ML20203J308

Amend 227 to License DPR-65,allowing Licensee to Prevent Automatic Start of Any High Pressure Safety Injection Pump When Shutdown Cooling Sys in Operation

ML20203J308
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	02/10/1999
From:	Bill Dean NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203J311	List: ML20203J308 ML20203J319
References
NUDOCS 9902230357
Download: ML20203J308 (9)

Text

_ -. _. - - - _ -. _ _. -. -. -. _ _.. _ _. _, _ -. _ - - - -. _ _ _...

m_ _ _.._... _ _. -. _

.__.__,.--__m.,_.m.. _ _.

+

hR EE?O

'p t

UNITED STATES l

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1

E

..... lI WASHINGTON, D.C. 30006-0001 1

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY Tlic CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY THE WESTERN MASGACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-338 i

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 227 License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated October 22,1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accorrlance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9902230357990kgo pDR ADOCK 050 354 PDR

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attach ient to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. JPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 227, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

~

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days ofissuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION William M. Dean, Director Project Directorate 1-2 Division of Rea:: tor Projects - 1/il Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

4 i

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

February 10, 1999 l

1

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 227 EACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 DOCKET NO. 50-336 Replace *' a following pages of the Appendix A,lechnical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain verticaliines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert 3/4 3-12 3/4 3-12 3/4 3-16 3/4 3-16 3/4 4-21b 3/4 4-21b 3/4 5-7 3/4 5-7 8 3/4 4-7b 8 3/4 4-7b B 3/4 5-2a B 3/4 5-2a l

1 4

i

..__-.~.._

I gz-TABLE 3.3-3 B

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION a

m MINIMUM g

TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS

~ APPLICABLE q

FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION 1.

SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)(d) l a.

Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 1,2,3,4 1

b.

Containment Pressure -

High 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 2

c.

Pressurizer Pressure -

l Low 4

2 3

1,2(e),3(a) 2

~

E 2.

CONTAINNENT SPRAY (CSAS)

[

a.

Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 1,2,3,4 1

b b.

Containment Pressure--

High - High 4

2(h) 3

1. 2, 3 2

3.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) a.

Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 1,2,3,4 1

b.

Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 1,2,3,4 1

[

c.

Containment Pressure -

High 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 2

I

=

d.

Pressurizer Pressure -

(

Low 4

2 3

1,2(e),3(a) 2 S

F

\\

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION (a) Trip function may be bypassed when pressurizer pressure is < 1850 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is 11850 psia.

(b) An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.

(c) Trip function may be bypassed when ste m generator pressure is < 700 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when steam generator pressure is 1 700 psia.

l (d)

In MODE 4 the HPSI pumps are not required to start automatically on a SIAS.

(e) Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 2 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a.

The inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition within I hour. The inoperable channel shall either be restored to OPERABLE status, or placed in the tripped condition, within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

b.

Within I hour, all functional units receiving an input i

from the inoperable channel are also declared inoperable, and the appropriate actions are taken for the affected functional units.

c.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be removed from service f.r up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, provided one of the inoperable channels is placed in the tripped condition.

u MILLSTONE - UptT 2 3/43-16 Amendment No. JJP, 177. J7J.

o+4s 777, 177, 227

L l

l REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT l

4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a.

Performance of a

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation. channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at Least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE.

t b.

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation t

channel at least once per 18 months.

i c.

Wrifying the PORV block valve is open at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

d.

Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.9.3.2 Verify no more than the maximum allowed number of charging pumps are capable of injecting into the RCS at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

This is accomplished for each charging pump prevented from injecting into the RCS by l

verifying the motor circuit breaker is in the open position.

l 4.4.9.3.3 Verify no more than the maximum allowed number of HPSI pumps are l

capable of injecting into the RCS at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

This is l

accomplished for each HPSI pump prevented from injecting into the RCS by:

a.

Racking down the motor circuit breaker from the power supply circuit; or b.

Shutting and tagging the discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel (2-SI-654 or 2-S1-656); or c.

Placing the pump control switch in the pull-to-lock position and removing the breaker control power fuses; or d.

Placing the pump control switch in the pull-to-lock position and shutting the discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel (2-SI-654 or 2-51-656).

4.0 9.3.4 Verify the required RCS vent is open at least once per ?! days when the vent pathway is provided by. vent valve (s) that is(are) locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, otherwise, verify the vent pathway at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

i i

i i

1 l

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-21b Amendment No. pp, Jpf, Jpp, JJp, 227 essa i

t

_._ m ENERGENCY C0RE C0OLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T

< 300*F LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 One ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

a.

One OPERABLE **** high-pressure safety injection pump **, and l

b.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refuel-ing water storage tank on a safety injection actuation signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a sump recirculation actuation signal.***

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.

b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

Withpressurizefpressure< 1750 psia.

The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4 for the high pressure safety injection pump that is inoperable pursuant to Specification 3.4.9.3 provided the high pressure safety injection pump is restored to OPERABLE status within I hour after entering MODE 4.

L l

In MODE 4, the requirement for OPERABLE safety injectica and sus.p recirculation actuation signals is satisfied by use of the safety injection and sump recirculation trip pushbuttons.

In MODE 4, the OPERABLE HPSI pump is not required to start automatically i

on a SIAS. Therefore, the pump control switch for this OPERABLE pump may i

be placed in the pull-to-lock position without affecting the OPERABILITY j-of this pump.

t j

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-7 Amendment No. JJ JJJ, 117,117,227 mas i

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES i

i l

input from the secondary system.

They also ensure sufficient steam volume l

exists in the pressurizer to accommodate the insurge.

No credit for PORY l

actuation was assumed in the LTOP analysis of the energy addition transient.

The restrictions apply only to the start of the first RCP. Once at least l

one RCP is running, equilibrium is achieved between the primary and secondary temperatures, eliminating any significant energy addition associated with the l

start of the second RCP.

The LTOP restrictions are based on RCS cold leg temperature.

This temperature will be determined by using RCS cold leg temperature indication when RCPs are running, or natural circulation if it is occurring.

Otherwise, i

SDC return temperature indication will be used.

J Restrictions on RCS makeup pumping capacity are included in Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.

These restrictions are based on balancing the requirements for LTOP and shutdown risk.

For shutdown risk reduction, it is 1

desirable to have maximum rskeup capacity and to maintain the RCS full (not i

vented). However, for LTOP it is desirable to minimize makeup capacity and vent l

the RCS. To satisfy these competing requirements, makeup pumps can be made not capable of injecting, but available at short notice. A pump can be considered to be not capable of injecting into the RCS if the pump breaker is racked down under l

administrative control. Alternate methods include placing the pump control switch in pull-to lock with the discharge valve closed, placing the pump control i

l switch in pull-to-lock with the breaker control power fuses removed, or maintaining the associated discharge valve closed under administrative control.

These methods prevent inadvertent pump injections while allowing manual actions to rapidly restore the makeup capability if conditions require the use of additional charging or ;1 PSI pumps for makeup in the event of a loss of RCS inventory or reduction in shutdown margin.

If a loss of RCS inventory or reduction in shutdown margin event occurs, the appropriate response will be to correct the situation by starting RCS makeup pumps.

If the loss of inventory or shutdown margin is significant, this may necessitate the use of additional RCS makeup pumps that are being maintained not capable of injecting into the RCS in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.

The use of these additional pumps to restore RCS inventory or shutdown i

margin will require entry into the associated action statement. The action l

statement requires immediate action to comply with the specification. The restoration of RCS inventory or shutdown margin can be considered to be part of i

the immediate action to restore the additional RCS makeup pumps to a not capable of injecticg status. While recovering RCS inventory or shutdown margin, RCS pressure will be maintained below the Appendix G limits. After RCS inventory or shutdown margin has been restored, the additional pumps should be immediately made not capable of injecting and the action statement exited.

1 4

4 2

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 4-7b Amendment No. 7/J. 227 0424

'i

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES The purpose of the ECCS throttle valve surveillance requirements is to provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:

(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

Verification of the correct position for the mechanical and/or electrical valve stops can be performed by either of the following methods:

1.

Visually verify the valve opens to the designated throttled position; or l 2.

Manually position the valve to the designated throttled position and verify that the valve does not move when the applicable valve control switch is placed to "0 PEN."

l In MODE 4 the automatic safety injection signal generated by low pressurizer pressure and high containment pressure and the automatic sump recirculation actuation signal generation by low refueling water storage tank level are not required to be CPERABLE.

Automatic actuation in MODE 4 is not required because adequate time is available for plant operators to evaluate plant conditions and respond by manually operating engineered safety features components.

Since the manual actuation (trip pushbuttons) portion of the safety injection and sump recirculation actuation signal generation is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4, the plant operators can use the manual trip pushbuttons to rapidly position all components to the required accident position.

Therefore, the safety injection and sump recirculation actuation trip pushbuttons satisfy the requirement for generation of safety injection j

and sump recirculation actuation signals in MODE 4.

In MODE 4, the OPERABLE HPSI pump is not required to start automatically on a i

SIAS. Therefore, the pump control switch for this OPERABLE pump may be placed in the pull-to-lock position without affecting the OPERABILITY of the pump.

This will prevent the pump from starting automatically, which could result in overpressurization of the Shutdown Cooling System.

Only one HPSI pump may be i

OPERABLE in MODE 4 with RCS temperatures less than or equal to 275'F due to the restricted relief capacity with Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection System. To reduce shutdown risk by having additional pumping capacity readily i

available, a HPSI pump may be made inoperable but available at short notice by shutting its discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel.

TLe provision in Specification 3.5.3 that Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4 is provided to allow for connecting the HPSI pump breaker to the respective power supply or to remove the tag and open the discharge valve, and perform the subsequent testing necessary to declare j

the inoperable HPSI pump OPERABLE.

Specification 3.4.9.3 requires all HPSI pumps to be not capable of injecting into the RCS when RCS temperature is at i

or below 190*F.

Once RCS temperature is above 190*F one HPSI pump can be capable of injecting into the RCS.

However, sufficient time may not be l

available to ensure one HPSI pump is OPERABLE prior to entering MODE 4 as required by Specification 3.5.3.

Since Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 i

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2a Amendment No. (), J7p, 177, 117, l

esas 119, 119, 119 227 1

-.