ML20205F261
| ML20205F261 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/26/1999 |
| From: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Deutch J, Specter A AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205F266 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9904060159 | |
| Download: ML20205F261 (26) | |
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UNITED STATES q-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p
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March 26, 1999 c n The Honorable Mn Deutch Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons
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of Mass Destruction P.O. Box 18205 Washington, D.C. 20036-8205
Dear Mr. Deutch:
On November 20,1998, you wrote the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) seeking information on our non-proliferation efforts to be included in your assessment of United States Government activities to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As you may know, the primary mission of the NRC is to regulate domestic civilian uses of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, and to protect the environment. In addition, NRC has statutory responsibility for promoting the U.S.
common defense and secGrity by preventing the loss or theft of NRC-regulated special nuclear materials, and by support.ng U.S. national interests in the safe use and non-proliferation of nuclear materials. I have enclosed, on behalf of the Commission, the NRC response to your survey that addresses only the latter area of our activities, ruch as licensing exports and imports. Because you indicate that domestic response capabilit;es are no longer part of your authorized mandate, our survey response does not include information on this aspect of the NRC mission.
If you have questions about the data provided, please feel free to con.act Ms. Janice Dunn Lee, Acting Director of the NRC Office of International Programs, at (301) 415-2336.
Sincerely,
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Enclosure:
As stated
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March 26, 1999 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Arlen Specter Commiss;on to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction P.O. Box 18205 Washington, D.C. 20036-8205
Dear Mr. Specter:
On November 20,1998, you wrote the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) seeking informatior' en our non-proliferation efforts to be included in your assessment of United States Government activities to ccmbat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As you may know, the primary mission of the NRC is to regulate domestic civilian uses of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, and to protect the environment. In addition, NRC has statutory responsibinty for promoting the U.S.
common defense and security by preventing the loss or theft of NRC regulated special nuclear materials, and by supporting U.S. national interests in the safe use and non-proliferation of nuclear materials. I have enclosed, on behalf of the Commission, the NRC response to your sytyey that addresses only the latter area of our activities, such as licensing exports and imports. Because you indicate that domestic response capabilities are no longer part of your authorized mandate, our survey response does not include information on this aspect of the NRC mission.
If you have questions about the data provided, please feel free to contact Ms. Janice Dunn Lee, Acting Director of the NRC Office of International Programs, at (301) 415-2336.
Sincercly,
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Shirky Ann Jackson
Enclosure:
As statea le-
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NRC RESPONSE TO DEUTCH COMMfGSION BASELINE SURVEY OF PROLIFERATION RELATED ACTIVITIES l
Mission 1.
Describe your department's/ agency's overall proliferation-related mission. In this survey, prollferation refers to the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, their means of delivery, and related technologies and expertise.
The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974, as amended, establish the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) basic regulatory mission "to regulete the Nation's civilian use of byproouot, source, and special nuclear materials i
to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety, to promote the common defense and security, and to protect the environment." The NRC's scope of responsibility includes regulation of commercial nuclear power plants; research, test, and training reactors; fuel cycle facilities; medical, academic, and industrial uses of nuclear materials, the transport, storage and disposal of nuclear materials and waste; and the issuance of export licenses based on statutorily mandated non-proliferation criteria.
L The NRC has developed strategic goals consistent with its mission, including to " support U.S.
national interests in the safe use of nuclear materials and in non-proliferation."
The NRC performs a range of non-proliferation activities, some of which support tho agency's domestic mission and many of which support broader U.S. nationalinterests. These activities include participation in U.S. Government nuclear policy formulation; export-import licensing for j
nuclear materials and equipment; treaty implementation; physical protection and threat assessment; safeguards implementation domestically; and safegua'ds assistance abroad. Our domestic safeguards responsibility involves the control of and accounting for nuclear materials, the protection of nuclear materials to prevent theft or diversion, and contingency plans dor responding to threatening situations. In addition to the AEA and the ERA, the primary foundation for these activities include the Nuclear Non-Proliferatim Act (NNPA) of 1978, execubve orders, and treaties and conventions.
In support of President Clinton's September 1993 Non-Proliferation Initiati"e setting specific U.S. policy objectives, the NRC participates in a range of interagency and international nuclear non-proliferation activities, including priorities such as:
providing policy input and materials control and accounting technical support for fissile e
material and plutonium disposition activities in countries of the former Qviet Union; harmonizing domestic and multilateral export controls and maximizing the effectiveness e
of those controls; providing support to the IAEA for its safeguards and technical assistance activities; e
participating in the policy and technical aspects of safeguarding of excess weapons e
material;
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working within the extensive array of international programs to promote the safe o
operation of nuclear power plants in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe; and in keeping with the U.S.'s obligations under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), providing support for bilateral and IAEA-sponsored exchanges of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
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List and briefly describe all laws, directives, and guidance statements (Presidential, Congressional, departmental) that directly and specifically inform your department's/ agency's proliferation-reltited mission, as well as any relevant legislation currently being proposed or sought by the Administration or the Congress.
The NRC's nen-proliferation activities aie based upon legal authority contained in statutes, Executive Orders, Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs), multilateral conventions or treaties, agency-to-agency memoranda of understanding, exchange agreements, and the like. Chief among these is the AEA, as amended by, among other statutes, the NNPA, which requires that NRC license exoorts and ;mports of nuclear facilities, coror )nents, and materials. The AEA an J other statutes also assign NRC a consultative role in the export-related work of other U.S.
agencies. The bulk of NRC's nuclear non-proliferation activity is authorized by law and confirmed by NRC regulations and/or Commission policy, including most of NRC's participation in U.S. Government policy development and the agency's many programs of cooperation with, and assistance to, foreign governments.
Laws. Directives and Guidance Statemeny Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Licensing Statutes:
e the AEA; the NNPA of 1978 (P.L.95-242 and P.L.96-280); Atomic Weapons i
and Special Nuclear Mate @ls Rewards Act (P.L.84-165); International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act of 1957 and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (P.L.85-177); EURATOM Cooperation of 1958 and Concurrent Resolution (P.L.85-846); EURATOM Cooperation Act of 1958, Amendment (P.L. 93-88); international Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L.94-329); International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (P.L.96-533); intemctional Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (97-113); Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials implementation (P.L.97-351): Title Ill; Section 305; the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act; the Freedom Support Act; and NRC authorization acts.
U.S. Government obligations and commitments, such as participation in:
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l l's the IAEA; IAEA Supply Agreements; Agreements for Cooperation in the Use of Atomic Energy; the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); the Nuclear Non-i proliferation Treaty Exporter Committee (the "Zangger Committee"); and Vice Presidential Commissions such as the Russian Federation-U.S. Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation (known as the Gore-Primakov Commission).
International treaties and agreements, such as:
j Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1973; Agreement between the U.S.
and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. (Information Circular-288); Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Information I
Circular-274); Additional Protocol to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America; and Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards (Information Circular-540).
1 Code of Federal Regulations The regulatory authority for implementation of the NRC non-proliferation responsibilities resides in Chapter 1 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Guidance on how the regulations are to be implemented is provided in regulatory guides and Nuclear Regulation (NUREG) documents. The regulations implementing the U.S.-lAEA Safeguards Agreement are loc. ;ed in 10 CFR Part 75, and the rules regulating the import and export of nuclear material and equipment are located in 10 CFR Part 110. The regulations pertaining to the protection, control, and accounting of source and special nuclear materials (SNM) at licensee facilities are provided in 10 CFR Parts 10 (eligibility for access to classified information),11 (eligibility for access to or control over SNM),40 (licensing of source material),50 (licensing of production and utilization facilities),60 (geologic repositories),61 (licensing of land disposal of radioactive wastes),70 (licensing of SNM),72 (licensing of spent fuel and high-level waste storage),73 (physical protection), 74 (matarial control and accounting), and 95 (protection of classified information).
1 Part 110 of Title 10, Chaoter 1, Code of Federal Regulations - Energy prescribes
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licensing, enforcement, ari. rulemaking procedures and criteria under the AEA for the export (Sections 110.8 and 110.9) and import (Section 110.9a) of nuclear equipment and material. The NRC published new regulations, effective August 7,1996, to implement recommendations of the NSG guidelines for exports of
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uranium conversion equipment and to reflect U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policies.
Applicable Executive Orders and Presidential Decision Directives are as follows:
l Executive Order (E.O.) 10841 (re: International Atomic Energy Cooperation);
E.O.10956 (re: Amendment to E.O.10841);
E.O.12058 (re: Functions Relating to Nuclear Non-Proliferation);
j E.O.12730 (re: Continuation of Export Control Regulations);
Presidential Decision Directive / National Security Council-13 'Non-proliferation j
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in and Export Controls (U)" SECRET. dated September 27,1993);
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Presidential Decision Directive / National Security Council-41 "U.S. Policy on improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and the Other Newly independent States" (dated September 20,1995).
The NRC's assistance efforts also have bases in the 1992 Lisbon Nuclear Safety Initiative, and Presidentialinitiatives developed in four summit meetings of the G-7 nations. Much of the funding for these efforts is authorized by the Freedom Support Act and the Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, and passed to NRC by the Department of Energy (DOE), the Agency for international Development (AID), and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), formerly the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA).
NRC Non-Proliferation Activities Pursuant to the Atomic Enerav Act (AEA)
Under the AEA, as amended by the NNPA, the NRC has statutory responsibility under Section 122 to "give maximum effect to the policies contained in any international arrangement made after the date of enactment of this Act." The NRC also has statutory responsibility for licensing tha export and import of nuclear-related materials and equipment to ensure these items are used for peaceful purposes. This authority extends to nuclear reactors and other fuel cycle facilities and equipment, to source and special nuclear material, to byproduct materials, and to certain other commodities, including radioactive waste. The AEA and NNPA specify various substantive and procedural prerequisites for the NRC's issuance of nuclear export licenses.
The stringency of these requirements correlates w*1 the perceived nuclear proliferation or explosive risk of an item. The general statutory finding that the NRC must make with respect to l
all nuclear exports is that the export will not be " inimical to the common defense and security of l
the public." Sections 127 and 128 of the AEA set forth additional specific criteria that must be l
met in order for the NRC to issue an export license for nuclear facilities, special nuclear material and source material; and Section 109b sets forth additional criteria for issuing an export license for components. No export license for nuclear ft Oilities, special nuclear material, or source material may be issued by the NRC unless the U S. Government and the country of export have in place an " agreement for cooperation" meeting the requirements of Section 123 of the AEA.
Facility components and byproduct material, however, may be exported in the absence of a Section 123 agreement, l
The AEA, in Section 123, also specifies that certain actions -- taking place after March 10,1978
-- such as detonation of a nuclear explosive device, termination or abrogation of IAEA safeguards, or material violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement, will result in the termination of U.S. exports of nuclear equipment and materials or to nations which have engaged in such conduct absent certain Presidential determinations. In addition, the President is authorized to suspend nuclear cooperation with any nation or group of nations which has not ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
AEA Section 126 sets forth export licensing procedures that the NRC follows in reviewing export applications, including a requirement that NRC transmit any such application to the Executive Branch for its views and recommendations. The Department of State provides a unified Executive Branch view to the NRC, and the NRC, in turn, provides its views and recommendations to the Departments of Energy and Commerce on nuclear-related export authorizations under their jurisdiction. The NRC may not issue a proposed export license if the Executive Branch opposes its issuance. Within the NRC, the export licensing function is 4
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'6 performed primarily by the Office of International Programs (OIP), with technical assistance from the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) and legal advice from the Office of the General Counsel.
The NRC has a consultative role under the AEA and other statutes with respect to certain other nuclear-related matters that are within the primary jurisdiction of other Federal agencies. These matters include: (1) proposed agreements for cooperation negotiated by the Secretary of State
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under Section 123 of the AEA --in which a separate NRC review of each agreement is required as well as a letter from the NRC Chairman to the President recommending approval or disapproval; (2) DOE decisions on the transfer of nuclear technology relating to the production of special nuclear material under Section 57b of the AEA --in which an opportunity is provided for NRC views to be given to DOE on all cases requiring specific DOE authorizations, such as j
commercial reactor safety reviews or services undertaken in non-NPT countries; (3) DOE-administered " subsequent arrangements" under Section 131 of the AEA -- in which NRC views must be obtained by DOE before it authorizes, for example, retransfers of previously exported nuclear fuel and reactor equipment, or the reprocessing of spent fuel arising from uranium supplied by the U.S. or irradiated in a U.S. supplied reactor; and (4) Department of Commerce regulations under Section 309(c) of the NNPA regarding export controls on nuclear-related commodities that could be of significance for nuclear explosive purposes where there is operational and policy interface with the nuclear materials and equipment under NRC jurisdiction, in giving the NRC a consultative role regarding these matters, the Congress intended that the NRC provide an independent assessment of whether the Executive Branch agencies' proposed actions are consistent with statutory requirements and non-proliferation objectives. Specifically, with respect to agreements for cooperation under Section 123 of the AEA, the NRC determines whether a proposed agreement meets the statutory requirements for new agreements. With respect to the remaining matters over which the NRC has been given a consultative role, the NRC review generally focuses whether the proposed action: (1) is consistent with prior decisions; (2) is consistent with U.S. non-proliferation policy; (3) raises any safeguards concerns; (4) is consistent with U.S. international obligations; (5) is consistent with the NRC export program; and (6) is inimical to the common defense and security of the U.S. These statutory consultative responsibilities are performed primarily by OIP with technical support from NMSS.
The NRC staff reviews pending export cases to confirm that appropriate IAEA safeguards and physical protection arrangements will be applied to exports by the receiving country. Reviews are performed in conformance with U.S. non-proliferation laws, which are intended to ensure that U.S. exports will be protected and safeguarded during transit and use in the importing country and that exports will be used only for peaceful purposes.
The NRC has not identified a need for any significant legislative changes to achieve the goals and strategies included in its strategic plan, including its non-proliferation-related mission.
Organizational Structure 1
3.
Describe the organization of your department's/ agency proliferation-related j
efforts, including the specific function of each element and key management 5
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l i e personnel and their positions. Include a description of how these elements interact with each other.
1 Commission guidance determines the NRC's approach in implementing non-proliferation activities. The Offices of International Programs (OlP) and of Nuclear Material Safety and Fafeguards (NMSS), with legal review by the Office of the General Counsel, provide assistance and recommendations to the Chairman, the Commission, the Executive Director for Operations, and NRC program office staff on non-proliferation issues.
Office of International Proarams (OIP)
OIP provides overall coordination for NRC's international activities in the areas of licensing of nuclear exports and imports and non-proliferation matters; further, it manages NRC's foreign intelligence responsibilities. OIP plans, develops, and implements these non-proliferation programs, in concert with NRC program offices, to carry out Commission-approved policies.
OIP establishes and maintains working relationships with individual countries and international nuclear organizations, as well as other involved U.S. Government agencies. It insures that
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non-proliferation activities carried out by the Commission and staff are well coordinated internally and Government-wide and are consistent with NRC and U.S. policies.
'Under the leadership of a Director (vacant) and Deputy Director (Janice Dunn Lee), OIP is divided into two divisions: 1) the Division of Bilateral Cooperation and Assistance (BCA; directed by OIP Deputy Director Janice Dunn Lee), and 2) the Division of Non-Proliferation, Exports and Multilateral Relations (NEMR; Division Director Ronald R. Hauber).
Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeouards (NMSS)
Within NMSS, the Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards (FCSS) provides coordination and support on international safeguards and physical protection, conducts efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards, conducts efforts to strengthen material control and accounting and physical protection in other countries, and conducts and coordinates NRC activities in support of implementation of IAEA safeguards at NRC -licensed facilities. FCSS also provides technical reviews for the international safeguards and physical protection technical aspects of export / import control licensing and retransfer requests. FCSS develops, implements, and evaluates overall agency safeguards policy for licensed or certified fuel cycle, special nuclear material, and waste processing facilities. FCSS develops NRC's design basis threats (DBTs),
assesses all reported threats against NRC licensed facilities and materials, as well as continuously reviewing the general domestic threat environment to assure the adequacy of NRC's DBTs. The NRC staff, in coordination with other agencies, addresses issues regarding smuggling of nuclear materials and black market scams. The continuirt eview includes analysis of intelligence traffic and ciose liaison with the intt 'ligence C anity and Federallaw enforcement agencies.
Within FCSS, the organization with related responsibilities includes the Licensing and International Safeguards Branch (LIB), which includes the International Safeguards Section (ISS); and the Operations Branch (FCOB), which includes the Threat Analysis Team (TAT).
Key management personnel and their positions are Elizabeth O. Ten Eyck, FCSS Division Director; Josephine M. Piccone, FCSS Acting Deputy Division Directo;; Theodore S. Sherr, LIB 6
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Chief; Lydia A. Roch6, ISS Chief; Philip Ting, FCOB Chief; and Roberta S. Warren, TAT Team Leader.
4.
What do you envision your proliferation-related mission and organizational structure to be in one year? Five years? If you have recently undergone or are anticipating a significant reorganization of this structure, please provide a description of the previous organization framework, the changes made or anticipated, and the reasons for the reorganization. How has your organization evolved over the last ten years on proliferation matters? Show the evolution of organizational units covering proliferation, including each reorganization, in this time frame.
4 There are no anticipated changes to the NRC proliferation-related organizational framework, either in one or five years' time. The organization described in Question #3 has been stable for the last ten years, and its evolution is described in greater detail below.
NRC's non-proliferation role supports its mission to protect the public health and safety, the environment, and the common defense and security, as well as U.S. national interests, it consists of four main functions: export-import licensing; international policy and priority formulation; international regulate, information exchange; and assistance provided by NRC to other countries and international orgt.,iizations.
The first function, export-import licensing, is statutoiily mandated and contributes to the U.S.
common defense and security. Congress gave NRC these responsibilities to provide an independent check on Executive Branch approvals of export licenses and, over the years, has opposed taking these responsibilities away from the Commission. This function involves NRC's licensing of certain exports and imports and its consultation role with regard to the export-related work of other agencies. The workload in this area is expected to remain relatively constant, with the agency issuing 75100 export licenses per year. OlP has the lead in this area, with technical review of license applications provided by NMSS. Also related to this function, are NRC efforts to implement the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement (a U.S. treaty obligation) at U.S. licensed or certified nuclear facilities, and to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. In this effor! NMSS takes the leod, assisted by OIP.
There are two aspects to the second function, international policy and priority formulation. First, NRC regularly interacts with the Executive Branch (usually the State Department) to sup1 ort broad U.S. non-proliferation interests by contributing to the development of international policies for the U.S. Government in areas related to NRC's mission and responsibilities, particularly international nuclear safety and security issues. The Commission plays an active role in helping to forge such policies, assisted by OlP and NMSS. Second, NRC has developed broad policies and priorities for NRC's non-proliferation activitie:. The Commission has traditionally taken the lead in this function, with OIP and the program offices implementing the decisions.
The third function, international regulatory information exchanges, provides support to enhancing guidelines for the physical protection and control and accounting of nuclear materials. Activities in this area include physical protection bilateral meetings in other countries to review their physical piotection systems and make recommendations for improvements; i
participation in international meetings to ensure that the international guidelines for protection of 7
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nuclear materials provide adequate protection against known threats; providing ctaff to support international training courses in development of state systems for accounting and control of nuclear materials; safeguards bilateral meetings to review the implementation of international safeguards in the IAEA Member States; and meetings on the management and reporting of safeguards eformation.
The fourth function provides NRC's contributions to strengthening of regulatory material l
protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) programs abroad. NRC has responded to requests to providr, assistance to the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU). NRC utikzes I
staff and contractor resources on these efforts. Historically, NRC has directly funded its staff costs for this assistance and has funded its contractual support and travel costs through reimburseable funds provided by other Federal agencies. Due to current budget constraints, and legal requirements to recover 100 percent of NRC's budget authority through fees paid by NRC licensees, Commission policy is to pursue reimbursement from other Federal agencies for the full costs of performing activities that are not a required part of NRC's statutory mission and for which the NRC has not received appropriations. Therefore, NRC's future MPC&A assistance to the FSU countries may be limited by the availability of funds from other Federal agencies. NRC's future MPC&A assistance to the FSU could also be resolved legislatively by a separate General Fund appropriation for NRC's cost for this assistance.
While some of NRC's international activities are carried out by NRC to support its domestic safeguards and security responsibilities, and some are performed to support U.S. national non-proliferation interests, they tend to be mutually reinforcing. For instance, providing nuclear materials safeguards assistance to other countries and strengthening the IAEA safeguards system in support of U.S. non-pronferation interests can also reduce the possibility that nuclear materials will be diverted and used by terrorists in the U.S. or against U.S. interests elsewhere; these activities, in turn, provide useful information for safeguards regulatory oversight for domestically licensed activities, and undergirding NRC's domestic mission.
5.
List and briefly describe department / agency directives tFat set forth authorities and responsibilities for managing department / agency e'. orts to combat proliferation.
The organizational responsibilities and authorities for managing NRC's non-proliferation efforts are provided in Volume 9 (NRC Organization and Functions) of NRC's Management Directives (MDs). The chapters in Volume 9 define the functional responsibilities of NRC's offices; those chapters pertinent to the Offices of International Programs (9.14), the Executive Director for Operations (9.17), Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (9.26), and Nuclear Reactor Regulation (9.27) are most relevant to the non-proliferation issue (Attachment 1).
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Resource Allocation 6.
Provide data on the amount and source of funds obligated for proliferation -
related activities in fiscal years 1990-1997, budgeted for fiscal year 1998, and projected for fiscal years 1999-2001.~ Provide a breakdown of allocated resources by function (including but not limited to: operational activities; research and development for related technologies; acquisition activities; education, training and career development for related personnel including rotatees; information 4
l management; and by proliferation subject area - nuclear, chemical, biological, means of delivery, and related technologies and expertise).
Office of international Proarams (OIP) Resources Exoort Licensina For the period FY 1990 through FY 2001, approximately 2.5 FTEs per year have been included for this activity in the NRC budget.
Other Nuclear Non-oroliferation Activities For the period FY 1990 through FY 2001, approximately 1 FTE per year has been included for this activity in the NRC budget.
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treatv Under a prospective Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) states would (1) cease production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices; (2) agree not to assist other states,n such activities, and (3) accept IAEA inspections to verify that treaty obligations are being met. Mthough the scope of any potential FMCT is, as yet, undetermined, all proponents agree that any FMCT should cover production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The FMCT essentially targets the activities of the five nuclear weapon states and the three " threshold states" (Israe!, India and Pakistan). NRC has now been requested by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (head of the interagency group heading the negotiations) to participate in both the Verification Experts Group, which is tasked with defining what facilities will be included in the FMCT -- some of which may be NRC licensees -- and in the Backstoppers Group, the policy body. OIP is working with NMSS to review current definitions being proposed for use in the FMCT negotiations.
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeauards (NMSS) Resources Export Licensina Technical Reviews For the period FY 1990 through FY 2001, approximately 2 FTEs per year have been included for this activity in the NRC budget.
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International Safeauards Activities For the period FY 1990 through FY 2001, approximately 5 FTEs per year have been included for this activity in the NRC budget.
Nuclear Material Manaaement Safeauards System (N_MMSS)
For the period of FY 1990 through FY1998, approximately $1.1 M per year was included and, from FY 1999 through FY2001, approximately $1.7 M per year is included for contractor support in the NRC budget. The increase is a result of the privatization of the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC). (Before USEC was privatized, USEC directly funded NMMSS. Subsequent to the privatization, the NRC was obligated to assume the funding of the USEC costs, as it does for NRC licensees.)
Nuclear material protection. control, and accountina (MPC&A) support to Russia.
Ukraine. and Kazakhstan The Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (P.L.102-228). This legislation (also known as Nunn-Lugar) was enacted by the U.S. to support the destruction of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and other non-proliferation-related activities. Under the legislation, a Safe and Secure Dismantlement (SSD) group (which is now known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program) was established to focus on activities to assist the FSU in dismantling nuclear weapons, including support in developing national systems for nuclear materials control and accounting (MCP&A) and physical protection.
FY 1994-1998 fundina for contractor support and travel orovided by the Department of Defense (DOD) under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) proaram: FY 1999-2001 fundina reauested from the Department of Enerav (DOE).
Net Obligated: FY 1994-1997* "
Obligated: FY 1998 Projected: FY1999-2001 * "*
1 Russia:
$469,798
$382,541
$3,130,000 Ukraine:
678,273 94,674 1,555,000 Kazakhstan:
547,468 197,301 1,455,000 l
Total
$1,695,539
$674,516
$6,140,000 Total budget across stated years Net obligations equals gross obligations less amounts deobligated.
Identifier only contractor and travel costs. NRC staff effort of 2 FTE/ year (approximately $250K) are in addition to these costs, resulting in a total projected cost of $6,890,000.
NRC's primary participation in the U.S. Government's provision of MPC&A support to the former Soviet Union began during 1992, when discussions commenced with officials I
o7 Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan under the Safe Secure Dismantlement program (later renamed as the CTR program) funded under Nunn-Lugar legislation.
implementing agreements were signed with the three countries during the latter half of j
1993, and NRC and DOE received DOD funding through Interagency Cost i
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Reimbursable Orders (lACROs) from the Defense Nuclear Agency (now the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)) during 1994. NRC's funding period of performance was extended by DTRA through September 1998, at which time the funds were exhausted. During September 1995, DOD transferred program and funding responsibility to DOE beginning October 1995.
To continue its MPC&A support to the three countries, NRC formally requested to receive funding for future reimbursement of NRC staff, travel, and contractor support costs with DOE during April 1997. Subsequently, in letters dated September 24,1997, March 24,1998, and July 1,1998, NRC requested that the DOE funding also address staff costs. NRC addressed the request to DOE to procure program funding based on the October 1995 transfer of program responsibility to DOE by DOD, as well as Presidential Decision Directive /NSC-41 (PDD-41), "U.S. Policy on improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and the Other Independent States," dated September 20, 1995.
As a result of a number of meetings conducted between NRC and DOE to discuss various aspects of the NRC request, DOE provided a formal response to NRC's requer.,ts on February 16,1999, which addressed some of the issues. In the response, DOE formally commits to provide reimbursement for NRC staff costs and task funding beginning in FY 1999. DOE states that it will provide NRC $280,000 in FY 1999 for MPC&A work with Russia and that these funds will be identified in DOE's next financial plan for disbursement to NRC. The response states,in part," DOE will continue to l
integrate NRC supported tasks into our out-year planning as we develop long-term j
requirements." The DOE formal response addressed only funding for Russia for FY 1999. With regard to Ukraine and Kazakhstan, staff was informed that this would be addressed in a separate communication. NRC intends to continue to pursue the funding of staff salaries, benefits, and overhead costs, as well as travel and project costs.
MPC&A fundina for contractor support and travel orovided by the Aaency for j
International Development under the Freedom Support Act (Lisbon Initiative).
l Obligated: FY 1994-1997*
Budgeted: FY 1998 Projected: FY 1999-2001*
Russia:
S320,000
$0 Currently not available Ukraine:
170,000 0
Currently not available Total
$490,000
$0 Currently not available
- Total budget across stated years The Lisbon Initiative program principally addresses safety issues in the Newly Independent States (NIS). However, some elements of NRC's MPC&A support program I
to Russia and Ukraine have also been addressed. it is possible that some relatively small amount of AfD FY 1998 funds provided to NRC may be expended, for the purpose of supplementing funding provided by DOE.
1 Plutonium Disposition J
th Congress comes from the FY 1999 j
A legislative change of significance in the 105 Defense Authorization Act. The Act provides that any mixed oxide (MOX) fuel 11 i
fabrication facility built to provide civilian reactor fuel will be licensed by the NRC. In that same provision, the statutory prohibition regarding NRC's expenditure of appropriated funds for NRC licensing of DOE defense projects (42 U.S.C. 7272) was dropped for this specific endeavor.
DOE's Offica of Fissile Materials Disposition has initiated an effort to procure mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication and irradiation services from the private sector for the purpose of disposing of U.S. weapons plutonium (Pu) declared surplus to defense needs. NRC participates in this ellort by providing legal, technical, and regulatory assistance in Pu handling, safeguards, security, and fuel fabrication to meet the following DOE objectives identified to date:
(a) Develop draft standard review plan modules for the review and acceptance of a MOX fuel fabrication facility license application; (b) Identify NRC standards applicable to the design and construction of a pit disassembly and conversion facility, which converts surplus nuclear weapons pits into unclassified forms and disposes of other non-Pu pit components, including highly enriched ur&nium; and (c) Identify NRC standards applicable to the design and construction of an immobilization facility, which converts surplus Pu into immobilized forms that are significantly less weapons-usable.
NRC/NMSS devotes approximately 1.0 FTE/ year to this project.
Safeauardino Excess Weapons Material (Trilateral Initiative)
During the April 1996 Nuclear Summit in Moscow, Russia, the P 8 Group participants pledged their support for efforts "to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material (separated I
plutonium and highly enriched uradum) designated as not intended for use in meeting defense requirements is safely stored, protected and placed under IAEA safeguards (in Nuclear Weapons States, under the relevant voluntary offer lAEA safeguards agreement) as soon as it is practicable to do so."
As a follow-up to the Moscow Summit, on September 17,1996, a meeting was held on th IAEA General Conference to consider practical measures to the margins of the 40 fulfill statements by President Clinton (September 1993) and President Yeltsin (April I
1996) concerning the application of IAEA verification of weapons-origin fissile material.
The meeting principals were IAEA Director General Blix, DOE Secretary O' Leary, and MINATOM Minister Mikhailov. At the meeting, the three parties agreed to form a joint group which will report on progress in the consideration of associated technical, legal,
]
and financialissues with implementing IAEA verification of relevant materials within nine months (i.e., June 1997). The three parties also agreed that bilateral U.S.-Russian discussions would take place to address issues related to protecting weapon-sensitive j
information.
Discussions between the U.S., Russia and the IAEA continue under the Initiative. NRC is a member of the U.S. Government interagency team, and devotes approximately 0.15 12 q
i 1
I
' FTE/ year to this effort.-
Office of Nuclear Reactor Reaulation/ Office of Research in September 1997, the United States and the Russian Federation signed three interlinked agreements to proceed with the project to convert the cores of the three remaining Russian plutonium production reactors. The NRC and the i~
uian nuclear regulatory agency, Gocatomnadzor (GAN), also signed a joint statemuii affirming their intention to consult closely on regulatory approaches, including licensing requirements for the purpose of minimizing the risk assaciated with the reactors' operation in providing district heat and electricity. An implementing arrangement is presently under negotiation with GAN, and is expected to be signed in the third quarter of FY 1999. Through an interagency cost reimbursement order, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) funds NRC full staff costs associated with this activity. Although originally the task was undertaken by the Office of Nuclear Reactor j
Regulation, it is now being carried out by the Office of Research.
]
DTRA ' Core Conversion Project Fundina for NRC staff costs and foreian travel expenses:
FY 1998 Funding FY 1998 Obligations FY 1999 Funding (to date)
$50,000
$46,027
$200,000 l
i Office of the General Counsel For the period FY 1990 through FY 2001, approximately 0.5 FTEs per year have been included for this activity in the NRC budget.
Intelliaence in addition to regularly receiving intelligence information on a variety of nuclear non-proliferation topics from all intelligence agencies and intelligence groups within agencies, NRC also has access to two classified computer networks, CACTIS (which ties in with INTELINK) and SCAT, both of which carry proliferation intelligence. However, due to recent cuts in resources for
'lligence, NRC has had to curtail some intelligence-related activities in support of credibility
< dssment (see question 16).
7.
List and describe the authorities and responsibilities of the persons or groups within the department / agency making overall resource decisions, providing advice on resource decisions, or influencing the resource decision process.
i During the budget formulation process at ihe NRC, individual Office Directors submit their budget requests to the 6-n ember Program Review Committee (PRC) which consists of three Deputy Executive Directors for Operations; the Deputy Chief Financial Officer; the Director, Planning and Program Support Division, Office of the Chief Information Officer; and the Deputy Director for Corporate Planning end Management in the Chairman's Office. The PRC submits its recommendations to the 3-member Executive Council (EC) made up of the Executive 13 m
f i
Director for Operations; the Chief Information Officer, and the Chief Financial Officer. EC recommendations are forwarded to the Chairman and then to the Commission for final decisions. Final Commission decisions are incorporated into the agency budget request that is I
I submitted initially to the Office of Management and Budget and then to the Congress as part of the President's Budget.
8.
Describe how your department / agency integrates decisions on combating proliferation into its strategic planning and resource planning-programming-l budgeting process. How do you prioritize activities and a!!ocate personnel and -
l funds to achieve your proliferation-related mission? What is the pronc6 used to l
balance resources for current activities with mid/long term insestment needs?
NRC's Strategic Plan forms the basis for the NRC budget. The Strategic Plan is made up of l
strategic goals that represent the principal mission of the agency. Strategies describe how the NRC will achieve these strategic goals and provide a direct link between what the NRC hopes to achieve and the programs it conducts to accomplish those goals. One of NRC's strategic goals is to "[s]upport U.S._ national interests in the safe and secure use of nuclear materials and i
in nuclear non-proliferation." To achiave this strategic goal, NRC will employ a specific l
strategy:"We will assist in curbing the proliferation of the capability to produce nuclear j
explosives." The NRC plans to accomplish this strategy by reviewing and issuing export and l
import licenses; completing the timely review of Part 810 authorizations, Subsequent l
Arrangements, and Section 123 Agreements for Cooperation; conducting technicalinformation exchanges related to physical protection procedures and practices in foreign countries possessing or receiving nuclear materials or equipment of U.S. origin; and providing technical support for the disposition of highly enriched uranium and plutonium removed from nuclear weapons originating in the U.S. or Russia. These activities are associated with specific planned accomplishments that provide a direct link to resource requirements.
I 9.
What is the process and criteria for evaluating your success in allocating resources to achieve your proliferation-related mission?
The NRC is implementing its Planning, Budgeting, and Performance Management process, which allocates resources in an integrated and outcome directed manner to achieve the j
agency's mission. As the budget is updated each year, the resources required for our proliferation-related mission are reviewed, and in general the workload and resource related requirements have remained constan.t.
The NRC has established the following performance goal to measure progress in achieving the strategic goal of international nuclear safety support by participating in implementing U.S.
national interests in the safe and secure use of nuclear materials and in nuclear non-i proliferation:
l Strengthen intemational nuclear safety and safeguards through leadership and participation in international nuclear policy formulation and exchange activities by providing assistance through international agreements. Suppcrt U.S. nuclear non-proliferation interests through export / import licensing and other activities.
14 L
I Personnel 10.
Provide a breakdown of the number of personnel working proliferation-related issues by the following categories: full-time, part-time employees, full and part-time rotational employees in and out of your organization, and full and part time contractor employees. Also include in your breakdown for these categories, the i
number of employees at each pay grade, their total years of government service, and the total years of proliferation-related service. Include, to the extent available, a breakdown by organization (e.g., offices, groups, task forces, centers).
Office of International Proorams 10 emplcyees working, but not exclusively, on proliferation-related issues for a total of t
I approximately 3.5 FTE i
Office of the Director, OlP l
Pay Grades: 1 SES; 1 GG-15 l
Total Years of Govemment Service: 43 Total Years of Proliferation-Related Service: 43 Division of Non-Proliferation, Exports, and Multilateial Relations (OIP/NEMR)
Pay Grades: 1 SES; 4 GG-14 Total Years of Government Service: 100 Total Years of Proliferation Related Service; 81 Divisiori of Bilateral Cooperation and Assistance (OIP/BCA)
Pay Grades: 1 SES; 2 GG-15 Total Years of Government Service: 58 Total Years of Proliferation-Related Service: 36 Full and part-time rotational employees:
Not applicable Full and part time contractor employees:
Not applicable Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeauards (NMSS1; 23 full tir"e employees working, but not exclusively, on proliferation-related issues for a total of approximately 10 FTE.
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards (NMSS/FCSS)
Office of the Director, FCSS Pay Grades: 2 SES Total Years of Govemment Service: 50 Total Years of Proliferation-Related Service: 35 Licensing and Intemational Safeguards Branch (NMSS/FCSS/lJB)
Pay Grades: 1 SES,7 GG-15,4 GG-14,1 GG-13,1 GG-12 Total Years of Govemment Service: 190 Total Years of Proliferation-Related Service: 140 15 L.__
h,.
i Operations Branch (NMSS/FCSS/FCOB) -
Pay Grades: 1 SES,3 GG-15,2GG-14,1 GG-8 Total Years of Government Service: 140 Total Years of Proliferation-Related Service: 105 Full and part-time rotational employees:
Not applicable Full and part time contractor employees:
3.3 FTE j.
Office of the Ganeral Counsel:
l 3 full-time employees working, but not exclusively, on proliferation-related issues for a total of l
approximately 0.5 FTE.
Office of Legal Counsel, Legislation and Special Projects l
Pay G ades: 1 SES,1 GG-15,1 GG i' Total Years of Government Service: 54 Total Years of Proliferation-Related Service: 36 11.
Compare the size and capabilities of your proliferation-related staff today to those covering these issues for you ten years ago using the following critdria:
i Number of staff with specialized non-technical degrees whose primary account e-responsibility was the assessment of proliferation programs, collection or j
gathering of information on these programs or formulation of proliferation-related policies. - (For example, the number of political science officers who conducted proliferation-related policy on a country of concern.)
j l
l Number of staff with technical degrees whose primary account responsibility was e
the assessment of proliferation programs, collections or gathering of information on these programs, or formulation of proliferation-related policies. (Fcr example, l
the number of chemists / chemical engineers assigned to the task of assessing the l
technical status of a foreign chemical weapons program.)
J l
Number of staff, not captured by the above categories, whose primary account e
responsibility was the assessment of proliferation programs, collection of information on these programs, or formulation of proliferation-related policies, e
A breakdown of the staff devoted to information collection or gathering into general categories of collector, report preparation and evaluation, and desk officers or other categories as you deem appropriate.
Number of staff officers and support contractors with foreign language capabilities relevant to countries of proliferation concern.
16 L
1 The NRC does not perform information reviews on other countries to assess their proliferation risk; country evaluations are performed to assure that exported nuclear materials will be adequately protected and controlled to prevent theft or diversion and that exported materials and equipment will be subject to eff ective international safeguards measures such that they cannot be diverted to undeclared uses. NRC staff also provide support to the IAEA and other countries to assure that physical protecdon and safeguards measures are sufficiently effective l
that theft or diversion of nuclear material would be detected and/or prevented. NRC staff working non-proliferation issues, in general, have technical degrees. The number of staff has changed little over the past decade.
l 12.
Do you rely significantly on contractors, consultants, or other outside personnel to fulfill your proliferation related mission? If so, describe the rationale for outsourcing and provide a breakdown for each contract, including type of work conducted, and length and cost of contract. What are the comparative advantages and disadvantages to using these personnel?
With regard to MPC&A regulatory support to Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, NRC does rely significantly on contractors to address support projects. In a Commission paper, SECY-95-054, dated March 3,1995, the Executive Director for Operations informed the Commissioners that NRC plans to use contractors, utilizing NRC funds received from extemal sources, to perform as many program functions as possible. The rationale was that using contractor support should allow NRC to remain within budgeted FTE limits and still accomplish all requested support. The advantage to this approach is that the number of staff members involved is indeed minimized, along with the cost to NRC licensees, who pay licensing fees to the agency. Also, using contractors / consultants provides experience and expertise in specific areas that can be obtained more quickly and flexibly than would be possible by hiring additional staff. The disadvantages include the NRC staff time needed to monitor the contractors, as well as the additional project costs incurred using contractors in lieu of NRC staff.
In other non-proliferation activities (e.g., non-proliferation policy, export / import licensing, safeguards, physical protection), contractors and consultants are not extensively used by the NRC in performing its non-proliferation mission, except in the operation of the U.S.
computerized state accounting system (the Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System). They are used to supplement staff and to balance or provide experience and expertise of the NRC staff on projects.
Information on specific contracts will be provided on request.
13.
As they pertain specifically to proliferation-related personnel, describe your processes and policies for recruitment, retention, maintenance of morale, and advancement of personnel. What opportunities for training, acquisition of new expertise, and career development are made available to proliferation related personnel in your agency?
Personnel with skills pertinent to non-proliferation project activities are recruited from within and outside of the NRC. Available positions are posted, and personnel with known skills are l
17
l contacted and encouraged to apply for the positions. Continued training through NRC and U.S.
government sponsored courses and rotational assignments are encouraged such that personal skills and capabilities can be improved. Projects are divided among the staff such that all staff have project leadership responsibilities.
Interagency and OtherInteractions 14.
List all interagency proliferation-related efforts in which your department / agency participates, including task forces, working groups, and other permanent or ad hoc forums. Describe your role in interagency proliferation-related efforts and the precise mechanisms in place to plan, coordinate, and implement that role.
Non-oroliferation policy makina Participation in U.S. Government internal efforts preparing for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee and Review Conferences; representation on USG I
delegation at Review Conferences Participation in U.S. delegation to IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference Participation in interagency committees -- IAEA Steering Committee, Subcommittee on international Safeguards and Monitoring, Subgroup on Safeguards Techrical Support, and Subgroup on IAEA Safeguards in the U.S. (NRC Chairs)-- addressing the implementation and strengthening of IAEA safeguards Participation in IAEA Director General's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards implementation Chair of IAEA's Technical Coordinating Committee for Programme on Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories Participation in Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System Steering Committee Participation in Interagency Working Group on Plutonium Disposition Participation in International Working Group on Alternate Nuclear Materials Participation in Trilateral Initiative Working Groups for the verification of Russian and U.S. nuclear materials removed from weapons Participation in interagency teams conducting bilateral visits to hold discussions and review implementation of international physical protection measures in countries possessing U.S.-origin nuclear materials Participation in IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) teams to review and recommend improvements to physical protection in IAEA Member States 18
. Participation in interagency teams conducting bilateral meetings to review implementation of IAEA safeguards in Japan and Europe Participation in U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) to improve the protection, control and accounting for nuclear materials in the FSU countries. NRC's role in this effort is primarily directed at regulatory development assistance.
Participation in international advisory group meetings, consultants meetings, working aroup meetings, workshops, and conferences addressing enhancements to safeguards and physical protection measures to permit more effective and efficient implementation of the measures by the States and IAEA Exoort licensino Participation in Zangger Committee e
Participation in Nuclear Suppliers Group e
Participation in Subgroup for Nuclear Export Control e
The roles of the Departments of State (DOS), Energy (DOE), Commerce (DOC),
e Defense (DOD), the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the NRC are defined in formal interagency procedures estaolished pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The procedures were issued in June 1978 and amended in May 1984.
Work closely with U.S. Customs to resolve export concerns By virtue of its role in licensing exports of nuclear-related materials and equipment, the NRC plays an important role in the development and implementation of U.S. and international export control regimes, such as participating in the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), whose guidelines set the international standard for nuclear cooperation and supply. NRC has also participated in interagency consultations to clarify the kinds of reactor components that are under NRC controls.
NRC also meets with Federal Bureau of Investigation Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit to coordinate activities concerning assessment and response to nuclear threat issues.
15.
Describe the interface between your department's/ agency's proliferation related i
I efforts and the National Security Council, including any formal mechanisms in place for day-to-day interaction, as well as any additional framework established for crisis management. Include details regarding the !evel at which the interaction occurs both at the NSC and at your department / agency, as well as the names and positions of the individuals responsible for this interaction. Descri'm any related interactions with other offices in the Executive Office of the Presl6ent, such as the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Science and 19
L Technology Policy.
' NRC participates in the National Security Council Nuclear Smuggling Working Group Subgroup, an interagency group responsible for policy formulation and rapid coordination of responses to illicit smuggling incidents.
L NRC participates in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness (WMDP) Group, which prepares policy relative to Presidential Decision Directive 62," Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas," May 22,1998, under the l
auspices of the Office of the National Coordinator fo. Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism. NRC participates in a number o' WMPP subgroups which relate to nonproliferation as well as counterterrorism, sucF as: Security of WMD-related materials in the
- U.S.; Preventing WMD from Entering the U.F., Contingency Planning, and Intelligence, in core conversion activities pertaining to Russian reactors, the NRC staff has worked closely-with NSC staff to resolve interagency differences on the role of regulatory issues within the non-proliferation aspects of the project.
On occasion the NRC Chairman has been requested to participate in Office of Science and Technology Policy missions, (e.g., Chairman Jackson participated in an OSTP-led mission to Japan for the Joint High Level Committee Meeting in 1997).
16.
Describe your interaction with entitle 5 of the federal government that collect or provide intelligence in support of you' proliferation-related activities. What deficiencies and strengths do you see with intelligence on this topic? Would you make recommendations for change?
NRC staff routinely participates in the activities of the interagency Intelligence Community on Terrorism's Chemical, Biological and Radiological Subcommittee. NRC also has links to the CentralIntelligence Agency's Nonproliferation Cer;ter; the Department of Energy; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); U.S. Customs; and various intelligence organizations associated with the Department of Defense.
While NRC staff has good interaction with the agencies listed above, funding for intelligence related activities has been reduced in the interest of minimizing fees to NRC licensees (the NRC budget is presently fee-recoverable from NRC licensees.) in particular, NRC funding was eliminated for the NRC/ DOE Threat Credibility Assessment Team (CAT) program, based at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which limits NRC direct interaction and technical support for this effort. The CAT program provides support in responding to illicit attempts to sell radioactive materials worldwide. In addition, the FBI has suggested that NRC provide liaison support to FBI Headquarters for which existing staff resources are not available. NRC staff are currently exploring mechanisms for funding important counter-terrorism and nonproliferation initiatives which would avoid or minimize the impact onNRC licensee fees (e.g.,
requesting funding through the National Security Council) and are considering Congressional action to allow some deviation from the fee-recovery provision.
i We have no recommendations at this time related tc the deficiencies or strengths of the 20
p i.
I mechanisms for providing intelligence. NRC intelligence needs are generally supplied in a timely and complete manner under existing arrangements.
17.
What deficiencies and strengths do you see with the U.S. policy process on proliferation? What recommendations would you make for changes to the policy process on proliferation matters?
Identified weaknesses and deficiencies include:
The National Security Council depends on the Department of Energy for all nuclear-e related ir,suas, even in areas in which DOE does not have jurisdiction or expertise. The N?C should engage key agencies with the requisite expertise below the traditional Cabinet-level threshold.
NRC is not identified in PDD-39 or PDD-62, both of which deal with issues concerning weapons of mass destruction. Here again, the NSC should include key agencies beyond the Cabinet-level when preparing such f ar-reaching policies.
The NSC-sponsored Nuclear Smuggling Working Group (NSWG) has become e
I moribund and has not met in over two years. NRC staff believr,s the NSWG could be revitalized and better integrated with current National initiatives if it was subsumed into the WMPD as a subgroup.
i 18.
Describe how specific elements within your department / agency interact on proliferation-related issues with foreign governments and with international or multinational organizations. Include formal arrangements as well as policies and practices for ad hoc interaction. Provide a description of specific significant recent or ongoing cooperative efforts with foreign governments. Explain the most significant factors hampering more effective cooperation with foreign governments as well as the factors that most ensure or enhance the effectiveness of such cooperation. How have these relationships evolved over the last ten l
years? Has the U.S. Government been effective in its interactions with foreign governments on proliferation issues?
NRC staff interact on proliferation-related issues as members of U.S. interagency teams holding discussions with representatives from other States and international organizations and I
as participants on international committees. These interactions were listed in the response to Question 14. Ad hoc interactions occur through telephone, facsimile, electronic mail, and letters to address specific questions or issues.
In addition, regular design basis threat briefs are provided to the Commission, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice as an integral component of the OIP/NMSS assessment of work with foreign governments, in particular with reference to the countries of the former Soviet Union.
Finally, NRC staff coordinate with the Canadian Atomic Energy Agency on threat-related 21 o
i matters.
19.
Describe your department's/ agency's role in achieving, monitoring, and/or i
verifying bilateral and multilateral treatles, agreements, or commitments with respect to non-proliferation, including assurances regarding the future use of
)
commodities exported from the U.S.
The NRC is responsible for ensuring that the inspection and reporting requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Protocols are effectively implemented at the U.S. licensee facilities and that the terms of agreements for cooperation and other international commitments for which the NRC or its licensees are responsible are implemented.
The NRC's export licensing function requires keeping abreast of the status of bilateral and multilateral Agreements for Cooperation, as well as the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. NRC participates in the review of export licenses, proposed new Agreements for Cooperation, and applications for export of nuclear technology. NRC staff participate on interagency teams conducting bilateral visits to hold discussions and review implementation of international
. physical protection measures in countries possessing U.S. origin nuclear materials.
20.
Describe any significant relationships with non federal-government entities (e.g.,
state and local governments, academic institutions and think thanks, industry, trade groups and associations) that support proliferation-related activities.
The NRC's primary relationships with non-federal-government entities is in relation to regulation of the NRC licensees in areas related to MPC&A, its participation in professional societies and standards organizations, and its oversight of its contractors. To this end, NRC is a member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Nuclear Black Market Task Force; NRC staff participate in the University of Pittsburgh's Ridgeway Center for International Security Studies' Weapons of Mass Destruction Workshops; and works closely with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management.
Interactions with non-governmental organizations such as the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) and the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center have, as a matter of public policy, been beneficial to NRC in considering nuclear non-proliferation matters. For example, the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center petition of January 30,1998, which concerned the Combustion Engineering application for a license to export nuclear materials to North Korea, helped to shape NRC's export licensing deliberations.
Evaluation / Accountability 21.
Describe the department's/ agency's evaluation process, including criteria used to determine success in achieving national and/or organization proliferation-related efforts.
l In 1995, the NRC established the Strategic Assessment and Rebaselining Initiative, an agency-l 22
}
i 4
l i
wide effort to assess NRC's current role and activities and to determine the agency's future path. In 1997, the NRC developed a Strategic Plan, a tool for setting priorities and allocating
)
resources consistent with the vision and goa', of the agency. The implementation of the Strategic Plan includes developing a framework integrating it with the budget process, performance monitoring and reporting processes, and the process for developing future Commission decisions.
In the area of export licensing, effectiveness is gauged by noting that Commission action is definitive in more than 99% of the cases, with no Presidential override or successful administrative, legislative, or judicial appeal, and all NRC authorized shipments clear U.S.
Customs. Fewer than 5% of completed cases raise questions from licensees, U.S. or foreign governmental agencies, public interest groups, nuclear industry groups, or the Congress concerning the quality of the staff's technical, policy or legal reviews, the staff's processing of the application, or the fairness of the final NRC decision. Approximately 90% of the Commission's recommendations to the Executive Branch are accepted /used by the Executive Branch.
In the area of national security, the NRC's international exchanges assist in the development of approaches for the safe and secure use of nuclear material for peaceful purposes; encourages -
the identification of possible precursor events warranting further investigation; helps to strengthen regulatory organizations; and enhances operational safety and risk reduction.
Effectiveness is indicated by the extent to which regulation of the domestic nuclear industry is improved through the Commission's international nuclear cooperation and assistance activities, while supporting the protection of U.S. common defense and security. This effectiveness is reflected in the extent to which (a) the NRC's domestic regulatory program is improved, i
enhanced, and strengthened through information acquired from counterpart foreign regulatory agencies; and (b) the Commission's international program interests and priorities are considered and acted on by the U.S. Government, foreign governments, and international organizations and associations.
22.
Please provide copies of any formal evaluations or audits undertaken in the last three years of any of the offices or elements involved in the proliferation-related efforts described above. Include any customer surveys, inspector General reports, GAO reports, or other internal or external reports that address the effectiveness of your proliferation-related efforts.
No such reviews have been undertaken in the last three years.
23.
Describe the most significant successes and failures of your department's/ agency's proliferation-related efforts over the last 8 years. What factors most significantly contributed to these successes / failures?
NRC does not believe there have been any significant failures; what follows is a list of notable successes in our proliferation-related efforts over the last eight years.
Bringing to interagency attention the need for international controls on alternate nuclear e
23 i
l
l materials and participation in international working group to develop measures for l
verification of nonseparation of alternate nuclear materials in Non-nuclear Weapon States Participated at international meeting to ensure that I AEA safeguards policy for the l
termination of safeguards on wastes did not weaken the international safeguards system Participated on interagency and international committees (e.g., SAGSI) to strengthen o
the IAEA safeguards system.
l Chaired effort to develop safeguards for the final disposal of spent fuel in geologic repositories During 1997-8, HEU removed from Kazakhstan was down blended by an NRC licensee.
NRC facilitated IAEA verification of the downblending activities at the licensee facility.
NRC has obtained and provided data to other U.G. Government agencies to assist the IAEA in resolving an issue regarding stolen enriched uranium in another country NRC provides historical export licensing data files and monthly updates to the IAEA under a voluntary agreement to support Agency efforts to strengthen safeguards.
NRC assistance to regulatory development efforts in the FSU have resulted in the passing of an appropriate National Nuclear Law and the subsequent development of regulatory technical requirements for MPC&A activities in Kazakhstan. In Ukraine, NRC has assisted in the development of regulatory technical requirements for Physical Protection activities. In Russia, NRC has provided assistance in the development of the MPC&A inspection program.
Approximately 90% of the Commission's recommendations to the Executive Branch are accepted /used by the Executive Branch.
24.
What does your agency see as the key proliferation-related challenges for the future? In your view, is the U.S. Government prepared to address these concerns?
Developing effective regulatory programs in the FSU will be a long-term effort that must e
take into account the limited regulatory resources in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.
Improvements to IAEA safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through combining the traditional and strengthened safeguards measures (e.g., Additional Protocol) will be a challenge to effectively merge the measures in the light of constrained resources.
24
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