ML20205N821

Notice of Violation from Insp on 880809-1021.Violations Noted:Licensee Failed to Meet Tech Spec 6.2.A by Failing to Adhere to Listed Procedures,Including LAP-200-3,LAP-1600-2, LOA-B309 & LOA-B409

ML20205N821
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	10/28/1988
From:	Greenman E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205N812	List: IR 05000373/1988022 ML20205N808 ML20205N821
References
50-373-88-22, 50-374-88-21, NUDOCS 8811040364
Download: ML20205N821 (2)

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E 110TICE OF VIOLATION Commonwealth Edison Company Docket No. 50-373 Docket tio. 50-374 As.a result of the inspection conducted on August 9 through October 21, 1988, and in accordance with the "General Polig e.nd Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (19PV,, the following violation was identified:

1. Technical Specific ' ri (TS) 6.2. A requires that detailed written procedures, including applicable checkoff lists, shall be prepared, approved and adhered to for the applicable procedures recomended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978 (which includes procedures covering operations) and for actions to be taken to correct 4

potential malfunctions including responses to alanns.

LaSalle Administrative Procedure (LAP) LAP-200-3 "Shif t Changes" requires licensed personnel to perform a visual control room panel check which must include the status of annunciated alarms.

LAP-1600-2, "Conduct of Operations," in part F.1.aa.1 requires the operator to know the reason for each alarmed annunciator and in part F.1.aa.2 states, "Response to annunciator is potentially the operator's highest priority, and until evaluated, should be treated as such."

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to meet the requirement of TS 6.2.A by failing to adhere to the following procedures:

! LAP 200-3 Shift Change LAP 1600-2 Conduct of Operations LOA B309 "RCIC CHAN B STM LIllE DIFF PRESS HI" alann procedure LOA B409 "RCIC DIV 2 ISOL SIG" alarm procedure.

On September 1,1988, at 4:31 p.m., differential pressure (dP) switch

2E31-N0078B actuated causing a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) i steam line isolation. This caused the "RCIC CHAN B STM LINE DIFF PRESS HI" and "RCIC DIY 2 ISOL SIG" alarms to annunciate in the control room.

In response to the alann signals, the Unit Operator acknowledged the i alarms at the 2H13-P601 panel. However, the operator did not recognize this event to be a RCIC Steem Line High dP switch actuation, instead in-correctlybelieving(57psig).that Pressure Isolatinn the isolation was due to a RCIC Low Steam Supply 8811040364 88102G PDR ADOCK 05000373

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,' Notice of Violation 2 Due to this misunderstanding of the isolation and failure to follow appropriate procedures, the 4-hour ENS notification was not made within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of the event, troubleshooting of the problem was not started and no other actions were taken at this time by the operator. The other licensed operators on-shift at the time of the event also failed to recognize the isolation and the on-coming shift personnel did not recognize it during their shift turnover, either. The error in inter-preting the annunicator signals and RCIC isolation signal was finally recognized on September 2,1988, at 2:00 a.m.-approximately 91/2 hours after the isolation.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

The inspection showed that actions had been taken to correct the identified violation and to prevent recurrence. Consequently, no reply to the violation is rr. quired and we have no further questions regarding this matter.

OCT I 81988

[ g, Date Edward G. Greenman, Director Division of Reactor Projects