ML20204E339
| ML20204E339 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1999 |
| From: | Adensam E NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204E343 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9903250005 | |
| Download: ML20204E339 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES g,. M,.l j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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't WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 0001 g{n, f
NORTH ATLANTIC ENERGY SERVICE CORPORATION. ET AL.*
DOCKET NO. 50-443 SEABROOK STATION. UNIT NO.1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 60 License No. NPF-86 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment filed by the North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, et al. (the licensee), dated May 20,1998, as supplemented by letter dated January 28, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) thr,t the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
INorth Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (NAESCO) is authorized to act as agent for the:
North Atlantic Energy Corporation, Canal Electric Company, The Connecticut Light and Power Company, Great Bay Power Corporation, Hudson Light & Power Departmert Massachuset's Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, Montaup Electric Company, New Engiand Power Company, New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc., Taunton Municipa! Light Plant, The United Illuminating Company, and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical canstruction, operation and maintenance of the facility.
2 9903250005 990312 PDR ADOCK 05000443 P
. 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated ir the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating cicense No. NPF-86 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 60, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B are incorporated into Facility License No. NPF-86. NAESCO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Elinor G. Adensam, Director Project Directorate 1-2 1
Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attachinent: Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: March 12, 1999 L
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 60 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO, NPF-86 DOCKET NO. 50-443 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain verticallines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages have been provided.*
Remove Insert 3/4 3-27 3/4/3-27 3/4 3-28*
3/4/3-28*
3/4 3-29 3/4/3-29 i
3/4 3-30*
3/4/3-30*
i 83/43-1*
B 3/4 3-1*
B 3/4 3-2 B 3/4 3-2 B 3/4 3-2A i-I i
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3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATIQM BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATlQNREACTOR TRIP S Features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks e associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter (1) the monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, (3) sufficient redundancy is main-tained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance, and (4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.
The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.
integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the The assumptions used in the safety analyses.
maint?ined comparable to the original design standards.
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lance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrateT this capability.
Specified surveillance intervals and surveiliance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271, " Evaluation of Sur-veillance Frequencies and out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection In-strumentation System," and supplements to that report.
Surveillance intervals and out of service times were determined based on maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features instrumentation.
The NRC Safety Evaluation Reports for WCAP-10271 and its supplements and revisions were provided on February 21, 1985, February 22, 1989 and April 30, 1990.
The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints specified in Table 3.3-4 are the nominal values at which the bistables are set for each functional unit. A Setpoint is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as measured" Setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.
To accostaodate the instrument drift assumed to occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Setpoints have been specified in Table 3.3-4.
Opera-tion with $atpoints less conservative than the Trip Setpoint but within the Allowable Value is acceptable since an allowance has been made in the safety analysis to r. omodate this error. An optional provision has been included for deterni og the OPERA 81LITY of a channel when its Trip Setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value.
The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation tros the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other SEABROOK - UNIT 1 8 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 36. 60
/ S 1 0 1995
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INSTRUMENTATION j
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BASES 3/4 3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and the uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation.
In Equation 2.2-1.
Z + R S s TA. the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, and the "as measured" values of the errors are considered.
Z as specified in Table 3.3-4. in percent span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement.
TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in percent span: R or Rack Error is the "as measured" deviation. in the percent span, for the affected channel from the specified Trip Setpoint.
S or Sensor Error is either the "as measured" deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 3.3-4. in percent span, from the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation 2.2-1 allows for a sensor drift factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshold value for REPORTABLE EVENTS.
The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining all of the uncertainties in the channels.
Inherent to the determination of the Tri) Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties.
Sensor and racc instrumentation utilized in these channels are expected to be ca]able of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.
Racc drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met
% allowance.
Being that there is a small t.:atistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected.
Rack or sensor drift. in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.
I The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the Reactor trip and the Engineered Safety Features actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses.
No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.
Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, ovorlapping, or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.
Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either:
(1) in place, onsite, or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response time.
At the end of the injection phase of a LOCA. the RWST will be nearly empty.
Continued cooling must be pron ded by the ECCS to remove decay heat.
The source of water for the ECCS pumps is automatically switched to the containment recirculation sumps. The low head residual heat removal (RHR) pumps and containment spray pumps draw the water from the containment recirculation sumps, the RHR aumps pump the water through the RHR heat exchangers, irdect the water Jack into the RCS, and upon manual alignment supply the cotned water to the other ECCS pumps.
Switchover from the RWST to SEABROOK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3
- Amendment No. 34, 60
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TABLE 3.3-4 (Continuedl TABLE NOTATIONS
- Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Steam Line Pressure Low are t a 50 seconds and T s 5 seconds.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION shallerdurethatkhesetimeconstantsareadjustedtothesevalues.
2
- The time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High is greater than or equal to 50 seconds.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall ensure that this time constant is adjusted to this value.
- Value specified applies when "as measured" Trip Setpoint is greater than the specified Trip Setpoint.
- Value specified applies when "as measured" Trip Setpoint is less than the specified Trip Setpoint.
SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 3-29 Amendment No.60
TABLE 3.3-5 (This table number is not used) i SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/4 3-30 Amendment No. 60 1
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1NSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4 3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGIfd aLU SAFETY FEATURES ACIVATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) the containment recirculation sumps must occur before the RWST empties to prevent damage to the ECCS pumps and a loss of core cooling capability.
For similar reasons, switchover must not occur before there is sufficient water in the containent sump to provide sufficient net positive suction head (NPSH) to 1
i support ECCS pamp operation.
Furthermore, early switchover must not occur to ensure that sufficient borated water is injected from the RWST.
This ensures the reactor remains shut down in the recirculation mode.
To satisfy these requirements the RWST Level low-Low Allowable Value/ Trip Setpoint has both i
upper and lower limits.
The lower limit ensures switchover occurs before the RWST empties to prevent ECCS pump damage while the upper limit ensures the reactor remains shut down and that there is adequate water inventory in the j
containment recirculation sumps to provide ECCS pump suction.
The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant parameters and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded.
If they are the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents, events, and transients. Once the required logic combination is completed the system sends actuation signals to those Engineered Safety Features components whose aggregate function best j
j serves the requirements of the condition. As an example, the following actions may be initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss-of-coolant accident:
(1) Safety 4
SEABROOK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3 2A Amendment No. 34, 60 1