ML20205T759

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Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying Purge & Vent Isolation Valves
ML20205T759
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/11/1986
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20205T756 List:
References
1762K, NUDOCS 8606160193
Download: ML20205T759 (7)
v • d • e


Text

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0 ATTACl9EENT B PROPOSED CHANGE TO APPENDIX A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO OPERATING LICENSE NPF-18 REVISED PAGES: 3/4 6-18 3/4 6-28 3/4 6-37 3/4 8-27 B 3/4 6-2 l

t 1762K 8606160193 860611 PDR ADOCK 05000374 P PDR

I CONTAIW9ENT SYSTDtS 1

ORWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMER PURGE SYSTEM LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.8 The drywell and suppression chamber purge system may be in operation with the drywell and/or suppression chamber purge supply and exhaust butterfly isolation valves open for inerting, deinerting, and pressure control,,previd;d p

" t :ch butt r'ly :lv: i: bl;;h:d :: :: :: ': :::: rr: th:2 5^*.

Purging through the Standby Gas Treatment System shall be restricted to less than or equal to 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> per 365 days.

APPLICA8ILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With a drywell and/or suppression chamber purge supply and/or exhaust butterfly isolation valve open for other than inerting, deinerting, or pressure control, f ,

oc-not-Mocked t: 10:: t';; Or ;;;;l t: 5^* ;; n , close the butterfly valve (s)  %

within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1.S.1 "t being ;;;nd, th drf.;;11 : d :r;;rn: ice ch- ':r perg: ce;;1y M e.5:ect betterfly fee!:tien v:!re: thel' M ver** fed te M b! r 5M :: ::

ta ;: M 105: th:2 :P : r:1 t: 50* :;:n, unle  :: veri 'fM withia tM e

pr:vi::: 31 ty:.

( 4.5.1.0.2 E;;h drf.;;11 end :;;;rn :ica ch- ':r ;;;;; := ;1y : d ::h: :t butterfly i::1: tion v:lve :h ll b; f: :ntrated 0"5"f"LE st 1;=t ;n: ;:r i

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^2 d:y: by verifying th:t the u n cred i n k;;; rete i: len th: Or :q::1 t: D t _

A.ME 4.6.1.8.#1The cumulative time that the drywell and suppression chamber purge 4--

system has been in operation purging through the Standby Gas Treatment System shall be verified to be less than or equal to 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> per 365 days prior to use in this mode of operation.

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LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-18

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued) 5 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES C ~

r-m MAXIMUM

' ISOLATION TIME VALVE FUNCTION AND NtMIER VALVE GROUP (a)

E' (Seconds) q . Automatic Isolation Valves (Continued) n

8. Containment Vent and Purge Valves 4 I 2VQO26

< 10**

2VQO27 7 10 **

2VQO29 2VQ030 i 10 "* {

2VQO31 i 10"*

2 10 W 2VQO32 7 5 2VQO34 2VQO35 71

  • 4 -

i 5 7 10 @ N 5:' 2VQO36 2VQ040 l  ? 2VQ042 i 10 "*

i y 2VQ043 7 10** C -

2VQ047 7 10t*)

I 5 2VQ048 7 5 2VQ050 7 5 2VQ051 -

I 5 2VQ068

9. i 5 RCIC Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breaker 9 H.A.

i Line Valves -

.i 2E51-F080 l 2E51-F086

10. LPCS, HPCS, RCIC, RHR Injection g Testable Check Bypass Valves (9) N.A. N.A.

i S

o.

k I

t. -
  • I TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)

G

, PRIMARY CONTAllelENT ISOLATION VALVES h VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER 7 Other Isolation Valves (Continued)

g 7. Post LOCA Hydrogen Control

! U 2HG001A, B N 2HG002A, B i 2HG005A, B 1

2HG006A, B l 8. Standby Liquid Control System j 2C41-F004A, B

! 2C41-F007 l

j 9. Reactor Recirculation Seal Injection

! R 2833-F013A, 8

  • 2833-F017A, B -

J, 10. Drywell Pneumatic Valves 21N018 l TABLE NOTATIONS

  • But > 3 seconds.
    • These valves shall have a maximum isolation time of 40 seconds until STARTUP following the firsM refuelina outane. -

( ~

I (a) See Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signal (s) that operates each valve group.

(b) Not included in total sum of Type B and C tests.

j (c) May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

i (d) Not closed by SLCS actuation.

j (e) Not closed by Trip Functions Sa, b, or c Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1.

! (f) Not closed by Trip Functions 4a, c, d, e, or f of Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1.

l [ (g) Not subject to Type C leakage test. -

j = (h) Opens on an isolation signal. Valves will be open during Type A test. No Type C test required.

z ( (i) Also closed by drywell pressure-high signal.

(j) Hydraulic leal test at 43.6 psig.

1 3

, (k) Not subject to Type C leakage test - leakage rate tested per Specification 4.4.3.2.2.

o (1) These penetrations are provided with removable spools outboard of the outboard isolation valve.

During operation, these lines will be blind flanged using a double 0-ring and a type 8 leak

  • test. In addition, the packing of these isolation valves will be soap-bubble tested to ensure insignificant or no leakage at the containment test pressure each refueling outage. .

TA8LE 3.8.3.3-1 MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION BYPASS DEVICE SYSTEM (S)

VALVE NUM8ER (Continuous)(Accident ronditions) AFFECTED

a. IVG001 Accident Conditions $8GTS 1VG003 Accident Conditions 2VG001 Accident Conditions 2VG003 Accident Conditions
b. 2VP113A Accident Conditions Primary containment 2VP1138 Accident Conditions chilled water coolers 2VP114A Accident Conditions 2VP1148 Accident Conditions 2VP053A Accident Conditions 2VP0538 Accident Conditions 2VP063A Accident Conditions 2VP0638 Accident Conditions
c. 2VQ0'^ M citat Cerditiere e Primary containment 2VQO30 A::id:: C: diti::: s=r- vent and purge system 2VQ020 A :id ;t 0:nditi :: p 2VQ000 A::id:nt C;;diti :: e 2VQ038 Accident Conditions 2VQ001 A::id::t C: diti :: 4___

2VQ032 Accident Conditions 2VQ034 A :id;;t C nditi::: d=r-2VQO35 Accident Conditions 2VQ007 A :id:a0 0:aditi;;; < --

2VQ0'2 A::ident 00 ditica: <Er-EVQ043 A :id:at 0:nditi::: .g__

2VQ047 Accident Conditions 2VQ048 Accident Conditions 2VQ050 Accident Conditions 2VQ051 Accident Conditions 2VQ068 Accident Conditions 2VQO30 A::id:nt C diti::: d=-

2VQO37 Accident Conditions Accident Conditions R8CCW system

d. 2WR179 2WR180 Accident Conditions 2WR040 Accident Conditions 2WR029 Accident Conditions 2821 - F067A Accident Conditions Main steam system e.

2821 - F0678 Accident Conditions 2821 - F067C Accident Conditions 2821 - F067D Accident Conditions 2821 - F019 Accident Conditions 2821 - F016 Accident Conditions LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 8-27

_ _ _ - _ =- - _-

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l CONTAI MENT SYSTEMS BASES i

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3/4.6.1.5 PRIMARY CONTAIMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of j the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment 1 will withstand the maximum pressure of 45 psig in the event of a LOCA. The measurement of containment tendon lift-off forco, the tensile tests of the tendon wires or strands, the visual examination of tendons, anchorages and exposed interior and exterior surfaces of the containment, the chemical and visual examination of the sheathing filler grease, and the Type A leakage test are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the primary containment's structural integrity and the method of predicting the prestress losses are in compliance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35, " Inservice Inspection of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures,"

January 1976, and proposed Regulatory Guide 1.35.1, " Determining Prestressing Forces for Inspection of Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures," April 1979 with the following clarification: the tested lift-off force of individual tendon tension shall be greater than or equal to the initial prestress minus the losses, as predicted in the as-built design, which occur between .the initial pre-operational structural integrity test and the time of subsequent surveillance.

The required Special Reports from any engineering evaluation of contain-ment abnormalities shall include a description of the tendon condition, the condition of the concrete (especially at tendon anchorages), the inspection procedure, the tolerances on cracking, the results of the engineering evalua-tion, and the corrective action taken.

3/4.6.1.6 ORWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on drywell and suppression chamber internal pressure ensure that the containment peak pressure of 39.6 psig does not exceed the design pressure of 45 psig during LOCA conditions or that the external pres-sure differential does not exceed the design maximum external pressure differen-tial of 5 psid. The limit of 2.0 psig for initial positive primary containment i

' pressure will limit the total pressure to 39.6 psig which is less than the design pressure and is consistent with the safety analysis.

3/4.6.1.7 ORWELL AVERAGE AIR TEMPERATURE The limitation on drywell average air temperature ensures that the containment peak air temperature does not exceed the design temperature of 340*F during LOCA conditions and is consistent with the safety analysis.

3/4.6.1.8 ORWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PURGE SYSTEM The drywell and suppression chamber purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed during plant operation except as required for inerting, de-inerting and pressure control. Un44+7g"hese valves have been des;onstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accidentp 4 th;y t !' be b!::k:d :: :: :::: to e;;en acre then 50".

f-. , + M kit ope, p od% .

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 6-2 l i__________.__ ____ ____ _ - - _

ATTACHMENT C SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed Technical Specifi-cation Amendment and determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards consideration established in 10 CFR 50.92, operation of LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the new vent and purge isolation valves replace the existing isolation valves one for one. No additional valves have been added. The new valves meet the requirements for vent and purge containment isolation valves. This amendment simply removes requirements which only apply to the valves being removed.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the modification does not effect the containment isolation valve arrangement.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because the design still meets the intent of General Design Criteria 56 as specified in the UFSAR.

Based on the preceding discussion, it is concluded that the proposed system change clearly falls within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component, the consequences of previously evaluated accidents will not be increased and the margin of safety will not be decreased. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register l and the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(e), the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.

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1762K

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