ML20206B996

Proposed Tech Specs,Correcting Deficiencies Found in Figure 3/4 7-1 & Typo on Page 3/4 7-21

ML20206B996
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	11/03/1988
From:	DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20206B982	List: ML20206B978 ML20206B996
References
NUDOCS 8811160068
Download: ML20206B996 (7)

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ATI%QM2?P 1 Proposed ibchnical Specification Changes C811160068 881103 PDR ADOCK 05000369 P

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PLANT SYSTEMS l.

MRVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(Continued) e.

F,unctional Tests (Continued) h(y 3)

An initial representative sample of fifty-five (55) snubbers shall be functionally tested.

For each snubber which does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria, another sample of at least one-half the size of the initial sample shall be tested until the total number tested is equal to the initial sample size multiplied by the factor,1 + C/2, where "C" is the number of snubbers found which do not meet the functional test acceptance w

criteria.

This_W be plotted using an "Accept" line which follows ON the equation N = 55(1 + C/2).

Each snubber should be plotted as soon as it is tested.

If the point plotted falls on or below the "Accept" line, testing may be discontinued.

If the point plotted falls above the "Accept" line, testing must continue unless all snubbers have been tested.

The representative samples for the functional test sample pla6s shall be randomly selected from the snubbers required by Specifi-cation 3.7.8 and reviewed before beginning the testing.

The review t

shall ensure as far as practical that they are representative of the various configurations, operating environments, range of sizes, and capacities.

Snubbers placed in the same locations as snubbers which failed the previous functional test shall be retisted at the time of the next functional test but shall not be included in the sample plan.

If during the functional testing, additional sampling is required due to failure of only one type of snubber, the functional testing results shall be reviewed at that time to determine if additional samples should be. limited to the type of snubber which has failed the functional testing.

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FunctionalTestAcceptanceCriterja The snubber functional test shall verify that:

1)

Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range in both tension and compression, except that inertia dependent, acceleration limiting mechanical snubbers may be tested to vorify only that activation takes place in both directions of travel; 2)

Snubber bleeo, or release rate where required, is present in I

both tension and compression, within the specified range; 3)

Where required, the force required to initiate or maintain motion of the snubber is within the specified range in both direction of travel; and 4)

For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement.

Testing methods may be used to measure parameters indirectly or i

parameters other than those specified if those results can be correlated to the specified parameters through established methods.

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 7-21 Amendment No.

(Unit 1) l Amendment No.

(Unit 2)

ATTACIM27f 2 Justification and Safety Analysin 1

!bclear Service Water Systern Figure Change h proposed changen to the thouire !bclear Station 'Ibchnical Specifications are to correct Figure 3/4 7-1, Nuclear Service Water System (RN Systern). As the result of a design study at tbGuire concerning the basis for Fagineered Safety Features (ESP) valw actuations, minor discrepancies were identified in the figure. 'Ihis proposal is to correct these discrepancies, h changes are:

1.

PC supply crosrmer through valve ORN2B is changed frun Train A shared to Train B shared.

2.

Piping between valves ORN301A, C and OM301A,C and ORN302B is split, and valve ORN302B and associated piping is redesignated as Train B shared.

3.

Train B sharrd designation is extended through valve ORNSB, to clarify that train separation occurs between valves ORN5B and ORN4A, C 4.

Valvo ORN283A, C is redesignated as Train A shared. Valve ORN284B retrains designated as Train a shared. 'Ihe train separation occurs between the two valves.

'Ihese changes are identified in the attached mrked figure, the valves and piping that are beirrJ re-designated are Train A and Train B valves in series.

hre valves are in series to ensure m systczn integrity and isolation of non-essential loads given a single failure.

In the first care, valves ORN2B and ORN3A,C isolate the sci mic, safety related portion of tM RN systctn fran the non-seimic, non-safety related portions of the systczn and the Ibactor Coolant (FC) systcrn.

Isolation is necessary to prewnt draining the Standby !bclear Service Water Pend (SNSb?)

to Iake !brmn and losing ?bt Ibsitive Suction Ibad (NPSH) to the m Purps. A single failure (either valve or either diesel) will not prevent ccrpletion of the safety functicn.

Ibr valves ORN301A,C and ORN302B, the function is to isolate RN frun W (contalment ventilation cooling water).

h RV is isolated to prevent an unacceptable diversion of FN ficw.

h two valves in series assure a single failuru will not cause loss of safety function.

Valves OEN4A,C and ORNSB serve to isolate the ncn-seimic, ncn-safety related torticos of tM RN system frun the seismic, safety related porticos.

'Ihis will ensure the SNSh? (kes not drain to Iake ?brmn ard ensure sufficient NPSH for the RN prps. / gain, the two ciposite train valves in series are to imet tle ningle failure criterien.

Valves ORN283A,C and ORN284B are to isolate Train B frcin lake !brun in the event of an FSF signal.

Eitler valve will prevent RN Train B frcin taking suction frun the S?se (safety related) ard discharging to Iake Ibrmn (ron-safety related).

As the valws are ciposite train, the single failure criterim is ret.

Valve designaticns A, B, ani C icbntify the valves' asscciation with Train A, Train B,

or the standby shutdcun

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'McGUIRT ' UNITS'l AND 2 3/4 7-11a Amendment No. 78 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 59 (Unit 2)

he apparently correspcmding m Train A valves,ORN147A,C and ORN148A,C, serve 4

a different function and are correctly designated. RN Train A normally aligns to Iake Norman on an ESF actuation, and tNse valves establish the discharge patlway.

If it is desired to align M Train A to the SNSWP, these valves would isolate this discharge path, h single failure criteria is et, as if cne valve fails, the other will isolate the path, if diesel generator

'A' fails disabling IN Train A, then RN Train B is available to meet M needs.

h changes are corrections to the figure to properly reflect safety functions j

and to ensure prcper operator interpretatico of the figure, thus ensuring proper cperator action based on the figure.

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Cbrrection of Tyrographical Error i

On page 3/4 7-21 a typographical error appears: "his plan be plotted using h word "plan" is changed to "can."

Analysis of Significant Itazartis Cbnsideraticos I

a h follcuing analyses are provided, pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.91 to justify the conclusion that the preposed changes do not involve j

a significant hazards consideratico, as defined by the criteria of 10CPR50.92.

RN Piqure change I

he prrposed change will not result in a significant increa m in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the FEAR.

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%e change is to the figure only, and does not affect the operation or

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alignment of the systen..

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No new accident not previcusly evaluated will be created.

!b new failure redes, systm configurations, or systm operations will be introduced which j

could create the possibility of a new accident.

No margin of safety will be significan'ly reduced.

No systm setpoints

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allowable outage times, acceptance criter.iz, or other margin of safety will be affectal by this revision.

Wis is an actnintstrative-type charge which will not result in a significant hazant.

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praphical Error on Page 3/4 7-21 i

l h prcrosed charge will not increase the probability or ccnsoquences of any i

accident previously evaluated in the FSAR, or create a new accident not l

previously evaluatcd in the FSAR, or result in a dccrease in any margin of sa fety.

Se change is editerial only, and will tot affect any systs,

ccrponent, prmodures or modo of operation.

Ib setpoints, outage tires, or tolerances are charged, i

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