ML20205S005

Forwards Response to NRC 860515 Request for Addl Info Re Unresolved Items 50-327/86-20-09 & 50-328/86-20-09 Concerning Containment Isolation Design Per Chemical & Vol Control Sys from Insp Repts 50-327/86-20 & 50-328/86-20

ML20205S005
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	05/30/1986
From:	Gridley R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8606060078
Download: ML20205S005 (50)

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0 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 SN 157B Lookout Place May 30, 1986 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Project Director PWR Project Directorate No. 4 Division of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR)

Licensing A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Youngblood:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 Please refer to J. A. Olshinski's letter to S. A. White dated April 23, 1986 transmitting IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-327/86-20 and 50-328/86-20 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN). The reference inspection report contains unresolved item 50-327/86-20-09 and 50-328/86-20-09, Containment Isolation Design Pertaining to the Chemical and Volume Control System. Enclosed is our response to NRC's request for additional information made during a telephone conference call on May 15, 1986 among your staff, Region II, IE-Operating Reactor Programs Branch, and TVA. TVA would appreciate bringing this unresolved item to its final conclusion with all parties as soon as possible.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. E. Alsup at FTS 858-2725.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY R. L. ridley, irector Nuclear Safety nd Licensing Enclosure cc: See page 2 8606060078 860530 PDR ADOCK 00000327 G PDR j An Equal Opportunity Employer

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Mr. B. J. Youngblood May 30, 1986 cc (Enclosuro):

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region II Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace., Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 s

?tr. James Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and' Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Carl Stahle Sequoych Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory' Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue

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S ENCLOSURE RESPONSE - NRC-OIE INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-327/86-20 AND 50-328/86-20 JOHN A. OLSHINSKI'S LETTER TO S. A. WHITE DATED APRIL 23, 1986 Unresolved Item 50-327/86-20-09 and 50-328/86-20-09 BACKGROUND IE Inspection Hoport Nos. 50-327/86-20 and 50-328/86-20 identified an unresolved item (URI) concerning five (5) chemical and volume control system (CVCS) containment penetrations. The penetrations involved are penetration X-16, the normal charging supply, and penetrations X-43A, -43B, -43C, and

-43D, the four reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection lines. The URI was identified during an Operational Readiness inspection. The issue involves lack of conformance to the explicit requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A Ceneral Design Criteria (GDC) for containment isolation.

Subsequent to a letter dated March 25, 1986, from John A. Olshinski identifying the URI, a telephone conference call was held on April 14, 1986, among TVA-Licensing / Design Nuclear Engineering (DNE)/Sequoyah (SQN),

Westinghouse, NRR-Containment Systems Branch, IE-Operating Reactor Programs Branch, and Region II to discuss the URI and determine a course of action toward resolution. The Westinghouse design bases for the five penetrations and the FSAR section 6.2.4 and tabic 6.2.4-1 were discussed at length. It was determined that a written submittal, answers to remaining NRC questions and concerns, would be required. Region II was to coordinate NRC resolution to the URI. With the assistance of the Region, c list of six (6) questions was provided by the SQN resident inspector. The inspection report itself, received following the April 14, 1986 conference call, principally identified misclassifications in FSAR table 6.2.4-1 and stated that exceptions should have been taken for the five subject penetrations since their isolation schemes differed from the explicit schemes identified in the 10 CFR 50 GDCs. This report also identified resolution to the URI as a startup item.

Before answers to the six questions could be transmitted to the resident inspector, TVA Licensing was informed that responsibility for resolution had been transferred from Region II to NRR. TVA initiated a second conference call to reestablish the course for resolution and to define a schedule for such resolution since this URI had been identified as a startup item. The teleconference was held on May 15, 1986 among TVA-Licensing /SQN/DNE, NRR-Containment Systems Branch, IE-Opera >.ing Reactor Programs Branch, and Region II. During this second conference call, TVA presented the design bases and requirements for the SQN containment isolation system as a whole and then specifically for the five lines in question. Technical questions were asked and answered for the five subject penetrations; the majority of the conference centered on whether NRC correctly understood TVA's position regarding the CDCs at the time of licensing, i.e., the actual design for SQN relative to the then existing 10 CFR 50 GDCs. As a result of the subsequent

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discussions, URC requested that TVA provide a written summary of the TVA-DNE presentation made during the conference call regarding the design bases for the SQN containment isolation system and full information for all penetrations which have isolation schemes differing from the explicit schemes identified in the GDCs, i.e. , alternate isolation schemes deemed acceptable on 'other defined bases.' clarification of TVA's position at the time of licensing regarding the SQN design relative to current CDCs was also requested.

TVA RESPONSE The two attachments provide the information requested. Attachment 1 provides the design bases for the SQN containment isolation system and specifically for the five subject penetrations. This includes references to applicable criteria, standards, supporting documents, system descriptions, etc. Explanation is also provided of TVA's position at the time of licensing regarding the CQN design relative to current 10 CFR 50 GDC.

Attachment 2 provides a tabulated listing of pertinent information for SQN containment penetrations. Specifically identified are the isolation configurations and bases for penetrations which employ alternate isolation schemes from those specifically identified in the CDCs. The penetration isolation configurations--available to the NRC through the FSAR narrative, tables and flow / control / logic diagrams--are being concisely described and summarized herein due to identified typograohical errors and apparent confusion regarding the FSAR narrative and table 6.2.4-1 format.

SUMMARY

TVA believes the existing designs for the five subject penetrations uatisfy all applicable design criteria, provide isolation redundancy consistent with the intent of current criteria, and are, therefore, fully adequate to ensure protection of the health and safety of the public. The questions regarding the technical presentation and format of section 6.2.4 and table 6.2.4-1 of the FSAR will be resolved by a rewrite of these sections to be submitted 15, 1987.

with the next annual FSAR update scheduled for April Typographical errors will be corrected and the presentation of the design bases and system configurations clarified. While the current 10 CFR 50 GDC 54, 55, 56, and 57 are not the applicable criteria for the design of the containment isolation system at SQN, review of the existing design relative to the CDCs indicates the criteria are satisfied in the SQN design, either directly or by alternate isolation schemes which are acceptable and meet the intent of the CDCs on 'other defined bases.'

ATTACHMENT 1 RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE DESIGN BASES AND CRITERIA FOR THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM FOR SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT The following provides a brief summary of the design bases for the SQN containment isolation system as a whole and specifically for five (5) chemical and volume control system (CVCS) penetrations of recent concern to the NRC---the normal charging line and the four reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection linas. A discussion of the design bases relative to current 10 CFR 50 Appendix A General Design Criteria (CDC) is also provided.

SQN is a late 1960s design vintage plant, and was designed, along with other plants of the same vintage, according to Westinghouse " Systems Standard Design Criteria Nuclear Steam Supply System Containment Isolation," 1.14 Revisions O and 1. Westinghouse stated before licensing that this is the only design standard applicable to SQN; this position was recently reconfirmed in the attached letter to TVA from Westinghouse dated May 7, 1986. They also stated that they have provided a design for SQN which is in keeping with the requirements for a plant of its vintage and consider the design adequate. It is Westinghouse's position that no backfits or modifications were required.

Revisions 0 and 1 of this Westinghouse standard satisfy the requirements of Celterion 53 of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) July 1967, " Proposed General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Construction Permits," which was the applicable regulatory requirement at that time. The July 1967 AEC Design Celterion 53, " Containment Isolation valve," states: " Penetrations that require closure for the containment function shall be protected by redundant valving and associated apparatus." The SQN design meets this requirement, utilizing the previously referenced Westinghouse system standard. This Westinghouse system standard design criteria includes the following general containment isolation criteria.

" Piping which penetrates the containment and is not required to function following a loss-of-coolant accident must be provided with two automatic isolation barriors; one barrier must be located outside the containment and one must be inside the containment.

The definition of an automatic barrier is either a closed system, trip valve, or check valve. Using this definition, four general classifications are derived:

A. Two closed systems - one inside, one outside, no isolation valves required.

B. No closed systems - one valve inside and one valve outside required.

C. Closed system inside - no valve inside, valve required outside.

D. Closed system outside - no Valve outside, valve required inside.

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NOTE:

1. The same criteria apply to lines which are used after an accident except that manual isolation outside containment is acceptable.

2. For lines 1-inch nominal pipe size and larger which penetrate the containment and which are connected to the Reactor Coolant System, at least two valves shall be provided inside the containment. The valves shall be normally closed or shall have automatic closure. For incoming lines check valves are permitted and are considered as automatic.

The requirements for a closed system include the following:

Inside Containment

1. Does not communicate with either the reactor coolant system or the reactor containment interior.

2. Safety classification same as for engineered safety system

3. Must withstand external pressure and temperature equal to containment design pressure and temperature

4. Must withstand accident transient and environment

5. Must be missile protected Outside Containment

1. Does not communicate with tho atmosphere outside the containment

2. Safety classification same as for engineered safety systems

3. Internal design pressure and temperature must be at least equal to containment design pressure and temperature"

The five lines specifically in question are the normal charging line and the four seal water injection lines to the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). A check valve inside containment provides the first isolation barrier for the normal charging line; the second automatic isolation barrier is provided by a closed system outside containment. Additionally, two automatic system gate valves are available which isolate on a safety injection (SI) signal.

The CVCS seal water injection lines to the RCPs contain check valves inside containment and are connected to a closed system outside containment which serves as the second automatic isolation barrier. Additionally, manual needle valves outside containment may be closed to provide long-term isolation. Within the design basis operation of the plant - normal, transient, and accident conditions - loss of seal flow from the charging pump (s) is not anticipated, i.e., at least one charging pump remains in operation. The designs for these penetrations are identified in the previously referenced Westinghouse system standard.

The design basis for the normal charging line provides capability for containment isolation and system isolation to prevent boren injection tank (BIT) bypass of ECCS injection flow from the centrifugal charging pumps.

The design basis for the four seal injection lines provides containment isolation capability while maintaining injection flow to retain integrity of the RCP seals and use of the RCPs, if available, for post-accident cooldown. Some limited reactor coolant system (RCS) makeup capability is also provided through the seal flow.

In summary, the SQN containment isolation system was designed in accordance with criteria and standards applicable to all plants of that vintage. The applicable criteria are Criterion 53 of the 1967 GDC, and the Westinghouse systems design standard 1.14, Revisions O and 1. The later-issued 10 CFR 50 Appendix A GDC 55, 56, and 57 designate specific allowable isolation schemes. CDC 55 and 56 acknowledge alternate schemes can be considered acceptable for applicable penetrations on 'other defined bases.' A review of the containment isolation system for SQN relative to the later-issued 10 CFR 50 GDCs was performed to verify that the design philosophy / intent of the current CDCs was acceptably employed for SQN even though these design criteria are not the applicable criteria for SQN. This review, performed by TVA before licensing, concluded that the SQN containment isolation system did in fact satisfy the requirements (meet the intent) of the GDCs, either directly or on 'other defined bases.' Westinghouse review at the time of

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issuance of Revision 2 to their system standard 1.14 (prompted by issuance of the new CDCs) resulted in their like conclusion that the Revision 0/1 designs were, as such, adequate and, therefore, did not require backfits or modifications to predesigned plants. The isolation schemes for the five (5)

CVCS penetrations in question reflect standard Westinghouse-supplied and NRC-reviewed designs and provide the redundant isolation capability required by both earlier and current design criteria to ensure protection of the health and safety of the public.

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Westinghouse Water Reactor Nuclear Tectnclegy Omsion ewe @puuton Divisions ecx 355 Pitts::urgnpennsylvania 15230 TVA-86-565 FSD/CWBS-184 May 7, 1986 Ref.: 1. TVA Memo, 4/18/86

2. 10CFR50, 7/11/67 Mr. J. A. Rau1ston 3. TVA Ltr. 3085, Chief Nuclear Engineer 7/23/73 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 4. W Ltr FSA-II-13170, 400 West Summit Hill Drive, ~11/26/73 W10C126 5. W Ltr FSA-II-TV-15310, Knoxville, TN 37902 ~9/5/74

6. W Letter RFS-TV-11214 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NUMBERS 1 AND 2 Containment Isolation Criteria

Dear Mr. Raulston:

Reference 1 transmitted a request from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for Westinghouse support in their effort to satisfy NRC questions regarding the adequacy of the Sequoyah Unit's Seal Water Injection Containment Isolation design. Listed below is the documentation TVA has requested, followed by a description of the information Westinghouse is providing in response.

1. AEC design criteria in existence at the time of Sequoyah's design.

The General Design Criteria-for Nuclear Power Plant Construction Permits published by the Atomic Energy Commission dated July 11, 1967.

2. Draft of the NRC's general design criteria which was also in existence at the time of Sequoyah's design.

This information is not available; documentation does not appear in Westinghouse files.

3. Westinghouse design standards. (entire copies) - revisions 0,1, and 2.

Westinghouse Systems Standard Design Criteria Nuclear Steam Supply System Containment Isolation - Revisions 0, 1, and 2. -

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TVA-86-565 J. A. Raulston 2 May 7, 1986

4. Any NRC/ Westinghouse correspondence that may be pertinent to my case.

This information is not available; documentation does not appear in Westinghouse files.

5. Documentation supporting the Westinghouse position not to backfit Sequoyah to the General Design Criteria.

. Westinghouse /TVA correspondence confirming the adequacy of

' the Sequoyah Containment Isolation and verifying the 1967 AEC

.. Criteria as the design bases.

The available documentation requested by TVA is attached for.your use and information. A copy of this attachment was informally transmitted to M. Chattin of TVA at the Sequoyah site for review on April 28, 1986.

Westinghouse has reviewed the attachment and considers the following information pertinent to your case:

o Criterion 53 of the Atomic Energy Commission General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Permits dated 1967 is the only criteria for containment isolation valves. Criterion 53 states that," Penetrations that require closure for the containment function shall be protected by redundant calving and associated apparatus." (Reference 2) e " Westinghouse stated that they have provided a design for Sequoyah wSich is in keeping with the requirements for a plant of its vintage and consider the design adequate." (Reference 3) e The applicable Containment Isolation design criteria for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant are those contained in the July 1967 General Design

. Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Permits. (Reference 4) e Westinghouse has the responsibility to perform the design of the several fluid systems included in the terms of the contract. These systems do not include the Containment Isolation System, which must therefore be in TVA's scope of design. The Westinghouse supplied systems have incorporated into their design all provisions necessary for isolation of certain lines penetrating the reactor containment.

(Reference 5) -

e The AEC General Design Criteria 55, 56 and 57 (which became effective in July 1971) cannot be considered applicable to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. (Reference 6)

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• TVA-86-565 J. A. Raulston 3 May 7, 1986 e Revision 2 of the Westinghouse document 1.14 was transmitted to TVA for information only. "Use of the document to view corrections , minor editorial changes and more detail in some areas, in conjunction with Revision 1 is recommended, however, changes of a major nature due to Westinghouse position to meeting the intent of the new AEC GDC criteria 55, 56 and 57 are not to be construed as being required for the licensing of the Sequoyah Plant." (Reference 6)

Should you have any questions regarding the attachment, or require additional information, please contact the undersigned.

Very truly yours

. WESTNGH0VSEELECT[CCORPORATION d

. L. Williams, Manager SSD Projects

[M74tanB Mid South Area

/plw/C.A.'Marmo/05025.0200.D -

cc: H. L. Abercrombie R. U. Mathieson I.'R. Williamson C. C. Mason M. E. Chattin e

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ATTACHMENT 2 RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTION REGARDING SPECIFIC DESIGN OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS FOR SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT TVA has again reviewed the SQN containment isolation design, penetration by penetration, with regard to (1) initial design requirements, (2) current 10 CFR 50 CDC classifications and corresponding isolation schemes, and (3) GDC intent, i.e., acceptability of alternate isolation schemes on 'other defined bases.' The TVA view of acceptability (on 'other defined bases') is based on consideration of 1967 CDC-Celterion 53, Westinghouse system design standard 1.14 Revision 0/1, the general requirements of 10 CFR 50 GDC 54, and the specific process line function (normal and accident conditions). It is readily apparent that even for a new GDC plant, numerous classes of penetrations cannot conform to the GDC specified isolation schemes, e.g.,

ECCS lines, instrument lines, equipment hatches, airlocks, flanged penetrations, electrical penetrations, etc. Alternate schemes must be employed to provide the redundant isolation capability consistent with criteria 54 and still permit system operation. GDC 55, 56, and 57 provide requirements for three general classifications of penetrations and are, therefore, somewhat subject to interpretation. Based on our interpretation of these criteria and the current 10 CFR 50.2 definition (v.) for reactor coolant pressure boundary, we have identified for each penetration:

(1) penetration classification (GDC 55, 56, or 57), (2) physical configuration (barrier inside, barrier outside), (3) the applicable FSAR figure (if available), and (4) the 'other defined basis' for acceptability if the isolation scheme differs from 10CFR50 GDC identified schemes.

Supporting description, notes and/or references are provided as necessary.

This information is presented in the form of two tables. Table 2.1 lists penetrations for which the design correlates with the explicit GDC designated isolation schentes. Table 2.2 lists penetrations for which their design correlates with the intent of the CDC and the design is determined acceptable on 'other defined bases.' only principal process line isolation barriers are identified; penetration branch takeoffs such as vent, drain and test lines, and instrumentation sensing taps are not addressed within the scope of this presentation.

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Pcp 1 af 24 Table 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC1 Requirements Penetration Inside Outside FSAR s Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Ref./ Notes Description Classification P:netr< tion 56 30-56 30-57 9.4.7-1 X-004 Lower Comp. Purgo Exh.

Instr. Rs. Purge Exh. 56 30-58 30-59 9.4.7-1 X-005 56 30-50 30-51 9.4.7-1 X-006 Upper Comp. Purge Exh.

56 30-52 30-53 9.4.7-1 X-007 Upper Comp. Purge Exh.

1GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Va}ve, (CV) Check Valve

m Table 2.1 Page 2 of 24 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC3 Requirements Penetration Description Penetration Inside Classification 3 Outside FSAR X-009A Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figu e Upper Comp. Purge Supply Ref./ Notes 56 30-08 30-07 9.4.7-1

(-009B Upper Comp. Purge Supply 56 30-10 3C-09 9.4.7-1

-010A Lower Comp. Purge Supply 56 30-15 30-14 9.4.7-1

-010B Lower Comp. Purge Supply 56 30-17 30-16 9.4.7-1 DC 55, 56, 57 TE:

Automatic (Ctf) CheckPower Vp)ve Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows:

(LC) Locked Closed h aual Valve, (101) Remote fianual Vglye,

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Table 2.1 ' Page 3 of 24 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDCt Requirements Penetration Description Penetration. Inside outside Classification! FSAR X-Oll _ Barrier (s)_ . Barrier (s) . Figure Instr. Re. Purge Supply $6 Re f. /No t e_s 30-20 30-19 9.4.7-1

-012A Feedwater 57 Closed System 3-33, 3-164, 3-164A, 10.4.7-2 and Remote manual operation 3-174 10.4.7-12 available. Do not receive containment isolation signal

-012B Feedwater 57 Closed System 3-47 10.4.7-2 and See X-012A 10.4.7-12 1

012C Feedwater 57 Closed System 3-87 10.4.7-2 and See X-012A 10.4.7-12

)C 55, 56, 57 rE:

Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced (CV) Chec) Valve ows: as foll (LC)LockedClosedManualValve,(Hij)Eepo$cManualV4}ye

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Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC1 tiequirements t

Penetretion Description Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Classificationt Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Ref./ Notes

(-012D Feedwater 57 closed System 3-100, 3-171, 10.4.7-2 and See X-012A 3-171A, 10.4.7-12 3-175

'- 014A Sta. Gen. Blwdn. 57

• Closed System 1-14, 43-58 10.4.8-1

• Valve 1-182 is available i

-014B Sta. Gen. Blw4n. 57

• Closed System 1-32, 43-64 10.4.8-1

• Valve 1-184 is available 014C Sta. Gen. B1wdn. 57

• Closed System 1-25, 43-61 10.4.8-1

• Valve 1-183 is

{ available

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Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Frpote Manual Valyr, (fy) Cherk Valve I

Psgr 5 of 24 Table 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC8 Requirements Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure i Ref./ Notes X-014D Sta. Gen. Blvdn. 57

• Closed System 1-07, 43-55 10.4.8-1

• Valve 1-181 is available X-023 PASF Hot Leg 3 55 43-310(RM)43-309(RM) Valves are Train B closed with power removed during normal operation X-025A Przr. Sta. Sample 55 43-11 43-12 X-025D Przr. Liquid Sample 55 43-02 43-03 3

GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Powrr Operated Valve unless otherwise reference 4 as follows: (LC) Locked Closed tjanual Valve, (pj) Ermate Manua} Va}ye, (CV) Check Va}ve

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Page 6 of 24 Table 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC3 Requirements Penetration Inside Gutside FSAR Penetration Description Classifications Barrier (s) ' Barrier (s) Figure Ref./ Notes X-026B Control Air - Train B 56 Unit 1 32-102 9.3.1-6 32-297 (CV)32-295 (LC) i X-026B Control Air - Train B 56 Unit 2 32-103 9.3.1-6

)32-348 (CV)32-341 (LC)

X-027C ILRT 56 52-504 (LC)52-505 (LC) 4 I

i X-029 CCS from RCP Coolers 56 70-89 70-92 UI 9.2.1-2  !

l 70-698 (CV) U2 9.2.1-3 i

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3 CDC 55, 56, 57 i

j NOTE:' Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (pl) Rppte Mapug} yalye,

! (CV) Cherk Velve I

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Page 7 of 24 Table 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC8 Requirements Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Flaure Ref./ Notes l X-030 Accum. to HU Tank 56 63-71 63-84 l .

63-23 6.3.2-1

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X-034 Control Air - 56 Unit 1- 32-110 9.3.1-6 1 Nonessential 32-377 (CV)32-375 (LC) i r

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X-034 Control Air - 56 Unit 2 32-111 9.3.1-6 Nonessential 32-387 (CV)32-385 (LC) i 1

X-039A N2 t Accumulat rs 56 77-868 (CV) 63-64 11.2.2-5 4

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GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTEi Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Femote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Va)ve I

Pigs 8 ef 24 Table 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC3 Requirements Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) 3uy F Ref./ Notes X-039B N2 t PRT 56 77-849 (CV)66-305 11.2.2-5 X-040A Aux. Feedwater 57 Closed System 3-156 10.4.7-12 See X-012A 3-156A 3-173

, X-040B Aux. Feedwater 57 Closed System 3-148 10.4.7-12 See X-012A 3-148A 3-172 X-041 Floor Sump Pump Disch. 56 77-127 77-128 9.3.3-1 nGDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve

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Ttble 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC8 Requirements Penetration Inside Outaide FSAR Penetration Description Classification 1 Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Ref./ Notes X-042 Primary Water 56 81-502 (CV) 81-12 X-044 Seal Water Return 55 62-61 62-63 9.3.4-1 62-639 (CV)

X-045 RCDT & PRT to Vent 56 77-18 77-19 11.2.2-1 Hdr. 77-20 X-046 RCDT Pump Discharge 56 77-09 77-10 9.3.6-1 84-511 (LC) 3 GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (EM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve

Page 10 or 25 Table 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC8 Requirements Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description classification 8 Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figu e Ref./ Notes X-047A Glycol In 56 61-192 61-191 61-533 (CV)

X-047B Glycol Out 56 61-194 61-193 61-680 (CV)

X-050A RCP Therm. Barr. 56 70-87 70-90 9.2.1-2 Ret.70-687 (CV)

X-0508 RCP There. Barr. 56 70-679 (CV)70-134 9.2.1-2 Supply 8

CDC 55, 56, 57 NOTEE Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve 4

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Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC8 Requirements

-Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classificationt Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure. Ref./ Notes X-051 Fire Protection 56 26-1260 (CV)26-240 9.5.1-10 X-052 CCS to RCP Oil 56 70-692 (CV)70-140 9.2.1-2

' Coolers I

X-056 ERCW Supply to Lower 56 67-562D (CV)67-107 9.2.2-3 j Capt.

i X-057 ERCW Return from Lwr. 56 67-111 67 '!; 9.2.2-3 l Capt. 67-575D (CV) l 4

j nGDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE:' Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (Rti) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve

Pige 12 ef 24 Ttble 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDCI Requirements Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Ref./ Notes X-058 ERCW Supply to Lwr. 56 67-562A (CV) 67-83 9.2.2-3 Comp.

X-059 ERCW Return from Lwr. 56 67-87 67-88 9.2.2-3 Comp. 67-575A (CV)

X-060 ERCW Supply to Lwr. 56 67-562B (CV) 67-99 9.2.2-3 Comp.

X-061 ERCW Return from Lwr. 56 67-103 67-104 9.2.2-3 Comp. 67-575B (CV) 3 GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve

Page 13 of 24 Ttble 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDCI Requirements Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classification 1 ,Ba rrie r(s) Barrier (s) Figure Re f. / Notes X-062 ERCW Supply to Lwr. 56 67-562C (CV) 67-91 9.2.2-3 Comp.

X-063 ERCV Return from Lwr. 56 67-95 67-96 9.2.2-3 Comp. 67-575C (CV)

X-064 Instr. Rm. Chill 56 31C-223 31C-222 Wtr. Ret. 31C-752 (CV)

X-065 Inst. Rm. Chill Wtr. 56 31C-225 31C-224 Supply 31C-734 (CV) 3 GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve

Ptge 14 of 24 Table 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC1 Requirements Penetration Inside Cutside FSAR Penetration Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Fyigu e Ref./ Notes X-066 Inst. Rm. Chill Wtr. 56 31C-230 31C-229 Ret. 31C-715 (CV)

X-067 Inst. Rs. Chill Wtr. 56 31C-232 31C-231 Supply 31C-697 (CV)

X-068 Upper ERCW Supply 56 67-580D (CV)67-141 9.2.2-3 to Cooler X-069 Upper ERLW Supply 56 67-580A (CV)67-130 9.2.2-3 to Cooler

'GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve

i . Page 15 of 24 Table 2.1 .

Design Correlates to Explicit -i' 10CFR50 CDC1 Requirements Penetration Inside Outside FSAR

' - Penetration Description Classification 3 Barrier (s) Parrier(s) Fiaure- Ref./ Notes X-070 Upper ERCW Return 56 67-297 67-139 9.2.2-3 from Cooler 67-585B (CV) l

.i t

T X-071 Upper ERCW Return 56 67-296 67-134 9.2.2-3 from Cooler ,

67-585C (CV) t t

X-072 Upper ERCW Return 56 67-298 67-142 9.2.2-3 from Cooler 67-585D (CV) '

t l

X-073 Upper ERCW Return 56 67-295 67-131 9.2.2-3 j from Cooler 67-585A (CV)

'CDC 55, 56, 57

' NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced'as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve i,

y .w . 7 --- - - -

t w ~'e i "- h

Prge 15 of 24 7tble 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC1 Requirements Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Ref./ Notes X-074 Upper ERCW Supply 56 67-580B (CV)67-138 9.2.2-3 X-075 Upper ERCW Supply 56 67-580C (CV)67-133 9.2.2-3 X-076 Service Air 56 Ut 33-704 (LC) UI 33-740 (LC)

U2 33-722 (LC) U2 33-739 (LC)

X-077 Demin. H O 56 59-633 (CV)59-522 (LC) 9.2.3-2 2 59-529 (LC) 3 GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve i

t

Page 17 of 24 Table 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC8 Requirements Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classification 8 Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Ref / Notes X-078 Fire Protection 56 26-1296 (CV)26-243 9.5.1-10 X-080 Lower Comp. Press. 56 30-40 30-37 9.4.7-1 Relief X-081 RCDT to Gas Analyzer 56 77-16 77-17 11.2.2-1 X-082 Refueling Cavity Pump 56 78-560 (LC)78-561 (LC) 9.1.3-1 Suet.

8 CDd55,36,57 NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve

Pasir 18 ef 24 ' .

Table 2.1 ., .

. Design Correlates to Explicit-10CFR50 CDC8 Requirements s Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration ' Description LClassification1 Barrier (s): Ba rrier(s) Figure Ref./ Notes '-

X-083 Refueling Cavity Papp 56 78-558,(LC) .78-557 (LC) 9.1.3-1 Disch. ,

s u . ,.

? , e W

X-084A- ,

PRT to Gas Analyzer 56 68-308 68-307

3. .

e r#

X-085A Excess Ltdn. HX to  % 43-75 ,43-77 3 Boron Analyzer

, e X-0878 ILRT P-TAPS 's 56 52-502 (LC)52-503 (LC)

'Gbc55,56,57 NOTEi Automatic Power Operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valvr, (CV) Check Valve

. - _ -. _._m .. .. . - . _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . ,_. . _. _ . . _ _ _ _ ,_ ,_

1 Page 19 of 24 .

' Table 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC8 Requirements ,

Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description . Classifications Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Ref./Noted I X-087D ILRT P-TAPS 56 52-500 (LC)52-501 (LC) i l

i r

X-090 Control Air - 56 Unit 1 32-80 9.3.1-6 Train A 32-287 (CV)32-285 (LC)

't l

X-090 Control Air - 56 Unit 2 32-81 9.3.1-6  !

Train A 32-358 (CV)32-353 (LC) ,

1 X-091 PASF Hot Leg 1 55 43-251(RM)43-250(RM) See X-023 Train A i

8 CDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) lacked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve i i 4

Page 20 of 24 Table 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit

-10CFR50 CDC8 Requirceents

- Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classifications Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Re f. / Notes X-093 Accumulator Sample 56 43-34 43-35 i

i i

j X-094A Upper Rad. Mon. - 56 90-109 90-107 Intake a

l X-094B Upper Rad. Mon. - 56 90-108 90-107

{ Intake if

. X-094C Upper Rad. Mon. - 56 90-110 90-111

Return i

s

.u nGDb55,56,57

, NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve,

(CV) Check Valve i 4

3 i

i I

f 1

1 e -

e n -. -, - , ,,. .- -, , , 4 .m. e ~ m

, , , , , . _ . - . _ _ . ~ . . _ _

. ~ . .

Prat 21 of 24 Table 2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC1 Requirements Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description classification! Barrier (s) . Barrier (s) Fiaure Re f./Not es X-095A Lower Rad. Mon. - 56 90-115 90-113 Intake X-095B Lower Rad. Mon. - 56 90-114 90-113 Intake X-095C Lower Rad. Hon. - 56 90-116 90-117 Return X-096C Hot Leg Sample 55 43-22 43-23 Loops 2 & 3 8

CDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve,

?"V) Check Valve

. _ . _. _ _ . . _ -_ . . . .. . . - . .. ~ .. .-..-.m . . _ _ _ . , , . . . . - . . . . _...,m. ___ _ _ _ - . .. .._.m .._ . ..- - . . ._,

3 Pran 22 of 24 Table 2.1

, Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC1 Requirements 4 Penetration Inside Outside FSAR

. Penetration Description Classifications Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Flaure Ref./ Notes

'X-098 ILRT P-TAPS 56 52-506 (LC)52-507 (LC) s 4

56 43-319(RM)43-318(RM) See X-023 X-101 'PASF Containment Air I Intake - Train B i

AFW Test Line 57 Closed System 3-351C (LC) ,

X-102 i

i i i i

43-461 (CV)43-317(RM) See X-023 Note -

X-103 PASF Liquid Discharge 56 applies to outboard to Containment 43-341(RM) valves only i

i 4

l i

3 CDC 55, 56, 57 1

I NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, 4

(CV) Cberk Valve 4

4 4

1

_._._.._ ~.. . . . ~ . - _ . . . _ . . . . . . . _ . - , _. - . . - . . _. . _ , . . _ . . . _ _ ,. .....__. , . . _ . . .

Past 23 of 26 Table'2.1 Design Correlates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC1 Requirements Penetration Inside Outside FSAR

.! Penetration Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Ref./ Notes X-106 AFW Test Line 57 Closed System 3-352C (LC)

I I

X-106 PASF Air Discharge 56 43-460 (CV)43-325(RM) See X-023-to containment 43-307(RM) Note - applies' s

i to outboard valves only j

l i

j X-llo mil Valve Test Line 55 87-7 87-9 6.3.2-15 87-8 l

f 1

X-114 Glycol Floor Cooling 56 61-122 i

61-110 6.5.6-2 i 61-745 (CV) '

l 4

1 l3CDC 55, 56, 57 i  !

NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual V.:lve,

! (CV) Check Valve ,

I I

l a i

i l.

4 l

Paga 25 of 24 Table 2.1 Design Correl.ates to Explicit 10CFR50 CDC8 Requirements Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classifications Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figuiy Ref./ Notes X-115 Glycol Floor Cooling 56 61-97 61-96 6.5.6-2 61-602 (CV)

X-116A PASF Containment Air 56 43-288(RM)43-287(RM) See X-023 Intake - Train A 3

GDC'55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve a

S

P:gi 1 ef 14 Tib12 2.2 Design Co 10CFR50 CDC{ relates on Other Definedto Intent Basis of Penetratic.n Inside Outside FSAR Penetrttion Description Classifications Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Other Defined Basis Re f. /Not es X-001 Equipment Hatch 56 Hatch ----

6.2.4-12 Double 0-Ring provides redundancy for hatch seal X-002A Personnel Airlock 56 Airlock Airlock 6.2.4-13 Two daars, both with double resilient Door Door seals and mechanical interlocks X-002B Personnel Airlock 56 Airlock Airlock 6.2.4-13 Two doors, both with double resilient Door Door seals and mechanical interlocks X-003 Fuel Transfer Tube 56 Blind ----

6.2.4-14 Double resilient seals provide Flange redundant flange seal.

X-008 Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- Penetration is a seal-welded spare and is a single passive barrier as is primary containment X-013A Main Steam 57 Cicsed System 1-04, 1-147, 10.3.2-1 This directly meets GDC 57 with the 1-15, 1-05 & exception of the (5) safety relief

& Safeties (5) valves outside containment which relieve to the atmosphere. Safety relief valves required to ensure transient and accident condition secondary side heat removal mechanism.

X-013B Main Steam 57 Closed System 1-11, 1-148, 10.3.2-1 See X-Ol3A 1-12, and Safeties (5)

X-013C Main Steam 57 Closed System 1-22, 1-149, 10.3.2-1 See X-Ol3A 1-23, and Safeties (5)

I CDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief Valve.

I

Psse 2 of 14 Table 2.2 Design Co 10CFR50 CDC{ relates on Other to Intent Defined Basis of Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classification 8 Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Other DefincJ Basis Ref./ Notes X-013D Main Steam 57 Closed System 1-29, 1-150, 10.3.2-1 See X-013A 1-16, and 1-30 and Safeties (5)

X-015 CVCS Letdown 55 62-72 62-77 9.3.4-1 One of the inner isolation valves is 62-73 a pressure relief valve,62-662 which 62-74 relieves to pressurizer relief tank 62-662 (RV) (PRT), acceptable per Westinghouse design standard.

X-016 Normal Charging 55 62-543 Closed 9.3.4-1 Closed system outside containment pro- Automatic system l (CV) System vides outer barrier Auxiliary bora- isolation valve

, tion valves62-709 and 84-500 are 62-90 available two normally closed valves outside which receives containment. Safety Injection signal. Accept-

! able per Westing-house design stan-dard.

1 X-017 RER Return 55 63-640 (CV) Closed 5.5.7-1 See X-020A Remote manual 63-643 (CV) System system valve 63-158 (RM)63-172 available.63-637 (RV) RV relieves to PRT.

X-018 Spare 56 ---- ---- See X-008  !

! I GD0 55, 56, 57 -

I

. NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief Valve.

7

.i J

d 1

i l

1 l

-- - . . - - - _. -.. .-. . .- - - .._. . . . .. . - . - - - , - . - . . . . ~

Page 3 of 14 Table 2.2 Design Co 'i 10CFR50 CDC{ relates on other DefinedtoBasis Intent of i

Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Other Defincd Basis Ref./ Notes

^ Containment isolation for the RHR X-019A RiiR Sump 56

• Closed 6.3.2-1 System sump line penetration consists of:

(1) a closed system outside contain-j ment (2) a containment isolation i

valve (63-72) outside containment in the RHR sump valve-room. This

valve is remotely controlled from the main control room.

An enclosure of the RHR sump lines

) and isolation valves is provided 1 from the containment out to and r i including the isolation valves. ,

However, this enclosure is not '

, designed to be leaktight after .

an accident for the following l l

reasons: (1) The maximum pres-

sure which will be experienced inside the RHR sump line will only be about 25 pisg. (2)

The containment sump valve is qualified to 400 psig.

Thus, the penetration has such 3

overconservatism in its design j that an external leaktight enclosure around the valves is

, not necessary.

This design is acceptable on basis j of Westinghouse system design stan-i dard and acceptable resolution to NCR SQN NEB 8203.

4 4

NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief Valve.

s i

Pzg2 4 af 14 Table 2.2 Design Co 10CFR50CDC{relatestoIntentof on Other Defined Basis Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Other Defined Basis Ref./ Notes X-019B RHR Sump 56

• Closed 6.3.2-1

• Containment isolation for the RHR System sump line penetration consists of:

(1) a closed system outside con-tainment (2) a containment isolation valve (63-73) outside containment in the RHR sump valve-room. This valve is remotely controlled from the main control room. An enclosure of the FUUi sump lines and isolation valves is pro-vided from the containment out to and including the isolation valves. However, this enclosure is not designed to be leaktight af ter an accident for the following reasons: (1) The maximum pressure which will be experienced inside the RHR sump line will only be about 25 psig. (2) The containment sump valve is qualified to 400 psig.

Thus, the penetration has auch overcon-servatism in its design that an external leaktight enclosure around the valves is not necessary. This design is accept-able on the basis of Westinghouse system design standard and acceptable resolution to NCR SQN NEB 8203.

I CDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief Valve.

Pege 5 of 14 Table 2.2 Design Co 10CFR50 CDC{ relates on Other DefinedtoBasis Intent of Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Other Defined Basis Ref./ Notes X-020A SIS - RIIR Pump 55 63-633 (CV) Closed 6.3.2-1 This penetration employs a check Remote manual Discharge - Train B 63-635 (CV) System valve in each of the branch lines system valve 63-112 (RM) inside containment as the inner 63-94 is isolation barriers, and a closed available.

system outside containment is the outer barrier. Acceptable per Westing-house design standard. Additionally, a test line adjoins each line inside con-tainment between the check valves and primary containment. The isola-tion valve in the test line is remote manually actuated from the main con-trol room. These valves are open for short periods of time during normal operation for the performance of SIS and RHR system venting as described in Tech. Spec. 4.5.2. Thus, these valves do not automatically close when the containment isolation or safety injection signal is initiated during the venting of the SIS and RHR system. This is acceptable because -

administrative controls exist in the test documents to assure valve closure after testing and containment integrity is not compromised during testing since flow is being maintained into contain-ment by pump operation.

X-020B SIS - RIIR Pump 55 63-632 (CV) Closed 6.3.2-1 See X-020A Remote manual Discharge - Train A 63-634 (CV) System system valve 63-111 (RM) 63-93 available.

ICDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief Valve.

P;ge 6 of 14 Txble 2.2 Design Cor 10CFR50 CDC{ elates on Other Definedto Basis Intent of Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Peretrrtion Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Other Defined Basis Ref./ Notes St Pump Discharge to 55 63-547 (CV) Closed 6.3.2-1 See X-020A Remote manual X-021 system valve Hot Legs - Train B 63-549 (CV) System 63-167 (RM)63-157 is available.

BIT Charging Pump 55 63-581 (CV) Closed 6.3.2-1 See X-020A Remote manual X-022 system valves Discharge 63-174 (RM) System 63-25 and 63-26 are available.63-697 is a locke.

closed valve.

X-024 SI Relief Valve 56 68-559 (CV) Closed 5.1-1 The closed system outside contain-Discharge System ment is a header of lines from relief valves in the RHR, CVCS, SIS, and Containment Spray systems. Each of the relief valves discharges through this penetration to the Pressurizer Relief Tank. Acceptable per Westing-house design standard.

dP Sensor 56 * --- *The containment pressure sensors are X-025B ---

located outside of and as close as practical to the containment. The lines and pressure sensors are missile protected and designed to safe shutdown event requirements. These sensors employ redundant bellows as isolation barriers.

Design required to permit actuation of equipment necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

I GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief Valve.

Prar 7 af 14 Table 2.2 Design Cor 10CFR50 CDC{ elates on Other to Intent Defined Basis of Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penet ration Description Classification

• Barrier (sl Barrier (s) Fiaure other Defined Basis Ref./ Notes X-025C Rx Vessel Level 55 * * ----

• The reactor vessel level indication system (RVLIS) is required post-accident for continual indication of the water level in the reactor vessel.

The capillary sensing lines which transmit pressure from the reactor vessel to instruments in the Auxiliary Building are armored and designed to withstand DBE conditions. Any con-tainment isolation valves installed in the RVLIS capillary lines will jeo-pardize the performance of the system.

For this reason, isolation of these capillary lines is accomplished by a sealed sensor located inside contain-ment and an isolator located outside containment. These devices utilize a type of bellows which transmits pressure while preventing mixing of the fluids on either side of the isolation devices. The capillary line is armored 3/16 inches 0.D.

stainless steel tubing and is filled with demineralized water and sealed.

A postulated shear of this capillary line on either side of the containment would not allow a leak to develop through the co.stainment boundary.

This is a Westinghouse design.

X-026A dP Sensor 56 --- * --- *See X-0258 X-026C Rx Vessel Level 55 * * --- *See X-025C I GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief %alve.

I

Pcgs 8 cf 14 Ttble 2.2 Design Co 10CFR50 CDC{ relates on other DefinedtoBasis Intent of Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Description Classificationt Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Other Defined Basis Ref./ Notes Penetration X-027A dP Sensor 56 --- * --- *See X-025B X-0278 dP Sensor 56 --- * --- *See X-025B X-C27D Rx Vessel Level 55 * * --- *See X-025C X-028 Spare 56 --- --- --- See X-008 X-031 Spare 56 --- --- --- See X-008 Closed 6.3.2-1 See X-020A Remote Manual X-032 SI Pump Discharge 55 63-545 (CV) system valve to Hot Legs - Train A 63-543 (CV) System 63-21 (RM)63-156 is available.

Closed 6.3.2-1 See X-020A Remote manual X-033 S1 Pump Discharge 55 63-533 (CV) valve 63-22 is63-555 (CV) System available.63-551 (CV)63-557 (CV)63-121 (RM)

X-035 CCW From Excess 57 Closed 70-85 9.2.1-2 See X-053 Ltda. HX System X-036 Spare g 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-037 Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-038 Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-039C Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-039D I

CDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief Valve.

l

Prge 9 of 14 Ttble 2.2 Design Co 10CFR50 CDC{ relates on Other Definedto Basis Intent of Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classifications Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Other Defined Basis Ref./ Notes X-040C Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 i

X-040D H2 Purge Supply 56 ----

Blind ----

See X-003 Flange X-043A To RCP Seals 55 62-563 (CV) Closed 9.3.4-1 Closed system outside containment Local meaual

System provides outer barrier. This design system valve allows continued use of Reactor 62-559 Coolant Pumps post accident and retain- available.

ing integrity of the seals. Limited RCS makeup is provided. Acceptable per Westinghouse design standard.

X-043B To RCP Seals 55 62-561 (CV) Closed 9.3.4-1 See X-043A Local manual System system valve 62-557 is available.

X-043C To RCP Seals 55 62-562 (CV) Closed 9.3.4-1 See X-043A Local manual System system valve 62-558 is available.

X-043D To RCP Seals 55 62-560 (CV) Closed 9.3.4-1 See X-043A Local manual System system valve 62-556 is available.

X-048A Containment 56 72-547 (CV) Closed 6.2.2-2 Closed system outside containment Remote manual Spray System provides outer barrier. This design system valve allows use of line post-accident for 72-39 is mitigation of high containment pres- available.

sures.

I CDC 55, 56, 57 i

NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief Valve.

Page 10 cf 16 Table 2.2 Design Co 10CFR50CDC{relatestoIntentof on Other Defined Basis Penet ration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Other Defined Basis Ref./ Notes X-048B Containment 56 72-548 (CV) Closed 6.2.2-2 See X-048A Remote manual Spray System system valve 72-2 is available.

X-049A RHR Spray 56 72-556 (CV) Closed 6.2.2-2 See X-048A Remote manual Systesi system valve 72-40 is available.

X-049B R}iR Spray 56 72-555 (CV) Closed 6.2.2-2 See X-048A Remote manual System system valve 72-41 is available.

X-053 CCh' to Excess 57 Closed 70-143 9.2.1-2 This directly meets CDC 57 except that Ltda. HX System on the closed system inside containment is a pressure relief valve which relieves into containment, ?O-703. Penetrations X-053 and X-035 are part of the same loop.

Acceptable per Westinghouse design standard.

X-054 Thimble Renewal 56 ----

Blind 6.2.4-15 See X-003 Flange X-055 Spare 56 ---- ---- ----

See X-008 X-079A Ice Blowing 56 ----

Blind 6.2.4-16 See X-003 Flange X-079B Negative Return 56 ----

Blind 6.2.4-16 See X-003 Flange X-084B Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 I

GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief Valve.

Page 11 of 14 Table 2.2 Design Co 10CFR50 on CDC{

Otherrelates to Intent of Defined Basis Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Other Defined Basis Ref./ Notes X-084C Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-084D Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-085B dP Sensor 56 ---- * ---- *See X-025B X-085C Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-085D Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-086A Rx Vessel Level 55 * * ---- *See X-025C X-086B Rx Vessel Level 55 * * ---- *See X-025C X-086C Rx Vessel Level 55 * * ---- *See X-025C X-086D Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-087A Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-087C Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-038 Shutdown Maint. 56 ---- Blind ---- See X-003 Access Flange X-089 Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-092A Hy Analyzer 56 43-207 (Auto open Closed Closed system outside containment on pump start) System provides outer barrier. This line is required post-accident for H2 monitoring. Penetrations X-092A and X-0928 are part of the same.

I GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief Valve.

Pisi 12 of 14 Ttble 2.2 Design Co 10CFR50 CDC{ relates on Other DefinedtoBasis Intent of Penetration inside Outside FSAR Penttration Description Classificationi Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Other Defined Basis Ref./ Notes X-092A (continued) closed loop. Valves43-207 and 43-208 are both located inside containment. Hz Analyzers dis-cussed in Supplement 2 to SQNP's SER.

X-092B Hy Analyzer 56 43-208 (Auto open Closed ---- See X-092A on pump start) System X-096A Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-096B Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-099 Hy Analyzer 56 43-202 (Auto open Closed Closed system outside containment on pump start) System ---- provides outer barrier. This line is required post accident for H y monitoring. Penetrations X-099 and X-100 are part of the same closed system. Valves43-202 and 43-201 are both located inside containment.

X-100 H Analyzer 56 43-201 (Auto open Closed ---- See X-099 2

on pump start) System X-105 Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-lO7 RHR Supply 55 74-2 (RM) Closed 5.5.7-1 Closed system outside containment Remote manual System provides outer barrier. Valve valve 74-1 is 74-2 is normally closed with available, interlocks to prevent inadvertent opening. Acceptable per Westing-house design standard.

I CDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief Valve.

Table 2.2 Prge 13 of 14 Design Co 10CFR50GDC{relatestoIntentof on Other Defined Basis Penetration Inside Outside FSAR

• Penetration Description Classification! Barrier (s) Barrier (s) Figure Other Defined Basis Ref./ Notes X-108 L'd! 55 87-562 (CV) Closed 6.3.2-15 Closed system outside containment Remote manual System provides outer barrier. System valve 87-21 is required post-accident as part of available.

ECCS.

X-109 1:HI 55 87-563 (CV) Closed 6.3.2-15 See X-108 Remote mancal System valve 87-23 is available.

X-Ill Vacuum Relief 56 30-46 9.4.7-1 The containment vacuum relief system 30-571 (CV) and isolation valve is located in series 6.2.4-17 with a vaccuum relief (check) valve both outside of containment. The closing of the isolation valves are actuated by a set of redundant pres-sure sensors independent of those for other containment isolation valves.

The closing is powered by redundant air supplies. The spring-loaded vacuum relief valves are normally closed and have position indicators in the Main Control Room to indicate the open or closed positions. These valves are not considered as simple check valves.

X-Il2 Vacuum Relief 56 ----

30-47 9.4.7-1 See X-Ill 30-572 (CV) and 6.2.4-17 X-113 Vacuum Relief 56 ----

30-48 9.4.7-1 See X-111 30-573 (CV) and 6.2.4-17 X-Il6B Spare 56 ---- ---- ----

See X-008 I

CDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otberwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief Valve.

Page 14 of 14 Table 2.2 Design Co 10CFR50 CDC{ relates on Other DefinedtoBasis Intent of Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penetration Description Classificationi Barrier (s] Barrier (s) Figure Other Defined Basis Ref./ Notes X-Il6C Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-Il6D Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-117 Shutdown naint. 56 ----

Blind ----

See X-003 Access Flange X-lla Layup Water 56 ----

Blind ----

See X-003 Treatment Flange X-119 Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-120 Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-120E thru Electrical 56 Epoxy Epoxy ---- Standard dual passive epoxy barrier X-170E Penetrations Seal Seal electrical penetration assembly design pressurized between the seals with N2' X-125E Spare 56 ---- ---- ----

See X-008 X-1302 Spare 56 ---- ---- ----

See X-008 X-155E Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 X-162E Spare 56 ---- ---- ---- See X-008 I

CDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE: Automatic Power operated valve unless otherwise referenced as follows: (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve, (RM) Remote Manual Valve, (CV) Check Valve, (RV) Relief Valve.

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