ML20203E097
| ML20203E097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1986 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203E094 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-60287, TAC-60288, NUDOCS 8604240102 | |
| Download: ML20203E097 (3) | |
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o UNITED STATES g
8 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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a wAsmNGTON, D. C. 20655
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 62 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 AND AMENDMENT NO. 53 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364 1
INTRODUCTION By letter dated November 22, 1985, the licensee proposed a change to the Joseph M. Farley Technical Specifications to remove an ambiguity regarding a turbine trip surveillance which is a Channel Functional Test done prior to each reactor startup, if not performed in the previous 7 days. The channels involved are those initiated by a turbine trip.
If a turbine trip occurs, a signal on 2 of 3 of the Low Auto Stop 011 Pressure channels, or a signal on 4 of 4 of the Turbine Throttle Valve Closure channels, initiates a reactor trip; provided that the P-9 setpoint has been reached or exceeded (approxi-mately 50% thermal power or greater). The test would assure that no inadvertent (incorrect) signals remain on the channels that could cause a reactor trip when no condition exists that should cause a reactor trip. A change is proposed to allow the surveillance to be performed prior to latch-ing the turbine.
EVALUATION The licensee requests a change to Table Notation (9) of Functional Unit 17 of Technical Specification 4.3.1.1, Table 4.3-1.
The existing Table 4.3-1 Notation (9) states:
Channel FUNCTIONAL TEST will consist of verifying that each channel indicates a turbine trip prior to latching the turbine and indicates no turbine trip after latching the turbine.
The licensee desires to replace the last four words "after latching the l
turbine" with the words " prior to P-9 "
l The licensee's justification is that a turbine trip does not initiate a i
reactor trip until after P-9.
Thus, a spurious trip signal on one channel, j
or even on all channels, prior to P-9 would not trip the reactor.
I Based on our review of licensee's proposed Technical Specifications and the Final Safety Analysis Report, as well as the licensee's justifications for revision of Table Notation (9), we agree with the licensee's statements justifying the proposed change in the Technical Specification.
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This clarification and change of the Technical Specification is acceptable because incorrect channel trip signals prior to P-9 would not result in a i
j reactor trip. This fact alone is sufficient from a safety standp,., int.
Further, it is noted that even after P-9, an incorrect trip due to spurious i
trip sionals on the channels involved is very unlikely. With retard to the Turbine Throttle Valve Closure channels, an incorrect turbine trip would require an incorrect signal on each of the four out of four channels.
Similarly, an incorrect trip because of incorrect signals on the Low Auto i
Stop Oil Pressure channels would require incorrect trip signals on two out of three of the channels.
SAFETY StHMARY AND CONCLUSION The Technical Specification change proposed by the licensee is to clarify that
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the surveillance testing to check that there are no incorrect reactor trio l
signals on the Turbine Throttle Stop Valve channels and on the Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure channels need not be performed immediately after latching the t
l turbine provided the tests are conducted prior to P-9 (approximately 50%
j thermal power). The proposed change has negligible safety significance because of the 0-9 interlock which prevents a reactor trip prior to P-9.
3 Essentially the change is administrative in nature and corrects an uninten-tional error made when the Table 4.3-1 notations were developed. Thus, we i
conclude that the proposed Technical Specification change is acceptable.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION These amendments irvolve a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in l') CFR Part 20.
The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that i
may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously j
published a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.
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Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 951.22(c)(9). These amendments also involve changes in recordkeeping, reporting or administrative procedures or require-ments. Accordingly, with respect to these items, the amendments meet the 4
eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 651.22(c)(10).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 651.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public
N will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendnents will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
i Dated: April 15, 1986 Principal Contributor:
A. Toalston j
E. A. Reeves 3
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