ML20206E152

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Rev 0 to Sequoyah Element Rept 225.0(B), TVA Employee Concerns Special Program:Battery Support Design
ML20206E152
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 04/06/1987
From:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20206E135 List:
References
225.0(B), 225.0(B)-R, 225.0(B)-R00, NUDOCS 8704130532
Download: ML20206E152 (16)


Text

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, TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 225.0(B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM g- REPORT TYPE: SEQUOYAH ELEMENT REVISION NUMBER: 0

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TITLE: BATTERY SUPPORT DESIGN Battery Support Design PAGE 10F 15 REASON FOR REVISION:

PREPARATION

. PREPARED BY:

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SIGNATURE Q 8 DATE REVIEWS

. _ . . . REVIEW COMMI k

LAIGNATURE Y~ ' ' ~

'0 I "N DATE I

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by h' $$ hay +lWM SIGNATURE DATE LunLURRtnLt.s 0704130532 870409 7 _ 9. d ) /- s T 7 DR ADOCK 0500 SR90Dj ft./0d /,/.gr -97 SIGNATURE DATE

[ SIGHATUlf*/

j DATE

.. t APPROVED  :

t / , 1 M/A ECSP MANAGEli' 4\t A Tl! I MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE

\ CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)

CSRP Secretary's signature denotes SEP concurrences are in files.

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I TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 225.0(B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 PAGE 2 0F 15

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1. CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUES:

Concern: Issues: j XX-85-122-017 a. Class 1E and non-class IE batteries "Sequoyah - Class 1E and non- are unacceptably supported since they class IE batteries are unaccept- have no tie downs.

ably supported (no battery tie downs), and Unistrut supports b. Unistrut supports are unacceptably are unacceptably used. CI has used.

no further information.

Anonymous concern via letter."

XX-85-122-018 (BLN)

XX-85-122-019 (BFN)

WI-85-100-006 (WBN)

2. HAVE ISSUES BEEN IDENTIFIED IN ANOTHER SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS? YES X N0 o Identified by NRC - SCRT Audit (125 Vdc vital battery system)

Date September 1976 NRC letter to TVA from Varga to Williams, Trip Report on Seismic Audit of TVA Equipment, [ DES 761122 022), (11/16/76) o Identified by TVA SON NSRS Date Janaary 1986 TVA SNP - Nuclear Safety Review Staff Investigation Report No. I-86-274-SQN, Adequacy of Seismic Design of Battery Racks, (02/20/86)

3. D0ctMENT N05., TAG NOS., LOCATIONS OR OTHER SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIVE IptRIIFICATIONS STAItu IN ELEMENT:

Class 1E and non-class 1E battery supports; no specific tag numbers identified,

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t. INTERVIEW FILES REVIEWED:

File XX-85-122 was reviewed, and no additional unreviewed information for Sequoyah regarding this concern was identified.

l 05530 - December 31, 1986 L

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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NWBER: 225.0(8)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NWBER: 0 FAGE 3 0F 15 E. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:

See Appendix A.

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6. WHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING COMI1MENTS, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA 7 See Appendix A.

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7. LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER

, DISCUSSIONS RELAltu TO ELEMENT.

See Appendix A.

l l 8. EVALUATION PROCESS:

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a. Obtained results of Seismic Qualification Review Team (SCRT) audit by NRC.  ;
b. Reviewed TVA Report I-86-274-SQN.

i c. Identified other documents needed to perform review.

d. Performed walkdown of class 1E battery systems.
e. Reviewed available transcripts of NRC investigative

! interviews.

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! 9. DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS:

T Chronology:

09/76: NRC - SQRT audit of 125 Vdc vital battery system 1984: Concern identified to TVA management 11/14/85: X-form provided to TVA 01 /8 6 : TVA NSRS investigates adequacy of seismic design of class 1E battery racks 01/13/86: Sequoyah Engineering Project inspects 125 Y vital

! battery racks for the improperly installed Unistrut i fasteners

! 05/86: SQN retorques all bolts on battery racks for vital batteries I to IV

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09/20/86: Evaluation team perfonns walkdown inspection of the n 125 Y vital and diesel generator Lattery systems.

05530 - December 31, 1986 I

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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT N4SSER: 225.0(B) i SPECIAL PROGRAM l

REVISION NLSSER: 0 l i  ?

j. PAGE 4 0F 15 Discussion:

The issues relate to a concern that class 1E and non-class 1E ,

batteries are unacceptably supported since they have no vertical tie downs and the strut (Unistrut) used in their racks is -

unacceptable. ,

NRC General Design Criterion 2 requires Category I structures. l systems, and components to be designed to withstand the effects of ,

natural phenomena such as earthquakes. Sequoyah commitment to-  ;

comply with this criterion is stated in SNP FSAR Section 3.1. The j seismic design bases of Category I items are described in FSAR ,

Sections 2.5 and 3.7. Specific application of these bases for Category I battery racks in class 1E service is contained in FSAR l Section 3.10, Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-11.2 and SQN-0C-11.2.1, and ,

. Specification 1591 for the vital battery system. .

e Class 1E electrical service is provided for those systems which are j essential to the safe shutdown of the power plant or to maintaining  ;

radiation limits within NRC prescribed limits at the site  ;

jl f boundary. For non-class IE services, it is not appropriate from l either a safety or an economic viewpoint to apply the more severe j

("Q 5 seismic design criteria which is used for class 1E services. Thus i i non-class 1E batteries need not have vertical tie downs to accommodate seismic events, and the strut used in their racks is i acceptable. l

. Table 3.2.1-3 of Sequoyah FSAR indicates that class 1E service [

. batteries are used for the 125 V vital battery system and the 125 V l diesel generator battery system.

A. 125 V Vital Battery System (Gould. Inc.) '

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) 1. Vital Batteries I to IV:

The batteries and racks are supplied by Gould, Inc.

under contract 73C8-83800. They are located at i elevation 749 feet of the auxiliary building as shown ,

f on drawing 45N230, RIS for vital battery rooms !

J through IV. The batteries and racks were ordered under the requirements of Specification 1591 ( App. A 6.d).

? Section D2 of this specification states the  :

requirements for the seismic design of class IE

, equipment. Seismic qualification testing was performed by TI! Testing Laboratories under contract to Gould,

Inc. as documented in ETL Re rt No. 5547 (App. A, 5.j; 05/20/74). The selsric qual fication tests were 0553D - December 31, 1986

4 TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT Nt#8ER: 225.0(8)

SPECIAL PROGRMt REVISION Nt#4BER: 0 i FAGE G OI 15 j witnessed by TVA perscnnel as indicated on ETL Report i 5547. This test report was approved by TVA as documented by TVA meno from Domer to Chandler (App. A, 5.k; 06/26/74). In addition, a seismic qualification analysis was performed by Gould, Inc. as documented in summary of calculations of 4-60 Cells NCX-2100 rack and  !

S07-074698-666 (App. A, 5.1). TVA approval of the seismic qualification analysis was documented by TVA letter to Gould Inc. from Sprouse to Frenzel ( App. A, 5.y; 02/16/73).

i The following points are noted for the above referenced

' reports in conjunction with Gould, Inc. drawing 059469C (App. A, 5.f):

l o No positive battery tie down to the support rack was provided in the qualifying shake table tests.

! o The top strut side rail is clearly above the battery center of gravity, thus preventing battery tipping ,

during a seismic event.

o Strut (Unistrut) members were used in both the rack seismic qualifying analysis and the battery seismic qualifying tests.

l o The rack attachment to the shake table used a bolted connection (see later discussion in this report).

l i o Both test rack and contract rack shown on Gould, Inc.

i drawings 059469C (App. A 5.f) and 0590680 ( App. A,

) 5.c), respectively, indicate torquing bolted i + 2.5 foot pounds. Such torque ,

connections requirementsto are 27.5, for The internal rack assembly.

l The above provides evidence that the Gould, Inc. batteries i and racks for vital battery rooms I to IV were subjected to a i detailed seismic qualification program which demonstrated the acceptability of the use of strut (Unistrut) esterial and the 4

non-inclusion of battery vertical tie downs. '

3 The 125 Y vital battery system was also included by the NRC in their seismic audit of TVA equipment in late September l, 1976 ( App. A, 5.h). The NRC seismic team had requested that TVA provide the vital battery seismic test report to verify l ,. that tests were conducted without constraints to vertical motions. The NRC concluded that the batteries functioned 05530 - December 31, 1986

, _ _ . . . . . , - . . . . . ,. . . - , , . - - . , _ _ - , - . . _ _ _ , _ _ _ y.._-,r. ..,,,m .,,...__,.,,--._.-_,_-__y, _

- ~ -.- -.- - . - . . . - . -- .- . -- . - . - - . _ .

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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT Nt2SER: 225.0(8) l j SPECIAL PROGRAM  !

REVISION NL21BER: 0 j i s 5 ." ACE 6 0F 15

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acceptably during and after seismic testing, according to infonnation submitted by TVA. This conclusion was reflected '

in Sections 3.10 and 7.8 of the Safety Evaluation Report .

(SER).

During the course of investigating this employee concern in January 1986 ( App. A, 5.s), TVA NSRS visually inspected the l' battery racks and identified a limited number (two to five) of improperly installed Unistrut fasteners in each vital battery room. Approximately 50 percent of the Unistrut fasteners were observed. NSRS recommended that SQN inspect ,

all Unistrut fasteners on the vital batteries for proper l installation and rework all improperly installed fasteners.

Sequoyah Engineering Project (SQEP) inspected the vital i battery racks with respect to this recommendation as indicated in a meno from Abercrombie to Seiberling

( App. A 5.t; 04/18/86). The SQEP inspection results '

revealed that several bolting installations of Unistrut fasteners in each battery room did not meet design requirements. SQEP performed calculations and showed that the as-built installation of the( App.

battery) racks

. was adequate

(? to meet design requirements A, 5.u NSRS investigators also found no quality assurance records to indicate that the bolt torque requirements in the vital  !

battery racks had been verified by inspection. Therefore, I they recommended that SQN inspect a sample of Unistrut bolts t on each battery rack for proper torque if construction

' inspection records could not be located. In response to this NSRS recommendation, SQN indicated that 10 percent of the Unistrut fasteners for each vital battery rack would be ,

inspected for ) roper torque and the sampling size would be I increased if tw results of the initial sampling were i unacceptable ( App. A, 5.t). SQN commitment tracking report. l commitment verification and completion. form, tracking No. 86110 ( . A, 5.v) indicated SQN construction had inspected be t torque of the battery racks and retorqued all bolts of the racks for vital battery rooms I to IV to verify and record the prescribed torque value.

TVA NSRS concluded that no vertical restraint of the vital batteries was required by their seismic qualification.

Further, the battery racks were tested using Unistrut material and had been seismically qualified.

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05530 - December 31, 1986 i

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- TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NISSER: 225.0(B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM i

REVISION NtMBER: 0 PAGE 7 0F 15 In March 1985, TVA received a letter from Gould, Inc.

(App. A, 5.w) regarding the need to limit the space between the end battery cell and the end stringer of the battery rack to 1/4-inch or less to maintain the battery's seismic qualification based on testing. Gould, Inc.-indicated the excessive space can be corrected either by moving the end stringer in or by placing a spacer between the stringers and the batteries. Subsequently, SQN issued ECN L6436 ( App. A, 5.x) to modify the battery rack assembly to eliminate the excessive space which existed at the end of each row. ~As.

indicated later in this report, these modifications have been completed.

11. Fifth Vital Battery:

The fifth vital battery and rack are located at elevation 749 feet of the auxiliary building as shown on drawing 45W299, R4 of vital battery room V. Both SQN and WBN fifth vital batteries are of the same design and were supplied by Gould, 'Inc. under contract 84X8-832101. The battery and rack were qualified to

(. the enveloping WBN and SQN response spectra. The seismic test report and qualification analysis were included in the Environmental Qualification Report by GNB Batteries, Inc. -( App. A, 5.1; 05/29/84). The cover page of the environmental report was marked with a TVA ,

approval stamp dated 11/01/85.  ;

,! l Testing and analysis of the fifth vital battery and I

. rack were based on no vertical holdoown and the use of Unistrut for horizontal side rails. The battery racks

shown on Gould, Inc. drawings 410334C ( App. A, 5.d) and 4 410336C (App. A, 5.e) were similar to the racks i supporting vital batteries I to IV.

The records in SQN Workplan 11188 ( App. A, 5.p) indicated that all bolted connections for the fifth vital battery rack were inspected for proper torque.

l iii. Evaluation Team Walkdown of Vital Battery System:-

I The evaluation team perfomed a plant walkdown on September 20, 1 986 to make a general comparison of the battery installation with the installation drawings and 3 seismic qualifications. The specific areas included as a sample were the auxiliary buildin at elevation 749 feet,125 V vital battery rooms I, I, and V, r

1 f 05530 - December 31, 1986  !

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, TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NLDSER: 225.0(B)

SPECIAL PROGRN4 REVISION NL5WER: 0

[ PAGE 8 0F 15 o All battery rooms appeared complete and in accordance with the installation drawings and seismic qualifications with exceptions noted below. The Gould, Inc. batteries were installed with no vertical battery tie downs.

Separation material was installed between individual batteries. The strut side rails were in place. The fifth vital battery rack was bolted to the base.

o The racks in vital battery rooms I and II were welded to the base embedded plate. The test rack in the qualification. report was bolted to the shake table.

Since both the test rack and the contract rack were analytically determined rigid by Gould, Inc. (App. A, 5.cc), the use of welded connection is technically acceptable. The rack anchoring detail shown on section B-B of drawing 47N230, R15 indicated welding to base embedded plate without specifying weld type, size, and length. The as-built rack was composed of six transverse frames and three longitudinal frames interconnecting the transverse frames with X-braces. The bottom of each transverse frame consisted of two steel angles (2-1/2 inches x 2-1/2 inches x 3/8 inch). Each angle was about 20 inches long and welded to the base embedded plate continuously on both sides of the angle along the longitudinal axis. The weld appeared to be 1/8-inch fillet weld or larger. Gould, Inc. installation drawing 059068D ( App. A, 5.c) showed two 9/16-inch-diameter anchor bolt holes in each angle. This inferred the use of two 1/2-inch-diameter anchor bolts since the test rack was also bolted to the shake table with 1/2-inch-diameter bolts. Upon comparison of the estimated allowable capacity between the welded and bolted connections, the evaluation team considered the as-built welding connection adequate and an acceptable alternate for the 1/2-inch-diameter anchor bolts.

B. 125 V Diesel Generator Battery System (CSD)

The original batteries and racks for the main diesel generator building installed pre-1980 had been replaced beginning in 1981 with the currently existing batteries and racks which are supplied by CSD Battery Division of Eltra Corp. under TVA contract 80K8-327334. The batteries and racks are located at elevation 722 feet of the diesel generator building - one set in each of four rooms as shown

.. on drawing 15N210, R5 and on elevation 723.2 feet of the

, additional diesel generator building as shown on drawing 7

0553D - December 31, 1986

, TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NLMBER: 225.0(B )

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NLSEER: 0

. PAGE 9 0F 15 15N213, R1. Seismic qualification testing was performed by Wyle Laboratories under contract to C&D as documented in s Wyle Report No. 43368-1 dated 09/22/86 which is attached to -

C&D Report No. VL7610-02 ( App. A, 5.n; 11/18/76). TVA e7 proval of seismic qualification is documented by CEB memo from Barnett to Chandler (App. A, 5.m; 09/09/60) and TVA letter to C&D from Chandler to Walker (App. A, 5.aa; q' 09/24/80).

The following points are noted for the above referenced i reports:

o Positive battery tie down to the support rack was provided.in the qualifying shake table tests. 4 o The strut side rail is above the battery center of gravity, thus preventing battery tipping during a seismic event.

o Strut- (Unistrut) members were used in seismic qualifying

  • tests.

o The rack attachment to the shake table used a bolted connection.

The above provides evidence that the C&D batterie's and racks for the four diesel battery' rooms in the main diesel generator building were subjected to a detailed seismic qualification program which demonstrated the acceptability of the use of strut (Unistrut) material. These batteries included ' vertical battery tie downs.

The records in SQN Workplan 9119, R1 ( App. A, 5.o) indicated that all bolted connections for the battery rack in the four battery rooms of the main diesel generator building were inspected for proper torque. -

During the course of investigating this employee concern in January 1986 (App. A, 5.s), TVA NSRS reviewed the seismic -

reports of the diesel generator batteries and racks, and visually inspected the as-built battery rack assembly installation. The inspection revealed holddown brackets were Installed on these batteries in accordance with seismic qualification. NSRS concluded that the batteries were rdequately installed with vertical restraint. Further, the battery racks were tested using Unistrut material and had been .

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seismically qualified.

05530 - December 31, 1986

j' .. TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NLMBER: 225.0(B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM A REVISION NLMBER: 0:

PAGE 10 0F 15 The evaluation team performed a plant walkdown on September 20, 1986 to make a general comparison of the battery installation with the installation' drawings-(CSD drawing M-7739, Rev. 5) and seismic qualifications. The specific areas included as a sample were the diesel generator building at elevation 722 feet,125 V i

diesel generator battery rooms 1A-A and 2A-A. Both battery rooms appeared complete and in accordance with the installation drawings and seismic qualifications.s The CSD batteries were installed with vertical battery tie downs. Separation material was installed between individual batteries; the racks were bolted to the base; and the strut side rails were in place.

The evaluation team reviewed the attachments to the two NRC letters from Youngblood to White ( App. A, 5 4 and. 5.r) for

. material applicable to this element report. The team found no l additional relevant issues or infomation other than those

! already inauded in the concern statement itself.

Findings:

l 4 The alphabetic identifiers listed below correspond to the list of-

\g issues in Section 1.

e a. Class 1E batteries are acceptably supported with or without l use of tie downs as required by seismic qualifications;

non-class 1E batteries are. acceptably supported.

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b. The struts (Unistrut) used in the battery racks supporting the class 1E batteries are adequately qualified by testing and analysis; the struts used in the non-class 1E battery racks are also acceptable.

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Conclusions:

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a. The issue that class 1E and non-class 1E batteries are unacceptably supported since they have no tie downs is not valid.
b. The issue that Uni .st supports are unacceptably used is not

, valid.

c. The employee concern for Sequoyah is not valid and does not require any further action.

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I 10. CORRECTIVE ACTION No corrective action is required.

t 05530 - December 31, 1986

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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT Nt#EER: 225.0(B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NtMBER: 0 PAGE 11 0F 15 APPENDIX A

5. DOCtMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
a. TVA Drawings:

45W299, R4 " Electrical Equipment 125Y Vital Battery V - El.

749.0, Plans and Details" 45N230, R15 " Electrical Equipment Battery and DC Equipment Rooms, Plans, Sections and Details" 45N832-1, R24 " Conduit and Grounding, Floor El. 722.0, Floor Plan" 45N832-5, R21 " Conduit and Grounding, Floor El. 722.0 and l 740.5, Details - Sheet 1" l 41N353-14, R2 " Concrete Equipment Foundations Outline and Reinforcement" 15N210, R5 " Electrical Equipment General Arrangement, E1. 722.0" 10N320-2, R11 " Concrete Floors and Walls Outline - Sheet 2" 15N213, R1 " Electrical Equipment General Arrangement, El. 723.2" 18W292-1, R8 " Miscellaneous Steel, Frames, Covers, Grating, Plates, Anchor Bolts and Ladders" 48N1274, R14 " Miscellaneous Steel Anchor Plates and Handrailing E1. 749.0 - Sheet 1"

b. TVA OE Calculation, " Support Frame for the 125-volt Batteries," R0 (B25 860121 805), (01/21/86)
c. Gould Drawing 059068D, " Layout and Wiring Diagram for 60 ,

cells NCX 2100 Battery," Rev. C

d. Gould Drawing 410334C, " Rack Ass'y for Special Heavy Seismic Two Step Rack 18'-0"LG," Rev. B
e. Gould Drawing 410336C, " Rack Ass'y for Special Heavy Seismic Two Step Rack 11'-0"LG," Rev. A 05530 - December 31, 1986 l

. TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NtMBER: 225.0(B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0

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PAGE 12 0F 15 APPENDIX A (Cont'd)

f. Gould Drawing 059469C, " Layout for 3 Cells - For Type See Table on Special Test Rack with '666' Rack Bracing," Rev. 0 .
g. C&D Drawing M-7739, " Rack 2-Step EP Cat. III W/Gnd. Pads for 19 3DCU-9 Batteries," Rev. 5
h. Letter from S. A. Varga, NRC, to G. Williams, Jr. , TVA,

[ DES 761122 022], " Trip Report on Seismic Audit of TVA Equipment," (11/16/76)

1. Letter from R. H. Desai, Gould, Inc. to TVA with " Summary of Calculations (Rack)" of 4-60 Cells NCX-2100 and S07-074698-666 for contract 73C8-83800 (01/19/73)
j. " Report on Seismic Test on Three(3) Type NCX-2100 Batteries for Gould, Inc., Trenton, New Jersey," by TII Testing Laboratories, ETL Report No. 5547 (05/20/74)

.c, , k. TVA memo from R. G. Domer to F. W. . Chandler, "Sequoyah e Nuclear Plant - Contract 73C8-83800 - Squad Check EE-02914

' Seismic Qualification Test of 125-Volt Vital Batteries by TII 1

Testing Laboratories, Incorporated," (06/26/74) f

1. " Environmental Qualification of Class 1E' Lead-Acid Storage Batteries," GNB Batteries for SQN/WBN on TVA Contract No.

84X8-832101, received May 29, 1984

! m. TVA memo from R. O. Barnett to F. W. Chandler, j [CEB 800909 202], "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) and Watts Bar i Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Contract 80K8-827334 - Seismic Qualification of 125-Volt Diesel Generator Batteries and Racks," (09/09/80)

n. CAD Batteries Laboratory Report No. VL7610-02, " Seismic
Qualification Test - 2 Step Rack for "D" Battery Sizes -

3DCU-9 Battery Units, ARR130HK50 Battery Charger," (11/18/76) i L o. SQN Workplan 9119, R1 i

f p. SQN Workplan 11188, R0 j-l 0553D - December 31, 1986 l

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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 225.0(B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM

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REVISION NtmBER: _ 0~

PAGE 13 0F 15 APPENDIX A (Cont'd)

q. Letter from B. J. Youngblood, Director PWR Project Directorate #4, NRR to S. A. White, TVA Manager of Nuclear Power, [L44 860226 001],

Subject:

" Concerns Regarding TVA Nuclear Program," (02/18/86)

r. Letter from B. J. Youngblood, Director PWR Project Directorate #4, NRR to S. A. White, TVA Manager of Nuclear Power,

Subject:

" Transcript of Interview . . ," (06/23/86)

s. TVA memo from K. W. Whitt to H. L. Abercrombie, "NSRS Report No. I-86-274-SQN - Adequacy of Seismic Design of IE Battery Racks" (02/24/86)
t. TVA memo from H. L. Abercrombie to R. K. Seiberling,  !

" Response to the NSRS Report No. I-86-274-SQN," (04/18/86)  !

u. TVA memo from J. P. Vineyard to H. B. Rankin, ,

[B25 860127 012], " Review of Unistrut Bolts on the 125-Volt l Vital Battery Racks with regard to employee concern,"

j

[pf (y (01/27/86)

v. SQN Commitment Tracking Report, Commitment Verificatio aa.!

Completion Form, Tracking No. 86110 (05/29/86)

w. Letter from R. H. Desai, GNB, to F. W. Chandler, TVA,  ;

[B43 850402 002], (03/27/85) t

x. SQN ECN No. L6436 [B25 851002 513], (10/02/85)
y. Letter from M. N. Sprouse, TVA, to E. J. Frenzel, Gould, Inc., "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,125-Yolt Vital Batteries, Contract 73C8-83800," (02/16/73)
z. SQN ECN No. L5158 [SWP 810717 500], (07/17/81) aa. Letter from F. W. Chandler, TVA, to G. Walker, C&D,

[EEB 800924 919], (09/24/80) bb. TVA Employee Concerns WBN Element Report No. 225.0, " Battery Support Design," (4/29/86) cc. Gould calculation of test rack (Drawing 056469-C) and  !

contract rack (Drawing 059068-D) under TVA contract 73C8-83800 (05/30/84) 05530 - December 31, 1986

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 225.0(B)

SPECIAl PROGRAM REVISION NUlWER: 0 - I l

PAGE 14 0F 15

(. . .

APPENDIX A (Cont'd)

6. WHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING CWWI1MENTS, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OR OTHER ,

APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA?

a. SNP FSAR Update through Amendment 3 Section 2.5, " Geology and Seismology" Section 3.1, "Conformance with NRC General Design Criteria" Section 3.7, " Seismic Design" Section 3.10, " Seismic Design of Category I Instrumentation l and Electrical Equipment" l
b. SQN Design Criteria for 125-Volt Vital Battery System I

( SQN-DC-Y-11.2)

c. SQN Design Criteria for 125-Volt Fifth Vital Battery System

. ( SQN-DC-V-11. 2.1 )

N TVA Specification 1591 for 125-Volt Vital Batteries and Racks d.

for SQN

e. NRC's NUREG-0011, Safety Evaluation Report related to )

operation of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Sections 3.10 and 7.8, (03/79)

7. LIST REQUESTS FOR INFOIMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS RELAltu TO ELtntNT.
a. RFI SQN #556, (09/10/86)
b. RFI SQN #726, (11/18/86)
c. RFI SQN #733, (11/20/86)
d. RFI SQN #741, (11/21/86)
e. RFI SQN #747 (12/01/86)
f. RFI SQN #748 (12/03/86)-

0553D - December 31, 1986 l

m TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NtMBER: 225.0(B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM l REVISION NUMBER: 0 l PAGE 15 0F 15

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APPENDIX A (Cont'd)

g. RFI SQN #755 (12/12/86)
h. RFI SQN #756 (12/15/86)
1. TVA Transmittal #094, Item 4 (08/15/86) . i
j. TVA Transmittal #157, Item 2 (11/21/86)
k. TVA Transmittal #162, Items 3 and 5 (12/01/86)
1. TVA Transmittal #164, Item 6 (12/03/86)
m. TVA Transmittal #165, Item 5 (12/04/86) 1
n. TVA Transmittal #166, Item 5 (12/05/86)
o. TVA Transmittal #172, Item 13 (12/15/86)
p. Telephone call from Moi Ibanez, Bechtel at TVA, Knoxville to Y. K. Hui, Bechtel, IOM 435 (12/01/86)
q. Telephone call from Y. K. Hui, Bechtel, to R. S. Green, TVA, IOM 436 (12/03/86) l
r. Telephone call from Y. K. Hui, Bechtel, to T. A. Hogan, TVA IOM 437 (12/03/86)
s. Telephone call from R. D. Gish, TVA to Y. K. Hui, Bechtel, IOM 452 (12/15/86)
t. Telephone call from Y. K. Hui, Bechtel to R. D. Gish, TVA, 4 IOM 460 (12/16/86) 1 1

c 1

0553D - December 31, 1986

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY PAGE' -

108 REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C RUN TIME - 12:57:19 FREQUENCY - REQUEST OFFICE OF NUCLEAR P0HER 3 EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS) RUN DATE - 12/02/86 ONP - ISSS - RHM LIST OF EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION CATEGORY: EN DES PROCESS S OUTPUT SUBCATEGORY: 22500 BATTERY SUPPORT DESIGN KEYHORD A

' dk I I S GENERIC QTC/NSRS P KEYHORD 8 H APPL KEYHORD C CONCERN SUB R PLT 355W INVESTIGATION S CONCERN DESCRIPTION KEYHORD D y

NUMBER CAT CAT D LOC FLQB REPORT R YYYY SR CLASS 1E AND NON-CLASS 1E BATTERIES NDHCONFORMANCE HI 100-006 EN 22500 N HBN ARE UNACCEPTABLY SUPPORTED (NO BATTE CONST PROCESS T50211 REPORT ELECTRICAL RY TIE DOHNS), AND UNISTRUT SUPPORTS

) ARE UNACCEPTABLY USED. CI HAS NO F SUPPORTS ELECT URTHER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCE RN VIA LETTER.

YYYY I-86-274-SGN SS SEQUOYANs CLASS 1E AND NON-CLA!3 1E NONCONFORMANCE 3

XX 122-017 EN 22500 N SQN BATTERIES ARE UNACCEPTABLY SUIPORTS CONST PROCESS T50214 REPORT (NO BATTERY TIE DONNS), AND UNISTRUT ELECTRICAL SUPPORTS ARE UNACCEPTABLY USED. CI SUPPORTS ELECT

) HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYM OUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

YYYY I-85-113-BLH SR BELLEFONTE: CLASS 1E AND NON-CLASS 1 NCNCONFORMANCE XX 122-018 EN 22500 N BLN CONST PROCESS I T50214 REPORT E BATTERIES ARE UNACCEPTABLY SUPPORT ED (NO BATTERY TIE DOHNS), AND UNIST ELECTRICAL RUT SUPPORTS ARE UNACCEPTABLY USED. SUPPORTS ELECT CI HAS NO FURTHEP. INFORMATION. AND I NYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

YYYY I-85-119-BLN SR BROWN 8S FERRY: CLASS 1E AND NON-CLA NONCONFORMANCE XX 122-019 EN 22500 N BFN CONST PROCESS T50214 REPORT SS IE BATTERIES ARE UNACCEPTABLY SUP PORTED (No BATTERY TIE DOHNS). AND U ELECTRICAL

)

SUPPORTS ELECT NISTRUT SUPPORTS ARE UNACCEPTABLY US ED. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

J.

J 4 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY EN SUSCATE00RY 22500 l

l

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