ML20205G366
| ML20205G366 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/25/1999 |
| From: | Wigginton J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Essig T NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| PROJECT-689 NUDOCS 9904070228 | |
| Download: ML20205G366 (23) | |
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[ 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666-0001
%..... March 25, 1999 MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas H. Essig, Acting Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiation Protection Branch
. Division of Inspection Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: James E. Wigginton, Senior Reactor Health Physicis Y '
7 Emergency Preparedness and Radiation Protectio nc Division of Inspection Program Management Office 'of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF PUBLIC MEETING WITH THE NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (NEI) REGARDING PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND -
INSPECTION FINDINGS SIGNIFICANCE FOR ASSESSING RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAMS On March 18,'1999, representatives of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) met with representatives of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at the NRC offices in Rockville, Maryland. Attachment 1 provides a list of workshop attendees.
The purpose of the meeting was to get stakeholder comments and feedback on NRC staff draft matrices and logic diagrams to be used by the NRC to help assess licensees' radiation protection (RP) programs at power reactors. These tools will atlow NRC inspectors to determine the safety significance of ine"vidual RP inspection findings. Additionally, NRC staff provided comments and discussed the draft Performance Indicator (PI) Manual to be used in the upcoming April Pilot Workshop in Chicago. /[
Tom Essig gave the meeting introduction, including the recent NRR reorganization impacting
' the emergency preparedness (EP) and RP areas. By April, Tom will be the section chief over
/)F#s both EP and RP functions.
NRC and NEl staff summarized and discussed the NRC and industry efforts to date, arj the goals and time schedohs for this ongoing project. Future meetings were planned, with a goal of meeting with indusicj radiation protection managers at the end of March. The NRC informed NEl that the scheduleior providing the draft inspection procedures (IP_) had not been finalized.
NEl noted that the inspection materials would be needed for the scheduled NRC inspector training in Atlanta the week of April 26.
The discussion started with the NRC staff's comments on the draft PI Manual covering both the occupational and pub'ic exposure areas (see attachment 2). NEl agreed to incorporate the comments, and the revision would be discussed at the March 18 NRC/NEl management meeting. NEl and the staff agreed to develop examples of what events and scenarios would CONTACT: James E. Wigginton, PERB/NRR
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i constitute a PI " hit", and perhaps more important, what events should not be counted as Pl.
These examples would be valuable inspection training tools for the upcoming training sessions.
The staff agreed to work with NEl and the industry task force to finalize these Pl examples. 1 Further discussion in the Pl area focused on the threshold intervals, relative to going to a single time interval (instead of the current yearly and three-year intervals). There was agreement to ,
use the three-year for the pilot inspections and NEl agreed to collect three years of data to attempt to validate a two year interval to be used in the post-pilot period.
, The NRC staff handed out Attachment 3a (NRC draft occupational exposure matrix and a flow l l diagram). NEl provided feedback (Attachment 3b), and had the following comments. NEl continues to have significant problems with the NRC using significant potential for overexposure (SPO) in the logic diagram -- it could be misused, it is subjective ar 4 could be used inconsistently across the Regions. NRC staff understood industry concerns, but noted that l written SPO guidance (in the enforcement manual) is in place and no significant problems (in the stafi's view) have surfaced over the past years. NEl asked the staff to consider Attachment 3b as a substitute for SPO, and the staff agreed to examine that suggestion. Attachment Sa's
" failure to report" and " Compromises ability to assess dose (Risk)?" blocks were discussed and the NRC staff agreed to make editorial changes. NEl shared the view that the red risk significance for failing greater than three barriers in a VHRA area is too severe, and the staff agreed to reconsider that severity level finding.
The NRC staff discussed work in progress on the flow logic for handling inspection findings in the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) area. Objective criteria could be used, for example, to partition the top 50% of the plant performers with this group receiving no additional inspection efforts beyond the baseline IP. NEl agreed that the staff making progress by using a graded, performance-based path. The staff committed to provide a draft flow diagram by the next scheduled meeting.
The staff handed out the draft flow diagram for the transportation and Part 61 inspection findings areas (Attachment 4), but due to time constraints, detailed discussion was postponed.
NEl agreed to provide comments on these areas to the NRC before the next meeting, it was agreed to carryover thic discussion to the next meeting. The staff gave NEl the latest version of the NRC assessment process for EP inspection findings i Attachment 5). The meeting was adjourned.
Attachments: As stated cc w/att: See next page I
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' l Nuclear Energy institute Project No. 689 cc: Mr. Ralph Beedle Ms. Lynnette Hendricks, Director ;
Senior Vice President Plant Support !
and Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Energy institute i Nuclear Energy Institute [
Suite 400 1
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Suite 400 1776 l Street, NW I 1776 l Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3708 Washington, DC 20006-3708 I
Mr. Steven Driscol Radiation Protection INPO 700 Galleria Parkway Mr. Alex Marion, Director Atlanta, Georgia' 30339-5957 l Programs Nuclear Energy Institute .
Suite 400 1776 l Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3708 l
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e Distribution: Mtg. Summary w/ Dated March 25, 1999 o Hard Cooy PUBLIC PERB RlF MBranch DHickman SMagruder JWigginton TEssig JWhite, R1 KBarr, R2 GShear, R3 GGood, R4 N. Shah G.Kuxo R.Pedersen JNoggle CHinson RZelac S.Klementowicz RAnderson, NEl PGenoa, NEl i
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Distribution: Mtg. Summary w/ Dated Uarch 25, 1999 Hard Cooy PUBLIC -
PER8 R/F MBranch DHickman SMagruder JWigginton TEssig ,
JWhite, R1 !
KBarr, R2 GShear, R3 GG aod, R4 N. Shah G.Kuzo R.Pedersen JNoggle l CHinson RZelac
! S.Klementow:cz RAnderson, NEl PGenoa, NEl i l i
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.w Attachment 1.
Radiation Protection inspection Finding Significance Meeting 3/16/99 List of Attendees Name Oraanization Tom Essig USNRC Morris Branch USNRC Don Hickman USNRC Ken Ban USNRC Ronanid Zelac USNRC Roger Pedersen USNRC Jim Noggle USNRC Jim Wigginton USNRC Charles Hinson USNRC Ralph Anderson NEl Paul Genoa NEl
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])724FT OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION SAFETY The objectives of this cornerstone are to:
(1) keep occupational dose to individual workers below the limits specified in 10 CFR 20 Subpart C; and (2) use, to the extent practical, procedures and engineering controls based upon sound radiation protection principles to achieve occupational doses that are as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) as specified in 10 CFR 20.1101(c).
1 A performance indicator has been developed to address the first objective of the occupational radiation safety cornerstone. The indicator monitors the control of access to and work activities within radiologically-significant areas of the plant and occurrences involving degradation or failure of radiation safety barriers that result
. in readily-identifiable unintended dose. At this time, a performance indicator has not been established to address the second objective, i.e., regarding ALARA.
The indicator includes dose-rate and dose criteria that are risk-informed, in that the indicator encompasses events that might represent a substantial potential for exposure in excess of regulatory limits. The performance indicator also is considered " leading" because the indicator:
. encompasses less significant occurrences that represent precursors to events that might represent a substantial potential for exposure in excess of regulatory limits, based on industry experience; and
. employs dose criteria that are set at small fractions of applicable dose limits (e.g., the criteria are generally at or below the levels at which dose monitoring is required in regulation).
The performance indicator for this cornerstone consists of three elements which include the following:
. Technical specification high radiation areas occurrence
. Very high radiation area occurrence
. Unintended exposure occurrence 88
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Technical Snecification. High Radiation Area Occurrence -
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i The purpose of this element of the performance indicator is to monitor occurrences that involve the loss of radiological control over access to or work activities within technical specification high radiation areas.
Definition:
The performance indicator is defined as a nonconformance (or concurrent nonconformances) with technical specifications or comparable requirements in 10 CFR 20 applicable to technical specification high radiation areas that results in the loss of radiological control over access to or work activities within the respective -
high radiation area. " Technical specification high radiation areas" includes any area, accessible to individuals, in which radiation levels from radiation sources external to the body could result in an individual receiving a dose equivalent in excess of 1 rem (10 mSv) in I hour at 30 centimeters from the radiation source or 30 centimeters from any surface that the radiation penetrates, and excludes very high radiation areas.
" Radiological control over access" refers to measures that provide assurance that inadvertent entry into the area by unauthorized personnel will be prevented.
" Radiological control over work activities" refers to measures that provide assurance that dose to workers performing tasks in the area is monitored and controlled.
Examples of occurrences that would be counted against this indicator include a failure to secure an area against unauthorized access, a failure to provide a means of personnel dose monitoring or contal required by technical speci6 cations, or an actual unauthorized or unmonitored entry into an area.
Very High Radiation Area Occurrence The purpose of this element of the performance indicator is to monitor occurrences that involve the loss of radiological control over access to or work activities within very high radiation areas.- !
Definition:
The performance indicator is defined as a nonconformance (or concurrent nonconformances) with 10 CFR 20 and/or licensee procedural requirements that results in the loss of radiological control over access to or work activities within a very high radiation area. "Very high radiation area"is de6ned as any area the 89
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I respective high-radiation area, accessible to individuals, in which radiation levels from radiation sources external to the body could result in an individual receiving '
an absorbed dose in excess of 500 rads (5 grays) in I hour at 1 meter from a radiation source or 1 meter from any surface that the radiation penetrates
" Radiological control over access" refers to measures that provide !
L assurance that entry into the area by unauthorized personnel, whether j intentional or unintentional, will be prevented, l a
" Radiological control over work activities" refers to measures that provide assurance that dose to workers performing tasks in the area is monitored and controlled. .
Unintended Exposure Occurrence i
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The purpose of this element of the performance indicator is to monitor occurrences involving degradation of one or more radiation safety barriers that results in readily-identifiable unintended dose.
Definition The performance indicator is defined as a single occurrence of the degradation or failure of one or more radiation safety barriers resulting in unintended occupational exposure (s) equal to or exceeding any of the following dose criteria from a single occurnince:
l 2% of the stochastic limit in 10 CFR 20.1201 on total effective dose equivalent (0.1 rem) 10 % of the non stochastic limits in 10 CFR 20.1201 on:
. the sum of the deep-dose equivalent and the committed dose equivalent to any individual organ or tissue, other than the lens of the eye or dose received from a discrete radioactive particle (5 rem);
or the lens dose equivalent to the lens tithe eye (1.5 rem); or j .
the shallow-dose equivalent to the skin or any extremity (5 rem).
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l 20% of the limits in 10 CFR 20.1207 and 20.1208 on minors and declared
! pregnant women (0.1 rem) l )
. 100% of the limit on shallow dose equivalent from a discrete radioactive l particle (50 rem)12 {
l The dose criteria are established at levels deemed to be readily identifiable, based on industry experience. The dose criteria should not be taken to represent levels of dose that are " risk-significant." In fact, the criteria are generally at or below dose levels that are required by regulation to be monitored or to be routinely reported to l the NRC as occupational dose records.
Examples of" degradation or failure of radiation barriers" that could potentially !
count against this indicator include the following (i.e., if the degradation or failure I directly results in unintended dose equal to or greater than the respective criteria):
)
e failure to identify and post a radiological area )
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. failure to implement required physical controls over access to a radiological '
area e failure to survey and identify radiological conditions
. failure to train or instruct workers on radiological conditions and radiological work controls
. failure to iniplement radiological work controls (e.g., as part of a radiation work permit)
Data Elements; Includes the number of occurrences mach quarter, as defined above for:
. Technical specification high radiation areas occurrence
. Very high radiation area occurrence
. Unintended exposure occurrence Calculation:
I
" The NRC is currently proceeding with rulemaking to propose a 500 rem limit on shallow-dose equivalent from a discrete radioactive particle. At the time a final rule is issued, the performance indicator value will be revised to continue to reflect "100% of the established regulatory limit."
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The sum of the number of occurrences, as denned above, for:
c Se current and previous three quarters (" rolling" four-quarter value) e the current and previous eleven quarters (" rolling" twelve-quarter value)
Clarifyine Notes:
1
! Occurrences that potentially meet the definition of more than one element of the performance indicator will only be counted once. In other words, an occurrence will l not be double-counted (or triple-counted) against the performance indicator. ;
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Annendix I Radiological Effluent Occurrence J l
Defmition Radiological effluent release occurrences that exceed the values listed in Table 2.
Note: Table 2 values are the 10 CFR 50 Appendix Ilimits which meet the criteria of"As Low As is Reasonably Achievable" for radioactive material in light-water-cooled nuclear power reactor efHuents. 3 Table 2 i Radiological effluent releases in excess of the following limits:
Liquid Effluents Whole Body 3 mrem /yr Organ 10 mrem /vr Gaseous Effluents Gamma Dose 10 mrads/yr Beta Dose 20 mrads/yr Organ Doses from 15 mrems/yr I-131, I-133, H 3
& Particulates !
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_D_ata Elements Number of Appendix I Radiological Effluent Occurrences each quarter involving assessed dose in excess of the Table B values.
Calculation Number of Appendix I Radiological Effluent Occurrences this quarter summed with the Appendix I Radiological Effluent Occurrences documented for the past three quarters.
Clarifvine Notes
. Provisions on reporting occurrences involving abnormal releases and out-of-service process and effluent radiation monitors are excluded from this performance indicator.
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~ Examples l-l EfDuent releases that count against the Anoendix I Radiological EfDuent Occurrence:
. Liquid efHuent releases in one calendar year which total a calculated dose to the public of 3.1 mrem whole body or 10.1 mrem to any organ.
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Gaseous efDuent releases in one calendar year which total a calculated gamma air dose of 10.1 mrads, a beta air dose of 20.1 mrads, or a calculated organ dose from I-131, I-133, H-3, and particulates of 15.1 mrems.
Examples Effluent release occurrences that do not count aeainst the RETS/ODCM l Radiological EfDuent Occurrence:
l
. Liquid and / or gaseous monitor operability issues
. Liquid and / or gaseous releases in excess RETS/ODCM concentration limits
. Liquid and / or gaseous releases less than the values in Table B.
RadI61ogicalguent release occurrences (as listed balow) tlJatarereportabl617 :.
accordance the Rlaological_ Effluent Te
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1-SpFcTHeations (RETS) or similar reporting provisions in -
ose Calculation Manual (ODCM),if applict.ble
,RE n moved to the ODCM in accordance with Gsneric Letter 89 01. ,
- m. m u Definition and Scow f
. eleases reportable under the RETS/ODCM provisions outlined fo 'R's in
-1301 and for BWR's in NUREG-1302, as identified be *:
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+ . Dose rols for liquids - Section 3.11.1.2
+ Liquid radw treatment system controls - 3.1, .3
+ Dose controls for n
+ Dose controls for I-131, I-ases - 3.11.2.2
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H-3, and p iculate form - 3.11.2.3
+ Gaseous radwaste treatment sy . trols - 3.11.2.4 and 3.11.2.5
+ Total dose controls - 3.11.4 Note: - Provisions on reporting occ ences involving abn al releases and out-of-
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service process and efHuent ra ion monitors are retained in risk-informed I f baseline inspection progra nd are excluded from this performance' indicator.
Data Elements:
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. Number of reportable efnuent occurrences each quarter as defined ayove 4 involving assessed dose less than or equal to the "as low as reasonably l chievable" criteria in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I / '
- ber of reportable efnuent occurrences each quarter as efined above l inv ving assessed dose greater than the "as low as reaso ably achievable" i crite in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I Calculationi l 1
. None-simple abulation Clarifvine Notes:
4
. Provisions on report' g occurrences inv ving abnormal releases and out-of-service process and e uent radiation onitors are excluded from this performance indicator.
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i Examples: 1 1
. EfHuent releases that excee e following limits:
- e, QuaMer Per Year Liquid EfHuents Whol Body 2 a.em 3 mrom Org 5 - n ew.
- r mrem Gaseous EfHuents Ga ma Dose 5 mrads 16 rads ta Dose I mrads 20 mrads rgan Doses from 7. mrems 15 mare.
& Particulates
. Efnuents di . charged without treatment and in exc ss of the following limits: ;
Liquid EfHu ts 0.06 mrem 0.2 mrem Whole Body Organ Gaseous uents 0.2 mrad - Gamma 0.4 mrad Beta 0.3 mrad organ 1
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. Ma' condenser air extraction system being discharged witho treatment for m e than 7 days Ex moles of efnuent occurrences that do not count against the ERO PI:
. Liquid and / or gaseous monitor operability issues
. Liquid and / or gaseous releases in excess RETS/ODCM concentration limi ,
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,E RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence Definition Radiological efDuent release occurrences that exceed the values listed in Table 3 but are less than or equal to the values listed in Table 4. '
Table [ @*NJ Radiological effluent releases in excess of the following limits:
Liquid EfDuents Whole Body 1.5 mrem /qtr Organ 5 mrem /qtr Gaseous EfDuents Gamma Dose 5 mrads/qtr Beta Dose 10 mrads/qtr Organ Doses from 7.5 mrems/qtr I-131, I-133, H-3
& Particulates Radiological effluents discharged without treatment and in excess of the following 1jmits:
Liquid Effluents Whole Body 0.06 mrem Organ 0.2 mrem Gaseous Effluents Gamma 0.2 mrad Beta 0.4 mrad Organ 0.3 mrad hiain condenser air ejector system being discharged without treatment for more than 7 days Note: Table 3 values are derived from the Radiological EfDuent Technical Specifications (RETS) or similar reporting provisions in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), if anplicable RETS have been moved to the ODCM in accordance with Generic Letter 89-01.
Table / (T Radiological effluent releases in excess of the following limits:
Liquid-EfDuents Whole Body 3 mrem /yr Organ 10 mrem /3T Gaseous EfDuents Gamma Dose 10 mrads/yr Beta Dose 20 mrads/3 7 Organ Doses from 15 mrems/3T I-131, I-133, H-3
& Particulates Note: Table 4 values are the 10 CFR 50 Appendix I limits which meet the criteria of"As Low As is Reasonably Achievable" for radioactive materialin light water-cooled nuclear power reactor efDuents.
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J Data Elements Number of RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrences each quarter involving assessed dose in excess of the Tabley#Evalues but less than or equal to values.
the Table B j e
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a Calculation Number of RETS/ODCM Radiological EfDuent Occurrences this quarter summed with the RETS/ODCM Radiological EfHuent Occurrences documented for the past three quarters.
Clarifvine Notes
. Provisions on reporting occurrences involving abnormal releases and out-of-service process and effluent radiation monitors are excluded from this performance indicator.
. Radiological Effluent Occurrences that exceed the Table 4 values are counted against the Appendix I Radiological Occurrences.
Examples 1
EfDuent re2 eases that count against the RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence:
Liquid efHuent releases in one quarter which total a calculated dose to the public of 1.6 mrem whole body or 5.1 mrem to any organ.
. Gaseous effluent releases in one quarter which total a calculated gamma air dose of 5.1 mrads, a beta air dose of 10.1 mrads, or a calculated organ dose from I-131, I-133, H-3, and particulates of 7.6 mrems.
. Liquid effluents discharged without treatment which total a calculated dose of 0.07 mrem whole body or 0.21 mrem to any organ.
. Main condenser air ejector system being discharged without treatment for eight days.
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l l Examnles EfDuent release occurrences that do not count against the RETS/ODCM l Radiological EfDuent Occurrence:
I Liquid and / or gaseous monitor operabilityissues i
e Liquid and / or gaseous releases in excess RETS/ODCM concentration limits l
= Liquid and / or gaseous releases in excess of the values in Table 4.
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e l constitute a PI " hit", and perhaps more important, what events should not be counted as Pl. l These examples would be valuable inspection training tools for the upcoming training sessions.
The staff agreed to work with NEl and the industry task force to finalize these Pl examples.
Further discussion in the Pl area focused on the threshold intervals, relative to going to a single time interval (instead of the current yearly and three-year intervals). There was agreement to use the three-year for the pilot inspections and NEl agreed to collect three years of data to attempt to validate a two year interval to be used in the post-pilot period.
The NRC staff handed out Attachment 3a (NRC draft occupational exposure matrix and a flow diagram). NEl provided feedback (Attachment 3b), and had the following comments. NEl continues to have significant problems with the NRC Cng significant potential for overexposure (SPO) in the logic diagrat. -- it could be misused, it a nl Jactive and could be used inconsistently across the Regions. NRC staff understood industry concerns, but noted that written SPO guidance (in the enforcement manual) is in place and no significant problems (in the staff's view) have surfaced over the past years. NEl asked the staff to consider Attachment 3b as a substitute for SPO, and the staff agreed to examine that suggestion. Attachment 3a's
" failure to report" and " Compromises ability to assess dose (Risk)?" blocks were discussed and the NRC staff agreed to make editorial changes. NEl shared the view that the red risk significance for failing greater than three barriers in a VHRA area is too severe, and the staff agreed to reconsider that severity level finding.
The NRL staff discussed work in progress on the flow logic for handling inspection findings in the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) area. Objective criteria could be used, for example, to partition the top 50% of the plant performers with this group receiving no additional inspection efforts beyond the baseline IP. NEl agreed that the staff making progress by using a graded, performance-based path. The staff committed to provide a draft flow diagram by the next scheduled meeting.
The staff handed out the draft flow diagram for the transportation and Part 61 inspection findings areas (Attachment 4), but due to time constraints, detailed discussion was postponed.
NEl agreed to provide comments on this areas to the NRC before the next meeting. It was agreed to carryover this discussion to the next meeting. The staff gave NEl the latest version of the NRC assessment process for EP inspection findings (Attachment 5). The meeting was adjoumed.
Attachments: As stated cc w/att: See next pagc-DISTRIBUTION: See attached page DOCUMENT NAME:G:\MTSUMNE2.WPD OFFICE PERP PERB n NAME Jhnton TEssig hk DATE 3/N799 3/t(/99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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2-constitute a PI " hit", and perhaps more important, what events should not be counted as Pl.
These examples would be valuable inspection training tools for the upcoming training sessions.
The staff agreed to work with NEl and the industry task force to finalize these Pl examples.
Further discussion in the Pl area focused on the threshold intervals, relative to going to a single time interval (instead of the current yearly and three-year intervals). There was agreement to use the three-year for the pilot inspections and NEl agreed to collect three years of data to attempt to validate a two year interval to be used in the post-pilot period.
The NRC staff handed out Attachment 3a (NRC draft occupational exposure matrix and a flow diagram). NEl provided feedback (Attachment 3b), and had the following comments. NEl continues to have significant problems with the NRC using significant potential for overexposure }
(SPO) in the logic diagram - it could be misused, it is subjective and could be used i inconsistently across the Regions. NRC staff understood industry concerns, but noted that l written SPO guidance (in the enforcement manual) is in place and no significant problems (in the staff's view) have surfaced over the past years. NEl asked the staff to consider Attachment 3b as a substitute for SPO, and the staff agreed to examine that suggestion. Attachment 3a's I
" failure to report" and "Cempromises ability to assess dose (Risk)?' blocks were discussed and the NRC staff agreed to make editorial changes. NEl shared the view that the red risk significance for failing greater than three barriers in a VHRA area is too severe, and the staff agreed to reconsider that severity level finding.
The NRC staff discussed work in progress on the flow logic for handling inspection findings in the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) area. Objective criteria could be used, for j
example, to partition the top 50% of the plant performers with this group receiving no additional !
inspection efforts beyond the baseline IP. NEl agreed that the staff making progress by using a graded, performance-based path. The staff committed to provide a draft flow diagram by the next scheduled meeting.
The staff handed out the draft flow diagram for the transportation and Part 61 inspection
- findings areas (Attachment 4), but due to time constraints, detailed discussion was postponed.
NEl agreed to provide comments on this areas to the NRC before the next meeting;it was agreed to carryover this discussion to the next meeting. The staff gave NEl the latest version of the NRC assessment process for EP inspection findings (Attachment 5). The meeting was adjoumed.
Attachments: As stated i cc w/att: See next page DISTRIBUTICN: See attached page DOCUMENT NAME:G:\MTSUMNE2.WPD OFFICE PERP PERB n l NAME JMhInton TEssig[d DATE 3/N799 3/tf99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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