ML20205R134

Confirms 870330 Verbal Granting of Temporary Waiver of Compliance to Change Min Number of Sequencer Channels Required to Be Operable from Four to Three,Per 870331 Application for Amend to License NPF-3

ML20205R134
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	04/01/1987
From:	Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Shelton D TOLEDO EDISON CO.
Shared Package
ML20205R137	List: ML20205R134 ML20205R159 ML20205R173 ML20205R183
References
TAC-65028, NUDOCS 8704060228
Download: ML20205R134 (6)

Text

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Q~- - 0 Docket No. 50-346 April 01,1987 Mr. Donald C. Shelton Vice President, Nuclear Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza - Stop 712 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652

SUBJECT:

EMERGENCY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE - SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Re: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station By letter dated March 31, 1987, you requested an emergency Technical Specification (TS) change which would modify the number of Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) logic sequencer channels for Emergency Diesel Generator loading which is required to be operable. There are four (4) such logic sequencer channels as indicated in TS Section 3.3.2.1. Table 3.3-3 and the existing TS requires all four channels to be operable. Your Parch 31, ,

1987 letter proposes to change the minimum number of sequencer channels required to be operable from four (4) to three (3).

We have reviewed your evaluation and iustification provided in your March 31, 1987 submittal and find them acceptable. This letter confirms the verbal granting of a temporary waiver of compliance, as discussed with you on March 30, 1987, to change the minimum number of, sequencer channels required to be operable from 4 to 3, as indicated in the enclosed TS page. This temporary waiver of compliance will be in effect until April 3,1987, while we complete the processing of your amendment request.

Sincerely,

/S/

R DO O O 46 John F. Stolz, Director P PDR PWR Project Directorate #6 Division of PWR Licensing-B

Enclosures:

TS pages 3/4 3-11 and 3/4 3-12 /

cc w/ enclosures:

See next page -

Distribution ranch 21.les Ringram ADeAgazio <r.y..a UGC ~ACRS Edordan JPartlow BGrime NThompson A w-PWR(6 PWR RIngr/n am ADeAgazio;eh J N / \ lS7 'f // /87 l /87

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ENERGENCY' LICENSE AUTHORI2ATION - .

CHECK LIST .

1. Complete submittal (Section III, Item 1) /

2. Prepare and sign handwritten SER, EA , final NSHC and Technical Specifications (Section III, Item S) . .

a. ORAB'or technicaf branch input __

b. Resident or regional personnel input -

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3. "Best effort" to obtain state coments (Section III, Item 6) /

/ s 4 . Assistant Director concurrence (Section III, item 7) V .

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5. Assistant Director oral , authorization to licensee (Section III, Item 8)- .. .

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Telecopy Technical Specifications (Section III, Item 8) 6.

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7. Forward final two day. license amendment with post notice and l FNSHC -(Section III, Item 9) (Prepare DLOP 228, Attachuent 4)

Project Manager AL DEA C @ / o Branch Chief ;y onu 1 ror., 4 - ,

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^ ^1 " 0. . . . a ::.cf l-Tech. Review Branch Chief

• 3 or e c4 4 s o M. / . Tech. Review 8 anch AD* O t'Awk cit c res.sf/gy p To the extent practicable. ,

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l'a p r O Vinel Over l oadinu t t he EINn i n the evro t. a Safety Feat ures Actunt i on Si tpia l (SFH5) i n coi nc t ife'n t wi th a irm of ot + si te power. the SFAS logic t. o

' t i r i. u i t e i nclude sequor.rern uhi ch . anne equipitient I.o be powered by the EDGs When

,g ne iuaded in a 5tepuiur manties .

L oarti rey ic accompfished in five s t op r. .

the sc quencer 1 s a c,t isa t.c d . the SI;AS signal ta start. aThin component in 1.emporarily prevents overloading-Oloched inn ti l o upr5ci f i c t i rne i ntierval has. elapsed.

al,sence of o 1oss of u f f r. i L i>

the IIDGs durina utariinu (4md I c.uti nu. In the t. hat permi ts star tup of the component p o w er'. the sequenrcr u ar e i ri a t.t.ndi t i on upon reculpt. uf an SFinS uiynal.

t her e are f uni Sb/Ui s lmoncl n: llo- un t rui. of l.no cleannel e. arc combinerf to f or m uno oi tical. un c h.'tnnol .n ett I l u.. o.a po t. of t.he oLIer two channels are. combined to 00 he a %-i.Ond ot.l ital l un r h.;innet t iw..l . SF AS r.hannr ] f a j r,n has nn associ a t ed tiegnt:nc on - chbonel. I hr ue sn qn.7mi

- thannels are t ota) 1 y . i ndepetident stod redondesil. In obloiti a ir ip us an zu l oa t i on chgt,ioel .-Is,c3 t h SffAS logic ch,.nnel s enun t trs p init thin t rip can be thelayed by thr aEtionof only one of the two awor i r.l eil coqnr nc et chcuene1 .. I hn r. . :l t i.onoh therr? Are f our siaquencer

(.honnel t . unl v One p tr IJhii u.ngI he v, r r ,.ib I C to assure proper sequered1 ng o F c on,pon en t s . Thi s ar rangement annures t hat the single f ailure cri terion is r.at i s f i ed since a si ngi c sequencer channel failure.can not affect both EDGs.

lable 3.5-3 of I S Gr.cl l on 3/4 3 . *.' . Functional Uti t t 4 a.' requires a. minimum of four Sequencer units to be operable. i . e ., , all the.sequencers must be operable. 7he associated sclion in the-ev'ent Less. than the total nurnber of units are operable uould allnw rainlinued operatiori provided the inoperable.

in.i t: 'i o pl acesl inn tlur t r i piir d e e .* *tli l l i n i within o n r= l inu r* and l.lio it!.Ili5.ntu,pt n u'IdLRf~c of units are opersble. As presen'.y we..r d eci . the action statement is .

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paradoxical in t. hat i t c.a n o r,'. L.c r.at.i s f i ed once antered. The licensee asser ts that t. h e I S i s i n nrr e.- und that the minimum number of Sequencer units Lo be operwbl e ut.oul t! he - I bree vi c.c f o.ir .

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!in thr. app!icat1on s:uhnu l f.ett . I l u.* *i< . tit >ee also proposen ta c)arify t- h a t ior the piir pose of eneet. i n ig A:- t t ori St a t.t tuer.t 9 a. of 'IS 3/4 3 . . Table 3.5-3, a St ttoent.e'r i .. si t en:ed i ri 1.00 " t r i ppeel" turidi r i on by physicall y r ernov i ng the s o r gu er s t er ruudu j e.

,s f,Wikile. l Illri lhe stc.ff lias revi cesed t.f is a lactinnen opplication. Dased ori the fact that only orie ca clucticer o ris t per E DG inu e. t f uric t i on to pr ov i cle for proper set;uenc i ng of cornponenta pooered by tfie liDGs. anr1 1. h e i ndepentience of the redundant untts, the ntatt agrees t ha t. the M i n i rni n.i IHeguencer] tJanits Operable should be three

. ice i out -- an t.h e 1 i c en s?c- asser t n.. ilic staff alun agrees tsith the clartticatton Llial a sequencer .:hannel is placed in,the " t r i p p e t! c ontf i, t i on by it.e physi cal r emowil of t, tic se :iodul e. a. m e h r m v M *f h ekpnels setrv kir {s Coesseit1evtgutkri,esit.cro fLv 71ch u ca./ S eoftk ra ft. V&S /J t'

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FINAL N0 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERiilNATION The Commission's regulations in 10 CfR 50.92 state that the Commission may make a final determination that c license amendment involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility, in .accordance with the amendment, would not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. i i

1 The proposed changes do not involve a significant hasards consideration because the operation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Unit No. 1, in accordance with these changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of l an esceident previously evaluated (10CFR50.92(c)(1)) .

No fignificant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated results because three logic sequencers  !

will still be required to be operable thus ensuring that under i single failure conditions an EDG can be properly loaded.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accidane from l any previously evaluated (10CFR50.92(c)(2)).  ;'

The proposed action does not involve a modification to any plant syrAem or component. It is shown above. that with the inoperable sagtencer channel in a tripped condition, the safe operation of the l EST equipment is not affected.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety (10CFR50.92(c)(3)).

It is shown above with the inoperable sequencer channel placed in a 'I trffped condition the operability of the SFAS channels is ensured by c:aMaining the required coincidence logic. Since proper sequencing is ftill ensured by the revised action statement and minimum operable  ;

unfd requirements, the response time of ESF equipment is maintained witlin the assumptions of the Safety Analysis Report. In addition, compliance with the single failure criteria is not affected.

Accordingly, we co.nclude that the amendment to Facility Operating License lI NFF-3 involves- no significant hazards considerations. ll l

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STATE CONSULTATION Cu'~ h '

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ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment involves,a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within tiie restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.

We have determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released p'f.fsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has 'made a final no significant hazards consideration finding with respect to this amendment.

Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need by prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, arid (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

G . It/ Y Dated:

's I Principal Contributors: -

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