ML20205G201
| ML20205G201 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1985 |
| From: | Hufham J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8511130170 | |
| Download: ML20205G201 (2) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374o1 400 Chestnut Street Tower II 35 0CIIG Jo},d.15 o
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BLRD-50-438/85-13 BLRD-50-439/85-13 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
Dear Dr. Grace:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - PIPE BREAK MITIGATION VALVE CAPABILITIES DURING POSTULATED PIPE FAILURE - BLRD-50-438/85-13, BLRD-50-439/85 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector Al Ignatonis on April 10, 1985 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR BLN NEB 8501. This was followed by our first interim report submitted on May 3, 1985. Enclosed is our final report which concludes that we no longer consider 10 CFR 50.55(e) as applicable to this condition.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY a bO,
. W. Hufham, Ifdn er Licensing and Risk Protection Enclosure cc:
Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 0
D S
I An Equal Opportunity Employer h
ENCLOSURE e
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLAdT UNITS 1 AND 2 PIPE BREAK MITICATION VALVE CAPABILITIES DURING POSTULATED PIPE FAILURES BLRD-50-438/85-13 AND BLRD-50-439/85-13 NCR BLN NEB 8501 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency In reviewing the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN) pipe break reports, it was noted that credit was taken for various valves changing positions for mitigating the pipe break. No supporting documentation was found to show that these valves are qualified to operate under pipe break conditions. This appears to violate the intent of engineering procedure (EP) 3.42 and BLN Design Criteria N4-50-D720, section 8.0.
Safety Implications All valves at BLN which are required to mitigate the effects of a pipe rupture have been evaluated and are qualified to operate under pipe break conditions.
These conclusions have been documented by design input memorandum (DIM)
N4-50-D720-4.
Since this lack of qualification documentation could not have ad'ersely affected the safety of operations of the plant, TVA no longer considers 10 CFR 50.55(e) as applicable to this condition.
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