ML20205E220
| ML20205E220 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/07/1986 |
| From: | Mark Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GL-86-10, NUDOCS 8608180278 | |
| Download: ML20205E220 (32) | |
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/ o UNeTED STATES
!" # ' ,h NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 p WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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o v Aca 1986 Docket Hos.: 50-424 50-425 APPLICANT: Georgia Power Company FACILITY: Vogtle, Units 1 and 2
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING ON V0GTLE SAFE AND ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN HELD ON JULY 29, 1986 The staff met with the applicant and its representatives on July 29, 1986, to discuss the Vogtle safe and alternate shutdown analysis submitted by FSAR Amend-ment 24. Participants are listed in Enclosure 1. -
The applicant presented an overview of the Vogtle analysis discussing the methodology and results. The applicant's slides are included as Enclosure 2.
The applicant stated that Vogtle does not have any one-hour barriers for separation of safe shutdown areas. Pressurizer heaters are not considered in the analysis and the loss of offs.ite power event is a design condition for a fire. The associated circuits were considered in three ways: coninon power source, common enclosure, and spurious actuation.
Paragraph L of each fire area in Appendix 9A of the FSAR discusses the safe and alternate shutdown analysis. The applicant indicated that it uses approximately 200 f t. of 3-hour wrapping. Deviations for other than 3-hour rated barriers are addressed in paragraph S. for each fire area in FSAR Appendix 9A.
Regarding Item 5 of the applicant's Open Issues slide (FSAR Appendix 98, pgs.
51-52), the staff indicated that if certain actions cannot be-accomplished in the control room, they would need to be perfonned at the remote shutdown panel.
The applicant needs to include this provision in the plant procedures and make a statement in the FSAR indicating that the procedures do include this, j The staff requested the applicant to explain in the introductory paragraphs of i the fire hazards analysis in FSAR Appendix 9A how spurious actions were
- evaluated and what operator actions were assumed. The staff also requested more l specific details regarding any repairs such as how much time is available to complete the repair and the indication that qualified personnel are on shift.
In the case of the diesel generator fuel oil transfer system, the applicant should have which wouldneed 'pennanently lugged jumpers to be discussed are theavailable in storage.in loss of ventilation Other repairs two locations.
8608180278 860807 '
5 % f Item 6 of the applicant's Open Issues Slide indicates that reactor coolant system T-cold indication will be used to ascertain steam generator pressure. The staff stated that it would verify the acceptability of this. Regarding Item 7, the applicant further clarified that the cable fault requires 10-17 seconds to clear and run down to zero voltage but that no equipment is damaged. This situation may occur in different fire locations.
The staff stated that it believed that Item 8 of the Open Issues slide is accept-able but would verify that against Generic Letter 86-10. Regarding Item 9, the applicant stated that it did not believe that simultaneous centrifugal charging pump damage was credible. A schematic illustrating the situation is provided as Enclosure 3. The fire damper caulking issue of Item 11 deals with a fire resistive caulking compound being used at pressure boundaries.
The staff inquired as to whether both diesel generator controls were isolaole from the control room, and the applicant stated that they were. The staff asked the significance of Note 3 to FSAR Table 9.5.1-1. The applicant responded -
that this note indicates that the interlock may be fnoperable and manual action is necessary. The staff also noted that items 12403-P4-001 through -004 are incorrectly described in FSAR Amendment 24 and that " pumps" need to be included.
The applicant did not know how many people are necessary to accomplish safe shutdown outside of the control room when asked by the staff. The staff indicated that an extra person may be necessary for the atmospheric dump valve.
The applicant will obtain an answer to this staff question and so infonn the staff.
The staff asked the applicant to justify alternate shutdown for only 0ne unit and remote shutdown for the second unit. For this situation, the applicant will need to show why damage does not occur to both units and address whether or not an additional person is necessary in this situation. If the applicant's justification is unacceptable, the staff would require the applicant to have enough personnel to accomplish alternate shutdown for both units.
! On FSAR page 9A.1.16-2, the applicant did not address what Train A and B safe shutdown cables are being referred to. This is necessary to clarify why safe shutdown is not affected. The specific fire area is 1AB-LC-E for which the applicant will submit a specific explanation. The Train B ACCW pump on FSAR l page 9A.I.19-2 should be listed under safe shutdown equipment. The applicant l
also needs to check the tag number because it is the same as the spare pump listed under safe shutdown equipment. On FSAR page 9A.1.19-4, paragraph L.2.a.
the applicant needs to clarify that procedures are in place.
The staff also inquired as to whether a fire in the control room could affect j the control access system. The applicant will respond to this and also provide the schedule' for completion of the control access system.
l FSAR page 9.5.1-28 implies that one train of equipment is completely free of fire damage which, according to the applicant, is not exactly true. This needs to be clarified in the FSAR. Also, FSAR pages 9.5.1-31 and 32 contain conflicting statements regarding fire team leadership which need to be clarified.
07 AUG 1986 The applicant indicated that additional information resulting from the meeting would be forthcoming within two weeks.
%\
Melanie A. Miller, Project Manager PWR Project Directorate #4 Division of PWR Licensing-A
Enclosures:
As stated cc: See Next Page i
DISTRIBUTION: See Other Page j
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/PWN-A PAPAS M [ b PWR# P 1 er:lh WLeFave BJYoungblood 8/g/86 08/7/86 08/7/86
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e o MEETING
SUMMARY
DISTRIBl! TION a "wDochet;Filei:t 0 7 AUG M NRC Participants G# NRC POR W. LeFaye L PDR NSIC PRC System PWRf4 Reading File M. Miller M. Duncan Attorney, OELD J. Partlow E. Jordan B. Grimes ACRS (10) bec: Licensee & Service List e
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Mr. R. E. Conway Georgia Power Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant cc:
Mr. L. T. Gucwa Resident Inspector Chief Nuclear Engineer Nuclear Regulatory Connission Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 572 P.O. Box 4545 Waynesboro, Georgia 30830 Atlanta, Georgia 30302 Mr. Ruble A. Thomas Deppish Kirkland, III, Counsel Vice President - Licensing Office of the Consumers' Utility Vogtle Project Council Georgia Power Company / Suite 225 Southern Company Services, Inc. 32 Peachtree Street, N.W.
P.O. Box 2625 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Bimingham, Alabama 35202 James E. Joiner Mr. Donald 0. Foster Troutman, Sanders, Lockeman, -.
Vice President & Project General Manager & Ashmore Georgia Power Company Candler Building -
Post Office Box 299A, Route 2 127 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Waynesboro, Georgia 30830 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Douglas C. Teper Mr. J. A. Bailey Georgians Against Nuclear Energy Project Licensing Manager 1253 Lenox Circle Southern Company Services, Inc. Atlanta, Georgia 30306 P.O. Box 2625 Birmingham, Alabama 35202 Ernest L. Blake, Jr.
Bruce W. Churchill, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge Tim Johnson i 1800 M Street, N.W. Executive Director l Washington, D. C. 20036 Educational Campaign for j a Prosperous Georgia Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr. 1083 Austin Avenue, N.E.
Vogtle Plant Manager Atlanta, Georgia 30307 Georgia Power Company Route 2 Box 299-A Billie Pirner Garde Waynesboro, Georgia 30830 Citizens Clinic Director Government Accountability Project Regional Administrator, Region II 303 10th Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Augusta, Georgia 30901 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
Enclosure 1 Participants NRC Bechtel Diller 5. Cereghino W. LeFaye M. Larson K. Walvekar B. Woodley J. Holmes Georgia Power Company Westinghouse R. Sprankle R. Morrison J. Hartka G. Lang D. Hudson Southern Company Services K. Kopecky i
J. McLeod -
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! SAFE AND ALTERNATE SHUTDONN
{ METHODOLOGY, RESULTS AND OPEN ISSUES i
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I. INTRODUCTION r
II. METHODOLOGY ,
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, o TASKS o ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS i
l o ALTERNATE SHUTOOWN i III. RESULTS i ;
i IV. OPEN ISSUES 1
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- INTRODUCTION ,
FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES SHOULD BE PROVIDED FOR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS IMPORTANT TO SAFE SHUTDOWN. THESE FEATURES SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF LIMITING FIRE DAMAGE SO THAT:
CMEB 9.5-1 C.S.b(1)(a)
ONE TRAIN OF SYSTEMS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN HOT SHUTDOWN (HOT STANDBY) CONDITIONS FROM EITHER THE CONTROL ROOM OR EMERGENCY CONTROL STATION (S) IS TO BE FREE OF FIRE DAMAGE; AND j CMEB 9.5-1 C.S.b(1)(b)
SYSTEMS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN FROM EITHER THE CONTROL ROOM OR EMERGENCY
- CONTROL STATION (S) CAN BE REPAIRED WITHIN 72 HOURS.
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VEGP 1
, INTRODUCTION ONE OF THE FOLLOWING MEANS OF ENSURING THAT ONE OF THE REDUNDANT TRAIhS IS FREE OF FIRE' DAMAGE SHOULD j BE PROVIDED: .
CMEB 9.5-1 C.S.b(2)(a)
SEPARATION OF CABLES AND EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS OF REDUNDANT TRAINS BY A FIRE BARRIER HAVING A 3-HOUR RATING:
CMEB 9.5-1 C.5.b(2)(b)
SEPARATION . . . BY A HORIZONTAL DISTANCE OF MORE THAN 20 FEET WITH NO INTERVENING COMBUSTIBLE OR FIRE
! HAZARDS. IN ADDITION, FIRE DETECTORS AND AN AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM SHOULD BE INSTALLED IN THE FIRE AREA; OR i
- CHEB 9.5-1 C.5.b(2)(c) l j ENCLOSURE . . . IN A FIRE BARRIER HAVING A 1-H00R RATING. IN ADDITION, FIRE DETECTORS AND AN AUTOMATIC
- FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM SHOULD BE INSTALLED IN THE FIRE AREA.
l OR CMEB 9.5-1 C.S.b(3) ,
l ALTERNATIVE OR DEDICATED SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AND ITS ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS, INDEPENDENT OF CABLES, i
SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS IN THE AREA, ROOM OR ZONE UNDER CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED.
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METH000 LOGY - TASK 1
, IDENTIFY SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN SAFE (COLD) SHUTDOWN FROM FUNCTIONAL l REQUIREMENTS IDENTIFIED IN RESAR-3, FSAR, AND OTHERS SUCH AS THE EMERGENCY RESP-)MSE GUIDELINES.
o THE FIRE EVENT SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT ARE LISTED IN FSAR TABLE 9.5.1-1.
o LESS EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED FOR THE FIRE EVENT SAFE SHUTDOWN THAN FOI: A NORMAL SAFE SilUTDOWN o SOME VALVE ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS SPURIOUS ACTUATION PROBLEMS 1 -
TWO NORMALLY CLOSED VALVES IN SERIES WILL PRECLUDE FLOW TWO NORMALLY OPEN VALVES IN PARALLEL HILL ENSURE FLON l
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5983t/7 . i JULY 29, 1986
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VEGP SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTION SUCCESS PATHS (FSAR TABLE 9.5.1-3)
SUCCESS PATHS FUNCTION ~ PURPOSE PREFERRED ALTERNATE i
REACTIVITY CONTROL SHUTDOWN REACTOR TO CONTROL ROD INSERTION CONTROL ROD INSERTION REDUCE HEAT PRODUCTION FOLLOWED BY BORATION FOLLOWED BV BORATION FROM FROM BAST RHST WITH HEAD VENT '
SYSTEM LETDOWN.
RCS INVENTORY CONTROL KEEP CORE COVERED CHARGING WITH LETDOWN SAME AS PREFERRED
- ISOLATION RCS PRESSURE CONTROL MAINTAIN SUBC00 LED PRESSURIZER HEATERS CHARGING AND CODE SAFETY MARGIN AND CODE SAFETY VALVES VALVES OR PORV's*
CORE HEAT REMOVAL TRANSFER OF HEAT TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLANT RCS HEAT REMOVAL TRANSFER OF HEAT FROM RCS TEMPERATURE >350*F: RCS TEMPERATURE > 350*F:
COOLANT AUXILIARY FEEDWATER MAIN STEAM CODE SAFETY SYSTEM AND MAIN STEAM VALVES ALONG WITH
- BYPASS CONTROL'** AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYS-CODE SAFETY VALVES
- TEM AND MAIN STEAM POWLR RCS TEMPERATURE <350*F: OPERATED RELIEF VALVES.
SHUTDOWN COOLING RCS TEMPERATURE <350*F:
SAME AS PREFERRED
- MAINTENANCE OF VITAL MAINTAIN OPERABILITY OF OFFSITE POWER, NORMAL ONSITE POWER, ESSENTIAL AUXILIARIES NECESSARY SUPPORT HVAC, NORMAL COOLING HVAC ESSENTIAL COOLING SYSTEMS AND CHILLED WATER, AND CHILLED WATER, ETC.
ETC.'**
- a. PREFERRED PATH NOT ACTUALLY EVALUATED. ALTERNATE PATH IS REDUNDANT AND IS ASSURED TO BE OPERABLE WITH OR HITHOUT OFFSITE POWER.
- FSAR TABLE BEING UPDATED TO REFLECT CHANGES 5983t/8 . i JULY 29, 1986
VEGP METHODOLOGY - TASK 2 IDENTIFY ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS FOR EQUIPMENT IDENTIFIED IN TASK 1 WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS.
o INSTRUMENTATION, CONTROL AND POWER CABLES ARE CONSIDERED. .
o THE FOLLONING TYPES OF CIRCUITS ARE NOT CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN:
POWEE FOR A FAIL SAFE DEVICE.
SPACE HEATER.
COMPONENT STATUS INDICATION SUCH AS INPUTS TO SYSTEM BYPASS STATUS AND MONITOR LIGHT BOXES.
INPUT TO ANNUNCIATOR. -
INPUT TO THE PLANT COMPUTER AND/0R ERF COMPUTER.
INDICATING LIGHT CIRCUITS, WHEN A SHORT OR OPEN CIRCUIT WILL NOT AFFECT THE CONTROL POWER SOURCE INTEGRITY. (DEVICE WILL OPERATE BUT STATUS LIGHT MAY NOT)
THE, CIRCUITS NOT REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SAFE SHUTDONN EQUIPMENT OPERATIONAL.
THE CIRCUIT THAT CANNOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE ABILITY OF EQUIPMENT TO OPERATE FOR SAFE
- SHUTDOWN. (ISOLATION DEVICE IS PROVIDED FOR THE CIRCUITS) o CIRCUITS ARE IDENTIFIED IN A COMPUTER DATA BASE (EE580) WITH AN "R" SYMBOL IN 'nlE El FIELD 5983t/9 . i JULY 29, 1986 .'
I VEGP METH000 LOGY - TASK 3 FOR THE CIRCUITS IDENTIFIED IN TASK 2 IDENTIFY THEIR LOCATIONS IN THE PLANT WITH RESPECT TO FIRE AREAS.
o RACENAY LOCATIONS ARE IDENTIFIED IN A COMPUTER DATA BASE (EE580) HITH A SPECIAL CODE IN THE E4 FIELD.
o THE SPECIAL CODES ARE BASED ON FIRE ZONES.
o EACH FIRE AREA HAS ITS UNIQUE GROUPING OF SPECIAL CODES.
o E4 CODES ARE DEFINED ON THE FIRE AREA DRAHINGS.
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i VEGP METH000LO'Y G - TASK 4 ,
i l A CALCULATION SHOWS THAT WITHIN EACH FIRE AREA:
o ONE TRAIN OF EQUIPMENT (INCLUDING CABLES) NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN HOT SHUTDOWN IS FREE OF FIRE DAMAGE THROUGH THE EXISTENCE OF PHYSICAL BARRIERS
- AND/OR SPATIAL SEPARATION, AND o THAT THE SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDONN IS FREE OF
, FIRE DAMAGE OR CAN BE REPAIRED WITHIN 72 HOURS, OR I
j o ALTERNATE SHUTDONN CAPABILITY EXISTS OUTSIDE OF, AND IS FREE OF, POTENTIAL DAMAGE FROM A POSTULATED FIRE IN THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION.
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- RADIANT ENERGY SHIELDS USED AS A BARRIER INSIDE CONTAINMENT i
5983t/12 , i JULY 29, 1986
VEGP METHODOLOGY - ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS COMMON POWER SOURCE o ALL ENERGY LEVELS HAVE BEEN EVALUATED.
o PROTECTIVE BREAKER, RELAY, AND FUSE COORDINATION ENSURES THAT A SAFE SHUTDOWN BUS REQUIRED FOR THE FIRE UNDER CONSIDERATION IS NOT DEENERGIZED BY A NONSAFE SHUTDOWN LOAD CABLE FAULT.
COMMON ENCLOSURE o FOR POWER AND CONTROL CABLES, CIRCUIT FROTECTION INTERRUPTS FAULT PRIOR TO CABLE DAMAGE.
o FOR INSTRUMENTATION CABLES, LOW ENERGY PRECLUDES CABLE DAMAGE.
SPURIOUS ACTUATION o UNDESIRED FIRE INDUCED VALVE, PUMP, AND ELECTRICAL BREAKER / MOTOR STARTER OPERATIONS ARE DEFINED.
o OPERATOR ACTIONS ARE USED TO TERMINATE / PRECLUDE CONCERNS.
o MULTIPLE VALVE OPENINGS ARE CONSIDERED FOR RCS HIGH/ LOW PRESSURE INTERFACE CONCERNS.
5983t/13 . i JULY 29, 1986
58 VEGP METHODOLOGY - ALTERNATE SHUTD0kN (CONTROL ROOM FIRE)
REMOTE SHUTDOWN CONTROL STATIONS s.
o TRANSFER OF CONTROL SWITCHES
- ARE PROVIDED FOR BOTH TRAINS
- ISOLATE THE CONTROL ROOM CIRCUITS
- ALIGNS THE CONTROL CIRCUIT THROUGH AN ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE
- ESTABLISHES CONTROL AT THE LOCAL STATION o
THE IMPACT OF HOT SHORTS OPEN CIRCUITS, AND SHORTS TO GROUND PRIOR TO TRA BEEN CONSIDERED o INDICATION AND MODULATING CONTROL
- HAS BEEN PROVIDED FOR TRAIN B ONLY
- THE ISOLATED PARAMETERS AT THE SHUTDOWN PANEL ARE:
PRESSURIZER LEVEL NEUTRON FLUX ,
STEAM GENERATOR HIDE RANGE LEVEL CORE EXIT TEMPERATURE HEAD VENT THROTTLE CONTROL RCS WIDE RANGE COLD LEG TEMPERATURE ACCUMULATOR TANK GAS VENT CONTROL RCS WIDE RANGE PRESSURE o
LOCAL TANK LEVEL INDICATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED FOR THE RHST, BAST AND THE CST's
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FIELD
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TRAIN "A* BOARDS TRAIN "B '
PROCESS PROCESS PROTECTION PROTECTION CABINETS CABINETS ISOLATED BY' ISOLATED BY' NON-ISOL ATED CONTROL CONTROL
, CIRCUITS , TRANSFER TRANSFER g
SWITCH IN SWITCH IN SHUTDOWN NON-ISOLATED 2 SHUTDOWN PANEL, PANEL, ' CIRCUITS '
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] W DEV1CE l.l COMPONENT COMPONENT
' (BREAKER) (BREAKERI CONTROL CONTROL
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ALTERNATE TRAIN "A" TRAIN '88 SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN INDICATION PANEL PANEL CABINET CONTROL ROOM - SHUTDOWN PANEL RELATIONSHIP
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VEGP ANALYSIS RESULTS FSAR APPENDIX 9A PRESENTS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON A FIRE AREA BY FIRE AREA BASIS:
o THE SAFE SHUTDOWN TRAIN NOT DAMAGED BY A FIRE IN THE AREA (PARAGRAPH L1) o ANY SPECIAL OPERATIONAL AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE AREA (PARAGRAPH L2) o SPURIOUS ACTUATION CONSIDERATIONS THAT COULD OCCUR DUE TO A FIRE IN THE FIRE AREA (PARAGRAPH L3) o LOCATIONS WHERE SEPARATION.IS PROVIDED BY MEANS OTHER THAN 3-HOUR RATED BARRIERS (DEVIATION, PARAGRAPH S) 1 1
5983t/17 . i JULY 29, 1986
VEGP FIRE EVENT SAFE SHUTDOHN ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS (SHEET I 0F 5)
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AVAILABLE SAFE SHUTDOWN OPERATIONAL / SPURIOUS SEPARATION ,
FIRE AREA TRAIN DESIGN ACTUATIQNS DEVIATION 1-AB-LD-A A YES YES NO
-B B YES YES NO
-C A YES NO NO
-D B NO YES NO
-E B NO NO NO
-F A AND B NO NO NO
-G (FIRE ZONE 14C) A YES YES YES
-G (OTHER FIRE ZONES) B YES YES YES
-H B NO NO NO
-I B NO YES NO
-J B NO NO NO
-PC B NO YES NO 1-AB-LC-A A NO NO NO
-B B NO YES NO
-C B YES NO NO
-D B YES YES NO
-E A YES YES NO 1-AB-LB-A A YES YES NO
-B B YES YES NO 1-AB-LA-A B NO YES NO
-B A YES YES NO
-C B NO YES NO
-D B NO YE5 NO
-E B YES YES NO 1-AB-L1-B A NO YES NO
-C B NO YES NO
-G A AND B NO NO NO
-H A AND B NO NO NO.
5983t/18 i i JULY 29, 1986
.I VEGP FIRE EVENT SAFE SHUTDOHN ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS (SHEET 2 0F 5)
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AVAILABLE SAFE SHUTDOWN OPERATIONAL / SPURIOUS SEPARATION FIRE AREA TRAIN DESIGN ACTUATIONS DEVIATION 1-AB-L2-A A OR B YES NO YES
-C A AND B NO NO NO
-E B NO YES NO 1-CB-LC-A B NO YES NO
-B B YES YES NO
-D A AND B NO NO NO 1-CB-LB-A B YES YES YES
-B B NO YES NO
-C A NO YES NO
-D A YES YES YES
-E A AND B NO NO NO
-F A AND B NO YES NO
-G A AND B NO NO NO
-H A NO NO NO
-I A AND B NO YES NO
-J A NO NO NO
-K B NO NO NO
-L B NO YES NO
-M B ,
NO YES NO
-N B NO YES N0 l -0 A NO NO N0 i -P A NO YES NO
! -Q A , NO N0 NO l -R A AND B NO NO , N0 l -S A AND B NO NO NO
-T B NO YES NO i
5983t/19 JULY 29, 1986 l , i l
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VEGP FIRE EVENT SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS (SHEET 3 0F 5)
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AVAILABLE SAFE SHUTDOHN OPERATIONAL / SPURIOUS SEPARATION FIRE AREA TRAIN DESIGN ACTUATIONS DEVIATION 1-CB-LA-A A NO YES NO
-B A AND B NO NO NO
-C A AND B NO NO NO
-D A YES NO NO
-E A AND B NO NO NO
-F A AND B NO NO NO
-G B NO YES N0 1-CB-LA-H A NO YES NO
-I A NO YES NO
-J A NO NO NO
-K B NO YES NO
-L A NO YES NO
-H A AND B NO NO NO
-N B NO YES NO
-0 B NO YES NO
-P A NO YES NO
-Q A NO YES NO
-R A NO YES NO
-S A . NO YES NO
-T A NO YES NO
-U A NO NO NO 1-CB-L1-A USE ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN YES YES YES
-B A YES YES NO
-C A NO YES NO
-D A NO YES NO 5983t/20 , JULY 29, 1986 i
l VEGP FIRE EVENT SAFE SHUTDOHN ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS (SHEET 4 0F 5)
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AVAILABLE SAFE SHUTDOHN OPERATIONAL / SPURIOUS SEPARATION FIRE AREA TRAIN DESIGN ACTUATIONS DEVIATION 1-CB-L1-E A AND B NO YES NO
-F B NO NO NO
-G B YES NO NO
-TSC A AND B NO NO NO 1-CB-L2-A A NO YES NO
-B A NO YES NO
-E A NO YES NO 1-CB-L3-A A NO NO NO
-B A AND B NO NO NO
-C B NO NO NO
-H B NO NO NO
-J A AND B NO NO NO
-K A AND B NO NO NO l
-L A NO NO NO l -M A NO NO NO
, 1-CB-L4-A A AND B NO NO NO 1-FB-LC-A A N0 YES NO i 1-FB-L3-A A AND B NO NO NO 3-B A AND B NO NO NO 1-CTB A OR B YES YES YES 1-EB-B A NO NO NO 1-DB-L1-A B NO NO NO
-B A NO NO NO
-C B NO NO NO
-D A NO NO N0 1-DPB-A B NO NO NO 5983t/21 . I JULY 29, 1986
/
VEGP FIRE EVENT SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS (SHEET 5 0F 5)
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AVAILABLE SAFE SHUTDOWN OPERATIONAL / SPURIOUS ~ SEPARATION FIRE AREA TRAIN DESIGN ACTUATIONS
_ DEVIATION l-DPB-B A NO NO NO l-AFS-A A NO NO NO
-B B NO NO NO
-C B NO YES NO
-D A AND B YES NO YES
-E A AND B NO NO NO
-F A AND 8 NO NO NO 1-NSP-LA-A B NO NO NO
-B A YES NO YES
-C A AND B NO NO N0 1-RB-LA-A A AND B NO NO N0 1-HPB-L1-A A AND B NO NO NO l-RTB-L1-A A AND B NO NO N0 t
5983t/22 , i JULY 29, 1986
OPEN ISSUES 5983t/23 . 3 JULY 29, 1986
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OPEN ISSUES ,
(SHEE1 1 0F 2)
ISSUES REQUIRING NRC ACCEPTANCE 1., SER OPEN ITEM 7A: FIRE DOORS AND DAMPERS l A. UNLABELED CERTIFIED DOORS IN FIRE AREA BOUNDARY BARRIERS (APPENDIX 98 SECTION C.5.a.(5))
B. UNRATED WATERTIGHT DOORS (APPENDIX 9A) ,
- 2. SER OPEN ITEM 7B: POWER SUPPLIES FOR VENTILATION (APPENDIX 98 SECTIONS C.I.b AND C.S.f(3))
FIRE AREAS WHERE SHOKE REMOVAL SYSTEMS MAY NOT OPERATE:
1-AB-LD-A 1-AB-L1-G 1-CB-LC-B* 1-CB-LA-U 1-AB-LD-B l-AB-L2-A 1-CB-LB-A* l-CB-L1-A 1-AB-LD-G I-AB-L2-C 1-CB-LA-K 1-CB-L3-H*
1-AB-LC-B 1-AB-L2-E I-CB-LA-H 1 -CB-L3-M *-
(*FSAR TO BE UPDATED TO REFLECT THESE ADDITIONAL AREAS)
- 5. OPERATOR ACTIONS IN ADDITION TO TRIPPING THE REACTOR PRIOR TO LEAVING THE CONTROL RD0M (APPENDIX 9B SECTION C.5.c.(1))
o TRIP REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS o CLOSE PRESSURIZER PORV BLOCK VALVES o CLOSE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION AND BYPASS VALVES o CLOSE MAIN FEEDWATER AND BYPASS VALVES 1
5983t/24 . JULY 29, 1986 l
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OPEN ISSUES .
(SHEET 2 0F 2) o CLOSE STEAM GENERATOR BLONDOWN ISOLATION VALVES
- 6. , INDIRECT INDICATION OF SOME VARIABLES (APPENDIX 98 SECTION C.5.c.(2)(d))
o CONTROL ROOM FIRE: USE RCS T-COLD INDICATION TO ASCERTAIN S/G PRESSURE o TRAIN B OUTSIDE CONTROL ROOM FIRES: USE S/G PRESSURE TO ASCERTAIN RCS COLD LEG '
TEMPERATURE ,
- 7. 120V AC VITAL BUS LOSS OF VOLTAGE CONDITION (APPENDIX 98 SECTION C.5.c.(7))
- 8. 3-PHASE POWER CABLE SPURIOUS ACTUATION ANALYSIS ASSUMPTION (APPENDIX 98 SECTION C.5.c.(7))
- 9. SIMULTANE0US CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP DAMAGE (APPENDIX 9B SECTION C.5.c.(7))
o VOLUME CONTROL TANK OUTLET VALVE SPURIOUS CLOSURE o CHARGING PUMP COMMON MINIMUM FLOW VALVE SPURIOUS CLOSURE
- 10. SPECIFIC DEVIATIONS ARE DEFINED IN FSAR APPENDIX 9A o SEPARATION BY DISTANCE o UNRATED CONTAINMENT FIRE AREA BOUNDARY BARRIER o UNRATED EXTERIOR BUILDING FIRE AREA B0UNDARY BARRIERS
- 11. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES '
o CONDUIT INTERNAL FIRE SEALS (APPENDIX 98 SECTION C.S.a.(3))
o NO FIRE DETECTION FOR TWO CONTROL ROOM RAISED FLOOR SECTIONS (APPENDIX 9B SECTION C.7.b) o USE CAULKING AT FIRE DAMPERS (APPENDIX 98 SECTION C.S.a.(4))
5983t/25 . i . JULY 29, 1986
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