DRAFT RES NOT PARTICIPATING.
INDEPENDENT RECOMMENDATIONS AS INDICATED BELOW.
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l COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS:
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4 ones ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SUP Toe mame. esce symber, room number, inniens pet.
$,M16ns, Agency /Peet).M. Bernero, Chairman, RIRB L
- 0. E. Bassett, Member, RIRB 2.
K. R. Goller.Hember, RIRB 3.
G. A. Arlotto, Member, RIRB 4.
5.
)( Action Fue Note and Retum Approval For Clearance Per Conversation As Requested For Correction Prepare Reply C6ccufete For Your Information See Me Comment investigate Signature Coordination Justify REMARKS We are at step III.C.2, "RIRB deliberations," of the RES independent review procedures for the attached specific ongoing rulemaking.
Please evaluate the attached draft independent review "I:
package and provide RAf4RB with your voting sheet indicating your position on the rulemaking.
Your response by c.o.b.
will assist in RES' making independent recommendations
.to the ED0 in a timely manner.
& & PP>MW Up r.od W I O "
DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvets. concurrences, 6sposals.
clearances, and similar actions FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency / Poet)
Room No.-Bids.
RA4RB staff Phone Me.
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JUL 0 61984 MEMORANDUM FOR:
James Malaro, Chief Regulatory Analysis and Materials Risk Branch Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research FROM:
Robert M. Bernero, Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
SUBJECT:
RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW 0F ONG0ING RULEMAKING:
" PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATIONS" The subject proposed rule is in the very earliest staces of development.
Consequently some documents needed for the review are not available at this time. The Task Leader Package forwarded for review consists only of a copy of the NRC Regulatory Agenda entr.y and the Evaluation of Rulemaking. However, based upon the information available and discussions with the NMSS task leader by the technical reviewer it is judged that the rulemaking effort should continue at this time. We anticipate a more complete Task Leader Package will be ready for our review in the near future.
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Robert M. Bernero, Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research l
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RESULTS OF RES STAFF EVALUATION 4
i INDEPENDENT RES EVALUATION RULEMAKING TITLE:
Physical Protection Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations 1.
The issue to be addressed.
The requirements for the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel at in-l dependent storage sites are currently contained in 10 CFR 73.50. These requirements were originally developed for a broad range of materials and facilities and were r.ot developed specifically for independent spent rule storage installations (ISFSIs). The investigation that is being conducted by NMSS to determine whether these requirements should be changed for those installations should be continued. The result of the investigation will most likely point to a need for continuation of the rulemaking.
2.
The necessity and urgency of addressing the issue.
It is the opinion of the reviewer that the NMSS contention that the eval-uation of the proposed rule is necessary since licensing of the first ISFSI is scheduled to be completed in 1985 or 1986. The number of ISFSIs to be licensed thereafter may be one or two per year, with the monitored retriev-able storage sites beginning to be licensed around 1990.
3.
Alternative to rulemaking.
An alternative to the rulemaking is to continue use of the existing regu-lations, issuing exemptions and adding license conditions as necessary.
2 It is possible that instead of rulemaking that a regulatory guide could be developed with the appropriate needed guidance.
In accordance with NRC Policy and Planning Guidance, rulemaking is to be utilized when numerous licensees are affected.
4.
How the issue will be addressed through rulemaking.
The rulemaking will reword the requirementsin 73.50 to be more commensurate with the consequences that could result from a sabotage attack at the installation and during transportation to or from the installation. A proposed performance-oriented rule can be developed to allow licensees the flexibility of using the most cost effective measures available to meet the requirements.
EffectoftherulemakingresSitson[hepublic, industry,andNRC.
5.
1 Since the technical issues have not been resolved, n'a effect of this action has been determined. The most probable effect would be to lessen the phys-ical protection requirements for the installation without any effect on the public. To evaluate the proposals submitted because of a performance oriented rule, an increase in NRC effort would be most likely.
6.
NRC resources and scheduling needed for the rulemaking.
1 It will take about one year to publish a final rule after the Consnission approves the proposed rule for publication. The estimated resources needed l
3 from now until a final rule is prepared are approximately 11/2 staff years.
s UNITED STATES
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%, 7f JUN 15 B84 RES Mail Control No. 841230D MEMORANDUM FOR: Guy A. Arlotto, Director Division of Engineering Technology, RES FROM:
Robert M. Bernero, Chaiman RES Independent Review Board
SUBJECT:
CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING: RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW 0F ONG0ING RULEPAKING Enclosed is a rulemaking (review package received from a sponsoring office for RES independent review. )
In accordance with procedures apporoved by the EDO on May 30, 1984, the rulemaking review package is assigned to your Division for action.
(Enclosure 2)
The EDO-approved procedures allow a total of 20 working days for completing the RES independent review. To assist RES in completing its independent review in a timely manner, please submit the draft independent review package for this specific rulemaking to RAMRB by 5 working days from the date of this tremorandum.
C' t.)
S-Robert M. Be nero, Chr.iman
'x Independent Review Board
Enclosure:
1.
Physical Protection Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) 2.
Procedures for Conducting RES Independent Review of Rulemakings 4
i
RULEMAKING REVIEW PACKAGE RECEIVED FROM fNSS
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGUL/. TORY COMMISSION 5
WASHING 7JN.D.C. 20655 June 8, 1984 Mr. Henry:
Here is some additional information on the NMSS I
rulemaking action " Physical Protection Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs)". Copies of references 1 and 2 are available from Bil Labs, RE3. The NUREG/CR report can be obtained through Distribution.
i If you need further information, please contact either Frank Davis (x74765) or Robert Dube (x74767).
These two are working on the rule and can provide first-hand information.
M Sally Corng1 Program Su rt Branch NMSS 3
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JUN 0 71984 MEMORANDUM FOR:
W. B. Brown, Chief Fuel Facility Safeguards Licensing Branch, SG THRU:
R. J. Dube, Section Chief Regulatory Activities and Analysis Section, SGFF/SG FROM:
F. C. Davis Regulatory Activities and Analysis Section, SGFF/SG
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TO JUNE 5, 1984 PSB NOTE In response to note dated June 5,1984, apparently from Program Support Branch, the following coments are given:
By " preliminary studies," we are referring to the studies by Battelle, Sandia, and Science Applications, Inc.,
regarding sabotage of shipping casks and high-level waste storage facilities.
By " ongoing assessments," we are referring to our internal technical evaluations of the above studies and extrapolation of that data to dry storage cask scenarios.
No contract is in effect for the ongoing assessments.
kid 0.l04 d F. C. Davis Regulatory Activities and Analysis Section, SGFF/SG
References:
1.
Battelle Task 3 Report, September, 1982 2.
Sandia 82-2365, Dec., 1982 3.
Science Applications, Inc., NUREG/CR-1758, Sept.,1980
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UNITED STATES
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r Mr. Brown -
We forwarded the attached rulemaking review package to RES in response to the request from the EDO.
Now, RES is in the process of beginning their review for reconnendation to the EDO on which rules to continue activity on, and which to cease activity on.
One package, submitted by Frank Davis of your Branch, involves " Physical Protection Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations",a al is now being reviewed in RES.
Mr. Jim Henry has called us asking for more background information on this activity.
He asked that we provide him with infomation on the " ongoing assessments" and the " preliminary studies".
If there is a contract in effect.here, he would like to see some of the results or the Statement of Work.
Please provide Program Support Branch, George Beveridge or Sally Cornell, with background infomation to be forwarded to RES.
Mr. Henry will appreciate any background material you feel will be helpful in their review of this rulemaking package.
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM:
John G. Javis Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
SUBJECT:
CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING - EDO INITIAL REVIEW In response to your memorandum of February 13, 1984, and in accordance with instruction., provided in subsequent memoranda from the Office of Nuclear Regu-latory Research (RES), the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards has reviewed the on-going rulemaking activities listed below.
On the basis of our review, we recomend the approval of continued activity on these rules.
REVIEWED BY NMSS FOR EDO INITIAL REVIEW A.
" Human Uses of Byproduct Material - revisions to 10 CFR Part 35" B.
" Radon and Technetium Estimates for Table S-3"
's C.
" Reporting Requirements for Safeguards Events"
" Physical Protection Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations" E.
" Material Control and Accounting Requirements for Low Enriched Uranium Facilities" F.
" Clarification of General Physical Protection Requirements" WLS John G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Enclosures:
Review Packages for the above listed rulemaking activities cc w/ encl:
J 3
s DIVISION OF SAFEGUARDS
" Physical Protection Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations" Division
Contact:
Frank Davis x74181 S
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O TITLE:
- Physical Protection Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Sto. age Installations (ISFSIs)
CFR CITATION:
10 CFR 73 ABSTRACT:
Requirements for the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel at independent storage sites are currently contained in 10 CFR 73.50.
Those requirements were originally developed for a broad range of materials and facilities, and were not developed specifically for independent spent fuel storage installa-tions (ISFSIs).
Preliminary studies, some of which are related to transpor-tation and require extrapolation to fixed installations, indicate that some of the current requirements may be excessive for ISFSIs.
If ongoing assess-ments confirm that existing regulations should be changed, a proposed performance-oriented rule would be developed to allow licensees the flexi-bility of using the most cost-effective measures available to meet the regulatory requirements.
TIMETABLE:
NPRM 12/31/85 LEGAL AUTHORITY:
42 USC 2201; 42 USC 5841 EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESS AND OTHER ENTITIES:
No AGENCY CONTACT:
Frank Davis Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Washington, DC. 20555 301 427-4181 t
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EVALUATION OF RULEMAKING TITLE: Physical Protection Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations 1.
The issue to be addressee The requirements for the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel at independent storage sites are currently contained in 10 CFR 73.50.
These requirements were originally developed for a broad range of materials and facilities and were not developed specifically for independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs). A current investigation is being conducted to determine whether these requirements should be changed for those installations.
2.
The necessity and urgency of addressing this issue.
Evaluation of the proposed rule is felt necessary since licensing of the i
first ISFSI is scheduled to be completed in 1985 or 1986.
The number of ISFSIs to be licensed thereafter may be one or two per year, with the monitored retrievable storage sites beginning to be licensed around 1990.
3.
Alternatives to rulemaking.
An alternative to the rulemaking is to continue use of the existing regula-tions, issuing exemptions and adding license conditions as necessary.
In accordance with NRC Policy and Planning Guidance, rulemaking is to be utilized when numerous licensees are affected, i
i 4.
How the issue will be addressed through rulemaking.
The rulemaking will reword the requirements in 73.50 to be more commensurate with the consequences that could result from a sabotage attack. A proposed performance-oriented rule would be developed to allow licensees the flexibility of using the most cost effective measures availabl.e to meet the requirements.
-mm
2 5.
Effect of the rulemaking results on the public, industry, and NRC.
Since the technical issues have not been resolved, no effect of this action has been determined.
6.
NRC resources and scheduling needed for the rulemaking.
l It will take about one year to publish a final rule after the Commission approves the proposed rule for publication.
The estimated resources needed from now until a final rule is prepared are approximately 1 1/2 staff years.
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BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS i
1
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8 73.54 Requirements for physical protec. Vital area may be within a single pro.
tion of licenned metivities.
tected area.
Each licensee who possesses, uses, or (2) The licensee shall locate material stores formula quantities of strategic access areas only within protected speelal nuclear material which is not areas such that access to the material readily separable from other radioac-access area requires passage through j
tive material and which has a total ex.
at least two physical barriers. More ternal radiation dose rate in excess of than one material access area may be i
100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 within a single protected area.
feet from any accessible surface with.
(3) The physleal barrier at the pe-out intervening shielding other than rimeter of the protected area shall be at a nuclear reactor facility licensed separated from any other barrier des-pursusnt to Part 50 of this chapter ignated as a physical barrier within shall comply with the following:
the protected area. and the interven-(a) Physical secuHty organkaffon. Ing space monitored or periodically (1) The licensee shall establish a secu. checked to detect the presence of per-rity organization, including guards, to sons or vehicles so that the facility se-protect his facility against radiological curity organization can respond to sus-sabotage and the special nuclear mate. plcious activity or to the breaching of rial in his possession against theft.
any physical barrier.
(2) At least one supervisor of the se.
(4) An isolation zone shall be main-curity organization shall be on site at tained around the physical barrier at all times, the perimeter of the protected area (3) The licensee shall establish, and any part of a building used as part maintain and follow written security of that physical barrier. The isolation procedures which document the strue-sone shall be monitored to detect the ture of the security organization and presence of individuals or vehicles which detail the duties of guards, within the zone so as to allow response watchmen. and other individuals re.
by armed members of the license secu-sponsible for security.
rity organization to be initiated at the (4) The licensee shall not permit an time of penetration of the protected individual to act as a guard, watch. area. Parking facilities. both for em-man, armed response person, or other p'nyees and visitors, shall be located member of the security organization outside the isolation zone, unless such individual has been (5) Isolation zones and clear areas trained, equipped, and qualified to between barriers shall be provided perform each assigned security job with illumination sufficient for the 4
duty in accordance with Appendix B.
monitoring required by paragraphs (b)
" General Criteria for Security Person. (3) and (4) of this section, but not less nel." of this part. Upon the request of than 0.2 foot candles.
an authorized representative of the (c) Access requirements. The licensee Commission the licensee shall demon-shall control all points of personnel strate the ability of the physical secu. and vehicle access into a protected rity personnel to carry out their as-area, including shipping or receiving i
signed duties and responsibilities, areas, and into each vital area. Identi-Each guard, watchman, armed re-fication of personnel and vehicles sponse person, and other member of shall be made and authorization shall the security organization shall requa-be checked at such points.
lify in accordance with Appendix B of (1) At the point of personnel and ve-this part at least every 12 months. hicle access into a protected area, all Such requalification shall be docu. Individuals. except employees who pos-mented.
seas a NRC or United States Depart-(b) Physicci barriers. (1) The licens-ment of Energy access authorization.
ee shall locate vital equipment only and all hand-carried packages shall be within a vital area which, in turn, searched for devices such as firearms, I
shall be located within a protected explosives, and incendiary devices, or area such that access to vital equip-other items which could be used for ment requires passage through at least radiological sabotage. The search shall two physical barriers. More than one be conducted either by a physical i
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search or by the use of equipment ca-(6) No tehicles used primarth im pable of detecting such devices. Em-the conveyaner of indniduals shalt N ployees who possess an NRC or De-permitted within a protrried neo 1
partment of Energy access authoriza-except under emeterney ennditime tion shall be searched at random inter.
(*l) Keys, locks. combinalions md vals. Subsequent to search, drivers of related equipment shall be enntroll t delivery and service vehicles shall be to minimize the possibihts of compen escorted at all times while within the mise and promptly changed w heneser protection area.
there is evidence that they hate brrn (2) All packages being delivered into compromised. Upon termination of the protected area shall be checked employment of any emplorre. ken for proper identification and authori-locks, combinations and related enmp-zation. Packages other than hand-car-ment to which that employer hari ried packages shall be searched at access shall be changed random intervals.
(d) Detection cids. (1) All alarms re.
(3) A picture badge identification quired pursuant to this part shall nn system shall be used fer all individuals nunciate in a continuously manned who are authorized access to protected central alarm station located uitlun areas without escort.
the protected area and in at Irast an.
(4) Access to vital areas and material other continuously manned st at inn.
access areas shall be limited to individ-not necessarily within the proterted uals who are authorized access to vital area, such that a sincle art enenm equipment or special nuclear material remove the capability of calline for as and who require such access to per-sistance or otherwise respondme to an form their duties. Authorization for alarm. All alarms shall be self. chm such individuals shall be provided by ing and tamper indientinc. The numm the issuance of specially coded num-ication of an alarm at the onsite een bered badges indicating vital areas and tral alarm station shall indicate t ha material access areas to which access type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarm is authorized. Unoccupied vital areas emergency exit alarm. etea and lara.
and material access areas shall be pro-tion. All intrusion alarms. emercenes tected by an active intrusion alarm exit alarms, alarm systems, and line system.
supervisory systems shall at minimum (5) Individuals not employed by the meet the performance and rrhnbili's licensee shall be escorted by a watch-levels indicated by GSA Interim Fed-man, or other individual designated by eral Specification W-A-00450 B <GSA the licensee, while in a protected area FSS).
and shall be badged to indicate that an (2) All emergency exits in cach pm escort is required. In addition, each in-tected area and each sital aren shall dividual not employed by the licensee be alarmed.
shall be required to register his name.
(e) Comm unication req uirem en ti date, time, purpose of visit. employ- (1) Each guard or watchman on cl'it.
rnent affiliation, citizenship name and shall be capable of maintainmc rnn badge number of the escort, and name tint *ods communication alth an mch of the individual to be visited. Except vidual in a continuously manned een for a driver of a delivery or service ve-tral alarm station within the protected hicle, an individual not employed by area, who shall be capable of calhne the ticensee who requires frequent and for assistance from other guards and extended access to a protected area or watchmen and from local law enforce.
a vital area need not be escorted pro-ment authorities.
vided such individual is provided with (2) The alarm stations required b3 a picture badge. which he must receive paragraph (dx1) of this section shall upon entrance into the protected area have conventional telephone scrsire and which he must return each time for communication with the law on-he leaves the protected area, which in-forcement authorities as described in dicates: (1) Nonemployee no escort re-paragraph (e)(1) of this section.
quired. (ii) areas to which access is au-(3) To provide the capability of con.
thorized, and (iii) the period for which tinuous communication. two way radio access has been authorized.
voice communication shall be estab.
l t 73.50 hshed in addition to conventional tele-(ii) Assess the extent of the threat, phone service between local las en-if any, and lorcement authorities and the facility (iii) Take immediate concurrent and shall terminate at the facility in a sneasures to neutrahze the threat, by:
continuously manned central alarm station within the protected area.
(A) Requiring responding guards to (4) All communications equipment, interpose themselves between material including offsite equipment, shall access areas and vital areas and any remain operable from independent adversary attempting entry for the power sources in the event of loss of purpose of theft of special nuclear ma-primary power.
terial or radiological sabotage and to (f) Testing and maintenance. Each intercept any person exiting with spe-licensee shall test and maintain intru-cla) nuclent materin). and sion alarms, emergency alarms, com-(B) Informing local law enforcement munications equipment. physical bar-agencies of the threat and requesting riers, and other security related de.
assistance.
vices or equipment utilized pursuant (4) The licensee shall instruct every to this section as follows:
guard to prevent or impede attempted (1) All alarms, communications acts of theft or radiological sabotage equipment, physical barriers, and by using force sufficient to counter other security related devices or equip-the force directed at him including ment shall be maintained in operable deadly force when the guard has a res, and effective condition.
sonable belief it is necessary in self do.
(2) Each intrusion alarm shall be fense or in the defense of others, a
functionally tested for operability and required performance at the beginning (h) By February 20.1979 each licens-and end of each interval during which ee shall submit a training and quall5
- 11 is used for security, but not less fre* cations plan outlining the processes by which guards, watchmen, armed re i quently than once every seven (7) sponse persons and other members of
( ) Communications equipment shall e secu y organization will k 00-be tested for operability and perform-lected. trained, equipped, tested, and ance not less frequently than once at qualified to assure these individualg the beginning of each security person. meet the requirements of paragrapit:
nel sork shift.
(a)(4) of this section. The training an$
(g) Response requirement (1) The 11-qualifications plan shall include g':
censee shall have a safeguards contin. schedule to show how all security gency plan for dealing with threats, sonnel will be qualified by (within thef ts. and radiological sabotage relat. years after October 23.1978) or wt ed to the special nuclear material and two years after the submitted plan nuclear facilities subject to the provi-approved, whichever is later.
sions of this section. Safeguards con-training and qualifications plan tingency plans shall be in accordance be followed by the licensee after with the criteria in Appendix C of this 23,1979 or 60 days after the sub part. " Licensee Safeguards Contingen-plan is approved by the NRC, w cy Plans."
ever is later.
(2) The licensee shall establish and document liaison with law enforce.
(Sec.1611. Pub. L 83-703. 68 Stat. 944.
{
ment authorities I.93-377. 88 stat. 475; sea. 201, 204(b (3) Upon detection of abnormal pres. M 1.93-438. 88 sm.1242-1243.
ence or activity of persons or vehicles M. 89 Sm 413 (42 m 3
g, 3
within an isolation zone, a protected 138 FR 35430. Dec as amended area, a material access area, or a vital 42 FR 64103. Dec[ 28,197322.197i; 43 FR I area; or upon evidence or indication of intrusion into a protected area, mate' Mar. 23,1978; 43 FR 37426, Aug. 23. IMR rial access area, or vital area, the h-FR 68198. Nov. 28.19791 censee security organization shall:
(1) Determine whether or not a
. threat exists, l
j
Subpart H-Physleel Protection S 71.81 Physical security plan.
A plan for detailed security meas-ures for physical protection shall be established. This plan shall consist of two parts. Part I shall demonstrate how the applicant plans to comply with the applicable requirements of Part 73 of this chapter and during transportation to and from the pro-posed ISFSI and shall include the design for physical protection and the licensee's safeguards contingency plan and guard training plan. Part II shall list tests, inspections, audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate com-pliance with such requirements.
S 72.82 Design for physical protection.
The design for physical protection shall show the site layout and ISFSI design features provided to protect the ISFSI from sabotage. It shall include:
(a) The design criteria for the physi-cal protection of the proposed ISFSI; (b) The design bases and the relation of the design bases to the design crite-ria submitted pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section; and (c) Information relative to materials of construction, equipment, general ar-rangement, and proposed quality as-surance program sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final se-curity system will conform to the design bases for the principal design criteria submitted pursuant to para-graph (a) of this section.
l i
Federal Cegist:r / V11. 49. Ms.11g i Friday, June 8.1984 / Proposid Ruhe 23887 DaTE: Comment period expires Dep**mber 10.19M.
Appetssts-Written comments should be submitted to the Secretary of the Commission. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. DC 30555.
Attention: Docieting and Service Branch. Copies of comments on the proposed rule may be examined and copied for a fee at the NRC public Document Room.1717 H Street NW.
Washington. DC.
I POR PUstTHEA INF0masatt0N C0ertACT:
Carl B. Sawyer. Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commision.
Washington. DC 20555. Telephone: 301-427-4186.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATl0sc
Background
The NRC carries out a continuing series of studies to aid in determining the measures that are needed to protect radioactive material. Including irradisted (spent) fuel, against sabotage.
During the mid.1970s. studies (NUREG-0194. " Calculations of Radiological Consequences fmm Sabotage of Shipping Casks for Spent Fuel and High-Jevel Waste " February 1977; and '
NUREG-0170 "FinalEnvironmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes." December 1977), estimeted the health effects of a radiological release in NUCLEAR REGULATORY a non-urban area resulting from a high-COMMISSION explosive assault of a spent fuel cask.
The estimated risks were not considered 10 CFR Part73 to be substantive enough to warrant
^ ' "
44odification of Protection S
at nes ud Requirements for Spent Fuel chapter on the sabotage of spent fuelin WPments urban areas of high population density Aotwer.Nucleat Regulatory (SAND 77-1927. ' Transport of Commission.
Radionuclides in Urban Endrons: A ACTIOst proposed rule.
. Working Draft Assessment"). *Jhle study auggested that the sabotage of spent fuel DussasAnr.The Nuclear Regulatory shipments had the potential for Commission is considering am ending its producing serious radiological eegulatinas for the physical protection of consequences in areas of high irradiated reeclor fuelin transit. h population density.& Commission l
Issue underconsideration la one of concluded that.in order to protect safeguards eather than safety.*Ibe lealth and==l=l=* danger to life and amendments =onld take into account pmperty (se.:tions 161b and 1811(3) of I
new data from a research program and the Atomic Energy Act of1954, as '
from other sources that Indicate that the amended) it was prudent and desirable consequences of successful sabotage of So mequire artain interim esfeguards
.an irradiated fuel shipment in a heavily measures for spent fuel shipments.h populated area would be small focus ofconcemwas on possible compared to the conseguence astimates successful acts of sabotage in densely that promptedissuance of the current pepalated urban areas. Because of the l
sule. For attain spent fuel shipments.
possibility that spent fuel shipments I
.these amendments wouliprovide could be hijacked and moved fromlow continued protection aplast sabotage, population areas to high population 4,
while at the same time selieving the.
areas,the interim requirements applied licensee of mon. essential requirements.
to all abipments, even though the t
YT 6% 23847
23868 Fcdcral Rzgistrr / Vol. 49. No.112 / Friday Jun? 8,1984 / Proposed Rulzs planned shipment route did not pass the U.S. Army M3A1 was assumed. It is values can be obtained, depending on through a densely populated urban area.
the largest shaped charge readily the circumstances that are assigned. The The interim requirements were to be in available. An M3A1 causes damage following is an example from among the effect until the results of confirmatory through formatin of a high pressure higher values that can be obtained from research became available and were particulate jet which may be a fraction the data. For the most densely populated analyzed.
of an inch in diamter and has the area studied (up to 200.000 persons per i
The interim rule, which set forth capability to penetrate two or more feet square mile), at evening rush hour on a physical protection requirements in 10 of metal, eroding everything in its path.
business day, and in the most CFR 73.37, was issued on June 15,1979.
From the outset,it was expected that a unfavorable location for a release, the and was made effective on July 3.1979.
shaped charge would be more efficient calculated radiological consequence ne rule was issued without benefit of than other configurations in producing (peak consequence) based on data from public comment, but at the time of respirable particles. For that reason the Table 5-4 of NUREG/CR-0743 is no publication public comment was invited. M3A1 was designated as the reference early fatalities and less than three (2.9)
Afte reviewing the public comments and explosive.The refernece cask was latent cancer fatalities.
efter taking into account its experience specified as a single-assembly cask. The in administer 1g the rule, the NRC. on specificaton is conservative since a ne results of an explosive sabotage June 3,1980, published amendments to single assembly cask has smaller experiment vary from experiment to the rule.The amendments were made dimensions than a multiassembly cask experiment, and only a limited number effective on July 3,1980, and the and is, therefore, more likely to yield a of experiments can be performed.The amended rule is currently in effect as to greater quantity of respirable particles Mts of h NR@md Nm CFR 73.37(a) through (e).
(per assembly)in response to a given are based on four scaled experiements using irradiated fuel, and the largest sfrie o Related Rmarch i
xpe ts using model measured release value was used to SAND 77-1927 which prompted (small-scale) explosives against derive the nine-gram value cited. In issuance of the protection requirements.
simulated casks containing irradiated addition, a number of supporting tests a
contained estimates which were fuel characterized the NRC sponsored were performed to establish shaped i
unavoidably subject to large program.These experiments used charge jet characteristics and jet-to-fuel-I uncertainties due to a lack of technical pressurized water reactor (pWR) fuel pin interaction.
data. A later draft of the Sandia report with a burnup of approximately 30,000 Results of the NRC-sponsored
(" Transportation of Radionuclides in megawatt days per metric ton of heavy research program (as well as those of Urban Environs: Draft Environmental metal and approximately six-and-a-half-the DOE program to be discussed Assessment") was published by the year cooling. Measurement of the subsequently) assume sabotage of a NRC as NUREG/CR-0743. Although this quantity of released material revealed single-asse.mbly cask, while the original draft predicted less serious the fraction that was made up of SAND 77-1927 and NUREG/CR-0743 consequences, a significant degree of particles of respirable size (those having estimates assume a three-assembly uncertainty still remained that could be a diameter ofless than four microns).
cask. For the levels of release under resolved only by further study and
' Upward scaling permitted the data to consideration here, the releases and the i
experiments.
take into account the effect of the health consequences for a three.
Investigators at that time agreed and reference explosive and a full-scale assembly cask are calculated to be, at continue to agree (1) that consequences cask. Scaling led to the conclusion that worst. double those for a single-of an act of sabotage would be a direct less than nine grams of spent fuel would assembly cask.The presence of l
function of the quantity of spent fuel be released in respirable form if the additional assemblies in a cask would that would be released in respirable reference charge were used successfully increase the likely release, but only in 3
form, and (2) that the only credible against a cask containing a single PWR proportion to the number of assemblies means of malevolent generation of spent fuel assembly.Using results of the that lie in the roughly straight line path respirable particles would be through METRAN computer code for health of the jet. For more than three PWR the use of a large quantity (tens to conseuences(oneof twohealth assemblies (a fully loaded rail cask hundreds of pounds) of high explosive consequence codes used in SAND 77-could contain 10 PWR assemblies) the skillfull applied. IJttle information was 1927 and NUREG/CR-0743) as set forth upper bound of release would likely availab e to aid in predicting the in Table 5-6 of NUREG/CR-0743 and.
response of spent fuel and spent fuel assuming 150-day rather than six-and-a-increase roughly in proportion to the squhre root of the total number of casks to explosive sabotage.
half. year cooling, res,erschers found that assemblies contained in a cask. On the The NRC and the Department of the average radiological consequence of b"N' *f ", it is expected that the number
8"I**** fro
- th*
Energy (DOE) responded to this need for a release in a heavily populated area explosive technical data by sponsoring separate such as New York City would be no but coordinated experimental programs.
early fatalities and less than one (0.4) of fatalities from a sabotage explosion Both programs were designed to yield latent cancer fatality.Early fatalities are w uld be greater than the number of information about the release from a those that occur within one year after radiologically induced fatalities.
specified reference sabotage event.
exposure to the radioactive material.
~ Explosive charges other than shaped which was defined as follows. Saboteur Latent cancer fatalities are those that charges were considered.In other skills were specified as those of an occur at any time following the exposure experiments, scaled charges experienced military or commercial and could result from the intitial representing full-scale charges of up to explosive demolition specialist.
exposure orTrom anylong-term several hundred pounds of explosive did Familiarity with a wide range of kinds exposure tolow levels of contamination. not breach the cask's inner containment and configurations of explosives was The average consequence values just components. Accordingly,such full-assumed. Use of up to hundreds of cited were selected as being the most - -scale charges appear unlikely to produce pounds of military or commecial representative of the values that were any release of spent fuel and hence explosives was permitted.For the calculsted for the specified release.
unlikely to ca'use radiological i
4 special case of shaped charges, use of Either higher orlower consequence consequences.
l
Fedir:1 Regist:r / V:1. 49, No.112 / Friday. June 8,1984 / Pr:p:s:d Rul:s 23869
%e program sponsored by DOE (KW/Kg), which is termed reference fatalities.Re research recently included one full-scale and several fuel.The possible transport of spent fuel completed has shown that the likely small-scale experiments.The full-scale subjected to higher burnup was respirable release from sabotage and the experiments used a reference charge considered although these shipments resulting consequences are but a tiny against a full-scale cask containing a are not now being made. For fuel percentage of the estimated values single unirradiated surrogate fuel subjected to 40.000 mwd /hfr (which is which originally prompted issuance of assembly. Again the quantity of material typical of the higher burnups being the rule. Accordingly, the original basis released from the cask was measured.
considered) at a power density of 36.4 for the~ rule is no longer valid.
and the released quantity was analyzed KW/Kg. the calculated consequences of 2.The value of consequence now to determine what fraction was successful sabotage are about 45 percent predicted (no early fatalities and about composed of respirable-sized particles.
higher than the consequences of four latent cancer fatalities average for About three grams of respirable successful sabotage of reference fuel.
reference basis sabotage of a three-surrogate fuel was released.On the Additionalinformation on the NDC.
assembly cask) is obtained only when a basis of the results of small-scale fuel spons'ored program con be found in a set of assumptions very favorable to the characterization experiments which had report entitled " Final Report On saboteur are made.Re effects of been conducted separately,it was Shipping Cask Sabotage Source Term assumptions less favorable to a determined that a release of three grams Investigation." Additionalinformation saboteur are discussed below:
of surrogate fuel was equivalent to a on the DOE-sponsored program can be a.fyelburnup and cooling.
maximum release of17 grams of found in a report entitled "An Consequence calculations are based on irradiated fuel.Using the CRAC Assessment of the Safety of Spent Fuel reference fuel cooled for 150 days.
computer code for health consequences Transportation in Urban Environs." A Because oflower burnup and longer (the second of the computer codes used peer review of both research programs cooling, assemblies currently being in SAND 77-1927 and NUREG/CR-0743 was carried out by the U.S. Army's shipped typically contain a radioactive and a code which generally predicts Ballistic Research Laboratory.The material inventory 0.2 to 0.5 as i
higher health consequences than the review focused on the interaction hazardous as the assumed inventory for hETRAN code) and again assuming between explosives, cask, and fuel and reference fuel.
150-day cooling researchers found that on the experimental techniques used.
- b. Population density. The release of the average radiological consequence of The conclusions in the peer review radioactive material was postulated to a 17-gram release m a heavily populated area such as New York City would be report generally confirm the take place within an area with I
d about 2 latent reasonableness of the approaches taken population density in the range between in the research, and based on the 62.000 and 200,000 persons per square t
assumptions of the research approach, mde.Very few (perhaps only one) characterized l
e nfirmed the estimated release levels, locations in the U.S. are,ty.
s ere o en ly a t es an s out 7 latent cancer fatalities. Values of The two research reports, the peer by this population densi average or peak consequences should be review report, and SAND 77-1927 are Consequences decline markedly for doubled to account for the case of a available forinspection at the NRC lower population density.
1 three-assembly truck cask.
Public Document Room,1717 H Street
- c. Lifetime ofrespitableparticles. A j
Conceivably, an adversary could use NW., Washington, DC. NUREG/CR-0743 respirable particle tends to adhere to the more than one shaped charge in is available from the NRC/GPO Sales first sizeable particle it encounters or to attacking a cask, and that possibility Program. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory serve as a condensation site for vapors was considered. For shaped charges the Commission, Washington, DC 20555.
(such as water). thus possibly limiting size of the reference charge, the likely Conclusions its lifetime to one that is shorter than result is that the release would be in that necessary for human inhalation and proportion to the number of charges For the following reasons, the deep deposition in the lung. In an actual used.The use of larger shaped charges Commission concludes that moderation sabotage, products of the explosion is conceivable but less credible.These of the current interim rule (10 CFR 73.37) would undoubtedly provide numerous types of charges would probably have to f r the protection of spent fuel larger-than-respirable particles that be custom-made, thereby introducing a shipments against sabotage is justified:
would act as agglomeration sites for formidable new problem for en
- 1. Issuance of the interim rule was respirable particles. In both sets of adversary.There is no known based chiefly on consequence estimates experiments, the products of the technology that would allow a set forth in SAND 77-1927. A baseline explosion were isolated from the cask to disproportionately large increa se in estimate, a high estimate, and a low keep the measurement problems production of respirable particles with estimate were provided. At the time the manageable. Water particles (fog.like credible increase in a saboteur's rule issuance was under consideration, droplets) would also serve as explosive resources.
the high consequence estimate was agglomeration sites. Finally, water Most consequence calculations based on 14,000 grams of respirabis vapor or materials vaporized by the discussed herein are based on fuel release for a truck cask containing ticee explosive earlier do not account for a subjected to burnop of 33,000 megawatt fuel assemblies and on 47,500 grams of. water jacket or annulus of wet material days per metric ton of heavy metal respirable release for a rail cask. At the present in all truck casks now in use. An (mwd /hfr) at a power density of 40 time, the high-estimate releases could experiment has shown that the presence kilowatts per kilogram of heavy metal not be ruled out.The calculated average of water (water jacket and water-filled consequences for truck cask sabotage cavity) between the explosive and the 8 De current CRAC code that is dted her, were Summarized as several tens of fuel reduces the quantity of respirable (sometunes referred to es CRAC 2)is a medined early fatalities and hundreds of latent material released by a factor of 40.
version of the code that wu used in SAND r7-1s27 cancer fatalities.The calculated average Simultaneous occurrence of worst-or consequences for a rail cask were near-worst-case values for each of these
)
con e o ew rce t than the earlier vers;en; the ntimated consequences are summarized as hundreds of early factors, plus an assumption of successful bened on this modined verstoa fatalities and thousands of latent cancer sabotage appears remote in the extreme.
s e
23870 Fed;ral Rigist:r / W1. 49. No.112 / Frid y. June C.19841 Propos d Rults Calculated consequences reported
- 3. For shipments of spent fuel cooled significant economic impact upon a herein are reduced by factors of up to 150 days or more, a new set of moderate substantial number of small entities. The hundreds if values other than the most requirements would apply that are rule.if promulgated, would apply to
/
f:vorable are assigned.
consistent with the experimentally licensees who transport or dehver to e
- 3. Although the experiments have determined level of consequence. The carrierfor transport a shipment of spent reduced the uncertainty in the quantity requirements call for a ahlpment to be fuelin a quantity in excess of 100 grams.
cf materiallikely to be released as a accompanied by an unarzned escort Typical of the licensees who deliver result of successful sabotage, there are (who may also serve as driver. rail spent fuel to carrier for transport are limitations to the conclusions of the employee, or ship's officer) who would nuclear power reactor operators, program that must be taken into arry out prescribed security independent spent fuel storage pool cecount.The reduced consequences procedures. In addition. present operators, and research institutions.
described herein are necessarily subject requirements for protection of shipment None of the licensees who deliver spent to several assumptions. including that of schedule information, onboard fuel to a carrier for transport are known a reference explosive. While the shaped communications (all transport modes).
to be small entities. Licensees who charge selected for the explosive threat and immobilization (truck mode only) transport spent fuel are typically large represents a very severe threat.even would be retained.
carriers who specialize in the transport more severe threats cannot be ruled out Among other requirements considered of radioactive materials and other if an adversary is granted protracted no longer needed (for shipments of fuel hazardous materials and who have control of a shipment and unhindered cooled 150 days or more) are those for many employees. No small entities are movement. In a similar vein, route surveys and advance coordination known to be within this licensee group.
consequence modeling assumptions with locallaw enforcement agencies ne NRC has estimated the cost more severe than those postulated in (LLEAs).New DOT requirements for impact of these amendments upon the NUREG/CR-0743 can also be routing (49 CFR 177.825) issued in the licensed industry. According to these conjectured (e,g, localized areas, such interest of safety and recent! put in -
estimates licensees would incur the 3
es stadiums, with extremely high force apply to NRC licensees and follow ng costs, assuming continuation population densities). If completely require them to use routes consistent of the current approximately135 unrestricted movement of the shipment with NRC safeguards routing policy.
shipments annually. One. time costs for end unrestrained use of sabotage With respect to LLEA coordination, a the proposed amendments have already resources against the shipment are separate NRC rule [the present been expended due to the same ellowed. For these reasons a set of i 73.37{f)] requires the notification of requirements under the present interim moderate requirements that would g6vernors (or designated state oI!icials) rule. Annual maintenance cost of continue to provide a significant level of whenever spent fuelis to be transported equipment required by the proposed protection agamst protracted loss of within a state to enable the state t amendments is estimated at $14.000.
control of a shipment and unhindered contribute to the safety, security, and Annual planning and administration movement of a shipment by a saboteur ease of transport of the shipment State cost is estimated at $7,000. Total cost to ts being considered.The requirements LLEAs typically are informed of licensees is therefore estimated at should (a) deny an adversary easy impending shipments through this
$21.000 annually, access to shipment location information; process.
One savings to industry under the le olent mo es aga s oss of EnvironmentalImpact: Negative proposed amendments would be the eh,m, adon oMout $r,000 expeded Declaration m
control of a shipment (c) provide a annuaUy I r armed escorts presently means to quickly summon assistance The promulgation of these required under the interim rule.
from locallaw enforcement authorities; amendments would not result in any and (d) provide a means toimpede activity that affects the environment.
Simplification of admin,stratio,n is i
estimated to result in an additional unauthorized movement of a truck Accordingly, the Commission has shipment into a heavily populated area.
determined under the National informa o e ri ese est metes is Summary of the Proposed Rule nmenha set forth in,a document entitled tn er
' Modification of Protection A rule is proposed that takes into an environmentalimpact statement nor Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments:
account the new information and environmentalimpact appraisal to conclusions which have emerged from support a negative declaration for the Regulatory Analysis and is available f r inspection and copying in the NRC the research program.ne important proposed amendments to Title tois Public Document Room.1717 H Street features of the proposed rule are:
required-1.ne performance requirements for NW., Washington. D.C.
protection of spent fuel shipments'have Paperwork Reduction Act Statement Any small entity subject to this been modified to emphasiz.e protection
- Ihis proposed rule amends regulation which determines that, against sabotage with high consequence. Information collection requirements that because of its size,it is likely to bear a High consequence refers to the levels of are subject to the Paperwork Reduction disproportionate adverse economic consequence that prompted issuance of Act of1980 (44 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.) by impact should notify the Commission of the original interim rule. For a truck reducing the burden."Ihis rule has been this in a comment that indicates:
shipment, high consequence refers to submitted to the Office of Management (a) The licensee's siu in terms of tens of early fatalities and hundreds of and Budget for review of the proposed annual bcome or revenue and number latent cancer fatalities.
revised paperwork requirements.
of employees:
2.For shipment of spent fuel cooled (b) How the proposed regulation less than 150 days, the current RegulatoryMexibHity CertWicatm.e would result in a significant economic requirements would continue to apply.
Ilased on the information available at burden upori the licensee as compared
)
because detailed consequence this stage of the rulemaking proceeding to that on a larger licensee: and calculations for auch fuel have not been and in accordance with the Regulatory (c) How the proposed regulations carried out Mexibility Act of 1980,5 U.S.C. 605(b), a could be modified to take into account
Fediral Regi:t r / Vcl. 49. Ns.112 / Friday. June 8,1984 / Prop:sid Rul:s 23871 the licensee's differing needs of (1) * *
- supporting chain reaction at any time capabilities.
(i) Minimize the possibilities for high during the 150 day period before the Public Comment Solicited consequence radiological sabotage of date on which the fuel is loaded aboard spent fuel shipments; and the transport vehicle for transport shall:
Although it welcomes pubhc comment (1) Provide for notificatbn of the on any aspect of the proposed (2) * *
- NuclearRegulatory Commissionin
- regulation. the Commission particulary
( ii) Impede attempts at high advance of each shipment,in solicits comment on the following topics:
1.ls more research justified for consequence radiological sabotage of accordance with I 73.72 of this part safegurads of shipments of spent fuel spent fuel shipments or attempts to (2) include procedures for coping with cooled less than 150 days befo e illicitly move spent fuel shipmenta circumstances that threaten deliberate shipmenti containing materials with high damage to a spent fuel sh!pment and 2.Should the NRC simplify its consequence potential, until response with other safeguards emergencies; forces arrive.
(3) Provide that shipments are safeguards regulations by prohibitm.8 planned so that scheduled intermediate shipment of fuel cooled less than 150 days before shipment?
(b) Ceneraliequirements for stops are avoided to the extent
- 3. Are the NRC cost estimates in pmfection ofshipment ofspentfuel g,
(4) Provide for at least one escort. who accord with licensee experience?
ed less n
e g
may be a shipment vehicle operator or Ilst of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73 performance objectives of paragraph (a) an officer of the shipment vessel, and flazardous materials-Transportation, of this section, shall provide for a who main ains visual surv illance of the Incorporation by reference. Nuclear physical protection system that has a pment penods en e materials Packaging and containers, been established, maintained or 8 ipment we icle is stopped, or 9 e Penalty. Reporting requirement.
arranged for fuel that has been used as slu m tus is For the reasons set out in the part of an assembly to sustain nuclear preamble and under the authority of the fission in a self-supp rting c ain familiarized with, and is capable of implementing the security procedures; a
o de boa tran p rt ehl e or th t up n det c n a omal s
en n
S 553 oe hereby given that adoption of"the transport. This physical protection presence of unauthorized persons.
following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 system must include the following:
hic r suls in e vici i is contemplated.
d d
(c) Shipments by wodofspent reactor a deliberately induced situation that has PART 73-PHYSICAL. PROTECTION OF fuelcooledless than 250 days. In gye Potenda3 g,r gamaging a spent g,,3 sh m esco wiH:
PLANTS AND MATERIAL.S addition to the provisions of paragraph
- 1. The authority cifation for Part 73 is (b) of this sectiort the physical, exists:
revised to read as follows:
t (U) Assess the extent of the threat.if Authority: Secs. 53.161. 88 Stat 930. 948. as amended. see 147,94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C 2073.
(b) of this section that is by road must
" I*'
2167. 2201); sec. 210. 88 Stat.1242 es provide that*.
@)In om locallaw enforcement agencies of the threat and request amended, sec. 204. se Stat.1245 (42 U.S C aasistance; and 5641.sa44).
(d) Shipments by milofspent reactor (iv) Implement the procedures
/
Sections 73r (31 and (b) are also issued fuelcooledless than 250 days. In developed in acgordance with under sec. 301. Pub. L 96-295. 94 stat. 789 (42 addition to the provisions of paragraph ILS C 5642 note).
(b) of this section, the physical paragraph (f)(2) of this section; (7) Provide, for shipments by road a For the purposes of sec. 223, se Stat. 958. as protection system for any portion of a capability for an escort to communicate apent fuel shipment subject to paragraph as amended (42 USC 2201(b)); il 7320 (b) of this section that is by rail must with locallow enforcement agencies are vedu d 1
es S 73 24. n.2s. n.2e, nr nr. n.40. n.45, provide that:
through the use of the following equipment located on the transport
'r3.so, n.ss. n.e7 are issued under sec. tell. -
vehicle:
es Stat. 949. as amended (42 U.S.C 2201(i)):
(e) Shipments by sea ofspent reactor (i) citizens band (CE) redio; and and il 73.20 (c)(1). n.24 (b)(1). n.2e (b)(3).
fuelcooledless than 150 days. In (ii) radiotelephone or other NRC-(b)(e). and (k)(4), n.27 (a) and (b). 735 (8) addition to the provisions of paragraph approved equivalent means of two-way and (b). 73.40 (bl and (d). 73.46 (s)(e) and (b) of this section. the physical voice communication:
protection system for any portion of a (8) Provide, for shipments by ros'd,
) an (4 ( )
73 2 re issued under sec.181o. ee Stat. 950. as spent fuel shipment subject to paragraph NRC-approved featums that permit amended (42 U.S.C 2201(o)).
- (b} of this section that is by sea must immobilization of the cab or car Carryin8 Pordon he n% go-
- 2. Section 73.37is amended as follows: M
- a. Paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (a)(2)(lii), a nd '
(9) Provide, for shipments by rail, a (bMe) are revind.
(f)Regw.iementsforprotection of capability for an escort to communicate
- b. Existing paragraphs (f) and (g) are shipments of spent fuel cooled 150 days with locallaw enforcement agencies redesignated as paragraphs (g) and (h) ornrom.To achieve the performance through the use of a radiotelephone or respectively and are revised.
objectives of paragraph 73.37(a) of this other NRC-approved equivalent means
- c. A new paragraph (f)is added.
section, a physical protection system of two-way voice communication, which established, maintained, or arranged for must be available on the train: and I 73.37 Requirements for physical by the licensee for fuel which has not (10) Provide, for shipments by water
~ Protection of Irmsated tuol in tranett-been used as part of an assembly to in U.S. territory, a capability for an (a) Performance objectives.
sustain nuclear fission in a self-escort to communicate with locallaw l
23872 Fed ral Register / W1. 49, N2.112 / Frid;y, jun2 8,1984 / Prop:sid Rults snforcement agencies through the use of accordance with the provisions of radiotelephone or other NRC-approved i 73.21 until10 days after the last equivalent means of two.way voice shipment in the series has entered or communication.
originated within the state and an (3) Prior to the transport of spent fuel estimate of the date on which the last within or through a state a licensee shipment in the series will enter or subject to this section shall notify the originate within the state.
governor or the governor's designee. ne (4) A licensee shall notify by licensee shall comply with the following telephone or other means a responsible -
criteria in regartl to a noti 5 cation.
Individualin the ofEce of the govemor (1) He notification must be in writing or in the of5m of the governor's cnd sent to the office of each designee of any schedule change that cppropriate governor or the governor's differs by more than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> from the designee. A notification delivered by schedule information previously mail must be postmarked at least 7 days furnished in accordance with paragrsph before transport of a shipment within or (g)(3) of this section, and shallinform through the state. A notification that individual of the number of hours of delivered by messenger must reach the advance or delay relative to the written effice of the governor or the governor's schedule information previously designee at least 4 days before transport furnished.
af a shipment within or through the (h) State o!!!cials, state employees, state. A list of mailing addresses of and other individuals, whether or not governors and governor's designees was licensees of the Commission, who published in the Federal Registar on receive schedule information of the kind June 7.1982 (Vol. 47. No.109, pages specified in paragraph (g)(3) of this 24671-24673). An updated list will be section shall protect that information published annuallyin the Federal against unauthorized disclosure as Register on or about June 30.
specified in j 73.21.
fo lo i r stion, Dated at Washington, DC, this 5th day of (i)%e name, address, and telephone jurie.19s4.
number of the shipper. carrier and For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
receiver; samuel J. Gilk, (ii) A description of the shipment as Secretaryofthe Gmmission.
specified by the Departmeat of pi o.
n.se r.id s.r-ea. us amt Transportation in 49 CFR 172.202 and an.La.o coca neoases 172.203(d);
(iii) A listing of the routes to be used within the state; and (iv) A statement that the Information described below in i 73.37(g)(3)is required by NRC regulations to be protected in accordance with the requirements of I 73.21.
s (3) A licensee shall provide the '
following information on a separate anclosure to the written notification clong with a statement that the information is required by NRC regulations to be protected in eccordance with the requirements of 6 73.21.
(i) He estimated date and time of departure from the point of origin of the shipment:
(ii) He estimated date and time of cntry into the governor's state; (iii) For the esse of a single shipment,
whose schedule is not related to the schedule of any subsequent shipment, a statement that schedule information must be protected in acx:ordance with the provisions of 9 73.21 until at leest 10 days after the shipment has entered or originated within the state; and (iv) For the case of a shipment in a series of shipments whose schedules are related, a statement that schedule information most be protected in
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