ML20205D362

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Audit of Pump & Valve Operability Assurance Program for Hope Creek Generating Station
ML20205D362
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 09/30/1985
From: Kido C
EG&G IDAHO, INC.
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20205D373 List:
References
CON-FIN-A-6415 EGG-EA-6901, NUDOCS 8510030411
Download: ML20205D362 (46)
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Text

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EGG-EA-6901 SEPTEMBER 1985 AUDIT OF THE PutiP AND VALVE OPERABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR THE HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION n

C. Kido C. F. Miller H. M. Stromberg Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Informal Report Oceratec by the U.S Department of Energy

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EGG-EA-6901 AUDIT OF THE PUNP AND VALVE OPERABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR THE HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION Docket No. 50-354 C. Kido C. F. Miller H. M. Stronterg 4

1 Publisned September 1985

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NRC Licensing Support Section Engineering Analysis Division

! EG&G Icaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 7

l Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission Wasnincton, D.C. 20555 i Uncer COE Contract No. OE-AC07-76IC01570

?!.'i No. A6415

j ABSTRACT The Hcpe Creek Generating Station was audited May 7 to 10,1985 to determine the ad'e quacy of their pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program. Four concerns, which could not be resolved by the close of the

< audit, wer's identified to the applicant; he committed to address these j concerns prior to fuel load. The results of this audit indicate that the applicant has established and is implementing a program that will track all

, pumps anc valves important to safety from manufacture and in-shop testing through qualification, installation, testing, maintenance, and surveillance l ,

for the purpose of assuring continued operability of these ccmponents over tne life of the plant.

FOREWORO ,

i This report is supplied as part of the " Equipment Qualification Case Reviews" project that is being conoucted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commissien, Office of Auclear Reactor Regulation Division of Engineerinc, f Equipment Qualification Branch by the Engineering Analysis Division of EG&G J Icaho, Inc.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission fundeo this work under the authorization, B&R 20-19 40-41-2, FIN Number A6415.

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i StJMMARY The Pump ano Valve Operasility Assurance Review Team (PVCRT),

l comprised of one member of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) staff

, anc three EG&G personnel, conauctea an on-site audit of the hope Creek Pump anc Valve Operability Assurance Program during the week of May 7 to 10, l

1985. A representative sample of active pumps and valves was selected for -

! review and evaluation. Tnese components are categorized as either Nuclear I Steam Supply System (NSSS) or Balance of Plant (BCP), based upon which organization was responsible for the purenase and installation of the component. General Electric is Hope Creek's NSSS vender while Becntel Power Corporation, an architectural engineering firm, is responsible for tne 60P components.

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The process used to evaluate the plant's overall Pump anc Valve

[ Operability Assurance Program includes: (a) becoming frmiliar with each

, selected component anc the system in which it is installed,

! (b) uncerstanding the component's normal and safety functien, (c) visually inspecting the component's configuration and mounting, (d) reviewinc those

! cccuments relating to the operability of each selected component.

l (e) ensuring the applicant has an adequate dccument retrieval system, anc (f) reviewing tne applicant's preoperaticnal testing and maintenance /st rveillance programs.

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. The results of the evaluation process are two-fold. Any component

! specific ceficiencies or concerns are ider.tified and documented. Of

! greater importance are any generic concerns, wnich may be icentifiec, that could affect other compcnents in the plant or possibly even extena to other l plants.

l j Ouring tne PVORT review, a number of comocnent specific concerns were .

j raised. All but two of these specific concerns were satisfactorily I resolvec auring the audit by the applicant supplying aeditional information

cr demonstrating that acministrative procecures were in olace that woulc i

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accress them. The applicant ccanitted to resolve these two component specific concerns price to fuel loaa. In acoition, tne staff also requests that prior to fuel loac the applicant confirm that: (a) all new loaas are 1

verified to be less than those originally used to qualify the equipment ano (b) all pumps and valves irrportant to safety are qualified.

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4 CONTENTS ABSTRACT.............................................................. 11 FOREh0RD .............................................................. 11

SUMMARY

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1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... I
2. EVALUATION METH000 LOGY ........................................... 3 2.1 Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) Components .............. 6 2.1.1 Reactor Core Spray P urg, I AP-206 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.2 High Pressure Coolant Injection Booster Pump, 10P-217 ............................................ 8 2.1.3 Res idu al He at Remov al P ump, IAP-202 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.1.4 High Pressure Coolant Injection Turbine Stop

- Valve, IFV 4880 .................................... 12 2.2 B alance of P l ant ( 80P ) Cceponents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.2.1 D iesel Fuel O il Transf er P ump , LAP-401 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.2.2 Station Serv ice Water P uto, LAP-502 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.2.3 Torus Water Cleanup Isolation Valve, lhy 4680 ...... 17 2.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Cooling .

I sol at ion V al ve , 1HV-F015A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.2.5 Safety Auxiliaries Cooling--Turoine Auxiliaries Cool ing Isolation Valve, lHV-25228 . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.2.6 Feecwater, I sol ation V a?ve, I AE-V007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.3. Other Equ ipment Qual if icat ion I s sues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.3.1 Safety Evaluation Report ( SER) I tems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.3.2 Long Term Ocerability of Deep Draft Pumps .......... 26 2.3.3 Implementation of the Overall Program ............. 25

3. CONCLUSION ....................................................... 29 4 REFERENCE S ( hSSS COMPONENTS ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5. REFERENCES (BCP COMPONENTS) ...................................... 36 .

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TABLE

1. Pumps anc V alves Selected f or the PVORT Aud it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a
2. Status of SER Items for Pump and Valve Operability Assurance ..... 24
3. S uma ry o f P VOR T A ud i t * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , , , , , 39 e

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AUDIT OF THE PUMP AND VALVE OPERABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR THE HODE CREEK GENERATING STATION

1. INTRODUCTION ine Equipment Qualification Branch (EQB) performed a two-step review of the Pump anc Valve Operability Assurance Program being implemented by tne hope Creek Generating Station. Tne purpose of this review was to determine whether hope Creek's program is adequate to ensure that pumps ana valves important to safety will operate when requires during the life of the plant uncer normal anc accident conaitions. (Hope Creek is a 1067-MWe boiling water reactor (SWR) located s8 miles southwest of Salem, New Jersey.)

The first step was a review of Section 3.9.3.2 of the applicant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). This information was general in nature, newever, and by itself was not adequate to properly determine the sccpe of the app'licant's overall equipment cualification program as it pertains to pump and valve acerability. The results of this FSAR review accearec as input to He;e Creek's Safety Evaluation Report (SER). The resolution of all open SER issues was acccmplished prier to or concurrently with the en-site aucit.

The seconc step of tne review was an on-site audit to assess the applicant's overall program, wnile it was being implemented. A Pump anc Valve Operacility Review Team (PVCRT) consisting of er gineers frem tne EyB ano the Icano National Engineering Laboratory (INEL-EGLG) concuctea an aucit from May 7 to 10,1985, of a representative sample of installed pump ana valve assemblies anc their suppurting qualification cocuments at the applicant's plant site. Based upon the results of the FSAR review anc the on-stte aucit, the PVORT was able to determine whether the applicant's overall program conforms to tne current licensing criteria presented in Section 3.10 cf the Stancard Review Plan (SRP). Ccnformance with SRP 3.10 1

criteria is required in crcer to satisfy tne applicable portions of General

  • Design triteria (GDC) 1, 2, 4, 14 ano 30 of Appendix A tc 10 CFR 50 as well as Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.

Section 2 of tnis report presents the basic methocology used to evaluate Hope Creek's overall equipment qualification program as well as a -

  • ciscussion of the concerns r'aised during the evaluation of the selected components and other qualification issues. Section 3 presents the staff's conclusions concerning the audit. Sections 4 ano 5 present the references for the NSSS and BOP components, respectively.

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2. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY In orcer to evaluate the acequacy of McDe Creek's Pump anc Valve Operability Assurance Program and the extent to which it is being implementec, the PVORT conducted an audit at the plant site May .7 to 10,1985. The first phase of the on-site audit consisted of the applicant presenting the major elements of his overall equipment -

qualification program. The remainder of the audit consisted of determining wnether the applicable elements ,of the prugram had been (or would ce) ,

implementea for the set of selectec coriiponents. By performing a detailed review on a civerse set of components, tne PVORT is attempting to icentify concerns that may be generic to the applicant's overall program. Taole 1 presents a list of pumps ano valves selectec for tne PVORT aucit.

As the first step of the detailed review of ,the selected cceponents, the PVCRT concuctec a plant walkdcwn of eacn corrpenent accompanied by ccgnizant licensee personnel. One purpose of this walkdown was to obtain inferruation that coula later be ccmpared with the evidence of qualification contained in each component's dccument package. Some examples of walkdown information that was compare:: with relevant dccuments are: (a) name plate >

] cata versu" design and purchase soecifications. (b) installed conficuration and mounting versus the configuration and type of mountino that was tested (or assumed in an analysis,), (c) local equipment environment (including tne environment tnat coulc resul't from an accident) versus the environment i enveloped curing required testing, (c) system interfaces versus energy or fluia require,r.ents, anc (e) installed functional accessories versus actual aquipment testec. In accition, a second purpose of the walkcown was te evaluate each selected ccmponent in order to determine wnether any operacility concerns may nave been overlocked up to that point in time.

Examples of sucn concerns are: (a) the potential for flooding, (b) compcnent misapplicaticn, (c) the potential for pipe whip or missile .

camage, and (d) tne potential for personnel interactions tnat could inacvertently cause a :cmpenent to become inoperable.

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TABLE 1. PUMPS AND VALVES SELECTED FOR THE PVORT AUDIT I

NSSS Correonents 80p Conconents

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Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer IAP-2064 Reactor Core Spray 1AP-401

, Pump Pump l

10P-217b Hign Pressure Coolant IAP-502a Station Service Water Pump

!' Injection Booster ,

Pump 1AP-2024 Resioual Heat Removal 1HV-4680 Torus Water Cleanup Isola-l Pump tion Valve IFV-4880D*C High Pressure Coolant 1HV-F015A Residual Heat Removal Injecticn Turbine Shutdown Cooling Isolation

, Stop Valve Valve l IHV-25228 Safety Auxiliary Cooling-t Turbine Auxiliary Cooling

! solation Valve IAE-V007C Feedwater Isolation Valve hote: The applicant has six weeks to prepare document packages for alt $ut the surprise ecmponents; for those he has only a few days. The contents of tne document package for tne surprise ccmponents is an inoicator of: (a) tne applicant's ability to retrieve documents in a timely manner, ano (b) .tne ccmpleteness of his central files, i

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a. The applicant proviced a separate presentation concerning the deep orsf t pump issue (refer to IE Bulletin 79-15) for tnis component. -

l b. Tne applicant consicers this component to be a subcomponent of a larger component for qualification purposes.

1 i c. Surprise cceconent--Tne applicant is informed cf this component only a  !

l few days prior to tne en-site aucit.

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The cccument review portion of the aucit was c nducted af ter the completien of the applicant's program presentation and the walkcown of the selecteo components. One purpose of the cocument review was to verify that the principles established in Hope Creek's program had been (or woulo be) uniformly implementeo. Therefore, the document package for each of the aucit ccmponents was reviewed to ensure that, as a minimum, each package contain,ed the following:

0 A purchase specification that reflects design and functional

- requirements ,

o Results of applicaole in-shop tests o Evicence that the component was subjected to a qualification plan tnat adoressed:

- Pre-aging

- Significant aging meenanises (if applicable)

- Formal and accioent loads (including seismic ano ,

hydredynamic loads)

- Acceptance criteria requiring operacility both during ano after an event

- Icentifiable safety margins (offference between design basis parameters and the test parameters useo for equipment qualification) o Applicaule precoerational test procedures o Similarity statements, wnere the qualification of a similar equiceent is uses to cualify tne installeo equiprent (if acclica:'2) 5

o Evidence that maintenance / surveillance practices incorscrate -

qualification ano operability concerns.

In adoiticn, a second purpose of the cocur.,ent review was to ensure that an -

auditaole link existec between tne cocuments in the package ano that all documents hao been reviewed and approved by personnel having a working -

knowledge of equipment qualification issues and concerns. Those documents not present in the aucit component document package were requested by the PVORT. Hope Creek's timely response to these requests and their ability to compile a coglete package for the surprise components were considered to be positive incicators of the acceptaoility of the applicant's central file sy stem.

The remainder cf Section 2 is devoted to discussing any ccncerns raised by the PVCRT as a result of the equipment and issues reviewed during

  • the on-site aucit. ' Sections 2.1 and 2.2 present the evaluation of the NSSS and BOP ccmpenents, respectively. Section 2.3 sumarizes the status of other equipment qualification issues relating to pump and valve operacility.

2.1 Nuclear Steam Sacoly System (NSS$) Cort.conents 2.1.1 Reactor Core Soray Pumo, IAP-206, ( Audit Status: closea) 2.1.1.1 Comoonent Descriotton. This component is a vertical (ceep craf t) centrif ugal pump manuf actured oy Ingersoll Rand (Model 25APKD) whicli is driven by a 700 hp incuction motor manuf actured by General Electric (Medal 5K6339xC1188). The component is part of the Reactor Core Scray System anc is located in the Reactor Building at the 54-ft level. Tne pump is normally in stancby. Its safety function is to start and puep water from the supression pool to the reactor vessel to ensure acequate ccre cooling in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (LCCA).

2.1.1.2 cc ocnent Walkdown. The walkcown of this component revealeo one acerability concern and two minor deficiencies, all of which were resolvec prior to tne close of the suuit. The minor oeficiencies involvec 1:ose ults on tne cover of the juncticn pox attacned to the meter and a 6

crack in tne insulation of a wire leacing to the mo;or wincing heater. Tne applicant informed the PVORT tnat the system hao n>t yet been turned over to the utility and that part of the turn over procedure was to ensure tnat these types of deficiencies were corrected prior to system turn over.

The operability concern noted was that the ventilation system (HVAC) exnaust duct was located only a few feet from the sice of the pump's driver motor. The PVCRT asked what might be the consequences of a cooling water

. coil in the HVAC system rupturing and having that water blown directly into the motor. The applicant explained that the HVAC system (including the cooling water coils) was cesigned to seismic Categary I standarcs ano, therefore, such a failure would represent one of the single failures that coulo cisable the pump. If this were to occur, the reduncant system would be placec in service. While "cefense in depth" is part of the overall plant cesign, it is nut tne answer to questions cencerning indivicual coeponent operacility and tne applicant recognizes this. As part of a ,

hazaros walkdown to ce conducteo later of applicant personnel, the failed cooling water coil concern will be examined. The applicant stated that if the hazarcs team ceered it appropriate, deflectors could be installed to ensure that water coulo not enter the mctor from this source. It should be noted that otner corrp0nents appeared to be susceptible to tne same proolem (see Secticn 2.1.3.2). The applicant further explained that the hazards walkcoan team woule evaluate each component's susceptibility to this and .

etner hazards on a case-by-case basis.

During tne PVCRT walkdcwn, it was noted that this ccmponent was equipped with a nurrter of permanently mounted vibraticn and proximity mcnitors. The applicant explained tnat these monitcrs are part of nis overall program to address the deep craf t pump operaoility cencern, wnich was originally cccumentec in IE Sulletin 79-15. Tne applicant's treatment of the ceep craf t, pump issue was reviewed as a separate generic concern by tne PVCRT curing tne audit peccess anc is discussed in hection 2.3.2.

(Note: The core spray pump was turned by hano curing the walkdcwn. No bincing was cetectec curing a full revolution of tre motor ano pues uncer a

"no 1cac c:nc it tons. )

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i 2.1.1.3 Occument Review. The review of the qualification cocuments

  • inoicated that qualification of this component was accressed by a combination of tests and analyses. Although a minor discrepancy involving olfferences between the pump's design and -

ncrmal/accicent nead was noted on the component's long form, this was l -

! resolved curing discussions with General Elec'tric personnel. Therefore, no specific operacility concerns resulted from this review. ,

During the review of an environmental document (NEOC-30737) app 1'icaole to this component it was noted that the document contained two specific maintenance / replacement.requ'irements. Upon questioning, tne applicant

providea documentation (i.e., E.Q. Maintenance and Surveillance Information Sheet for HCGS, ECMS No. M001-MOT-001, cated April 18,1985),which verifiec that these recuirements had been incorporated into the maintenance

! program. ,

i 2.1.1.4 F ind ings. Ne specific operability concerns remained af ter the evaluation of this component. ,

l 2.1.2 High Prestsi e Coolant injection (HPCI) Booster puro, iOP-217

(Audit Status
Closed Pencing Resolution by Aeolicant.)

1 2.1. 2.1 Comconent Description. This component is a horizcntal, split case, centrifugal pump manufactured by Byron Jackson (Mocal 12 x 14 x 23

DVS) whten is oriven oy a cual wneel turbine manuf actured by Terry Turoine Company (Model CCS). The main HPCI pump is manufactured by Byron Jackson
(Macel 10 x 12 x 15, 2 stage, DVMX). The two pumps ano turbine are bolteo i~

to a pecestal that is welced to a cormon steel base plate. The pump assemoly is located in the Reactor Building at the 54-ft level. Tne oooster and main pumps act together to provide domineralized make-up water freni the concensate storage tank or, alternately, water from the .

suppression enameer to ensure tnat the reactor is not uncovered in the

) event of a small LOCA. The normal state of the pump is standey.

  • NSSS Reference, see Section 4 3

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l 1 2.1.2.2 Comoonent Walkcown. The walkcown of this ccmponent revealed i

i three anomalies, only one of whien was not acequately resolved curing the

document review cr discussion with the applicant. Specifically, the control oox to the turoine had been recently moved to an adjacent room in I order to meet environmental qualification requirements for its enclosed '

) instruments. however, the nameplate data for the turbine was left attached i

to the cover of the box. The staff requested the applicant to provice

written confirmation that the HPCI turbine nameplate data had been restored to its proper location (on the turbine) prior to fuel load. This item was presentec to the applicant at the close of the audit.

The other two walkdown ancmalies were resolved as follows: First, it was discovered that the HPCI booster pump did not have an N stamp. The pump was ordered in 1971 but qualified to the 1968/1969 ASME code, which ,

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was in effect at that time. Tne applicant provided evidence that the NRC j nac grantee thers relief frem the N stamp requirement because the Mcpe Creek l ccnstruction permit had been celayed until 1974,' instead cf the expectec

{ 1971 ccnstruction cate. Seconcly, although the HPCI pump assembly had been I turnec over to the systems group, none of th's couplings were in place. The

, start-up engineer explained that the pumps were undergoing final alignment

) prececures price to installing the couplings.

2.1.2.3 Occument Review. The review cf the qualification i 12-24 revealec that operability was adoressed by a concination documents .

I of tests anc analyses. Since the turbine centrol box had been recently

) movec cue to environmental cualification recuirements, the staff asked the applicant to justify tne new mounting configuration. The control box was l

originally mounted on tne turbine skid oy angle brackets at the cottom, Q

whereas the new configuration had the box mounted against a concrete wall

attacheo oy crackets too and bottom. The applicant explainec that tne ,

f turoine skid has an alternate mounting bracket that is used to simulate a .-

wall mounteo ccnfiguratten. During the Wyle biaxial shake test of tne HPCI 4

turoine assemoly, both ecunting locatiens were instrumented and the highest l loacs were usec to cualify tne contrcl oox. This uiscussten plus review of I su
perting ccc:.ments s:acustely resolved tnis concern.

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i The pump assembly has s Iow natural frecuency (12.6 Hz), which prompted questions concerning the effects of dynamic amplification. The .

applicant presented the dynamic analysis of the pump assembly. The - ,

calculated stresses usi.ng f aulted loads were compared with the upset condition allowable criteria and were found to be adequate. Results of the , l f analysis of the gear box demonstrated that the calculated s, tresses ana

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shaf t oisplacementis were within the manuf acturer's reconsiended limits. The

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i preoperational test procedures were reviewed, as well as the vendor I certified pump curves. The cumulative documentation, completion of no-loao ,

i. spin-tests, ano discussion of start-up tests provide confidence that the i pump will operate as requireo.

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J 2.1.2.4 Findings. Except for the restoration of the HPCI turbine nameplate data mentioned in Section 2.1.2.2, no other specific operability

) concerns remained after the evaluation of this component.

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l 2.1.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump A.1AP-202. (Aucit Status:

} Closed) .

a l 2.1.3.1 Component Cescriotion. This component consists of a vertical a

j cent'ifugal (oeep draft) pump manufactured by Ingersoll Rand (Model 3A j APKO) which is driven ey a 1250 hp induction motor manufactured by General Electric (Model 5K6348XC54A). The pump is located in the Reactor Building c-at tne 54-ft level. The normal function of the pump is to provide cooling of tne fuel pool and to remove residual heat generated by the core under normal ano abnormal snutocwn conditions. The pump's safety function is to  !

l provice emergency cooling flew to the reactor core in the event of a loss j of reactor coolant in order to prevent fuel camage. The normal state of the pump is stancby.

l 2.1.3.2 conconent walkoown. During the plant walkoown, several .

1 anomalies were discovereo, all of which were adequately resolved prior to the close of the audit. First, the grounding wire for the flexible conouit i .o tne 1AP202 space heater was found to te loose. The acolicant generatec i

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a Start-up Deviation Report (SOR) immeoiately after tne walkcown to ,

reconnect the grounding wire to tne upper collar of the flexible conduit, j Secondly, it was noticed that the HVAC exhaust duct discharged air directly I

against the side of the mctor as was tne case for the Reactor Core Spray pump, (see Section 2.1.1.2 for the applicant's response to this concern).

l Thirdly, the 18 in, check valve on the RHR pump discharge line was found to .

f be ' tagged out-and undergoing a replacement of its flexitallic gasket., A i blue QC tag near a pipe weld was still attached to the valve, thus  !

{ indicating that work was still in progress. The start-up engineer l

! explained that the weld was finished and that the tag should have been f removed. The blue tags'are used by applicant to identify field work to be  !

I dcne by qualified technicians and are not incorporated as part of the permanent plant reccrds. The applicant produced documentation and descriptions of tagging procedures to support the start-up engineer's

statements. ,

2.1.3.3 Occument Review. The review of the qualification ,

2b33 revealec that operability was adoressed by a comb,1 nation cocume'nts .

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! of tests, analyses, and plant cperating experience. Minor discrepancies in .

the PVCRT Icng form were clarif,ted by examining the system drawing (FSAR i

{

! Figure 6.3-12) anc equipment data sheets. The Icw fundarantal frequency (9 Hz) prompted a question concerning oynamic amplification. The applicant presentec results of a dynamic analysis of the assembly that showed that the predicted stresses and deflections were acceptable. The analysis

. predictec some rutbing of the motor against the cover plate, hewever the 1

loacs assumed in the analysis clearly enveloped the design loads. The

! start-up engineer explained that the RHR pumps had been in cperation for l much of the time between December 1984 and April 1985 to support system l' flush tests. The PVORT's review of the vendor test results and discussions i with the apolicant provideo further confidence that this component will

! function as requirec. .

Since the RHR pure is a ceep craf t pump, the applicant's esponse te IE Bulleti(79-15 " Deep Draf t pumo Oaficiencies" was reviewec. The l!

t a:clicant cescriceo nis crocacures for monitoring the status of t.se i

i l 11

l l

equipment, which is used to obtain " operating signatures" of the

, equipment. A preventive maintenance program is used to detect f ailure l

trends and to recommend changes to the maintenance schedule. These
activities are performed in adoition to the code-required inservice test -

4 and inspection procedures. The applicant compared his methods of comonstrating ceep draft pump operability with the NRC's suggested ~

1 guidelines. A summary of this discussion is presented in Section 2.3.2 of i

j tnis report, j

2.1.3.4 Findinos.. No specific operability cor.cerns remained af ter i

the evaluation of this component.

2.1.4 High pressure Coolant Injection Turbine Stop Valve, IFV-4880

( Audit Status: Closed) 2.1.4.1 Comconent Descriotion. This component is a 10-inch p. lug i

valve manuf actured by Schutte and Koerting (Model 69-XC-103) which is operated by a hydraalic actuator msnufactured by Miller Fluid Power I (ModelJ-53). The valve is located in the Reactor Building at the 54-f t

.: level . It is normally closed in the standby moce. The safety function of

+ the valva is to auto-ocen upon receipt of either a reactor low water it.t' or hign crywell pressure signal. The valve is auto-trippeo closed upon j receipt of a turbine / system protection signal. The valve is cesigned to h f ait closed, which is the f ail safe position.

3 i

l 2.1.4.2 Component Walkdown. The walkdown of tnis component revealed i

one ancmaly that was eventually resolveo prior to the close of the aucit; namely, the steam seal leakoff piping spool between the turoine stop valve anc the turbine upper half wneel case was found to be removed ano untagged. Upon questioning, the applicant explaineo that the spool piece hao oeen removed to gain access to the HPCI turbine ortven oil purrp for .

cleaning and Inspection. Tne app 1'icant provided the appropriate j documentation demonstrating his intent to reconnect the spool piece.

)

Regarcing tne apparent lack of any identification tag on the spcol piece, i tne applicant explainec that tne system turnover exception items are j managec in a closed loco f asnien. Each task is assignec a unique work

! l 12

! I i

order numoer which is recorced on a system turnover exception list. This tas( must be complete and verified oefore it is removed frcm the list. A il icose parts are requireo to be tagged or etched for identification. It was noted that the piping spool was etched. This discussion adequately resolved this concern.

2.l.4.3 Occument Review. The review of the qualification accuments34-40 revealea that operability was aodressed by a combination of tests and analyses. The applicant further explained that the stop valve was considered to be qualified oy virtue of the qualification of the HPCI turbine assemoly. See Section 2.1.2 for an evaluation of the HPCI booster pump and turbine. The documentation for the turbine stop valve was reviewed ano found to be adequate. Briefly, the HPCI turbine assembly was subjected to a oynamic qualification test program that consisted of single-axis resonance search tests, biaxial random multifrecuency SRV yibraticn aging simulation, seismic simulation, anc t.0CA vibraticn simulation. The turoine assembly was supplied with both steam and electrical power and was operated ano man'itored during the vioration testing. Functional tests were performed prior to and after the seismic test program. The calculated stresses and displacements were found to be accepta31e. A no-loac run test demonstrated that the oil pressure tu operste the pilot relay valve and hydraulic cylincer was acequate. Opening time for the stop valve was measured to be 24.5 seconds compared to the allowable range of 20 to 30 secends. The environmental qualification rescrt for the stop valve recommended a 5 year replacement of the hydraulic cylinder seals.

2.1.4.4 F ind ino s. No specific operability concerns remained af ter the evaluation of this cceponent.

2.2 Balance of plant (BOP) Comconents .

l 2.2.1 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pumo, IAp-401, ( Audit Statn.: Closed 1 2.2.1.1 Cce:enent Jes:ristien. Tnis c:ncocent is a heri: ental

entrifugal aume w n an electric motor criver, betn manufacturec by C ane 13 l

_ . - _ _.. _ . _ - . . - - . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _-~ _ ._ . ___ _ . - . .. . _ _ _ .

T 1

Co. (Model G3-3K-751H-IS) and assembled as a sealed unit on a common j

shaft. The pump is part of,the Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer j- System and is located in the Auxiliary Building at the 54-ft level. The j . pump is nor' m ally in stanoby. Its safety function is to transfer fuel oil

  • l from the fuel oil storage tank to the diesel day tank to ensure that the j oiesel has an adequate supply of fuel for extended operation. The transfer -

f , ump p is intermittently actuated on a diesel fuel day tank low level signal, l which occurs as a result of diesel generator fuel oil consumption. The diesel generator, and therefore the fuel oil transfer pump, are required j for loss of power or loss of coolant accidents. .

i

! 2.2.1.2 Component Walkdown. The walkdown of this cogonent aid not f reveal any operability concerns. It appeared that installation of the pump l

} and associated equipment was complete, with the exception cf the equipment f ioentification tag, and that the equipment hac been installed in a manner j that would f acilitate easy operation. The applicant discussed the name tag ,

l program anc demonstrated that completion of this program will accress the

} . missing tag. Therefore, this oversight is not considered to b'e a concern. l l

i . 2.2.1.3 Document Review. The pv0RT's review of the qualification documentation" revealed that operacility was addressed by a j combination of shoo tests and analysis. The motor was seismically

! qualified by testing ano then the pump end motor were qualified as a unit j by analysis. The review identified one concern; namely, the response

! spectra used for seismte qualification was changed. During the initial l equipment qualification, a zero period acceleration (IPA) of 0.2 g was utilizeo, newever, later t:1e ZpA was changeo to 0.25 g. It was not clear why this change was mace. The applicant explained that the original

{

seismic qualification calculations were mace based on the construction of 4

two osants at the Hope Creek complex. One of the plants was cancelled, thus affecting the seismic calculaticns. To correct for the cancellattor .

j of Unit 2, tne ZPA was increased to 0.25 g and applicant reverified the l equipment qualificatien.

i i

1 3CP Reference, see Secticn 5.

I

  • i 14 l

i i

i f

u____.__.____-__._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

i ,

t Review of the equipment qualification reocrts, the operating anc

maintenance manuals, certified flow curves, hyoraulic test ano certificate of conformance r,eport, operating test procecures and inservice test proce3ures revealed that these cocuments acequately accress the operability of the fuel oil transfer pump.

2.2.1.4 Findings. No specific operability concerns remained after the evaluation of this component.

1 2.2.2 Station Service Water Pumo, IAP-502 (Audit Status: Closed pencing Resciution by the Acolicant.)

2.2.2.1 Cemoonent Descriction. This component is a single stage vertical (ceep craf t) turbine type pump manufactured by Hayward Tyler (Mocal 24VSN) wnich is driven by an 800 hp induction motor manufactured by General Electric (Mcdel SK6346XC127A). The component is part of the Station Service Water System and is located in the Intake Structure / Pump Rocm at the 93-ft level. There are two pumps in two reduncant loops; one pump per loop is operating ano the other is in standby during normal operation. Tne pump's safety function is to start (if in stendby) and provice screened river water to various system heat excitangers during the shutccwn cooling mcde.

2.2.2.2 Cy conent kalkocwn. During tne walkdown of this cceponent, t significant operability concern was noted which requires resolution by the applicant.

The service water pump is designed to accept luorication water from i the service water pump disenarge header. Two 50% capacity cyclone separators are used to filter silt particles frcm this water and ensure clean ficw to the pumo bearings and stuffing box. However, during the .

walkdown it was noted that the applicant had installed a temporary

modification to typass tne separators and to switch the seal water supply

! f ec= service water to clean water off of the fire protection water system.

I I

15 4

, - . - -- ,n. - - - - - . - . . . - - - . . , - , , . - - . - , . - . . - - - , . - . - , - - r - - -- -

The system test engineer (STE) explained that during initial testing, tne '

punp's packing glano had filleo with silt, forming a clay which stopped the flo of lubricating water to tne packing and resulted in a packing failure. Further investigation revealed that one of the pump's cyclone -

separators (design is two in parallel) hac been blocked off for a system hydro. Upon ccmpletion of the hydro, some fibrous material was left in the separator's outlet piping. This resulted in a loss of flow, apparently due ,

to one of two causes: (1) the fiber material carried into the packing gland thus cutting off flow from both cyclone separators or, (2) the fiber material remained in place anc the one remaining operable separator could not remove sufficient silt.

The STE further explainea that when the packing failure occurred the pressure instrument downstream of the cyclone separators dic not provide an alarm. The only initial inoication of a problem was a noticeable reoucticn in leak-off flow from the packing gland, and the fact 'that the packing glanc was hot to the touch. This incicent prompted tne PVCRT to pose the folicwing questions to the applicant:

1. Do you know precisely what caused tne loss of cooling water flow?
2. Is the present cyclone separator design adequate to ensure that silt is not a problem?
3. Is the present pump instrumentation adequate to alert operators to an impending pump failure?

The applicant could not provice an answer to tnese questions prior to the close of tne aucit out aid ccmmit to resolve the issue prior to fuel load.

2.2.2.3 Cccurent Review. The review of the qualification I

cocuments incicated that qualification of this component was accressed oy a comoinaticn cf tests and analyses. An item of particular interest aas 15 i

discovered in the Bechtel purchase specifications to the vencor (Haywarc Tyler). This docueent specifically arought to Hayward Tyler's attention that a " severe silting problem" exists at the site and that they (Tyler) nave the responsibility to ensure that the pump's cyclone separators have the proper capacity / rating.

, The applicant cid supply the two start-up deviation reports (SORS) that were generated as a result of the failed packing incident. A review of these documents (SDR No. 346 anc 351, 2 pages) verified most of the STE

. explanation of the incident and confirmed that the applicant is awIre that ,

' he nas potential design problems.

2.2.2.4 Findings. Except for the acequacy of the pump's cyclone separator anc instrumentation design mentioned in Section 2.2.2.2, no other specific operability concerns resulted from the evaluation of tnis component.

,2.2.3 Torus Water Cleanuo Isolation Valve, lHV a6EO, (Audit Status: Closed) 2.2.3.1 Comconent Descriotien. This compcnent is a 6-inch gate valve manufacturec by the Anchor / Darling Valve Co. (Model numcer not assignec) wnich is operated by a motor actuator manufactured by the Limitorque '

Corporation (Mcdel SMS-000). The component is part of the Suppression Pool / Torus Water Cleanup System and is loc;ced in the Reactor Building at the 55-ft 3-in level. Its safety function is to close on a containment isolaticn signal, if tne system is in operation.

2.2.3.2 Component Walkcown. The walkdown of this component led to one concern involving the vertical pipe supports on either sice of tne valve. The downstream supports were constructed of dimensionally smaller enannel iron than was tne upstream support. When questioneo about tnis,

, the applicant provideo the PVORT with the Torus Water Cleanup System pice sue: ort crawings tnat verifiec the as-tuilt conficuratien.

17 1

i i

~.

2.2.3.3 Occument Review. The review of the qualification documents 10-15 indicated that qualification of this congonent was accressed oy a combination of tests and analyses. Values for the component design pressure and the system accident pressure were discovered to be in error on the long form. Examination of the specific valve data sheet ,

resolved the apparent discrepancies.

While reviewing Preoperational Precedure.EE-1, it was noted that the valve (suction valve to the Torus Water Cleanup System' pump) was not tested to verify closure under rated flow conditions. The valve is stroked ana .

timed under no flow conditions. However, there is an interlock between the valve and the pump that trips the pump whenever the valve starts to close.

Given that this interlock functions, which is also verified by procecure EE-1, valve 1HV-4680 will never be required to close unde- flow conoitions. The PVORT therefore concludes that the preoperational test procecure for this valve is acequate as written.

2.2.3.4 Fincings. No specific operability concerns remained after the evaluation of this cumponent. - ,

2.2;4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Coolino Return Isolation Valve, lHV-F0lSA (Audit Status: Closed) 2.2.4.1 Comoonent Descriotion. This component consists of a 12-inch globe valve manufacturec by the Anchor Darling Valve Company (mocal number not assignea) which is operated by a motor actuator manufactured by Limitorque (Model SMB 4-150). Valve F015A is the outbcard containment isolation valve in the shutdown ecoling return line. It is located in the

.teactor Building at the 106-ft level. The valve is normally closed for ccntainment isolation anc is coened for ncrmal shutdown cooling. The valve must close on receipt cf an isolation signal. Following an accicent event .

wnen tne reactor pressure crops belcw 100 psig, the valve must be capable of opening to previce snutccwn cooling. ,

IS l

_- - . -= - _ - . ..

2.2.4.2 Comcenent Walkcown. The walkdown of the component revealed two biceking tags on the handwneel that required clarification. The start-up engineer explained that these tags are used to protect personnel and equipment from potentially harmful construction and testing conoitions. All tags must be removed by the originator before operation of

! tne component is permitted.

2.2.4.3 Doct: ment Review. The review of the qualification documents M-22 revealeo that operability was accressed by a comoination of tests, analyses, and qualification by similarity. Seismic tests were performeo on the actuator using single axis input which was justified by

the lack of cross-coupling discoverea during the resonance search.

j Furthermore, it was demonstratec that the actuator was cculd withstand test loads of 7 g's comparea to the design loading of 0.9 g. The test load of 7 g's was usec as a part of:a generic qualification procedure to qualify a

, family of actuators that coulc De subjected to hydrodynamic conoitions.

l However, nycredynamic loads are not applicable for valve 1HV-F015A'since it lies outsica of containment.

It was found that all vencor tests were completed satis'actorily including hycrostatic, seat leakage,and valve cycling. In adoition, the preoperational test procedures were reviewed. They indicated that the valve will be tested against full flow conditions.

e j There were several anomalies on the PVORT long form that were

! clarified by 01scussion with the applicant or review of cocuments. Upon questioning, tne applicant correctea tne long form ano explained that an icentical valve assemoly rather than a prototype hao been satisfactorily pull tested at 1.84 g's. Also, it was noted tnat the environmental qualification report for the Limitorque actuator covered the family of similar actuators that snared tne same materials, design features, .

standards, ano manufacturing tolerances according to size. Tnis discussion satisfied the PVORT's concern involvino qualification by similarity.

19

__ _ , . -_ .. - . _ . _ ~_., ._ -_----__._, __ , - _ - . - .

1 2.2.4.4 Fincings. No specific cperability concerns remairec after the evaluation of this component. -

2.2.5 Safety Auxiliaries Cooling--Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Isolaticn Valve.1HV-2522B, ( Audit Status: Closeo) ,

2.2.5.1 Component Descriotion. This component is a 30-inch butterfly valve manufacturea by BIF (Mocel 0652-30) which is operated by a hydraulic actuator manufactured by Paul Munroe Hydraulic Inc. (Model VOQ625H). Tne coniponent is an isolation valve between the Safety and Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Systems (SACS, TACS). and is located in the Reactor Building at the 125-ft level. The safety function of the valve is to close on a LOCA/ LOP signal to isolate SACS Icop B from SACS loop A and TACS.

2.2.5.2 Conconent Walkdown. The walkdown of this component revealed two mino.- concerns. A tag on a vent cover stated that a seal inside the vent cap snoula be removec prior to operating the valve. The system hycro test hac ceen performec prior to tne audit so it was assumea the valve nac been operatea without removing the seal. The system test engineer (STE) explained that the valve had not been operated ucing the component's 7

hyaraulic actuator but nad instead been opened using a hand pump. In addition ne explained that the system was still under the jurisdiction of the start-up test organization. This information resolved the PVORT's second concern, wnich was that the lower flange gasket showed signs of having leaked during the hycro. The STE explained that the gasket would be removec and the flange tightenea prior to system turn over. He orovidea documentation demonstrating that work on the system was still in progress.

2.2.5.3 Document Review. The review of the qualification 23-28 indicatec that qualification of this component was documents addresse:d by a comoination of tests and analyses. A review of the component's design specifications revealed that tne capacity of the pressure accumulator on the hydraulic actuator was such that the valve ,

could only oe full stroseo twice using the accralator. The PVCRT i

therefere askea the applicant wnat wcula hapoen if tne valve shoulc close .

20 l

automatically (using the accumulater) followed by an cperation personnel inadvertently reopening the valve (again using tne accumulator). At this point the valve ,should be reclosed but the pressure witnin the accumulator is expendec. The applicant explained that the possibility of this occurrence had been analyzed as part of their response to IE Bulletin 80-06 "ESF Reset Controls" and was not found to be a problem due to Hope Creek's

' interlock circuitry.

While reviewing the hyoraulic fluid specifications for tne actuator, a general question was posec concerning the radiation qualification of lubricants and fluids. The applicant responded by stating that they were presently working with their luoricant supplier (EXXON) to ensure that qualified lubricants and fluids would be specified for applicable components.

2.2.5.4 F ind inos. No specific operability concerns remained after the evaluation of this component. .

2.2.6 Feecwater Isolation Valve, IAE-V007, ( Audit Status: Closeo) 2.2.6.1 Cerconent Descriotion. This component is, a 24-inch swing check valve manufactured oy the Anchor Darling Valve Co. (Model number not assignec,S/N-E6162-58-1). The component is part of the Feecwater System anc is located inside the crywell at the ll3-ft level. The valve's safety function is to close, providing containment isolation, whenever feedwater ficw is insufficient to overcome reactor pressure.

2.2.6.2 Comoonent Walkdoan. No operability concerns resultea from tne walkcown of tnis component.

2.2.6.3 Dccument Review. The review of the qualification .

29-30 indicated tnat qualification of this component was cocuments accressed oy a combination of test and analyses. During tnis review, it was learnec that this valve hac been ir.cluded in Mcpe Creek's Mecnanical Etui: ment Qualificaticn pr: gram, which evaluates tne non-metallic 21

subcomponents of all Class I components that are located in a harsn environment. Tne results of this program are factored into the applicant's maintenance, surveillance, and spare parts programs. The applicant also ,

indicatec that this program would probably be expanded at a later cate to incluce all mechanical equipment important to safety including those .

located in a mild environment. .

The document package for this component was complete even though this was one of the surprise components and the applicant had had only a few days t'o prepare the package. This inoicates that the applicant can retrieve information from his central files in a manner that is both timely and complete.

2 .'2. 6.4 Finoings. No specific operability concerns remained after the evaluation of this component.

2.3 Other Ecuicment Oualification Issues This section summarizes the status of other issues relating to pump

'and valve operability that were accressed by the PVORT. The following ciscussions ccroined with the oetailed review of selected equipment provice accitional basis for PVCRT's conclusions concerning the applicant's overall program.

2.3.1 Safety Evaluation Recort (SER) Items (Status: Closed)

The PVORT reviewed the Hope Creek FSAR and formulated questions and concerns that appeared in the preliminary SER dated February 16, 1984 At that time the PVORT requested the applicant to provide acditional information in order to better clarify his program as well as to detect and aooress any major deficiencies. Table 2 summarizes the status of the six .

SER items. Three of these items (1, 2, and 4) were addressed acequately by 22 i

l

the applicant in a response dated August 20, 1984*. In this letter, the applicant committeo to provide the requested information in the form of new or amended tables and expanded discussion in the appropriate sections of the FSAR. The remaining three items (3, 5, and 6) were acdressed during the site audit May 7 to 10,1985.

Items 3, 5, and 6 were resolved during the on-site audit. Regarding item 3, the applicant committed to provice new tables and text in his forthcoming Amendment 11 to the FSAR, a draft copy of which was available to the PVORT for review. The FSAR Amendment 11 is schedaled for release in July 1985. Regarcing item 5, the applicant stated that he did not use the guidelines of the craft standards. The applicant oid, however, state that he would evaluate tnese standards when they were approved. It is the PVORT's belief that Hope Creek's pumps and valves do meet the requirements of the coces and standards tnat were in effect at the time of purchase and that the applicant's reluctance to review draft standarcs oces not constitute a licensing issue. Regarcing item 6, the information requested is indirectly referenced in FSAR Chapter 14 (Start-up Testing) and Chapter 16 (Plant Technical Specification ). The applicant explained that the extent of full flow tests is difficult to describe in general terms, .

anc must be examined on a cocoonent level. Tne PVORT reviewed the precperational test procedures for selected components within the context of tne audit. The applicant further described inservice test (IST) activities that cover the flow test concerns. Although the IST procedures were unavailaole for review, the applicant stated that they will comply witn the ASME Section XI requirements and will be referenced in the FSAR.

In summary, the PVORT believes that the applicant has, by way of appropriate commitments ano clarifications, acequately addressed all six SER items as they relate to pucp anc valve operability.

  • Letter from R. L. Mitti, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance anc Regulation, Fublic Service Electric and Gas Company, to A. Scnwencer, Cnief, Licensing 3rar.ch 2, Division of Licensing, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissicn, Hace Creek Generatino Station, Oraft Safety Evaluatien Recort Coen
  • tan Status, Augus; 10,.i954 23

f TABLE 2. STATUS OF SER ITEMS FOR PUMP AND VALVE OPERABILITY ASSURANCE SER Itemsa ResSIuEion Status

1. There should be a list of equipment Satisf actory Closed b types which clearly shows the methods used for qualification. This list -

snguld also address which standards are met, in particular those citeo in SRP 3.10.

2. Clarification of how aging was in- Satisf actory Closedb corporated in the qualification pru-cess should be contained in the FSAR.

In addition, the applicant should

commit to establish a maintenance and surveillance program to maintain
equipment in a qualified status tnroughout tne life of the plant.

The criteria for the maintenance and surveillance program should be con-tained in the FSAR.

3. Identify in the FSAR which valves Satisf actory ClosedC .

will be subjected to frequencies higner than 33 Hz (from hydrodynamic loads) and discuss the impact of .

tnese dynamic loads on the valve qualification and performance.

4. The FSAR shoulo be amended to clearly Satisfactory ' Closed 0 sncw the loacs ano conditions ccn-sicered in the qualification of safety related pumps and valves.
5. The extent to wnich draf t standards Satisfactory Closedc ANSI /ASME QNPE-1 (N551.1), QNPE-2 (N551.2) QNPE-3 (N551.3), QNPE-4 (N555.4) and N41.6 and issuec stan-4 dard ANSI /ASME 3.16.41 are used needs
to te clearly stated in tne FSAR. In accition, the aaplicant's position with respect to Regulatory Guice 1.148 must also ce indicated in the FSAR. .

2a

TABLE 2. (continued)

SER Itemsa gej8IdE9dn Status

6. The FSAR should be amended to show Satisfactory ClosedC the extent to which operational test-ing is being used to meet the requirements of SRP Section 3.10.

The extent to which operational testing is perfor ed at full flow and temperature conditions should be shewn,

a. The Hope Creek SER items for pump and valve operability assurance were identifiec in an earlier SER dated February 16, 1984.
b. This item was acequately resolved based on information suomitted by tne applicant in a letter dateo August 20, 1984.
c. This item was adequately resolved cased on information revieweo by the staff during the site audit May 7-10, 1985. The applicant ccmmitted to close out this item in a manner and time frame that is acceptable to the staff.

a

.e 25

- _, , - , e-- . - -,

i 2.3.2 Long Term Ooerability of Deeo Oraft puros, (Status: Closed) i IE Bulletin 79-15 was issued July 11, 1979 as the result of ,

incustry-wide problems associated with the long term operation of deep draf t pumps. P lants uncer construction were required to identify such .

pumps, provide operating history, and verify the pump's ability to operate j without incurring vibration-innucec problems. At the time of the bulletin, f

Hope Creek was in a position only to identify the types of pumps used, since operating nistory was unavailable. As -a followup to their original response, the PVORT askea the applicant to review and compare his deep draft pum qualification program to the NRC's suggested guidelines contained in a memoranoum regarding the Licensing Review Group-II Issue 9-RSB. The applicant stated that his vibration analysis program is sophisticated enough to encompass the extent of these guidelines. For all rotating equipment at Hope Creek, the design parameters will be compared against specific baseline vibration signatures to detect abnormalities. -

The instrumentation is permanently installed on equipment larger than 50 hp to ensure consistent parametric traces. Readings will be taken on a schecule that, at a minimum, is concurrent with Hope Creek's voluntary preventive maintenance program and the ASME code required IST pengram.

Long term operacility (over 40 nours continuous run) has alreacy been achieved for two of four service water pumps, two of four core spray pumps, anc two of four RHR pumps. The remaining pumps will be similarly operated ,

for routine system flush tests and start-up activities prior to fuel load.

In summary, the pVCRT Delleves that tne program descriced by the applicant meets the intent of the NRC's suggested guidelines for long term operaoility of ceep craft pumps.

i 2.3.3 1molementation of tne Overall Program. (Status: Closed pending Resolutien by Acolicant)

The pV0"'s evaluation of the applicant's overall q1alification program was based on many factors, including the FSAR review, resolution of .

SER items, pre-audit corresponcence, and the on-site review of selected equ ipment. Anotner important factor was the follcw-up evaluatien of tne -

25 l

6

,- l l

l applicant's acministrative programs that are linkeo to equipment qualification. The PVORT evaluated these programs during the on-site aucit. This evaluation enaDied the PV0RT to gain a better perspective of tne programmatic scope anc implementation of the applicant's overall equipment qualification program. For example, the PVORT's questions concerning the equipment tags observed during the walkdown, resulted in a brief discussion of the applicant's tag management procedures and system turnover log. Similarly, the PVORT's concern about deep draft pump operability led to discussions of the applicant's vibration analysis program, in-service test procedures, preventive maintenance procedures, and qual'ity control program. Throughout the audit, it was apparent that the applicant's occument control system was sufficiently complete and organized to retrieve tne cocuments necessary to support these discussions. The programs mentionec aoove enhance the PVORT's confidence the applicant's overall program can ensure that all pumps and valves important to safety will operate as requirec for the life of the plant.

The PVORT's evaluation of the applicant's overall progra$1 was not entirely absent c'f qualification issuas, however. The PVORT did ioentify two generic issues that the applicant must resolve prior to fuel load.

Both issues were ciscussed with the applicant at the exit meeting and are presented below.

The staff requires that all equipment important to safety be procerly qualified orier to fuel load. However, the PVORT audit was concucted l months in advance of the expected fuel load cate before the applicant hac been able to qualify, test, and install all of his equipment. The applicant did provide evidence that the documentation and installaticn was complete for at least 85 percent of the Hope Creek equipment at the time of tne auc1t. The remaining 15 percent is schedulea to be completed prior to fuel load. The applicant is aware that tne MSIV tests are not scheduled to be complete until late Novemoer 1985, which is only a month or two before the schedulec fuel load cate of January 1986. In addition, at the time of the aucit, only 123 of 209 plant systems had oeen turned over and 31 of 134 creeperational tests hac ceen cerfcrmec.

27 r --  % v --w y-4-, y

Consequently, the first generic issue requires the applicant to confirm that the original loads usec in the tests / analysis to cualify pumps anc valves important to safety are not exceeded by any new loaos, such as those imposed by a LOCA (hydrocynamic loads) or as-built conditions. If a new lead exceeds that originally usea, the impact of the new load on the '

qualification of the equipment must be assesseo and reported to the NRC prior to fuel loac.

Tne second generic issue, wnich the applicant must confirm, is that all pumps and valves .important to safety are properly qualified prior to fuel loaa. Complete qualification incluces, but is not limited to, confirmation that (a) the associated occumentation is complete and readily accessible, (b) the equipment is properly installed, and (c) the apprcpriate preoperational tests and administrative procedures have been performed as required.

Section 3 summarizes the two generic issues mentionec acove as well as the two specific concerns mentionec in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.2 and presents the applicant's ecmmitments to resolve these concerns.

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3. CONCLUSION The Equipment Qualification personnel for Hope Creek are dealing with the equipment qualification issue in a positive manner. The PVORT has

'reacheo this conclusion because the applicant has: (a) provided adequate documentation to demonstrate qualification of a representative sample of purgs and valves important to safety, ;b) established administrative, programs to determine, monitor, and maintain equipment operability for the life of the plant, (c) demonstrated an adequate central file system by the timely retrieval of information requested by the staff, (d) demonstrated that he corresponds closely with the NSSS venoor, architect-engineer, and equiprent suppliers concerning details of construction, design, maintenance, utility policy, and plant operation, and (e) cemonstrated overall accountability by committing the appropriate personnel to implement tnese policies and programs.

Basea on the results of the on-site auoit, the PVORT ccncluces that an appropriate Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program has been cefinec and is being implemented at Hcpe Creek. The continued implementatinn of this program should provice adequate assurance that all pumps ano valves impcrtant to safety will perform their safety-related functions as required for the life of the plant.

Table'3 presants a summary of the audit results. By the close of the on-site auoit, all but two specific and two generic concerns had been resolvec. These ccncerns were icentified to the applicant and he committed to resolve them prior to fuel load. The following is a list of all unresolved pump and valve operability concerns ano the applicant's commitments:

1. Concern--At the time of the audit, the HPCI turbine

, icentification incluoing manufacturer nameplate information had been movec to another ccmpartment with the turbine controller to meet environmental considerations.

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a e t ' - -- - ~ - - - - _ w --- - --- e

I Am t 3 SUMMMtv Of PW0sti Aubli * -

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' P lant 4.D.

htmal6er Dest r ipt lOn Saf eIf fl ncIlves fIINjings Rtsolutlons Status- llegark s IAP-?u6 (NMS) Core spray punge Supply emergency ct.slin.j Closedk Specit le concerns were resolveu water to reactor core uuring tese audit.

IUP-?ll(NMS) HPLI booster pump Enable IIPCI pump to supply Note

  • Noteb CeosedI the HPCI Turbine nameplate was emergency cooling water to found to be attacleed to the

, core control bos. The control bos had been relocated to a def ter-ent resos in order to meet enviroceental quallt lcation requirements.

IAP-202 (N % S) klR pump Supply emergency cooling Close# 5pecific cancerns were resolved water to reactor tyre during tne adit.

If v-48m) HPCI tuebine stop valve Open to supply steam to Closedk (h%%) ISPCI turbine IAP-401 (LMIP) Utesel fuel oil transfer Operate when required to Closedk Specific concerns were resolved pump illi elesel fuel oil say during the audit.

tank ,

1AP 'a02 (DUP) Serske u.ter pung Supply coollag water to NoteC moted ClosedJ A failure of this component SA $. TALS ana RAC5 he.t . prior to the cate of the audst exchangers led to this finding.

lHV-46tdl(80r) Torus water cleanup 6-in. Close to provide contala- Closed Specific concerns were resolveu gatt valve ment isolation

  • during tne atuelt.

Ittv-I0lSA illa sleuteumes cooling Close to provide contala- Closedk Specific concerns were resolved

( tior) 12-in. glube valve ment isolation /open aster curing (ne audit.

.eccident to provide sleut-do.se coollag Ivtl-n228 SAC 5-1ACS 30-in. Close to isolate SACS Closedk Specific concerns were resolved (Blir) butterfly valve loop B free loup A aM IAC$ during the audit.

I At -W(Wil 24 In. Iceslutter cheth Close to provide contain. Clnsed Specific concerns were resolveu (cur) valve ment isoh tle7 during tree aualt.

  • /

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IAm t 3 (tontinued)

P lant I .D.

nieneer Descr igat ion Safety functinn findings flesolutions .. St atus Ilmark s ALL PLMPh AND VALVE 5 operate as required during Note'*9 Isote ,h f

Closed I flone lit %IANI 10 SAttlY the life of the plant under normal and accident condit ions

a. W ummeplate date was of f laco to the llPCI turtsine.
h. Ihe applicant shall co+ firm that nameplate data is properly 4tilmed to the itPCI turbine.

l t.

Inc pplicant nas not dammstrated that the design of tne service esater pumps cyclone separators or lustrumentation system is euequate, u.

The applicant steell analyse this event to determine the precise cause of the failure and confirm that the service wattr pumps: (1) can pes i e i I..to=>= .Enelr saf ety f unction given the present cyclone separatur system design asus (t) are ath:quately lustrism nted tu detect leveeusing c.

The applicant has not verfiled that all new loads are enveloped by those loads originally used to quellfy the equipment, t.

usedThe applicant to tiualif y the shall confires that none of the new loads applicable to pumps and valves leportant to safety exceed those loads originally equipment. ,

g. the applicant has not completed the qualification of all pumps and valves leportant to safety,
h. lhe applicant shall confirm that all pumps and valves leportant to safety are quellfled prior to fuel load.
i. The quellfication status is considered " closed," peeuling completion of resolutions b, f and h.

J. The qualification status is considered " closed

  • pending completion of resolutions d, f and h.
h. the quallfIcation status is considered " closed" pending completion of resolutions f and h.

I .

Comitment--The applicant shall confirm that the turbine is properly foentified including affixing the manufacturer nameplate information physically to the HPCI turbine itself. ,

, 2. Concern--The Service Water Pump (AP-502) was operated with a .

blocked cyclone separator, which resulted in a loss of cooling r water that was not detected by the available instrumentation. _

Comitment--By July 1985, the applicant will (a) analyze the event to oetermine the precise cause of failure, (b) oemonstrate that the service water pumps can perform their safety-related funct, ion given tne present cyclone ' separator system design and (c) provide assurance that the present service water instrumentation h adequate to detect impending failures of the service water pumps. -

3. Concern--At the time of the aucit all construction, installation, I anc documentation was not complete. ,

I- Comitment--The applicant will, prior to fuel load, provide written confirmation that the original loads used in tests or

~

analyses to qualify pumps and valves important to safety are not exceeded by any new loads, such as those imposed by a LOCA (hydrodynamic loads) or as-built conditions.

4. Concern--At the time of the audit all pumps and valves important to safety were not qualified and approved by the applicant.

Comitment--The applicant will, prior to fuel load, provide written confirmation enat all pumps anc valves in.portant to safety are properly qualifico anc installeo.

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4. REFERENCES (NSSS COMPONENTS)a REACTCR CORE SPRAY PUMP, LAP-206
l. General Electric Company, Huce Creek Environmental Qualification Reoort, NEDC 30737.
2. Ingersoll-Rand, Core Soray Pumo Design Report, VPF 3308-66-1.
3. Ingersoll-Rand, Pumo Vendor Instruction Manual, VPF 2981-172-3.

4 General Electric Company, Hoce Creek CS Pumo and Motor Operability Assurance Analysis, ORF No. E21-00029.

5. General Electric Company, Report of Routine Test Induction Motor, ,

3 VPF 3002-98-1.

6. General Electric Company, Report of Routine Test Induction Motor, VPF 3002-78-1. .
7. General Electric Company, Reoort of Routine Test Induction Motor, VPF 3002-77-1.

I 8. Ingersoll-Ranc, Report of Performance Test for Pumo $7N 0273115,

.VPF 3308-152-1.

3

9. . General Electric Company, Core Soray Motor Purchase Spec. Data Sheet, 21A1734AC Rev. 4. ,
10. Ingersoll-Rand, Vertical Motor Data Read. from Pumo Vendor, '

VPF 3308-163-1.

~

11. Ingersoll-Rand, Pumo Vender Instruction Manual, VPF 3308-154-1.

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION BOOSTER PUMP,10P-217

12. General Electric Company, Design Record File, E41-00030.

! 13. Byron Jackson Pump Division, Seismic Analysis, VPF No. 3076-267-1.

14 NEB 0 General Electric Company, Purchase Soecification Data Sheet, 21A92438T Rev. 4.

15. NE30 General Electric Company, P&ID, 761E230AC Rev 9.
16. NEB 0 General Electric Company, Process Diagram, 761E270AC Rev. a. ,
17. Byron Jackson Pump Division, Hydrostat Test Procedures, VPF No. 3076-28-1.

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I 4 18. Byron Jackson Pump Division, Hyorestat Test Procecure, VPF No. 3076-29-1.

19. Byron Jackson Purp Division, Performance Test Procedure, VPF No. 3076-221-1. -

3 20. Byron Jackson Pump Division, Performance Test Procedure, VPF

  • No. 3076-222-1.
21. Byron Jackson Pump Division, Booster Pune Performance Test Data, VPF No. 3076-105-1. ,
22. General Electric Company, Mechanical Equipment Environmental Oualification Report, NEDC-30661.
23. Byron Jackson Pump Division, Outline Drawing, VPF No. 3076-032-6.

! 24. General Electri: Company, Design Recoro File, E41-00030-1.

RESIGUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP, IAP-202

25. General Electric Company, Hope Creek Environmental Qualification Report, NECC 30737.
26. Ingersoll-Rano, RhR Pump Design Report, VPF 3307-42-1.
27. Ingersoll-Ranc, Pump Vendor Instruction Manual, VPF 2993-417-2. '
28. General Electric Company, Hoce Creek RHR Purnp ano Motor Operability Assurance Analysis, DRF No. E12-00047.
29. - General Electric Company, Report of Routine Test Incuction Motor,
VPF 3292-11-1.
30. General Electric Company, Recort of Routine Test Induction Motor, VPF 3292-5-1.

l 31. Ingersoll-Rano, Recort of Performance Test for Pumo S/N 037322 j VPF 3307-138-1.

i

, 32. General Electric Company, RHR Motor Purchase Spec. Data Sheet, l 21A1734AB Rev. 4.

33. Ingersoll-Rano, Punc Vendor Instruction Manual, VPF 3307-83-2.

l HIGH PRESSURE CCOLANT INJECTION TURSINE STOP VALVE. IFV JS80

! 34. Terry Corporation, Turoine Instruction Manual, Section 15-M-1, VPF 2763-188. ,

35. General Electric Co: pany, HPCI System Design Saec and Data Sheet HPC:

) Suecorts RCIC informatien, 25623; ano -M. .

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36. General Electric Company, RCIC Turoine Functional Performance Recuirements.
37. Terry Corporation, Wyle Lacoratories, General Electric Comoany, Environmental Oualification Recort for the HPCI Turbine, NECE-30122.
38. Terry Cceparation, HPCI Turbine OC Records Binder.
39. General Electric Company, Turbine Steam Auxiliary Drive (HPCI),

,21A9203.

40. Terry Corporation, seismic Qualification, EL-20474 Rev 5.

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a. This list of references is not a complete list of those documents reviewed by the PVORT during the audit. The references listed are those 1 sup0 lied by tne aDolicant on the ccmconent long ferm. Each component cccument file c:ntains aeditional cecueents relatec to equipment qualifica:1cn. The PVCRT reviewec tnose documents from each file tnat pertainec to :na pumo anc valve cperacility assurance program.

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5. REFERENCES (BOP COMP 0NENTS)a DIESEL FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP, IAP 401 *
1. Cherpung Division, Crane Company, Qualification of IE Motors, A-19701. -
2. Chempump Division, Crane Company, Code Design and Seismic Analysis, ,

A-18857.

3. Champump Division, Crane Conpany, O&M Manual.

' 4 Chempump Division, Crane Corgany,' Certified Flow Curve, A-74335.

4

5. Chempump Division, Crane Company, Hydraulic Test and Certificate of Conformance. ,

STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP, 1AP-502 1

6. Haywarc Tyler, Seismic Analysis of Vertical Pumo--Mocel 24 VSN, ME-651.
7. Haywaro Tyler, Pump Performance Test Results, 7308-5063.
8. General Electric Qualification Recort--General Electric Vertical y Inouction Motors, 491HA911.

l 9. C. K. Mcdonald, Seismic Stress Analysis of 800 H-P Vertical Motor, 4

.' ME-725.

TORUS WATER CLEANUP ISOLATION VALVE,1HV-4680

10. Anamet Las Inc. for Anchor / Darling Valve Co., Seismic Cat. I Analysis Recort of 6 in.-150 lb. C. S. Gate Valve, Anamet Lao No. 82.050.

! 11. Limitorque Corporation, Hydecoynamic vibration Testing, Limitorque-Report No. 3-0115.

1

12. Anchcr/ Darling Valve Co., Functional Testing Procedure and Addendum Rev. A., Ancnor/ Darling Sto. No. EP5-lG5.
13. Anchor / Darling Valve Co., Static Seismic Testing--Anchor / Darling.
14. Limitorque Corporation, BWR Oualification Reoort--Containment Chamber Service, 600 76A Rev. B.
15. Anchcr/ Darling Valve Co., Hyorostatic Shell Test ano Other Tests, E6161-127-1. ,
16. Anaret Lab. for Anchor / Darling Valve Co., Class ! Nuclear Design Report of 12 in.-900 lb. C. S. Gloce Valves w/5MB-4-150 M.O., Anamet '

Lac. Report No. 19.061.

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RHR SHUTOOWN C0 CLING ISOLATION VALVE, lHV-F015A

17. Limitorque Corporation, Hydredynamic Vibraticn Testing, Limitorque Rep. No. B-0115.
18. Ancnor/ Darling Valve Co., Functional Testing Procedure and Accencum Rev. A, Anchor / Darling Rep. ho. EP5-lG5.
19. Anchor / Darling Valve Co., Static Seismic Test, Anchor / Darling Rep.

No. E6162.

\

20. Limitorque Corporation, BWR Oualification Report--Containment Chamcer Service, 600376A Rev. B.
21. Anchor / Darling Valve Co., Hyorostatic Shell Test and Other Tests, E6161-48-1.
22. Bechtel, Nuclear Gate GL, CK, 2-1/2 NPS anc larger--600 lb. ANSI i Rating Manual ano P.O.,10855 P-203 (Q) Rev.19.

4 SACS /TACS ISCLATION VALVE,1HV-2522B .

i 23. 'BIF, Seismic Analysis cf Butterfly Valve with PMH Actuator. Rev. O.

BIF Rep, h-toy 34 ecom i gev. o.

1 24 BIF, Wyle Lab, and Paul Munece, Seismic Analysis of Butterfly Valve witn P.WH Actuator, Rev. C (Oualification Report for Actuator), SIF

Rep. N-56934 Sco< 2 Rev. C.
25. BIF, Static Deflection Test Reoort, BIF Rep'. OED-650-220.

' 26. BIF, Static Deflection Test Procecure, BIF Procedure SDT-hcl Rev. D.

27. BIF/ Paul Munroe, Qualification Report for PF 86010 Actuator. Rev. C, BIF Rep. N-50934
28. BIF, Valve-Varicus Test Reoorts, N-50934-U.

i

! a. This list of references is not a complete list of those documents reviewec ey tne PVORT curing the atdit. The references listed are those

suppliec by the applicant on the component long form. Each component cocument file contains accitional cocuments related to equipment qualification. The PVCRT reviewee those documents from each file that I pertained tc :ne pump anc valve operacility assurance program.

l l

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.~ . __ . . _ , . - .

d FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE, IAE-V007

29. Anamet Lab. for Anchor / Darling Valve Co., Class 1 Nuclear Design Report of 24 in.-900 lb. C.S. Swing Check Valve, Anamet Lao.

No. 79.023. .

30. Bechtel Power Corporation, Mechanical Ecuicment Environmental '

Qualification Report, MEQ-1 Rev. O.

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, , , , , , , v = u. ... w .. :: r . . ..c. aa ~ ~ < os - . -. . --

hlfy Bl8UOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET EGG-EA-6901

.. . ,%c e.. ... ..u

.,,,s...,s. *6a'"""

Audit of the Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program for the Hope' Creek Generating Station , , , , , , , , , , ,,,,

September long

...r....o...u ..

r. ....

g C. Kido, C. F. Miller, H. M. Stremberg September 1985

, c ar . .ww .=; - e. - . **cm 'a* ** ' --" a EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, ID 83415 A6415, Project IV or. . ...  %. ..u.. - <.c ".a o*"**'

); Division of Engineering Technical Evaluation Report Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation , _ ,,,,, _ _

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 j , a se. .r . a.

..,.x,.

The Hope Creek Generating Station was audited May 7 to 10,1985 to j

determine the adequacy of their Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program.

I The results of this audit indicate that the applicant has established and is implementing a program that will track all pumps and valves important to -

safety from manufacture and in-shop testing through qualification, installation, '

testing, maintenance, and surveillance for the purpose of assuring continued cperability of these components over the life of the plant.

l

.. m .......... . ... . .uc... 2., .. ;;,.;g,.y -

Unlimited

, . n e... .. . .. u. . .c. , c.

r '..e se.

.....r............ Une1 ass 4e4ed

, r., _

Rf S$$$ $Af

. . ... 2. . 4 u 5 4 se.43 t

__ . _ __._ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ ___ __ _. - - . _ , _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ .

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